/2022 INSC 0285/
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.632 of 2022
[Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 2640 of 2022]
Jagjeet Singh & Ors ..... Appellant(s)
                                       VERSUS
Ashish Mishra @ Monu & Anr ..... Respondent
JUDGEMENT
Surya Kant, J:
Leave Granted.
2. The challenge is laid to an order dated 10.02.2022 passed by the
High   Court   of   Judicature   at   Allahabad,   Lucknow   bench,   whereby
Respondent   No.1   (hereinafter­“Respondent­Accused”),   has   been
enlarged   on   bail   in   a   case   under   Sections   147,   148,   149,   302,   307,
326 read with Sections 34 and 120­B  of the Indian Penal Code, 1860
(hereinafter­ “IPC”), as well as Sections 3, 25 and 30 of the Arms Act,
1959.
F ACTS     
3. In   brief,   it   is   alleged   that   several   farmers   had   gathered   in   the
Khairaitya   village   in   Lakhimpur   Kheri   District   on   29.09.2021,   to
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celebrate the birth anniversary of Sardar Bhagat Singh and to protest
against   the   Indian   Agricultural   Acts   of   2020.   During   this   gathering,
the farmers objected to certain comments made by Mr. Ajay Mishra @
Teni, Union Minister of State for Home. In the course of the meeting,
the   farmers   decided   to   organise   a   protest   against   Mr.   Ajay   Mishra   in
his   ancestral   village   on   03.10.2021.   Various   farmers’   organisations
issued  appeals to  their  members and  supporters to  participate  in the
demonstration, and pamphlets were also distributed. 
4. On   03.10.2021,   an   annual   Dangal   (wrestling)   competition   was
being organised by Ashish Mishra @ Monu, i.e., Respondent­Accused.
The   program   was   to   be   attended   by   Mr.   Ajay   Mishra,   as   well   as   Mr.
Keshav   Prasad   Maurya,   Deputy   Chief   Minister   of   the   State   of   Uttar
Pradesh,   for   whom   a   helipad   was   constructed   in   the   playground   of
Maharaja   Agrasen   Inter   College,   Tikonia.   A   crowd   of   farmers   started
gathering near the helipad in the morning of 03.10.2021. The route of
the   Chief   Guest   was   thus   changed   to   take   him   by   road.   But   the
changed road route was also passing in front of the Maharaja Agrasen
Inter College, where the protesting farmers had been gathering in large
numbers.   This   led   the   authorities   to   take   recourse   to   yet   another
alternative way to reach the Dangal venue. 
5. In the meantime, some supporters of Respondent No.1, who were
travelling   by   a   car   to   the   Dangal   venue,   were   statedly   attacked   by
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certain   farmers.   The   mirrors   of   their   vehicle(s)   were   smashed.   A
hoarding   board   that   displayed   pictures   of   Mr.   Ajay   Mishra   and   the
Respondent­Accused   was   also   damaged.   It   is   alleged   that   upon
gathering   knowledge   of   these   events,   coupled   with   the   information
that   the   route   of   the   Chief   Guest   had   to   be   changed   because   of   the
protesting   farmers,   Respondent­Accused   became   agitated.   He,
thereafter,   is   said   to   have   conspired   with   his   aides   and   confidants,
and decided to teach the protesting farmers a lesson. Respondent No.1
and   his   aides,   armed   with   weapons,   left   the   Dangal   venue   in   a
Mahindra   Thar   SUV,   a   Fortuner   vehicle   and   a   Scorpio   vehicle,   and
drove towards the farmers’ protest site. 
6. When   the   farmers   were   returning   to   their   homes   after   their
protest   was   over,   Respondent­Accused   along   with   his   associates   who
were  in  the  aforesaid  three  vehicles,  allegedly  drove  into  the  crowd  of
the   returning   farmers   and   hit   them   with   an   intention   to   kill.
Resultantly,   many   farmers   and   other   persons   were   crushed   by   the
vehicles.   The   Thar   vehicle   was   eventually   stopped.   Respondent   No.1
and   his   co­accused   Sumit   Jaiswal   then   stepped   out   of   the   Thar   and
escaped   by   running   towards   a   nearby   sugarcane   field   while   taking
cover by firing their weapons. 
7. As   a   consequence   of   this   incident,   four   farmers,   one   journalist,
the   driver   of   the   Thar   Vehicle­Hariom,   and   two   others,   were   killed.
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Nearly ten farmers suffered major and minor injuries.   
