/2022 INSC 0315/
NON­REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 32554 OF 2018
ALLAHABAD BANK & ORS.       …APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
AVTAR BHUSHAN BHARTIYA              ...RESPONDENT(S)
WITH
SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 9096 OF 2019
O R D E R
1. Aggrieved   by   an   order   of   reinstatement   with   50%   back­wages,
but all other consequential benefits in full, passed by the High Court
of   Judicature   at   Allahabad,   the   Management   of   the   Allahabad   Bank
has   come   up   with   one   Special   Leave   Petition   and   the   delinquent
Officer has come up with the other Special Leave Petition.
2. We have heard the learned Counsel for the parties.
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3. Since one of these Special Leave Petitions is by the Management
of the Bank and other SLP is by the delinquent Officer, we shall refer
to the parties as “the Bank” and “the Officer­employee”.
4. The Officer­employee was first appointed as a Clerk way back in
the year 1974. He was promoted to the post of Junior Manager Grade­
II in 1982 and to the post of Manager  in 1987. In July, 1988 he was
issued   with   a   charge   memorandum,   comprising   of   3   articles   of
charges. A departmental enquiry followed and the Enquiry Officer held
the charges proved. After finding that the Report of the Enquiry Officer
was   not   very   happily   drafted,   the   disciplinary   authority   analysed   the
evidence   on   record   independently   and   passed   an   order   of   penalty   of
dismissal from service on 31.03.1989.
5. The   Officer­employee   filed   a   departmental   appeal   under
Regulation   17   of   the   Allahabad   Bank   Officer   Employees   (Discipline
and   Appeal)   Regulations,   1976,   contending   among   others,   that   the
findings   of   the   Enquiry   Officer   were   not   even   enclosed   to   the   final
order of penalty.
6. The appellate authority, by an order dated 28.02.1990 dismissed
the   appeal,   despite   recording   a   finding   that   the   copy   of   the   enquiry
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report   was   not   enclosed   to   the   final   order   of   penalty.   However,   the
Appellate Authority attempted to overcome this defect by holding that
after   the   Officer­employee   filed   the   statutory   appeal,   a   copy   of   the
enquiry   report   was   sent   to   his   address   on   02.06.1989   and   that   the
same returned undelivered.
7. After   filing   a   petition   for   Review   and   getting   it   dismissed,   the
Officer­employee   moved   the   High   Court   with   a   writ   petition   in
W.P.No.29426 of 1990. After referring to Regulation 9 of the Allahabad
Bank   Officer   Employees   (Discipline   and   Appeal)   Regulations,   1976
which provides for a supply of the copy of the enquiry report, the High
Court   allowed   the   writ   petition   by   an   order   dated   27.04.2011,
directing   the   Management   to   supply   a   copy   of   the   enquiry   report
within   one   month   and   giving   liberty   to   the   Officer­employee   to   file   a
fresh   Appeal   with   a   further   direction   to   the   appellate   authority   to
decide the appeal expeditiously.
8. The Bank filed a Special Leave Petition (C) CC No. 13418 of 2011
and   the   same   was   dismissed   by   this   Court   by   an   Order   dated
26.08.2011. The Bank then sought a review before the High Court but
the same also got rejected.
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9. In an interesting twist, the Bank sent a letter dated 8.05.2012 to
the Officer­employee, claiming that the copy of the enquiry report was
not   traceable   and   that   he   will   be   free   to   submit   a   statutory   appeal,
raising   all   issues.   Aggrieved   by   the   stand   so   taken,   the   Officer­
employee filed a fresh Writ Petition in W.P No.1403 of 2013. The said
Writ   Petition   was   allowed   by   the   High   Court   of   Judicature   at
Allahabad,   setting   aside   the   order   of   penalty   and   directing
reinstatement with 50% of the back wages, but with all consequential
benefits   including   post   retirement   benefits   to   which   he   would   have
been entitled had he not been dismissed from service. This was for the
reason   that   the   employee   attained   superannuation   on   28.02.2013.
