/2022 INSC 0347/
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NOS.2752­2753 OF 2022
(Arising out of Special Leave Petition(C) NOS.19662­19663 OF 2021)
ASSET RECONSTRUCTION COMPANY
(INDIA) LIMITED       …APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
S.P. VELAYUTHAM & ORS.               ...RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
V. Ramasubramanian, J.
1. Asset   Reconstruction   Company   (India)   Limited,   to   whom   the
Indian   Bank   assigned   the   loans   and   the   underlying   security   of   a
particular  borrower, has come up with the above appeals challenging
the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature at
Madras,   reversing   the   judgment   of   a   learned   Single   Judge   of   the
Court,   by   which   the   learned   Single   Judge   held   the   registration   of   a
sale­deed by the Registering Authority to be null and void.
2. We have heard Mr. Guru Krishna Kumar  and Mr. Nakul Devan,
learned   senior   counsel   for   the   appellant,   and   Mr.   Shyam   Divan,
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Mr.   Atul   Nanda   and   Mr.   Mukul   Rohatgi,   learned   senior   counsel
appearing for the contesting respondents.
3. The   brief   facts   necessary   for   the   disposal   of   the   appeals   can   be
summarised as follows:­
(i) In   the   year   1992,   the   Indian   Bank   sanctioned   financial
facilities to M.V.R. Group of Industries. According to the Indian Bank,
the borrower offered the immovable property covered by the document
now in dispute, as collateral security and a mortgage by deposit of title
deeds is said to have been created way back in the year 1995­96;
(ii) Alleging   that   the   borrower   defaulted   in   repayment   of   the
loan,   Indian   Bank   filed   an   application   before   the   Debts   Recovery
Tribunal   in  the   year   1996  under  Section   19  of  the  Recovery   of   Debts
Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993;
(iii) However,   after   the   advent   of   the   Securitisation   Act,   2002,
the   Bank   issued   a   demand   notice   dated   15.12.2004   under   Section
13(2) of the Securitisation Act. It was followed by a possession notice
dated 30.03.2005 under Section 13(4);
(iv) Thereafter,   the   respondent   nos.   4   and   5   herein   executed   a
deed of  Power  of Attorney  (‘PoA’  for  short) on 23.08.2006 in  favour  of
Mr.   S.P.   Velayutham,   the   1 st
  respondent   in   one   of   these   appeals   and
the 6 th
  respondent in the other appeal. This deed of Power of Attorney
contained   an   express   prohibition   for   the   agent   to   encumber   the
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properties.   This   deed   of   PoA   was   registered   in   the   Office   of   the   Sub­
Registrar, Alandur;
(v) By another deed of PoA dated 07.06.2007, the power of sale
is said to have been conferred upon the agent, but this deed of power
was un­registered;
(vi) On   the   basis   of   the   original   registered   deed   of   PoA   dated
23.08.2006 which did not confer a power of sale, Mr. S.P. Velayutham
sold the  property  to  his son Amar  (the 6 th
  respondent in  one of these
appeals   and   the   1 st
  respondent   in   the   other   appeal)   under   a   deed   of
sale dated 05.07.2007;
(vii) In   the   meantime,   Indian   Bank   which   already   initiated
proceedings   under   the   Securitisation   Act,   assigned   the   debt   and   the
collateral security in favour of the appellant herein, which is an asset
reconstruction   company.   On   the   basis   of   such   assignment,   the
appellant issued a sale notice dated 05.08.2008;
(viii) However,   Mr.   Amar,   executed   a   deed   of   settlement   dated
13.10.2008 in favour of his father Mr. S.P. Velayutham, from whom he
had purchased the property;
(ix) While   so,   during   the   period   2009­2015,   some
encroachments   took   place   which   led   to   the   initiation   of   proceedings
under Section 145 Cr.P.C. The original borrowers also filed civil suits
and the appellant got themselves impleaded in those suits;
(x) Eventually,   the   appellant   filed   a   writ   petition   in   W.P.No.
33462 of 2014 seeking a declaration that the act of the Sub­Registrar
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in registering  the sale deed executed by  S.P. Velayutham in favour of
his son Amar, was null and void. The said writ petition was allowed by
a learned Judge on the ground that there was utter failure on the part
of the Registering Authority to follow the mandate of law as prescribed
in   Sections   32   to   35   of   the   Registration   Act,   1908   and   that   the
Registrar   failed   to   verify   the   deed   of   PoA   dated   23.08.2006,   before
allowing registration of the sale deed executed on the basis of the said
power;
(xi) However,   two   intra­court   appeals   filed   by   the   father­son
duo,   were   allowed   by   the   Division   Bench   primarily   on   the   ground,
(1)  that the appellant ought to have taken recourse to a civil suit; and
(2)   that   the   appellant   is   guilty   of   violating   the   order   passed   by   this
Court in the proceedings arising out of the order of the Sub­Divisional
Magistrate   under   Section   145   of   the   Cr.P.C.,   directing   the   parties   to
approach the civil court. Aggrieved by this order of the Division Bench,
the appellant has come up with the above appeals.
4. Assailing   the   impugned   order   of   the   Division   Bench   of   the   High
Court, it is contended by the learned senior counsel for the appellants,
(i)   that   the   High   Court   failed   completely   to   appreciate   that   the
Registration   Act,   1908,   enjoins   upon   the   Registering   Authority   to
verify   “the   person   executing”   the   document   sought   to   be   registered;
(ii)   that   in   cases   where   the   statutory   authorities   fail   to   perform   the
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duties   enjoined   upon   them,   under   specific   provisions   of   the   statute,
the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution
does not stand ousted;   (iii)   that what was challenged before the High
Court  in a  petition  under  Article 226 was not  the acts  of individuals,
but the acts of omission and commission on the part of the Registering
Authority   and   hence   the   writ   petition   cannot   be   said   to   be   not
maintainable; and   (iv)   that by an over­simplified process of reasoning,
the   Division   Bench   of   the   High   Court   threw   the   appellant   out   of   the
Court   and   also   added   insult   to   injury   by   commenting   upon   the
conduct of the appellant and imposing costs.
5. Supporting   the   impugned   order,   it   is   contended   by   Mr.   Shyam
Divan,   learned   senior   counsel   appearing   for   Mr.   S.P.   Velayutham
(respondent   no.6   in   one  of  these  appeals   and   respondent   no.1  in   the
other appeal),   (i)   that when admittedly title suits are pending and the
very appellant herein has got themselves impleaded therein, it was not
open   to  the  appellant   to  resort  to   a  short­cut  method  of  invoking   the
jurisdiction   of   the   writ   court;   (ii)   that   when   there   are   seriously
disputed questions of fact, with the contesting respondents (father and
son)   tracing   their   title   to   an   un­broken,   un­impeachable   chain   of
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registered   documents   dating   back   to   1929,   the   appellant   could   not
have   invoked  the   writ  jurisdiction   of   the  High   Court,   after   having  got
an   assignment   deed   from   the   Indian   Bank   just   a   few   years   ago   in
2007;  (iii)    that the very right of the Indian Bank to claim the creation
of a mortgage in their favour, has come under cloud after the officials
of   the   Indian   Bank   and   the   borrowers   got   convicted   by   the   Special
Court   for   the   CBI   cases   in   Calendar   Case   No.  36   of   1998   for   various
offences punishable under Section 120B read with Sections 420, 467,
471   etc.,   and   Section   13(2)   read   with   Section   13(1)(c)   and   13(1)(d)   of
the   Prevention   of   Corruption   Act,   1988;   (iv)   that   the   attempt   of   the
appellant  to invoke the  writ jurisdiction of the  High  Court was in  the
teeth   of   the   judgment   of   this   Court   in   SLP(Crl.)No.838   of   2015   dated
27.02.2015, which arose out of proceedings under Section 145 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973;  (v)  that despite this Court affirming
the   judgment   of   the   High   Court   relegating   the   appellant   to   a   civil
court, the appellant took a chance by invoking the writ jurisdiction of
the High Court suppressing material facts; and  (vi)  that the appellant,
whose   very   locus   to   stake   a   claim   on   the   properties   is   disputed,   was
rightly non suited by the High Court.
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6. Mr. Atul Nanda, learned senior  counsel appearing for  one of the
parties,   while   adopting   the   contentions   of   Mr.   Shyam   Divan,   added
that when the Special Court for CBI cases has found the very creation
of the mortgage in favour of Indian Bank to be a product of fraud and
forgery,   an   institution   claiming   to   be   the   assignee   of   the   mortgagee
could   not   have   invoked   the   writ   jurisdiction   of   the   High   Court,
especially after having got impleaded in the civil suits.
7. Mr.   Mukul   Rohatgi,   learned   senior   counsel   appearing   for   one   of
the   contesting   respondents   invited   our   attention   to   the   statutory
provisions and the decision of this Court in   Rajni Tandon   vs.  Dulal
Ranjan   Ghosh   Dastidar   &   Anr 1
,   and   contended   that   the
requirement   of   authentication   of   PoA   by   the   Registrar   under   Section
33(1),   was   mandatory   only   in   cases   where   the   person   executing   the
document   is   different   from   the   person   presenting   it   for   registration
and   that   wherever   the   agent   himself   has   signed   the   deed   which   is
presented for registration, he becomes the executant of the document,
leaving no role for the Registrar to probe.
8. We have carefully considered the above submissions.
1   (2009) 14 SCC 782
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9. The   limited   question   that   arises   for   our   consideration   is   as   to
whether the invocation of the writ jurisdiction of the High Court by the
appellant was right, especially when civil suits at the instance of third
parties are pending and when the appellant had already been directed
by this Court, in proceedings arising under section 145 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, to move the civil court?  
10. To   enable   (or   disable?)   us   to   find   an   answer   to   the   above
question,   the   learned   counsel   on   both   sides   took   us   through   some
provisions   of   the   Registration   Act,   1908   and   a   few   decisions   of   this
Court. We shall now take a look at them. 
11. There   is   and   there   can   be   no   dispute   about   the   fact   that   while
the   Registering   Officer   under   the   Registration   Act,   1908,   may   not   be
competent   to   examine   whether   the   executant   of   a   document   has   any
right, title or interest over the property which is the subject matter of
the   document   presented   for   registration,   he   is   obliged   to   strictly
comply with the mandate of law contained in the various provisions of
the Act. Therefore let us take a look at the scheme of the Act.
12. The   Registration   Act,   1908   is   divided   into   XV   parts.   Part   III
comprising   of   Sections   17   to   22   contains   provisions   relating   to
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registerable   documents;   Part­IV   of   the   Act   contains   prescriptions
regarding the time of presentation of documents for registration; Part­
V   contains   provisions   prescribing   and   regulating   the   place   of
registration   of   documents;   Part­VI   contains   provisions   relating   to
presentation   of   documents   for   registration   and   the   procedure   on
admission   and   denial   of   execution;   Part­VII   contains   provisions   for
enforcing   appearance   of   executants   and   witnesses;   Part­XI   contains
provisions relating to the duties and powers of Registering Officers and
Part­XII   contains   provisions   relating   to   refusal   to   register   and   the
remedies available against such refusal.
13. Before we look at the relevant provisions of the Registration Act,
1908,   it   is   necessary   to   note   that   “ Registration   of   deeds   and
documents”   falls   in   Entry   6   of   List   III   (Concurrent   List)   of   the
SEVENTH   SCHEDULE   of   the   Constitution.   Therefore,   the   Registration
Act,   1908,   which   is   a   Central   Act,   can   be   seen   as   something   which
provides   only   a   template   upon   which   the   States   are   entitled   to   make
amendments.   This   is   why   amendments   by   States   galore   in   the
Registration Act, 1908. Therefore, any interpretation of the provisions
of   the   Act,   should   be   in   consonance   with   the   scheme   of   the   Act   as
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applicable   to   the   State   involved   in   the   litigation.   For   instance,
registration of certain documents may be optional in some States but
mandatory in some other States. Therefore, the interpretation made by
this Court, of a provision as amended in its application to a particular
State, cannot be applied blindly while interpreting the same provision
as applicable to another State. Keeping this aspect in mind, let us now
peep into the statutory provisions.
14. Section   32   of   the   Act   mandates   that   every   document   to   be
registered under the Act, irrespective of whether such a registration is
compulsory   or   optional,   shall   be   presented   by   any   of   the   persons
mentioned therein. Section 32 reads as follows:­
“ 32. Persons to present documents for registration.— Except
in   the   cases   mentioned   in   sections   31,   88   and   89,   every
document,   to   be   registered   under   this   Act,   whether   such
registration be compulsory or optional, shall be presented at the
proper registration­office,—
(a)   by some person executing or claiming under the
same,   or,   in   the   case   of   a   copy   of   a   decree   or
order, claiming under the decree or order, or
(b)   by the representative or assign of such a person,
or
(c)   by the agent of such a person, representative or
assign,   duly   authorised   by   power­of­attorney
executed   and   authenticated   in   manner
hereinafter mentioned.”
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15. The   words   “ such   person ”   appearing   in   clauses   (b)   and   (c)   of
Section 32, correlate to the words “ person executing or claiming under
the   same ”,   appearing   in   clause   (a)   of   Section   32.   In   other   words,
clause   (a)   covers   both   the   executant   as   well   as   the   claimant   of   the
document.   Therefore,   clauses   (b)   and   (c)   cover   several   persons   who
may represent the executant or the claimant. Since the controversy in
several   decisions   of   this   Court   has   revolved   around   clause   (c)   of
Section 32, it would be useful, for the purpose of easy appreciation, to
break clause (c) into its several components as follows:­
(i) by the agent of the person executing the document;
(ii) by the agent of the person claiming under the document;
(iii) by   the   agent   of   the   representative   of   the   person   executing
the document;
(iv) by   the   agent   of   the   representative   of   the   person   claiming
under the document;
(v) by   the   agent   of   the   assign   of   the   person   executing   the
document;
(vi) by the agent of the assign claiming under the document.
It   must   be   noted   that   the   word   “agent”   appearing   in   clause   (c)   of
section   32   goes   not   only   with   the   words   “such   a   person”,   but   also
with   the   words   “representative”   and   “assign”.   This   is   for   the   reason
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that ‘representative’ and ‘assign’ are independently covered by clause
(b) and hence if these words do not go with the word ‘agent’ then their
appearance in clause (c) would be redundant. 
16. By virtue of the 2 nd
 part of clause (c) of Section 32, it is necessary
that   if   a   document   for   registration   is   presented   by   any   of   the   afore­
mentioned   six   categories   of   persons,   he   should   have   been   “ duly
authorized   by   a   PoA   executed   and   authenticated   in   the   manner
mentioned in the other provisions of the Act” . In other words, in cases
where a document is presented for registration by the agent,  (i)  of the
executant;   or   (ii)   of   the   claimant;   or   (iii)   of   the   representative   or
assign of the executant or claimant, the same cannot be accepted for
registration   unless   the   agent   is   duly   authorized   by   a   PoA   executed
and authenticated in the manner provided in the Act.
17. Section   33   contains   prescriptions   regarding   the   types   of   PoA,
which   alone   shall   be   recognized,   for   the   purposes   of   Section   32.
Section 33 reads as follows:­
33.   Power­of­attorney   recognizable   for   purposes   of   section
32. —(l) For the purposes of section 32, the following powers­of­
attorney shall alone be recognized, namely:—
(a) if   the   principal   at   the   time   of   executing   the  
power­of­attorney   resides   in   any   part   of    
India  
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in  which   this   Act   is   for   the   time   being   in  
force, a power­of­attorney executed before  and  
authenticated   by   the   Registrar   or   Sub­
Registrar  within   whose   district   or   sub­
district the  principal resides;
(b)   if   the   principal   at   the   time   aforesaid  
resides   in  
any   part   of   India   in   which   this   Act   is   not   in  
force, a power­of­attorney executed before  and  
authenticated by any Magistrate;
(c)   if   the   principal   at   the   time   aforesaid   does   not  
reside   in  
India,   a   power­of­attorney   executed  
before   and   authenticated   by   a   Notary   Public,  
or   any   Court,   Judge,   Magistrate,  
Indian  
Consul or  Vice­Consul,   or   representative   of  
the Central  Government: 
Provided   that   the   following   persons   shall   not   be   required   to
attend   at   any   registration­office   or   Court   for   the   purpose   of
executing   any   such   power­of­attorney   as   is   mentioned   in
clauses (a) and (b) of this section, namely:—
(i)   persons   who   by   reason   of   bodily   infirmity   are
unable without risk or  serious inconvenience so
to  attend;
(ii)   persons   who   are   in   jail   under   civil   or   criminal
process; and
(iii)   persons     exempt         by        law       from   personal
appearance in Court.  
(2)   In   the   case   of   every   such   person   the   Registrar   or   Sub­
Registrar or Magistrate, as the case may be, if satisfied that the
power­of­attorney   has   been   voluntarily   executed   by   the   person
purporting   to   be   the   principal,   may   attest   the   same   without
requiring   his   personal   attendance   at   the   office   or   Court
aforesaid.
(3)   To   obtain   evidence   as   to   the   voluntary   nature   of   the
execution,   the   Registrar   or   Sub­Registrar   or   Magistrate   may
either himself go to the house of the person purporting to be the
principal,   or   to   the   jail   in   which   he   is   confined,   and   examine
him, or issue a commission for his examination.
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(4)   Any   power­of­attorney   mentioned   in   this   section   may   be
proved   by   the   production   of   it   without   further   proof   when   it
purports   on   the   face   of   it   to   have   been   executed   before   and
authenticated by the person or C ourt hereinbefore mentioned in
that behalf.”
18. A   careful   look   at   Sections   32   and   33   will   show   that   while
speaking   about   PoA,   these   provisions   do   not   use   the   word
“ registration ”. While Section 32(c) uses the words “ executed and
authenticated ” ,   Section   33(1)   uses   the   words   “ recognised ”   and
“ authenticated ”. Therefore it is clear that   the word “ authenticated ”
is   not   to   be   understood   to   be   the   same   as   “ registered ” .   The
reason   why   we   say   so   is   that   Section   33(1)   speaks   only   about
authentication   and   not   registration   and   clauses   (a),   (b)   and   (c)   of
Section 33(1) provides the list of persons competent to authenticate a
PoA.   Persons   who   are   empowered   by   clauses   (a),   (b)   and   (c)   of   sub­
section (1) of Section 33 to authenticate a PoA are as follows:­
(i) The  Registrar   or  the  Sub­Registrar  within  whose  district or
sub­district the principal resides, if such principal resides, at the time
of execution of the PoA, in any part of India to which this Act applies;
(ii)     Any   Magistrate,   if   the   principal   resides   in   any   part   of   India
where this Act is not in force;
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(iii) A   Notary   Public,   any   Court,   Judge,   Magistrate,   Indian
Consul,   Vice   Consul   or   Representative   of   the   Central   Government,   if
the principal does not reside in India.
19. It may be seen from the list of persons indicated above, that not
all   of   them   are   Registrars   and   Sub­Registrars   appointed   in   terms   of
Section 6 of the Registration Act, 1908.  Under the Act, the power of
registration   is   conferred   only   upon   the   Registrars   and   Sub­
Registrars   appointed   under   the   Act.   But   clauses   (b)   &   (c)   of
Section   33(1)   speaks   about   persons   other   than   Registrars   and
Sub­Registrars.   This   is   why,   Section   32(c)   as   well   as   Section   33
use   only   the   expression   “authenticated”   and   not   the   word
“registered” .   But   unfortunately   several   Courts   have   mixed­up   these
two words, resulting  in applying  the  test  in  terms of  Sections 17 and
18 for determining the validity of a PoA.
20. In fact the distinction between “authentication” and “registration”
is spelt out very clearly in the Tamilnadu Registration Rules. It may be
noted here that section 69(1) of the Registration Act, 1908, empowers
the   Inspector   General   of   Registration   (i)   to   exercise   general
superintendence   over   all   the   registration   offices   in   the   territories
15

