/2022 INSC 0279/
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION 
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2912  OF 2022
[Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.26855 of
2018]
DENTAL COUNCIL OF INDIA  ...APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
BIYANI SHIKSHAN SAMITI & ANR.     ...RESPONDENT(S)
JUDGMENT
B.R. GAVAI, J.
1. Leave granted. 
2. The   present   appeal   challenges   the   judgment   and   order   of
the   Division   Bench   of   the   High   Court   of   Judicature   for
Rajasthan,   Bench   at   Jaipur,   dated   24 th
  April,   2018,   passed   in
D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 3260 of 2017, thereby  allowing  the
writ   petition   filed   on   behalf   of   the   respondent   No.1­Biyani
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Shikshan   Samiti   (hereinafter   referred   to   as   “the   respondent
No.1”) and striking down the Notification dated 21 st
  May, 2012
(hereinafter   referred   to   as   “the   impugned   Notification”),   vide
which   the   appellant­Dental   Council   of   India   (hereinafter
referred to as “the Council”), had substituted Regulation 6(2)(h)
of   the   Dental   Council   of   India   (Establishment   of   New   Dental
Colleges,   Opening   of   New   or   Higher   Course   of   Studies   or
Training and Increase of Admission Capacity in Dental Colleges)
Regulations, 2006 (hereinafter referred to as “the Regulations”),
on   the   ground   of   the   same   being   inconsistent   with   the
provisions   of   the   Dentists   Act,   1948   (hereinafter   referred   to   as
“the said Act”) and also being  violative of Articles 14 and 19(1)
(g) of the Constitution of India.  
3. The facts in the present case are not in dispute. 
4. The respondent No. 1 had submitted an application to the
Government   of   India   for   grant   of   permission   for   establishment
of   dental   college   from   academic   year   2012­2013   on   24 th
2