The   operative   portion   of   the   Order   dated   01.10.2018   passed   by   the
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad is reproduced as follows:
“...   Resultantly, the writ petition is allowed.
The   order   dated   31.03.1989   whereby   the
punishment   of   dismissal   has   been   imposed   upon   the
petitioner   is   hereby   quashed.   We   also   quash   the   order
dated   15.09.2016   rejecting   the   statutory   appeal   preferred
by the petitioner against the order of dismissal.
The   petitioner   will   thus   be   entitled   to   be   given   all
consequential   benefits,   including   the   post   retirement
benefit   to   which   he   would   have   been   entitled   had   he   not
been   dismissed   from   service   of   the   bank,   for   the   reason
that he has since attained the age of superannuation. We,
however,   direct   that   so   far   as   the   back   wages,   including
the wages to be determined by giving notional promotions
to the petitioner, if any, are concerned, he shall be entitled
only   to   50%   of   total   back   wages.   The   consequential
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benefits   arising   out   of   this   judgment   and   order   shall   be
made   available   to   the   petitioner   within   a   period   of   two
months   from   the   date   a   certified   copy   of   this   order   is
furnished to the competent authority.
Having regard to the entire facts and circumstances
of   the   case   and   also   considering   that   the   petitioner   has
been   litigating   since   the   year   1990,   we   also   direct   cost   to
be paid by the respondent­bank to the petitioner which we
quantify to be Rs.50,000/­.”
10. It   is   against   the   aforesaid   order   that   the   Bank   has   come   up
with   Special   Leave   Petition   (C)   No.32554   of   2018.   On   03.01.2019,
this   Court   directed   the   issue   of   notice   in   the   said   Special   Leave
Petition   limited   to   the   quantum   of   back   wages.   The   order   dated
03.01.2019 passed by this Court reads as follows:­
“Heard.
We   are   not   inclined   to  interfere   with  the  impugned
order of the High Court insofar as the petitioner­Bank has
been   directed   to   pay   all   the   retiral   dues   to   the   first
respondent.  
Issue notice limited to the quantum of back­wages.
In   the   meanwhile,   there   shall   be   stay   of   the
impugned order so far as the back­wages are concerned.”
11. Thereafter   the   Officer­employee   came   up   with   Special   Leave
Petition   (C)   No.9096   of   2019,   challenging   that   portion   of   the
impugned order whereby he was deprived of 50% of the back wages.
Therefore,   on   5.04.2019,   this   Court   ordered   the   issue   of   notice   in
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the   said   Special   Leave   Petition   also   and   directed   the   matter   to   be
tagged along with the Special Leave Petition of the Bank.
12. In   view   of   the   order   passed   by   this   Court   on   3.01.2019,   the
only   question   that   we   are   called   upon   to   decide   is,   whether   the
Officer­employee is not entitled to back wages at all or whether he is
entitled only to 50% of the back wages as held by the High Court or
whether he is entitled to full back wages.
13.   For   finding   an   answer   to   the   above   question,   we   have   to   see
primarily, as to who was at fault.
14. Admittedly,   the   Bank   initiated   disciplinary   proceedings   in
terms of  Allahabad Bank Officer Employees’ (Discipline and Appeal)
Regulations   1976,   for   a   major   misconduct.   The   three   articles   of
charges framed against the Officer­employee were as follows:­
“ARTICLE OF CHARGE I
While   posted   and   functioning   as   Manager,   Nighasan
Branch   during   the   year   1986­87   Shri   Avtar   Bhushan
Bhartiya failed to maintain integrity and devotion to duty
and   did   not   act   with   diligence   in   as   much   as   he   allowed
advances   to   several   borrowers   in   an   indiscriminate
manner without observing the norms of the Bank and the
spirit   of   the   scheme   under   which   such   advances   were
allowed   at   a   grave   risk   and   has   thereby   violated
regulation   3(1)   of   Allahabad   Bank   Officer   Employees'
(Conduct)  Regulations  amounting   to  a  misconduct   under
regulation 24 of the aforesaid regulations.
