/2022 INSC 0248/
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION 
CIVIL APPEAL NO.  2643    OF 2022
[Arising out of SLP(C) No. 6885 of 2021]
KALYAN DOMBIVALI MUNICIPAL 
CORPORATION        ...APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
SANJAY GAJANAN GHARAT 
AND ANOTHER    ...RESPONDENT(S)
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NO.  2644  OF 2022
[Arising out of SLP(C) No. 6968 of 2021]
J U D G M E N T
B.R. GAVAI, J.
1. Leave granted in both the Special Leave Petitions.
2. Kalyan   Dombivali   Municipal   Corporation   (hereinafter
referred   to   as   the   “KDM   Corporation”)   and   the   State   of
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Maharashtra,   by   way   of   the   present   appeals,   challenge   the
correctness of the judgment dated 6 th
 April 2021, passed by the
Division   Bench   of   the   High   Court   of   Judicature   at   Bombay   in
Writ   Petition   (ST.)   No.   3599   of   2020 ,   thereby   holding   that   the
KDM Corporation was not the competent authority to suspend
respondent   No.1­Sanjay   Gajanan   Gharat.     By   the   impugned
judgment,   the   High   Court   had   also   quashed   the   departmental
inquiry   initiated   against   the   respondent   No.1   and   directed   the
KDM   Corporation   to   reinstate   him   forthwith   to   the   post   of
Additional   Municipal   Commissioner   (hereinafter   referred   to   as
“AMC”) of the KDM Corporation. 
3. The   facts   are   not   in   dispute.     The   respondent   No.1   was
initially   appointed   as   an   Assistant   Municipal   Commissioner   of
the KDM Corporation in the year 1995.   The said appointment
was   approved   by   the   State   Government   on   1 st
  February   1997
under   Section   45   of   the   Maharashtra   Municipal   Corporations
Act, 1949 (hereinafter referred to as “the MMC Act”). The KDM
Corporation thereafter recommended the respondent No.1 to be
promoted   as   Deputy   Municipal   Commissioner   of   the   KDM
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Corporation   on   9 th
  May   2003.     This   was   done   after   the
Departmental   Promotion   Committee   of   the   KDM   Corporation
found   respondent   No.1   suitable   for   such   promotion.   The
General   Body   of   the   KDM   Corporation   also   approved   the   said
recommendation   in   its   meeting   held   on   18 th
  July   2003.     The
State   Government,   vide   notification   dated   23 rd
  July   2005,
granted   approval   to   the   promotion   of   respondent   No.1   as
Deputy Municipal Commissioner with effect from 9 th
 May 2003.
4. Vide   Maharashtra   Act   No.32   of   2011,   which   came   into
effect   from   25 th
  September   2011,   various   amendments   were
effected  into  the  MMC  Act.   Vide the  said amendment,  Section
39A was brought in the statute, which provided for  creation of
one   or   more   posts   of   AMCs   and   appointment   of   suitable
persons on such posts.
5. In pursuance of the amendment effected in the year 2011,
the   State   Government   issued   a   Government   Resolution
(hereinafter referred to as “G.R.”) on 11 th
  November 2011. Vide
the   said   G.R.,   one   post   of   AMC   was   created   for   the   KDM
Corporation.     Consequent   to   the   upgradation   of   the   KDM
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Corporation   from   Class   ‘D’   to   Class   ‘C’,   one   additional   post   of
AMC came to be created vide G.R. dated 6 th
 January 2015.  The
said   G.R.   also   laid   down   the   procedure   for   carrying   out   the
selection   process   for   the   post   of   AMCs.   Undisputedly,   the
Selection   Committee,   which   considered   the   proposal   of   the
Commissioner of the KDM Corporation, for a suitable person to
be   appointed   as   AMC,   in   its   meeting   held   on   5 th
  May   2015,
found   respondent   No.1   most   suitable   for   the   same   and
accordingly,   his   name   came   to   be   recommended   by   the
Selection   Committee   to   the   State   of   Maharashtra   for
appointment to the post of AMC of the KDM Corporation.   The
respondent   No.1   came   to   be   appointed   as   AMC   of   the   KDM
Corporation   by   the   State   of   Maharashtra   on   2 nd
  June   2015.
Pursuant   to   his   appointment,   the   respondent   No.1   joined   his
service as AMC of the KDM Corporation in the same month.
6. On   14 th
  June   2018,   an   FIR   No.34   of   2018   came   to   be
registered   against   the   respondent   No.1   for   the   offences
punishable   under   Sections   7,   8,   13(1)(d)   along   with   Section
13(2)   of   the   Prevention   of   Corruption   Act,   1988.     The
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respondent No.1 was arrested on the same date and continued
to   be   in   custody   till   17 th
  June   2018,   on   which   date,   he   was
released on bail.
7. The Commissioner of the KDM Corporation purportedly, in
exercise   of   the   powers   under   Section   56(1)(b)   of   the   MMC   Act
and Rule 4(1) of the Maharashtra Civil Services (Discipline and
Appeal) Rules, 1979 (hereinafter referred to as “MCS Rules”), on
18 th
  June   2018,   issued   an   order   suspending   respondent   No.1
from service.   The General Body of the KDM Corporation, in its
meeting   held   on   7 th
  July   2018,   ratified   the   suspension   of
respondent   No.1.   On   20 th
  June   2019,   the   General   Body   of   the
KDM Corporation also  accorded sanction  to hold  departmental
inquiry   against   respondent   No.1.   Accordingly,   the
Commissioner of the KDM Corporation issued a notice dated 7 th
August   2019   to   respondent   No.1   with   regard   to   holding   of
departmental   inquiry   against   him   and   called   upon   him   to
appear   before   the   Inquiry   Officer   appointed   by   the   KDM
Corporation.     The   respondent   No.1,   vide   his   letter   dated   16 th
August   2019   addressed   to   the   Commissioner,   KDM
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Corporation,   objected   to   the   said   departmental   inquiry   on   the
ground of jurisdiction.
8. Again,   the   KDM   Corporation   issued   a   notice   dated   5 th
December 2019, to respondent No.1 calling upon him to remain
present for the preliminary inquiry to be held on 26 th
 December
2019.  However, the respondent No.1 chose not to participate in
the   departmental   inquiry   and   filed   a   writ   petition   being   Writ
Petition   (ST.)   No.3599   of   2020   before   the   High   Court   of
Judicature at Bombay on 21 st
  February 2020.   In the said writ
petition, he sought the following reliefs:
“a) This Hon'ble Court may be pleased to issue Writ
of   Mandamus   or   any   other   appropriate   Writ   in   the
nature   of   Mandamus   or   any   other   appropriate
Direction   or   Order   thereby   directing   Respondent
No.1   Corporation   and   its   Municipal   Commissioner
to forthwith withdraw and/or cancel ­
I) the impugned Suspension Order dated
18th   June,   2018,   being   Exhibit­U
hereto; 
II) the impugned General Body Resolution
dated   7th   July,   2018,   being   Exhibit­V
hereto; 
III) the Impugned General Body Resolution
No.6   dated   20th   June,   2019   being
Exhibit­Y hereto; and 
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IV) the   Impugned   Notice   of   Departmental
inquiry   dated   7th   August,   2019   being
Exhibit­Z to this petition; 
b)   This   Hon'ble   Court   may   be   pleased   to   issue   a
Writ   of   Certiorari   or   any   other   appropriate   Writ   in
the   nature   of   Certiorari   or   any   other   appropriate
Direction or Order thereby quashing and/or setting
aside –
I)  the Impugned Suspension Order dated
18th   June,   2018,   passed   by   the
Municipal   Commissioner   of
Respondent   No.1   being   Exhibit   ­U
hereto; 
II)  the Impugned General Body Resolution
dated   7th   July,   2018   of   Respondent
No.1, being Exhibit­V hereto; 
III)  the Impugned General Body Resolution
No.6   dated   20th   June,   2019   or
Respondent   No.1,   being   Exhibit   ­Y
hereto; and 
IV) the   Impugned   Notice   of   193
Departmental   Inquiry   dated   7th
August   2019   issued   by   the
commissioner   of   Respondent   No.1
being Exhibit­Z to this petition; 
c) This  Hon'ble  Court  may  be pleased to  Issue  Writ
of   Mandamus   or   any   other   appropriate   Writ   in   the
nature   of   Mandamus   or   any   other   appropriate
Direction   or   Order   thereby   directing   Respondent
No.1   Corporation   and   its   Municipal   Commissioner
to   forthwith   re­Instate   the   Petitioner   in   the   post   of
Additional   Municipal   Commissioner   of   the   1st
Respondent Corporations;”
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9. By   the   impugned  judgment   dated  6 th
  April  2021,   the  writ
petition   filed   by   the   respondent   No.1   came   to   be   allowed   in
terms   of   the   prayers   (a)   to   (c),   which   are   reproduced
hereinabove.     Being   aggrieved   thereby,   both,   the   KDM
Corporation   and   the   State   of   Maharashtra   have   approached
this Court.
10. We have heard Shri P.S. Patwalia, learned Senior Counsel
appearing   on   behalf   of   the   KDM   Corporation,   Shri   Rahul
Chitnis,   learned   counsel   appearing   on   behalf   of   the   State   and
Shri   Anupam   Lal   Das,   learned   Senior   Counsel   appearing   on
behalf of respondent No.1.
11. Shri   Patwalia   submitted   that   the   High   Court   has   grossly
erred   in   holding   that   the   respondent   No.1   was   an   employee   of
the   State   Government   and   therefore,   it   was   only   the   State
Government,   who   had   powers   to   suspend   him.     He   submitted
that   though   under   Section   39A   of   the   MMC   Act,   the   State
Government   was   an   authority   competent   to   create   a   post   and
appoint a suitable person on that post, such a post was created
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specifically for the KDM Corporation and once a suitable person
was   appointed   by   the   State   Government   on   the   said   post,   he
became   an   employee   of   the   KDM   Corporation.     He   submitted
that  in view of  the  provisions of  Section  56 of  the  MMC  Act,  it
was   only   the   KDM   Corporation,   which   was   competent   to
suspend   such   an   employee   on   the   grounds   as   are   available
under   the   said   provision,   and   also   to   initiate   departmental
proceedings.     He   submitted   that   the   High   Court   has   grossly
erred in not considering the said aspect and referring to Section
16   of   the   Maharashtra   General   Clauses   Act,   1904   (hereinafter
referred   to   as   “GC   Act”).     He   submitted   that   when   there   is   a
specific   provision   in   the   MMC   Act,   which   empowers   the
Commissioner   to   suspend   an   employee   and   to   initiate
departmental   proceedings   against   him,   recourse   to   GC   Act   is
not   warranted.     He   submitted   that   since   the   respondent   No.1
was   arrested   and   was   detained   in   custody   for   a   period
exceeding 48 hours, in view of sub­rule (2) of Rule 4 of the MCS
Rules,   his   suspension   was   a   deemed   one.     The   learned   Senior
Counsel   submitted   that   the   impugned  judgment   has   the   effect
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of leading to a consequence that the respondent No.1, who has
been caught red­handed in a trap case, will be left scot­free. 
12. The State Government has also supported the contentions
as raised by the KDM Corporation.  It is submitted that though
the   post   was   created   by   the   State   Government   for   the   KDM
Corporation and though the respondent No.1 was selected and
appointed   by   the   State   Government   in   accordance   with   the
procedure   prescribed   in   the   G.R.   dated   6 th
  January   2015,   the
appointment   was,   as   an   AMC   of   the   KDM   Corporation   and   as
such,   the   KDM   Corporation   was   well   within   its   powers   under
Section 56 of the MMC Act to suspend him.
13. Shri   Anupam   Lal   Das,   learned   Senior   Counsel   appearing
for the respondent No.1, on the contrary, would submit that the
respondent No.1 was appointed by the State Government under
Section   39A   of   the   MMC   Act   and   the   post   of   AMC   is   pari
materia  with that of the Commissioner, who is appointed under
Section   36   of   the   MMC   Act.     He  submitted   that  under   Section
39A(2)   of   the   MMC   Act,   an   AMC   is   subject   to   the   same
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liabilities,   restrictions   and   terms   and   conditions   of   service,   to
which the Commissioner is subjected to as per the provisions of
the   MMC   Act.     He   further   submitted   that   the   posts   of   the
Commissioner and the AMC find place in Chapter II of the MMC
Act,  whereas  Section  56 finds place in  Chapter  IV of  the MMC
Act.   He submitted that various other sections in Chapter IV of
the   MMC   Act   provide   for   appointment   of   various   municipal
officers   and   servants   other   than   AMC   and   Commissioner   and
therefore,   the   term   “competent   authority”   will   have   to   be
construed   to   be   only   such   authorities,   who   were   competent   to
make   appointments   to   the   posts   found   in   Chapter   IV   of   the
MMC   Act.       He   submitted   that   in   any   case,   in   view   of   the
judgment of this Court in the case of   Ajay Kumar Choudhary
v.   Union   of   India   through   its   Secretary   and   Another 1
,
continued   suspension   of   respondent   No.1   was   not   warranted.
He   submitted   that   even   the   charge­sheet   was   not   submitted
within 90 days and as such, there is no reason to interfere with
the impugned judgment.
1   (2015) 7 SCC 291
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14. The High Court, in the impugned judgment, has held that
since   the   appointment   of   respondent   No.1   was   made   by   the
State   Government   in   view   of   Section   36   of   the   MMC   Act,   it   is
only the State Government, who was competent to suspend and
initiate   departmental   inquiry   against   him.     It   was,   therefore,
held   that   the   suspension   order   issued   by   the   Commissioner
and   ratified   by   the   KDM   Corporation,   and   the   departmental
inquiry  initiated by the Commissioner  with the approval of the
KDM   Corporation   was   beyond   their   powers.     We   will   have   to
examine the correctness of these findings.
15. Section 39A of the MMC Act reads thus:
“ 39A.   Appointment   of   Additional   Municipal
Commissioners . —(1)   The   State   Government   may
create   one   or   more   posts   of   Additional   Municipal
Commissioners   in   the   Corporation   and   appoint
suitable   persons   on   such   posts,   who   shall,   subject
to   the   control   of   the   Commissioner,   exercise   all   or
any   of   the   powers   and   perform   all   or   any   of   the
duties and functions of the Commissioner.
(2)   Every   person   so   appointed   as   the   Additional
Municipal   Commissioner   shall   be   subject   to   the
same   liabilities,   restrictions   and   terms   and
conditions of service, to which the Commissioner is
subjected to as per the provisions of this Act.
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16. The perusal of sub­section (1) of Section 39A of the MMC
Act   would   reveal   that   the   State   Government   is   empowered   to
create   one   or   more   posts   of   AMCs.     However,   such   a   post   is
created in the particular Corporation.  The State Government is
also   entitled   to   appoint   suitable   persons   on   such   posts.     It   is
further clear that the AMCs so appointed, though shall exercise
all or any of the powers and perform all or any of the duties and
functions of the Commissioner, the same shall be subject to the
control of the Commissioner.   Sub­section (2) of Section 39A of
the   MMC   Act   provides   that   every   person   so   appointed   as   the
AMC   shall   be   subject   to   the   same   liabilities,   restrictions   and
terms  and  conditions   of  service,  to  which  the  Commissioner  is
subjected to as per the provisions of MMC Act.
17. It is not in dispute that vide G.R. dated 6 th
  January 2015,
for the KDM Corporation, which was promoted from Class ‘D’ to
Class   ‘C’,   one   new   post   of   AMC   was   created.     It   is   also   not   in
dispute that there was already one post of AMC existing in the
KDM   Corporation.   The   perusal   of   the   said   G.R.   would   reveal
13