under   the   State   Government;   and   (ii)   to   make   rules   consistent   with
the   Act,   in   respect   of   matters   provided   in   clauses   (a)   to   (j)   therein.
These rules, by virtue of sub­section (2) of section 69, are required to
be   submitted   to   the   State   Government   for   approval   and   to   be
published   in   the   official   gazette   after   such   approval.   The   rules   so
made in terms of section 69, in the State of Tamil Nadu, provide
clarity   on   the   distinction   between   authentication   and
registration .
21. Rules   48   and   49   of   the   Tamilnadu   Registration   Rules   read   as
follows:
48.   A   power   of   attorney   may   be   brought   to   a   registering
officer   (1)   for   authentication,   or   (2)   for   registration,   or   (3)
for both authentication and registration . In the first case, he
shall merely make the entry prescribed for authentication; in the
second case, he shall register the power in the same manner as
any   other   document;   and   in   the   third   case,   he   shall   first
authenticate   the   power   and   then   admit   it   to   registration   in   the
usual manner. 
49.   Although   a   power   of   attorney   may   be   registered   like   any
other   instrument,   it   is   not   valid   for   registration   purposes   unless
authenticated.   When   a   power   of   attorney   is   brought   to   a
registering   officer   by   a   person   who   does   not   understand
the   distinction   between   authentication   and   registration,
the registering officer should explain the difference to him
and give him such information as may be necessary .  
16

