/2022 INSC 0316/ REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL  NO. 3001 OF 2022 (Arising out of Petition for Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 4881 of 2021) Hyundai Motor India Limited           ……...Appellant(s) Versus Shailendra Bhatnagar           ……Respondent(s)      J U D G M E N T ANIRUDDHA BOSE, J. Leave granted. 2. The   appellant   are   manufacturers   of   vehicles   and   the   present appeal   arises   out   of   a   complaint   made   by   the   respondent concerning   defect   in   a   vehicle,   particularly   in   relation   to   its   safety 1 features   originating   from   the   appellant,   of   the   model   Creta   1.6 VTVT SX+. The vehicle came with two front airbags. Purchase of the vehicle was made on 21 st   August 2015. It met with an accident on the   Delhi­Panipat   highway   on   16 th   November   2017   resulting   in substantial  damage  to   its  RH  front   pillar,   RH  front   roof,  side  body panels,   front   RH   door   panels   and   LH   front   wheel   suspension.   The initials RH and LH appears to be used as short forms of Right Hand and   Left   Hand   sides   of   the   vehicle.   At   that   point   of   time,   the complainant   (being   the   respondent   herein),   his   mother   and daughter   were   in   the   vehicle.   The   airbags   of   the   vehicle   did   not deploy   at   the   time   of   collision.   The   complainant   suffered   head, chest   as   also   dental   injuries.   He   attributes   such   injuries   to   non­ deployment   of   airbags   at   the   time   of   accident.   The   appellant themselves   obtained   an   investigation   report   which   has   been referred  to as  SRS  report. The  remarks  and conclusion  of  the said SRS Investigation Report, as it appears from pages 53 and 54 of the paperbook were:­ “Remarks: 2  Vehicle   found   with   major   damage   on   RH   front pillar,   RH   Side   body   panels   and   LH   front   wheel suspension.   Under   ride   &   Angular   impact   found   on   the   RH Front Pillar, Roof and Front RH Door panel.   Grazing   damages   found   on   the   RH   side   panels due to the scratch against truck while moving towards left.  Findings:  No   crash   info   recorded   in   SRSCM,   hence   no   air bags deployed.  No impact damage observed on both side chassis members, damages found away from impact sensors.  Vehicle   found   completely   dismantled   and   mid­ repair condition during inspection. Conclusion:  The   major   impact   to   the   vehicle   from   RH   pillar resulted in under ride and angular condition.  Both   front   chassis   member   found   unaffected   by the   frontal   impact,   hence   no   impact   sensed   by   the front   impact   sensors   and   not   triggered   any   signal   to SRSCM   (No   crash   info   recorded   in   SRSCM   for   frontal impact).  After   thorough   study,   it   is   confirmed   that   the condition   was   not   met   for   the   air   bag   deployment, hence   no   air   bags   deployed.   The   air   bag   system   was working proper at the time of accident. Accident description:  As   per   customer   verbatim,   while   he   was   driving at 100 kmph speed on Gannaur highway. A front going truck   applied   sudden   brake,   his   car   hit   to   the   truck from the right side to the left rear corner of the Truck. Further   his   car   scratched   against   the   truck   while moving   towards   left   side   of   the   road   and   finally   hit   to some   stones   on   the   left   front   wheel   and   vehicle stopped.” (quoted verbatim) 3 3. The   Delhi   State   Consumer   Redressal   Commission,   in   a complaint   raised   by   the   respondent,   upheld   his   claim.   The   main theme of his complaint was that the main reason for his purchase decision   of   the   model   was   because   of   its   safety   features   including the   airbags   and   the   injury   was   suffered   by   him   because   of   non­ deployment   of  the  airbags.  The  State  Commission   granted  relief  to the following effect:­ “ 19. Keeping   in   view   of   the   facts   and   circumstances of   the   present   consumer   complaint,   we   direct   the opposite party to: a. Compensate   the   complainant   an   amout   of Rs.2,00,000/­ for medical expenses and loss of income. b. Compensate   the   complainant   an   amount   of Rs.50,000/­ for mental agony. c. Pay   to   the   complainant   an   amount   of Rs.50,000/­ as cost of litigation. 20 . The   aforesaid   payment   shall   be   made   by opposite party within two months from the date of this order by way of demand draft. Failure of opposite party in   paying   the   said   amount   in   stipulated   period   will attract   an   interest   of   7%   per   annum   from   the   date   of default. Furthermore, failure in replacing the vehicle of the   appellant   will   also   attract   an   interest   of   7%   per annum   of   the   value   of   the   vehicle   from   the   date   of default.” 