/2022 INSC 0242/
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1927 OF 2022
Delhi Development Authority           ..Appellant (S)
Versus
Rajan Sood & Ors.                              ..Respondent (S)
With 
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1928 OF 2022
J U D G M E N T 
M. R. Shah, J.
1. Feeling   aggrieved   and   dissatisfied   with   the   impugned
judgment and order dated 30.08.2016 passed by the High
Court   of   Delhi   at   New   Delhi   in   Writ   Petition   (C)   No.
1034/2015, by which the High Court has allowed the said
writ petition preferred by the private respondents herein –
original   writ   petitioners   and   has   declared   that   the
acquisition   proceedings   initiated   under   the   Land
Acquisition   Act,   1894   (hereinafter   referred   to   as   the   Act,
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1894)   in   respect   of   the   subject   lands   are   deemed   to   have
lapsed   under   sub­section   (2)   of   section   24   of   the   Right   to
Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition,
Rehabilitation   and   Resettlement   Act,   2013   (hereinafter
referred to as the Act, 2013), Delhi Development Authority
(DDA) and Government of NCT of Delhi have preferred the
present appeals.
  
2. Private   respondent   No.1   and   2   herein   ­   original   writ
petitioners filed the writ petition before the High Court for
a   declaration   that   the   acquisition   proceedings   initiated
under   the   Act,   1894   in   respect   of   the   subject   lands   are
deemed to have lapsed under sub­section (2) of section 24
of  the   Act,  2013.  It   was   the   case   on  behalf  of  the   original
writ   petitioners   before   the   High   Court   that   as   the
possession   of   the   land   in   question   is   with   them   and   no
compensation   has   been   paid,   the   land   acquisition
proceedings   are   deemed   to   have   lapsed.   Heavy   reliance
was   placed   on   the   decision   of   this   Court   in   the   case   of
Pune   Municipal   Corporation   and   Anr.   Vs.   Harakchand
Misirimal Solanki and Ors, (2014) 3 SCC 183 .       
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2.1 The   petition   was   opposed   by   the   appellants   herein   and
others.   It   was  the   specific  case  on   behalf   of   the  DDA   that
as   such   the   compensation   was   tendered   to   one   Shiv
Kumar S/o Devi Chand. Relying upon the decision of this
Court in the case of  Pune Municipal Corporation  (supra),
the High Court, by the impugned judgment and order has
allowed   the   said   writ   petition   and   has   declared   that   the
acquisition   proceedings   initiated   under   the   Act,   1894   in
respect   of   the   subject   lands   are   deemed   to   have   lapsed
under sub­section (2) of section 24 of the Act, 2013.
2.2 Feeling   aggrieved   and   dissatisfied   with   the   impugned
judgment   and   order   passed   by   the   High   Court,   DDA   and
Government   of   NCT   of   Delhi   have   preferred   the   present
appeals.
3. Learned   counsel   appearing   on   behalf   of   the   DDA   has
vehemently submitted that in the facts and circumstances
of   the   case   the   High   Court   has   materially   erred   in
declaring   that   the   acquisition   proceedings   have   lapsed
under sub­section (2) of section 24 of the Act, 2013. 
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3.1 It   is   submitted   on   behalf   of   the   DDA   that   in   the   present
case as such the possession was already taken over by the
Authority on 23.09.1986 after following the due procedure
as   required   and   even   a   punchnama   was   also   drawn,
which was the requirement while taking over possession. 
3.2 It   is   urged   that   even   the   compensation   was   tendered   to
the   recorded   owner   ­   Shri   Shiv   Kumar   through   notice
under   section   12(2)   of   the   Act,   1894   but   recorded   owner
never   came   forward   to   accept   the   same.   It   is   submitted
that   therefore,   the   original   writ   petitioners   cannot   be
permitted   to   take   the   benefit   under   sub­section   (2)   of
section 24 of the Act, 2013.
3.3 It   is   further   submitted   that   even   the   amount   of
compensation of Rs.2.00 crores was deposited by the DDA
with   the   Land   and   Building   Department   towards
compensation.   Therefore,   the   original   writ   petitioners   are
not entitled to the benefit of deemed lapse.