22. After   pointing   out   the   distinction   between   authentication   and
registration   of   a   PoA,   Rule   52   indicates   the   duty   to   be   performed   by
the   Registering   Officer,   at   2   points   of   time,   namely   (i)   at   the   time   of
authentication;   and   (ii)   when   the   power   is  revoked.   Rule   52  reads  as
follows:
52.   (i)   An   abstract   in   the   form   printed   in   Appendix   III   shall   be
retained   of   each   power   of   attorney   authenticated   by   a
registering   officer   whether   such   power   is   general   or   special,
registered or not registered. The abstract shall be signed by the
registering   officer;   and   shall   be   filed   in   a   separate   file   with   a
serial   number   along   with   other   powers   retained   under   rule   46.
The   notes   of   interlineations,   blanks,   erasures   and   alterations
made   by   the   registering   officer   on   the   original   power   shall   be
copied verbatim in the abstract. 
(i)   (a)   Each   registration   office   shall   maintain   a   register   of   all
revocations of powers of attorney registered in, or communicated
to it. 
(b) When notice of a revocation is given to a registering officer, he
shall   send   an   intimation   of   the   same   to   such   other   offices   as
may be specified by the person revoking the power.
23. In   fact,   there   is   a   separate   chapter   in   Chapter   X   of   the
Registration   Rules   of   Tamilnadu,   devoted   to   deeds   of   PoA.   Rules   48,
49 and 52 which we have extracted above, are part of the said chapter.
Rule   46   spells   out   the   procedure   to   be   followed   by   the   Registering
Officer when a document is presented for registration under a general
PoA and the procedure to be followed when the document is presented
under a Special PoA. It reads as follows:
17

