/2022 INSC 0354/
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3636 OF 2022
[ARISING OUT OF SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) NO. 19035 OF 2021]
REDDY VEERANA        …APPELLANT
VERSUS
STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND OTHERS  ...RESPONDENTS
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3637 OF 2022
[ARISING OUT OF SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) NO. 5500/2022]
NEW OKHLA INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT 
AUTHORITY        …APPELLANT
VERSUS
REDDY VEERANA AND OTHERS  …RESPONDENTS
J U D G M E N T
1. Leave granted.
2. The   present   Civil   Appeals   arise   out   of   the   judgment   dated
28.10.2021,   passed   by   High   Court   of   Judicature   at
Allahabad   in   Civil   Miscellaneous   Writ   Petition   No.   2272   of
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2019   filed   by   appellant   Reddy   Veerana   (co­petitioner),   by
which,   the   High   Court   intervened   in   the   award   of
compensation   dated   31.01.2011,   passed   by   Additional
District   Magistrate   (Land   Acquisition)   for   acquired   land   of
appellant,   admeasuring   2.18.00   bighas   of   Khasra   Nos.   422
and 427, situated in village Chhalera Bangar and disposed­
off the petition.
3. Assailing   the   said   order,   both   the   parties   are   before   this
Court.   Briefly   stated,   facts   are   that   vide   sale   deed   dated
24.04.1997,   appellant   along­with   two   others   purchased   the
scheduled   property   land   in   Khasra   No.   422   admeasuring   3
bighas   9   biswas   and   in   Khasra   No.   427   admeasuring   2
bighas   4   biswas   and   10   biswansi   (i.e.,   total   of   13757.8   sq.
meters)   in   village   Chhalera   Bangar,   Gautam   Buddh   Nagar
district   for   a   total   sale   consideration   of   Rs.   1,00,00,000/­
(One crore only). However, through the prior land acquisition
proceedings   in   year   1979­1980,   a   portion   of   the   purchased
land to the extent of 1 bigha 5 biswas 15 biswansi in Khasra
No.   427   and   1   bigha   in   Khasra   No.   422   was   acquired   by
State.   Thus,   the   property   which   remained   unacquired   with
the appellant was 2 bigha 18 biswa 10 biswansi (i.e. total of
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7400   sq.   meters)   in   both   the   aforesaid   khasra   numbers   (in
short be called as scheduled piece of land).
4. As is borne out of the record, pursuant to purchase of land
by   appellant,   since   early   2000s,   employees   of   NOIDA   were
interfering   with   the   peaceful   possession   of   the   appellant
(land­owner),   which   resultantly   led   into   Civil   Suit   No.
416/1998 being filed by appellant for permanent injunction
against   NOIDA,   with   a   prayer   to   not   interfere   with   the
possession.   For   the   purpose   to   demonstrate   the   utility   and
value of land, the averments made in the written statement
filed   by   NOIDA   inter­alia   categorically   contended,   were   as
thus: 
“ ….. the   land   in   dispute   is   situated   in   the   centre   of
development   of   authority   and   the   use   of   land   has
been   prescribed   to   be   used   for   commercial.
Therefore, this land is very costly .  Since………the land
of village Chhalera Bangar under the provisions of Section
2  of   Act   No.  6 of   1976  is   declared  as   industrial   area  and
construction   on   this   land   without   the   permission   of
defendant is illegal. ”  
(emphasis supplied)
5. The   Trial   Court,   after   due   deliberation   on   the   contentions
raised   by   both   the   parties,   vide   order   dated   16.02.2000,
partly   decreed   the   suit   in   favour   of   appellant   (Reddy
Veerana)   herein   and   restrained   NOIDA   from   taking
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possession   of  land  which  was   not   the   subject   matter   of  the
prior acquisition in year 1979­1980. Further, the Court also
declared the appellant as the owner of the remaining portion
of   land   of   Khasra   No.   422   and   427   which   was   purchased
vide sale deed as mentioned earlier.
6. Being   aggrieved   by   aforesaid   order,   NOIDA   preferred   Civil
Appeal   No.   61   of   2020   before   District   Judge,   which   also
came   to   be   dismissed   vide   order   dated   30.03.2001   with
certain observations made in the following manner –
“ The lower court has not committed any error in decreeing
the   suit   of   permanent   injunction   of   plaintiff   produced   in
regard to the land admeasuring 02­09­00 bigha of Khasra
no. 422 and land admeasuring 00­09­10 bigha of Khasra
No. 427 of village Chhalera Bangar, Tehsil Dadri, District –
Gautam   Buddh   Nagar   against   appellant.   The
defendant/appellant   even   now   is   free   to  acquire   the
remaining   land   of   the   aforesaid   Khasra   Nos.   but
until   and   unless   the   land   is   not   acquired,   till   then
the   decree   of   permanent   injunction   issued   by   the
lower court shall remain applicable .”
(emphasis supplied)
The   judgment   and   decree   granting   permanent   injunction
passed by District Judge, confirming the order of Trial Court
has   not   been   assailed   and   therefore,   it   has   become   final.
Moreover,   despite   the   decree   of   permanent   injunction   being
operative,   NOIDA   in   the   year   2003   floated   a   tender   for
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development   of   large   piece   of   land   including   the   remaining
piece of land of Khasra No. 422 and Khasra No. 427 which is
the   subject   matter   of   this   case.   The   said   tender   was   widely
advertised   by   NOIDA   in   various   newspapers   and
subsequently,   nine   reputed   developers   including   MGF,
Unitech,   Sun   City,   Sahara   India   and   Omex   purchased   the
bid   documents.   It   was   a   known   fact   that   out   of   the   large
piece of the land, the scheduled piece of land was in dispute
and   hence,   all   the   reputed   developers   abstained   from
bidding for the tender. Be that as it may, on the closing date
of   tender   i.e.   9.03.2004,   only   one   tender   on   behalf   of
respondent   No.   7   herein,   i.e.,   M/s   DLF   Universal   Ltd.
(hereinafter   referred   to   as   DLF)   was   received   and   evaluated
by   Technical   Committee,   whereafter,   respondent   No.   7
quoted   the   rate   and   qualified   in   the   said   tender.
Consequently,   the   large   piece   of   land   as   mentioned   above
was   allotted   to   DLF   vide   order   dated   12.04.2004,   including
the   scheduled   piece   of   land   for   which,   the   decree   of
permanent injunction was in operation.
7. After   the   allotment   of   land   to   respondent   No.   7,   a
preliminary   notification   dated   02.09.2005   was   issued   by
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NOIDA   under   Section   4(1)   read   with   Section   17(1)   of   the
‘Land Acquisition Act, 1894’ (hereinafter referred to as 1894
Act),   followed   by   a   notification   dated   22.11.2005   under
Section 6 of the 1894 Act, to acquire the scheduled piece of
land  measuring  0.7400 hectare in Khasra No. 422 and  427
at village Chhalera Bangar, Dadri, NOIDA. The possession of
the scheduled piece of land was taken on 20.01.2006 as per
order   passed   by   Additional   District   Collector   (Land
Acquisition) Noida. 
8. The aforesaid notifications were challenged by the appellant
before   High   Court   of   Allahabad   in   Civil   Miscellaneous   Writ
Petition   No.   75152   of   2005   and   Civil   Miscellaneous   Writ
Petition No. 70088 of 2006. As per interim orders of the High
Court   in   the   aforesaid   petitions,   Revenue   Inspector   visited
the scheduled piece of land on 05.08.2008 and in his report
noted as under –
“ In accordance to the  spot, the land of Khasra No. 422 and
427   which   in   present   has   been   converted   in   Sector   18   in
regards   to   demarcation ,   has   no   identification   spot
because   the   NOIDA   authority   has   been   fully
developed  and in absence of any fixed identification,
demarcation of land is not possible . ”
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The High Court vide order dated 10.12.2009 disposed­off the
matter and held as under –
“ Perusal   of   record   shows   that   the   notification   under
Section   4   of   the   Act   was   issued   on   2.9.2005   and   in   this
notification under Section 4 of the Act a direction was also
issued  under  Section17(4)   of  the   Act   to   the  effect   that   the
provision   of   Section   5­A   of   the   Act   shall   not   apply.   A
notification   under   Section   6   of   the   Act   as   contained   in
Annexure No. 2 to the instant writ petition was issued on
22.11.2005   and   the   urgency   clause   was   invoked   under
Section 17(1) of the Act. 
Mr. S.D. Kautilya, learned counsel for the petitioners made
a   statement   at   bar   that   the   petitioners   do   not   press   the
relief   claimed   in   the   instant   writ   petitions   and   only   pray
that   their   compensation   be   determined   and   be   paid   to
them in accordance with law and also keeping in mind the
Judgement   of   High   Court   of   Uttaranchal   rendered   in
Bhopendra   Singh   and   others   Vs.   Awas   Vikas   Parishad
and others, reported in 2005(2) Uttaranchal Decision, 295.
According to him this  statement  is  being made keeping in
mind   the   Commissioner's   report   that   the   land   cannot   be
demarcated and the petitioners cannot get back the land. 
Having   heard   the   learned   counsel   for   the   parties,   but
without   prejudice   to   the   merits   of   the   case,   the   writ
petition   is   disposed   of   with   the   direction   to   the
SLAO   to   determine   the   compensation   according   to
law   as   laid   down   in   the   judgement   rendered   in
Bhopendra   Singh   and   others   (Supra).   The   payment
of the compensation shall be made preferably within
a   period   of   one   month .   However,   it   is   further   provided
that if as per policy of NOIDA any land is to be given to the
petitioners,   same   shall   be   expedited   for   rehabilitation   of
the petitioner. Writ petition is disposed of. ”
(emphasis supplied)
It may not be out of context to state that, the appellant (land­
owner)   gave   the   concession   before   the   Court   in   view   of   the
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observation made by Revenue Inspector in the report that the
land was fully developed by NOIDA and demarcation was not
possible.   Therefore,   the   direction   for   determination   of
compensation   as   per   the   judgment   rendered   in   the   case   of
‘Bhopendra   Singh   and   Others   Vs.   Awas   Evam   Vikas
Parishad   and   Others,   2005   (2)   Uttaranchal   Decision,
295; MANU/UC/0270/2005’  was only prayed.
9. Being   aggrieved,   NOIDA   challenged   the   aforesaid   judgment
in   Special   Leave   to   Appeal   (C)   No.   20196­20197   of   2010
(later admitted and converted into Civil Appeal No. 731­732
of 2013).   During the pendency of the aforesaid appeal, this
Court   vide   order   dated   10.01.2011,   issued   notice   while
observing   that   ‘in   the   meanwhile,   there   shall   be   stay   of
operation   of   the   impugned   judgment   and   order   dated
10.12.2009   passed   by  High   Court’.   It   is   the   specific   case  of
the   appellant   (land­owner)   that   NOIDA   did   not   even   inform
the   Court   about   passing   of   award   under   Section   11   of   the
1894 Act during the pendency of the said appeal. 
10. Be   that   as   it   may,   after   almost   delay   of   5   years,   an   award
dated   31.01.2011   was   passed   by   Additional   District
Magistrate   (Land   Acquisition),   NOIDA,   Gautam   Buddh
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Nagar, under Section 11 of 1894 Act. In the said award, the
compensation   was   determined   by   the   authority   in   the
following manner –
“ …… a decision was reached in the meeting on the basis
of   general   acquisition   process   to   pay   them   compensation
at  the  rate  of  Rs. 181.87  per square  yard  on the  basis  of
sell   letter   dated   04.02.2005   for   the   land   sold   in   village
Sadarpar of this circle, whose borders touch the borders of
village   Chhalera   Bangar   against   the   land   sold   in   village
Chhalera three  years  before  the  advertisement  of  this  Act
on 02.09.2005 under Section 4(1), 17 and were not found
suitable   for   getting   compensation,   the   approval   of   which
was   given   by   Commissioner,   Meerut   Division,   Meerut
through   his   official   letter   No.   452/891/2004­06   dated
18.01.2006. ”
Regarding the pending litigation before this Court, the award
dealt with the same as under – 
“ With   reference   to   the   disposal   of  Civil  Misc.  Writ  Petition
No.   75152/2005   –   Vishnu   Pradhan   Vs.   NOIDA   &   Ors.,
Hon.   High   Court   of   Allahabad   on   10.12.2009   ordered   to
dispose   the   compensation   on   the   basis   of   minimum
determined circle rate by the District Collectors as per the
order passed by the Hon. High Court, Uttaranchal, against
the   petition   filed   for   compensation,   determination   and
payment   by   Bhopendra   Singh   and   Others   Vs.   Resident
Development Council and Others, but against the orders of
Hon.   High   Court,   a   Special   Petition   No.   CC   20196­
20197/2010 was filed in the Hon. Supreme Court of India
by Naveen Okhla Udyog Vikas Pradhikaran, Noida versus
Vishnu   Pradhan   and   others,   in   which   the   enforcement
of   the   orders   of   Hon.   High   Court   dated   10.12.2009
was   stopped   on   10.01.2001 .   Due   to   the   postponement
order   issued   by   Hon.   Supreme   Court   of   India,   the
determined   rate   of   Rs.   181.87   per   square   yard   remains
effective   for   the   uncontracted   lands   as   per   the   decision
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taken   in   the   said   meeting   convened   under   the
chairmanship   of   District   Collector,   Gautam   Buddh   Nagar
and   the   decision   of   acquired   land   will   be   taken   on   this
basis only. ”
Finally, the  award was  passed in  following  terms  subject  to
the   decision   of   this   court   and   compensation   was   computed
as under – 
“ Therefore, for the 0.828 ha, land acquired by New Okhla
Industrial   Development   Authority   for   planned   industrial
development   in   village   Chhalera   Bangar,   Pargana   Dadri,
Tehsil   Dadri,   District   –   Gautam   Buddh   Nagar,   the
compensation is Rs. 18,00,481.00 and 30% solatium
payable   on   it   amounts   to   Rs.   5,40,144.00   and   12%
payable   on   the   compensatory   amount   is   Rs.
53,866.00   which   amounts   to   a   total   of   Rs.
23,94,491.00   (Rupees   Twenty­Three   Lacs   Ninety­
Four   Thousand   Four   Hundred   Ninety­One   only)   and
the   decision   upon   it   is   being   declared   today   on
31.01.2011.   This   decision   will   be   as   per   the
obedience   of   the   order   issued   by   the   Hon.   Supreme
Court   of   India   against   Special   Petition   No.   CC
20197­20197/2010   –   NOIDA   versus   Vishnu   Pradhan
and others .”
(emphasis supplied)
Thereafter,   on   04.11.2015,   the   appeal   of   NOIDA   before   this
Court was dismissed for being devoid of merits. 
11. It is also relevant to note that, vide order dated 04.11.2015,
this Court also dismissed the Civil Appeal No. 1107 of 2009,
which assailed the judgment of High Court of Uttaranchal in
Bhopendra   Singh   (supra).   In   view   of   the   aforesaid   order,
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Deputy   Chief   Executive   of   NOIDA   addressed   a   letter   dated
11.05.2016   to   Additional   District   Magistrate   (Land
Acquisition)   to   comply   with   the   order   of   High   Court   of
Judicature at Allahabad and Supreme Court of India. In the
meanwhile,   the   appellant   herein   preferred   representations
before   the   concerned   authority   and   thereby   sought
compensation in terms of the aforesaid orders passed by this
Court,   however,   in   vain.   The   District   Magistrate,   Gautam
Buddh   Nagar   on   08.01.2018,   dismissed   the   representation
of the appellant (land­owner) and observed as under – 
“ In view  of  the  aforesaid, it  is clear that  when the matter
was pending adjudication before the Hon. Supreme Court,
then   in   such   circumstances,   the   award/decision
dated   31.01.2011   was   not   be   announced/passed   by
then   Additional   District   Magistrate   (Land
Acquisition),   Noida,   Gautam   Buddh   Nagar   and   the
Additional   District   Magistrate   (Land   Acquisition),
Noida,   Gautam   Buddh   Nagar,   in   the   matter   has   to
wait for the final orders of Hon. Supreme Court . The
award/decision   dated   31.01.2011   of   Additional   District
Magistrate   (Land   Acquisition)   is   not   the   compliance   of
order   dated   10.12.2009   passed   by   Hon.   High   Court
and   stay   order   dated   10.01.2011   passed   by   Hon.
Supreme   Court ,   but   because   this   award/decision   has
already been passed/declared by then Additional District
Magistrate   (Land   Acquisition)   Noida,   Gautam   Buddh
Nagar, therefore, legally it is not appropriate to dispose­off
this point at the level of District Magistrate. ”  
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Being   aggrieved   by   the   order   passed   by   District   Magistrate,
the   appellant   preferred   Contempt   Petition   (C)   Nos.   1841­
1842   of   2018   in   Civil   Appeal   Nos.   731­732   of   2013.   This
Court  vide order  dated  22.10.2018,  dismissed  the  aforesaid
contempt as withdrawn and granted liberty to the petitioner
to avail appropriate remedy before the High Court. 
12. In   view   of   the   order   passed   in   Contempt   Petition   by   this
Court, the appellant (land­owner) again approached the High
Court   in   Writ   Petition   No.   2272   of   2019,   wherein   the   High
Court vide impugned judgment and order dated 28.10.2021,
with regard to question of title of appellant on the scheduled
land, the High Court held as under – 
“ 31. We   would   first   be   dealing   with   the   issue   as   to
whether the  writ  petition filed by the sole  petitioner
to   claim   compensation   of   land   measuring   2.18.00
bighas of Khasra Nos. 422 and 427 is maintainable.
The respondents have produced a copy of the order
dated 12.09.2002 passed by the Civil Judge (Junior
Division),   Gautam   Buddha   Nagar   to   deny
acceptance   of   compromise   and   accordingly,
allegations   have   been   made   about   suppression   of
aforesaid fact. It is also that no compromise deed or
decree has been issued by the competent Court and
for   that   reason,   one   co­owner   of   the   land,   namely,
Vishnu   Pradhan   contested   the   case   separately   to
challenge the acquisition of the land.   We, however,
find that petitioner has produced a copy of the
Khatauni   of   Fasli   Year   1407­   1412   when   the
land   was   recorded   solely   in   the   name   of   the
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petitioner.   It   was   pursuant   to   the   order   dated
01.09.2010   in   Suit   No.   2441   of   2010   under
Section 34 of the Land Revenue Act, 1996 and
the   judgment   of   Civil   Judge   (Senior   Division)
dated   17.06.2010   to   record   entire   land   of
Khasra   Nos.   422   and   427   in   the   name   of   the
present petitioner. A copy of the Khatauni was
submitted   alongwith   the   supplementary
affidavit,   thereby   the   objection   on
maintainability   of   the   writ   petition   in   the
hands   of   the   petitioner   is   not   tenable   rather
the   petitioner   became   sole   owner   of   the
property   in   dispute   after   an   order   under
Section   34   of   the   Land   Revenue   Act   and   the
judgment   of   the   Civil   Court   dated   17.06.2010 .
His name was accordingly entered in the khatauni.
The   respondents   have   ignored   the   subsequent
orders   by   which   land   was   entered   in   the   name   of
the petitioner alone. ”
Further, on the aspect of whether the schedule property was
an   agriculture   land   or   commercial   land,   the   High   Court
referred   to   the   pleadings   of   respondents   themselves   in   Suit
No.   416   of  1998   and   provisions   of   Uttar   Pradesh   Industrial
Development  Act,  1976,  to  conclude  that  the  schedule  land
was   a   commercial   property   and   the   compensation   shall   be
determined accordingly. 
Regarding   the   deduction   towards   development   charges,   the
High Court held as follows –
“ 63. The respondents were expected to take into account
the circle rate of the land in question and thereupon
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to   make   reasonable   deductions   towards   the
development   which   may   be   between   20%   and   50%
as per the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of
Viluben Jhalejar Contractor  (supra).
64. If   the   proposition   of   law   laid   down   by   the   Apex
Court   in   the   judgment   cited   above   is   applied,   then
determination   of   compensation   should   have   been
made   after   taking   the   circle   rate   of   Rs.1,10,000/­
per   square   meter   of   the   land   in   question   and
thereupon   to   make   deduction   towards   the
development.   The   development   charges   can   be
maximum to the extent of 50% of it and accordingly
respondents   should   have   taken   Rs.55,000/­   per
square meter to be the market value of the land.
65. The   official   respondents   while   doing   it   could   have
noticed   that   the   land   was   allotted   to   respondent
no.7 one and half years back prior to the notification
under   Section   4   of   the   Act   of   1894.   It   was   by   the
allotment   letter   dated   12.04.2004.   The   circle   rate
was   determined   thereupon   on   16.04.2004.   The
allotment   of   land   to   the   respondent   no.7   was   8
times   bigger   than   the   land   of   the   petitioner   and   it
was   one   and   half   years   back.   While   applying   the
judgment   of   the   Apex   Court,   the   market   value
should   have   been   taken   @   Rs.55,000/­   per   square
meter. However, due to the interim order of the Apex
Court dated 11.01.2011 against the judgment dated
10.12.2009,   the   respondents   did   not   determine   the
compensation   as   per   the   direction   given   by   this
Court. ”
And lastly, the High Court disposed­off the petition with the
following directions –
“ 69. Accordingly,   we   find   reasons   to   cause   interference
in the  award   dated   31.01.2011   and   direct   the
respondents to  determine   the   compensation   as
under –
14