8. In   the   early   hours   of   04.10.2021,   FIR   no.   219   of   2021   was
registered on the complaint of  the Appellant  No.1, i.e, Jagjeet Singh, at
Police   Station   Tikonia   against   Respondent   No.1   and   15­20   unknown
persons,   for   causing   the   death   of   four   farmers.   It   was   alleged   that
Respondent   No.1   along   with   his   accomplices   drove   into   the   crowd   of
protesting   farmers  and  crushed  them.  It  was  further   alleged  that one
Sukhvinder   Singh   died   on   the   spot   due   to   a  fire   arm   injury.   Another
FIR 1
  was   registered   by   Sumit   Jaiswal   against   unknown   persons   and
protesting   farmers   for   having   killed   four   persons,   including   the
journalist Raman Kashyap, the driver of the Thar vehicle­Hariom and
two other supporters of the Respondent­Accused. 
9. Meanwhile,   a   PIL   was   filed   in   this   Court   expressing   serious
concerns regarding the fairness of the investigation into the incidents
of   03.10.2021.   This   Court,   on   17.11.2021,   reconstituted   the   SIT   and
new   members   were   inducted   to   carry   out   the   investigation.   Justice
(Retd.)   Rakesh   Kumar   Jain,   a   former   Judge   of   the   Punjab   and
Haryana High Court, was appointed to monitor the investigation. The
reconstituted   SIT   filed   a   chargesheet   on   03.01.2022,   wherein,   the
Respondent­Accused   was   found   to   be   the   main   perpetrator   of   the
events that took place on 03.10.2021. 
1
  FIR No. 220 of 2021 was registered under Sections 147, 323, 324, 336 and 302 of the IPC.
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10. The   Accused­Respondent   moved   an   application   for   bail   before
the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench. Vide the
impugned order dated 10.02.2022 (corrected on 14.02.2022), the High
Court   allowed   the   application   and   granted   regular   bail   to   the
Respondent­Accused.  The relief was primarily granted on four counts.
Firstly ,   the   Court   held   that   the   primary   allegation   against   the
Respondent­Accused   was   of   firing   his   weapon   and   causing   gunshot
injuries,   but   neither   the   inquest   reports   nor   the   injury   reports
revealed any firearm injury, therefore, the High Court opined that the
present   case   was   one   of   “ accident   by   hitting   with   the   vehicle ”.
Secondly ,   the   allegation   that   he   provoked   the   driver   of   the   car   could
not  be   sustained   since   the   driver   along   with   two   others,   who   were   in
the vehicle, were killed by the protesters.  Thirdly , it was noted that the
Respondent­Accused had joined the investigation.  Fourthly , the charge
sheet had been filed. 
11. Discontented   with   the   order   of   the   High   Court,   the   aggrieved
‘victims’ are before us. 
C ONTENTIONS   
12. Shri   Dushyant   Dave,   learned   Senior   Counsel   on   behalf   of   the
Appellants   vehemently   contended   that   the   High   Court   had   erred   in
overlooking   several   important   aspects,   and   instead   placed   undue
weightage   on   issues   such   as   the   absence   of   any   fire   arm   injury.
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Relying   upon   the   decision   of   this   in   Court   in   the   case   of   Mahipal   v.
Rajesh   Kumar   &   Anr. 2
,   it   was   canvassed   that   the   High   Court   had
disregarded   well­established   principles   that   govern   the   Court’s
discretion at the time of granting bail. It was further pressed that the
bail order was passed in a mechanical manner with non­application of
mind, rendering it illegal and liable to be set aside. The learned Senior
Counsel   also   pointed   out   that   during   the   course   of   the   online
proceedings,  counsel  for  the  Complainant/victims  were  disconnected,
and   were   not   heard   by   the   High   Court.   It   was   stated   that   their
application for re­hearing the bail application was also not considered
by the High Court. Learned Senior Counsel also drew our attention to
FIR No. 46 of 2022, which was filed by one Diljot Singh, a witness to
the   incident   of   03.10.2021.   The   said   witness   therein   claimed   that   on
10.03.2022, he was threatened and attacked by the supporters of the
Respondent­Accused. Alternatively, emphasis was placed on judgment
of this Court in   Alister Anthony Pariera v. State of Maharashtra 3
,
to   highlight  that if  an  act  of  rash  and  negligent  driving  was  preceded
by real intention on the part of the wrong doer to cause death, then a
charge under section 302 IPC may be attracted. 
13. On   the   other   hand,   Shri   Ranjit   Kumar,   learned   Senior   Counsel
appearing   on   behalf   of   the   Respondent   No.1,   vigorously   defended   the
2
 ( 2020) 2 SCC 118 ¶ 12 & 13 
3
  (2012) 2 SCC 648 ¶ 47
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judgment   of   the   High   Court.   It   was   submitted   that   given   the
allegations made in FIR No. 219 of 2021, the High Court was bound to
prima   facie   consider   the   issue   of   bullet   injuries.   He   further   asserted
that   the   Respondent­Accused   was   never   in   the   Thar   vehicle   and   was
instead   at   the   Dangal   venue.   Lastly,   learned   Senior   Counsel   argued
that in the event that this Court was to set aside the impugned order
and cancel the bail, the Respondent accused would be left without any
remedy   and   it   would   be   nearly   impossible   for   him   to   be   released   on
bail till the conclusion of trial. 