September, 2011.  This was after the Letter of Intent was issued
by   the   State   Government   on   23 rd
  September,   2011.     The
respondent No. 2 – Union of India, through Secretary, Ministry
of   Health   and   Family   Welfare   (Dental   Education   Section)
[hereinafter   referred   to   as   “the   respondent   No.2”),   noticed
certain deficiencies in the proposal of the respondent No.1 and
vide its letter dated 7 th
  October, 2011, required the respondent
No.1 to cure the said deficiencies.  
5. After exchange of certain communications, on 6 th
 January,
2012,   the   respondent   No.2,   returned   the   application   of   the
respondent  No.1  along   with  demand  draft  of Rs.6 lakh,  on  the
ground that deficiencies pointed out were not cured prior to 31 st
December, 2011, i.e., the last date for curing the deficiencies.  
6. In   the   meantime,   the   Government   of   Rajasthan   issued
Essentiality Certificate to the respondent No.1 on 11 th
 January,
2012.   However,   on   17 th
  February,   2012,   the   respondent   No.2
declined   to   reconsider   the   application/request   of   the
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respondent   No.1,   on   the   grounds   stated   in   its   earlier   letter,
dated   6 th
  January,   2012.       As   such,   the   request   of   the
respondent No.1 for  reconsideration  of its proposal  came to be
rejected by the respondent No.2, vide its communication dated
17 th
 February, 2012.  
7. In  the meantime, vide the  impugned Notification, existing
Regulation   6(2)(h)   of   the   Regulations   was   substituted   by
amended   Regulation   6(2)(h)   on   21 st
  May,   2012.     Respondent
No.1   again   submitted   its   fresh   application   on   28 th
  September,
2012 for academic year 2013­2014.  The same was returned by
the   respondent   No.2  vide its  order  dated  31 st
  December,  2012,
on   the   ground   that   the   proposal/application   was   not   in
compliance   with   the   amended   Regulation   6(2)(h)   of   the
Regulations.     On   23 rd
  January,   2013,   the   respondent   No.1
thereafter wrote a letter to the respondent No.2, stating therein
that   since   Essentiality   Certificate   was   issued   to   it   on   11 th
January, 2012, the impugned Notification was not applicable to
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it and requested for reconsideration of its application under the
unamended   Regulation   6(2)(h)   of   the   Regulations.     The
respondent No.2 rejected the application of the respondent No.1
vide its order dated 5 th
 March, 2013.  
8. The   respondent   No.1   challenged   the   order   passed   by   the
respondent No.2 rejecting the request for reconsideration of its
application before the learned single judge of the High Court of
Judicature for Rajasthan, Bench at Jaipur, by way of S.B. Civil
Writ   Petition   No.15090   of   2016.     The   respondent   No.1   further
sought a direction to reconsider the application submitted by it
on   24 th
  September,   2011   for   establishment   of   a   new   dental
college   for   academic   session   2017­2018.     The   learned   single
judge   of   the   High   Court,   vide   judgment   and   order   dated   3 rd
November,   2016,   finding   no   merit   in   the   writ   petition,
dismissed the same. The respondent No.1 thereafter filed a writ
petition before the Division Bench being D.B. Civil Writ Petition
No.   3260   of   2017,   challenging   the   impugned   Notification
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amending   Regulation   6(2)(h)   of   the   Regulations.     The
respondent   No.1   also   sought   a   prayer   for   direction   to   the
respondent   No.2,   for   reconsidering   its   application,   dated   28 th
September, 2012, for establishment of a new Dental College for
academic   session   2018­2019   and   for   subsequent   academic
sessions. By the impugned judgment and order dated 24 th
 April,
2018,   the   Division   Bench   of   the   High   Court   allowed   the   said
writ   petition   by   striking   down   the   impugned   Notification   and
directed   the   respondent   No.   2   to   reconsider   the   case   of   the
respondent   No.1   in   the   light   of   the   observations   made   in   the
impugned   judgment   and   order.     Being   aggrieved   thereby,   the
present appeal has been preferred by the Council. 
9. We   have   heard   Shri   Gaurav   Sharma,   learned   counsel
appearing   on   behalf   of   the   Council,   Ms.   Aishwarya   Bhati,
learned Additional Solicitor General (“ASG” for short) appearing
on   behalf   of   the   respondent   No.2   and   Ms.   Shobha   Gupta,
learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent No.1.
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10. Shri Gaurav Sharma, learned counsel, would submit that
the   Division   Bench   of   the   High   Court   has   grossly   erred   in
allowing   the   writ   petition.     He   submits   that   the   Council   is   an
expert statutory  body duly constituted under  the said Act.   He
submits   that   the   said   Act   empowers   the   Council   to   make
Regulations   for   various   aspects   concerned   with   Dental
Education,   including   prescribing   requirement   of   minimum
standards.     He   submits   that   the   Council,   after   examining
various   aspects,   had   found   it   necessary   to   amend   Regulation
6(2)(h)   of   the   Regulations.     He   submits   that   this   was   done   for
providing   better   teaching   facilities   to   the   students   and   for
improving   the   standards   of   education.     He   submits   that   the
Division Bench has grossly erred in holding that it was beyond
the   powers   of   the   Council   to   make   delegated   legislation.     He
submits   that,   in   any   case,   the   finding   of   the   High   Court   that
the impugned Notification was violative of Articles 14 and 19(1)
(g) of the Constitution of India, is totally erroneous.  
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11. Ms.   Aishwarya   Bhati,   learned   ASG   also   supports   the
submission   made   on   behalf   of   the   Council.     Relying   on   the
judgment of this Court in the case of   Dental Council of India
vs.   Subharti   K.K.B.   Charitable   Trust   and   Another 1
,   she
submits  that  the   High  Court  ought   not   to  have  interfered  with
the impugned Notification, since the Regulations were made by
the   expert   body   in   accordance   with   the   provisions   of   the   said
Act.  
12. Ms.   Shobha   Gupta,   learned   counsel   appearing   on   behalf
of the respondent No.1, on the contrary, would submit that the
High Court has rightly quashed the impugned Notification. She
submits that the impugned Notification has no nexus with the
object sought to be achieved.  She submits that there is a huge
shortage of Dentists in the country and therefore, the object of
the   legislation   should   be   to   encourage   establishment   of   more
Dental Colleges rather than providing a requirement which will
1  (2001) 5 SCC 486
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restrict   the   number   of   new   Dental   Colleges.     On   facts,   she
submits   that   there   is   no   medical   college   within   the   vicinity   of
100 kms. from the place at which the respondent No.1 proposes
to start a new Dental College.   She submits that the impugned
Notification,   therefore,   violates   the   fundamental   rights   of   the
students   to   take   dental   education   as   well   as   the   fundamental
right   of   the   respondent   No.1   to   establish   an   educational
institution under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India.  
13. For   considering   the   rival   submissions,   it   will   be
appropriate   to   refer   to   certain   provisions   of   the   said   Act.
Section   3   of   the   said   Act   requires   the   Central   Government   to
constitute   a   Council   consisting   of   members   named   therein.
Section   10   of   the   said   Act   deals   with   recognition   of   dental
qualifications.     Section   10A   of   the   said   Act   deals   with
permission for establishment of new dental college, new courses
of   study,   etc.     Sub­section   (1)   of   Section   10A   of   the   said   Act
puts   restriction   on   the   establishment   of   an   authority   or
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institution for a course of study or training which would enable
a   student   of   such   course   or   training   to   qualify   himself   for   the
grant   of   recognized   dental   qualification;   it   also   imposes   a
restriction   on   opening   a   new   or   higher   course   of   study   or
training,   or   increase   the   admission   capacity   in   any   course   of
study or training, including a post­graduate course of study or
training.     It   is   provided   that   no   person   can   establish   an
authority   or   institution   for   dental   education   and   that   no
authority   or   institution   can   open   a   new   or   higher   course   of
study or training, including a post­graduate course of study or
training,   or   increase   its   admission   capacity   without   the   prior
permission   of   the  Central  Government.     Sub­sections   (2)  to   (4)
of   Section   10A   of   the   said   Act   deal   with   the   procedure   to   be
followed for making an application for permission to start a new
or   higher   course   of   study   or   training   or   increase   of   intake
capacity  in any  course of  study  or  training.   Sub­section  (5) of
Section   10A   of   the   said   Act   is   a   deeming   provision,   which
10

provides   that   if   the   Central   Government   fails   to   pass   an   order
on the scheme/application submitted by the applicant within a
period   of   one   year   from   the   date   of   submitting   the
scheme/application, such scheme/application shall be deemed
to  have been  approved by  the Central Government  in the form
in which it was submitted.  It also provides that the permission
of the Central Government required under sub­section (1) shall
also be deemed to have been granted. Sub­section (6) of Section
10A of the said Act provides for extension of the period provided
in sub­section (5) by entitling an applicant for the extension of
the   period   for   furnishing   the   particulars   called   for   by   the
Council or by the Central Government.  
14. It   will   be  apposite   to   reproduce  sub­section   (7)   of  Section
10A of the said Act, since the same fell for consideration before
the   Division   Bench   of   the   High   Court   while   allowing   the   writ
petition.  It reads thus: 
11