3.4 It   is   further   contended   by   learned   counsel   appearing   on
behalf   of   the   DDA   and   the   Government   of   NCT   of   Delhi
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that as such the original writ petitioners were not having
any   locus   to   file   the   writ   petition   as   their   title   to   the
property   is   shrouded   with   fraud   and   investigation   is
pending with the Anti­Corruption Branch. It is submitted
that as the possession of the land in question was already
taken   over   as   far   as   back   on   23.09.1986   and   even
compensation   of   Rs.2.00   crores   was   deposited   with   the
Land and Building Department, in view of the subsequent
decision   in   the   case   of   Indore   Development   Authority
Vs. Manoharlal and Ors., (2020) 8 SCC 129 , it cannot be
said   the   acquisition   proceedings   have   lapsed   under   sub­
section (2) of section 24 of the Act, 2013. 
3.5 It   is   further   submitted   on   behalf   of   the   appellants   that
while passing the impugned judgment and order, the High
Court has relied on the decision of this Court in the case
of   Pune   Municipal   Corporation   (supra).   That,   the   said
decision   has   been   subsequently   overruled   by   the
Constitution   bench   of   this   Court   in   the   case   of   Indore
Development Authority  (supra). 
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3.6 In   the   alternative,   it   is   submitted   by   the   learned   counsel
appearing   on   behalf   of   the   respective   appellants   that
assuming,   without   admitting   that   the   possession   of   the
land in question remain with the original writ petitioners,
in that case also, as there was an order of stay granted by
the High Court in the year 2011, in the writ petition filed
by the original writ petitioners and the High Court granted
the   interim   order   of   taking   no   coercive   action/order   qua
the land, therefore, in view of the decision of this Court in
the   case   of   Indore   Development   Authority   (supra),   the
period   under   which   the   stay   was   operative   is   to   be
excluded. Reliance is placed on para 366.8 of the decision
of   this   Court   in   the   case   of   Indore   Development
Authority  (supra). 
3.7 Making   the   above   submission   and   relying   upon   the
aforesaid   decision,   it   is   prayed   to   allow   the   present
appeals.        
4. Both these appeals are vehemently opposed by Ms. Pinky
Anand,   learned   Senior   Advocate   appearing   on   behalf   of
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the   original   writ   petitioners.  Counter   affidavits   have  been
filed on behalf of private respondent No.1 and 2 – original
writ petitioners opposing the present appeals.
4.1 It is vehemently submitted by Ms. Anand, learned Senior
Advocate   appearing   on   behalf   of   the   original   writ
petitioners   that   as   such   there   are   specific   findings
recorded   by   the   High   Court   that   the   original   writ
petitioners   continue   to   be   in   physical   possession   and
therefore,   as   neither   the   actual   possession   of   land   in
question was taken over nor any compensation was paid
and/or even tendered to the original writ petitioners. It is
rightly held that acquisition proceedings have lapsed.
4.2 It is urged that in fact in the earlier order passed by  the
High Court on 09.11.2011 in writ petition No.7714/2011,
the   Division   Bench   directed   the   authority   to   consider
their application under section 48 of the Act, 1894 and to
decide   it   on   merits.   That   as   per   section   48   of   the   Act,
1894   only   in   a   case   where   possession   of   the   land   is   not
taken   over   by   the   acquiring   authority,   then   only,   the
application   under   section   48   of   the   Act,   1894   would   be
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maintainable. It is submitted therefore, when the Division
Bench   directed   the   authority   to   consider   the   application
of   the   petitioners   under   section   48   of   the   Act,   1894   on
merits,   it   is   to   be   presumed   that   only   original   writ
petitioners continue to remain possession. It is contended
that   the   authority   might   have   taken   ex­parte   possession
on paper as alleged on 23.09.1986, however, the original
writ   petitioners   remained   in   possession   actually.   It   is
further   submitted   by   learned   Senior   Advocate   appearing
on behalf of the original writ petitioners that there is also
a   specific   finding   recorded   by   the   High   Court   that   the
authorities   have   failed   to   prove   that   any   amount   of
compensation   was   paid   and/or   tendered   to   the   original
writ petitioners or even deposited with the treasury. It is
submitted  that   when  the  original   writ   petitioners  remain
in   possession   and   neither   the   compensation   was
tendered   nor   it   was   paid,   the   twin   conditions   to   declare
the  acquisition  proceedings as having  lapsed under  sub­
section   (2)   of   section   24   of   the   Act,   2013   have   been
satisfied.   It   is   therefore   submitted   that   the   High   Court
has   not   committed   any   error   in   declaring   that   the
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acquisition   proceedings   in   respect   of   the   subject   lands
are   deemed   to   have   lapsed   under   sub­section   (2)   of
section 24 of the Act, 2013  
5. We have heard learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
respective parties at length.  