1. The   respondents   are   directed   to   take   into
consideration   the   circle   rate   of   Sector   –   18   since
16.04.2004 given in Annexure – 7 of supplementary
counter   affidavit   filed   by   the   respondent   no.   5.   It
was Rs. 1,10,000/­ per square meter for Sector – 18.
2. After   making   50%   deduction   towards   the
development charges, it would come to Rs. 55,000/­
per square meter and accordingly the compensation
would   be   determined   on   the   aforesaid   rate   for   the
land admeasuring 2.18 bighas.
3. The   addition   of   solatium   of   30%   would   be   made
thereupon.   The   amount   arrived   as   per   the   direction
in  paras   (1)   and   (2)   would   be   payable   with   interest
@   9%   per   annum   for   one   year   from   the   date   of
possession   i.e.   February,   2005   and   thereupon   15%
per annum as per the Proviso to Section 34 of the Act
of 1894.
4. The amount  deposited in the year 2017 would earn
interest   @   15%   only   till   it   was   deposited.   The
amount so deposited would be paid to the petitioner
with the interest earned on it.
5. The   amount   of   compensation   would   be   paid
thereupon to the petitioner. ”
13. The High Court on the issue of applicability of Section 24 of
‘Right   to   Fair   Compensation   and   Transparency   in   Land
Acquisition,   Rehabilitation   and   Resettlement   Act,   2013’
(hereinafter referred to as 2013 Act), held that, the argument
of   lapsing   of   acquisition   for   an   award   passed   beyond   a
period prescribed under Section 11(a) cannot be accepted in
view   of   the   ratio   of   judgment   of   this   Court   in   ‘Indore
Development   Authority   Vs.   Manohar   Lal   &   Ors.,   2020
15