  “ 10A.   Permission   for  establishment   of
new   dental   college,   new   courses   of
study, etc .—(1) …………………………
(2)………………………………………………
xxx
(7)   The   Council,   while   making   its
recommendations   under   clause   ( b )   of
sub­section   (3)   and   the   Central
Government,   while   passing   an   order
either   approving   or   disapproving   the
scheme under  sub­section (4), shall have
due   regard   to   the   following   factors,
namely:—
( a )   whether   the   proposed   authority
or   institution   for   grant   of
recognised   dental   qualification   or
the   existing   authority   or
institution seeking  to open a new
or   higher   course   of   study   or
training, would be in a position to
offer   the   minimum   standards   of
dental   education   in   conformity
with   the   requirements   referred   to
in   Section   16­A   and   the
regulations   made   under   sub­
section (1) of Section 20;
( b )   whether   the   person   seeking   to
establish   an   authority   or
institution   or   the   existing
authority or institution seeking to
open   a   new   or   higher   course   of
study   or   training   or   to   increase
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its   admission   capacity   has
adequate resources;
( c )   whether   necessary   facilities   in
respect   of   staff,   equipment,
accommodation,   training   and
other   facilities   to   ensure   proper
functioning   of   the   authority   or
institution or conducting the new
course   of   study   or   training   or
accommodating   the   increased
admission   capacity   have   been
provided   or   would   be   provided
within   the   time­limit   specified   in
the scheme;
( d )   whether   adequate   hospital
facilities,   having   regard   to   the
number   of   students   likely   to
attend   such   authority   or
institution   or   course   of   study   or
training   or   as   a   result   of   the
increased   admission   capacity
have   been   provided   or   would   be
provided   within   the   time­limit
specified in the scheme;
( e )   whether   any   arrangement   has
been   made   or   programme   drawn
to   impart   proper   training   to
students   likely   to   attend   such
authority   or   institution   or   course
of   study   or   training   by   persons
having   the   recognised   dental
qualifications;
13

( f )   the   requirement   of   manpower   in
the   field   of   practice   of   dentistry;
and
( g )   any   other   factors   as   may   be
prescribed.”
15. It   could   thus   be   seen   that   the   Council,   while   making   its
recommendations   and   the   Central   Government,   while   passing
an order, are required to take into consideration various factors
as   are   enumerated   in   clauses   (a)   to   (g)   of   sub­section   (7)   of
Section 10A of the said Act.  
16. Section 20 of the said Act empowers the Council, with the
approval   of   the   Central   Government,   to   make   Regulations.     It
will be apposite to refer to the relevant part of Section 20 of the
said Act, which reads thus:
“ 20. Power to make regulations.­ (1) The
Council   may,   with   the   approval   of   the
Central   Government,   by   notification   in
the Official Gazette, make regulations not
inconsistent   with   the   provisions   of   this
Act   to   carry   out   the   purposes   of   this
Chapter.
14

(2) In   particular   and   without   prejudice
to   the   generality   of   the   foregoing   power
such regulations may­
(a) ……………………………………………
(b) ……………………………………………
xxx xxx xxx
(fb) prescribe   any   other   factors   under
clause   (g)   of   sub­section   (7)   of
section 10A”
17. It   could   thus   be   seen   from   the   conjoint   reading   of   clause
(g)   of   sub­section   (7)   of   Section   10A   and   clause   (fb)   of   sub­
section (2) of Section 20 of the said Act that the Council is also
empowered to take into consideration any other factors as may
be   prescribed   and   also   entitled   to   make   Regulations   for
prescribing  any  other  factor  under  clause (g) of  sub­section  (7)
of Section 10A.  
18. It   will   also   be   relevant   to   refer   to   the   provision   of
Regulation   6(2)(h)   as   it   existed   prior   to   the   impugned
Notification   and   the   amended   provision   after   the   impugned
Notification was given effect to.  They read thus:
15

“ Regulation   6(2)(h)   prior   to   impugned
Notification dated 21    st
    May, 2012
6 .  Eligibility and qualifying criteria .­ 
(1) …………………………………………..
(2)   The   organizations   under   sub­
regulation   (1)   shall   qualify   to   apply   for
permission to establish a dental college if
the following conditions are fulfilled:­ 
(a) …………………………………………..
(b)  …………………………………………..
xxx
(h) the   applicant   owns   and   manages   a
General   Hospital   of   not   less   than   100
beds   as   per   Annexure   I   with   necessary
infrastructure   facilities   including
teaching   pre­clinical,   para­clinical   and
allied   medical   sciences   in   the   campus   of
the proposed dental college, 
or
the   proposed   dental   college   is   located   in
the   proximity   of   a   Government   Medical
College   or   a   Medical   College   recognised
by   the   Medical   Council   of   India   and   an
undertaking of the said Medical College to
the   effect   that   it   would   facilitate   training
to   the   students   of   the   proposed   dental
college   in   the   subjects   of   Medicine,
16

