/2022 INSC 0318/
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION 
SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRL.) NO. 2953 OF 2022
Ramveer Upadhyay & Anr.        ...Petitioners
Versus
State of U.P. & Anr.         ...Respondents
J U D G M E N T 
Indira Banerjee, J. 
This special leave petition is against a final judgment and order dated
7 th
  March   2022   passed   by   the   High   Court   of   Judicature   at   Allahabad,
dismissing   the   application   filed   by   the   Petitioner   under   Section   482   of   the
Criminal   Procedure   Code,   1973   being   case   No.29704   of   2021,   whereby   the
Petitioner   had   challenged   the   order   dated   17 th
  September   2021   passed   by
the 4 th 
 Additional District and Sessions Judge, Hathras taking cognizance of
the   complaint   filed   by   the   Respondent   No.2   under   Section   365   read   with
Section   511   of   the   Indian   Penal   Code,   1860   (IPC)   and   Section   3(1)(Dha)   of
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities Act), 1989,
hereinafter referred to as “the Atrocities Act”.        
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2. Mr.   Ranjit   Kumar,   Senior   Advocate   appearing   on   behalf   of   the
Petitioners   opened   his   arguments   contending   that   this   case   is   a   classic
example   of   malicious   prosecution   of   the   petitioners,   who   have   been
embroiled in a false criminal case, due to political animosity. The complaint
in   the   Court   of   the   2nd   Additional   District   and   Sessions   Judge/Special
Judge   under   the   Atrocities   Act,   under   section   156   (3)   of   the   CrPC   ,   which
has given rise to these proceedings, has been filed by the Respondent No. 2
at   the   instance   of   Devendra   Agarwal,   Ex­MLA   ,   a   political   opponent   of   the
Petitioner   No.   1.   The   Petitioner   No.   1   and   the   said   Devendra   Aggarwal   had
fought elections against each other several times. 
3. Earlier,   on   or   about   1st   January   2010,   Smt.   Meera   Devi,   wife   of   the
Respondent   No.2   had   filed   a   complaint   before   the   District   Magistrate,
Mahamaya   Nagar   District   (now   Hathras   District)   stating   that   the
Respondent No.2 had been abducted by the brothers of the Petitioner No. 1,
to   forcibly   make   him   vote   in   favour   of   their   party,   in   the   MLC   election   of
2010. In the said complaint it was alleged that the Petitioner had abused the
Respondent No.2 by his caste, using filthy language. 
4. On the same day, that is, 1st January 2010, Devendra Aggarwal wrote
a letter to the District Magistrate for release of the Respondent No.2. In the
aforesaid   letter,   it   was   stated   that   the   Petitioners   had   abused   the
Respondent No.2 in filthy language by reference to his caste. 
5. On 2 nd
   January 2010, Meera Devi filed an application in the Court of
the Judicial Magistrate, Sadabad, Hathras under Section 156(3) of the Code
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of   Criminal   Procedure   (Cr.P.C   ),   being   Complaint   No.   412   of   2010   for
directions   on   the   Station   House   Officer   (SHO)   at   Chandappa   Police   Station
to register her Complaint of abduction of her husband.
6. A complaint was thereafter registered, pursuant to which Crime Case
No. 17/2010 was started. The case was investigated by the Circle Inspector
Sadabad,   Hathras.     After   investigation,   the   Police   filed   a   final   report   of
closure   of   the   case,   opining   that   no   incident   of   abduction,   as   alleged   had
taken place, and the complaint had been filed out of political animosity.
7. Meera   Devi   filed   a   Protest   Petition   which   was   dismissed.   The   High
Court   did   not   interfere   with   the   order   of   dismissal   of   her   Protest   Petition.
Meera   Devi   approached   this   Court.   Pursuant   to   the   orders   of   this   court,
further investigation was held by the CB CID. The Investigating Officer filed
a final report dated 17.10.2018 in favour of the Petitioners.  Meera Devi filed
a Protest Petition. By an order dated 5th September 2020, the Special Judge
under the Atrocities Act, Hathras rejected the Protest Petition filed by Meera
Devi in Case No. 17/2010.
8. In February 2017, the Petitioner had contested the Assembly elections
from   Sadabad   Constituency.   Mr.   Devendra   Aggarwal   also   contested   the
election from the same constituency as a candidate of a rival political party.
It is alleged that, on 8th February 2017, when the Petitioner No 1’s son was
campaigning   for   the   Petitioner   No   1,   Devendra   Aggarwal,   who   was   then   a
sitting   MLA   of   the   ruling   party,   attacked   the   Petitioner   No   1’s   son   and   his
supporters and opened fire indiscriminately.
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9. One Pushpendra Singh, a supporter of the Petitioner No 1, was killed
in   the   incident.     Pushpendra’s   father,   Ramhari   Sharma   lodged   an   FIR,
arraigning   Devendra   Aggarwal   as   Accused   No.1,   pursuant   to   which   a
criminal case was started against Devendra Aggarwal and others,   inter alia ,
under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code.        
10.   It is stated that since Devendra Aggarwal was the sitting MLA of the
ruling party, the police did not take action to arrest him.   The father of the
deceased Pushpendra, Ramhari Sharma filed a Criminal Misc. Writ Petition
No.2739/2017   in   the   High   Court   praying   for   action   against   Devendra
Aggarwal.   
11. On 26 th
 October 2017, the Respondent No.2 filed an application in the
Court   of   the   Additional   Sessions   Judge/Special   Judge   SC/ST   Act,   Hathras
under   Section   156(3)   of   the   Cr.P.C   alleging   that   the   Petitioner   No.1   along
with his Personal Assistant, Ranu Pandit, being the Petitioner No.2 and 6­7
other persons had abused him in filthy language and asked his associates to
drag him into the car which they could not do, as a crowd had gathered, and
there was resistance put up.     The Respondent No.2 prayed for direction on
the   SHO,   Chandappa   Police   Station   to   register   the   case   against   the
Petitioners. 
12. The   relevant   averments   in   the   said   complaint   are   extracted
hereinbelow for  convenience:­ 
4