4. The  appellant  preferred  appeal  before  the  National  Consumer Dispute   Redressal   Commission   (“National   Commission”).   The 4 National   Commission   dismissed   the   appeal   sustaining   the compensation awarded by the State Commission. The Order of the National   Commission,   which   was   passed   on   5 th   January   2021,   is under   appeal   before   us.   Neither   the   State   Commission   nor   the National  Commission   accepted  the  justification   sought  to   be  made by   the   appellant   referring   to   the   said   investigation   report,   having regard   to   the   fact   of   non­deployment   of   the   airbags.   It   has   been, inter­alia, held by the National Commission:­ “11....   Learned   Counsel   for   the   Appellant/Opposite Party   submitted   that   the   airbags   deploy   only   when there   is   severe   impact   of   force   and   airbags   may   not deploy if the vehicle collides with objects like poles and trees,   when   full   force   of   the   impact   is   not   delivered   to the sensors. Learned Counsel for the Appellant argued that   the   SRS   Investigation   report   dated   01.12.2017 clearly stated that the impact of the accident was such that   the   minimum   threshold   force   required   for   the deployment   of   the   airbags   was   not   delivered   to   the front sensors installed in the engine compartment and hence,   the   airbags   did   not   deploy.   No   expert   evidence was   produced   by   the   Respondent   to   substantiate   any manufacturing   defect.   The   Complainant   contended that   he   purchased   the   car   for   its   safety   features highlighted   by   the   Manufacturer,   but   the   airbags   did not function when required, due to which he sustained serious   injuries   as   can   be   seen   from   the   medical prescriptions   and   bills   furnished   by   the   Complainant. The   impact/force   required   for   triggering   the   front airbags   was   not   made   known   to   the   Complainant. Nowhere   has   the   minimum   threshold   force   been 5 quantified   and   this   defence   can   never   be   refuted. Highlighting   safety   features   including   airbags   while selling   the   car   and   not   elaborating   and   disclosing   the threshold limits for  their  opening  is  by  itself  an unfair trade   practice.   Complainant,   however,   had   filed photographs of the accidental car. Major damage to RH front   pillar,   RH   front   roof,   side   body   panels   front   RH door   panels   and   LH  front   wheel  suspension  is   seen  in the   photographs   of   the   car.   Without   forceful   impact, the   car   would   not   have   been   so   badly   damaged.   The accident   was   a   major   accident   in   which   the   entire deriver side of the car, the side part and even the front mirror of the car got smashed and broken. The impact of   the   accident   was   so   intense   that   the   front   bumper grill, dash board and the radiator got totally damaged. The   State   Commission   rightly   observed   “that   expert evidence need not be relied upon where the facts speak for   themselves.   This   is   a   case   of   Res   Ipsa   Loquitur where   the   photographs   of   the   damaged   vehicle   placed on   record   clearly   show   the   impact   of   the   accident   on the vehicle.” 5. One of the points argued on behalf of the appellant by         Mr. Huzefa   Ahmadi,   learned   Senior   advocate,   is   that   the   order   for replacement   of   the   vehicle   ought   not   to   have   been   passed.   The respondent had not asked for replacement of the vehicle as part of the   reliefs  claimed before  the  State  Commission.  He has   otherwise questioned   legality   of   the   decisions   of   the   two   fora   citing   certain clauses from the owner’s manual. His argument on this count has been that if force generated by the collision is lesser than a certain degree, there  would   not  be  deployment  of  the   airbags. Thus,  there 6 was   no   defect   in   the   security   system   according   to   him.   He   also highlighted that impact of the accident was from the side and it was not a frontal hit. 6. It   is   the   case   of   the   appellant   that   the   airbag   deployment depends   on   a   number   of   factors   including   vehicle   speed,   angle   of impact,   density   and   stiffness   of   vehicles   or   objects   which   the vehicle   hits   in   the   collision.     The   vehicle   is   designed   to   deploy   the front   airbags   only   when   an   impact   is   sufficiently   severe   and   when the   impact   angle   is   less   than   30   degrees   from   the   forward longitudinal axis of the vehicle. Mr. Ahmadi has submitted that the front   airbags   are   not   intended   to   deploy   if   the   impact   is   from   the side or in cases of rear impact or roll over crashes. He has referred to a variety of circumstances in a collision which may not result in deployment of the airbags.   