Surgery   and   Allied   Medical   Sciences   has
been obtained, 
or
where   no   Medical   College   is   available   in
the   proximity   of   the   proposed   dental
college,   the   proposed   dental   college   gets
itself   tied   up   at   least   for   5   years   with   a
Government   General   Hospital   having   a
provision of at least 100 beds and located
within   a   radius   of   10   K.M.   of   the
proposed   dental   college   and   the   tie­up   is
extendable  till  it  has  its  own  100  bedded
hospital   in   the   same   premises.   In   such
cases,   the   applicant   shall   produce
evidence   that   necessary   infrastructure
facilities   including   teaching   pre­clinical,
para­clinical   and   allied   medical   sciences
are owned by the proposed dental college
itself; 
Regulation   6(2)(h)   after   the   impugned
Notification dated 21    st
    May, 2012
6 .  Eligibility and qualifying criteria .­ 
(1) …………………………………………..
(2)   The   organizations   under   sub­
regulation   (1)   shall   qualify   to   apply   for
permission to establish a dental college if
the following conditions are fulfilled:­ 
(a) …………………………………………..
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(b)  …………………………………………..
xxx
(h) the applicant shall attach its proposed
dental college with a Government/Private
Medical   College   approved/recognised   by
the   Medical   Council   of   India   which   is
located at the distance of 10 kms. by road
from   the   proposed   dental   college   and
produce   evidence   of   the   said   Medical
College   to   the   effect   that   it   would
facilitate   training   to   the   students   of   the
proposed   dental   college   as   per
syllabus/course curriculum prescribed in
respective   undergraduate   and   post
graduate   dental   course   regulations   as
amended from time to time:­ 
Provided   that   not   more   than   one   dental
college shall be attached with the medical
college.” 
19. It   could   thus   be   seen   that   the   change   that   has   been
brought by the impugned Notification is that, though under the
unamended   Regulation   6(2)(h),   an   applicant   was   entitled   to
apply   if   he/she/it   owned   and   managed   a   General   Hospital   of
not   less   than   100   beds;   by   the   impugned   Notification,   it   has
been   made   mandatory   that   the   applicant   has   to   attach   its
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proposed   Dental   College   with   the   Government/Private   Medical
College,   approved/recognized   by   the   Medical   Council   of   India,
which is located at a distance of 10 kilometers by road from the
proposed   Dental   College.     The   distance   of   10   kilometers   has
now been increased to 30 kilometers, vide amendment dated 5 th
July, 2017.  
20.   The Division Bench of the High Court vide the impugned
judgment and order dated 24 th
 April, 2018, has allowed the writ
petition   and   quashed   the   impugned   Notification   on   three
grounds, viz., 
(i) that  it  is  violative  of  Article  19(1)(g)  of  the   Constitution
of India; 
(ii) that it is beyond the scope of the powers of the Council
to   make   delegated   legislation   as   provided   under   sub­
section (7) of Section 10A of the said Act; and 
(iii) that   it   is   violative   of   Article   14   of   the   Constitution   of
India,   inasmuch   as   the   Dental   Colleges   established
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prior   to   impugned   Notification   would   be   permitted   to
run   without   attachment   with   Medical   Colleges,
whereas,   the   Dental   Colleges   established   after   the
impugned   Notification   will   be   compelled   to   have   such
an attachment with the Medical Colleges.  
 
21. We find that the learned judges of the Division Bench have
erred on all counts.  
22. It  will  be relevant  to  refer  to  the   following  observations  of
this   Court   in   the   case   of   Indian   Express   Newspapers
(Bombay)   Private   Ltd.   and   others   vs.   Union   of   India   and
others 2
.
“ 75.   A piece of subordinate legislation does not
carry   the   same   degree   of   immunity   which   is
enjoyed   by   a   statute   passed   by   a   competent
Legislature.   Subordinate   legislation   may   be
questioned   on   any   of   the   grounds   on   which
plenary legislation is questioned. In addition it
may   also   be   questioned   on   the   ground   that   it
does not conform to the statute under which it
2   (1985) 1 SCC 641
20

is   made.   It   may   further   be   questioned   on   the
ground   that   it   is   contrary   to   some   other
statute.   That   is   because   subordinate
legislation   must   yield   to   plenary   legislation.   It
may   also   be   questioned   on   the   ground   that   it
is   unreasonable,   unreasonable   not   in   the
sense of not being reasonable, but in the sense
that it is manifestly arbitrary.” 
23. It   could   thus   be   seen   that   this   Court   has   held   that   the
s ubordinate   legislation   may   be   questioned   on   any   of   the
grounds   on   which   plenary   legislation   is   questioned.     In
addition, it  may  also  be questioned on the  ground that  it does
not   conform   to   the   statute   under   which   it   is   made.   It   may
further be questioned on the ground that it is contrary to some
other statute.  Though it may also be questioned on the ground
of   unreasonableness,   such   unreasonableness  should   not  be  in
the   sense   of   not   being   reasonable,   but   should   be   in   the   sense
that it is manifestly arbitrary.  
24. It has further been held by this Court in the said case  that
for   challenging   the   subordinate   legislation   on   the   ground   of
21

