/2022 INSC 0355/
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 2935­2938 OF 2022
Swadesh Kumar Agarwal            ..Appellant (S)
Versus
Dinesh Kumar Agarwal & Ors, etc., etc.               ..Respondent (S)
J U D G M E N T 
M. R. Shah, J.
1. The   present   appeals   arise   out   of   impugned   common
judgment and order dated 07.09.2017 passed by the High
Court   of   Madhya   Pradesh   Principal   Seat   at   Jabalpur   in
Arbitration   Case   (AC)   No.   29/2015   and   in   Writ   Petition
Nos.   11258/2010   and   11259/2010   and   the   order   dated
17.11.2017   passed   in   Review   Petition   No.   655/2017,   by
which, the High Court in exercise of powers under section
11(6)   of   the   Arbitration   and   Conciliation   Act,   1996
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(hereinafter   referred   to   as   the   Act,   1996)   has   terminated
the   mandate   of   sole   Arbitrator   appointed   by   the   parties
themselves   and   has   substituted   the   sole   Arbitrator   and
has   appointed   a   fresh   Arbitrator   on   the   ground   that   the
mandate of the sole Arbitrator stood terminated in view of
section 14(1)(a) of the Act, 1996.   This is on the basis that
there   was   undue   and   unreasonable   delay   in   proceeding
with   the   arbitration   proceeding   by   the   Sole   Arbitrator.   By
the   impugned   judgment   and   order,   the   High   Court   has
also confirmed the order passed by the learned Trial Court
dismissing the application filed under Order VII Rule 11 of
Code   of   Civil   Procedure   (CPC)   preferred   by   the   appellant
herein.   
2. The   facts   leading   to   the   present   appeals   in   a   nutshell   are
as under: ­
2.1 That   a   dispute   between   the   parties   which   as   such   is   a
family   dispute   for   partition   of   the   properties   arose.   It   was
referred   to   the   sole   Arbitrator.   The   learned   Arbitrator   was
appointed as a sole Arbitrator by the parties themselves on
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04.08.2008.   The   learned   Arbitrator   directed   the   parties  to
appear   on   14.03.2009   for   deciding   the   pending
applications.   On   the   request   of   the   parties,   the   Arbitrator
adjourned the hearing on 30.03.2009. No proceedings were
undertaken   on   30.03.2009   due   to   the   fact   that   the   sole
Arbitrator   was   not   available   in   town.   Respondent   No.   1
and   3   herein   –   parties   to   the   arbitration   proceedings
revoked   the   mandate   of   the   sole   Arbitrator   vide   letters
dated   11.07.2009.   The   letters   were   replied   to   by   the   sole
Arbitrator.   Thereafter,   respondent   No.   1   and   3   herein,
parties   to   the   arbitration   proceedings   filed   applications
under   section   14(1)(a)   of   the   Act,   1996   before   the
concerned Court (District Court) to terminate the mandate
of the sole Arbitrator on the ground of delay in concluding
the   arbitration   proceedings.   The   appellant   herein   filed   an
application under order VII Rule 11 of CPC for dismissal of
the   said   applications   under   section   14   of   the   Act,   1996,
submitting that there was no delay at all on the part of the
sole   Arbitrator   and   therefore,   there   was   no   question   of
terminating   the   mandate   of   sole   Arbitrator   under   section
14(1)(a) of the Act, 1996. Vide order dated 15.07.2010, the
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learned   Trial   Court   dismissed   the   application   filed   under
order VII Rule 11 of CPC preferred by the appellant herein.
2.2 Feeling aggrieved by the order passed by the learned Trial
Court, rejecting the application under order VII Rule 11 of
CPC,   the   appellant   herein   preferred   present   writ   petition
Nos.  11259/2010  and   11258/2010   before  the   High  Court
and pending the applications under section 14(1)(a) of the
Act,   1996   one   of   the   parties   –   Dinesh   Kumar   Agarwal
preferred an  arbitration  case before  the  High  Court under
section   11(6)   of   the   Act,   1996   and   requested   to   terminate
the   mandate   of   the   sole   Arbitrator   and   to   appoint   a   fresh
Arbitrator. By the impugned judgment and order, the High
Court   has   allowed   Arbitration   Case   No.   29/2015   and   has
observed and held that there was undue and unreasonable
delay   on   the   part   of   the   sole   Arbitrator   in   concluding   the
arbitrating proceedings and his mandate stood terminated
under  section 14(1)(a) of the Act, 1996. Consequently, the
High   Court   has   appointed   a   fresh   Arbitrator.   By   the
impugned   judgment   and   order,   the   High   Court   has   also
dismissed   the   writ   petitions   preferred   by   the   appellant
herein, in which the appellant challenged the order passed
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by   the   learned   Trial   Court   rejecting   the   application   under
Order VII Rule 11 of CPC.
2.3 Feeling   aggrieved   and   dissatisfied   with   the   impugned
common   judgment   and   order   passed   by   the   High   Court
terminating   the   mandate   of   sole   Arbitrator   under   section
14(1)(a)   of   the   Act,   1996,   on   an   application   filed   under
section   11(6)   of   the   Act,   1996   and   dismissing   the   writ
petitions  confirming  the   order   passed  by  the  learned  Trial
Court rejecting the application under Order VII Rule 11 of
CPC, the appellant has preferred the present appeals. 
