/2022 INSC 0308/
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2911 OF 2022
M/s Indian Oil Corporation Ltd.          ..Appellant 
Versus
Shri Rajendra D. Harmalkar    ..Respondent 
J U D G M E N T 
M. R. Shah, J.
1. Feeling   aggrieved   and   dissatisfied   with   the   impugned
judgment and order dated 29.06.2015 passed by the High Court
of Judicature at Bombay at Goa in Writ Petition No.660 of 2013
by which the High Court has partly allowed the said writ petition
preferred by the respondent herein (hereinafter referred to as the
“original   writ   petitioner”)   directing   the   petitioner   herein   to
reinstate the original writ petitioner without any back wages and
other   benefits   by   substituting   the   punishment   of   dismissal
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imposed by the Disciplinary Authority, the employer – Indian Oil
Corporation Ltd. has preferred the present appeal.
2. The facts leading to the present appeal in a nutshell are as
under:
That   the   respondent   herein   original   writ   petitioner   was
initially   appointed   in   the   year   1982   as   a   casual   employee.     He
moved   an   application   seeking   the   position   of   Refueling   Helper,
wherein   under   the   heading   of   qualifications,   he   mentioned   that
he   has   passed   Secondary   School   Leaving   Certificate   (hereinafter
referred   to   as   “SSLC”)   in   April,   1986   from   Karnataka   Secondary
Education Board.  That he was thereafter appointed as Helper as
per   the   regularization   policy   regularizing   the   casual   employees,
inter   alia,   subject   to   the   contents   prescribed   in   the   application
form for employment being correct.  At that stage also the original
writ   petitioner   submitted   SSLC   of   Karnataka   Board   bearing
No.206271 dated 19.05.1986.
2.1 In   the   year   2003,   the   Chief   Vigilance   Officer   of   the
Corporation received a complaint that the original writ petitioner
had   secured   his   job   as   Re­fueling   Helper   by   submitting   a   false
and forged SSLC.   Similar complaint was also made to the police
authorities also.
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2.2 Despite repetitive requests and follow up by the authorities,
original   writ   petitioner   did   not   submit   the   original   SSLC
Certificate.     On   the   contrary,   the   original   writ   petitioner   sent   a
communication wherein it was mentioned that the original SSLC
has been misplaced.  Thereafter the Manager, ER advised original
writ petitioner to obtain a duplicate copy of the original SSLC and
to submit the same to the Manager, ER.   However, he continued
evading   submission   of   the   original   certificate   or   even   the
Duplicate SSLC from Karnataka Board.
2.3 The Manager, ER thereafter requested the authorities of the
Secondary Board to check up their records and confirm whether
they   had   issued   any   marks   certificate   carrying   details   available
on   the   photocopy   of   the   SSLC   marks   sheet   issued   by   them.     In
response to the same, the Board informed the authority that “as
per   the   record,   SSLC   statement   of   marks   for   the   year   March,
1986   bearing   Registration   No.206271   relate   to   one   Agrahar
Jayant S/o Satyanarayana A.L. DOB – 15.02.1968 and does not
belong   to   Rajendra   Dattaram   Harmalkar   S/o   Datta   Ram
Harmalkar, DOB – 08.12.1962”.
2.4 In   the   above   circumstances,   a   departmental   enquiry   was
initiated   against   the   original   writ   petitioner.     The   original   writ
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petitioner   was   served   with   the   charge­sheet   containing   two
charges which read as under:
“1.   Wilful   insubordination   or   disobedience
whether or not in combination with another, of
any lawful and reasonable order of a superior.
 
2. Giving false information regarding one's age,
father's   name,   qualifications   or   previous
service at the time of employment.”
2.5 The original writ petitioner replied to the charge­sheet.   The
Inquiry  Officer  held  that  both  the  aforesaid charges  were proved
and   proposed   the   punishment   of   dismissal.     After   giving   an
opportunity   to   the  original  writ   petitioner   on   having   agreed   with
the   findings   of   the   Inquiry   Officer,   and   after   taking   into
consideration   the   gravity   of   the   acts   of   misconduct   proved,   the
Disciplinary Authority imposed the punishment of dismissal from
services. The   appeal   preferred   by   the   original   writ   petitioner
came to be dismissed.  