that one post of AMC, which was newly created, was to be filled
in from the officers of the State Cadre in the KDM Corporation.
It would further reveal that the second post of the AMC was to
be   filled   in   from   the   officers   working   in   the   respective
Corporation by way of selection.   It further clarified that in the
event,   the   suitable   person   is   not   available   for   selection   to   the
said   post,   the   same   shall   be   filled   in   from   the   officers   of   the
State Government Cadre.
18. From   the   perusal   of   the   record,   it   could   be   seen   that   the
State   Government   had   called   for   the   names   of   suitable
candidates   from   the   Commissioner   of   the   KDM   Corporatoin.
The   Commissioner,   vide   his   communication   dated   4 th
  April
2015, proposed three names.   The said names were considered
by a Committee consisting of the following authorities:
(i) Commissioner/Director,   Directorate   of   Municipal
Administration;
(ii) Additional   Commissioner,   Mumbai   Municipal
Corporation;
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(iii) Commissioner, KDM Corporation; 
(iv) Deputy Secretary, Govt. of Maharashtra; and
(v) Under Secretary, Govt. of Maharashtra.
19. A perusal of the Minutes of the said Meeting would reveal
that   though   the   Commissioner   of   the   KDM   Corporation   stated
that none of the candidates including the respondent No.1 were
eligible for the post of AMC, the Committee, in its meeting held
on   5 th
  May   2015,   after   considering   the   confidential   reports   of
the   three   candidates,   resolved   to   recommend   respondent   No.1
for   appointment   to   the   post   of   AMC   of   the   KDM   Corporation.
The   said   recommendation   was   approved   by   the   State
Government   and   accordingly,   respondent   No.1   came   to   be
appointed as AMC  of the KDM Corporation vide G.R. dated 2 nd
June 2015.  The said G.R. would clearly reveal that respondent
No.1   had   been   appointed   specifically   as   AMC   of   the   KDM
Corporation.  It could thus clearly be seen from the record that
though the respondent No.1 was selected and appointed by the
15