“1.   The   applicant   belongs   to   “Dhobi’   caste   –   a   scheduled   caste   and   is
former BDC Member. 
2. ….
3.   That   on   01.09.2017,   at   about   2.45   or   3   P.M.   in   the   afternoon,   the
opposite   party   no.1   Ramveer   Upadhyay   came   to   Village­Bisana   along
with   his   convoy   of   vehicles   and   after   seeing   the   Complainant   started
abusing of his caste and on the road, he said that Saley dhobi you had
forgotten   your   position   and   your   wings   have   come   out   and   you   are
running   up   to   Supreme   Court.   You   will   be   sent   at   a   place   from   where
you   will   never   come   back.   When   the   Complainant   said   you   are   doing
your   work   and   I   am   doing   my   work,   Ramveer   Upadhyay   said   to   his
associates   that   pull   him   and   put   him   in   the   car,   then   opposite   party
no.2   Ranu   Pandit   and   6­7   other   unknown   persons,   who   can   be
identified   by   face,   dragged   the   Complainant   and   with   the   intention   to
kill tried to kidnap him but due to gathering of people on the road and
due  to  resistance  shown   by   Annu   R/o  Jindpatti,   Bisana,   Pradeep   R/o
Gambhirpatti,   Bisana,   they   were   not   successful   and   went   towards
Hathras   in   their   vehicles.   Due   to   this   incident   an   environment   of   fear
and terror was created in the village.”
13. Pursuant   to   the   aforesaid   application,   a   case   was   registered   and
numbered   Complaint   Case   No.19/2018.     The   Respondent   No.2   was
examined   under   Section   202   of   the   Cr.P.C.     The   statement   of   the
Respondent No. 2 being the complainant was recorded under Section 200 of
the   Cr.P.C.   in   the   Court   of   the   Additional   Sessions   Judge/Special   Judge,
SC/ST Act, Hathras.    The statements of one Annu son of Rukamal and one
Yogesh   Gupta,   son   of   Dhaniram   Gupta   were   also   recorded   in   the   same
Court under Section 200 Cr.P.C. 
14. In   the   meanwhile,   in   Writ   Petition   (Civil)   No.699/2016   titled   Ashwini
Kumar   Upadhayay   v.   Union   of   India ,   a   three­Judge   Bench   of   this   Court
5