He has cited the investigation report to which we have already referred to. 7. Before the Commission, point of limitation was also taken and the   appellant   wanted   the   limitation   to   run   from   the   date   of purchase   of   the   vehicle   and   not   the   date   of   the   accident.   This 7 objection   on   maintainability   has   been   rightly   rejected   by   both   the State   Commission   and   the   National   Commission.   We   do   not   find any  error  in  the   view  of  the   respective  Commissions  on  this  point. Vehicles are goods within the meaning of Section 2(7) of The Sale of Goods   Act,   1930   and   they   carry   implied   conditions   as   to   their fitness.   That   is   a   statutory   mandate   and   that   mandate   also operates in respect of goods, whose defect is subject  of  proceeding in   a   consumer   complaint   under   the   Consumer   Protection   Act, 1986.   In   the   complaint,   it   has   been   pleaded   that   the   respondent had   relied   on   the   safety   features   of   the   vehicle   projected   by   the manufacturer. In such a situation, the limitation will run from the day   the   defect   surfaces   in   a   case.   There   is   no   way   by   which   the nature   of   defect   complained   against   could   be   identified   in   normal circumstances at an earlier date, before the collision took place. In this case, the safety feature of the vehicle fell short of the quality of fitness as was represented by the manufacturer by implication. The National   Commission’s   view   is   broadly   based   on   the   principle incorporated in Section 16 of the 1930 Act. The defect in this case 8 ought to be treated to have had surfaced on the date of the accident itself.   We   quote   below   the   provisions   of   Section   16   of   The   Sale   of Goods Act, 1930:­ “16.   Implied   conditions   as   to   quality   or   fitness.— Subject   to   the   provisions   of   this   Act   and   of   any   other law   for   the   time   being   in   force,   there   is   no   implied warranty   or   condition   as   to   the   quality   or   fitness   for any   particular   purpose   of   goods   supplied   under   a contract of sale, except as follows:— (1) Where the buyer, expressly or by implication, makes known   to   the   seller   the   particular   purpose   for   which the   goods   are   required,   so   as   to   show   that   the   buyer relies   on   the   seller’s   skill   or   judgment,   and   the   goods are   of   a   description   which   it   is   in   the   course   of   the seller’s   business   to   supply   (whether   he   is   the manufacturer   or   producer   or   not),   there   is   an   implied condition   that   the   goods   shall   be   reasonably   fit   for such purpose:  Provided that, in the case of a contract for the sale of a specified   article   under   its   patent   or   other   trade   name, there   is   no   implied   condition   as   to   its   fitness   for   any particular purpose. (2) Where goods are bought by description from a seller who   deals   in   goods   of   that   description   (whether   he   is the   manufacturer   or   producer   or   not),   there   is   an implied   condition   that   the   goods   shall   be   of merchantable quality: Provided   that,   if   the   buyer   has   examined   the   goods, there   shall   be   no   implied   condition   as   regards   defects which such examination ought to have revealed. 9 (3) An   implied   warranty   or   condition   as   to   quality   or fitness for a particular purpose may be annexed by the usage of trade. (4) An   express   warranty   or   condition   does   not   negative a   warranty   or   condition   implied   by   this   Act   unless inconsistent therewith.” 8. The question on privity of contract was also raised before the State as also the National Commission and from the decision under appeal   we   find   that   this   point   was   raised   on   the   ground   that   the dealer   was   not   impleaded   as   a   party   and   there   was   no   contract between   the   appellant   and   the   respondent   consumer.   This   issue was   rejected   by   both   the   consumer   fora.   No   argument   has   been advanced   before   us   on   this   point   and   we   do   not   find   any   error   in the reasoning of the National Commission on this point.  9. There   are   findings   of   the   two   fora   about   the   defect   in   the product sold, in this case being a vehicle. This was sold with front airbags and there was frontal damage. The airbags did not deploy. The   accident   caused   injuries   to   the   respondent.   The   appellant referred   to   various   portions   from   the   owner’s   manual   to   contend that   the   impact   of   the   collision   was   not   sufficient   to   activate   the 10 sensor   which   in   turn   would   have   resulted   in   deployment   of   the airbags.   