14. Shri   Mahesh   Jethmalani,   learned   Senior   Counsel   appearing   for
Respondent   No.2,   i.e.,   State   of   Uttar   Pradesh,   at   the   outset   argued
that a bail hearing should not be converted into a mini trail. He urged
that the Court ought to consider three basic parameters at the time of
deciding bail­ (i) the possibility of tampering with evidence; (ii) whether
the   accused   would   be   a   flight   risk;   &   (iii)   the   nature   of   the   offense.
With   respect   to   the   first   consideration,   it   was   highlighted   that   the
State Government, under the ambit of the Witness Protection Scheme,
2018,   had  provided   adequate  security,  including  armed   personnel,   to
all   the   ‘victims’   and   witnesses.   It   was   explained   that   the   State   was
regularly following up with the witnesses and that the possibility of the
accused   tampering   with   any   witness,   was   narrow.   Learned   Senior
Counsel   further   submitted   that   given   the   local   roots   of   the
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Respondent­Accused, he could not be considered as a flight risk. Shri
Jethmalani,   however,   stated   that   the   nature   of   the   offense   in   the
present   case   was   grave.   He   clarified   that   the   State   had   vehemently
opposed the bail application before the High Court and in no manner,
does it deviate from its previous stand. 
A NALYSIS     
15. Having   heard   learned   Senior   Counsels   for   the   parties   at
considerable   length,   we   find   that   the   following   questions   fall   for   our
consideration:­
A. Whether a ‘victim’ as defined under Section 2(wa) of the Code
of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter, “Cr.P.C.”) is entitled
to  be heard  at the  stage  of  adjudication of bail  application  of
an accused?
B. Whether   the   High   Court   overlooked   the   relevant
considerations   while   passing   the   impugned   order   granting
bail to the Respondent­Accused?; and 
C. If   so,   whether   the   High   Court’s   order   dated   10.02.2022   is
palpably illegal and warrants interference by this Court?
A. Victim’s right to be heard: 
16.   Until   recently,   criminal   law   had   been   viewed   on   a   dimensional
plane   wherein   the   Courts   were   required   to   adjudicate   between   the
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accused  and  the  State.  The  ‘victim’  —  the   de   facto   sufferer  of  a  crime
had no participation in the adjudicatory process and was made to sit
outside the Court as a mute spectator. However, with  the recognition
that the  ethos  of  criminal  justice  dispensation  to   prevent  and   punish
‘crime’   had   surreptitiously   turned   its   back   on   the   ‘victim’,   the
jurisprudence with respect to the rights of victims to be heard and to
participate in criminal proceedings began to positively evolve.
17. Internationally,  t he UN Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice
for the Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power, 1985, which was adopted
vide   the   United   Nations   General   Assembly   Resolution   40/34,   was   a
landmark   in   boosting   the   pro­victim   movement.   The   Declaration
defined   a   ‘victim’   as   someone   who   has   suffered   harm,   physical   or
mental   injury,   emotional   suffering,   economic   loss,   impairment   of
fundamental  rights   through  acts   or  omissions  that  are   in  violation   of
criminal   laws   operative   within   a   State,   regardless   of   whether   the
perpetrator   is   identified,   apprehended,   prosecuted   or   convicted,   and
regardless of the familial relationship between the perpetrator and the
‘victim’.   Other international bodies, such as the European Union, also
took   great   strides   in   granting   and   protecting   the   rights   of   ‘victims’
through various Covenants 4
. 
4
  The   position   of   a   victim   in   the   framework   of   Criminal   Law   and   Procedure,   Council   of
Europe Committee of Ministers to Member States, 1985; Strengthening victim's right in the
EU   communication   from   the   Commission   to   the   European   Parliament,   the   Council,   the
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Reasons, European Union, 2011;
Proposal   for   a   Directive   of   the   European   Parliament   and   of   the   Council   establishing
“Minimum Standards on the Rights, Support and Protection of Victims of Crime, European
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18. Amongst   other   nations,   the   United   States   of   America   had   also
made two enactments on the subject i.e. (i) The Victims of Crime Act,
1984 under which legal assistance is granted to the crime­victims; and
(ii) The Victims' Rights and Restitution Act of 1990. This was followed
by meaningful amendments, repeal and insertion of new provisions in
both   the   Statutes   through   an   Act   passed   by   the   House   of
Representatives as well as the Senate.   In Australia, the Legislature has
enacted South Australia Victims of Crime Act, 2001. While in Canada
there is the Canadian Victims Bill of Rights. Most of these legislations
have defined the ‘victim’ of a crime liberally and have conferred varied
rights on such victims.