presided over by the Chief Justice, passed an order dated 4.12.2018, taking
notice   of   the   fact   that   there   were   4122   cases   pending   against   legislators
including   former   legislators,   out   of   which   2324   cases   were   against   sitting
legislators.     A   chart,   presented   in   Court   by   the   learned   Amicus   Curiae,
showed   that   there   were   430   cases   involving   life   sentence   pending   against
sitting as well as former legislators.
15. To expedite the disposal of the cases, this Court  requested each High
Court   to   assign/allocate   criminal   cases   involving   former   and   sitting
legislators   to   as   many   as   Sessions   Courts   and   Magisterial   Courts   as   each
High   Court   might   consider   fit   and   expedient.     Pursuant   to   administrative
directions   issued   by   the   High   Court,   and   pursuant   to   the   directions   of   this
Court,   Complaint   Case   No.19/2018   was   transferred   to   the   Additional
District and Sessions Judge Court No.4, Hathras, as the Petitioner No.1 was
a legislator/former legislator.  
16. On   being   prima   facie   satisfied   that   the   complaint   case   No.19/2018
made   out   a   prime   facie   case   against   the   Petitioners,   the   Additional   District
and   Sessions   Judge,   Court   No.4,   Hathras   passed   an   order   dated   17 th
September   2021,   taking   cognizance   of   the   charges   against   the   Petitioners
and issuing summons to the Petitioners. 
17. Aggrieved   by   the   aforesaid   order   dated   17 th
  September   2021,   the
Petitioners filed an application under  Section 482 of the Cr.P.C in the High
Court and prayed that entire proceedings in Complaint Case No. 19/2018 as
well as the cognizance order dated 17 th
 September 2021 be quashed.   
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18. By   an   order   dated   5 th
  January   2022,   the   High   Court   admitted   the
application under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. and stayed further proceedings
in   Complaint   Case   No.19/2018   pending   in   the   Court   of   Additional   District
and Sessions Judge, Court No.4, Hathras.   
19.   However,   on   7 th
  March   2022,   the   High   Court   passed   the   impugned
judgment   and   order   rejecting   the   application   filed   by   the   Petitioners   under
Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. 
20. Mr. Ranjit Kumar, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the
Petitioners   questioned   the   jurisdiction   of   the   Additional   District   and
Sessions   Judge,   Court   No.2,   Hathras,   to   take   cognizance   of   the   offence   in
Complaint Case No.19/2018. 
21. Emphasizing   Section   14   of   the   Atrocities   Act,   Mr.   Ranjit   Kumar
argued that only the Special Judge under the Atrocities Act was competent
to pass an order for issuance of summons.   He argued that the order of the
Additional   District   and  Sessions   Judge,   Court   No.2,   Hathras   being   without
jurisdiction the High Court should have quashed the same in exercise of its
power  under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.   Mr. Ranjt Kumar also argued that
Complaint Case No.19/2018 patently a case of malicious prosecution which
stemmed   from   political   rivalry   and   was   in   gross   abuse   of   the   process   of
Court. 
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22. In   Shantaben Bhurabhai Bhuriya v. Anand Athabhai Chaudhari
and Ors. 1
,   Cited by Mr. Siddharth Dave, learned senior counsel, appearing
on   behalf   of   the   Respondent   No.2,   this   Court   rejected   the   contention   that
only Special Court could take cognizance of offences under the Atrocities Act
and held:
23.   Therefore,   the   issue/question   posed   for   the   consideration   of   this
Court  is,   whether   in   a   case   where   cognizance  is  taken   by   the  learned
Magistrate and thereafter  the case is committed to the learned Special
Court,   whether   entire   criminal   proceedings   can   be   said   to   have   been
vitiated   considering   the   second   proviso   to   Section   14   of   the   Atrocities
Act which was inserted by Act 1 of 2016 w.e.f. 26.1.2016?
24.   While   considering   the   aforesaid   issue/question,   legislative   history
of the relevant provisions of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes
(Prevention   of   Atrocities)   Act,   1989,   more   particularly,   Section   14   pre­
amendment  and   post  amendment   is  required  to   be  considered.   Section
14 as stood pre­amendment and post amendment reads as under:
........
Provided that in Districts where less number of cases under this Act is
recorded,   the   State   Government   shall,   with   the   concurrence   of   the   Chief
Justice of the High Court, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify for
such Districts, the Court of Session to be a Special Court to try the offences
under this Act;
Provided further that the Courts so established or specified shall
have power to directly take cognizance of offences under this Act.”
******
28.   Considering   the   aforesaid   legislative   history   which   brought   to
insertion of proviso to Section 14 of the Atrocities Act, by which, even the
Special Court so established or specified for the purpose of providing for
speedy   trial   the  power   to   directly   to  take   cognizance   of  offences  under
the   Atrocities   Act,   1989,   the   issue/question   posed   whether   in   a   case
where  for   the  offences  under   Atrocities  Act,   the  cognizance  is  taken   by
the learned Magistrate and thereafter the case is committed to the Court
of   Sessions/Special   Court   and   cognizance   is  not   straightway   taken   up
by   the   learned   Special   Court/Court   of   Session,   whether   entire  criminal
proceedings for the offences under the Atrocities Act, 1989 can be said
1  2021 SCC Online SC 974
8