(8)   SCC   129’ .   After   going   through   the   said   judgment,   it   is
clear   that   Section   24(1)(a)   of   2013   Act,   starts   with   non­
obstante   clause   and   states   that   in   case   where   the
proceedings   have   been   initiated   under   1894   Act,   but,   the
award  has   not   been  made  under   Section   11,   the  provisions
of   the   2013   Act   relating   to   the   determination   of
compensation   would   apply.   In   the   case   at   hand,   the   award
was   made   on   31.01.2011   after   grant   of   stay   on   10.01.2011
in   Civil   Appeal   No.   731­732   of   2013,   though   it   was   by   a
delay   of   5   years.   By   the   final   order   passed   on   04.11.2015,
the   said   appeals   were   dismissed.   Thereafter,   the
representation   was   made   by   the   appellant   asking
compensation at the rate of Rs. 1,10,000/­ per sq. mtrs. as
directed by High Court inter­party relying upon judgment of
Bhopendra   Singh   (supra)   was   rejected   vide   order   dated
08.01.2018.   Thereafter,   the   contempt   petitions   were   filed
alleging   non­compliance   of   the   order   of   the   High   Court
which   were   dismissed   as   withdrawn   while   granting   the
liberty to appellant to avail appropriate remedy. Thus, on the
date of commencement of the 2013 Act, the possession was
taken   and   the   award   was   passed,   though   as   alleged   it   was
16