We   would   not   like   to   revisit   the   facts   on   which   findings have been returned by the two fora against the appellant. The State Commission   relied   on   the   principle   of   Res   Ipsa   Loquitur   to   affix the   liability   of   the   manufacturer   as   regards   defect   in   the   airbag system,   having   regard   to   the   nature   of   the   collision.   The   National Commission   affirmed   this   finding   referring   to   certain   photographs of  the  damaged vehicle, which  showed substantial  frontal damage. In   such   circumstances,   both   the   aforesaid   fora   took   the   view   that expert   evidence   was   not   necessary   in   the   subject   case.   Such   view cannot be faulted as being unreasonable, in the given facts.  10. We do not find any reason to interfere with the finding  of the National   Commission.   We   would   like   to   add   here   that   ordinarily   a consumer   while   purchasing   a   vehicle   with   airbags   would   assume that the same would be deployed whenever there is a collision from the front portion of the vehicle (in respect of front airbags). Both the fora,   in   their   decisions,   have   highlighted   the   fact   that   there   was significant damage to the front portion of the vehicle. Deployment of 11 the airbags ought to have prevented injuries being caused to those travelling in the vehicle, particularly in the front seat. A consumer is not meant to be an expert in physics calculating the impact of a collision   on   the   theories   based   on   velocity   and   force.   In   such circumstances, we do not find that there is any error in the findings of the two fora as regards there being defect in the vehicle.   11. We   shall   now   turn   to   the   reliefs   granted   by   the   State Commission   and   upheld   by   the   National   Commission.     The   first point   argued   in   this   regard   is   that   there   was   no   prayer   in   the petition   for   replacement   of   the   vehicle.     This   is   a   case   where   the 1986 Act was applicable and Section 14 of the said statute lays down   the   reliefs   which   may   be   granted.     The   directions   as   per   the statute,   could   be   for   replacement   of   defective   goods   as   also   punitive damages.   The   appellant   have   also   taken   a   point   that   so   far   as replacement   of   the   vehicle   is   concerned,   there   was   no   substantive direction   and   no   discussion   either.   The   operative   part   of   the   order suffers   from   a   shortcoming   on  this   count,   but  that   is   not   fatal.     On  a composite   reading   of   the   directions,   we   find   from   paragraph   20   of   the 12 Order   of   the   State   Commission   that   such   a   direction   was   made.     The confusion, if any, arises because of construction defect in the Order of the State Commission. Considering the fact that the dispute is pending for   a   reasonably   long   period   of   time,   we   have   ourselves   applied   our mind  on this issue and our view is that a direction for replacement of the   vehicle   is   justified   in   the   facts   of   this   case.     The   direction   for replacement   of   the   vehicle   would   not   be   treated   as   non­est   having regard to paragraph 20 of the State Commission’s Order.  The fact that the consumer has got the car repaired on insurance money  would not impact the quantum of damages, which is partly punitive in nature in this case.  12. Three cases arising out of motor accident claims were cited before us .  In  Nagappa v. Gurudayal Singh & Others.  [( 2003) 2  SCC 274],   it  was  held    that   there is  no     restriction    that  the  Tribunal  or Court   cannot   award   compensation   amount   exceeding   the   claimed amount.     Two   other   authorities   were   cited   before   us,   by   Ms.   Tamta, learned counsel for the respondent, being  the cases of   Sangita Arya and   Others   v.   Oriental   Insurance   Company   Limited   and   Others 13 [(2020) 5 SCC 327] and   Jitendra Khimshankar Trivedi and Others v. Kasam Daud Kumbhar and Others  [(2015) 4 SCC 237]. These two cases   lay   down   the   principle   of   just   and   reasonable   compensation that   may   be   paid.   The   ratio   of   these   authorities,   however,   do   not directly apply in the facts of this case. 13. The   damages   awarded   against   the   appellant   may   have   gone beyond   the   actual   loss   suffered   by   the   respondent   and   may   not represent   the   actual   loss   suffered   by  him   in  monetary   terms.     But the   provision   of   Section   14   of   the   1986   Act   permits   awarding punitive damages.   