19. On   the   domestic   front,   recent   amendments   to   the   Cr.P.C.   have
recognised a victim’s rights in the Indian criminal justice system.  The
genesis of such rights lies in the 154 th
  Report of the Law Commission
of   India,   wherein,   radical   recommendations   on   the   aspect   of
compensatory   justice   to   a   victim   under   a  compensation   scheme   were
made.     Thereafter,   a   Committee   on   the   Reforms   of   Criminal   Justice
System in its Report in 2003, suggested ways and means to develop a
cohesive   system   in   which   all   parts   are   to   work   in   coordination   to
achieve the common goal of restoring the lost confidence of the people
in   the   criminal   justice   system.   The   Committee   recommended   the
Union, 2011.
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rights   of   the   victim   or   his/her   legal   representative   “ to   be   impleaded
as   a   party   in   every   criminal   proceeding   where   the   charges
punishable with seven years’ imprisonment or more ”.  
20. It   was   further   recommended   that   the   victim   be   armed   with   a
right to be represented by an advocate of his/her choice, and if he/she
is   not  in   a  position   to   afford   the   same,   to   provide   an   advocate   at  the
State’s expense.   The victim’s right to participate in criminal trial and
his/her   right   to   know  the   status   of   investigation,   and   take   necessary
steps, or to be heard at every crucial stage of the criminal proceedings,
including   at   the   time   of   grant   or   cancellation   of   bail,   were   also   duly
recognised   by   the   Committee.   Repeated   judicial   intervention,   coupled
with   the   recommendations   made   from   time   to   time   as   briefly   noticed
above,   prompted   the   Parliament   to   bring   into   force   the   Code   of
Criminal   Procedure   (Amendment)   Act,   2008,   which   not   only   inserted
the   definition   of   a   ‘victim’   under   Section   2   (wa)   but   also   statutorily
recognised various rights of such victims at different stages of trial. 
21. It   is   pertinent   to   mention   that   the   legislature   has   thoughtfully
given   a   wide   and   expansive   meaning   to   the   expression   ‘victim’   which
“ means   a  person  who   has   suffered  any   loss   or   injury   caused  by
reason of the act or omission  for which  the accused person has
been   charged   and   the   expression   “victim”   includes   his   or   her
guardian or legal heir ”
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22. This   Court,   in   Mallikarjun   Kodagali   (Dead)   v.   State   of
Karnataka & Ors 5
, while dealing with questions regarding a victim’s
right to file an appeal under section 372 of Cr.P.C, observed that there
was   need   to   give   adequate   representation   to   victims   in   criminal
proceedings.   The   Court   therein   affirmed   the   victim’s   right   to   file   an
appeal   against   an   order   of   acquittal.   In   Mallikarjun   Kodagali ,
though the Court was primarily concerned with a different legal issue,
it   will   be   fruitful   in   the   present   context   to   take   note   of   some   of   the
observations made therein:
“3.   What   follows   in   a   trial   is   often   secondary   victimisation
through repeated appearances in court in a hostile or a semi­
hostile   environment   in   the   courtroom.   Till   sometime   back,
secondary   victimisation   was   in   the   form   of   aggressive   and
intimidating   cross­examination,   but   a   more   humane
interpretation of the provisions of the Evidence Act, 1872 has
made the trial a little less uncomfortable for the victim of an
offence,   particularly   the   victim   of   a   sexual   crime.   In   this
regard, the judiciary has been proactive in ensuring that the
rights   of   victims   are   addressed,   but   a   lot   more   needs   to   be
done. Today, the rights of an accused far outweigh the rights
of the  victim  of  an offence  in many respects. There  needs to
be some balancing of the concerns and equalising their rights
so   that   the   criminal   proceedings   are   fair   to   both.   [Girish
Kumar Suneja   v.   CBI, (2017) 14 SCC 809 : (2018) 1 SCC (Cri)
202]……
xxx
8.   The  rights  of  victims,  and  indeed  victimology,   is  an
evolving jurisprudence and it is more than appropriate
to   move   forward   in   a   positive   direction,   rather   than
stand still or worse, take a step backward. A voice has
5
  (2019) 2 SCC 752, ¶ 3 & 8
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been   given   to   victims   of   crime   by   Parliament   and   the
judiciary  and   that   voice   needs   to  be  heard,   and  if  not
already heard, it needs to be raised to a higher decibel
so that it is clearly heard. ”
      (Emphasis Supplied)
23. It   cannot   be   gainsaid   that   the   right   of   a   victim   under   the
amended Cr.P.C. are substantive, enforceable, and are another facet of
human   rights.     The   victim’s   right,   therefore,   cannot   be   termed   or
construed   restrictively   like   a   brutum   fulmen .     We   reiterate   that   these
rights are totally independent, incomparable, and are not accessory or
auxiliary to those of the State under the Cr.P.C. The presence of ‘State’
in   the   proceedings,   therefore,   does   not   tantamount   to   according   a
hearing to a ‘victim’ of the crime.