arbitrariness, it can only be done when it is found that it is not
in conformity with the statute or that it offends Article 14 of the
Constitution.     It   has   further   been   held   that   it   cannot   be   done
merely on the ground that it is not reasonable or that it has not
taken   into   account   relevant   circumstances   which   the   Court
considers relevant. 
25. The judgment of this Court in the case of  Indian Express
Newspapers   (Bombay)   Private   Ltd.   (supra)  has  been   followed
by   a   three­judge   Bench   of   this   Court   in   the   case   of   Khoday
Distilleries   Ltd.   and   others   vs.   State   of   Karnataka   and
others 3
.     It   will   be   apposite   to   refer   to   the   following
observations of this Court in the said case: 
“ 13.   It   is   next   submitted   before   us   that
the   amended   Rules   are   arbitrary,
unreasonable and cause undue hardship
and,   therefore,   violate   Article   14   of   the
Constitution.   Although   the   protection   of
Article   19(1)( g )   may   not   be   available   to
the   appellants,   the   rules   must,
undoubtedly, satisfy the test of Article 14,
3   (1996) 10 SCC 304
22

which   is   a   guarantee   against   arbitrary
action.   However,   one   must   bear   in   mind
that what is being challenged here under
Article   14   is   not   executive   action   but
delegated   legislation.   The   tests   of
arbitrary   action   which   apply   to   executive
actions   do   not   necessarily   apply   to
delegated   legislation.   In   order   that
delegated legislation can be struck down,
such   legislation   must   be   manifestly
arbitrary;   a   law   which   could   not   be
reasonably   expected   to   emanate   from   an
authority   delegated   with   the   law­making
power.   In   the   case   of   Indian   Express
Newspapers   (Bombay)   (P)   Ltd.   v.   Union   of
India   [(1985) 1 SCC 641 : 1985 SCC (Tax)
121   :  (1985)  2   SCR   287]   (SCR   at   p.  243)
this   Court   said   that   a   piece   of
subordinate legislation does not carry the
same   degree   of   immunity   which   is
enjoyed   by   a   statute   passed   by   a
competent   legislature.   A   subordinate
legislation   may   be   questioned   under
Article   14   on   the   ground   that   it   is
unreasonable;   “unreasonable   not   in   the
sense of not being  reasonable, but in the
sense   that   it   is   manifestly   arbitrary”.
Drawing a comparison between the law in
England   and   in   India,   the   Court   further
observed   that   in   England   the   Judges
would   say,   “Parliament   never   intended
the   authority   to   make   such   Rules;   they
are   unreasonable   and   ultra   vires”.   In
India,   arbitrariness   is   not   a   separate
23

ground   since   it   will   come   within   the
embargo of Article 14 of the Constitution.
But   subordinate   legislation   must   be   so
arbitrary that it could not be said to be in
conformity   with   the   statute   or   that   it
offends Article 14 of the Constitution.”
26. In   the   case   of   State   of   T.N.   and   another   vs.   P.
Krishnamurthy   and   others 4
  after   considering   the   law   laid
down   by   this   Court   earlier   in   the   cases   of   Indian   Express
Newspapers   (Bombay)   Private   Ltd.   (supra),   Supreme   Court
Employees’   Welfare   Association.   vs.   Union   of   India   and
another 5
,   Shri   Sitaram   Sugar   Company   Limited   and
another vs. Union of India and others 6
,  St. Johns Teachers
Training   Institute   vs.   Regional   Director,   National   Council
for   Teacher   Education   and   another 7
,   Rameshchandra
Kachardas   Porwal   and   others   vs.   State   of   Maharashtra
4   (2006) 4 SCC 517
5   (1989) 4 SCC 187
6   (1990) 3 SCC 223
7   (2003) 3 SCC 321
24

and   others   8
,   Union   of   India   and   another   vs.   Cynamide
India   Ltd.   and   another 9
  and   State   of   Haryana   vs.   Ram
Kishan   and   others 10
,   this   Court   has   laid   down   certain
grounds,   on   which   the   subordinate   legislation   can   be
challenged, which are as under: 
“ Whether   the   rule   is   valid   in   its
entirety?
15.   There is a presumption in favour of
constitutionality   or   validity   of   a
subordinate legislation and the burden is
upon him who attacks it to show that it is
invalid.   It   is   also   well   recognised   that   a
subordinate legislation can be challenged
under any of the following grounds:
( a ) Lack of legislative competence  to
make the subordinate legislation.
( b )   Violation   of   fundamental   rights
guaranteed   under   the   Constitution   of
India.
( c )   Violation   of   any   provision   of   the
Constitution of India.
( d ) Failure to conform to the statute
under   which   it   is   made   or   exceeding
the limits of authority conferred by the
enabling Act.
8   (1981) 2 SCC 722
9   (1987) 2 SCC 720
10   (1988) 3 SCC 416
25

( e )   Repugnancy   to   the   laws   of   the
land, that is, any enactment.
( f )   Manifest   arbitrariness/
unreasonableness   (to   an   extent   where
the   court   might   well   say   that   the
legislature   never   intended   to   give
authority to make such rules).”
27. In   the   light   of   these   guiding   principles,   we   will   have   to
examine the correctness of the findings of the learned judges of
the Division Bench in the impugned judgment and order.  
28. One   of   the   grounds   on   which   the   impugned   Notification
has been struck down is that it is beyond the scope of powers of
the   Council   under   Section   10A(7)(d)   of   the   said   Act.     The
Division   Bench   of   the   High   Court   has   relied   on   clause   (d)   of
sub­section   (7)   of   Section   10A   of   the   said   Act   to   come   to   a
conclusion that clause (d) refers to adequate hospital facilities,
having   regard   to   the   number   of   students   likely   to   attend   the
institution.     It   has   held   that   a   requirement   of   hospital   was
already   fulfilled   in   the   pre­amended   Regulation   6(2)(h)   of   the
Regulations. It has further held that clause (d) does not refer to
26