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ARTICLE OF CHARGE II
While   posted   and   functioning   as   Manager,   Nighasan
Branch   during   the   year   1986­87   Shri   Avtar   Bhushan
Bhartiya   has   failed   to   maintain   integrity   and   devotion   to
duty   in   as   much   as   he   allowed   indiscriminate   advances
for   patthar   udhyog   in   village   Jhandi   &   Khairani   in
complicity   with   one   Shri   Raj   Kumar   with   intent   to
misutilise   the   subsidy   availed   on   such   advances   by   not
observing   the   norms   of   the   Bank   and   the   rules   of   the
scheme   under   which   advances   were   allowed.   Shri
Bhartiya has thereby violated regulation 3(1) of Allahabad
Bank   Officer   Employees'   violated   Regulation,   1976
amounting   to   a   misconduct   under   regulation   24   of   the
aforesaid regulations.
ARTICLE OF CHARGE III
While   posted   and   functioning   as   Manager,   Tikonia
Branch   in   Distt.   Lakhimpur   during   the   year   1985,   Shri
Bhartiya   has   failed   to   act   with   diligence   and   devotion   to
duty   in   as   much   as   he   failed   to   conduct   appraisal   and
verification of the identity of Shri Tarsem and has thereby
violated   regulation   3(1)   of   Allahabad   Bank   Officer
Employees'   (Conduct)   Regulations   amounting   to   a
misconduct   under   regulation   24   of   the   aforesaid
regulations.”
15. The   departmental   enquiry   commenced   on   21.11.1988   and
concluded on 09.01.1989. The enquiry report dated 09.03.1989 was
forwarded to the disciplinary authority  vide  letter dated 13.03.1989.
The   disciplinary   authority   passed   an   order   of   penalty   on
31.03.1989.   It   is   obvious   from   the   order   of   penalty   dated
31.03.1989   that   the   copy   of   the   enquiry   report   was   neither   sent
beforehand nor even enclosed to the order of penalty. Interestingly,
the   disciplinary   authority   agreed   with   the   conclusions   reached   by
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the   enquiry   officer   but   felt   that   the   reasoning   was   deficient.
Therefore,   the   disciplinary   authority   chose   to   analyse   the   evidence
on   record   independently.   The   relevant   portion   of   the   order   of   the
disciplinary authority reads as follows:­
“From   the   enquiry   officer's   report   I   find   that   while
holding   the   charges   leveled   against   Shri   Bhartiya   in   the
aforesaid   charge   sheet   dated   26.7.88   as   proved   against
him he has not analysed the facts brought on the records
of   the   enquiry   proceedings   and   has   also   not   highlighted
the   merits/demerits   of   the   evidences   brought   on   the
records  of  enquiry  proceedings.  Accordingly  evidences  on
records   of   the   proceedings   would   first   be   discussed   and
analysed by me chargewise separately each here under as
the   same   exercise   has   become   necessary   for   the   reasons
mentioned above.”
16. In the statutory appeal filed by the Officer­employee, he raised
a   specific   contention   that   the   enquiry   report   was   not   furnished.
Despite recording a finding that the copy of the enquiry report was
not   even   enclosed   to   the   final   order   of   penalty,   the   Appellate
Authority attempted to overcome the same on the ground that after
the   appeal   was   filed,   the   copy   of   enquiry   report   was   sent   by   post
and that the same returned undelivered. The relevant portion of the
order of the Appellate Authority reads as follows:­
Also,   a   copy   of   the   Enquiry   Officer's   report/findings,
although   not   enclosed   with   the   Disciplinary   Authority's
Order,   has   been   subsequently   provided   to   the   appellant.
However,   the   same,   which   was   sent   at   the   recorded
address   of   the   appellant   on   2.6.1989,   has   been   returned
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undelivered   by   the   Post   Office   with   the   remark   :   "Pane
wale bar bar jane par nahi milte, intezar ke bad wapas." 