6. By the impugned judgment and order the High Court has
held and declared that the land acquisition proceedings in
respect of the land in question are deemed to have lapsed
under sub­section (2) of section 24 of the Act, 2013. While
holding   and   declaring   so   the   High   Court   has   relied   upon
decision   of   this   Court   in   the   case   of   Pune   Municipal
Corporation   (supra).   However,   the   said   decision   of   this
Court has been subsequently overruled by the decision of
this Court in the case of   Indore Development Authority
(supra). In paragraph 365 to 366, this Court in the case of
Indore Development Authority  (supra) has observed and
held as under: ­ 
“365.   Resultantly,   the   decision   rendered   in   Pune
Municipal   Corpn.   [ Pune   Municipal
Corpn.   v.   Harakchand   Misirimal   Solanki ,   (2014)   3   SCC
183 : (2014) 2 SCC (Civ) 274] is hereby overruled and
all   other   decisions   in   which   Pune   Municipal
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Corpn.   [ Pune Municipal Corpn.   v.   Harakchand Misirimal
Solanki ,   (2014)   3   SCC   183   :   (2014)   2   SCC   (Civ)   274]
has   been   followed,   are   also   overruled.   The   decision
in   Sree   Balaji   Nagar   Residential   Assn.   [ Sree   Balaji
Nagar   Residential   Assn.   v.   State   of   T.N. ,   (2015)   3   SCC
353   :   (2015)   2   SCC   (Civ)   298]   cannot   be   said   to   be
laying down good law, is overruled and other decisions
following   the   same   are   also   overruled.   In   Indore
Development   Authority   v.   Shailendra   [ Indore
Development Authority   v.   Shailendra , (2018) 3 SCC 412
:   (2018)   2   SCC   (Civ)   426]   ,   the   aspect   with   respect   to
the proviso to Section 24(2) and whether “or” has to be
read   as   “nor”   or   as   “and”   was   not   placed   for
consideration.   Therefore,   that   decision   too   cannot
prevail,   in   the   light   of   the   discussion   in   the   present
judgment.
366.   In   view   of   the   aforesaid   discussion,   we   answer
the questions as under:
366.1.   Under the provisions of Section 24(1)( a ) in case
the   award   is   not   made   as   on   1­1­2014,   the   date   of
commencement   of   the   2013   Act,   there   is   no   lapse   of
proceedings.   Compensation   has   to   be   determined
under the provisions of the 2013 Act.
366.2.   In   case   the   award   has   been   passed   within   the
window   period   of   five   years   excluding   the   period
covered   by   an   interim   order   of   the   court,   then
proceedings   shall   continue   as   provided   under   Section
24(1)( b ) of the 2013 Act under the 1894 Act as if it has
not been repealed.
366.3.   The   word   “or”   used   in   Section   24(2)   between
possession   and   compensation   has   to   be   read   as   “nor”
or   as   “and”.   The   deemed   lapse   of   land   acquisition
proceedings under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act takes
place where due to inaction of authorities for five years
or   more   prior   to   commencement   of   the   said   Act,   the
possession   of   land   has   not   been   taken   nor
compensation   has   been   paid.   In   other   words,   in   case
possession   has   been   taken,   compensation   has   not
been   paid   then   there   is   no   lapse.   Similarly,   if
compensation has been paid, possession has not been
taken then there is no lapse.