46.   (i)   If   a   document   is   presented   for   registration   under
special   power   of   attorney,   the   power   shall   be   retained   an
filed   in   the   office   with   the   following   endorsement
……………………. No…………….. of 19 ……….. 
Presented   in   connection   with   document   No…………….   of
19……….. of Book………., Vol……….. 
Date:  Signature of Registering Officer.
(ii)   If   a   document   is   presented   for   registration   under   general   power
of   attorney,   the   power   shall   be   returned   with   the   following
endorsement: 
Presented   in   connection   with   document   No…………….   of
19……….. of Book………., Vol……….. 
Date:  Signature of Registering Officer.
  (iii)   When   a   document   is   presented   for   registration   by   a
person entitled to present it and execution is admitted by an
agent   under   a   power   of   attorney,   the   following   endorsement
shall   be   made   on   the   power,   which   shall   be   retained   and   filed,   or
returned, according as it is a special or a general power 
*No…………….   of   19……   Presented   in   connection   with
document   No…………….   of   19………..   of   Book……….,
Vol……….. 
Date:  Signature of Registering Officer.
24. Having   seen   (i)   the   distinction   between   authentication   and
registration   of   a   PoA;   (ii)   the   obligation   imposed   by   the   Act   and   the
Rules,   upon   the   Registering   Officer   while   authenticating   and/or
registering   a   PoA;   (iii)   the   necessity   for   the   Registering   Officer   to
maintain   a   track   of   revocation   of   deeds   of   PoA;   and   (iv)   the   different
requirements   of   Rule   46,   relating   to   a   document   presented   under   a
18

general   PoA   and   a   document   presented   under   a   special   PoA,   let   us
now turn to the other provisions. 
25. Section 34 of the Act contains provisions regarding the enquiry to
be   undertaken   by   the   Registering   Officer   before   registration.   Section
34,   in   its   application   in   the   State   of   Tamilnadu,   as   amended   by
Tamilnadu Amendment Act 28 of 2000, reads as follows:­
34.   Enquiry   before   registration   by   registering   officer .—(l)
Subject to the provisions contained in this Part and in sections
41,   43,   45,   69,   75,   77,   88   and   89,   no   document   shall   be
registered   under   this   Act,   unless   the   persons   executing   such
document   ( and in the case of document  for sale of property, the
persons claiming under that document ) 2
, or their representatives,
assigns   or   agents   authorized   as   aforesaid,   appear   before   the
registering   officer   within   the   time   allowed   for   presentation
under sections 23, 24, 25 and 26: 
Provided   that,   if   owing   to   urgent   necessity   or   unavoidable
accident   all   such   persons   do   not   so   appear,   the   Registrar,   in
cases   where   the   delay   in   appearing   does   not   exceed   four
months, may direct that on payment of a fine not exceeding ten
times   the   amount   of   the   proper   registration   fee,   in   addition   to
the fine, if any, payable under section 25, the document may be
registered.
(2)   Appearances   under   sub­section   (1)   may   be   simultaneous   or
at different times.
(3)   The registering officer shall thereupon—
(a)   enquire   whether   or   not   such   document   was  
executed by the persons by whom it purports to  have  
been executed;
2   Vide  Tamil Nadu Act 28 of 2000, sec.3
19

(b)   satisfy   himself   as   to   the   identity   of   the   persons  
appearing   before   him   and   alleging   that   they   have  
executed   the   document   ( or   they   are   claiming   under  
the document ) 3
; and
(c)   in   the   case   of   any   person   appearing   as   a  
representative,   assign   or   agent,   satisfy   himself   of  
the right of such person so to appear.
(4)   Any   application   for   a   direction   under   the   proviso   to   sub­
section   (1)   may   be   lodged   with   a   Sub­Registrar,   who   shall
forthwith forward it to the Registrar to whom he is subordinate.
(5)   Nothing in this section applies to copies of decrees or orders.
26. Sub­section (3) of Section 34 imposes three obligations upon the
Registering Officer. These obligations are:­
(i)   To enquire whether or not such document was executed by
the person by whom it is claimed to have been executed;
(ii)   To satisfy himself as to the identity of the person appearing
before him and claiming to have executed the document;
(iii)   To satisfy himself about the right of any person appearing as
a representative, assign or agent, to so appear;
27. We   may   note   that   Sections   32(c),   34(1)   and   34(3)(c)   use   the
expressions   ‘ agent’,   ‘representative’   and   ‘assign’ .   Though   in   common
parlance, we understand the power of attorney agent of a person to be
the   representative   of   the   principal,   the   words   “ agent ”   and
“ representative ”   are   used   in   Sections   32(c)   and   34(3)(c)   to   mean
3   Vide  Tamil Nadu Act 28 of 2000, sec.3
20

different persons. The word “ representative ” is defined in Section 2(10)
of   the   Registration   Act   “ to   include   the   guardian   of   a   minor   and   the
committee or other legal curator of a lunatic or idiot ”. The words “ agent ”
and  “ assign ” are not  defined in the Act. Therefore, we may  justifiably
borrow the definition of the expression “agent” from Section 182 of the
Indian Contract Act, 1872, which defines an “ agent ” “ to mean a person
employed to do any act for another or to represent another in dealings
with third person ”.
28. Keeping   the   above   definitions   in   mind,   if   we   go   back   to   Section
32(c)   it   could   be   seen   that   whenever   the   agent   of,   (i)   the   executant;
(ii)   the   claimant;   (iii)   a   representative;   or   (iv)   an   assign,   presents   a
document for registration,
(1)  he should have been authorised by PoA and 
(2)   such   PoA   should   have  been  executed   and  authenticated   in
the manner provided in clauses (a), (b) or (c) of sub­section (1) of
Section   33.   The   requirement   of   registration   depends   upon   the
State amendments.
29. What   is   covered   by   Section   32   (c)   read   with   Section   33(1)   is
something   different   from   what   is   covered   by   Section   34(3).   While
Section 32(c) read with  Section 33(1) speaks about  the  entitlement of
the   person   to   present   a   document   for   registration,   Section   34(3)
21