2.6 At this stage it is required to be noted that the original writ
petitioner   was   also   prosecuted   by   the   Criminal   Court,   however
the   learned   Trial   Court   acquitted   him   by   giving   benefit   of   doubt
mainly on the ground that the original SSLC was not brought on
record.   
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2.7 Feeling   aggrieved   and   dissatisfied   with   the   order   of
dismissal  passed by   the  Disciplinary  Authority  confirmed  by  the
Appellate Authority, the original writ petitioner preferred the writ
petition  before  the  High  Court.    It  was  the  case  on   behalf   of  the
original   writ   petitioner   that   he   admitted   the   alleged   guilt   of
misconduct on the assurance of a lenient view being taken by the
authorities.     It   was   also   argued   that   there   was   no   minimum
educational   qualification   and   age   limit   (minimum   or   maximum)
prescribed   to   secure   the   job   or   even   for   the   promotion.     It   was
submitted that therefore in such circumstances, it cannot be said
that   he   had   submitted   a   false   and   forged   certificate   with   an
attempt to secure the job or promotion.   That the certificate was
produced   only   for   the   purpose   of   record   and   there   was   no
dishonest   intention   to   grab   the   job   or   promotion.     It   was   also
urged that the Criminal Court had acquitted him and that he had
a good service record and that the first charge of insubordination
is   not   established.   The   High   Court   framed   only   one   point   for
determination,   namely,   whether   the   punishment   imposed   upon
the   petitioner   is   grossly   disproportionate   to   the   misconduct
committed   by   the   petitioner.     By   the   impugned   judgment   and
order   the   High   Court   observed   and   held   that   the   punishment
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imposed   upon   the   original   writ   petitioner   was   grossly
disproportionate to the misconduct and interfered with the order
of   punishment   imposed   by   the   Disciplinary   Authority   by
observing that the respondent was assured that on admission of
his   guilt   a   lenient   view   may   be   taken   while   imposing   the
punishment. The High Court also observed that the petitioner  is
out   of   service   from   the   year   2006   and   as   the   counsel   for   the
petitioner   had   made   a   statement   that   he   will   forgive   his   back
wages  and  promotion,  by   the  impugned  judgment  and  order   the
High   Court   allowed   the   said   writ   petitioner   and   the   directed   the
appellant to reinstate the original writ petitioner from the date of
dismissal   from   service   in   the   post   of   Refueling   Helper,   however
without any back wages or benefits.
2.8 Feeling   aggrieved   and   dissatisfied   with   the   impugned
judgment   and   order   passed   by   the   High   Court   allowing   the   writ
petitioner   and   interfering   with   the   order   of  punishment   imposed
by   the   Disciplinary   Authority,   the   Indian   Oil   Corporation   –
employer   –   Disciplinary   Authority   has   preferred   the   present
appeal.
3. Shri   Rajiv   Shukla,   learned   counsel   appearing   on   behalf   of
the   appellant   had   vehemently   submitted   that   in   the   facts   and
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circumstances of the case the High Court has committed a grave
error in interfering with the order of punishment imposed by the
Disciplinary   Authority   pursuant   to   the   charge   of   giving   false
information   regarding   his   father’s   name,   his   qualification   by
producing   a   fake   and   false   SSLC   was   held   to   be   proved.     It   is
contended that the High Court materially erred in observing that
the   punishment   of   dismissal   imposed   by   the   Disciplinary
Authority   on  the  proved  misconduct   was  disproportionate  to   the
misconduct established and proved.
3.1 It is urged that when an employee has produced a false and
forged SSLC of the Education Board the same can be said to be a
grave   misconduct   and   therefore   the   Disciplinary   Authority   was
justified in imposing the punishment of dismissal.
