/2022 INSC 0241/
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPEME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.7937 of 2011
JAI BHAVANI SHIKSHAN PRASARAK MANDAL      … APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
RAMESH & ORS.     …RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
V. Ramasubramanian, J.
1. The   removal   from   service   of   respondent   No.1   herein   from   the
post of Principal of the Institute of Pharmacy, having been set aside
by   the   School   Tribunal,   Aurangabad   and   the   same   having   been
confirmed   by   the   learned   Single   Judge   and   the   Division   Bench   of
the   High   Court,   the   Educational   Society   running   the   Institute   of
Pharmacy has come up with the above appeal.
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2. We   have   heard   the   learned   counsel   appearing   for   the   first
respondent and the learned counsel for the State of Maharashtra.
3. The   appellant   is   an   Educational   Society   registered   under   the
Bombay Public Trusts Act. It is running an institute of Pharmacy at
Gadhi   Georai   Dist.,   Beed.   In   the   year   1991,   the   first   respondent
herein   was   appointed   as   the   Principal   of   the   said   Institute.   In   the
year   2004   disciplinary   proceedings   were   initiated   against   him   on
certain   allegations   of   serious   nature.   The   Departmental   Inquiry
Committee held an inquiry in which the first respondent was given
all   opportunities   of   fair   hearing,   including   permission   to   be
represented   by   a   lawyer.   After   the   completion   of   the   inquiry,   the
Inquiry Committee submitted a report on 31.07.2004 holding 7 out
of   10   charges   proved.   Therefore,   after   issuing   a   show   cause   notice
enclosing a copy of the Inquiry Report, the Management passed an
order   dated   19.08.2004   imposing   upon   the   first   respondent,   the
penalty of removal from service.
4. The  first respondent  challenged the  penalty  before the  School
Tribunal   by   way   of   an   appeal   under   Section   9   of   the   Maharashtra
Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Regulation Act,
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1977   ( hereinafter   referred   to   as   the   ‘Act’ ).   The   School   Tribunal
framed   five   issues   as   arising   for   consideration   namely:   (i)   Whether
the   Inquiry   Committee   constituted   by   the   Management   to   conduct
further   inquiry   against   the   employee   was   proper,   legal   and
permissible   by   law?   (ii)   Whether   the   Management   did   not   pay
subsistence   allowance   and   whether   non­payment   of   subsistence
allowance   vitiated   the   inquiry?;   (iii)   Whether   the   inquiry   was
vitiated on account of the fact that the Management conducted the
inquiry   by   engaging   a   lawyer?;   (iv)   Whether   the   Management
conducted the inquiry by following  Rule 37 of MEPS Rules, 1981?;
and   (v)   Whether   the   impugned   dismissal   order   was   legal   and
sustainable   in   law.     Out   of   these   five   issues,   the   Tribunal   found
only   the   issue   relating   to   the   constitution   and   composition   of   the
Inquiry   Committee   to   be   not   in   accordance   with   the   Rules.
Therefore, the said appeal was allowed by the Tribunal by an order
dated 22.06.2006, primarily on the ground that the constitution of
the Inquiry Committee was not in accordance with Rule 36(2)(b) of
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the   Maharashtra   Employees   of   Private   Schools   (Conditions   of
Service) Rules, 1981 ( hereinafter referred to as the “MEPS Rules ”).  
5. The appellant­Management filed a writ petition in WP No.5387
of   2006   on   the   file   of   the   High   Court   of   Judicature   at   Bombay,
Aurangabad   Bench.   A   learned   Judge   of   the   High   Court   dismissed
the writ petition, affirming the view taken by the School Tribunal.  
6. The intra­court appeal filed by the appellant­Management was
dismissed   by   the   division   Bench,   by   placing   reliance   upon   the
decision   of   the   Full   Bench   of   the   High   Court   in   National
Education   Society,   Nagpur   and   another   vs.   Mahendra,   s/o
Baburao   Jamkar   and   another 1
.    Aggrieved  by  the   said  order  the
Management is on appeal before us.
7. Since   the   entire   dispute   revolves   around   the   constitution   of
the   Departmental   Inquiry   Committee   with   reference   to   Rule   36   of
the MEPS Rules, it is necessary first to look into Rule 36.