17. At  the   time   when   the   final   order  of  penalty   dated   31.03.1989
was passed and at the time when the appeal was dismissed by the
order   dated   28.02.1990,   the   law   in   this   regard   was   actually   in   a
state   of   flux.   After   the   decision   of   the   Constitution   Bench   of   this
Court in   Union of India and Another   vs.   Tulsiram  Patel 1
,   a two
member   Bench   doubted   its   authenticity   or   applicability   to   cases
where  a  copy  of   the  enquiry  report  was  not  supplied. Therefore,  in
Union   of   India   And   Others     vs.   E.   Bashyan 2
,   a   reference   was
made, which led to the decision in  Union of India and Others    vs.
Mohd.   Ramzan   Khan 3
.   The   position   became   very   clear   after   the
decision   in   Managing   Director,   ECIL   ,   Hyderabad     vs.     B .
Karunakar 4
  .
18. Therefore,   by   the   time   the   writ   petition   challenging   the   final
order of penalty was decided on 27.04.2011, the law in this regard
was no longer  res integra .
1   (1985) 3 SCC 398
2   AIR 1988 SC 1000
3   (1991) 1 SCC 588
4   1994 SCC Supp.(2) 391
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19. Dehors   the   development   of   law   as   aforesaid,   the   Officer­
employee   had   an   advantage   in   the   form   of   Regulation   9   of   the
Allahabad   Bank   Officer   Employees   (Discipline   and   Appeal)
Regulations 1976. This Regulation 9 reads as follows:­
“9. COMMUNICATION OF ORDERS :
Orders   made   by   the   Disciplinary   Authority   under
Regulation   7   or   Regulation   8   shall   be   communicated   to
the   officer   employee   concerned,   who   shall   also   be
supplied with a copy of the report of enquiry, if any.”
20. Therefore,   by   the   order   dated   27.04.2011,   the   High   Court
allowed the writ petition of the Officer­employee, on the basis of the
above   Regulation.   The   operative   portion   of   the   order   of   the   High
Court dated 27.04.2011 reads as follows:­
“In view of above, the writ petition is allowed. A writ
in   the   nature   of   certiorari   is   issued   quashing   the
impugned  appellate order  dated 28.2.1990  and  the order
dated   3.7.1990   (Annexure­8)   passed   on   the   review
petition.   A   cost   of   Rs.50,000/­   is   imposed   upon   the
respondents which shall be deposited in this Court within
a   period   of   two   months.   The   respondents   shall   supply   a
copy   of   the   enquiry   report   within   one   month   from   today.
Thereafter, the petitioner may prefer an appeal setting up
grounds   and   pointing   procedural   illegality   including   the
plea   raised  before   this  Court   within  the  next   one  month.
The   appellate   authority   shall   decide   the   appeal,
expeditiously say within a period of two months from the
date   of   filing   of   fresh   appeal.   In   case   the   cost   is   not
deposited, the same shall be realised through the District
Magistrate as arrears of land revenue. It shall be open for
the petitioner to withdraw an amount of Rs.25,000/­ and
the rest  shall be remitted to the Mediation Centre of this
Court at Lucknow. Registry to take follow­up action.”
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21. The aforesaid order of the High Court has attained finality with
the   dismissal   of   the   SLP   on   26.08.2011.   The   order   of   dismissal   of
the SLP reads as follows:­
“Delay condoned.
Having   considered   the   pleadings   in   the   case,   the
materials   placed   on   record   and   the   submissions   of   the
learned   counsel,   we   do   not   find   any   merit   in   the   Special
Leave   Petition   and   hence   the   special   leave   petition   is
dismissed.”
22. The   Bank   thereafter   took   a   chance   by   filing   a   petition   for
review   before   the   High   Court,   but   the   same   also   got   dismissed   on
29.02.2012.   Thereafter,   the   Bank   took   a   very   strange   position   by
holding   out   that   the   copy   of   the   enquiry   report   was   not   traceable.