3.2 It is further  submitted by learned counsel for  the appellant
that   the   grounds   on   which   the   High   Court   interfered   with   the
punishment   imposed   by   the   Disciplinary   Authority   namely   that
original writ petitioner:­ 
(i) has  admitted the  guilt  on  an  assurance that a  lenient
view shall be taken while imposing the punishment;
(ii) has been acquitted by the Criminal Court; and
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(iii) that   no   minimum   qualification   or   age   limit   was
prescribed for getting the job or promotion and that he
had a good service record, are all irrelevant and/or not
germane.
3.3 It   is   submitted   that   the   High   Court   has   not   properly
appreciated   the   fact   that   the   Criminal   Court   acquitted   the
original writ petitioner by giving him a benefit of doubt and there
was no honorable acquittal.
3.4 It   is   contended   that   it   is   immaterial,   whether,   there   was   a
minimum   qualification   or   age   limit   prescribed   for   the   job   or
promotion or  not  and therefore there was no  intention to  secure
the   job  by  producing  the   fake/forged  certificate.    It  is  submitted
that   it   is   a   case   of   TRUST   and   therefore   when   the   Disciplinary
Authority/employer loses the Confidence and TRUST in such an
employee who submitted a forged/fake certificate, the High Court
ought   not   to   have   interfered   with   the   order   of   punishment
imposed by the Disciplinary Authority. 
3.5 Relying   upon   the   decision   of   this   Court   in   the   case   of   Om
Kumar   v.   Union   of   India,   (2001)   2   SCC   386;   Union   of   India   v.   G.
Ganayutham, (1997) 7 SCC 463; Union of India v. Dwarka Prasad
Tiwari,   (2006)   10   SCC   388 ;   and   Union   of   India   v.   Diler   Singh,
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(2016) 13 SCC 71,   it is submitted that while interfering  with the
order   of   punishment   imposed   by   the   Disciplinary   Authority   the
High   Court   has   exceeded   in   its   jurisdiction   while   exercising   its
powers   under   Article   226   of   the   Constitution   of   India.     It   is
submitted that as per the settled position of law unless there is a
procedural irregularity in conducting the disciplinary proceedings
and/or   the   punishment   imposed   is   shockingly   disproportionate
to   the   proved   misconduct,   then   and   then   only,   the   High   Court
can exercise powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India
and   interfere   with   the   order   of   punishment   imposed   by   the
Disciplinary Authority.
3.6 It is further submitted that even denying the back wages on
the   concession   given   by   the   employee   cannot   be   said   to   be   a
sufficient   punishment   imposed.     It   is   submitted   that   in   the
present   case   as   such   during   the   interregnum   period   the
respondent   original   writ   petitioner   was   working   with   the
petroleum   unit   of   Reliance   Industries   as   a   driver   for   the   period
between   2006   to   2017.     Therefore,   denying   the   back   wages   and
promotion   by   the   High   Court   by   the   impugned   judgment   and
order cannot be said to be any punishment at all.
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3.7 Making   the   above   submissions   and   relying   upon   the   above
decisions, it is prayed to allow the present appeal.
4. The   instant   appeal   is   vehemently   opposed   by   Ms.   Suruchi
Suri, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent.
4.1 It   is   submitted   by   Ms.   Suri,   learned   counsel   appearing   on
behalf   of   the   respondent   –   original   writ   petitioner   that   in   the
present case the respondent – original writ petitioner did produce
the   fake/forged   SSLC.     However,   the   same   had   no   relevance   for
securing   the   job   as   there   was   no   minimum   qualification   or   age
limit prescribed for getting the job or promotion.   It is submitted
that the same was produced only for the purpose of record.
4.2 Further,   the   original   writ   petitioner   admitted   his   guilt   of
producing   the   fake/forge   certificate   on   an   assurance   that   a
lenient   view   would   be   taken   at   the   time   of   imposing   the
punishment.
4.3 It   is   submitted   that   even   the   respondent   –   original   writ
petitioner   has   been   acquitted   by   the   Criminal   Court   for   the
offences   punishable   under   Sections   468   and   471   IPC   regarding
the said SSLC produced by him.