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366.4.   The   expression   “paid”   in   the   main   part   of
Section   24(2)   of   the   2013   Act   does   not   include   a
deposit   of  compensation  in  court.  The  consequence  of
non­deposit is provided in the proviso to Section 24(2)
in   case   it   has   not   been   deposited   with   respect   to
majority   of   landholdings   then   all   beneficiaries
(landowners)   as   on   the   date   of   notification   for   land
acquisition   under   Section   4   of   the   1894   Act   shall   be
entitled   to   compensation   in   accordance   with   the
provisions   of   the   2013   Act.   In   case   the   obligation
under   Section   31   of   the   Land   Acquisition   Act,   1894
has not been fulfilled, interest under Section 34 of the
said Act can be granted. Non­deposit of compensation
(in   court)   does   not   result   in   the   lapse   of   land
acquisition   proceedings.   In   case   of   non­deposit   with
respect   to   the   majority   of   holdings   for   five   years   or
more, compensation under the 2013 Act has to be paid
to   the   “landowners”   as   on   the   date   of   notification   for
land acquisition under Section 4 of the 1894 Act.
366.5.   In   case   a   person   has   been   tendered   the
compensation   as   provided   under   Section   31(1)   of   the
1894   Act,   it   is   not   open   to   him   to   claim   that
acquisition has lapsed under Section 24(2) due to non­
payment or non­deposit of compensation in court. The
obligation to pay is complete by tendering the amount
under Section 31(1). The landowners who had refused
to   accept   compensation   or   who   sought   reference   for
higher   compensation,   cannot   claim   that   the
acquisition   proceedings   had   lapsed   under   Section
24(2) of the 2013 Act.
366.6.   The proviso to Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act is
to   be   treated   as   part   of   Section   24(2),   not   part   of
Section 24(1)( b ).
366.7.   The mode of taking possession under the 1894
Act   and   as   contemplated   under   Section   24(2)   is   by
drawing   of   inquest   report/memorandum.   Once   award
has   been   passed   on   taking   possession   under   Section
16 of the 1894 Act, the land vests in State there is no
divesting provided under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act,
as   once   possession   has   been   taken   there   is   no   lapse
under Section 24(2).
366.8.   The   provisions   of   Section   24(2)   providing   for   a
deemed   lapse   of   proceedings   are   applicable   in   case
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authorities   have   failed   due   to   their   inaction   to   take
possession   and   pay   compensation   for   five   years   or
more   before   the   2013   Act   came   into   force,   in   a
proceeding   for   land   acquisition   pending   with   the
authority   concerned   as   on   1­1­2014.   The   period   of
subsistence   of   interim   orders   passed   by   court   has   to
be excluded in the computation of five years.
366.9.   Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act does not give rise
to   new   cause   of   action   to   question   the   legality   of
concluded   proceedings   of   land   acquisition.   Section  24
applies   to   a   proceeding   pending   on   the   date   of
enforcement of the 2013 Act i.e. 1­1­2014. It does not
revive   stale   and   time­barred   claims   and   does   not
reopen concluded proceedings nor allow landowners to
question   the   legality   of   mode   of   taking   possession   to
reopen   proceedings   or   mode   of   deposit   of
compensation   in   the   treasury   instead   of   court   to
invalidate acquisition.”
7. The   High   Court   while   passing   the   impugned   judgment
and order has observed that the possession of the land in
question   continued   with   the   original   writ   petitioners   and
that the compensation was neither paid nor even tendered
to   the   original   writ   petitioners.   However,   by   holding   that
the   original   writ   petitioners   have   continued   to   remain   in
possession,   the   High   Court   has   relied   upon   the   earlier
order   dated   09.11.2011   passed   in   writ   petition
No.7714/2011,   by   which   the   High   Court   directed   the
authority to consider their application under section 48 of
the Act, 1894 on merits. However, it was the specific case
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on behalf of the authority before the learned Single Judge
that   the   possession   of   the   land   in   question   was   already
taken   over   on   23.09.1986   and   even   the   compensation
amount of Rs.2.00 crores was deposited with the land and
building department.
7.1 It is the case on behalf of the original writ petitioners that
a   purported   letter   dated   23.09.1986   allegedly   taking
symbolic possession was never disclosed by appellants in
the proceedings conducted before the High Court on two
separate   occasions   and   the   same   has   been   filed   for   the
first time in the present proceedings. The aforesaid is not
correct. Even in the impugned order itself in paragraph 2,
the   High   Court   has   noted   the   submissions   on   behalf   of
the appellants to the effect that the possession was taken
over   on   23.09.1986.   Therefore,   it   cannot   be   said   such   a
plea is taken for the first time before this Court. It is the
case   on   behalf   of   the   original   writ   petitioners,   relying
upon   the   earlier   order   passed   by   the   High   Court   dated
09.11.2011   in   writ   petition   No.7714/2011   that,   the
original writ petitioners continue to be in possession and
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the   actual   possession   has   never   been   taken   over.