The   communication   dated   08.05.2012   sent   by   the   Bank   to   the
Officer­employee in this regard reads as follows:­
“In   reference   to   the   captioned   matter   we   have   to
advise   that   the   copy   of   the   finding   of   Enquiry   Officer   is
not traceable and this fact has been brought to the notice
of Hon'ble High Court in the writ petition, and also to you
vide letter No.ZOLK/INSPECTION/693 dated 08.09.2011.
You   are   requested   to   submit   your   statutory   appeal   and
the   same   will   be   considered   and   you   will   be   provided   all
reasonable   opportunity   to   put   forth   your   case   even
personal hearing, if required, will also be afforded to you,
but   since   the   copy   of   finding   of   Enquiry   Officer   is   not
traceable we are unable to provide the same. Kindly bear
with us and submit your appeal which will be considered
by the Bank on the basis of records available.”
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23. In   view   of   the   aforesaid   turn   of   events,   the   Officer­employee
moved a contempt petition before the High Court. Finding  that the
Management of the Bank cannot be penalized for not being able to
trace   the   copy   of   the   enquiry   report,   the   High   Court   closed   the
contempt petition with liberty to the employee to re­agitate the issue
on the basis of the subsequent cause of action. The relevant portion
of   the   order   dated   21.05.2013   passed   by   the   High   Court   in   the
contempt petition filed by the employee reads as follows:­
“…Since   by   the   letter   dated   8.5.2012,   the   respondents
had communicated that inquiry report is not available in
absence   of   inquiry   report,   cause   of   action   arose   contrary
to   finding   recorded   by   the   judgment   and   order   dated
27.4.2011.     It   is   open   for   the   petitioner   to  approach   this
Court   again   to   ventilate   his   grievance   on   the   basis   of
subsequent cause of action…”
24. Therefore,  the  Officer­employee  was  driven  to   the  necessity  of
filing a fresh writ petition in W.P.No.1403(S/B) of 2013. During the
pendency of the said writ petition, an order was passed by the High
Court   on   03.08.2016   holding   that   the   stand   of   the   Bank   was
unacceptable and that in any case an appeal may be preferred and
the   same   may   be   decided   by   the   Appellate   Authority.   Accordingly,
an   appeal   was   preferred.   The   Appellate   Authority   considered   the
appeal   once   again   but   obviously   without   the   copy   of   the   enquiry
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report   and   rejected   the   appeal.   This   fact   is   borne   out   by   the
impugned   order   itself,   the   relevant   portion   of   which   reads   as
follows:­
“…During   pendency   of   this   writ   petition,   an   order
was   passed   by   the   Court   in   these   proceedings   on
03.08.2016   wherein   it   has   been   observed   that   the   stand
of   the   respondent­Bank   that   enquiry   report   was   not
available, cannot be accepted in view of the finding of this
Court   recorded   earlier   i.e.   the   finding   recorded   in   the
judgment   and   order   dated   27.04.2011.     It   was   further
observed   that   the   obligation   cast   upon   the   respondent­
Bank  has  not   been carried  out  on  the lame  excuse.    The
Court   further   observed   that   the   Bank   may,   however,
decide   the   appeal   preferred   by   the   petitioner   taking   into
consideration   the   direction   issued   earlier,   vide   judgment
and order dated 27.04.2011…”
25. In the light of the aforesaid facts, no great deal of research was
necessary on the part of the High Court to arrive at the conclusion
that   the   Management   of   the   Bank   was   clearly   at   fault.   Therefore,
the   High   Court   allowed   the   writ   petition.   The   operative   portion   of
the impugned order is already extracted earlier.
26. It   is   not   as   though   the   High   Court   proceeded   solely   on   the
basis   of   the   failure   of   the   Management   to   supply   the   copy   of   the
enquiry report. The High Court found that the charges related to a
Government   sponsored   Scheme   and   that   the   beneficiaries   were
identified   and   were   short­listed   by   a   Government   agency,   namely
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the District Rural Development Agency. The High Court also found
that no bad motive was either attributed to the employee nor proved
in the departmental proceedings.