State   Government,   his   appointment   was   specifically   for   the
KDM Corporation.  
20. Therefore, the question that we will have to consider is as
to   whether   the   respondent   No.1   though   an   employee   of   the
KDM   Corporation,   can   neither   be   suspended   nor   any
departmental   proceedings   can   be   initiated   against   him   by   the
KDM   Corporation,   since   his   selection   and   appointment   was
done by the State Government.  
21. For considering the rival submissions, it will be relevant to
refer   to   some   of   the   provisions   of   the   MMC   Act.     We   have
already   reproduced   Section   39A   of   the   MMC   Act   hereinabove.
The   other   two   provisions   that   require   consideration   are   sub­
section  (9) of  Section 2 and Section 56 of the MMC  Act, which
read thus:
“ 2. Definitions.­  
…..
(9)   “the   Commissioner”   means   the   Municipal
Commissioner  for  the City  appointed under  Section
36 and includes an acting Commissioner appointed
under Section 39;
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…………..
56. Imposition of penalties on municipal officers
and   servants . —(1)   A   competent   authority   may
subject   to   the   provisions   of   this   Act   impose   any   of
the   penalties   specified   in   sub­section   (2)   on   a
municipal   officer   or   servant   if   such   authority   is
satisfied   that   such   officer   or   servant   is   guilty   of   a
breach   of   departmental   rules   or   discipline   or   of
carelessness, neglect of duty or other misconduct or
is incompetent:
Provided that,—
( a ) no municipal officer or servant   holding
the   post   equivalent   to   or   higher   in   rank
than   the   post   of   the   Assistant
Commissioner   shall   be   dismissed   by   the
Commissioner   without   the   previous
approval of the   Corporation.
[ (b)   any   officer   or   servant   whether
appointed   by   the   Corporation   or   any
other   competent   authority,   except
Transport   Manager   being   a   Government
officer   on   deputation,   may   be   suspended
by the Commissioner pending an order of
the   Corporation   and   when   the   officer   so
suspended   is   the   Transport   Manager   or
an   officer   appointed   under   Section   45,
such   suspension   with   reasons   therefor,
shall,   forthwith   be   reported   by   the
Commissioner   to   the   Corporation,   and
such   suspension   shall   come   to   an   end   if
not   confirmed   by   the   Corporation   within
a   period   of   six   months   from   the   date   of
such suspension:
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Provided that, such suspension of an officer or
servant pending inquiry into the allegations against
such  officer  or  servant shall not be deemed to  be a
penalty.]”
22. It could thus be seen that under Section 39A of the MMC
Act, though the AMC will exercise all or any of the powers and
perform   all   or   any   of   the   duties   and   functions   of   the
Commissioner,   the   same   shall   be   subject   to   the   control   of   the
Commissioner.  No doubt, that the AMC would be subject to the
same   liabilities,   restrictions   and   terms   and   conditions   of
service,   to   which   the   Commissioner   of   the   Corporation   is
subjected.     However,   the   legislative   intent   is   clear   that   the
powers to be exercised by AMCs would be subject to the control
of the Commissioner.  
23. The   legislative   intent   would   also   be   gathered   from   sub­
section (9) of Section 2 of the MMC Act.  It could be seen that in
the   definition   of   the   “Commissioner”,   though   an   acting
Commissioner appointed under Section 39 of the MMC Act has
been   included,   an   AMC   appointed   under   Section   39A   of   the
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MMC  Act has  not been  included.   We  are, therefore, unable  to
accept the contention of respondent No.1 that the post of AMC
is   pari   materia   with   that   of   the   Commissioner.     The   legislative
intent  is  clear   that  though  the  AMC  exercises all  or  any   of the
powers   and   performs   all   or   any   of   the   duties   and   functions   of
the   Commissioner,   he   would   be   subject   to   the   control   of   the
Commissioner, and as such, subordinate to him.  
24. Under   sub­section   (1)   of   Section   56   of   the   MMC   Act,   a
competent authority, subject to the provisions of the said Act, is
entitled  to  impose any  of the  penalties  specified in sub­section
(2)   of   Section   56   of   the   MMC   Act   on   a   municipal   officer   or
servant if such authority is satisfied that such officer or servant
is   guilty   of   breach   of   departmental   rules   or   discipline   or   of
carelessness,   neglect   of   duty   or   other   misconduct   or   is
incompetent.     Clause   (a)   of   the   proviso   to   sub­section   (1)   of
Section   56   of   the   MMC   Act,   however,   provides   that   no
municipal   officer   or   servant   holding   the   post   equivalent   to   or
higher   in   rank   than   the   post   of   the   Assistant   Commissioner,
19