non­est.   In   our   opinion,   by   the   impugned   order,   the
determination   of   compensation   as   per   circle   rate   of   Rs.
1,10,000/­   per   sq.   mtrs   for   commercial   land   was   the
question   res­integra   in   the   light   of   Bhopendra   Singh
(supra)   judgment and the award, whether rightly or wrongly
passed,   was   in   existence   on   the   date   of   commencement   of
2013   Act.   Therefore,   in   our   considered   opinion,   the   High
Court   has   rightly   refused   to   interfere   on   the   issue   of
applicability   of   2013   Act   for   determination   of   compensation
and   rightly   relied   upon   the   judgment   on   Indore
Development Authority  (supra) . 
14. Being aggrieved by the impugned order, the appellant (land­
owner)   and   NOIDA   have   filed   separate   appeals,   which   are
heard analogously . 
Mr.   Ranjit   Kumar,   learned   Senior   Counsel   assisted   by   Mr.
P.B.   Suresh   for   appellant,   in   addition   to   the   point   of
applicability   of   Section   24   of   2013   Act   as   discussed   above,
contended as under –
17

a. That,   the   award   dated   31.01.2011   passed   by   District
Magistrate was in violation of order of this Court as well
as the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad;
b. The award itself acknowledged that it was contingent in
nature;
c. There was no personal hearing granted to the appellant,
even   though   NOIDA   knew   about   the   interest   of   the
appellant in the scheduled property;
d. The   impugned   award   was   a   void   exercise   since   the
public   notice   of   the   same   was   given   two   days   after   the
designated  date of   hearing  under  Section  9  of  the  1894
Act;
e. The   award   itself   was   passed   after   a   delay   of   5   years
since   the   date   of   hearing,   which   violates   the   mandate
under   Section   11A   of   the   1894   Act.   Therefore,   the   date
of   award   of   compensation   should   be   shifted     or   in
alternate,  since  the compensation was deposited in the
year   2017,   therefore,   the   amount   of   compensation   be
determined as per the provisions of 2013 Act.
18

f. Deduction   with   respect   to   development   charges   could
not   be   levied   as   the   plot   was   already   developed   even
before the acquisition;
g. NOIDA   illegally   sold   the   schedule   property   even   before
the   acquisition   which   is   a   clear­cut   violation   of   right   to
property   under   Article   300A   of   the   Constitution.   Such
Constitutional   tort   should   not   be   allowed   to   be   left
unpunished   and   the   respondent   authorities   should   not
take benefit of their own wrongful acts.
15. Per   contra,   Mr.   Balbir   Singh,   learned   Additional   Solicitor
General appearing  on behalf of NOIDA, contended as under
–
a. Appellant   cannot   be   entitled   for   a   compensation   more
than   Rs.   31,850/­   which   was   the   price   tendered   by
respondent no. 7 (DLF);
b. The  said price of  Rs.  31,850/­ has  been  adjudicated by
this   Court   in   ‘Anil   Kumar   Srivastava   Vs.   State   of
U.P., (2004) 8 SCC 671’  to be reasonable;
c. It has been conceded that allotment to respondent no. 7
(DLF)   was   prior   to   the   date   of   acquisition   of   the
scheduled land;
19

d. Appellant   (land­owner)   acquired   the   property   in   year
1997 for  a sale consideration  of Rs. 1 crore. One of the
earlier land owners namely Vishnu Vardhan had entered
into   an   agreement   to   sale   dated   07.06.2006,   for   a   sale
consideration   of   Rs.   3   crores   only.   These   transactions
indicate that the aforesaid land was an agricultural plot,
however, the scheduled land has to  be characterized as
agriculture land or at best residential;
e. Jurisdiction of reference court constituted under Section
18   of   1894   Act   has   been   by­passed   by   the   High   Court
while determining the compensation;
f. Development   charge   amounting   to   75%   has   to   be
deducted instead of 50%;
g. Compensation granted by the High Court would amount
to unjust enrichment for the appellant which cannot be
sustained under the law.
16. Mr. Rayzada, Additional Advocate General appearing for the
State   has   submitted   that,   the   subject   land   was   bought   as
benami   property   and   hence,   appellant   is   only   entitled   for
1/3 rd
 of the amount.
20

17. Learned   counsel   for   respondent   no.   7   has   submitted   that,
the   dispute   is   inter­se   NOIDA   and   appellant   herein   and
respondent no. 7 has nothing to add other than to state that
the  allotment of land  was  subject matter  of  litigation before
this   Court   in   Anil   Kumar   Srivastava   (supra),   which   has
upheld   the   allocation   through   the   process   of   auction.
However,   the   compensation,   if   any,   enhanced,   may   be
directed only against NOIDA.
18. Before adverting to the merits of the rival contentions raised
by both parties, at the outset it is relevant to mention that,
the   legality   and   validity   of   judgment   dated   10.12.2009
passed   by   High   Court   in   Civil   Miscellaneous   Writ   Petition
No.   75152/2005   has   sustained   the   scrutiny   of   this   Court
and   has   been   upheld   vide   order   dated   04.11.2015   in   Civil
Appeal   No.   731­732   of   2013.   The   judgment   has   attained
finality inter­se the parties. It is not the case of respondents
that   the   previous   judgment   as   well   as   the   impugned   order
has   been   rendered   by   an   incompetent   authority.   In   other
words, the said judgment has effectively put the controversy
inter­se the parties to rest. Thus, incidentally, what remains
in the matter is mere observance of those directions given by
21

the   High  Court   in  the   light   of   prevailing   law.   Therefore,   the
contention   disputing   the   payment   of   compensation
altogether for the acquired land is untenable and cannot be
entertained at this stage. The conclusion arrived at by High
Court   has   been   given   seal   of   affirmation   by   this   Court   and
hence, the right of the appellant herein to get compensation
in   terms   of   determination   as   directed   has   been   crystallized
and   cannot   be   interfered   with.   It   would   be   unjust   and
improper   to   allow   re­agitation   of   issues   and   vexing   the
appellant twice when the matter has already been put to rest
by impugned judgment inter­se the parties. 
19. At   this   juncture,   we   consider   it   appropriate   to   refer   ‘R.
Unnikrishnan   and   Another   Vs.   V.K.   Mahanudevan   and
Others,   (2014)   4   SCC   434’ ,   wherein   para   19,   the   Court
while   dealing   with   finality   to   binding   judicial   decisions
observed as follows – 
“ 19. It   is   trite   that   law   favours   finality   to   binding
judicial   decisions   pronounced   by   courts   that
are  competent   to deal   with  the  subject­matter.
Public   interest   is   against   individuals   being
vexed   twice   over   with   the   same   kind   of
litigation.   The   binding   character   of   the
judgments   pronounced   by   the   courts   of
competent   jurisdiction   has   always   been
22

treated  as  an  essential  part  of the rule of law
which   is   the   basis   of   the   administration   of
justice  in   this   country . We  may gainfully refer to
the   decision   of   the   Constitution   Bench   of   this   Court
in   ‘Daryao   v.   State   of   U.P.   [AIR   1961   SC   1457]’
where   the   Court   succinctly   summed   up   the   law   in
the following words: 
9. …It is in the interest of the public at large that  a
finality   should   attach   to   the   binding
decisions   pronounced   by   courts   of
competent   jurisdiction,   and   it   is   also   in
the public interest that individuals should
not be vexed twice over with the same kind
of litigation .
***
11. …The   binding   character   of   judgments
pronounced   by   courts   of   competent   jurisdiction
is itself an essential part of the rule of law, and
the   rule   of   law   obviously   is   the   basis   of   the
administration   of   justice   on   which   the
Constitution lays so much emphasis. ”
20. Therefore,   in   view   of   settled   legal   position   with   respect   to
binding   nature   of   the   judgment   that   has   attained   finality,
there   is   no   iota   of   doubt   that   NOIDA   is   under   mandatory
obligation   to   determine   the   compensation   as   per   law   laid
down   in   Bhopendra   Singh   (supra).   The   relevant   extracts
from  Bhopendra Singh  (supra) are being reproduced herein
below for ready reference –
“ 4 . Learned   reference   court   has   assessed   the   market
value of similar land @ of Rs. 6/­ per square feet on
the   ground   that   other   land   of   the   same   area   which
was acquired with land in question was also valued
23