24. A ‘victim’ within the meaning of Cr.P.C. cannot be asked to await
the commencement of trial for asserting his/her right to participate in
the proceedings. He/She has a legally vested right to be heard at every
step   post  the   occurrence   of   an   offence.   Such   a   ‘victim’   has   unbridled
participatory rights from the stage of investigation till the culmination
of  the  proceedings  in  an   appeal  or  revision.   We  may   hasten  to  clarify
that   ‘victim’   and   ‘complainant/informant’   are   two   distinct
connotations in criminal jurisprudence. It is not always necessary that
the complainant/informant is also a ‘victim’, for even a stranger to the
act of crime can be an ‘informant’, and similarly, a ‘victim’ need not be
the complainant or informant of a felony. 
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25.   The   above   stated   enunciations   are   not   to   be   conflated   with
certain statutory provisions, such as those present in Special Acts like
the   Scheduled   Cast   and   Scheduled   Tribes   (Prevention   of   Atrocities)
Act,   1989,   where   there   is   a   legal   obligation   to   hear   the   victim   at   the
time   of   granting   bail.   Instead,   what   must   be   taken   note   of   is   that;
First ,   the   Indian   jurisprudence   is   constantly   evolving,   whereby,   the
right   of   victims   to   be   heard,   especially   in   cases   involving   heinous
crimes, is increasingly being acknowledged;  Second,  where the victims
themselves have come forward to participate in a criminal proceeding,
they   must   be   accorded   with   an   opportunity   of   a   fair   and   effective
hearing.   If   the   right   to   file   an   appeal   against   acquittal,   is   not
accompanied with the right to  be heard at the time of deciding a bail
application,   the   same   may   result   in   grave   miscarriage   of   justice.
Victims   certainly   cannot   be   expected   to   be   sitting   on   the   fence   and
watching   the   proceedings   from   afar,   especially   when   they   may   have
legitimate grievances. It is the solemn duty of a court to deliver justice
before the memory of an injustice eclipses.
26. Adverting to the case at hand, we are constrained to express our
disappointment with the manner in which the High Court has failed to
acknowledge the  right of the victims.  It is worth  mentioning  that,  the
complainant in FIR No. 219 of 2021, as well as the present Appellants,
are   close   relatives   of   the   farmers   who   have   lost   their   lives   in   the
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incident   dated   03.10.2021.   The   specific   stance   taken   by   learned
Senior   Counsel   for   the   Appellants   that   the   Counsel   for   the   ‘victims’
had got disconnected from the online proceedings and could not make
effective submissions before the High Court has not been controverted
by the Respondents. Thereafter, an application seeking a rehearing on
the   ground   that  the   ‘victims’   could   not   participate   in   the   proceedings
was   also   moved   but   it   appears   that   the   same   was   not   considered   by
the High Court while granting bail to the Respondent­Accused. 
27. We,   therefore,   answer   question   (A)   in   the   affirmative,   and   hold
that   in   the   present   case,   the   ‘victims’   have   been   denied   a   fair   and
effective   hearing   at   the   time   of   granting   bail   to   the   Respondent­
Accused. 
B. Whether the High Court overlooked relevant considerations :
28. We   may,   at   the   outset,   clarify   that   power   to   grant   bail   under
Section   439   of   Cr.P.C.,   is   one   of   wide   amplitude.   A   High   Court   or   a
Sessions   Court,   as   the   case   may   be,   are   bestowed   with   considerable
discretion while deciding an application for bail. But, as has been held
by this Court on multiple occasions, this discretion is not unfettered.
On the contrary, the High Court or the Sessions Court must grant bail
after   the   application   of   a   judicial   mind,   following   well­established
principles, and not in a cryptic or mechanical manner. 