to have been vitiated, as so observed by the High Court in the impugned
judgment and order ?
29.   On   fair   reading   of   Sections   207,   209   and   193   of   the   Code   of
Criminal   Procedure   and   insertion   of   proviso   to   Section   14   of   the
Atrocities   Act   by   Act   No.   1   of   2016   w.e.f.   26.1.2016,   we   are   of   the
opinion   that   on   the   aforesaid   ground   the   entire   criminal   proceedings
cannot be said to have been vitiated. Second proviso to Section 14 of the
Atrocities Act which has been inserted by Act 1 of 2016 w.e.f. 26.1.2016
confers power upon the Special Court so established or specified for the
purpose   of   providing   for   speedy   trial   also   shall   have   the   power   to
directly   take   cognizance   of   the   offences   under   the   Atrocities   Act.
Considering the object and purpose of insertion of proviso to Section 14,
it cannot be said that it is not in conflict with the Sections 193, 207 and
209   of   the   Criminal   Procedure   Code,   1973.   It   cannot   be   said   that   it
takes   away   jurisdiction   of   the   Magistrate   to   take   cognizance   and
thereafter   to   commit   the   case   to   the   Special   Court   for   trial   for   the
offences   under   the   Atrocities   Act.   Merely   because,   learned   Magistrate
has  taken   cognizance   of   the   offences  and   thereafter   the   trial/case   has
been committed to Special Court established for the purpose of providing
for   speedy   trial,   it   cannot   be   said   that   entire   criminal   proceedings
including   FIR   and   charge­sheet   etc.   are   vitiated   and   on   the   aforesaid
ground entire criminal proceedings for the offences under Sections 452,
323,   325,   504,   506(2)   and   114   of   the   Penal   Code,   1860   and   under
Section   3(1)(x)   of   the   Atrocities   Act   are   to   be   quashed   and   set   aside.   It
may   be   noted   that   in   view   of   insertion   of   proviso   to   Section   14   of   the
Atrocities   Act   and   considering   the   object   and   purpose,   for   which,   the
proviso  to  Section  14  of the Atrocities  Act has  been   inserted  i.e.  for  the
purpose of providing for speedy trial and the object and purpose stated
herein above, it is advisable that the Court so established or specified in
exercise   of   powers   under   Section14,   for   the   purpose   of   providing   for
speedy trial directly take cognizance of the offences under the Atrocities
Act.   But   at   the   same   time,   as   observed   herein   above,   merely   on   the
ground   that   cognizance   of   the   offences   under   the   Atrocities   Act   is   not
taken   directly   by   the  Special   Court   constituted   under   Section   14   of   the
Atrocities   Act,   the   entire   criminal   proceedings   cannot   be   said   to   have
been vitiated and cannot be quashed and set aside solely on the ground
that   cognizance   has   been   taken   by   the   learned   Magistrate   after
insertion of second proviso to Section 14 which confers powers upon the
Special Court also to directly take cognizance of the offences under the
Atrocities   Act   and   thereafter   case   is   committed   to   the   Special
Court/Court of Session.
30.   In   support   of   the   above   conclusion,   the   words   used   in   second
proviso to Section 14 are required to be considered minutely. The words
used   are   “ Court   so   established   or   specified   shall   have   power   to
directly   take   cognizance   of   the   offences   under   this   Court ”.   The
word “ only ” is conspicuously missing. If the intention of the legislature
would have to confer the jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offences
9

under the Atrocities Act exclusively with the Special Court, in that case,
the   wording   should   have   been   “ that   the   Court   so   established   or
specified   only   shall   have   power   to   directly   take   cognizance   of
offences under this Act ”. Therefore, merely because now further and
additional   powers   have   been   given   to   the   Special   Court   also   to   take
cognizance   of   the   offences   under   the   Atrocities   Act   and   in   the   present
case merely because the cognizance is taken by the learned Magistrate
for   the   offences   under   the   Atrocities   Act   and   thereafter   the   case   has
been   committed   to   the   learned   Special   Court,   it   cannot   be   said   that
entire criminal proceedings have been vitiated and same are required to
be quashed and set aside.”
23. In   view   of   the   judgment   of   this   Court   in   Shantaben   Bhurabhai
Bhuriya   (supra),   the   Argument   of   Mr.   Ranjit   Kumar   that   the   Additional
District Judge and Sessions Judge, Court No.4 Hathras had no jurisdiction
to take cognizance or issue summons/orders cannot be sustained.  
24. There was apparently political rivalry between the Petitioner No.1 and
Devendra   Aggarwal.     However,   Complaint   Case   No.   19/2018   has   not   been
lodged   against   the   Petitioners,   by   Devendra   Aggarwal,   but   by   the
Respondent No.2, a Dhobi by caste, which is a scheduled caste.     It cannot
be said that the allegations in the complaint do not make out offence under
the  Atrocities  Act.    It  is   specifically   alleged  that   the  Petitioners  had  abused
the   Respondent   No.2   in   filthy   language   by   reference   to   his   caste.     The
allegations in the Complaint Case No.19 of 2018, if established, could result
in conviction under the relevant sub­sections of Section 3(1) of the Atrocities
Act. 
10