at   the   said   rate   by   the   Special   Land   Acquisition
Officer. However, learned Counsel for the Appellants
argued  that  the  land   in question  is   adjoining  to  the
main   road   unlike   the   land   which   was   taken   into
consideration   by   the   reference   court.   It   is   further
argued   that   the   land   in   question   should   not   have
been   valued   less   than   Rs.   50/­   Square   feet.   On
perusal of the oral evidence adduced by the parties
we   found   that   P.W.­1   Smt.   Raj   Dulari   has   stated
that in the year 1976 value of land in question was
Rs. 50/­ per square feet. P.W.­2 Arvind Singh, P.W.­
3   Ranvir   Singh   and   P.W.­4   Harpal   Singh   have   also
made   the   similar   statements.   But   in   the   matters
of   Land   Acquisition,   best   way   to   assess   the
market   value   is   to   examine   the   value   in   the
light  of  price  paid by the purchaser of  similar
land   in   the   neighbourhood   of   the   land   in
question.   Such   transaction   if   nearer   the   date
of   notification   of   acquisition,   facilitates   the
court   to   assess   the   more   accurate   market
value of the land. However, in the present case
none of the above witnesses have adduced any
evidence   as   to   the   exemplar   sale   deed
pertaining   to   the   nearby   similar   land.   In
absence   of   such   sale,   deeds   we   are   compelled
to   see   the   valuation   of   the   surrounding   land
made by the Collector Nainital under Rule 340­
A   of   the   U.P.   Stamp   (first   amendment)   Rules,
1976.   Paper   No.   44­C/1   is   copy   of   the   Circle
rate   showing   market   value   assessed   by   the
Collector   for   the   purposes   of   registration   of
instrument   of  sale.  The said  documents   shows
that the circle  rate of the land in question  for
imposing the stamp duty over the documents is
Rs.   95/­   to   Rs.   135/­   per   sq.   meter   as   market
value   of   the   land   adjoining   to   road   and   Rs.
67/­ to Rs. 80/­ per sq. meter for the land away
from   the   road .   From   the   evidence   on   record,   it   is
clear   that   the   land   in   question   was   near   the   main
road. As such the market value as per the circle rate
24

was treated for the purpose of realizing stamp duty
not   less   than   Rs.   95/­   per   sq.   meter.   It   would   be
injustice   to   the   owner   of   land   if   for   realizing   the
stamp   duty   we   apply   the   circle   rate   and   deny   at­
least   the   said   rate   in   making   payment   of
compensation   on   acquisition   of   his   land.   The   total
area   of   the   land   in   question   is   2900   sq.   yard.   The
learned   reference   court   has   erred   in   law   by
multiplying the rate mentioned per sq, feet with area
in   terms   of   sq.   yard.   That   is   why   due   to
miscalculation   the   amount   has   been   stuck   at
meager   Rs.   17,400/­.   Area   measuring   0.6   acre   is
equal   to   2900   Sq,   yard   which   is   equal   to   2397   sq.
meter. If we assess the market value relying on the
circle   rate   it   would   be   Rs.   95/­   per   sq.   meter,   the
market value of the land in the year 1976 comes out
to be Rs. 95/­ A – 2397.80 sq. meters = 2,27,791/­.
xxx xxx xxx
12. The   market   value   determined   for   the   circle,   is   the
minimum statutory market value, in accordance with
the   statutory   rules   framed   under   the   Stamp   Act,   as
amended   by   the   U.P.   Act,   on   the   basis   of   which,
stamp   duty   is   paid   as   per   schedule   appended   to
Section   3   and   sale   deed   is   to   be   entertained   only
after   the   payment   of   the   stamp   duty   paid   on   the
said  minimum market value  and  if in the opinion of
the Registering Authority the value of the property is
more than the minimum value determined as per the
rules,  he   may  refer  the  matter  to  the   Authority  who
may   further   proceed   to   require   the   vendee   to   pay
more stamp duty. And if not paid they may impound
the sale deed. Thus, the basis  of exercise  of power,
is   the   minimum   market   value   determined   according
to   rule.   If   for   the   augmentation   of   the   revenue,
government fixes the market value of the property in
a   circle   why   that   not   be   taken   as   minimum   market
value   of   the   property   for   the   purpose   of   Land
Acquisition   Act.   The   procedure   of   determination
of   market   value   provided   under   Section   23   of
Land   Acquisition   Act   is   pari­materia   to   the
25

rules   framed   under   the   Stamp   Act.   Therefore,
we   hold   that   while   avoiding   compensation   for
land   acquired   under  the   Land   Acquisition   Act,
the   compensation   cannot   be   paid   at   a   lesser
rate   than   that   of   market   value  determined   for
the   purpose   of   payment   of   stamp   duty   under
the Stamp Act . ”
(emphasis supplied)
21. Bare   perusal   of   the   aforesaid   makes   it   clear   that,   the
determination of the compensation has to be made by taking
into consideration the circle rate which has been determined
as   per   the   market   value.   The   market   value   of   a   property   is
the   price   that   a   willing   purchaser   would   pay   to   a   willing
seller   for   it,   taking   into   account   its   current   condition,   all
existing advantages, and potential possibilities when led out
in   the   most   advantageous   manner,   while   excluding   any
benefit resulting from the implementation of the scheme for
which   the   property   is   compulsorily   acquired.   Therefore,   the
market value is to be determined in the light of price paid by
the   purchaser   of   similar   land   in   the   neighbourhood   of   the
land   in   question   and   in   cases,   where   no   records   for   such
transaction/purchase   is   available,   the   minimum   statutory
value   in   accordance   with   Stamp   Act   must   be   taken   as
market value for circle rate. 
26

22. In   the   instant   case,   since   the   title   of   the   appellant   on   the
scheduled   piece   of   land   has   not   been   contested   by   the
respondents   and   the   adjudication   is   confined   only   to   the
quantum   of   compensation,   we   deem   it   appropriate   not   to
interfere with the findings of the High Court with respect to
the ownership. Be that as it may, moving further, the order
dated   27.03.2004   passed   by   District   Magistrate,   Gautam
Buddh   Nagar   notifying   the   circle   rate   to   be   Rs.   1,10,000/­
per   sq.   mt.   as   applicable   on   commercial   properties,
residential   properties   etc.,   situated   in   Noida   is   also   on
record.   Further,   the   nature   of   acquired   land   is   also   not   in
dispute for the reason that, NOIDA while contesting the Civil
Suit   No.   416/1998   filed   by   appellant   herein   seeking
permanent injunction, itself admitted that the land has been
determined for use of commercial purposes and hence, it is
a   valuable   land.   This   fact   is   also   fortified   by   the   Revenue
Inspector’s   report   dated   05.08.2008,   submitted   in
compliance   of   interim   order   passed   by   High   Court   in   Writ
Petition No. 75152 of 2005. By the said report, it is apparent
that,   on   spot   the   land   of   Khasra   No.   422   and   427   was
converted into a part of Sector 18, for which demarcation is
27

not   possible   because   of   absence   of   any   fixed   identification
points   for   demarcation   since   the   land   is   fully   developed.
Thus, NOIDA cannot turn around to say in this case that the
land   is   either   agricultural   or   at   best   residential.   Thus,   the
arguments as advanced is contrary to record, far from truth
and cannot be countenanced. 
23. Now, the argument advanced by learned Additional Solicitor
General   for   State   and   counsel   for   respondent   no.   7   relying
upon   the   judgment   of   Anil   Kumar   Srivastava   (supra) ,
which   was   a   PIL   filed   before   the   Allahabad   High   Court   and
later   transferred   to   this   Court,   is   also   required   to   be
analyzed.   This   Court   in   the   aforesaid   case   dealt   with   the
challenge   made   to   tender   floated   by   NOIDA   in   2003   and
dismissed the said PIL while observing as thus – 
“ 7. In   reply,   respondent   no.   2   has   pointed   out   that   the
impugned   Scheme   was   given   wide   publicity;
that   the   development   of   the   plot   admeasuring
54,320.18   sq.   m.   became   necessary   to
decongest   Sector   18   where   car   parking   has
become   an   acute   problem;   that   decongestion
could   be   achieved   by   constructing   shopping
malls   with   matching   parking   facility ;   that
although   the   area   of   the   plot   in   question   is
54,320.18   sq.   m.,   FAR   is   restricted   to   150   and
ground   cover   is   restricted   to   30%   unlike   the
instances of plots submitted by the petitioner where
28