“ 36.   Inquiry   Committee .­   (1)   If   an   employee   is   allegedly
found   to   be   guilty   on   (any   of   the   grounds   specified   in   sub­
rule (5)   of Rule 28) and the Management decides to hold an
inquiry, it shall do so through a properly constituted Inquiry
Committee. Such a committee shall conduct an inquiry only
in  such  cases  where  major  penalties  are  to be  inflicted.  The
1   2007(3) Mh.L.J 707
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Chief   Executive   Officer   authorised   by   the   Management   in
this   behalf   (and   in   the   case   of   an   inquiry   against   the   Head
who   is  also   the   Chief   Executive   Officer,   the   President   of   the
Management)   shall   communicate   to   the   employee   or   the
head   concerned   by   Registered   Post   acknowledgement   due
the   allegations   and   demand   from   him   a   written   explanation
within seven days from the date of receipt of the statement of
allegations. 
(2)     If   the   Chief   Executive   Officer   or   the   President,   as
the case may be, finds that the explanation submitted by the
employee   or   the   Head   referred   to   in   sub­rule   (1)   is   not
satisfactory,  he  shall  place  it   before  the Management   within
fifteen   days   from   the   date   of   receipt   of   the   explanation.   The
Management shall in turn decide within fifteen days whether
an   inquiry   be   conducted   against   the   employee   and   if   it
decides   to   conduct   the   inquiry,   the   inquiry   shall   be
conducted   by   an   Inquiry   Committee   constituted   in   the
following manner, that is to say­
(a)  in the case of an employee­
(i) one member from amongst the members  of the
Management   to   be   nominated   by   the
Management,   or   by   the   President   of   the
Management   if   so   authorised   by   the
Management  whose   name   shall   be
communicated to Chief  Executive   Officer   within
15 days from the date of the  decision of  the
Management;
(ii) One   member   to   be   nominated   by   the  
employee   from   amongst   the   employees   of   any  
private school;
(iii) one   member   chosen   by   the   Chief   Executive  
Officer from the panel of teachers on   whom  
state/National Award has been conferred;
(b) in the case of the Head referred to in sub­rule (1)­
(i) one member who shall be the President of 
the  Management;
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(ii) one member to be nominated by the Head
from  amongst   the   employees   of   any
private school;
(iii) one member chosen by the President from
the  panel   of   Head   Masters   on   whom
State/National  Award   has   been
conferred.
(3) The Chief Executive Officer or, as the case may be, the
President   shall   communicate   the   names   of   members
nominated under sub­rule  (2)   by   Registered   Post
acknowledgement   due   to   the   employee   or   the   Head   referred
to in sub­ rule   (1),   as   the   case   may   be,   directing   him   to
nominate   a   person   on   his   behalf   on   the   proposed   Inquiry
Committee   and   to   forward   the   name   alongwith   the   written
consent of the person so nominated to the Chief Executive or
to   the   President,   as   the   case   may   be,   within   fifteen   days   of
the receipt of the communication to that effect.
(4) If   the   employee   or   the   Head,   as   the   case   may   be,
communicates the name of the person nominated by him the
Inquiry   Committee   of   three   members   shall   be   deemed   to
have been  constituted   on   the   date   of   receipt   of   such
communication   by   the   Chief   Executive   Officer   or   the
President, as the case may be. If the employee or such head
fails   to   communicate   the   name   of   his   nominee   within   the
stipulated  period,   the   Inquiry   Committee   shall   be   deemed
to   have   been   constituted   on   expiry   of   the   stipulated   period
consisting of only two members as provided in sub­rule (2).
(5) The   Convener   of   the   respective   Inquiry   Committee
shall be the nominee of the President, or as the case may be,
the   President   who   shall   initiate   action   pertaining   to   the
conduct of the Inquiry Committee and shall maintain all the
relevant record of the Inquiry.
(6) The meetings of the Inquiry Committee shall be held in
the   School   premises   during   normal   school   hours   or
immediately thereafter, if the  employee   agrees   and   even
during vacation.”
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8. Two   expressions   namely   “ Head ”   and   “ Chief   Executive   Officer ”
used   in   sub­rule   (1)   of   Rule   36   provide   the   fulcrum   of   the
controversy   on   hand.   The   expression   “ Head ”   is   not   defined   in   the
Rules.   However,   the   expression   “ Chief   Executive   Officer ”   is   defined
in Rule 2(1)(c) as follows:­
“Chief   Executive   Officer”   means   the   Secretary,   Trustee,
Correspondent   or   a   person   by   whatever   name   called   who   is
empowered   to   execute   the   decisions   taken   by   the
Management.”