25. Respondent   No.2   being   an   employee   of   Devendra   Aggarwal,   it   is
possible   that   Complaint   Case   No.19/2018   may   have   been   prompted   by
political   vendetta   against   the   Petitioner   No.1.       However,   since   as   observed
above,   the   allegations   in   the   complaint   case   make   out   an   offence   under
Section 3 of the Atrocities Act, it would not be proper to nip the complaint in
the   bud,   more   so,   when   there   are   statements   recorded   in   Court   under
Section   200   of   the   Cr.P.C.     The   possibility   of   retaliation   on   the   part   of   the
Petitioners   by   the   acts   alleged   in   the   complaint,   after   closure   of   the   earlier
complaint   No.17   of   2010   cannot   be   ruled   out.   Quashing   the   criminal
proceedings at the very inception might result in injustice.  
26. Section 482 of the Cr.P.C provides:­
“ 482.   Saving   of   inherent   powers   of   High   Court .—Nothing
in   this   Code   shall   be   deemed   to   limit   or   affect   the   inherent
powers   of   the   High   Court   to   make   such   orders   as   may   be
necessary   to   give   effect   to   any   order   under   this   Code,   or   to
prevent   abuse   of   the   process   of   any   Court   or   otherwise   to
secure the ends of justice.”
27. Even though, the inherent power of the High Court under Section 482
of the Cr.P.C., to interfere with criminal proceedings is wide, such power has
to   be   exercised   with   circumspection,   in   exceptional   cases.   Jurisdiction
under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C is not to be exercised for the asking.   
28. In   Monica   Kumar   (Dr.)   v.   State   of   U.P 2
.,   this   Court   held   that
inherent   jurisdiction   under   Section   482   of   the   Cr.P.C   has   to   be   exercised
2  (2008) 8 SCC 781
11

sparingly,   carefully   and   with   caution   and   only   when   such   exercise   is
justified by the tests specifically laid down in the section itself. 
29. In   exceptional   cases,   to   prevent   abuse   of   the   process   of   Court,   the
High   Court   might   in   exercise   of   its   inherent   powers   under   Section   482
quash   criminal   proceedings.     However,   interference   would   only   be   justified
when   complaint   did   not   disclose   any   offence,   or   was   patently   frivolous,
vexatious or oppressive, as held by this Court in  Mrs. Dhanalakshmi v. R.
Prasanna Kumar 3
. 
30. The   fact   that   the   complaint   may   have   been   initiated   by   reason   of
political   vendetta   is   not   in   itself   ground   for   quashing   the   criminal
proceedings,   as   observed   by   Bhagwati,   CJ   in   Sheonandan   Paswan   v.
State of Bihar and Others 4
.   It is a well established proposition of law that
a   criminal   prosecution,   if   otherwise   justified   and   based   upon   adequate
evidence,   does   not   become   vitiated   on   account   of   mala   fides   or   political
vendetta   of   the   first   informant   or   complainant.       Though   the   view   of
Bhagawti, CJ in   Sheonandan Paswan   (supra)   was the minority view, there
was  no   difference   of   opinion   with  regard   to   this   finding.     To   quote   Krishna
Iyer,   J.,   in   State   of   Punjab   v.   Gurdial   Singh 5
,   “if   the   use   of   power   is   of
fulfilment of a legitimate object the actuation or catalysation by malice is not
legicidal.” 
3  AIR 1990 SC 494
4   (1987) 1 SCC 288
5   (1980) 2 SCC 471
12