Medical   College.     It   was   therefore   held   that   the   impugned
Notification   requiring   the   Dental   Colleges   to   be   attached   with
the Government/Private Medical College was beyond the scope
of sub­section (7) of Section 10A of the said Act and, therefore,
inconsistent with the said Act.  
29. We   find   that   the   Division   Bench   has   failed   to   take   into
consideration clause (g) of sub­section (7) of Section 10A of the
said Act.  It is to be noted that whereas clauses (a) to (f) of sub­
section   (7)   of   Section   10A   of   the   said   Act   deal   with   various
factors,   clause   (g)   thereof,   which   can   be   said   to   be   a   residual
clause, enables the Council to take into consideration also any
other factor as may be prescribed.  
30. We further find that the Division Bench of the High Court
has   also   failed   to   take   into   consideration   clause   (fb)   of   sub­
section (2) of Section 20 of the said Act.   A conjoint reading  of
these   provisions   would   reveal   that   the   Council   is   also
empowered   to   take   into   consideration   any   other   factor   as   may
27

be prescribed and also to make a Regulation with regard to any
other factor under clause (g) of sub­section (7) of Section 10A of
the   said   Act.     It   could   thus   be   seen   that   it   is   within   the
competence of the Council to make Regulations prescribing any
other   conditions,   which   are   otherwise   not   found   in   clauses   (a)
to   (f)   of   sub­section   (7)   of   Section   10A   of   the   said   Act.
Challenge to the same would be permissible only on the ground
of   manifest   arbitrariness.     It   is   also   equally   settled   that   the
presumption is always with regard to the validity of a provision.
The burden is on the party who challenges the validity of such
provision.     We   find   that   the   respondent   No.1   has   failed   to
discharge   the   burden   to   show   that   the   impugned   Notification
suffers from manifest arbitrariness.      
31. Secondly, the Division Bench of the High Court found the
impugned   Notification   dated   21 st
  May,   2012   to   be   violative   of
Article   14   of   the   Constitution,   on   the   ground   that   the   Dental
Colleges   established   prior   to   impugned   Notification   would   not
28

be required to be attached with the Medical Colleges, whereas,
the   Dental   Colleges,   established   after   the   impugned
Notification,   will   be   compelled   to   be   attached   to   such   Medical
Colleges.     We   are   of   the   considered   view   that   the   Colleges
established prior to the impugned Notification and the Colleges
established/to   be   established   after   the   impugned   Notification
would form two separate classes.  The differential treatment for
different   classes   would   not   be   hit   by   Article   14   of   the
Constitution   of   India.   The   only   requirement   would   be,   as   to
whether   such   a   classification   has   a   nexus   with   the   object
sought   to   be   achieved   by   the   Act.     For   the   reasons   given
hereinafter, we find that the factors taken into consideration by
the   Council,   while   amending   Regulation   6(2)(h)   of   the
Regulations are relevant factors.  The factors have a nexus with
the   object   sought   to   be   achieved.     It   has   been   submitted   on
behalf   of   the   Council   that   the   existing   recognized   Medical
College already has a facility to impart education to about 500­
29

700   students.   Such   Medical   Colleges   have   a   full­fledged
teaching   faculty.     Such   a   faculty   would   enable   providing   a
proper   education   to   the   students   of   the   Dental   colleges   on
various   aspects   of   pre­clinical,   para­clinical   and   allied
medicine,   etc.     The   Council   has   also   taken   into   consideration
the   fact  that  the  General  Hospitals  having  bed­capacity  of  100
beds   or   more   do   not   have   experts   on   full­time   basis.     They
usually engage the services of consultant doctors, who visit the
Hospital for a very limited period.   The Council has also taken
into   consideration   the   fact   that   the   private   hospitals   do   not
have   adequate   clinical   facilities   and/or   clinical   material   and
therefore,   it   is   unlikely   that   they   will   be   able   to   impart
education  and  training   to   students.    It   has  been   submitted  on
behalf of the Council that the amended Regulation 6(2)(h) of the
Regulations   was   brought   into   effect   so   that   it   would   facilitate
training to the students of the proposed Dental Colleges as per
the   syllabus/course   curriculum   prescribed.     It,   therefore,
30

cannot   be   said   that   the   Council   has   taken   into   consideration
the factors, which are not relevant or germane for  the purpose
to be achieved.  The object to be achieved is to provide adequate
teaching   and   training   facilities   to   the   students.     If   in   the
wisdom   of   the   expert   body,   this   can   be   done   by   attaching   a
Dental College to the already existing Medical College, it cannot
be faulted with.  
32. The reason given for not permitting more than one Dental
College to be attached to the existing recognized Medical College
is   that   if   one   Dental   College   is   permitted   to   be   attached   to   a
recognized   Medical   College,   which   is   already   having   500­750
students   in   different   semesters   of   their   5­year   MBBS   course,
the   additional  students  of   the   Dental   College   may  very   well   be
absorbed   in   the   facilities   that   are   already   available   in   the
recognized  Medical  College.     However,  if  more  than  one  Dental
College is permitted to be attached, it will lead to overcrowding
of students in the Medical College. 
31