speaks   about   the   enquiry   to   be   conducted   and   the   satisfaction   to   be
arrived   at   by   the   Registering   Officer.   Section   34(3)(c)   imposes   an
obligation on the Registering Officer to satisfy himself about the right
of   a   person   appearing   as   a   representative,   assign   or   agent.   This
prescription has to be read with rule 46 of the Tamilnadu Rules.
30. Before we complete our discussion on the statutory scheme, it is
necessary to take note of few more provisions, applicable in the State
of   Tamilnadu,   which   are   of   relevance.   By   Tamilnadu   Act   No.29   of
2012, Section 17(1) of the Registration Act, 1908 was amended so as
to   insert   clauses   (f),   (g),   (h)   and   (i).   Clause   (h)   so   inserted,   reads   as
follows:­
“Instruments   of   power   of   attorney   relating   to   immovable
property other than those executed outside India”
31. Simultaneously,   Section   28   was   also   amended   by   the   State   of
Tamilnadu   to   incorporate   a   proviso   to   the   effect   that   a   document
mentioned in Section 17(1)(h) may also be presented for registration in
the   office   of   the   Sub­Registrar   within   whose   jurisdiction   the   principal
ordinarily resides.
32. By   the   very   same   Tamilnadu   Amendment   Act   29   of   2012,   two
more  provisions   were  also  inserted in   the  Registration   Act,  1908.  One
22

was Section 34­B and another was Section 64A.  Section 34B   reads as
follows:­
"34­B.   Procedure   for   Registration   of   document   of   Power   of
Attorney   relating   to   immovable   property. ­Subject   to   the
provisions of this Act, no document of Power of Attorney relating
to   immovable   property   shall   be   registered   unless   passport   size
photographs and finger prints of the principal, the agent and of
the   identifying   witnesses   are   affixed   to   the   document   and   the
agent has also signed such document.".
Section 64­A   reads as follows:­
“64­A.   Procedure   where   instrument   of   Power   of   Attorney
presented   in   office   of   Sub­Registrar   relates   to   immovable
property not situate in sub­district . ­ Every Sub­Registrar on
registering   an   instrument   of   Power   of   Attorney   including
instrument   of   revocation   or   cancellation   of   such   Power   of
Attorney   relating   to   immovable   property   not   situate   in  his   own
sub­district, shall make a copy and send the same together with
a   copy   of   the   map   or   plan   (if   any)   mentioned   in   section   21,   to
every   other   Sub­Registrar   in   whose   sub­district   the   whole   or
any   part   of   such   property   is   situate   and   such   Sub­Registrar
shall file the same in his Book No.1:
Provided   that   where   such   instrument   relates   to   immovable
property in several districts, shall forward the same to the Sub­
Registrars concerned, under intimation to the Registrar of every
district in which any part of such property is situate."    
33. At   this   stage   we  should   record  that   the  dispute  on   hand   relates
to   a   document   executed   and   registered   much   before   the   Tamilnadu
Amendment Act 29 of 2012. But still we have taken note of it, not for
the purpose of applying it to this case, but for the purpose of flagging
certain   concerns.  Now  that   we  have   noticed  various   provisions  of   the
23

Act,   let   us   see   some   factual   aspects   and   then   deal   with   the
contentions on both sides. 
34. In the case on hand, the sale deed dated 05.07.2007 executed by
the   father   S.P.   Velayutham,   in   favour   of   his   son   Amar,   contained   a
specific   recital   to   the   effect   that   the   owners   of   the   property   had
appointed   S.P.   Velayutham,   as   their   Power   of   Attorney,   by   a   deed
dated   23.08.2006   to   sell   the   property.   But   far   from   authorising   the
power agent to sell the property, clause 7 of the registered deed of PoA
dated 23.08.2006, on  the  basis of which  the sale  deed was  executed,
actually   contained   an   express   prohibition   from   creating   any
encumbrance   on   the   property.   Clause   7   of   the   registered   PoA   dated
23.08.2006 reads as follows :­
“(7)   To   negotiate   with   any   third   party/s   claimant/s   including
broker/s   take   the   Banks   and   other   financial   institutions
claimant/s   if   any   in   the   schedule   mentioned   properties   and   to
settle   such   claims   and   on,   this   behalf   our   attorney   is
empowered to do all acts, deeds and things. To enter  upon the
schedule mentioned properties for the survey of, the same. The
power agent herein appointed shall have no power to encumber
the   schedule   mentioned   properties   for   the   survey   of   the   same.
The   power   agent   herein   appointed   shall   have   no   power   to
encumber   the   schedule   mentioned   properties   without   the
written consent of us. ”
35. Apart   from   the   fact   that   clause   7   extracted   above   expressly
prohibited   the   power   to   encumber,   there   was   also   no   stipulation
24

authorising S.P. Velayutham to appear before any  Registering Officer
for the purpose of sale, as an agent. Though clause 5 authorised the
agent to appear before the Registrar and to admit execution, the same
was  specifically  in  relation  to the execution  of gift deeds  in favour   of
municipalities,   corporations   or   other   authorities,   for   the   purpose   of
development   of   the   layout,   formation   of   the   roads   etc.   Similarly,
clause 6 of the deed of PoA also contained a limited power to appear
before the Sub­Registrar, but the same was also restricted to certain
things mentioned in clause 6 itself.
36. Interestingly, the contesting respondents relied upon another un­
registered deed of PoA dated 07.06.2007, which contained a power to
sell.   Despite   this   document   being   dated   07.06.2007   and   despite   the
date   of   execution   of   the   sale   deed   being   05.07.2007,   there   was   no
reference to this  PoA  in the sale deed. This deed of PoA has  surfaced
much   later   and   the   fraudulent   nature   of   this   deed   of   PoA   is   patently
visible,   in   view   of   certain   recitals   contained   therein.   The   relevant
recitals contained in the un­registered PoA dated 07.06.2007 reads as
follows:­
“…AND   WHEREAS,   under   the   said   General   Power   of   Attorney
Deed though   we have intended to confer power including to
25

sell   the   Schedule   mentioned   properties   under   clauses   of   the
said   General   Power   of   Attorney   Deed,   by   inadvertence   and
over   sight   the   said   clause   relating   to   power   to   sell   the
schedule   mentioned   properties   was   omitted   to   be   included
therein;
AND WHEREAS, now our Agent Mr. S.P. Velayutham has found
the said  mistake  and requested  for  execution  of additional and
supplemental General Power of Attorney Deed 'empowering him
to   sell   the   schedule   mentioned   properties'   and   to   receive   the
sale   consideration   therefor.   In   continuation   of   the   earlier
General   Power   of   Attorney   Deed   dated   23.08.2006   referred   to
above;:
AND WHEREAS, we as the Principals under  the General Power
of   Attorney   Deed   dated   23.08.2006   are   satisfied   with,   the
mistake   pointed   out   by   our   Agent   and   'accordingly   we   also
agreed'   to  execute   this   General   Power   of   Attorney   Deed   and   as
such we are appointing Mr. S.P. Velayutham, son of Sabapathy,
Hindu;   aged   about   50   years,   residing   at   No.   5,   Sabarj,   Street,
Madlpakkam,   Chennai­600091   as   out   General   Power   of
Attorney   to   do   the   following   acts;   deeds   and   things   relating   to
the properties detailed in the Schedule hereunder…”
The above recitals contain a totally false statement to the effect,  (i)  that
a   power   of   sale   was   intended   to   be   conferred   under  the   original   PoA,
but   it   was   omitted   due   to   inadvertence   and   oversight;   and   (ii)   that
after   the   mistake   was   pointed   out,   the   Principals   decided   to   execute
the   additional   document.   These   recitals   are   manifestly   false   and   are
contrary   to   clause   7   of   the   registered   PoA   dated   23.08.2006.   In   any
case, this PoA dated 07.06.2007 was not what was produced or relied
upon at the time of registration of the sale deed dated 05.07.2007.
26