27. On   the   basis   of   the   aforesaid   findings,   the   High   Court   could
have   granted   all   the   reliefs   in   full,   including   full   back­wages.   But
considering   the   fact   that   from   the   date   of   his   dismissal   namely,
31.03.1989, upto the date of his superannuation on 28.02.2013, a
period of nearly 24 years had passed, the High Court thought it fit
to   limit  the   back­wages   to   50%.  In   such  circumstances,   we  do  not
think that the Management can make out any grievance, especially
(i)   after  having  violated Regulation 9;   (ii)   after  their  failure to  point
out to the High Court in the first round of litigation that the copy of
the enquiry report was not available; and   (iii)   after their inability to
comply with the order of the High Court passed in the first round of
litigation, which was also confirmed by this Court.
28. Therefore,   the   Special   Leave   Petition   filed   by   the   Bank
deserves to be dismissed.
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29. Having dealt with the SLP filed by the Management, let us now
come   to   the   SLP   filed   by   the   Officer­employee   with   regard   to   the
grant of back wages only to the extent of 50%.
30. The   learned   counsel   for   the   Officer­employee   places   heavy
reliance   upon   the   decision   of   this   Court   in   Deepali   Gundu
Surwase   vs.   Kranti   Junior   Adhyapak   Mahavidyalaya   (D.   ED.)
&   Ors . 5
,   in   support   of   his   contention   that   the   grant   of   full   back
wages is a  normal  rule in cases of  wrongful  termination of service.
But the ratio laid down in the said decision cannot be pressed into
service   by   the   Officer­employee   in   this   case.   This   is   for   the   reason
that the Officer­employee in this case was originally appointed as a
Clerk   way   back   in   the   year   1974.   He   was   promoted   to   the   post   of
Junior   Management   Grade­II   in   the   year   1982   and   as   Branch
Manager   in   the   year   1987.   This   is   why   he   was   governed   by   the
Allahabad   Bank   Officer   Employees   (Discipline   and   Appeal)
Regulations, 1976. Courts should always keep in mind the different
yardsticks   to   be   applied   in   the   cases   of   workman   category
employees   and   managerial   category   employees.   In   appropriate
5   (2013) 10 SCC 324
15

cases, the distinction between labour law and service law may also
have   to   be   kept   in   mind.   Many   times,   Courts   wrongly   apply,   in
matters   arising   under   service   law,   the   principles   laid   down   in
matters arising under labour laws.  
31. As   a   matter   of   fact,   the   propositions   elucidated   in   Deepali
Gundu Surwase  (supra) ,  read as follows:­
“38.   The   propositions   which   can   be   culled   out   from   the
aforementioned judgments are:
38.1  In   cases   of   wrongful   termination   of   service,
reinstatement with continuity of service and back wages
is the normal rule.
38.2  The aforesaid rule is subject to the rider that while
deciding   the   issue   of   back   wages,   the   adjudicating
authority   or   the   Court   may   take   into   consideration   the
length   of   service   of   the   employee/workman,   the   nature
of   misconduct,   if   any,   found   proved   against   the
employee/workman,   the   financial   condition   of   the
employer and similar other factors.
38.3 Ordinarily,   an   employee   or   workman   whose
services   are   terminated   and   who   is   desirous   of   getting
back wages is required to either plead or at least make
a   statement   before   the   adjudicating   authority   or   the
Court   of   first   instance   that   he/she   was   not   gainfully
employed   or   was   employed   on   lesser   wages.   If   the
employer   wants   to   avoid   payment   of   full   back   wages,
then   it   has   to   plead   and   also   lead   cogent   evidence   to
prove   that   the   employee/workman   was   gainfully
employed   and   was   getting   wages   equal   to   the   wages
he/she  was drawing prior to the  termination of  service.