33. We are, therefore, of the considered view that the amended
Regulation   cannot   be   said   to   be   one,   which   is   manifestly
arbitrary, so as to permit the Court to interfere with it.   On the
contrary,   we   find   that   the   amended   Regulation   6(2)(h)   has   a
direct   nexus   with   the   object   to   be   achieved,   i.e.,   providing
adequate teaching and training facilities to the students.  
34. It will be apposite to refer to the following observations of
the   Division   Bench   of   the   High   Court   in   the   impugned
judgment: 
“We   fail   to   understand   as   to   how   the
earlier   provisions,   in   any   manner,   were
not   sufficient   for   the   object   sought   to   be
achieved.     A   careful   reading   of   the
unamended   Regulation   6(2)(h)   shows
requirement   of   attachment   with   General
Hospital   owned   and   managed   by   the
applicant   in   the   campus   of   the   proposed
Dental College.  It was with infrastructure
facilities   including   teaching   pre­clinical,
para­clinical and allied medical sciences.
If we talk about practical training, it
would  be  more  in   the  hospital,  therefore,
the   unamended   provision   of   Regulation
32

6(2)(h) provided both i.e. attachment with
General   Hospital   or   with   a   Medical
College   with   required   facilities   of
teaching.”
35. In   this   respect,   we   would   gainfully   refer   to   the   following
observations   of   this   Court   in   the   case   of   Maharashtra   State
Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary Education and
another vs. Paritosh Bhupeshkumar Sheth and others 11
:
“ 14.   …..   whether   a   rule   or   regulation   or
other type of statutory instrument — is in
excess   of   the   power   of   subordinate
legislation   conferred   on   the   delegate   has
to   be   determined   with   reference   only   to
the   specific   provisions   contained   in   the
relevant   statute   conferring   the   power   to
make   the   rule,   regulation,   etc.   and   also
the  object and purpose of  the Act  as can
be   gathered   from   the   various   provisions
of   the   enactment.   It   would   be   wholly
wrong for the Court to substitute its own
opinion   for   that   of   the   Legislature   or   its
delegate   as   to   what   principle   or   policy
would   best   serve   the   objects   and
purposes   of   the   Act   and   to   sit   in
judgment   over   the   wisdom   and
effectiveness   or   otherwise   of   the   policy
11   (1984) 4 SCC 27
33

laid down by  the regulation­making  body
and declare a regulation to be ultra vires
merely on the ground that, in the view of
the   Court,   the   impugned   provisions   will
not   help   to   serve   the   object   and   purpose
of the Act. So long as the body entrusted
with   the   task   of   framing   the   rules   or
regulations   acts   within   the   scope   of   the
authority   conferred   on   it,   in   the   sense
that   the   rules   or   regulations   made   by   it
have a rational nexus with the object and
purpose   of   the   statute,   the   court   should
not   concern   itself   with   the   wisdom   or
efficaciousness   of   such   rules   or
regulations.”
36. This Court in unequivocal terms has held that it  would be
wholly   wrong   for   the   Court   to   substitute   its   own   opinion   for
that   of   the   Legislature   or   its   delegate   as   to   what   principle   or
policy would best serve the objects and purposes of the Act.   It
has   been   held   that   it   is   not   permissible   for   the   Court   to   sit   in
judgment over the wisdom and effectiveness or otherwise of the
policy   laid   down   by   the   regulation­making   body   and   declare   a
regulation   to   be   ultra   vires   merely   on   the   ground   that,   in   the
34

view   of   the   Court,   the   impugned   provisions   will   not   help   to
serve the object and purpose of the Act. 
37. We   find   that   the   observations   quoted   herein   above   of   the
Division   Bench   of   the   High   Court   are   totally   contrary   to   the
view   expressed   by   this   Court   in   the   case   of   Maharashtra
State   Board   of   Secondary   and   Higher   Secondary
Education and another  (supra).  
38. The   Division   Bench   of   the   High   Court   has   erred   in
substituting   its   wisdom   with   that   of   the   rule­making   body,
which is an expert body.  In this respect, it will also be apposite
to   refer   to   the   observations   of   this   Court   in   the   case   of   All
India Council for Technical Education vs. Surinder Kumar
Dhawan   and   others 12
.     After   considering   various   judgments
on the issue, this Court observed thus:
“ 16.   The  courts  are  neither  equipped nor
have   the   academic   or   technical
12   (2009) 11 SCC 726
35

background   to   substitute   themselves   in
place   of   statutory   professional   technical
bodies   and   take   decisions   in   academic
matters   involving   standards   and   quality
of technical education. If the courts start
entertaining   petitions   from   individual
institutions or students to permit courses
of   their   choice,   either   for   their
convenience or to alleviate hardship or to
provide   better   opportunities,   or   because
they   think   that   one   course   is   equal   to
another,   without   realising   the
repercussions   on   the   field   of   technical
education in general, it will lead to chaos
in   education   and   deterioration   in
standards of education.
17.   The role of statutory expert bodies on
education   and   the   role   of   courts   are   well
defined   by   a   simple   rule.   If   it   is   a
question of educational policy or an issue
involving   academic   matter,   the   courts
keep their hands off.”
39. We   are,   therefore,   of   the   considered   view   that   it   was   not
permissible   for   the   Division   Bench   of   the   High   Court   to   enter
into an area of experts and hold that the unamended provisions
ought to have been preferred over the amended provisions.  
36