37. Therefore,   if   the   Registering   Officer   had   verified   the   recitals
contained in the registered deed of PoA dated 23.08.2006, to see if the
power agent had the power to do what he did, he would have refused
the   registration   of   the   document.   Rule   46   of   the   Tamilnadu
Registration   Rules   ordains   what   the   Registering   Officer   is   obliged   to
do,   (i)   when   a   document   is   presented   for   registration   under  a  special
PoA;   and   (ii)   when   a   document   is   presented   for   registration   under   a
general PoA. It was the failure on the part of the Registering Officer to
do what he is required to do, that convinced the learned Single Judge
to invoke the writ jurisdiction. But the Division Bench overturned the
decision of the learned Judge on the ground that the writ court ought
to have relegated the parties to the civil court.
38. Two   main   contentions   are   raised   on   behalf   of   the   contesting
respondents,   namely   (i)   the   restraint   that   is   expected   of   the   High
Court,   in   a   writ   petition   arising   under   Article   226,   in   respect   of
matters   which   require   detailed   factual   investigation;   and   (ii)   the
limited   scope   of   the   enquiry   that   could   be   conducted   by   the
Registering Authority under Sections 32 to 34 of the Registration Act,
1908.
27

39. In   support   of   the   1 st
  contention,   the   learned   senior   counsel
appearing   for   the   respondents   relied   upon   the   following   decisions,   (i)
Thansingh   Nathmal   vs.   Superintendent   of   Taxes 4
,   (ii)   Sarvepalli
Ramaiah    vs.    District Collector 5
;  (iii) Latif Estate Line India Ltd.
vs.   Hadeeja Ammal 6
.
40. Out of the aforesaid decisions, the decision in  Thansingh  (supra)
arose out  of the  orders of  assessment  passed under  the  Assam  Sales
Tax   Act,   1947.   The   order   passed   by   the   original   authority   was
challenged   before   the   appellate   authority   and   then   the   revisional
authority and thereafter in a writ petition under Article 226. It was in
such  circumstances  that  this  Court  held  that   the  High  Court  had  no
power   to   decide   questions   of   fact   which   are   exclusively   within   the
competence   of   the   taxing   authorities.   Similarly,   the   decision   in
Sarvepalli Ramaiah  (supra), arose out of proceedings for the grant of
Ryotwari   Patta.   The   dispute   travelled   to   the   High   Court   after   an
elaborate enquiry by the District Collector. It was in that context that
4   (1964) 6 SCR 654
5  (2019) 4 SCC 500
6   2011 (2) CTC 1
28

this   Court   examined   the   scope   of   the   power   of   judicial   review   under
Article 226.
41. The   Full   Bench   decision   of   the   Madras   High   Court   in   Latif
Estate   Line   India   Ltd .   (supra),   arose   out   of   a   controversy   as   to
whether   a   deed   of   cancellation   of   sale   can   or   cannot   be   accepted   for
registration. The Full Bench explained the circumstances under which
a   deed   of   cancellation,   presented   by   both   the   vendor   and   the
purchaser, can be accepted. But the Full Bench categorically held that
a   deed   of   unilateral   cancellation   cannot   even   be   accepted   for
registration.   This   proposition   actually   goes   in   support   of   the
contention   of   the   appellant   that   the   Registering   Officer   has   a   duty   to
see   whether   the   document   presented   for   registration   has   been
presented   in   accordance   with   law   or   not.   In   fact   the   decision   of   the
Full Bench itself arose out of a writ petition challenging the act of the
Registering   Authority   in   allowing   the   registration   of   the   deeds   of
unilateral cancellation of sale deeds.
42. The reliance placed by the respondents on the decision in  Satya
Pal Anand  vs.  State of Madhya Pradesh 7
, is misplaced. The decision
7   (2016) 10 SCC 767
29

in  Satya Pal Anand   (supra) arose out a case where the allotment of a
plot made by a cooperative society was cancelled unilaterally by a deed
of extinguishment, by the society. The allottee raised a dispute which
ended   in   a   compromise   but   notwithstanding   the   compromise   the
allottee raised a dispute under  the relevant provisions of the Madhya
Pradesh   Cooperative   Societies   Act,   1960.     When   the   dispute   was
pending, the allottee moved the Registering Officer for the cancellation
of   the   deed   of   transfer   executed   in   favour   of   the   subsequent
purchasers.   When   the   Registering   Authority   refused   to   comply   with
the demand, a writ petition was moved seeking a declaration that the
deed of extinguishment and the subsequent sales were null and void.
The   High   Court   dismissed   the   writ   petition   on   the   ground   that   a
dispute was already pending before the competent authority under the
Cooperative  Societies  Act.  When   the  order  of  dismissal  passed  by  the
High Court was challenged before this Court, there was a difference of
opinion as to whether the issue was directly covered by the decision of
this Court in   Thota Ganga  Laxmi and  Another   vs.   Government  of
Andhra   Pradesh   and   Others 8
.     Therefore,   the   matter   was   placed
8   (2010) 15 SCC 206
30

before a three Judge Bench. While upholding the decision of the High
Court, the three member Bench held in  Satya Pal Anand  (supra) that
there was no rule in the State of Madhya Pradesh similar to Rule 26(k)
(i)   of   the  Rules   issued   by   the   State  of  Andhra   Pradesh   under   Section
69   of   the   Registration   Act,   1908   and   that   therefore   the   decision   in
Thota Ganga Laxmi  (supra) cannot be invoked.
43. The   decision   in   Satya   Pal   Anand   (supra)   cannot   go   to   the
rescue   of   the   contesting   respondents,   for   the   simple   reason   that   the
writ   petitioner   in   that   case,   first   accepted   a   compromise   and   then
raised a dispute under the Cooperative Societies Act (which is akin to
a   civil   suit)   and   thereafter   approached   the   High   Court   under   Article
226 for a declaration, which he could have sought only in the already
instituted   proceedings.   The   very   fact   that   Thota   Ganga   Laxmi     was
sought   to   be   distinguished   on   the   basis   of   the   express   provision
contained in the Rules of the State of A.P., would indicate that there is
no   absolute   bar   for   the   High   Court   to   exercise   jurisdiction   under
Article 226.
44. Both   sides   relied   upon   the   decision   of   this   Court   in   Rajni
Tandon   (supra).   The   question   that   arose   in   Rajni   Tandon   (supra)
31

was as to whether the PoA required authentication by the Registering
Authority,   when   a   sale   deed   executed   by   the   power   agent   himself   is
presented   for   registration   by   the   power   agent.   This   question   was
couched  in  a different  language by  this  Court  in  paragraph 19 of  the
Report in  Rajni Tandon  (supra) as follows:­
“ 19.     In   view   of   the   aforesaid   situation,   the   issue   that   falls   for
our   consideration   is   whether   a   person   who   executes   a
document  under  the  terms  of  the  power   of  attorney,  is,  insofar
as   the   registration   office   is   concerned,   the   actual   executant   of
the   document   and   is   entitled   under   Section   32(a)   to   present   it
for registration and get it registered.”
45. After analysing Sections 32 and 33 of the Registration Act, 1908
this   Court   came   to   the   conclusion   that   whenever   an   agent   is
authorised   to   execute   a   document   and   present   the   same   for
registration   and   he   accordingly   executes   the   document   in   terms   of
PoA,   he   becomes   the   actual   executant   in   so   far   as   the   Registering
Authority   is   concerned   and   that   therefore   he   becomes   entitled   under
Section 33(a) to present it for registration. This Court further held that
the   authentication   in   terms   of   Section   33(1)(a)   is   required   only   in
cases   where   Section   32(c)   is   invoked.   Paragraph   33   of   the   Report   in
Rajni Tandon  is reproduced for easy appreciation as follows:­
“ 33.    Where a deed is executed by an agent for a principal and
the same agent signs, appears and presents the deed or admits
execution   before   the   registering   officer,   that   is   not   a   case   of
32

