/2022 INSC 0287/
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2582 OF 2010
K.C. LAXMANA … APPELLANT(S) 
VERSUS
K.C. CHANDRAPPA GOWDA & ANR. … RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
S. ABDUL NAZEER, J.
1.   This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment
and   decree   in   Regular   Second   Appeal   No.372   of   2003   dated
03.10.2008, whereby the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore has
dismissed the appeal.
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2. K.C.   Chandrappa   Gowda   filed   a   suit   against   his   father­K.S.
Chinne   Gowda   and   one   K.C.   Laxmana   for   partition   and   separate
possession of his one­third share in the suit­schedule property and
for   a   declaration   that   the   gift/settlement   deed   dated   22.03.1980
(Ex.   P­1)   executed   by   the   first   defendant­K.S.   Chinne   Gowda   in
favour   of   the   second   defendant­K.C.   Laxmana   as   null   and   void.
According to the plaintiff, the schedule property belongs to the joint
family   consisting   of   himself,   the   first   defendant   and   one   K.C.
Subraya Gowda.   It was further contended that the first defendant
had   no   right   to   transfer   the   schedule   property   in   favour   of   the
second   defendant   as   he   is   not   a   coparcener   or   a   member   of   their
family.   Consequently,   it   was   contended   that   the   alienation   made
without the plaintiff’s consent is null and void and thus not binding
on him.
3. The   first   defendant   opposed   the   suit   by   filing   his   written
statement.     It   was   admitted   that   the   suit   schedule   property   is   a
joint   family   property.   It   was   contended   that   the   second   defendant
was brought up by the first defendant and out of love and affection
he   settled   the   suit   property   under   Ex.P­1   in   favour   of   the   second
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defendant.   It   was   further   contended   that   the   joint   family   property
was already partitioned between himself, the plaintiff and the other
son­Subbraya   Gowda   on   23.03.1990.     The   plaintiff,   having   taken
his share without any demur is not entitled to maintain the suit. It
was   also   contended   that   the   suit   was   barred   by   limitation.   The
second   defendant   had   adopted   the   written   statement   filed   by   the
first defendant.   
4. The   parties   led   evidence   in   support   of   their   respective
contentions   and   have   produced   the   documents   thereof.     The   Trial
Court,   on   appreciation   of   the   materials   on   record,   dismissed   the
suit.     Feeling   aggrieved,   the   plaintiff   filed   a   first   appeal.     The
Appellate   Court,   after   reconsideration   of   the   entire   materials   on
record and re­assessment of evidence, set aside the judgment of the
Trial Court.  It was held that the Settlement Deed at Exhibit P­1 is a
void   document.     The   plaintiff   was   granted   one­third   share   in   the
suit property.  This judgment of the Appellate Court was challenged
by   K.C.   Laxmana,   the   second   defendant   in   the   High   Court.   The
High Court, after hearing the learned counsel for the parties and on
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consideration   of   the   materials   on   record,   dismissed   the   appeal   by
the impugned order.
5. Mr.  Anand   Sanjay   M.   Nuli,   learned   counsel   appearing   for  the
appellant/second   defendant,   first   contended   that   the   High   Court
was   not   justified   in   holding   that   the   suit   was   not   barred   by
limitation.   According to him, Article 58 of the Limitation Act, 1963
is   applicable   to   the   facts   of   the   present   case.   Secondly,   it   was
argued   that   the   transfer   of   property   by   way   of   settlement   was   for
pious purpose which is permissible in law.  Therefore, he submitted
that the High Court was not justified in upholding the judgment of
the Appellate Court. 
6. On the other hand, Mr. Arvind Varma, learned senior counsel
appearing   for   the   respondent/plaintiff,   while   supporting   the
judgment   of   the   High   Court,   has   submitted   that   the   alienation   by
way   of   gift   of   joint   family   property   made   by   the   first   defendant   in
favour   of   the   second   defendant   was   void.     The   period   of   limitation
for challenging such an alienation is twelve years from the date the
alienee   takes   possession   of   the   property   under   Article   109   of   the
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Second Schedule to the Limitation Act. Therefore, he submitted that
the suit was not barred by time.
7. Having   regard   to   the   contentions   urged,   the   first   question   for
consideration is whether the suit filed by the plaintiff was barred by
limitation. 
There is no dispute that the parties to the suit are Hindus and
are   governed   by   Mitkashara   Law.     The   plaintiff   has   challenged   the
alienation   made   by   his   father­the   first   defendant,   under   Ex.P­1
which is a joint family property, in favour of the second defendant.
8. Article   58   of   the   Second   Schedule   to   the   Limitation   Act
provides for the period of limitation to file a suit to obtain any other
declaration.     The   period   of   limitation   under   this   article   is   three
years   from   the   date   when   the   right   to   sue   first   accrues.     It   is   a
residuary article governing all those suits for declaration which are
not specifically governed by any other articles in the Limitation Act.