9. The word “ Head ” is defined in Section 2(9) of the Maharashtra
Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Regulation Act,
1977 as follows:­
“Head of a school” or “Head” means the person, by whatever
name   called   in   charge   of   the   academic   and   administrative
duties   and   functions   of   a   school   conducted   by   any
Management   and   recognised   or   deemed   to   be   recognised
under   this   Act,   and   includes   a   principal,   vice   principal,
head­master,   head­mistress,   assistant   head­master,
assistant head­mistress or superintendent thereof”
10. Sub­rule   (2)   of   Rule   36   provides   for   the   composition   of   the
Inquiry   Committee   in   a   particular   manner   in   the   case   of   “ an
employee ”   and   it   provides   for   the   composition   of   the   Inquiry
Committee in a different manner in the case of “ the Head ”. In other
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words,   the   Inquiry   Committee   can   comprise   of   (i)   one   member
amongst   the   members   of   the   Management,   nominated   by   the
management   or   the   President;   (ii)   one   member   nominated   by   the
employee   from   amongst   the   employees;   and   (iii)   one   member
chosen by the Chief Executive Officer from the panel of teachers, if
the   inquiry   is   against   “an   employee”.   But   if   the   inquiry   is   against
the   Head,   the   Inquiry   Committee   should   comprise   of:   (i)   the
President   of   the  Management;   (ii)   one   member   to   be  nominated  by
the   Head   from   amongst   the   employees   of   any   private   schools;   and
(iii)   one   member   chosen   by   the   President   from   the   panel   of   Head
Masters.
11. In   the   case   on   hand,   there   is   and   there   can   be   no   dispute
about   the   fact   that   the   first   respondent   was   the   Head   within   the
meaning of the expression in terms of Section 2(9) of the Act, as he
was   the   Principal   of   the   Institute.   But   admittedly   the   first
respondent was not the Secretary, Trustee or Correspondent of the
Institute,   to   fall   within   the   definition   of   the   expression   “ Chief
Executive Officer ” under Rule 2(1)(c) of the Rules.
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12. The   main   contention   of   the   first   respondent   which   was
accepted   by   the   School   Tribunal   and   the   High   Court   was   that   by
virtue   of   Rule   36(2)(b)   of   the   Rules,   the   President   of   the
Management   should   have   been   one   of   the   members   of   the   Inquiry
Committee. There is no dispute about the fact that the President of
the  appellant­Society  was not a member  of the Inquiry  Committee.
But this fact provides only one part of the story.
13. The   other   part   of   the   story   is   that   the   Departmental   Inquiry
Committee   as   originally   constituted,   had   the   President   of   the
appellant­Society as a Member. But the case of the management is
that   by   a   letter   dated   13.06.2004,   the   President   requested   the
appellant­Society   to   relieve   him   due   to   ill   health.   Therefore,   by   a
letter dated 14.06.2004 one of the Vice­Presidents was requested to
be part of the Inquiry Committee. But the said Vice­ President also
recused   due   to   family   problems.   Therefore,   by   a   letter   dated
16.06.2004 another Vice­President was nominated to be part of the
Inquiry   Committee.   The   said   Vice­President   also   opted   out.
Therefore,   by   a   Resolution   dated   22.06.2004,   the   Management
decided   to   confer   all   the   powers   of   the   President   to   one   Shri
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Amarsingh   Shivaji   Rao   Pandit.   The   said   resolution   reads   as
follows:­
“Resolution   no.   4:­   The   President   Mr.   Shivajirao   Ankushrao
Pandit   is   the   president   and   inviter   of   the   Departmental
Enquiry   Committee   for   inquiry   of   Mr.   Kalkotwar   R.   S.
(Suspended   Principal).   Therefore,   he   is   president   of   the
enquiry   committee   for   Departmental   enquiry   of   Mr.
Kalkotwar,   but   Mr.   Shivajirao   Ankushrao   Pandit   by   his
application   due   to   ill   health   and   as   per   advice   of   doctors
have intimation to take rest. His application and documents
annexed   thereto   have   been   considered   and   his   excuse
appears   reasonable.   Therefore,   all   the   powers   of   the
president   of   Jaibhawani   Shikshan   Prasarak   regarding   the
work   to   conduct   the   Enquiry   id   hereby   given   to   Mr.
Amarsingh Shivajirao Pandit. Therefore, it was unanimously
decided   by   all   that,   henceforth,   Mr.   Amarsingh   Shivajirao
Pandit   will   see   the   work   as   president   and   inviter   of   the
departmental   enquiry   committee   conducting   inquiry   of   Mr.
Kalkotwar R.S.”
14. But   the   School   Tribunal   held   that   the   aforesaid   Resolution
dated   22.06.2004   surfaced   only   after   the   conclusion   of   the
arguments   in   the   appeal   and   that,   therefore,   it   could   have   been
prepared as an afterthought. The learned Single Judge of the High
Court   refused   to   interfere   with   this   finding   of   fact,   on   the   ground
that   the   supervisory   jurisdiction   of   the   High   Court   was   limited
under Article 227 of the Constitution.