29. Ordinarily, this Court would be slow in interfering with any order
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wherein   bail   has   been   granted   by   the   Court   below.   However,   if   it   is
found   that   such   an   order   is   illegal   or   perverse 6
,   or   is   founded   upon
irrelevant materials adding vulnerability to the order granting bail 7
, an
appellate Court will be well within its ambit in setting aside the same
and   cancelling   the   bail.   This   position   of   law   has   been   consistently
reiterated, including in the case of  Kanwar Singh Meena v. State of
Rajasthan 8
,   wherein   this   Court   set   aside   the   bail   granted   to   the
accused   on   the   premise   that   relevant   considerations   and   prima   facie
material against the accused were ignored. It was held that: 
“ 10….Each   criminal   case   presents   its   own   peculiar   factual
scenario   and,   therefore,   certain   grounds   peculiar   to   a   particular
case may have to be taken into account by the court. The court has
to   only   opine   as   to   whether   there   is   prima   facie   case   against   the
accused. The court must not undertake meticulous examination of
the   evidence   collected   by   the   police   and   comment   on   the   same.
Such   assessment  of  evidence  and premature  comments are  likely
to   deprive   the   accused   of   a   fair   trial.… The   High   Court   or   the
Sessions Court can  cancel the  bail  even in  cases where  the
order   granting   bail   suffers   from   serious   infirmities
resulting in miscarriage of justice. If the court granting bail
ignores   relevant   materials   indicating   prima   facie
involvement of the accused or takes into account irrelevant
material, which has no relevance to the question of grant of
bail   to   the   accused,   the   High   Court   or   the   Sessions   Court
would   be   justified   in   cancelling   the   bail.   Such   orders   are
against the well­recognised principles underlying the power
6
  Puran v. Rambilas & Anr., (2001) 6 SCC 338, ¶10
7
  Narendra K. Amin (Dr.) v. State of Gujarat & Anr., (2008) 13 SCC 584, ¶ 25
8
  (2012) 12 SCC 180, ¶ 10
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to grant bail. Such orders are legally infirm and vulnerable
leading   to   miscarriage   of   justice   and   absence   of
supervening   circumstances   such   as   the   propensity   of   the
accused   to   tamper   with   the   evidence,   to   flee   from   justice,
etc. would not deter the court from cancelling the bail. The
High   Court   or   the   Sessions   Court   is   bound   to   cancel   such
bail orders particularly when they are passed releasing the
accused involved in heinous crimes because they ultimately
result in weakening the prosecution case and have adverse
impact   on   the   society.   Needless   to   say   that   though   the
powers   of   this   Court   are   much   wider,   this   Court   is   equally
guided   by   the   above   principles   in   the   matter   of   grant   or
cancellation of bail.”
          (Emphasis Supplied)
30. It   will   be   beneficial   at   this   stage   to   recapitulate   the   principles
that a Court must bear in mind while deciding an application for grant
of  bail.  This   Court  in   the  case  of   Prasanta  Kumar   Sarkar   v.   Ashis
Chatterjee   &   Anr. 9
,   after   taking   into   account   several   precedents,
elucidated the following:
“ 9…However, it is equally incumbent upon the High Court to
exercise its discretion judiciously, cautiously and strictly in
compliance   with   the   basic   principles   laid   down   in   a
plethora   of   decisions   of   this   Court   on   the   point.   It   is   well
settled   that,   among   other   circumstances,   the   factors   to   be
borne in mind while considering an application for bail are:
(i) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable ground
to believe that the accused had committed the offence;
(ii) nature and gravity of the accusation;
9
 ( 2010) 14 SCC 496, ¶ 9 & 10
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(iii) severity of the punishment in the event of conviction;
(iv) danger   of   the   accused   absconding   or   fleeing,   if
released on bail;
(v) character, behaviour, means, position and standing of
the accused;
(vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated;
(vii) reasonable   apprehension   of   the   witnesses   being
influenced; and
(viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by grant of
bail .”
(Emphasis Supplied)
31. The Court in  Prasanta Kumar Sarkar  went on to note: 
“10.   It is manifest that if the High Court does not advert to
these relevant considerations and mechanically grants bail,
the said order would suffer from the vice of non­application
of mind, rendering it to be illegal. In   Masroor   [(2009) 14 SCC
286   :   (2010)   1   SCC   (Cri)   1368]   ,   a   Division   Bench   of   this
Court,   of   which   one   of   us   (D.K.   Jain,   J.)   was   a   member,
observed as follows : (SCC p. 290, para 13)
“13.   …   Though   at   the   stage   of   granting   bail   an   elaborate
examination of evidence and detailed reasons touching the merit of
the case, which may prejudice the accused, should be avoided, but
there   is   a   need   to   indicate   in   such   order   reasons   for   prima   facie
concluding   why   bail   was   being   granted   particularly   where   the
accused is charged of having committed a serious offence.”  