Article 109 is the special Article to apply where the alienation of the
father   is   challenged   by   the   son   and   the   property   is   ancestral   and
the   parties   are   governed   by   Mitakshara   law.   Generally,   where   a
statute contains both general provision as well as specific provision,
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the   later   must   prevail.   Therefore,   Article   58   has   no   application   to
the instant case.  Article 109 is as under:
Description of suit Period of limitation Time   from   which
period begins to run
109.By   a   Hindu
governed   by
Mitakshara   law   to
set   aside   his
father’s   alienation
of   ancestral
property. Twelve years When   the   alienee
takes   possession   of
the property.
         
9. The   word   ‘alienation’   in   this   article   includes   ‘gift’.   In   order   to
attract   Article   109,   the   following   conditions   have   to   be   fulfilled,
namely, (1) the parties must be Hindus governed by Mitakshara; (2)
the   suit   is   for   setting   aside   the   alienation   by   the   father   at   the
instance   of   the   son;   (3)   the   property   relates   to   ancestral   property;
and   (4)   the   alienee   has   taken   over   possession   of   the   property
alienated   by   the   father.     This   article   provides   that   the   period   of
limitation is twelve years from the date the alienee takes possession
of the property.  
10. In   the   instant   case,   Ex.P­1   was   executed   by   the   father   of   the
plaintiff   in   favour   of   the   second   defendant   on   02.03.1980   and   the
second   defendant   has   taken   possession   of   the   property   on
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22.03.1980   when   Ex.P­1   was   registered.   Counting   the   period   of
twelve years  from   22.03.1980, the  limitation  for  filing  of  the  suit in
the   present   case   would   have   expired   on   21.03.1992.     The   suit   was
filed on 11.10.1991.  Therefore, the suit was not barred by time.   
11. The second question for consideration is whether the transfer
of   property   made   by   the   first   defendant   in   favour   of   the   second
defendant under Ex.P­1 was for a pious purpose. 
As   noticed   above,   the   second   defendant   has   adopted   the
written   statement   filed   by   the   first   defendant   before   the   trial   court
wherein   it   was   admitted   that   the   schedule   property   was   a   joint
family   property  belonging  to  the  HUF  consisting  of  the plaintiff,  his
father   the   second   defendant   and   his   brother   one   K.C.   Subbaraya
Gowda, all three of whom were coparceners in the HUF. The second
defendant is not a coparcener or a member of this family. It was also
admitted   that   the   schedule   property   was   gifted   to   him   by   the
settlement/gift   deed   dated   22.03.1980   (Ex.P­1)   by   the   first
defendant   who   was   the   Karta   of   the   HUF.     The   plaintiff   was   not   a
signatory   to   the   said   document.     In   fact,   the   plaintiff   has
categorically   averred   in   the   plaint   that   he   did   not   consent   to   the
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gifting   of   the   schedule   property   in   favour   of   the   second   defendant
vide the said deed.  
12. It   is   trite   law   that   Karta/Manager   of   a   joint   family   property
may alienate joint family property only in three situations, namely,
(i)   legal   necessity   (ii)   for   the   benefit   of   the   estate   and   (iii)   with   the
consent of all the coparceners of the family. In the instant case, the
alienation of the joint family property under Ex.P­1 was not with the
consent   of   all   the   coparceners.     It   is   settled   law   that   where   an
alienation is not made with the consent of all the coparceners, it is
voidable at the instance of the coparceners whose consent has not
been   obtained   (See   :   Thimmaiah   and   Ors.   Vs.   Ningamma   and
Anr. 1
).   Therefore,   the   alienation   of   the   joint   family   property   in
favour  of the second defendant was voidable at the instance of the
plaintiff   whose   consent   had   not   been   obtained   as   a   coparcener
before the said alienation. 
13. In   the   instant   case,   it   is   admitted   by   the   second   defendant
that the settlement deed dated 22.03.1980 (Ex.P­1) is, in fact, a gift
deed   which   was   executed   by   the   first   defendant   in   favour   of   the
1  (2000) 7 SCC409
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second defendant  ‘out of love and affection’ and  by  virtue of which
the   second   defendant   was   given   a   portion   of   the   joint   family
property.     It   is   well­settled   that   a   Hindu   father   or   any   other
managing   member   of   a  HUF   has   power   to   make  a  gift  of   ancestral
property   only   for   a   ‘pious   purpose’   and   what   is   understood   by   the
term   ‘pious   purpose’   is   a   gift   for   charitable   and/or   religious
purpose. Therefore, a deed of gift in regard to the ancestral property
executed ‘out of love and affection’ does not come within the scope
of the term ‘pious purpose’.  It is irrelevant if such gift or settlement
was made by a donor, i.e. the first defendant, in favour  of a donee
who   was   raised   by   the   donor   without   any   relationship,   i.e.   the
second  defendant.    The gift  deed  in the  instant  case  is  not  for  any
charitable or religious purpose.