for   a   smaller   plot   of   6000­7000   sq.   m.,   FAR   is   150
and for still smaller plots of 600 sq. m., FAR is 250
(see   Annexure   P­1).   That   by   offering   the   said   plot
admeasuring   54,320.18   sq.   m.,   the   Authority   is
saving   on   internal   development   for   amenities,
parking, etc ……..
xxx xxx xxx
9. Mr.   L.   Nageswara   Rao,   learned   Senior   Counsel
appearing on behalf of the petitioner submitted  that
the   reserve   price   fixed   by   respondent   no.   2   at   the
rate   of   Rs   27,500   per   sq.   m.   is   contrary   to   clause
2(e)   of   the   Board   resolution   dated   10­7­2003;   that
under   the   said   clause,   the   reserve   rate   of
commercial   plots   admeasuring   5001   sq.   m.   or   more
was   one­and­a­half   times   the   sector   rate;   that   the
sector   rate   was   Rs   90,000   per   sq.   m.;   that   the
reserve   price   of   Rs   27,500   per   sq.   m.   for   the   plot
admeasuring   54,320.18   sq.   m.,   without   sub­
division,   was   abysmally   low   and
understated………. It was submitted that transfer
of the said  plot  admeasuring  54,320.18  sq.  m.
at such a low reserve price of Rs 27,500 per sq.
m. would result in causing huge loss of Rs 340
crores to the State exchequer .
xxx xxx xxx
14. Applying the above tests to the facts of this case, we
find that there is no material on record to show that
the   tender   price   of   Rs   31,850   per   sq.   m.   is   a   low
price.   The   entire   edifice   of   the   petition   is   based   on
the   challenge   to   the   reserve   price   of   Rs   27,500   per
sq. m. As  stated  above, fixation of the  reserve price
is   to   facilitate   the   conduct   of   the   sale.   It   was   open
to   the   petitioner   to   challenge   the   tender   price
of   Rs   31,850   per   sq.   m.   as   understated,
notwithstanding   the   fixation   of   the   reserve
price .  No  comparative   sales  instances,  with   similar
parameters   of   ground   cover   of   30%   and   150   FAR,
have   been   placed   before   us.   No   figures   of   cost   of
2800 ECS have been placed before us as such costs
29

would increase the reserve price. On the other hand,
we   find   that   the   reserve   price   has   been   fixed   by
taking   into   account   several   factors.   Firstly,   in   the
past tenders invited for relatively smaller plots with
higher   reserve   price   had   failed.   It   is   important   to
bear in mind that the tender process is an expensive
exercise.   To   resort   repeatedly   to   this   exercise   is   a
costly   affair.   Secondly,   in   the   present   case,   the
reserve   price   was   fixed   by   taking   into   account   the
comparative   offers/sales   in   the   adjoining
sectors……..
15. Reading   of   the   said   clause   indicates   that   the   figure
of Rs 90,000 is not mentioned. It is a figure alleged
by   the   petitioner.   As   stated   above,   there   is   a
difference   between   the   circle   rate   and   the   sector
rate. The petitioner has confused the two. The circle
rate   is   notified   by   the   Government   for   the   guidance
of   the   Sub­Registrar.   They   are   notified   for   revenue
purposes.   There   is   nothing   to   show   that   Rs   90,000
per  sq.  m.  was  the  sector  rate.  In   the  present   case,
we are concerned with a larger plot of 54,320.18 sq.
m. with different variables of 30% ground cover and
150   FAR.   Keeping   in   mind   all   these   factors,   the
Authority has  fixed  the  reserve price. In the  present
case,   undue   importance   has   been   given   to   the
fixation   of   the   reserve   price.   As   stated   above,
notwithstanding   the   reserve   price,   the   petitioner
could have brought before the Court material, if any,
to   show   undervaluation.   In   the   present   case,   the
tender price is Rs 31,850 per sq. m. It is higher than
the   reserve   price.   There   is   no   material   to   show
whether   the   tender   price   is   understated .   In   the
circumstances, there  is no merit in the contention of
the   petitioner   that   the   land   is   sold   at   an   abysmally
low price. ”
(emphasis supplied)
24. From   reading   of   the   aforesaid   judgment,   it   is   clear   that   in
the   PIL,   petitioner   had   only   challenged   the   reserve   rate   as
30

being   abysmally   low   and   did   not   challenge   the   tender   price
of Rs. 31,850 per sq. mtrs. Further, the PIL petitioner inter­
alia had not led any evidence to show exemplar deeds as to
the   actual   market   value   of   the   plot   or   the   circle   rate
determined   under   the   Stamp   Act.   On   the   pleadings   and
evidence   as   existed   before   it,   this   Court   concluded   that   the
reserve   price   of   land   was   reasonable   and   accordingly
dismissed   the   PIL.   It   was   fairly   admitted   by   the   learned
Additional Solicitor General appearing for NOIDA that, at the
time   of   arguments   before   this   Court,   NOIDA   had   not
revealed   this   fact   that   they   were   intending   to   auction   third
party  lands  without there  being   formal acquisition  as such.
It   is   not   out   of   place   to   mention   that,   emphasis   in   the   PIL
was   on   the   act   of   handing   over   of   the   land   by   NOIDA   to
respondent no. 7 being arbitrary. While in the present case,
the   emphasis   is   on   grant   of   compensation   for   the   land   of
third   party,   whose   land   has   been   malafidely   and   forcefully
handed   over   to   respondent   no.   7   in   contravention   of   the
decree   of   permanent   injunction,   without   any   formal
acquisition,   though   made   subsequently.   In   the   said   PIL,
what   may   be   the   just   and   reasonable   amount   of
31

compensation   was   not   the   question   for   determination.
Therefore,   the   emphasis   made   by   learned   Additional
Solicitor   General   relying   on   the   judgment   of   Anil   Kumar
Srivastava  (supra)  in this regard is bereft of any merit. 
25. As   discussed   above,   with   regard   to   determination   of   the
compensation   in   the   present   case,   the   judgment   of
Bhopendra   Singh   (supra) ,   wherein   the   circle   rate   showing
market   value   assessed   by   the   Collector   for   the   purpose   of
registration   of   instrument   of   sale   was   made   valid.   The   said
judgment was not interfered with by this Court thereafter. In
the   case   of   the   land   owner   itself,   the   High   Court   by   order
dated 10.12.2009 passed in Writ Petition No. 75152 of 2005,
directed   the   Special   Land   Acquisition   Officer   to   determine
the   compensation   according   to   the   law   as   laid   down   in
judgment   rendered   in   Bhopendra   Singh   (supra) ,   which   is
sustained   by   this   Court.   Therefore,   the   issue   of   basis   of
determination   of   compensation   has   been   settled   inter­party
and also un­interfered by this Court. Now, on the said issue,
relying   upon   the   judgment   of   Anil   Kumar   Srivastava
(supra)   cannot   be   interfered   with   in   this   case.   In   no   event,
32

the   compensation   can   be   paid   at   a   rate   lesser   than   that   of
market   value   as   determined   for   the   purpose   of   payment   of
stamp duty under Stamp Act.
26. As   previously   stated,   the   land   in   dispute   was   not   only
designated for commercial use, rather it was also declared to
be   part   of   industrial   development   plan   area.   After
development, even a mall has been constructed on it. In our
view,   the   High   Court   in   the   impugned   order   has   rightly
determined   payment   of   compensation   at   the   rate   of   Rs.
1,10,000/­   per   square   meter   as   per   circle   rate.   We,
therefore,   confirm   the   findings   of   High   Court   for   grant   of
compensation with rate Rs. 1,10,000/­ per sq. mt. 
27. In   the   light   of   the   preceding   discussion,   the   only   question
that   remains   now   for   our   consideration   is   with   regard   to
deduction of development charges to the extent of 50% made
by High Court in impugned order. On the said issue, there is
no   straight   jacket   formula   to   arrive   at   the   quantum   of
deduction   of   development   charge   and   same   must   be
assessed based on the facts of the individual case after due
consideration   of   all   the   factors   which   might   affect   such
33