shall   be   dismissed   by   the   Commissioner   without   the   previous
approval of the Corporation.  It can be seen that the words used
are   “post   equivalent   to   or   higher   in   rank   than   the   post   of   the
Assistant   Commissioner”.     It   will   also   be   relevant   to   note   that
Section 56 of the MMC Act has also been amended by the same
Amending   Act   i.e.   Maharashtra   Act   No.   32   of   2011,   by   which
Section   39A   was   brought   in   the   statute.     Earlier,   the   words
used in clause (a) of sub­section (1) of Section 56 were “whose
monthly   salary,   exclusive   of   allowances   exceeds   one   thousand
rupees”.     The   said   words   were   substituted   by   the   words
“holding the post equivalent to or higher in rank than the post
of   the   Assistant   Commissioner”.     It   can   thus   be   seen   that
though   the   “competent   authority”   is   entitled   to   impose   the
penalty as specified in sub­section (2) of Section 56 of the MMC
Act on a municipal officer or servant; in case of an officer, who
is   equivalent   to   or   higher   in   rank   than   the   post   of   Assistant
Commissioner,   the   power   of   dismissal   can   be   exercised   by   the
“Commissioner”   only   with   the   previous   approval   of   the
Corporation. 
20

25. It can further be seen that clause (b) of the proviso to sub­
section   (1)   of   Section   56   of   the   MMC   Act   enables   the
Commissioner   to   suspend   any   officer   or   servant,   whether
appointed by the Corporation or any other competent authority,
except   Transport   Manager   being   a   Government   Officer   on
deputation,   pending   an   order   of   the   Corporation.   It   further
provides   that   when   the   officer   suspended   is   a   Transport
Manager  or   an officer  appointed  under  Section  45  of the  MMC
Act,   such   suspension   with   reasons   thereof,   shall,   forthwith   be
reported   by   the   Commissioner   to   the   Corporation.     It   further
provides   that   such   a   suspension   shall   come   to   an   end   if   not
confirmed   by   the   Corporation   within   a   period   of   six   months
from the date of such suspension. 
26. It   is   thus   clear   that   whereas,   the   Commissioner   is
empowered   to   suspend   any   officer   or   servant,   whether
appointed by the Corporation or any other competent authority,
in case of a Transport Manager being a Government Officer on
deputation   or   any   officer   appointed   under   Section   45   of   the
21

MMC   Act,   the   Commissioner   is   required   to   report   such   a
suspension with reasons thereof, to the Corporation.  It further
provides   that   such   suspension   shall   come   to   an   end   if   not
confirmed   by   the   Corporation   within   a   period   of   six   months
from the date of such suspension.
27. A conjoint reading of the aforesaid provisions of the MMC
Act   would   reveal   that   though   a   competent   authority   may
impose   any   of   the   penalties   on   a   municipal   officer   or   servant,
no municipal officer or servant holding the post equivalent to or
higher   in   rank   than   the   post   of   an   Assistant   Commissioner,
shall   be   dismissed   by   the   Commissioner   without   the   previous
approval of the Corporation.  
28. It   could   be   seen   that   the   legislature   has   created   two
classes of the municipal officers and servants.   One class is of
the   municipal   officers   and   servants,   other   than   the   ones
holding the post equivalent to or higher in rank than the post of
an   Assistant   Commissioner.     In   this   category,   a   competent
authority   may   impose   the   penalties   as   provided   under   the
22

provisions   of   the   MMC   Act.     The   other   class   of   municipal
officers   is   of   the   persons   holding   the   post   equivalent   to   or
higher   in   rank   than   the   post   of   Assistant   Commissioner.     The
officers   in   such   a   class   can   be   dismissed   only   by   the
Commissioner   and   that   too   with   the   previous   approval   of   the
Corporation.  
29. As already discussed hereinabove, clause (a) of the proviso
to   sub­section   (1)   of   Section   56   of   the   MMC   Act   has   been
amended   simultaneously   by   an   amendment,   which   brought
Section 39A into the statute.   As such, we are of the view that
the term “post equivalent to or higher in rank than the post of
Assistant   Commissioner”   cannot   be   construed   in   a   narrow
compass.     We   are   therefore   of   the   view   that   clause   (a)   of   sub­
section (1) of Section 56 of the MMC Act would also include the
post   of   AMC.     As   such,   the   Commissioner   would   be   a
“competent authority” insofar as the post of AMC is concerned.
Likewise,   though   the   powers   of   the   Commissioner   to   suspend
any   officer   or   servant   except   a   Transport   Manager   being   a
23

Government   Officer   on   deputation   or   the   officers   appointed
under   Section   45   of   the   MMC   Act   are   without   any   restriction,
when   such   suspension   is   with   regard   to   a   Transport   Manager
or   an   officer   appointed   under   Section   45   of   the   MMC   Act,
though the Commissioner is empowered to suspend them, such
a suspension has to be reported to the Corporation along with
the reasons thereof.   Such a suspension shall come to an end,
if   not   confirmed   by   the   Corporation   within   a   period   of   six
months from the date of such suspension. 
30. For   appreciation   of   the   rival   contentions,   it   will   be
apposite to seek certain guidance from some precedents of this
Court. 
31. In   the   case   of   Philips   India   Ltd.   v.   Labour   Court,
Madras and Others 2
, this Court had an occasion to decide the
rate of overtime wages as mentioned in Section 31 of the Tamil
Nadu Shops and Establishments  Act, 1947.   This Court found
that   for   finding   the   minimum   rate   of   overtime   wages   as
mentioned   in   Section   31   of   the   said   Act,   it   will   have   to   be
2   (1985) 3 SCC 103
24

interpreted   in   the   light   of   the   provisions   contained   in   Section
14(1) read with proviso to Section 31 of the said Act.  Coming to
this conclusion, this Court observed thus:
“ 15.   No   canon   of   statutory   construction   is   more
firmly   established   than   that   the   statute   must   be
read   as   a   whole.   This   is   a   general   rule   of
construction applicable to all statutes alike which is
spoken   of   as   construction   ex   visceribus   actus .   This
rule   of   statutory   construction   is   so   firmly
established that it is variously styled as “elementary
rule”   (see   Attorney   General   v.   Bastow   [(1957)   1   All
ER   497]   )   and   as   a   “settled   rule”   (see   Poppatlal
Shah   v.   State   of   Madras   [AIR   1953   SC   274   :   1953
SCR   667]   ).   The   only   recognised   exception   to   this
well­laid   principle   is   that   it   cannot   be   called   in   aid
to   alter   the   meaning   of   what   is   of   itself   clear   and
explicit.   Lord   Coke   laid   down   that:   “it   is   the   most
natural   and   genuine   exposition   of   a   statute,   to
construe one part of a statute by another part of the
same   statute,   for   that   best   expresseth   meaning   of
the   makers”   (Quoted   with   approval   in   Punjab
Beverages   Pvt.   Ltd.   v.   Suresh   Chand   [(1978)   2   SCC
144 : 1978 SCC (L&S) 165 : (1978) 3 SCR 370] ).”
32. It   could   thus   be   seen   that   this   Court   has   held   that   the
Statute   must   be   read   as   a   whole.     It   has   been   held   that   this
rule of statutory  construction is so firmly  established that it is
variously styled as “elementary rule”.   It has been held that for
25