31. In   Municipal   Corporation   of   Delhi   v.   Ram   Kishan   Rohtagi   and
Ors. 6
 A three­Judge Bench of this Court held:
“6.   It may be noticed that Section 482 of the present Code is the
ad   verbatim   copy   of   Section   561­A   of   the   old   Code.   This
provision confers a separate and independent power on the High
Court   alone   to   pass   orders   ex   debito   justitiae   in   cases   where
grave   and   substantial   injustice   has   been   done   or   where   the
process of the court has been seriously abused. It is not merely a
revisional   power   meant   to   be   exercised   against   the   orders
passed  by subordinate  courts. It  was  under this  section  that  in
the old Code, the High Courts used to quash the proceedings or
expunge   uncalled   for   remarks   against   witnesses   or   other
persons or subordinate courts. Thus, the scope, ambit and range
of   Section   561­A   (which   is   now   Section   482)   is   quite   different
from   the   powers   conferred   by   the   present   Code   under   the
provisions   of   Section   397.   It   may   be   that   in   some   cases   there
may   be   overlapping   but   such   cases   would   be   few   and   far
between.   It   is   well   settled   that   the   inherent   powers   under
Section 482 of the present Code can be exercised only when no
other remedy is available to the litigant and not where a specific
remedy  is   provided  by  the  statute.  Further,  the   power being  an
extraordinary   one,   it   has   to   be   exercised   sparingly.   If   these
considerations   are   kept   in   mind,   there   will   be   no   inconsistency
between Sections 482 and 397(2) of the present Code.
7.   The   limits   of   the   power   under   Section   482   were   clearly
defined   by   this   Court   in   Raj   Kapoor   v.   State   [(1980)   1   SCC   43   :
1980   SCC   (Cri)   72]   where  Krishna   Iyer,  J.  observed   as  follows:
[SCC para 10, p. 47: SCC (Cri) p. 76]
“ Even so, a general principle pervades this branch of law when a
specific provision is made: easy resort to inherent power is not right
except under compelling circumstances. Not that there is absence of
jurisdiction   but   that   inherent   power   should   not   invade   areas   set
apart for specific power under the same Code.”
.   Another important consideration which is to be kept in mind is
as to when the High Court acting under the provisions of Section
6 (1983) 1 SCC 1
13

482   should   exercise   the   inherent   power   insofar   as   quashing   of
criminal   proceedings   are   concerned.   This   matter   was   gone   into
in   greater   detail   in   Smt   Nagawwa   v.   Veeranna   Shivalingappa
Konjalgi   [(1976)   3   SCC   736   :   1976   SCC   (Cri)   507   :   1976   Supp
SCR   123   :   1976   Cri   LJ   1533]   where   the   scope   of   Sections   202
and   204   of   the   present   Code   was   considered   and   while   laying
down   the   guidelines   and   the   grounds   on   which   proceedings
could   be   quashed   this   Court   observed   as   follows:   [SCC   para   5,
p. 741 : SCC (Cri) pp. 511­12]
“ Thus it may be safely held that in the following cases an order
of   the   Magistrate   issuing   process   against   the   accused   can   be
quashed or set aside:
(1)   where   the   allegations   made   in   the   complaint   or   the
statements  of the witnesses recorded in support of the same taken
at their face value make out absolutely no case against the accused
or   the   complaint   does   not   disclose   the   essential   ingredients   of   an
offence which is alleged against the accused;
(2)   where   the   allegations   made   in   the   complaint   are   patently
absurd   and   inherently   improbable   so   that   no   prudent   person   can
ever reach a conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding
against the accused;
(3)   where   the   discretion   exercised   by   the   Magistrate   in   issuing
process is capricious and arbitrary having been based either on no
evidence   or   on   materials   which   are   wholly   irrelevant   or
inadmissible; and
(4)   where   the   complaint   suffers   from   fundamental   legal   defects,
such   as,   want   of   sanction,   or   absence   of   a   complaint   by   legally
competent authority and the like.
The   cases   mentioned   by   us   are   purely   illustrative   and   provide
sufficient guidelines to indicate contingencies where the High Court
can quash proceedings.”
9.   Same   view   was   taken   in   a   later   decision   of   this   Court
in   Sharda   Prasad   Sinha   v.   State   of   Bihar   [(1977)   1   SCC   505   :
1977   SCC   (Cri)   132   :   (1977)   2   SCR   357   :   1977   Cri   LJ   1146]
where Bhagwati, J. speaking for the Court observed as follows:
[SCC para 2, p. 506 : SCC (Cri) p. 133]
“ It   is   now   settled   law   that   where   the   allegations   set   out   in   the
complaint or the charge­sheet do not constitute any offence, it is
competent   to   the   High   Court   exercising   its   inherent   jurisdiction
under   Section   482   of   the   Code   of   Criminal   Procedure   to   quash
the   order   passed   by   the   Magistrate   taking   cognizance   of   the
offence.
14