15. But the School  Tribunal  as well as the High Court omitted to
take note of the very pleadings of the first respondent in his appeal
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before the Tribunal. In paragraph 7 of the Memorandum of Appeal
submitted   by   the   first   respondent   before   the   School   Tribunal,   he
admitted   that   the   charge­sheet   was   signed   by   Shri   Shivaji   Rao
Pandit,   the   President   of   the   Society.   In   paragraph   9   of   the
Memorandum of Appeal, the respondent No.1 also admitted that by
a   letter   dated   26.06.2004   he   was   informed   about   the   ill   health   of
the President of the Society and the appointment of Shri Amarsingh
Shivaji   Rao   Pandit   in   his   place.   Paragraphs   9   and   10   of   the
Memorandum of Appeal filed by  the first respondent herein, before
the School Tribunal reads as follows:­
“The   appellant   states   that   when   the   inquiry   was   under
progress, the  Administrative  officer  of  the  Respondent  No.  1
Society,   vide   his   letter   dated   26.6.2004,   informed   the
appellant   that   since   the   President   of   the   Society   was  ill,   his
representative   Shri.   Amarsing   Shivajirao   Pandit,   who   is   the
Member   of   the   Respondent   No.   1   Society,   shall   be   the
Convenor   of   the   Inquiry   Committee.   A   copy   of   this   letter
dated   26.6.2004   issued   by   the   Administrative   officer   of   the
Respondent No.1 Society is annexed herewith and marked as
EXHIBIT “G”. 
The   appellant   further   states   that   vide   letter   dated
30.6.2004,  the Administrative  Officer   of  the  Respondent  No.
1 Society has issued a Corrigendum whereby it was informed
that Shri Amarsinh Pandit would act as the Convenor of the
Inquiry   Committee   and   the   President   during   the   course   of
the   Inquiry.   A   copy   of   the   said   Corrigendum   dated
30.6.2004,   issued   by   the   Administrative   Officer   of   the
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Respondent   No.   1   is   annexed   herewith   and   marked   as
EXHIBIT “H”.”
16. Unfortunately   the   School   Tribunal   as   well   as   the   High   Court
failed to take note of the very pleadings of the first respondent with
regard   to   the   circumstances   in   which   the   President   of   the   Society
could not continue as part of the Inquiry Committee. Therefore, the
order of the School Tribunal was vitiated by perversity.
17. In any case, Rule 36(2)(a) begins with the words “ in the case of
an employee ”. Rule 36(2)(b) begins with the words “ in the case of the
Head referred to in sub­rule (1) ”.
18. The   interpretation   given   by  the   School   Tribunal   and   the   High
Court   to   the   aforesaid   Rule   would   have   been   acceptable,   if   Rule
36(2)(b)   had   began   only   with   the   words   “ in   the   case   of   the   Head ”.
But it begins with the words “ in the case of the Head referred to in
sub­rule (1) ”.
19. Sub­rule (1) refers to the Head who is also the Chief Executive
Officer.   Therefore,   clause   (b)   of   sub­rule   (2)   of   Rule   36   should   be
construed  to   apply  only  to   a  person  who  is  the  “ Head ”  and  who  is
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also   the   “ Chief   Executive   Officer ”.   Otherwise   the   words   “ referred   in
sub­rule (1) ” appearing in clause (b) would become redundant.
20. The   Division   Bench   of   the   High   Court   relied   upon   the   full
Bench   decision   of   the   High   Court   in   National   Education   Society
(supra),   to   come   to   the   conclusion   that   irrespective   of   whether   the
Head of the Institute is also the Chief Executive Officer or not, Rule
36(2)(b)   mandates   the   President   to   be   a   member   of   the   Inquiry
Committee. A perusal of the Judgment of the Full Bench of the High
Court   of   Bombay   in   National   Education   Society   (supra)   shows
that   the   full   Bench   framed   two   questions   for   its   consideration.
Question No.2 framed by the Full Bench reads as follows:­
“Whether   the   President   of   the   management   has   to   be   a
member of the Enquiry Committee as specified in Rule 36(2)
(b)(i)   for   holding   disciplinary   enquiry   against   the   Head,
whether   or   not   he   is   the   Chief   Executive   Officer   within   the
meaning of Rule 2(c) of the Rules of 1981.”