presentation   under   Section   32(c)   of   the   Act.     As   mentioned
earlier   the   provisions   of   Section   33   will   come   into   play   only   in
cases where presentation is in terms of Section 32(c) of the Act.
In   other   words,   only   in   cases   where   the   person(s)   signing   the
document   cannot   present   the   document   before   the   registering
officer   and   gives   a   power   of   attorney   to   another   to   present   the
document  that   the  provisions  of  Section  33  get  attracted.     It   is
only   in   such   a   case,   that   the   said   power   of   attorney   has   to   be
necessarily executed and authenticated in the manner provided
under Section 33(1)(a) of the Act.”
46. But we are not concerned in this case with the question whether
the   PoA   relied   upon   by   the   power   agent   S.P.   Velayutham   in   the   sale
deed   executed   by   him,   required   authentication   and   whether   the
Registering Authority committed a blunder in accepting the sale deed
presented by him for registration, without verifying the authentication
of   the   PoA   or   not.   We   are   concerned   in   this   case   with   the   most
fundamental   question   whether   the   Registering   Authority   could   have
turned   a   blind   eye   to   the   fact   that   the   deed   of   PoA   on   the   basis   of
which the sale deed was executed as well as presented for registration
by   S.P.   Velayutham   contained   an   express   prohibition   for   the   power
agent to create an encumbrance on the property, especially in the light
of   the   Rules   framed   under   section   69   of   the   Act.   The   decision   in
Thota Ganga Laxmi,  was in a way approved by a 3­member Bench in
Satya   Pal   Anand,   on   the   basis   of   the   rules   in   the   State   of   Andhra
33

Pradesh, showing thereby that statutory rules also play a crucial role.
Rajni   Tandon   is   not   an   authority   for   holding   that   the   registering
Authority   has   no   duty   even   to   verify   the   presence   or   absence   of   a
power of sale in the deed of PoA, especially in the light of the rules.
47. In  Amarnath   vs.   Gian Chand  9
,  this Court was concerned with
a case arising out of peculiar circumstances.   The said case arose out
of   a   civil   suit   for   a   declaration   of   title   and   for   permanent   injunction.
The plaintiff in that case entered into an oral agreement for the sale of
his property and gave a special PoA in favour of the second defendant.
But   the   agreement   fell   through   and  hence   the   plaintiff   took   back   the
original deed of PoA from  the second defendant. However, the second
defendant   applied   for   a   copy   of   the   PoA   and   thereafter   sold   the
property in collusion with the first defendant. Upon coming to know of
the   same,   the   original   owner   filed   the   suit   as   aforesaid,   contending
that the second defendant had no valid power and that the Registering
Authority ought to have verified this aspect from the second defendant
under Sections 32, 33 and 34 of the Registration Act, 1908. After trial,
the trial court dismissed the suit on the ground that the cancellation
9    (2022)  SCC Online SC­102
34

of  the  PoA also required registration  and that  the mere writing  of the
word “ cancelled ” on the original PoA cannot be taken to mean that the
power   was   validly   cancelled.   The   First   Appellate   Court   confirmed   the
judgment and decree of the trial court. While reversing the judgments
of the trial court and the Appellate Court, the High Court opined that
under Section 18A of the Registration Act as applicable to the State of
Himachal Pradesh, by way of an amendment under Himachal Pradesh
Act   2   of   1969,   the   PoA   ought   to   have   accompanied   the   sale   deed
presented   for   registration   and   that   if   the   Sub­Registrar   had   ensured
this, he would have found that in view of the cancellation of the power,
the agent ceased to have any power of sale. This decision of the High
Court   was   reversed   by   this   Court   in   Amar   Nath   (supra),   after   an
exhaustive   analysis   of   the   provisions   of   the   Registration   Act,   1908.
While doing so, this Court held in paragraph 26 as follows:­
“ 26 .     For   reasons,   which   we   have   indicated,   Section   32(c)   read
with   Section   33   and   Section   34(2)(c)   are   inter­   related   and   they
would   have   no   application   in   regard   to   the   document   presented
for   registration   by   a   power   of   attorney   holder   who   is   also   the
executant   of   the   document.   In   other   words,   there   is   really   no
need   for   the   production   of   the   original   power   of   attorney,   when
the document is presented for registration by the person standing
in the shoes of the second defendant in this case as he would be
covered by the provisions of   Section 32(a)   as he has executed the
document   though   on   the   strength   of   the   power   of   attorney.   To
make   it   even   further   clear,   the   inquiry   contemplated   under
35

the   Registration Act ,  cannot extend to question as to whether the
person who  executed  the  document  in his  capacity of  the  power
of   attorney   holder   of   the   principal,   was   indeed   having   a   valid
power of attorney or not to execute the document or not. .”
48. Though   the   passage   extracted   above,   lends   credence   to   the
contention   of   the   learned   senior   counsel   for   the   contesting
respondents,   there   is   some   difficulty   in   accepting   the   same   as   a
proposition of law of universal application. There are two reasons why
we say so. They are:  (i)  as we have stated elsewhere, the interpretation
of the provisions of the Registration Act, would depend upon the State
amendments   and   the   Rules   framed   in   each   State   under   Section   69;
and   (ii)   in   Amar   Nath,   the   challenge   to   the   sale   was   before   the   civil
court,   not   merely   on   the   ground   that   the   Registering   Authority   failed
to   perform   his   duties,   but   also   on   the   ground   that   the   defendant
conveyed what he could not have. Unfortunately, the parties in   Amar
Nath , appear to have gone on a wild goose chase. Instead of focussing
their   attack   on   the   agent   (who   was   the   defendant   in   the   suit),   for
executing the document without any power, the parties focussed their
attack   on   the   registering   officer   for   permitting   the   registration   of   the
document. This resulted in their  failure. If a civil court finds that the
sale   by   a   power   agent   was   unauthorised,   then   the   question   whether
36

the Registering Officer performed his duties properly or not, would lose
its   significance.   An   attack   on   the   authority   of   the   executant   of   a
document,  is  not   to  be  mixed  with   the  attack  on   the  authority   of  the
Registering   Officer   to   register   the   document.   The   distinction   between
the execution of a document and the registration of the document is to
be borne in mind while dealing with these questions. 
49.      Actually,   the  registration  of  a document  comprises   of three
essential   steps   among   others.   They   are,   (i)   execution   of   the
document,   by   the   executant   signing   or   affixing   his   left   hand
thumb   impression;   (ii)   presenting   the   document   for   registration
and admitting to the Registering Authority the execution of such
document; and  (iii)  the act of registration of the document .
50. In cases where a suit for title is filed, with or without the relief of
declaration   that   the   registered   document   is   null   and   void,   what   gets
challenged,   is   a   combination   of   all   the   aforesaid   three   steps   in   the
process   of   execution   and   registration.   The   first   of   the   aforesaid   three
steps   may   be   challenged   in   a   suit   for   declaration   that   the   registered
document is null and void, either on the ground that the executant did
not have a valid title to pass on or on the ground that what was found
37