10.   It is, therefore, manifestly clear that proceedings against an
accused in the initial stages can be quashed only if on the face
of   the   complaint   or   the   papers   accompanying   the   same,   no
offence is constituted. In other words, the test is that taking the
allegations   and   the   complaint   as   they   are,   without   adding   or
subtracting   anything,   if   no   offence   is   made   out   then   the   High
Court will be justified in quashing the proceedings in exercise of
its powers under Section 482 of the present Code.”
32. As held by  this Court  in   State  of  Andhra   Pradesh  v.  Gourieshetty
Mahesh 7
,  the High Court, while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of
the  Cr.P.C, would  not  ordinarily  embark  upon  an enquiry   into whether   the
evidence is reliable or not or whether there is reasonable possibility that the
accusation would not be sustained.  
33. In  Paramjeet Batra v. State of Uttrakhand 8
,  this Court held:­
  “12.   While   exercising   its   jurisdiction   under   Section   482   of   the
Code the High Court has to be cautious. This power is to be used
sparingly   and   only   for   the   purpose   of   preventing   abuse   of   the
process   of   any   court   or   otherwise   to   secure   ends   of   justice.
Whether a complaint discloses a criminal offence or not depends
14   upon   the   nature   of   facts   alleged   therein.   Whether   essential
ingredients of criminal offence are present or not has to be judged
by the High Court. …” 
34 . In   Madhavrao   Jiwajirao   Scindia   v.   Sambhajirao   Chandrojirao
Angre 9
, a three­Judge Bench of this Court summarized the law with regard
7   (2010) 6 SCC 588
8  (2013) 11 SCC 673
9   (1988) 1 SCC 692
15

to quashing  of  criminal proceedings  under  Section 482 of  the  Cr.P.C.    This
Court held:­ 
“The   legal   position   is   well   settled   that   when   a   prosecution   at   the
initial   stage   is   asked   to   be   quashed,   the   test   to   be   applied   by   the
court is as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made prima
facie   establish   the   offence.   It   is   also   for   the   court   to   take   into
consideration   any   special   features   which   appear   in   a   particular
case to consider whether it is expedient and in the interest of justice
to permit a prosecution to continue. This is so on the basis that the
court   cannot   be   utilised   for   any   oblique   purpose   and   where   in   the
opinion of the court chances of an ultimate conviction are bleak and,
therefore,   no   useful   purpose   is   likely   to   be   served   by   allowing   a
criminal   prosecution   to   continue,   the   court   may   while   taking   into
consideration the special facts of a case also quash the proceeding
even though it may be at a preliminary stage.”
35. In   Inder   Mohan   Goswami   v.   State   of   Uttaranchal 10
,   this   Court
observed:­
“46.   The   court   must   ensure   that   criminal   prosecution   is   not
used   as   an   instrument   of   harassment   or   for   seeking   private
vendetta or with an ulterior motive to pressurise the accused.
On   analysis   of   the   aforementioned   cases,   we   are   of   the
opinion that it is neither possible nor desirable to lay down an
inflexible   rule   that   would   govern   the   exercise   of   inherent
jurisdiction.   Inherent   jurisdiction   of   the   High   Courts   under
Section 482 CrPC though wide has to be exercised sparingly,
carefully and with caution and only when it is justified by the
tests   specifically   laid   down   in   the   statute   itself   and   in   the
aforementioned cases. In view of the settled legal position, the
impugned judgment cannot be sustained.”
10   (2007) 12 SCC 1 
16

36. In  Kapil Agarwal & Ors. V. Sanjay Sharma & Others 11
, this Court
observed that Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. is designed to achieve the purpose
of   ensuring   that   criminal   proceedings   are   not   permitted   to   generate   into
weapons of harassment. 
37. In  State of Haryana and Ors. v. Bhajan Lal and Ors. 12
, this Court
held:
“ 102.   In   the   backdrop   of   the   interpretation   of   the   various
relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the
principles   of   law   enunciated   by   this   Court   in   a   series   of
decisions   relating   to   the   exercise   of   the   extraordinary   power
under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of
the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we
give   the   following   categories   of   cases   by   way   of   illustration
wherein   such   power   could   be   exercised   either   to   prevent
abuse   of   the   process   of   any   court   or   otherwise   to   secure   the
ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any
precise,   clearly   defined   and   sufficiently   channelised   and
inflexible   guidelines   or   rigid   formulae   and   to   give   an
exhaustive   list   of  myriad  kinds  of  cases  wherein  such  power
should be exercised.
(1)   Where   the   allegations   made   in  the   first   information   report
or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and
accepted   in   their   entirety   do   not   prima   facie   constitute   any
offence or make out a case against the accused.
(2)   Where   the   allegations   in   the   first   information   report   and
other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose
a   cogizable   offence,   justifying   an   investigation   by   police
officers   under   Section   156(1)   of   the   Code   except   under   an
order   of   a   Magistrate   within   the   purview   of   Section   155(2)   of
the Code.
11  (2021) 5 SCC 524
12 1992 Suppl (1) SCC 335
17