quantum.   As   evident,   the   High   Court   did   not   take   into
consideration   all   the   factors   encircling   the   issue   and
routinely   proceeded   with   the   maximum   deduction   of   50%
development   charge.   We   say   so   because,   on   perusal   of   the
impugned   judgment,   it   is   clear   that   the   High   Court   has
inter­alia highlighted the glaring mischiefs played by NOIDA
in the whole acquisition proceedings but at the same time, it
has   failed   to   accord   a   substantial   reason   for   maximum
deduction   of   development   charges.   It   is   further   observed
that, it is not for the first time that NOIDA is in cross­roads
before   this   Court   for   playing   hand­in­glove   with   large
developers. 
28. Be as it may, it is uncontroverted from the material available
on   record   that,   the   scheduled   piece   of   land   was   allotted   by
NOIDA to respondent no. 7 in absence of formal acquisition,
whereafter,   the   said   scheduled   land   was   developed   in   the
line of commercial hub and even a mall was constructed on
it.   Hence,   in   our   considered   opinion,   the   quantum   of
deduction   of   development   charges   should   have   been
evaluated   by   High   Court   from   the   contextual   perspective   of
all   the   relevant   factors,   which   clearly   has   not   been   done   in
34

the instant case. Nevertheless, to cure the anomaly, it is trite
at   this   juncture   to   refer   to   the   doctrine   enunciated   by   this
Court   in   case   of   ‘Bhagwathula   Samanna   Vs.   Special
Tahsildar   and   Land   Acquisition   Officer,   (1991)   4   SCC
506’ , wherein while dealing with the question of principle of
deduction in the land value, this Court held as follows – 
“ 11. The principle of deduction in the land value covered
by   the   comparable   sale   is   thus   adopted   in   order   to
arrive   at   the   market   value   of   the   acquired   land.   In
applying   the   principle,   it   is   necessary   to
consider all  relevant  facts.  It  is  not the extent
of   the   area   covered   under   the   acquisition
which   is   the   only   relevant   factor.   Even   in   the
vast   area   there   may   be   land   which   is   fully
developed having all amenities and situated in
an   advantageous   position.   If   smaller   area
within the large tract is already developed and
suitable   for   building   purposes   and   have   in   its
vicinity   roads,   drainage,   electricity,
communications   etc.   then   the   principle   of
deduction simply for the reason that it is part
of   the   large   tract   acquired,   may   not   be
justified .
12.  ….. The land involved in these cases is of even level
and   fit   for   construction   without   the   necessity   of
levelling   or   reclamation.   The   High   Court   has   itself
concluded on the evidence that the lands covered by
the   acquisition   are   located   by   the   side   of   the
National   Highway   and   the   Southern   Railway   Staff
Quarters   with   the   town   planning   trust   road   on   the
north.   The   neighbouring   areas   are   already
developed ones and houses have been constructed,
and   the   land   has   potential   value   for   being   used   as
building   sites.   Having   found   that   the   land   is   to
35

be   valued   only   as   building   sites   and   having
stated the advantageous position in which the
land   in   question   lies   though   forming   part   of
the   larger   area,   the   High   Court   should   not
have   applied   the   principles   of   deduction.   It   is
not   in   every   case   that   such   deduction   is   to   be
allowed.   Where   the   acquired   land   is   in   the
midst   of   already   developed   land   with
amenities   of   roads,   electricity   etc.,   the
deduction  in the  value  of the  comparable land
is not warranted .
13.  The   proposition   that   large   area   of   land   cannot
possibly   fetch   a   price   at   the   same   rate   at   which
small  plots  are  sold is  not  absolute proposition and
in   given   circumstances   it   would   be   permissible   to
take   into   account   the   price   fetched   by   the   small
plots   of   land.   If   the   larger   tract   of   land   because   of
advantageous   position   is   capable   of   being   used   for
the   purpose   for   which   the   smaller   plots   are   used
and   is   also   situated   in   a   developed   area   with   little
or   no   requirement   of   further   development,   the
principle   of   deduction   of   the   value   for   purpose   of
comparison   is   not   warranted.   With   regard   to   the
nature of the plots involved in these two cases,
it   has   been   satisfactorily   shown   on   the
evidence on record that the land has facilities
of road and other amenities and is adjacent to
a developed colony and in such circumstances,
it   is   possible   to   utilize   the   entire   area   in
question   as   house  sites.   In   respect   of  the   land
acquired   for   the   road,   the   same   advantages
are   available,   and   it   did   not   require   any
further development. We, are, therefore, of the
view that the High Court has erred in applying
the   principle   of   deduction   and   reducing   the
fair   market   value   of   land   from   Rs   10   per   sq.
yard to Rs 6.50 per sq. yard. In our opinion, no
such   deduction   is   justified   in   the   facts   and
36

circumstances   of   these   cases.   The   appellants,
therefore, succeed . ”
29. Further,   this   Court   in   ‘Trishala   Jain   Vs.   State   of
Uttaranchal,   (2011)   6   SCC   47’ ,   while   dealing   with
determination   of   compensation   and   deduction   of
development charges held as under – 
“ 44. It   is   thus   evident   from   the   above   enunciated
principle   that   the   acquired   land   has   to   be
more   or   less   developed   land   as   its   developed
surrounding   areas,   with   all   amenities   and
facilities   and   is   fit   to   be   used   for   the   purpose
for   which   it   is   acquired   without   any   further
expenditure,   before   such   land   could   be
considered   for   no   deduction .   Similarly,   the   sale
instances even of smaller plots could be considered
for   determining   the   market   value   of   a   larger   chunk
of   land   with   some   deduction   unless,   there   was
comparability in potential, utilization, amenities and
infrastructure   with   hardly   any   distinction.   On   such
principles each case would have to be considered on
its own merits.
Further,   this   Court   in   ‘Kasturi   and   Ors.   Vs.   State   of
Haryana,   (2003)   1   SCC   354’ ,   while   dealing   with   various
factual factors to be taken into consideration while applying 
the cut in payment of compensation towards developmental
charges held as under –
37

“ 7. ........ However,   in   cases   of   some   land   where
there   are   certain   advantages   by   virtue   of   the
developed   area   around,   it   may   help   in
reducing   the   percentage   of   cut   to   be   applied,
as the developmental charges  required may be
less   on   that   account.   There   may   be   various
factual   factors   which   may   have   to   be   taken
into   consideration   while   applying   the   cut   in
payment   of   compensation   towards
developmental charges, maybe in some cases it
is more than 1/3    rd
     and in some cases less than
1/3 rd
. It must be remembered that there is difference
between   a   developed   area   and   an   area   having
potential   value,   which   is   yet   to   be   developed.   The
fact   that   an   area   is   developed   or   adjacent   to   a
developed  area will  not  ipso  facto  make  every land
situated in the area also developed to be valued as
a building site or plot, particularly when vast tracts
are   acquired,   as   in   this   case,   for   development
purpose. ”
The   aforesaid   judgments   postulate   general   factors   that   are
to   be   taken   into   consideration   for   deciding   the   quantum   of
deduction   of   development   charges.   As   iterated   above,   such
factors majorly include the nature of land to be acquired, the
extent   of   area   to   be   acquired,   the   extent   of   development   in
the  adjoining  land  as well  as land  proposed  to  be  acquired,
the commercial potentiality and so on. Therefore, deduction
of development charge in the instant case should have been
made while considering the said factors. However, it is made
38

clear that this observation is being made in peculiar facts of
the present case and not in general.
30. Applying the ratio of said judgments in the facts of the case
at   hand,   as   per   the   stand   taken   by   NOIDA,   the   scheduled
piece of land is a costly land, being situated at the centre of
development of authority and has commercial use. On spot,
the demarcation was not possible because the land was fully
developed. In the backdrop, without acquisition, the piece of
land   belonging   to   appellant   was   transferred   to   respondent
no. 7. The acquisition was made subsequently in view of the
observations   made   by   the   District   Court   confirming   the
decree of permanent injunction for the said piece of land. At
the   time   of   taking   over   of   possession,   the   amount   of
compensation   was   not   made   and   now,   the   appellant   is
running   from   pillar   to   post   to   receive   the   adequate
compensation. Even after settling the dispute for payment of
compensation at the circle rate of Rs. 1,10,000/­ inter­party
in   the   previous   round   of   litigation,   the   NOIDA   in   its   own
volition neither determined the compensation nor paid to the
appellant. The possession of scheduled piece of land, though
taken   long   back   in   year   2004­2005,   but   till   date,   the
39