finding   out   the   true   meaning   of   one   part   of   a   statute,   a
reference   will   have   to   be   made   to   another   part   of   the   statute
and that will best express meaning of the makers.  
33. In the case of  Sultana Begum v. Prem Chand Jain 3
, this
Court   was   considering   the   question   regarding   the   conflict
between   Section   47   of   the   Code   of   Civil   Procedure,   1908   and
Order   XXI   Rule   2   thereof.     This   Court   held   that   applying   the
rule of harmonious construction, the so­called conflict between
the said two provisions had been dispelled.   Observing so, this
Court   reiterated   the   following   well­settled   principles   of
interpretation of statutes:
“ 15.   On   a   conspectus   of   the   case­law   indicated
above,   the   following   principles   are   clearly
discernible:
(1)   It   is   the   duty   of   the   courts   to   avoid   a
head­on   clash   between   two   sections   of
the   Act   and   to   construe   the   provisions
which   appear   to   be   in   conflict   with   each
other   in   such   a   manner   as   to   harmonise
them.
(2)   The   provisions   of   one   section   of   a
statute cannot be used to defeat the other
provisions unless the court, in spite of its
3   (1997) 1 SCC 373
26

efforts,   finds   it   impossible   to   effect
reconciliation between them.
(3)   It   has   to   be   borne   in   mind   by   all   the
courts   all   the   time   that   when   there   are
two   conflicting   provisions   in   an   Act,
which   cannot   be   reconciled   with   each
other, they should be so interpreted that,
if   possible,   effect   should   be   given   to
both.   This   is   the   essence   of   the   rule   of
“harmonious construction”.
(4)   The   courts   have   also   to   keep   in   mind
that an  interpretation which  reduces one
of   the   provisions   as   a   “dead   letter”   or
“useless   lumber”   is   not   harmonious
construction.
(5)   To   harmonise   is   not   to   destroy   any
statutory provision or to render it otiose.”
34. It can thus be seen that this Court has held that it is the
duty of the court to avoid a head­on clash between two sections
of the Act and to construe the provisions which appear to be in
conflict   with   each   other   in   such   a   manner   so   as   to   harmonise
them.     It   has   further   been   held   that   the   provisions   of   one
section   of   a   statute   cannot   be   used   to   defeat   the   other
provisions   unless   the   court   finds   the   reconciliation   between
them   impossible.     It   has   further   been   held   that   when   two
conflicting  provisions  in an Act cannot  be reconciled with each
27

other,   they   should   be   so   interpreted   that,   if   possible,   effect
should   be   given   to   both.     It   has   further   been   held   that   an
interpretation,   which   reduces   one   of   the   provisions   as   a   “dead
letter” or “useless lumber”, should be avoided.
35. This   Court,   in   the   case   of   Jagdish   Singh   v.   Lt.
Governor,   Delhi   and   Others 4
,   while   considering   the   conflict
between   Rules   25(2)   and   28   of   the   Delhi   Cooperative   Societies
Rules, 1973, observed thus:
“ 7 .   …   It   is   a   cardinal   principle   of   construction   of   a
statute   or   the   statutory   rule   that   efforts   should   be
made in construing the different provisions, so that,
each provision will have its play and in the event of
any   conflict   a   harmonious   construction   should   be
given.  Further   a  statute   or  a   rule  made   thereunder
should be read as a whole and one provision should
be   construed   with   reference   to   the   other   provision
so   as   to   make   the   rule   consistent   and   any
construction   which   would   bring   any   inconsistency
or repugnancy between one provision and the other
should   be   avoided.   One   rule   cannot   be   used   to
defeat   another   rule   in   the   same   rules   unless   it   is
impossible   to   effect   harmonisation   between   them.
The   well­known   principle   of   harmonious
construction is that effect should be given to all the
provisions,   and   therefore,   this   Court   has   held   in
several   cases   that   a   construction   that   reduces   one
of   the   provisions   to   a   “dead   letter”   is   not   a
harmonious   construction   as   one   part   is   being
4   (1997) 4 SCC 435
28

destroyed   and   consequently   court   should   avoid
such a construction……..”
36. In   the   case   of   Commissioner   of   Income   Tax   v.
Hindustan   Bulk   Carriers 5
,   though   in   Sections   245­D(4)   and
245­D(6)   of   the   Income   Tax   Act,   1961,   the   terminus   point   for
charging   interest   was   not   specifically   provided,   this   Court,
applying   the   principle   of   harmonious   and   contextual
construction, held that they have to be charged in the spirit of
Sections 234­A, 234­B and 234­C of the said Act.  Holding this,
this Court observed thus:
“ 16 .  The courts will have to reject that construction
which   will   defeat   the   plain   intention   of   the
legislature   even   though   there   may   be   some
inexactitude   in   the   language   used.
(See   Salmon   v.   Duncombe   [ Salmon   v.   Duncombe ,
(1886)   LR   11   AC   627   (PC)   :   55   LJPC   69   :   55   LT
446]   ,   AC   at.   634,   Curtis   v.   Stovin   [ Curtis   v.   Stovin ,
(1889) LR 22 QBD 513 (CA) : 58 LJQB 174 : 60 LT
772] referred to in   S. Teja Singh case   [ CIT   v.   S. Teja
Singh , AIR 1959 SC 352 : (1959) 35 ITR 408] .)
17 .   If the choice is between two interpretations, the
narrower of which would fail to achieve the manifest
purpose   of   the   legislation,   we   should   avoid   a
construction   which   would   reduce   the   legislation   to
5   (2003) 3 SCC 57
29