This   is   so   because   it   is   settled   law   that   the   burden   of
proof   of   the   existence   of   a   particular   fact   lies   on   the
person   who   makes   a   positive   averments   about   its
16

existence.   It   is   always   easier   to   prove   a   positive   fact
than   to   prove   a   negative   fact.   Therefore,   once   the
employee   shows   that   he   was   not   employed,   the   onus
lies on the employer to specifically plead and prove that
the   employee   was   gainfully   employed   and   was   getting
the same or substantially similar emoluments.
38.4 The   cases   in   which   the   Labour   Court/Industrial
Tribunal   exercises   power   under   Section   11­A   of   the
Industrial   Disputes   Act,   1947   and   finds   that   even
though the enquiry held against the employee/workman
is   consistent   with   the   rules   of   natural   justice   and   /   or
certified   standing   orders,   if   any,   but   holds   that   the
punishment   was   disproportionate   to   the   misconduct
found   proved,   then   it   will   have   the   discretion   not   to
award   full   back   wages.   However,   if   the   Labour
Court/Industrial   Tribunal   finds   that   the   employee   or
workman   is   not   at   all   guilty   of   any   misconduct   or   that
the  employer had  foisted  a false  charge, then there  will
be ample justification for award of full back wages.
38.5 The   cases   in   which   the   competent   Court   or
Tribunal   finds   that   the   employer   has   acted   in   gross
violation   of   the   statutory   provisions   and/or   the
principles of natural justice or is guilty of victimizing the
employee   or   workman,   then   the   concerned   Court   or
Tribunal will be fully justified in directing payment of full
back   wages.   In   such   cases,   the   superior   Courts   should
not   exercise   power   under   Article   226   or   136   of   the
Constitution and interfere with the award passed by the
Labour Court, etc., merely because there is a possibility
of   forming   a   different   opinion   on   the   entitlement   of   the
employee/workman   to   get   full   back   wages   or   the
employer’s obligation to pay the same. The Courts must
always   be   kept   in   view   that   in   the   cases   of   wrongful   /
illegal   termination   of   service,   the   wrongdoer   is   the
employer   and   sufferer   is   the   employee/workman   and
there is no justification to give premium to the employer
of his wrongdoings by relieving him of the burden to pay
to   the   employee/workman   his   dues   in   the   form   of   full
back wages.
38.6 In   a   number   of   cases,   the   superior   Courts   have
interfered   with   the   award   of   the   primary   adjudicatory
17

authority   on   the   premise   that   finalization   of   litigation
has   taken   long   time   ignoring   that   in   majority   of   cases
the  parties   are  not  responsible   for  such   delays.  Lack  of
infrastructure   and   manpower   is   the   principal   cause   for
delay   in   the   disposal   of   cases.   For   this   the   litigants
cannot   be   blamed   or   penalised.   It   would   amount   to
grave   injustice   to   an   employee   or   workman   if   he   is
denied back wages simply because there is long lapse of
time   between  the   termination   of   his   service   and   finality
given   to   the   order   of   reinstatement.   The   Courts   should
bear in mind that in most of these cases, the employer is
in   an   advantageous   position   vis­à­vis   the   employee   or
workman.   He   can   avail   the   services   of   best   legal   brain
for   prolonging   the   agony   of   the   sufferer,   i.e.,   the
employee   or   workman,   who   can   ill   afford   the   luxury   of
spending   money   on   a   lawyer   with   certain   amount   of
fame.   Therefore,   in   such   cases   it   would   be   prudent   to
adopt   the   course   suggested   in   Hindustan   Tin   Works
Private   Limited   v.   Employees   of   Hindustan   Tin   Works
Private Limited  (1979) 2 SCC 80 .
38.7 The   observation   made   in   J.K.   Synthetics   Ltd.   v.
K.P.   Agrawal   (2007)   2   SCC   433   that   on   reinstatement
the   employee/workman   cannot   claim   continuity   of
service   as   of   right   is   contrary   to   the   ratio   of   the
judgments   of   three   Judge   Benches   referred   to
hereinabove   and   cannot   be   treated   as   good   law.   This
part  of the  judgment  is  also against the  very concept  of
reinstatement of an employee/workman.”