(Emphasis Supplied)
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32. The   aforestated   principles   have   been   affirmed   and   restated   in   a
number of subsequent decisions, including in the recent judgments of
Neeru Yadav v. State of U.P. & Anr. 10
,  Anil Kumar Yadav v. State
(NCT of Delhi) & Anr. , 11
  and  Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar & Anr. 12
.
33. Before   dealing   with   the   case   at   hand,   we   may,   at   the   cost   of
repetition,   emphasise   that   a   Court   while   deciding   an   application   for
bail,   should   refrain   from   evaluating   or   undertaking   a   detailed
assessment of evidence, as the same is not a relevant consideration at
the   threshold   stage.   While   a   Court   may   examine   prima   facie   issues,
including any reasonable grounds whether the accused committed an
offence or the severity of the offence itself, an extensive consideration
of   merits   which   has   the   potential   to   prejudice   either   the   case   of   the
prosecution   or   the   defence,   is   undesirable.   It   is   thus   deemed
appropriate   to   outrightly   clarify   that   neither   have   we   considered   the
merits   of   the   case   nor   are   we   inclined   to   comment   on   the   evidence
collected by the SIT in the present case. 
34. We   may   now   briefly   note   the   holding   of   the   High   Court   as   is
manifest   from   paragraph   25   of   the   impugned   order   which   reads   as
follows:  
“Considering   the  facts  and  circumstances  of  the  case  in   toto,   it  is
evidence   that   as   per   the   F.I.R.,   role   of   firing   was  assigned   to   the
10
 (2014) 16 SCC 508, ¶ 11
11
 (2018) 12 SCC 129, ¶ 17 & 18
12
 (2020) 2 SCC 118, ¶ 13
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applicant   for   killing   the   protestors,   but   during   the   course   of
investigation,   no   such   firearm   injuries   were   found   either   on   the
body of any of the deceased or on the body of any injured person.
Thereafter, the prosecution alleged that the applicant provoked the
driver of the vehicle for crushing the protestors, however, the driver
along with two others, who were in the vehicle, has been killed by
the   protestors.   It   is   further   evidence   that   during   the   course   of
investigation, notice was issued to the applicant and he appeared
before   the   Investigation   Officer.   It   is   also   evidence   that   charge
sheet has already been filed. In such circumstances, this Court is
of the view that the applicant is entitled to be released on bail .” 
35. We find ourselves in agreement with the learned Senior Counsel
for the Appellants that the High Court has completely lost sight of the
principles   enumerated   above,   which   conventionally   govern   a   Court’s
discretion   when   deciding   the   question   whether   or   not   to   grant   bail.
Instead   of   looking   into   aspects   such   as   the   nature   and   gravity   of   the
offence;   severity   of   the   punishment   in   the   event   of   conviction;
circumstances which are peculiar to the accused or victims; likelihood
of   the   accused   fleeing;   likelihood   of   tampering   with   the   evidence   and
witnesses   and   the   impact   that   his   release   may   have   on   the   trial   and
the society at large; the High Court has adopted a myopic view of the
evidence on the record and proceeded to decide the case on merits. 
36. The   High   Court   has   taken   into   account   several   irrelevant
considerations, whilst simultaneously ignoring judicial precedents and
established   parameters   for   grant   of   bail.   It   has   been   ruled   on
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numerous   occasions   that   a   F.I.R.   cannot   be   treated   as   an
encyclopaedia   of   events.   While   the   allegations   in   the   F.I.R.,   that   the
accused used his firearm and the subsequent post mortem and injury
reports may have some limited bearing, there was no legal necessity to
give   undue   weightage   to   the   same.   Moreover,   the   observations   on
merits of a case when the trial has yet to commence, are likely to have
an impact on the outcome of the trial proceedings.
37. Keeping   all   these   factors   cumulatively   in   mind,   we   have   no
difficulty   in   answering   question   (B)   also   in   the   affirmative.   It   is   held
that   the   order   under   challenge   does   not   conform   to   the   relevant
considerations. 
C. Whether interference is warranted by this Court:
38. As   a   natural   and   consequential   corollary   to   the   findings   under
questions (A) & (B) above, the impugned order of the High Court dated
10.2.2022 (as corrected on 14.2.2022) cannot be sustained and has to
be set aside.  Ordered accordingly.
39. As   a   sequel   thereto,   bail   bonds   of   the   respondent/accused   are
cancelled and he is directed to surrender within a week.