futility,   and   should   rather   accept   the   bolder
construction,   based   on   the   view   that   Parliament
would   legislate   only   for   the   purpose   of   bringing
about   an   effective   result.   (See   Nokes   v.   Doncaster
Amalgamated   Collieries   Ltd.   [ Nokes   v.   Doncaster
Amalgamated Collieries Ltd. , 1940 AC 1014 : (1940)
3   All   ER   549   (HL)   :   109   LJKB   865   :   163   LT   343]
referred   to   in   Pye   v.   Minister   for   Lands   for   New
South   Wales   [ Pye   v.   Minister   for   Lands   for   New
South   Wales ,   (1954)   1   WLR   1410   :   (1954)   3   All   ER
514   (PC)]   .)   The   principles   indicated   in   the   said
cases were reiterated by this Court in   Mohan Kumar
Singhania   v.   Union   of   India   [ Mohan   Kumar
Singhania   v.   Union   of   India ,   1992   Supp   (1)   SCC
594 : 1992 SCC (L&S) 455] .
18 .   The   statute   must   be   read   as   a   whole   and   one
provision   of   the   Act   should   be   construed   with
reference   to   other  provisions  in   the   same   Act   so   as
to   make   a   consistent   enactment   of   the   whole
statute.
19 .   The   court   must   ascertain   the   intention   of   the
legislature   by   directing   its   attention   not   merely   to
the   clauses   to   be   construed   but   to   the   entire
statute; it must compare the clause with other parts
of the law and the setting in which the clause to be
interpreted   occurs.   (See   R.S.   Raghunath   v.   State   of
Karnataka   [ R.S.   Raghunath   v.   State   of   Karnataka ,
(1992) 1 SCC 335 : 1992 SCC (L&S) 286] .) Such a
construction   has   the   merit   of   avoiding   any
inconsistency or repugnancy either within a section
or   between   two   different   sections   or   provisions   of
the same statute. It is the duty of the court to avoid
a   head­on   clash   between   two   sections   of   the   same
Act.   (See   Sultana   Begum   v.   Prem   Chand
Jain   [ Sultana   Begum   v.   Prem   Chand   Jain ,   (1997)   1
SCC 373] .)
30

20 .  Whenever it is possible to do so, it must be done
to   construe   the   provisions   which   appear   to   conflict
so   that   they   harmonise.   It   should   not   be   lightly
assumed   that   Parliament   had   given   with   one   hand
what it took away with the other.
21 .   The   provisions   of   one   section   of   the   statute
cannot  be used to defeat  those of another  unless it
is   impossible   to   effect   reconciliation   between   them.
Thus   a   construction   that   reduces   one   of   the
provisions   to   a   “useless   lumber”   or   “dead   letter”   is
not a harmonised construction. To harmonise is not
to destroy.”
37. It could thus be seen that it is more than well­settled that
the   court   has   to   avoid   the   interpretation   which   will   result   in
head­on   clash   between   two   sections   of   the   Act.     When   one
section of an Act is not in a position to bring out the legislative
intent,   recourse   will   have   to   be   made   to   other   sections   of   the
statute   for   gathering   the   legislative   intent.     An   attempt   should
be made to see to it that the effect must be given to parts of the
statute   even   if   they   may,   on   first   blush,   appear   to   be
conflicting.   One  provision  of the Act has to  be construed with
reference   to   other   provisions   in   the   Act,   so   as   to   make   a
consistent   enactment   of   the   whole   statute.   An   attempt   should
31

be   made   of   avoiding   any   inconsistency   or   repugnancy   either
within a section or between two different sections.
38. It   has   further   been   held   that   if   the   court   has   a   choice
between two interpretations, the narrower of which would fail to
achieve   the   manifest   purpose   of   the   legislation,   such   an
interpretation will have to be avoided.  The court should avoid a
construction   which   would   reduce   the   legislation   to   futility.   A
broader   interpretation   which   would   bring   about   an   effective
result, will have to be preferred.  Applying this principle, we are
of   the   considered   view   that   sub­section   (9)   of   Section   2,
Sections   39A   and   56   of   the   MMC   Act   will   have   to   be   read   in
reference to each other.  They cannot be read in isolation.
39. Therefore,   we   are  of  the   view  that   the  finding   of  the   High
Court   that   in   view   of   Section   39A   of   the   MMC   Act,   the
Commissioner   or   the   Corporation   will   not   have   power   to
suspend or initiate departmental inquiry against the AMC, is in
ignorance of the provisions of Section 56 and sub­section (9) of
Section 2 of the MMC Act.  
32

40. We find that the view taken by the High Court is also not
acceptable   in   view   of   another   principle   of   statutory
interpretation.  In the case of  Mahadeo Prasad Bais (Dead) v.
Income­Tax Officer ‘A’ Ward, Gorakhpur and Another 6
, this
Court held that an interpretation, which will result in anomaly
or absurdity, should be avoided.  It has been held that at times,
the   circumstances   justify   a   slight   straining   of   the   language   of
the clause so as to avoid a meaningless anomaly.
41. It   will   further   be   relevant   to   refer   to   the   following
observations   of   this   Court   in   the   case   of   K.P.   Varghese   v.
Income Tax Officer, Ernakulam and Another 7
: 
“ 6.  …….We must therefore eschew literalness in the
interpretation   of   Section   52   sub­section   (2)   and   try
to   arrive   at   an   interpretation   which   avoids   this
absurdity   and   mischief   and   makes   the   provision
rational   and   sensible,   unless   of   course,   our   hands
are   tied   and   we   cannot   find   any   escape   from   the
tyranny of the literal interpretation. It is now a well­
settled   rule   of   construction   that   where   the   plain
literal   interpretation   of   a   statutory   provision
produces   a   manifestly   absurd   and   unjust   result
which   could   never   have   been   intended   by   the
6   (1991) 4 SCC 560
7   (1981) 4 SCC 173
33

legislature, the court may modify the language used
by the legislature or even “do some violence” to it, so
as to achieve the obvious intention of the legislature
and   produce   a   rational   construction
(vide   Luke   v.   Inland   Revenue   Commissioner   [(1963)
AC  557] ). The  Court may   also in  such  a case read
into   the   statutory   provision   a   condition   which,
though not expressed, is implicit as constituting the
basic   assumption   underlying   the   statutory
provision   …..”
42. It will be apposite to refer to the following paragraphs from
the judgment of this Court in the case of  State of Tamil Nadu 
v. Kodaikanal Motor Union (P) Ltd. 8
:
“ 16.   Lord   Denning,   in   Seaford   Court
Estates   v.   Asher   [(1949)   2   All   ER   155,   164]   said
thus:
“... when a defect appears a Judge cannot
simply   fold   his   hands   and   blame   the
draftsman.   He   must   set   to   work   on   the
constructive   task   of   finding   the   intention
of   Parliament…   and   then   he   must
supplement the written word so as to give
‘force   and   life’   to   the   intention   of   the
legislature.... A Judge should ask himself
the question how, if the makers of the Act
had  themselves  come  across  this ruck in
the   texture   of   it,   they   would   have
straightened   it   out?   He   must   then   do   as
8   (1986) 3 SCC 91
34

they would have done. A Judge must not
alter   the   material   of   which   the   Act   is
woven,   but   he   can   and   should   iron   out
the creases.”
17.   The   courts   must   always   seek   to   find   out   the
intention of the legislature. Though the courts must
find   out   the   intention   of   the   statute   from   the
language used, but language more often than not is
an   imperfect   instrument   of   expression   of   human
thought.   As   Lord   Denning   said   it   would   be   idle   to
expect   every   statutory   provision   to   be   drafted   with
divine   prescience   and   perfect   clarity.   As   Judge
Learned   Hand   said,   we   must   not   make   a   fortress
out   of   dictionary   but   remember   that   statutes   must
have   some   purpose   or   object,   whose   imaginative
discovery   is   judicial   craftsmanship.   We   need   not
always   cling   to   literalness   and   should   seek   to
endeavour   to   avoid   an   unjust   or   absurd   result.   We
should not  make a  mockery  of legislation.  To  make
sense  out  of   an  unhappily  worded  provision,  where
the   purpose   is   apparent   to   the   judicial   eve   “some”
violence   to   language   is   permissible.   (See   K.P.
Varghese   v.   ITO   [(1981)   4   SCC   173,   180­82   :   1981
SCC   (Tax)   293,   300­302   :   (1981)   131   ITR   597,
604­606]   and   Luke   v.   Inland   Revenue
Commissioner   [(1964) 54 ITR 692 (HL)] .)”
43. It   could   thus   be   seen   that   this   Court   has   held   that   the
court   should   not   always   cling   to   literal   interpretation   and
should endeavor to avoid an unjust or absurd result.  The court
35