4.4 It   is   further   urged   that   even   the   respondent   had   an
unblemished and good service record.  Therefore, considering the
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aforesaid   overall   facts   and   circumstances,   when   the   High   Court
has   interfered   with   the   order   of   punishment   imposed   by   the
Disciplinary   Authority   and   has   ordered   reinstatement   without
any   back   wages   and   promotion,   the   same   is   not   required   to   be
interfered   with   by  this   Court  in   exercise   of  powers  under  Article
136 of the Constitution of India.
4.5 Making   the   above   submissions   it   is   prayed   to   dismiss   the
present appeal.
5. Heard learned counsel for the respective parties. 
6. By   the   impugned   judgment   and   order,   the   High   Court,   in
exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India,
has   interfered   with   the   order   of   punishment   imposed   by   the
Disciplinary   Authority   and   has   ordered   reinstatement   without
back   wages   and   other   benefits   by   observing   that   order   of
punishment   of   dismissal   from   the   service   imposed   by   the
Disciplinary   Authority   is   disproportionate   to   the   misconduct
proved.  
Therefore,   the   short   question   which   is   posed   for
consideration   by   this   Court   is,   whether,   in   the   facts   and
circumstances   of   the   case   the   High   Court   is   justified   in
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interfering with the conscious decision taken by the Disciplinary
Authority   while   imposing   the   punishment   of   dismissal   from
service,   in   exercise   of   powers   under   Article   226   of   the
Constitution of India.
7. On   the   question   of   judicial   review   and   interference   of   the
courts   in   matters   of   disciplinary   proceedings   and   on   the   test   of
proportionality,   a   few   decisions   of   this   Court   are   required   to   be
referred to:
i) In   the   case   of   Om   Kumar   (supra) ,   this   Court,   after
considering   the   Wednesbury   principles   and   the   doctrine   of
proportionality,   has observed and held that the question of the
quantum of punishment in disciplinary matters is primarily for
the   disciplinary   authority   to   order   and   the   jurisdiction   of   the
High   Courts   under   Article   226   of   the   Constitution   or   of   the
Administrative   Tribunals   is   limited   and   is   confined   to   the
applicability of one or other of the well­known principles known
as ‘ Wednesbury principles’ .
In   the   Wednesbury   case,   (1948)   1   KB   223 ,  it  was  said   that
when   a   statute   gave   discretion   to   an   administrator   to   take   a
decision, the scope of judicial review would remain limited.   Lord
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Greene further said that interference was not permissible unless
one or the other of the following conditions was satisfied, namely,
the   order   was   contrary   to   law,   or   relevant   factors   were   not
considered, or irrelevant factors were considered, or the decision
was one which no reasonable person could have taken.
ii) In   the   case   of   B.C.   Chaturvedi   v.   Union   of   India,   (1995)   6
SCC   749 ,   in   paragraph   18,   this   Court   observed   and   held   as
under:
“18.   A   review   of   the   above   legal   position   would
establish that the disciplinary authority, and on appeal
the   appellate   authority,   being   fact­finding   authorities
have   exclusive   power   to   consider   the   evidence   with   a
view  to maintain discipline.  They  are invested with the
discretion   to   impose   appropriate   punishment   keeping
in view the magnitude or gravity of the misconduct. The
High   Court/Tribunal,   while   exercising   the   power   of
judicial   review,   cannot   normally   substitute   its   own
conclusion  on  penalty  and  impose  some  other  penalty.
If   the   punishment   imposed   by   the   disciplinary
authority   or   the   appellate   authority   shocks   the
conscience   of   the   High   Court/Tribunal,   it   would
appropriately   mould   the   relief,   either   directing   the
disciplinary/appellate   authority   to   reconsider   the
penalty   imposed,   or   to   shorten   the   litigation,   it   may
itself, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate
punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof.”
iii) In   the   case   of   Lucknow   Kshetriya   Gramin   Bank   (Now
Allahabad,   Uttar   Pradesh   Gramin   Bank)   v.   Rajendra   Singh,
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(2013) 12 SCC 372 , in paragraph 19, it was observed and held
as under:
“19.   The  principles  discussed  above  can  be  summed  up
and summarised as follows:
19.1.   When   charge(s)   of   misconduct   is   proved   in   an
enquiry   the   quantum   of  punishment   to  be  imposed   in  a
particular   case   is   essentially   the   domain   of   the
departmental authorities.