21. The above question was taken up for consideration by the full
Bench in Paragraph 17 of its decision. In paragraphs 18 and 19, the
full Bench held as under:­
“18.   Rule   36(1)(a)   of   the   Rules   provides   for   constitution   of
Inquiry   Committee   in   respect   of   an   employee   while   Rule
36(2)(b)   provides   for   constitution   of   Inquiry   Committee   for
the Head. We have already quoted the definition of “Head” in
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terms of Section 2(9) of the Act. If it is held that there is no
requirement   for   the   President   of   the   management   to   be   a
member of the Inquiry Committee in case of the Head who is
not   the   Chief   Executive   Officer,   providing   separate   Inquiry
Committee for the Head in Rule 36(2)(b) would be nugatory.
In case such an interpretation is accepted Head of the school
would be  an  employee  for   the  purposes  of  Rule  36(2)(a) and
there   was   no   need   to   have   separate   constitution   of   Inquiry
Committee in terms of Section 36(2)(b). It is well settled that
the   Legislature   does   not   use   any   word   unnecessarily.   It
would  be   appropriate  to  quote   paragraph  9  of   the  judgment
of the Apex Court in Utkal Contractors & Joinery Pvt. Ltd. v.
State   of   Orissa   reported   in   MANU/SC/0077/1987   :
[1987]3SCR317.   In   para   9,   the   Apex   Court   observed   as
under:
…Just   as   Parliament   is   not   expected   to
use unnecessary expressions, Parliament is also
not   expected   to   express   itself   unnecessarily.
Even   as   Parliament   does   not   use   any   word
without   meaning   something,   Parliament   does
not   legislate   where   no   legislation   is   called   for.
Parliament   cannot   be   assumed   to   legislate   for
the sake of legislation; nor can it be assumed to
make   pointless   legislation.   Parliament   does   not
indulge   in   legislation   merely   to   state   what   it   is
unnecessary   to   state   or   to   do   what   is   already
validly done. Parliament may not be assumed to
legislate unnecessarily….
19. We, therefore, hold that in case of Head whether or not
he   is   empowered   to   act   as   Chief   Executive   Officer,   the
President   of   the   management   shall   be   a   member   of   the
Inquiry Committee as contemplated by Rule 36(2)(b)(i) of the
Rules of 1981.”
22. As   could   be   seen  from   the   portion   of   the   Judgment  extracted
above, the full Bench was unduly carried away by the fact that the
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Head of an Institution will become equated to an employee, if it was
held that the President of the Society need not be a member of the
Inquiry Committee. But what the Full Bench omitted to take note of
was   that   the   Chief   Executive   Officer   of   a   Society,   such   as   the
President,   Secretary   or   Treasurer   cannot   be   an   employee   of   the
Institution   run   by   the   Society   and   that   a   Chief   Executive   Officer
such   as   the   President   or   Secretary   is   liable   to   get   elected   and   not
entitled   to   remuneration.   On   the   other   hand,   the   Head   of   the
Institution   is   essentially   an   employee   who   is   entitled   to
remuneration,   seniority,   promotion,   continuance   in   service   till   the
age   of   superannuation   etc.,   and   who   is   subject   to   the   disciplinary
control of the Management. In fact the President or Secretary of the
Society cannot be removed under the MEPS Rules. But the Head of
the   Institution   can   be   removed   only   in   terms   of   the   Rules.
Therefore,   the   interpretation   given   by   the   Full   Bench   of   the   High
Court   of   Bombay   in   National   Education   Society   (supra),   under
Rule 36(2)(b) may not be correct.
23. In   any   case,  the   High   Court,  in   the   impugned  order,   failed   to
take   the   note   of   doctrine   of   necessity.   Once   it   is   admitted,   (i)   that
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the disciplinary proceedings commenced with an Inquiry Committee
of which the President was a member; and  (ii ) that subsequently he
was replaced by someone due to ill health, the doctrine of necessity
would come into play. Hence the impugned orders of the High Court
and the School Tribunal are liable to be reversed. Since the School
Tribunal   rejected   all   other   contentions   of   respondent   No.1,   but
upheld   only   the   contention   revolving   around   Rule   36(2)(b),   the
penalty  of  removal  from   service  imposed upon  the  first  respondent
is   liable   to   be   upheld.   However,   if   by   virtue   of   any   interim   order
passed   by   any   forum,   the   respondent   No.1   has   been   granted   any
monetary   benefit,   the   same   shall   not   be   recovered   from   him.   The
appeal is accordingly allowed on the above terms and there shall be
no order as to costs.  
……………………………….J.
(HEMANT GUPTA)
………………………………..J.
(V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN)
New Delhi
March 29, 2022
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