should   not   permit   a   mockery   of   legislation.     It   has   been   held
that   to   make   sense   out   of   an   unhappily   worded   provision,
where   the   purpose   is   apparent   to   the   judicial   eye,   ‘some’
violence to language is also permissible.
44. If   the   interpretation   as   placed   by   the   High   Court   is
accepted,   it   will   lead   to   an   absurd   and   anomalous   situation
wherein   on   one   hand,   the   respondent   No.1,   who   was   selected
and   appointed   by   the   State   Government   for   the   KDM
Corporation,   though   would   be   an   employee   of   the   KDM
Corporation, the KDM Corporation would not be in a position to
initiate   departmental   proceedings   against   him,   even   if   he   is
found to have indulged into serious misconduct.   On the other
hand, since the respondent No.1 is not an employee of the State
Government,   the   State   Government   also   would   not   be   in   a
position to initiate any departmental proceedings against him. 
45. We have no hesitation in holding that the intention of the
legislature would not have been to lead to such an absurd and
anomalous situation.   A legislative intent cannot be to leave an
36

employee   scot­free   though   he   has   indulged   into   serious
misconduct.   We are therefore of the considered view that on a
harmonious   construction   of   sub­section   (9)   of   Section   2,
Sections 39A and 56 of the MMC Act, the Commissioner of the
Municipal   Corporation   will   have   the   power   to   suspend   or
initiate   departmental   proceedings   against   an   AMC,   who   is   an
officer,   superior   in   rank   to   the   Assistant   Commissioner.
However,   in   case   of   suspension   of   such   an   officer,   the   only
requirement   would   be   to   report   to   the   Corporation,   with
reasons   thereof,   and   if   such   a   suspension   is   not   confirmed   by
the Corporation within a period of six months from the date of
such   suspension,   the   same   shall   come   to   an   end.     In   our
considered   view,   any   other   interpretation   would   lead   to
absurdity and anomaly, and therefore will have to be avoided.
46. We find that the appeals deserve to be allowed on another
rule  of  interpretation,  that   the  statute  has   to  be  interpreted in
such a manner that it preserves its workability.   Recently, this
Court,   in   the   case   of   Sanjay   Ramdas   Patil   v.   Sanjay   and
37

Others 9
, has referred to the earlier judgments of this Court and
observed thus:
“ 36.   …..It   will   be   relevant   to   refer   to   the
observations   of   this   Court   in   State   of   T.N.   v.   M.K.
Kandaswami   [ State   of   T.N.   v.   M.K.   Kandaswami ,
(1975)   4   SCC   745   :   1975   SCC   (Tax)   402]   :   (SCC   p.
751, para 26)
“ 26 .   …   If   more   than   one   construction   is
possible,   that   which   preserves   its
workability, and efficacy is to be preferred
to the one which would render it otiose or
sterile.”
37.   This   Court   in   CIT   v.   Hindustan   Bulk
Carriers   [ CIT   v.   Hindustan   Bulk   Carriers ,   (2003)   3
SCC 57] has observed thus : (SCC p. 73, para 15)
“ 15 . A statute is designed to be workable
and   the   interpretation   thereof   by   a   court
should   be   to   secure   that   object   unless
crucial omission or clear direction makes
that   end   unattainable.
(See   Whitney   v.   IRC   [ Whitney   v.   IRC ,   1926
AC   37   :   10   Tax   Cas   88   (HL)   :   95   LJKB
165 : 134 LT 98] , AC at p. 52 referred to
in   CIT   v.   S.   Teja   Singh   [ CIT   v.   S.   Teja
Singh ,   AIR   1959   SC   352   :   (1959)   35   ITR
408]   and   Gursahai
Saigal   v.   CIT   [ Gursahai   Saigal   v.   CIT ,   AIR
1963 SC 1062 : (1963) 48 ITR 1] .)”
9   (2021) 10 SCC 306
38

38.   In   Balram   Kumawat   v.   Union   of   India   [ Balram
Kumawat   v.   Union of India , (2003) 7 SCC 628] , this
Court   observed   thus   :   (SCC   pp.   636­37,   paras   25­
26)
“ 25 .   A   statute   must   be   construed   as   a
workable instrument.   Ut res magis  valeat
quam   pereat   is   a   well­known   principle   of
law.   In   Tinsukhia   Electric   Supply   Co.
Ltd.   v.   State   of   Assam   [ Tinsukhia   Electric
Supply   Co.   Ltd.   v.   State   of   Assam ,   (1989)
3   SCC   709]   this   Court   stated   the   law
thus : (SCC p. 754, paras 118­20)
‘ 118 .   The   courts   strongly   lean
against   any   construction   which
tends  to   reduce  a  statute  to  futility.
The   provision   of   a   statute   must   be
so   construed   as   to   make   it   effective
and   operative,   on   the   principle   “ ut
res  magis valeat  quam pereat ”. It is,
no   doubt,   true   that   if   a   statute   is
absolutely   vague   and   its   language
wholly   intractable   and   absolutely
meaningless,   the   statute   could   be
declared   void   for   vagueness.   This   is
not   in   judicial   review   by   testing   the
law   for   arbitrariness   or
unreasonableness   under   Article   14;
but   what   a   court   of   construction,
dealing   with   the   language   of   a
statute,   does   in   order   to   ascertain
from, and accord to, the statute the
meaning   and   purpose   which   the
39

legislature   intended   for   it.
In   Manchester   Ship   Canal
Co.   v.   Manchester   Racecourse
Co.   [ Manchester   Ship   Canal
Co.   v.   Manchester   Racecourse   Co. ,
(1900) 2 Ch 352 : 69 LJCh 850 : 83
LT   274]   Farwell,   J.   said:   (Ch   pp.
360­61)
“Unless   the   words   were   so
absolutely   senseless   that   I   could
do   nothing   at   all   with   them,   I
should   be   bound   to   find   some
meaning, and not to declare them
void for uncertainty.”
119 .   In   Fawcett   Properties
Ltd.   v.   Buckingham   County
Council   [ Fawcett   Properties
Ltd.   v.   Buckingham   County   Council ,
(1960) 3  WLR  831  : (1960) 3  All  ER
503   (HL)]   Lord   Denning   approving
the dictum of Farwell, J., said: (WLR
p. 849 : All ER p. 516)
“But   when   a   statute   has   some
meaning,   even   though   it   is
obscure,   or   several   meanings,
even   though   there   is   little   to
choose   between   them,   the   courts
have   to   say   what   meaning   the
statute   is   to   bear,   rather   than
reject it as a nullity.”
40