19.2.   The   courts   cannot   assume   the   function   of
disciplinary/departmental   authorities   and   to   decide   the
quantum   of   punishment   and   nature   of   penalty   to   be
awarded,   as   this   function   is   exclusively   within   the
jurisdiction of the competent authority.
19.3.   Limited judicial review is available to interfere with
the   punishment   imposed   by   the   disciplinary   authority,
only in cases where such penalty is found to be shocking
to the conscience of the court.
19.4.   Even   in   such   a   case   when   the   punishment   is   set
aside   as   shockingly   disproportionate   to   the   nature   of
charges   framed   against   the   delinquent   employee,   the
appropriate   course   of   action   is  to   remit   the   matter  back
to   the   disciplinary   authority   or   the   appellate   authority
with   direction   to   pass   appropriate   order   of   penalty.   The
court by itself cannot mandate as to what should be the
penalty in such a case.
19.5.   The   only   exception   to   the   principle   stated   in   para
19.4   above,   would   be   in   those   cases   where   the   co­
delinquent   is   awarded   lesser   punishment   by   the
disciplinary   authority   even   when   the   charges   of
misconduct   were   identical   or   the   co­delinquent   was
foisted with more serious charges. This would be on the
doctrine   of   equality   when   it   is   found   that   the   employee
concerned   and   the   co­delinquent   are   equally   placed.
However,   there   has   to   be   a   complete   parity   between   the
two,   not   only   in   respect   of   nature   of   charge   but
subsequent   conduct   as   well   after   the   service   of   charge­
sheet   in   the   two   cases.   If   the   co­delinquent   accepts   the
charges,   indicating   remorse   with   unqualified   apology,
lesser punishment to him would be justifiable.”
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7.1 In   the   present   case,   the   original   writ   petitioner   was
dismissed   from   service   by   the   Disciplinary   Authority   for
producing   the   fabricated/fake/forged   SSLC.     Producing   the
false/fake certificate is a grave misconduct.   The question is one
of a TRUST.  How can an employee who has produced a fake and
forged   marksheet/certificate,   that   too,   at   the   initial   stage   of
appointment   be   trusted   by   the   employer?     Whether   such   a
certificate   was   material   or   not   and/or   had   any   bearing   on   the
employment  or  not  is  immaterial.   The  question  is not  of having
an   intention   or   mens   rea.     The   question   is   producing   the
fake/forged   certificate.     Therefore,   in   our   view,   the   Disciplinary
Authority   was  justified  in   imposing  the  punishment   of  dismissal
from service.
7.2 It   was   a   case   on   behalf   of   the   petitioner   –   original   writ
petitioner   before   the   High   Court   that   he   pleaded   guilty   and
admitted   that   he   had   submitted   a   forged   and   fake   certificate   on
the assurance that lesser punishment will be imposed.  However,
except   the   bald   statement,   there   is   no   further   evidence   on   the
same.  Nothing has been mentioned on record as to who gave him
such an assurance.  
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7.3 Even  otherwise the  conduct  on  the  part  of the original  writ
petitioner is required to be considered.
As   observed   hereinabove,   prior   to   the   issuance   of   the
chargesheet   and   after   the   complaint   was   received   by   the
Vigilance Officer, there were repetitive requests and follow up by
the   authorities   requesting   the   original   writ   petitioner   to   produce
the   original   SSLC.     Initially   the   original   writ   petitioner   did   not
even respond to the said requests.  Thereafter, he came up with a
case   that   the   original   SSLC   was   misplaced.     He   was   then   called
upon   to   obtain   a   duplicate   copy   of   the   SSLC   and   to   submit   the
same   to   the   Manager,   ER.     However,   he   continued   to   evade
obtaining   the   duplicate   certificate   from   Karnataka   Board.     Only
thereafter   the   Manager,   ER   directly   contacted   the   authorities   of
the  Board and  requested the  Education  Board to  check up from
their   records   and   only   thereafter   it   was   revealed   that   the   SSLC
produced   by   the   original   petitioner   was   forged   and   fake   and
belonged   to   or   related   to   some   another   student   and   it   did   not
belong   to   the   original   writ   petitioner.     This   shows   the   malafide
intention on the part of the original writ petitioner.