14. This   principle   of   law   has   been   laid   down   by   this   Court   in
Guramma   Bhratar   Chanbasappa   Deshmukh   and   Ors.   vs.
Mallappa Chanbasappa and Anr. 2
, wherein it was held as follows:
“It   may,   therefore,   be   conceded   that   the   expression   “pious
purposes” is wide enough, under certain circumstances, to take in
charitable   purposes   though   the   scope   of   the   latter   purposes   has
2  AIR 1964 SC 510
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nowhere been precisely drawn. But what we are concerned with in
this case is the power of a manager to make a gift to an outsider of
a joint family property. The scope of the limitations on that power
has   been   fairly   well   settled   by   the   decisions   interpreting   the
relevant texts of Hindu law. The decisions of Hindu law sanctioned
gifts   to  strangers   by   a   manager   of   a   joint   Hindu   family   of   a   small
extent of property for pious purposes. But no authority went so far,
and   none   has   been   placed   before   us,   to   sustain   such   a   gift   to   a
stranger   however   much   the   donor   was   beholden   to   him   on   the
ground   that   it   was   made   out   of   charity.   It   must   be   remembered
that   the   manager   has   no   absolute   power   of   disposal   over   joint
Hindu   family   property.   The   Hindu   law   permits   him   to   do   so   only
within   strict   limits.   We   cannot   extend   the   scope   of   the   power   on
the   basis   of   the   wide   interpretation   give   to   the   words   “pious
purposes”   in   Hindu   law   in   a   different   context.   In   the
circumstances,   we   hold   that   a   gift   to   a   stranger   of   a   joint   family
property by the manager of the family is void.”
15. In   Ammathayi   @  Perumalakkal   and   Anr.   Vs.   Kumaresan   @
Balakrishnan   and   Ors. 3
,   this   Court   has   reiterated   the   above
position as under:
“10.   As   to   the   contention   that   Rangaswami   Chettiar   was   merely
carrying his father’s wishes when he made this gift in favour of his
wife   and   that   act   of   his   was   a   matter   of   pious   obligation   laid   on
him   by   his   father,   we   are   of   opinion   that   no   gift   of   ancestral
immovable   property   can   be   made   on   such   a   ground.   Even   the
father­in­law,   if   he   had   desired   to   make   a   gift   at   the   time   of   the
marriage of  his daughter­in­law, would  not  be competent  to do  so
insofar   as   immovable   ancestral   property   is   concerned.   No   case   in
support   of   the   proposition   that   a   father­in­law   can   make   a   gift   of
ancestral   immovable   property   in   favour   of   his   daughter­in­law   at
the time of her marriage has been cited. There is in our opinion no
authority   to   support   such   a   proposition   in   Hindu   law.   As   already
observed,   a   Hindu   father   or   any   other   managing   member   has
power   to   make   a   gift   within   reasonable   limits   of   ancestral
immovable property for  pious purposes, and we cannot see how a
3  AIR 1967 SC 569
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gift   by   the   father­in­law   to   the   daughter­in­law   at   the   time   of
marriage   can   by   any   stretch   of   reasoning   be   called   a   pious
purpose, whatever may be the position of a gift by the father or his
representation to a daughter at the time of her marriage. One can
understand   such   a   gift   being   made   to   a   daughter   when   she   is
leaving the family of her father. As it is the duty of the father or his
representative  to marry  the daughter, such  a gift  may  be  and  has
been   held   by   this   Court   to  be  for  a   pious  purpose.  But   we  see  no
pious   purpose   for   such   a   gift   by   a   father­in­law   in   favour   of   his
daughter­in­law   at   the   time   of   marriage.   As   a   matter   of   fact   the
daughter­in­law   becomes  a  member   of   the   family   of   her   father­in­
law after marriage and she would be entitled after marriage in her
own   right   to   the   ancestral   immovable   property   in   certain
circumstances,   and   clearly   therefore   her   case   stands   on   a   very
different footing from the case of a daughter who is being married
and to whom a reasonable gift of ancestral immovable property can
be made as held by this Court.”
16. In   view   of   the   above,   we   are   of   the   view   that   the   settlement
deed/gift   deed   dated   22.03.1980   (Ex.P­1)   executed   by   the   first
defendant in favour of the second defendant was rightly declared as
null and void by the first Appellate Court and the High Court.   
17. Resultantly,   the   appeal   fails   and   it   is   accordingly   dismissed.
There shall be no order as to costs.
…….……………………………J.
    (S. ABDUL NAZEER)
…….……………………………J.
    (KRISHNA MURARI)
New Delhi;
April 19, 2022.
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