appellant   has   not   been   able   to   reap   the   fruits   of
compensation   and   kept   litigating   before   courts   even   up   to
subsequent   rounds.   Considering   all   this   aspect,   deduction
made to  extent  of  50%  in by  High  Court  in  the said cannot
be sustained and is set aside without touching the findings
on the point of payment of solatium. 
31. As   determined   hereinabove,   the   compensation   at   the   circle
rate   of   Rs.   1,10,000/­   per   sq.   meter   be   payable     to   the
appellant   –   Reddy   Veerana.     Now,   the   issue   of   interest   is
required   to   be   looked   into   in   the   context     of   provisions   of
Section 34 of 1894 Act, which reads as thus:
  “ 34.   Payment   of   interest   ­   When   the   amount   of   such
compensation is not paid or deposited on or before taking
possession of the land, the Collector shall pay the amount
awarded   with   interest   thereon   at   the   rate   of   [nine   per
centum] per annum from the time of so taking possession
until it shall have been so paid or deposited: 
[Provided that if such compensation or any part thereof is
not paid or deposited within a period of one year from the
date   on   which   possession   is   taken,   interest   at   the   rate   of
fifteen   per   centum   per   annum   shall   be   payable   from   the
date or expiry of the said period of one year on the amount
of   compensation   or   part   thereof   which   has   not   been   paid
or deposited before the date of such expiry.]”
On perusal, it is clear  that if amount of compensation is not
paid or deposited on or before taking possession of the land,
interest   @     9%   p.a.     leviable     from   the   time   of   taking   of
40

possession   until it shall have been so paid or deposited.   It
further provides that if the amount of compensation has not
been   paid   or   deposited   within   one   year,   the   interest   would
be   payable   @   15%   p.a.   on   expiry   of   the   period   of   one   year.
On perusal of the aforesaid, it is clear that if the amount of
compensation is not paid or deposited, 9% interest would be
leviable   and   payable.     In   case   the   said   amount   is   not
deposited   or   paid   within   one   year,   then   interest   would   be
payable @ 15% p.a. In the case at hand, as discussed above,
the   land   was   given   initially   in   the   year   2003   to   respondent
No.   7   and   the   acquisition   was   made   subsequently.   The
additional   award   was   passed   on   31.1.2011   after   a   delay   of
five   years   from   the   date   of   taking   over   of   possession.     The
amount   was   deposited   in   the   year   2017   by   a   delay   of
approximately   14  years.       In the   peculiar  facts  of  this  case,
in   our   view,   the   civil   right   of   appellant   Reddy   Veerana   is
violated   in   breach   of   Article   300­A   of   the   Constitution   of
India.       Such   action   of   the   NOIDA   clearly   amounts   to
constitutional tort.   In the context of acquisition as made in
this   case  in   violation   of  Article  300­A  of   the  Constitution  of
India, judgment of this Court in the case of  ‘Kalyani (Dead)
41

Through   Lrs.   &   Ors.   Vs.   Sulthan   Bathery   Municipality
&   Ors.,   Civil   Appeal   No.   3189   of   2022’   is   relevant,
wherein it was observed as under – 
“ 20. Article   300A   clearly   mandates   that   no   person   shall
be deprived of his property save by authority of law.
In   the   present   case,   we   do   not   find,   under   which
authority   of   law,   the   land   of   the   appellants   was
taken   and   they   were   deprived   of   the   same.   If   the
Panchayat   and   the   PWD   failed   to   produce   any
evidence   that   appellants   have   surrendered   their
lands   voluntarily,   depriving   the   appellants   of   the
property would be in violation of Article 300­A of the
Constitution.
21. A   Constitution   Bench   of   this   Court   in   this   case   of
‘K.T.   Plantation   Private   Limited   Vs.   State   of
Karnataka,   2011   (9)  SCC  63’ ,  apart   from   others,
dealt   with   an   issue   relating   to   payment   of
compensation   where   a   person   is   deprived   of   his
property   after   deletion   of   Article   31(2).   It   laid   down
that there are two requirements to be fulfilled while
depriving   a   person   of   his   property.   Requirement   of
public   purpose   is   a   pre­condition   and   right   to   claim
compensation   is   also   inbuilt   in   Article   300­A.   While
answering   the   reference   in   paragraph   221   (e),   it
provided as follows –
“221. We,   therefore,   answer   the   reference
as follows:
xxxxxx
(e) Public   purpose   is   a   precondition
for   deprivation   of   a   person   from
his   property   under   Article   300­A
and   the   right   to   claim
compensation   is   also   inbuilt   in
that Article and when a person is
deprived   of   his   property,   the
State   has   to   justify   both   the
grounds   which   may   depend   on
42

scheme   of   the   statute,   legislative
policy,   object   and   purpose   of   the
legislature   and   other   related
factors. ”  
32. Taking note of the aforesaid and in the peculiar facts of this
case,   we   are   of   the   view   that   in   addition   to   the   statutorily
paid   interest,   the   additional   amount   of   penal   interest   must
be paid in place of shifting the date for determination of the
amount   of   compensation   or   to   determine   the   compensation
as   per   2013   Act,   as   demanded   by   the   appellant   Reddy
Veerana.     It   is   not   out   of   place   to   mention   here   that   the
nature   of   interest   is   essentially   a   consideration   paid   either
for the use of money or forbearance from demanding it after
it   has   fallen   due.   Interest,   whether   it   is   statutory   or
otherwise, represents the profit, the creditor may have made
if   he   had   used   the   money   or   from   the   loss,   he   may   have
suffered because he could not use the amount. Therefore, in
the   present   case,   on   the   amount   of   compensation,   in   our
view,   the   amount   of   compensation   be   payable   along   with
statutory   interest,   as   directed   by   the   High   Court   and   3%
penal interest, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the
case, is directed.
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33. In   view   of   the   foregoing,   Civil   Appeal   No.   3637   of   2022,
preferred   by   NOIDA   is   dismissed,   whereas   the   Civil   Appeal
No. 3636 of 2022 filed by appellant Reddy Veerana is hereby
allowed in part with the following directions: 
1. Respondents   are   directed   to   compute   the   amount   of
compensation   by   taking   the   circle   rate   of   Sector­18,
i.e., Rs. 1,10,000/­ per square meter;
2. The   judgment   of   the   High   Court   directing   50%
deduction   towards   development   charge   stands   set­
aside.   In   the   peculiar   facts   of   the   present   case,   the
respondents   are   directed   not   to   make   any   deduction
towards   the   development   charge   while
computing/calculating the amount of compensation as
per circle rate, specified in para 1 above;
3. As directed by the High Court, the amount of solatium
of   30%   in   terms   of   Section   23(2)   of   1894   Act   is   also
payable;
4. The   statutory   interest   on   the   amount   of   compensation
shall   be   payable   @   9%   from   the   date   of   taking   over   of
possession,   i.e.,   February,   2005   for   a   period   of   one
year.  Thereafter, @ 15% p.a. be paid as per the proviso
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of   Section   34   of   1894   Act.     In   addition   to   the   said
statutory interest, 3% penal interest is further directed
to be paid in the peculiar facts of this case. 
5. It   is   made   clear   here   that   the   amount   so   deposited   in
the year 2017 would also earn the interest at the same
rate,   as   directed   in   para   4   above   till   the   date   of
realization.   
6. Since, the acquisition of the land in question was made
by NOIDA which was purchased by respondent No. 7 in
public   auction,   therefore,   the   liability   to   pay   the
amount   of   compensation   would   be   of   NOIDA.     The
entire   amount   shall   be   paid   within   a   period   of   six
weeks from the date of this judgment.
          ………..………………...J.
       (VINEET SARAN)
                   ….………………………J.
                (J.K. MAHESHWARI)
     New Delhi;
     May 5, 2022.
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