120 . It is, therefore, the court's duty
to   make   what   it   can   of   the   statute,
knowing that the statutes are meant
to   be   operative   and   not   inept   and
that   nothing   short   of   impossibility
should   allow   a   court   to   declare   a
statute   unworkable.
In   Whitney   v.   IRC   [ Whitney   v.   IRC ,
1926   AC   37   :   10   Tax   Cas   88   (HL)   :
95   LJKB   165   :   134   LT   98]   Lord
Dunedin said : (AC p. 52)
“A   statute   is   designed   to   be
workable,   and   the   interpretation
thereof   by   a   court   should   be   to
secure   that   object,   unless   crucial
omission or clear direction makes
that end unattainable.” ’
26 .   The   courts   will   therefore   reject   that
construction   which   will   defeat   the   plain
intention   of   the   legislature   even   though
there   may   be   some   inexactitude   in   the
language   used.
[See   Salmon   v.   Duncombe   [ Salmon   v.   Dun
combe ,   (1886)   LR   11   AC   627   (PC)   :   55
LJPC   69   :   55   LT   446]   (AC   at   p.   634).]
Reducing   the   legislation   futility   shall   be
avoided and in a case where the intention
of   the   legislature   cannot   be   given   effect
to,   the   courts   would   accept   the   bolder
construction   for   the   purpose   of   bringing
about an effective result.”
41

39.   It could thus be seen that the Court will have to
prefer   an   interpretation   which   makes   the   statute
workable.   The   interpretation   which   gives   effect   to
the   intention   of   the   legislature,   will   have   to   be
preferred. The interpretation which brings about the
effect   of   result,   will   have   to   be   preferred   than   the
one   which   defeats   the   purpose   of   the
enactment……”
47. We   are   of   the   considered   view   that   the   legislature   could
not have intended a situation, wherein though the post of AMC
is   created   by   the   State   Government   and   a   suitable   person   is
appointed by it and though a person appointed on the said post
becomes   an   employee   of   the   Corporation,   there   would   be   no
provision   in   the   statute   to   initiate   departmental   proceedings
against   him.     If   such   an   interpretation   is   accepted,   it   would
lead to absurdity and create a vacuum. In our opinion, in order
to avoid such a situation, the interpretation as placed by us on
the   aforesaid   provisions   of   the   MMC   Act   will   have   to   be
preferred. 
48. Insofar   as   the   contention   raised   on   behalf   of   respondent
No.1   that   the   term   “competent   authority”   as   used   in   sub­
42

section (1) of Section 56 of the MMC Act will have to be read as
a “competent authority” in respect of appointments to be made
for   the   posts   in   Chapter   IV   is   concerned,   we   are   unable   to
accept   the   said   contention.     Such   a   restrictive   meaning   would
render   the   legislation   otiose.       In   any   event,   it   is   to   be   noted
that   though   a   Transport   Manager   is   appointed   under   Section
40   of   the   MMC   Act,   which   is  a  part   of   Chapter  II,   a   Transport
Manager   is   specifically   referred   to   in   clause   (b)   of   sub­section
(1) of Section 56 of the MMC Act which is a part of Chapter IV
and   empowers   the   Commissioner   to   suspend   his   services,
however, with a requirement of reporting the same with reasons
to the Corporation.   It is thus clear that if the legislative intent
was   to   give   a   narrower   meaning   to   the   term   “competent
authority”,   only   to   mean   such   authorities   who   were   found   in
Chapter   IV,   then   there   would   have   been   no   reference   in   sub­
section (1) of Section 56 of the MMC Act to Transport Manager,
who   is   appointed   under   Chapter   II   of   the   MMC   Act.     We
therefore   find   that   the   contention   in   that   regard   needs   to   be
rejected.
43

49. We   are   therefore   of   the   considered   view   that   the   High
Court has totally erred in setting aside the suspension and the
departmental   proceedings   initiated   against   respondent   No.1.
The effect of the impugned judgment is that the respondent No.
1, who has been,   prima facie , found to be involved in a serious
misconduct,   has   been   left   scot­free   without   requiring   to   face
any   departmental   proceedings   and   directed   to   be  reinstated   in
services. 
50. Insofar   as   the   prolonged   suspension   of   the   respondent
No.1   is   concerned,   the   respondent   No.1   has   relied   on   the
judgments   of   this   Court   in   the   cases   of   Ajay   Kumar
Choudhary  (supra) and  State of Tamil Nadu represented by
Secretary to Government (Home) v. Promod Kumar, IPS and
Another 10
.  Insofar as the judgment of this Court in the case of
Ajay   Kumar   Choudhary   (supra)   is   concerned,   though   this
Court   has   deprecated   the   protracted  period   of   suspension   and
repeated   renewal   thereof,   in   the   facts   of   the   said   case,   this
10   (2018) 17 SCC 677
44

Court found that since the appellant therein was served with a
charge­sheet, the  direction   issued  in  the  said  case  may   not   be
relevant to him any longer. 
51. Insofar   as   the   judgment   of   this   Court   in   the   case   of
Promod Kumar, IPS   (supra) is concerned, this Court observed
thus:
“ 24.   ….There   cannot   be   any   dispute   regarding   the
power   or   jurisdiction   of   the   State   Government   for
continuing   the   first   respondent   under   suspension
pending   criminal   trial.   There   is   no   doubt   that   the
allegations   made   against   the   first   respondent   are
serious in nature. However, the point is whether the
continued   suspension   of   the   first   respondent   for   a
prolonged period is justified.”
52. In   the   said   case,   the   respondent   No.1   therein   was
suspended   for   more   than   six   years.     This   Court   found   that   no
useful   purpose   would   be   served   by   continuing   the   respondent
No.1 therein under suspension any longer.
53. We find that in the present case, it is the respondent No.1
who,   though   called   upon   to   participate   in   the   departmental
proceedings, has on his own, chosen not to participate therein.
45

It is the respondent  No.1, who had objected to the  initiation of
the   departmental   proceedings   by   the   Commissioner   on   the
ground   of   jurisdiction   and   refused   to   participate   in   the
departmental   proceedings.     We   therefore   find   that   the
respondent No.1 cannot be permitted to take benefit of his own
wrong.     In   any   case,   we   find   that   the   issue   of   prolonged
suspension   would   be   taken   care   of   by   directing   the
departmental   proceedings   to   be   completed   within   a   stipulated
period   but   the   suspension   of   respondent   No.1   would   continue
till then.  
54. W e   find   that   the   impugned   judgment   passed   by   the   High
Court is not sustainable in law.  
55. In   the   result,   the   appeals   are   allowed   in   the   following
terms:  
(i) The impugned judgment dated 6 th
 April 2021, passed by
the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in Writ Petition
(ST.) No. 3599 of 2020 is quashed and set aside;  
46

(ii) The   Writ   Petition   (ST.)   No.   3599   of   2020   filed   by   the
respondent No.1 before the High Court of Judicature at
Bombay is dismissed; 
(iii) The   departmental   proceedings   initiated   against
respondent   No.1   are   directed   to   be   completed   as
expeditiously   as   possible   and   in   any   case,   within   a
period   of   four   months   from   the   date   of   this   judgment.
The   respondent   No.1   would   continue   to   be   under
suspension  till the conclusion of the  said departmental
proceedings; and
(iv) Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of in
the above terms. No order as to costs.
..…..….......................J.
[L. NAGESWARA RAO]
.…….........................J.       
[B.R. GAVAI]
NEW DELHI;
MARCH 31, 2022.
47