However, it is required to be noted that even in the order
dated 09.11.2011, there was  no  specific finding   given  by
the   High   Court   that   the   original   writ   petitioners   are   in
possession of the land in question. On the contrary, it is
observed   that   the   authority   to   consider   the   application
under   section   48   of   the   Act,   1894   on   merits   on   the
assumption of the possession being with the original writ
petitioners.   Therefore,   while   passing   the   order   dated
09.11.2011   also,   the   High   Court   assumed   the   original
writ   petitioners   are   in   possession   hence   as   such   no
specific   finding   was   given   to   the   effect   that   the   original
writ petitioners are in possession. 
7.2 It   is   next   contented   on   behalf   of   the   original   writ
petitioners   that   the   alleged   possession   on   23.09.1986   is
illegal   and   it   was   a   paper   possession.   However,   it   is
submitted   on   behalf   of   the  appellants   that   possession  of
land   in   question   was   taken   over   by   drawing   the
punchnama   which   can   be   said   to   be   sufficient
compliance   of   the   requirement   while   taking   possession.
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The High Court has also doubted the compensation being
tendered as contended on behalf of the appellant. 
7.3 Be   that   as   it   may.   Assuming   for   the   sake   of   argument
that   the   original   writ   petitioners   are   found   to   be   in
possession   and   the   compensation   was   not   tendered,   in
that   case   also   as   can   be   seen   from   the   order   passed   by
the   High   Court   on   09.11.2011   in   writ   petition
No.7714/2011,  the   authority   was  restrained   from   taking
any   coercive   action   in   respect   of   the   land   in   question.
Therefore,   in   view   of   the   subsequent   decision   of   this
Court   in   the   case   of   Indore   Development   Authority
(supra   ­   paragraph   366.8),   the   period,   during   which   the
interim order is/was operative, has to be excluded in the
computation   of   five   years’   period.   In   the   present   case
even,   it   is   the   contention   on   behalf   of   the   original   writ
petitioners   that   the   order   of   no   coercive   action   was
directed to be continued till the application under section
48 of the Act, 1894 was decided. It is the specific case on
behalf   of   the   original   writ   petitioners   before   this   Court
and   even   so   stated   in   the   written   submissions   that   till
15

date no decision is taken on the application under section
48   of   the   Act,   1894.   Meaning   thereby   the   direction/stay
granted by the High Court while passing the order dated
09.11.2011   in   writ   petition   No.7714/2011   continued
when the Act, 2013 came into force.
7.4 In that view of the matter and considering the decision of
this   Court   in   case   of   Indore   Development   Authority
(supra),   it   cannot   be   said   that   the   land   acquisition
proceedings are deemed to have lapsed under sub­section
(2) of section 24 of the Act, 2013. 
8. Applying   the   law   laid   down   by   this   Court   in   the   case   of
Indore   Development   Authority   (supra),   more
particularly,   paragraph   366,   it   cannot   be   said   that   the
land acquisition proceedings are deemed to have lapsed.
9. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above and
on the aforesaid ground  alone that at the  time when  the
Act, 2013 came into force there was a stay granted by the
High   Court   vide   order   dated   09.11.2011   in   writ   petition
No.7714/2011   restraining   the   authority   taking   any
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coercive   action   in   respect   of   the   land   in   question,   the
impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court
declaring   that   the   land   acquisition   proceedings   are
deemed   to   have   lapsed   under   sub­section   (2)   of   section
24 of the Act, 2013, is unsustainable.
  
10. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, the
present appeals are allowed. The impugned judgment and
order   passed   by   the   High   Court   in   Writ   Petition   (C)
No.1043/2015   declaring   that   the   land   acquisition
proceedings under the Act, 1894 with respect to the land
in question are deemed to have lapsed under sub­section
(2) of section 24 of the Act, 2013, is hereby quashed and
set   aside.   The   present   appeals   are   allowed   to   the
aforesaid   extent,   accordingly.   There   shall   be   no   order   as
to costs.    
…………………………………J.
                  (M. R. SHAH)
…………………………………J.
 (B.V. NAGARATHNA)
New Delhi, 
March 29, 2022.
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