in   the   document   was   not   the   signature   of   the   executant   or   on   the
ground   that   the   signature   of   the   executant   was   obtained   by   fraud,
coercion   etc.   The   second   step   of   presentation   of   the   document   and
admitting   the   execution   of   the   same,   may   also   be   challenged   on   the
very   same   grounds   hereinabove   stated.   Such   objections   to   the   first
and second of the aforesaid three steps are substantial and they strike
at the very root of creation of the document.  A challenge to the very
execution of a document, is a challenge to its very DNA and any
defect   or   illegality   on   the   execution,   is   congenital   in   nature .
Therefore,   such   a   challenge,   by   its   very   nature,   has   to   be   made   only
before the civil court and certainly not before the writ court.
51. The   third   step   namely   the   act   of   registration,   is   something   that
the   Registering   Authority   is   called   upon   to   do   statutorily.   While   the
executant   of   the   document   and   the   person   claiming   under   the
document (claimant) are the only actors involved in the first two steps,
the   Registering   Officer   is   the   actor   in   the   third   step.   Apart   from   the
third step which is wholly in the domain of the Registering Authority,
he may also have a role to play in the second step when a document is
presented   for   registration   and   the   execution   thereof   is   admitted.   The
38

role   that   is   assigned   to   the   Registrar   in   the   second   step   is   that   of
verification   of   the   identity   of   the   person   presenting   the   document   for
registration.
52. Thus,   the   first   two   steps   in   the   process   of   registration   are
substantial   in   nature,   with   the   parties   to   the   document   playing   the
role   of   the   lead   actors   and   the   Registering   Authority   playing   a   guest
role  in  the  second  step.  The  third  step  is  procedural  in  nature  where
the Registering Authority is the lead actor.
53. In suits for declaration of title and/or suits for declaration that a
registered   document   is   null   and   void,   all   the   aforesaid   three   steps
which comprise the entire process of execution and registration come
under challenge. If a party questions the very execution of a document
or the right and title of a person to execute a document and present it
for   registration,   his   remedy   will   only   be   to   go   to   the   civil   court.   But
where a party questions only the failure of the Registering Authority to
perform his statutory duties in the course of the third step, it cannot
be   said   that   the   jurisdiction   of   the   High   Court   under   Article   226
stands   completely   ousted.   This   is   for   the   reason   that   the   writ
jurisdiction   of   the   High   Court   is   to   ensure   that   statutory   authorities
39

perform   their   duties   within   the   bounds   of   law.   It   must   be   noted   that
when   a   High   Court,   in   exercise   of   its   jurisdiction   under   Article   226
finds   that   there   was   utter   failure   on   the   part   of   the   Registering
Authority to stick to the mandate of law, the Court merely cancels the
act   of   registration,   but   does   not   declare   the   very   execution   of   the
document   to   be   null   and   void.   A   declaration   that   a   document   is   null
and void, is exclusively within the domain of the civil court, but it does
not mean that the High Court cannot examine the question whether or
not   the   Registering   Authority   performed   his   statutory   duties   in   the
manner   prescribed   by   law.   It   is   well   settled   that   if   something   is
required   by   law   to   be   done   in   a   particular   manner,   it   shall   be   done
only   in   that   manner   and   not   otherwise.   Examining   whether   the
Registering Authority did something in the manner required by law or
otherwise, is certainly within the jurisdiction of the High Court under
Article   226.   However,   it   is   needless   to   say   that   the   High   Courts   may
refuse   to   exercise   jurisdiction   in   cases   where   the   violations   of
procedure on the part of the Registering Authority are not gross or the
violations   do   not   shock   the   conscience   of   the   Court.   Lack   of
40

jurisdiction   is   completely   different   from   a   refusal   to   exercise
jurisdiction.
54. In the case on hand, the appellant has not sought a declaration
from   the   High   Court   that   the   execution   of   the   document   in   question
was   null   and   void   or   that   there   was   no   title   for   the   executant   to
transfer   the   property.   The   appellant   assailed   before   the   High   Court,
only   the   act   of   omission   on   the   part   of   the   Registering   Authority   to
check up whether the person who claimed to be the power agent, had
the power of conveyance and the power of presenting the document for
registration,   especially   in   the   light   to   the   statutory   rules.   Therefore,
the  learned Single Judge rightly  applied the law and  allowed the writ
petition filed by the appellant, but the Division Bench got carried away
by   the   sound   and   fury   created   by   the   contesting   respondents   on   the
basis   of   (i)   pendency   of   the   civil   suits;   (ii)   findings   recorded   by   the
Special Court for CBI cases; and  (iii)  the order passed by this Court in
the SLP arising out of proceedings under Section 145 Cr.P.C.
55.  Arguments   were   advanced   on   the   question   whether   the
Registering Authority is carrying out an administrative act or a quasi­
judicial act in the performance of his statutory duties. But we think it
41

is   not   relevant   for   determining   the   availability   of   writ   jurisdiction.   If
the   Registering   Authority   is   found   to   be   exercising   a   quasi­judicial
power,   the   exercise   of   such   a   power   will   still   be   amenable   to   judicial
review   under   Article   226,   subject   to   the   exhaustion   of   the   remedies
statutorily   available.   On   the   contrary   if   the   Registering   Authority   is
found to be performing only an administrative act, even then the High
Court is empowered to see whether he performed the duties statutorily
ordained upon him in the manner prescribed by law.  
56. Much   ado   was   sought   to   be   made   by   contending   that   the
appellant   approached   the   High  Court   without  disclosing   the   previous
orders of the High Court and this Court, relegating them to civil court
for   the   adjudication   of   their   claim.   Reliance   was   also   placed   in   this
regard on the decision of this Court in   Raj Kumar Soni   vs.   State of
U.P. 10
.
57 . But we do not agree. The previous orders directing the appellant
to go to the civil court arose out of the proceedings under Section 145
of the Cr.P.C. But it does not mean that the recourse to civil court was
seen as the only panacea for all ills.
10   (2007) 10 SCC 635
42

58. Therefore,   in   the   light   of   (i)   the   Tamilnadu   Registration   Rules
discussed above;   (ii)   the statutory scheme of Sections 32 to 35 of the
Act as well as other provisions as amended by the State of Tamilnadu;
and   (iii)   the distinction between a challenge to the first 2 steps in the
process   of   execution   of   a   document   and   the   third   step   concerning
registration,  we  are  of  the  considered  view  that  the  Division   bench   of
the High Court was not right in setting aside the order of the learned
single   Judge.   If   the   Registering   Officer   under   the   Act   is   construed   as
performing   only   a   mechanical   role   without   any   independent   mind   of
his   own,   then   even   Government   properties   may   be   sold   and   the
documents  registered by  unscrupulous  persons  driving  the  parties  to
go to civil court. Such an interpretation may not advance the cause of
justice.
59. Therefore, in fine, the appeals are allowed, the impugned order of
the   Division   Bench   is   set   aside   and   the   order   of   the   learned   single
Judge is restored. There will be no order as to costs.
………………………………….J.
(Hemant Gupta)
43

………………………………….J.
(V. Ramasubramanian)
New Delhi
May  04, 2022
44