40. Having  held  so,   we  cannot  be  oblivious  to  what has  been  urged
on  behalf  of  the   Respondent­Accused  that  cancellation   of  bail  by  this
Court is likely to be construed as an indefinite foreclosure of his right
to seek bail.   It is not necessary to dwell upon the wealth of case law
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which,   regardless   of   the   stringent   provisions   in   a   penal   law   or   the
gravity of the offence, has time and again recognised the legitimacy of
seeking   liberty   from   incarceration.   To   put   it   differently,   no   accused
can be subjected to unending detention pending trial, especially when
the law presumes him to be innocent until proven guilty. Even where
statutory   provisions   expressly   bar   the   grant   of   bail,   such   as   in   cases
under   the   Unlawful   Activities   (Prevention)   Act,   1967,   this   Court   has
expressly ruled that after a reasonably long period of incarceration, or
for   any   other   valid   reason,   such   stringent   provisions   will   melt   down,
and   cannot   be   measured   over   and   above   the   right   of   liberty
guaranteed  under   Article  21  of  the   Constitution  ( See   Union  of   India
v. K.A. Najeeb, (2021) 3 SCC 713, ¶ 15 & 17 ). 
41. We   are,   thus,   of   the   view   that   this   Court   on   account   of   the
factors like (i) irrelevant considerations having impacted the impugned
order   granting   bail;   (ii)   the   High   Court   exceeding   its   jurisdiction   by
touching   upon   the   merits   of   the   case;   (iii)   denial   of   victims’   right   to
participate in the proceedings; and (iv) the tearing hurry shown by the
High Court in entertaining or granting bail to the respondent/accused;
can   rightfully   cancel   the   bail,   without   depriving   the   Respondent­
Accused of his legitimate right to seek enlargement on bail on relevant
considerations. 
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42.    We are thus  inclined to allay the apprehension in the mind of
learned   Senior   Counsel   for   the   Respondent­Accused   that   the
cancellation   of   bail   by   this   Court   shall   amount   to   denial   bail   to   the
Respondent­Accused till conclusion of the trial. 
43. This   Court   is   tasked   with   ensuring   that   neither   the   right   of   an
accused   to   seek   bail   pending   trial   is   expropriated,   nor   the   ‘victim’   or
the   State   are   denuded   of   their   right   to   oppose   such   a   prayer.   In   a
situation   like   this,   and   with   a   view   to   balance   the   competing   rights,
this   Court   has   been   invariably   remanding   the   matter(s)   back   to   the
High   Court   for   a   fresh   consideration. 13
  We   are   also   of   the   considered
view   that   ends   of   justice   would   be   adequately   met   by   remitting   this
case to the High Court for a fresh adjudication of the bail application
of   the   Respondent­Accused,   in   a   fair,   impartial   and   dispassionate
manner, and keeping in view the settled parameters which have been
elaborated in  paragraphs 30  & 31 of this  order. 
44.   Needless   to   say   that   the   bail   application   shall   be   decided   on
merits and after giving adequate opportunity of hearing to the victims
as   well.     If   the   victims   are   unable   to   engage   the   services   of   a   private
counsel, it shall be obligatory upon the High Court to provide them a
legal   aid   counsel   with   adequate   experience   in   criminal   law,   at   the
State’s expense.
13
  Naresh Pal Singh v. Raj Karan and Anr, (1999) 9 SCC 104, ¶2; Brij Nandan Jaiswal v. 
Munna alias Munna Jaiswal & Anr, (2009) 1 SCC 678, ¶ 12 & 13; Hari Om Yadav v. Dinesh
Singh Jaat & Anr, 2013 SCC Online SC 610, ¶ 6.
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45. Lastly, in furtherance of the order of this court dated 26.10.2021
in   Writ   Petition   (Criminal)   No.   426/2021,   and   keeping   in   mind   the
allegations   of   the   Appellants   with   respect   to   the   incident   dated
10.03.2022,   we   deem   it  appropriate   to   observe   that   if   the   aforestated
incident,   has   happened   in   the   manner   as   alleged,   the   same   should
serve   as   an   awakening   call   to   the   State   authorities   to   reinforce
adequate   protection   for   the   life,   liberty,   and   properties   of   the
eye/injured   witnesses,   as   well   as   for   the   families   of   the   deceased.
C ONCLUSION   
46. We set aside the impugned order dated 10.02.2022 (corrected on
14.2.2022) and  remit the matter back to  the High Court. Respondent
No.1 shall surrender and be taken into custody as already directed in
paragraph   39   above.   We   have   not   expressed   any   opinion   either   on
facts   or   merits,   and   all   questions   of   law   are   left   open   for   the   High
Court   to   consider   and   decide.   The   High   Court   shall   decide   the   bail
application   afresh   expeditiously,   and   preferably   within   a   period   of
three months.  The appeal is disposed of in the above terms.
………………………….. CJI.
(N.V. RAMANA)
…….……..………………… J.
(SURYA KANT)
………….…………………...J.
(HIMA KOHLI)
NEW DELHI
DATED : 18.04.2022
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