32. Even if we apply the propositions enunciated by this Court in
Deepali Gundu Surwase   (supra) , the Officer­employee may not be
entitled   to   full   back   wages.   This   is   for   the   reason   that   there   is
nothing on record to show whether he was gainfully employed after
his   dismissal   from   service.   A   careful   look   at   the   pleadings   in   the
writ   petition   W.P.   No.1403   of   2013   would   show   that   he   has   not
18

pleaded about his non­employment. Though in paragraphs 36 to 38
of his writ petition, the employee has pleaded about the sudden set
back to his health in the year 2011 and the financial hardships he
was facing, there was no assertion about his non­employment.  The
employee   had   his   pleadings   amended   after   the   dismissal   of   his
appeal   during   the   pendency   of   the   writ   petition.   Even   in   the
amended   pleadings,   there   was   no   averment   relating   to   his   non­
employment.   Therefore,   even   if   we   apply   the   ratio   in   Deepali
Gundu   Surwase   (supra) ,   the   employee   may   not   satisfy   the   third
proposition found in para 38.3 thereof.
33. The   reliance   placed   upon   the   decision   in   Pawan   Kumar
Agarwala   vs.   General   Manager­II   and   Appointing   Authority,
State   Bank   of   India   and   Others 6
  may   not   also   be   of   help   to   the
employee. It is a case where this Court applied the propositions laid
down   in   Deepali   Gundu   Surwase   (supra).   This   Court   found   that
there   was   nothing   to   show   that   the   employee   was   gainfully
employed after the date of dismissal.  It is needless to point out that
in   the   first   instance,   there   is   an   obligation   on   the   part   of   the
6   (2015) 15 SCC 184
19

employee to plead that he is not gainfully employed. It is only then
that   the   burden   would   shift   upon   the   employer   to   make   an
assertion and establish the same.
34. The   decision   in   Fisheries   Department,   State   of   Uttar
Pradesh  vs.  Charan Singh 7
  arose out of an award of the Industrial
Tribunal   under   the   U.P.   Industrial   Disputes   Act,   1947.   Therefore,
the same has no relevance to the case on hand.
35. In   Jayantibhai   Raojibhai   Patel   vs.   Municipal   Council,
Narkhed   and   Others 8
,   this   Court   referred   to   the   principles   laid
down in  Hindustan Tin Works (P) Ltd.   vs.  Employees 9
 and to the
propositions   culled   out   in   the   Deepali   Gundu   Surwase   (supra).
Though   this   Court   held   that   the   denial   of   back   wages   in   entirety
was   not   justified,   this   Court   awarded   only   a   lump­sum
compensation in that case.
36. Therefore,   even   applying   the   ratio   laid   down   in   various
decisions,   we   do   not   think   that   the   employee   could   be   granted
anything more than what the High Court has awarded.
7   (2015) 8 SCC 150
8   (2019) 17 SCC 184
9   (1979) 2 SCC 80
20

37. As   we   have   pointed   out   at   the   beginning,   the   total   period   of
service   rendered   by   the   Officer­employee   before   his   dismissal   from
service, was about 15 years, from 1974 to 1989 and he attained the
age of superannuation in February, 2013, meaning thereby that he
was out of employment for 24 years.  The High Court has taken this
factor   into   consideration   for   limiting   the   back   wages   only   to   50%
and we find that the High Court has actually struck a balance. We
do   not   wish   to   upset   this   balance.   Therefore,   the   Special   Leave
Petition of the Officer­employee is also liable to be dismissed.
38. Accordingly, both the Special Leave Petitions are dismissed, no
costs.
………………………………….J.
(Indira Banerjee)
………………………………….J.
(V. Ramasubramanian)
New Delhi
April  22, 2022
21