7.4 Now, so far as the submission on behalf of the original writ
petitioner   that   he   was   acquitted   by   the   Criminal   Court   for   the
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offences   punishable   under   Sections   468   and   471   IPC   in   respect
of the same certificate is concerned, the said contention is neither
here   nor   there   and   is   of   no   assistance   to   the   original   writ
petitioner.     Apart   from   the   fact   that   he   was   acquitted   by   the
Criminal   Court   by   giving   benefit   of   doubt   and   there   was   no
honourable acquittal, in the present case before the Disciplinary
Authority   the   original   writ   petitioner   as   such   admitted   that   he
produced   the   fake   and   forged   certificate.     Therefore,   once   there
was   an   admission   on   the   part   of   the   respondent   –   original   writ
petitioner,   thereafter   whether   he   has   been   acquitted   by   the
Criminal Court is immaterial.
7.5 Even from the impugned judgment and order passed by the
High   Court   it   does   not   appear   that   any   specific   reasoning   was
given by the High Court on how the punishment imposed by the
Disciplinary   Authority   could   be   said   to   be   shockingly
disproportionate   to   the   misconduct   proved.     As   per   the   settled
position of law, unless and until it is found that the punishment
imposed   by   the   Disciplinary   Authority   is   shockingly
disproportionate   and/or   there   is   procedural   irregularity   in
conducting the inquiry, the High Court would not be justified in
interfering   with   the   order   of   punishment   imposed   by   the
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Disciplinary   Authority   which   as   such   is   a   prerogative   of   the
Disciplinary Authority as observed hereinabove.
7.6 From the impugned judgment and order passed by the High
Court, it appears that the High Court has denied the back wages
and   other   benefits   and   has   ordered   reinstatement   on   a
concession given by the learned counsel on behalf of the original
writ   petitioner.     However,   it   is   required   to   be   noted   that   for   the
period between 2006 to 2017 i.e. during the pendency of the writ
petition the respondent was working in the Petroleum Division of
Reliance Industries.  Therefore, he was aware that even otherwise
he   is   not   entitled   to   the   back   wages   for   the   aforesaid   period.
Therefore,   the   concession   given   on   behalf   of   the   original   writ
petitioner as such cannot be said to be a real concession.  In any
case   in   the   facts   and   circumstances   of   the   case   and   for   the
reasons stated above and considering the charge and misconduct
of  producing  the  fake  and false SSLC  Certificate proved, when  a
conscious   decision   was   taken   by   the   Disciplinary   Authority   to
dismiss   him   from   service,   the   same   could   not   have   been
interfered   with   by   the   High   Court   in   exercise   of   powers   under
Article   226   of   the   Constitution   of   India.     The   High   Court   has
exceeded   in   its   jurisdiction   in   interfering   with   the   order   of
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punishment   imposed   by   the   Disciplinary   Authority   while
exercising   its   powers   under   Article   226   of   the   Constitution   of
India.
8. In   view   of   the   above   and   for   the   reasons   stated   above,   the
impugned   judgment   and   order   passed   by   the   High   Court   in
interfering   with   the   order   of   punishment   imposed   by   the
Disciplinary   Authority   of   dismissing   the   original   writ   petitioner
from service and ordering reinstatement without back wages and
other benefits is hereby quashed and set aside.  The order passed
by   the   Disciplinary   Authority   dismissing   the   original   writ
petitioner   from   service   on   the   misconduct   proved   is   hereby
restored. 
The present appeal is accordingly allowed.   In the facts and
circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.
…………………………………J.
                           (M. R. SHAH)
…………………………………J.
       (B.V. NAGARATHNA)
New Delhi, 
April 21, 2022.
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