40. That   leaves   us   with   the   finding   of   the   Division   Bench   of
the   High   Court   that   the   amended   Regulation   is   violative   of
Article   19(1)(g)   of   the   Constitution.   Reliance   in   this   respect   is
placed   on   the   Eleven­Judge   Constitution   Bench   judgment   of
this   Court   in   the   case   of   T.M.A.   Pai   Foundation   and   others
vs.   State  of Karnataka  and  others 13
.   In this  respect, it will
be relevant to refer to the following observations of the   Eleven ­
Judge Constitution Bench of this Court in the said case:
“54.   The right to establish an educational
institution   can   be   regulated;   but   such
regulatory measures must, in general, be
to   ensure   the   maintenance   of   proper
academic   standards,   atmosphere   and
infrastructure   (including   qualified   staff)
and   the   prevention   of   maladministration
by   those   in   charge   of   management.   The
fixing   of   a   rigid   fee   structure,   dictating
the   formation   and   composition   of   a
governing   body,   compulsory   nomination
of   teachers   and   staff   for   appointment   or
nominating   students   for   admissions
would be unacceptable restrictions.”
13   (2002) 8 SCC 481
37

41. It   can   thus   clearly   be   seen   that   the   Constitution   Bench
itself   has   held   that   the   right   to   establish   an   educational
institution   can   be   regulated.     However,   such   regulatory
measures   must,   in   general,   be   to   ensure   the   maintenance   of
proper academic standards, atmosphere and infrastructure and
the prevention of maladministration. 
42. The impugned Notification, undoubtedly, is made in order
to   ensure   the   maintenance   of   proper   academic   standards   and
infrastructure   and   as   such,   the   judgment   of   the   Constitution
Bench of this Court in the case of  T.M.A. Pai Foundation and
others   (supra),   rather   than   supporting   the   case   of   the
respondent No.1, would support the case of the Council.  
43. We   further   find   that   the   impugned   judgment   of   the
Division Bench of the  High Court is also not sustainable on the
ground of judicial propriety.   The respondent No.1 had already
filed   a   writ   petition   being   S.B.   Civil   Writ   Petition   No.   15090   of
2016, challenging the action of the Council and the respondent
38

No.2   in   returning   the   application   of   the   respondent   No.1   for
grant of recognition to new Dental College and for a direction to
reconsider   its   application   submitted   on   24 th
  September,   2011.
The said writ petition was filed in the year 2016.   The said writ
petition  was   dismissed  by   the  learned  single  judge  of   the  High
Court   by   the   judgment   and   order   dated   3 rd
  November,   2016.
After the said writ petition was rejected on 3 rd
 November, 2016,
the   respondent   No.1   filed   the   present   writ   petition   being   D.B.
Civil Writ Petition No.3260 of 2017 before the Division Bench of
the   High   Court   on   1 st
  March,   2017.     In   the   said   writ   petition,
the   prayer   was   for   challenging   the   validity   of   the   impugned
Notification and for a direction to reconsider the proposal of the
respondent   No.1.     The   impugned   Notification   could   have   very
well been challenged in the earlier writ petition, which was filed
in   the   year   2016   before   the   learned   single   judge   of   the   High
Court.     However,   having   failed   in   that   writ   petition   before   the
learned   single   judge,   the   respondent   No.1   filed   another   writ
39

petition   before   the   Division   Bench   of   the   High   Court.     Though
one   of   the   prayers   challenges   the   validity   of   the   impugned
Notification,   another   prayer   claims   for   reconsideration   of   its
proposal.     The   said   prayer   has   been   granted   by   the   Division
Bench   of   the   High   Court   by   its   impugned   judgment   and   order
dated 24 th
 April, 2018.  It could thus be seen that the prayer for
reconsideration   of   the   proposal   submitted   by   the   respondent
No.1, which was already rejected by the learned single judge of
the   High   Court   vide   order   dated   3 rd
  November,   2016   in   S.B.
Civil   Writ   Petition   No.15090   of   2016,   has  been   renewed  in   the
fresh   writ   petition   filed   in   the   year   2017   and   granted   by   the
Division Bench of the High Court.  
44. We, therefore, find that on the ground of judicial propriety
also   the   Division   Bench   of   the   High   Court   ought   not   to   have
entertained   the   writ   petition   for   a   prayer,   which   already   stood
rejected.   In   that   view   of   the   matter,   the   impugned   judgment
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and order dated 24 th
  April, 2018 passed by the Division Bench
of the High Court is not sustainable. 
45. In   the   result,   the   appeal   is   allowed.     The   impugned
judgment   and   order   dated   24 th
  April,   2018   passed   by   the
Division Bench of the High Court is quashed and set aside.  The
D.B. Civil Writ Petition No.3260 of 2017 filed by the respondent
No.1   before   the   Division   Bench   of   the   High   Court   stands
dismissed.  No order as to costs.
46. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of. 
…..….......................J.
[L. NAGESWARA RAO]
…….........................J.       
[B.R. GAVAI]
NEW DELHI;
APRIL 12, 2022
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