Such damages, in our view, can be awarded in the event the defect is found to have the potential to cause serious injury   or   major   loss   to   the   consumer,   particularly   in   respect   of safety features of a vehicle. For instance, defective safety feature in a   vehicle   has   to   be   distinguished   from   a   dysfunctional   “courtesy light”.   The   manufacturer   should   be   under   strict   and   absolute liability   in   respect   of   the   latter.   Compensation   in   the   form   of punitive damages ought to have a deterrent effect.  We also refer to 14 the principles detailing the factors guiding quantification of liability laid down by a Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of  M.C. Mehta   and   Another   v.   Union   of  India  and   Others   [(1987) 1 SCC 395]. In this case it has been opined:­ “32.  We  would   also   like  to  point   out   that  the   measure of compensation in the kind of cases referred to in the preceding   paragraph   must   be   corelated   to   the magnitude and capacity of the enterprise because such compensation must have a deterrent effect.  The larger and   more   prosperous   the   enterprise,   the   greater   must be   the   amount   of   compensation   payable   by   it   for   the harm caused on account of an accident in the carrying on of the hazardous or inherently dangerous activity by the enterprise.”  14. The aforesaid decision arose out of a case involving the death of   an   individual   and   injuries   to   several   others   in   an   industrial accident.  But  in  our  opinion,  in the subject dispute also  the  same principle   can   be   extended.   We   are   dealing   with   a   case   where   in   a collision,   the   airbags   did   not   deploy.   The   complainant,   driving   the vehicle, suffered substantial injuries as a result thereof. The impact of the collision was such that it would have been reasonable for the respondent   to   assume   that   there   would   have   been   deployment   of the   airbags.   The   safety   description   of   the   goods   fell   short   of   its 15 expected quality. The content of the owners’ manual does not carry any   material   from   which   the   owner   of   a   vehicle   could   be   alerted that   in   a   collision   of   this   nature,   the   airbags   would   not   deploy. Purchase decision of the respondent­complainant was largely made on the basis of representation  of the safety  features of the vehicle. The   failure   to   provide   an   airbag   system   which   would   meet   the safety   standards   as   perceived   by   a   car­buyer   of   reasonable prudence,   in   our   view,   should   be   subject   to   punitive   damages which   can   have   deterrent   effect.   And   in   computing   such   punitive damages, the capacity of the manufacturing enterprise should also be a factor.   There was no specific exclusion clause to insulate the manufacturer   from   claim   of   damages   of   this   nature.   Even   if   there were such a clause, legality thereof could be open to legal scrutiny. But there is no reason for dilating on that aspect in this case. That question doesn’t arise here. 15. If   the   reliefs   granted   in   a   consumer   complaint   fits   any   of   the statutory provision contained in sub clause (1) of Section 14 of the Act, it would be well within the power and jurisdiction of the Forum 16 to pass directions irrespective of the fact as to whether specifically certain   reliefs   have   been   claimed   or   not,   provided   that   facts   make out foundations for granting such reliefs.  In any event, it is within the jurisdiction of the said forum to mould the reliefs claimed to do effective  justice,  provided the  relief comes within  the stipulation  of Section   14(1)   of   the   Act.   We   find   that   the   relief   granted   to   the respondent   comes   within   the   statutory   framework.   We   accordingly do   not   want   to   interfere   with   the   decision   of   the   National Commission.   We   do   not   find   the   reasoning   of   the   Commission   or the   operative   part   of   the   order   awarding   damages   to   be   perverse. We   do   not   need   the   aid   of   the   ratio   of   the   three   authorities   cited before us pertaining to motor accident claim to sustain the decision under   appeal.   We   are   also   of   the   view   that   the   directions   issued against  the   appellant   by   the  State   Commission   and   upheld   by   the National   Commission   cannot   be   said   to   have   failed   the   test   of proportionality.   We   hold   so   as   we   find   the   subject­defect   to   be   of such nature that the provisions relating to punitive damages ought to be attracted against the appellant.   17 16. We   accordingly   dismiss   the   appeal.   Interim   order   passed   in this matter shall stand dissolved.  17. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of. 18. There shall be no order as to costs. ………………………J.      (VINEET SARAN) ……………………….J. (ANIRUDDHA BOSE) NEW DELHI; APRIL 20, 2022.  18