(3)   Where   the   uncontroverted   allegations   made   in   the   FIR   or
complaint   and   the   evidence   collected   in   support   of   the   same
do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a
case against the accused.
(4)   Where,   the   allegations   in   the   FIR   do   not   constitute   a
cognizable   offence   but   constitute   only   a   non­cognizable
offence,   no   investigation   is   permitted   by   a   police   officer
without   an   order   of   a   Magistrate   as   contemplated   under
Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so
absurd   and   inherently   improbable   on   the   basis   of   which   no
prudent  person can ever reach a just conclusion that  there is
sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the
provisions   of   the   Code   or   the   concerned   Act   (under   which   a
criminal   proceeding   is   instituted)   to   the   institution   and
continuance   of   the   proceedings   and/or   where   there   is   a
specific   provision  in  the  Code   or  the  concerned  Act, providing
efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7)   Where   a   criminal   proceeding     is   manifestly   attended   with
mala   fide   and/or   where   the   proceeding   is   maliciously
instituted   with   an   ulterior   motive   for   wreaking   vengeance   on
the  accused  and  with a view  to  spite  him  due  to  private  and
personal grudge.
103. We also give a note of caution to the effect that the power
of   quashing   a   criminal   proceeding   should   be   exercised   very
sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of
rare   cases;   that   the   court   will   not   be   justified   in   embarking
upon   an   enquiry   as   to   the   reliability   or   genuineness   or
otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint
and   that   the   extraordinary   or   inherent   powers   do   not   confer
an   arbitrary   jurisdiction   on   the   court   to   act   according   to   its
whim or caprice.
18

37.   Ends of justice would be better served if valuable time of the Court is
spent   on   hearing   appeals   rather   than   entertaining   petitions   under   Section
482 at an interlocutory stage which might ultimately result in miscarriage of
justice as held in  Hamida v. Rashid @ Rasheed and Others 13
.  
39. In   our   considered   opinion   criminal   proceedings   cannot   be   nipped
in   the   bud   by   exercise   of   jurisdiction   under   Section   482   of   the   Cr.P.C.
only   because   the   complaint   has   been   lodged   by   a   political   rival.     It   is
possible that a false complaint may have been lodged at the behest of a
political   opponent.     However,   such   possibility   would   not   justify
interference   under   Section   482   of   the   Cr.P.C.   to   quash   the   criminal
proceedings.  As observed above, the possibility of retaliation on the part
of the petitioners by the acts alleged, after closure of the earlier criminal
case   cannot   be   ruled   out.     The   allegations   in   the   complaint   constitute
offence   under   the   Attrocities   Act.     Whether   the   allegations   are   true   or
untrue, would have to be decided in the trial. In exercise of power under
Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., the Court does not examine the correctness of
the allegations in a complaint except in exceptionally rare cases where it
is patently clear that the allegations are frivolous or do not disclose any
offence.     The   Complaint   Case   No.19/2018   is   not   such   a   case   which
should be quashed at the inception itself without further Trial.  The High
Court rightly dismissed the application under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.
13  (2008) 1 SCC 474 
19

40. F or   the   reasons   discussed   above,   we   are   not   inclined   to   interfere
with the impugned judgment and order  of the High Court.     The special
leave petition is, accordingly, dismissed. 
41. Documents   have   been   brought   on   record   by   the   Petitioners   which
show   that   the   Petitioner   No.1   is   a   patient   of   lung   cancer   of   an   advanced
stage.  He is on strong medication.   Considering the condition of the health
of the Petitioner No.1, the Trial Court may consider exempting the personal
appearance of the Petitioner No.1, if such an application is made to the Trial
Court. 
        ………………………………,J.
  [ INDIRA BANERJEE ]     
  
                                   ..
……………………………..,J.
         [ A.S. BOPANNA ]
NEW DELHI ;
APRIL 20, 2022. 
20