3. Shri   Divyakant   Lahoti,   learned   counsel   appearing   on
behalf   of   the   appellant   has   strenuously   submitted   that   in
the   facts   and   circumstances   of   the   case   the   High   Court
has   materially   erred   in   terminating   the   mandate   of   the
Arbitrator   under   section   14(1)(a)   of   the   Act,   1996   on   an
application filed under section 11(6) of the Act, 1996. 
3.1 It is further submitted that in a case, where an Arbitrator
was   already   appointed   by   the   parties   themselves,
subsequently,   no   application   under   section   11(6)   of   the
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Act,   1996   was   maintainable   either   to   terminate   the
mandate   of   the   sole   Arbitrator   and/or   to   substitute   the
Arbitrator. 
3.2 It   is   contended   by   Shri   Lahoti,   learned   counsel   that   the
mandate   of   the   Arbitrator   can   be   terminated   and/or   may
come   to   an   end   only   as   per   the   provisions   of   the
Arbitration   and   Conciliation   Act,   1996.   Reliance   is   placed
upon   sections   13,   14,   15,   25(a),   30   and   32   of   the   Act,
1996.   It   is   submitted   that   other   than   the   aforesaid
provisions   under   the   Act,   1996,   there   is   no   provision   to
terminate the mandate of the Arbitrator.
3.3 It is submitted that in case of the eventualities mentioned
in section 14(1)(a) of the Act, 1996, the remedy available to
the   aggrieved   party   would   be   to   approach   the   “court”   as
defined under section 2(e) of the Act, 1996. 
3.4 Shri   Lahoti,   learned   counsel   appearing   on   behalf   of   the
appellant   further   submitted   that   in   the   present   case   as
such   respondent   No.   1   and   3   herein   –   parties   to   the
arbitration   proceedings,   in   fact,   did   submit   the
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applications   under   section   14(2)   of   the   Act,   1996,   which
were pending before the concerned court at the time when
the   present   applications   under   section   11(6)   of   the   Act,
1996 was filed.
3.5 It   is   further   urged   that   in   fact,   there   is   a   difference   and
distinction   between   section   11(5)   and   section   11(6)   of   the
Act, 1996.
3.6 That in the absence of any written contract containing the
arbitration agreement, section 11(6) of the Act, 1996 shall
not be applicable and therefore, an application under that
provision shall not be maintainable. 
3.7 That   even   otherwise,   there   was   no   undue   delay   in   the
arbitration   proceedings   on   the   part   of   the   sole   Arbitrator
which   could   have   led   to   termination   of   his   mandate   that
too,  in  exercise  of  powers  under  section   11(5)  and  section
11(6) of the Act, 1996. 
3.8 It   is   further   submitted   by   Shri   Lahoti,   learned   counsel
appearing  on behalf of the  appellant  that  as there was no
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undue   delay   on   the   part   of   the   sole   Arbitrator   therefore,
section   14(1)(a)   would   not   be   attracted.     Therefore,
application under section 14 of the Act, 1996 was liable to
be   dismissed   and   the   learned   Trial   Court   ought   to   have
allowed the application filed by the appellant, to reject the
application under section 14 of the Act, 1996 in exercise of
powers   under   Order   VII   Rule   11   of   CPC.   It   is   submitted
that the High Court committed a grave error in dismissing
the   writ   petitions   and   confirming   the   order   passed   by   the
learned   Trial   Court   in   dismissing   the   application   under
Order VII Rule 11 of CPC.
3.9 Shri   Lahoti,   learned   counsel   appearing   on   behalf   of   the
appellant heavily relied upon the decision of this Court in
the   case   of   Antrix   Corporation   Limited   v.   Devas
Multimedia   Private   Ltd.;   (2014)   11   SCC   560   (para   31   &
33) and the subsequent decision of this Court in the case
of   S.P. Singla Constructions Private Limited v. State of
Himachal Pradesh and Anr.;  (2019) 2 SCC 488 in support
of his submissions that once the parties have invoked the
arbitration   proceedings   and   the   Arbitrator   has   been
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appointed,   subsequent   application   under   section   11(6)   of
the Act, 1996 shall not be maintainable.
4. The   present   appeal   is   vehemently   opposed   by   Shri   Ashok
Lalwani,   learned   counsel   appearing   on   behalf   of
respondent   No.   1   and   Shri   Rajesh   Inamdar,   learned
counsel   appearing   on   behalf   of   respondent   No.   2.   Shri
Lalwani,   learned   counsel   appearing   on   behalf   of
respondent   No.   1   has   vehemently   submitted   that   in   the
facts   and   circumstances   of   the   case,   when   it   was   found
that there was an undue delay on the part of the Arbitrator
in   concluding   the   arbitration   proceedings,   his   mandate
was   rightly   terminated   considering   section   14(1)(a)   of   the
Act, 1996. 
4.1 It is submitted that as per section 14(1) of the said Act, the
word   used   is   “shall” .  It  is  submitted  that   it   provides  that
the   mandate   of   an   arbitrator   “shall”   terminate   and   he
shall be substituted by another arbitrator, if he,   de jure   or
de   facto   is   unable   to   perform   his   functions   or   for   other
reasons   fails   to   act   without   undue   delay.   It   is   submitted
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that therefore, once it is found that the arbitrator is unable
to perform his functions due to eventualities mentioned in
section 14(1) of the Act, 1996, there shall be an automatic
termination   of   the   mandate   of   the   arbitrator   and   he   shall
be   substituted   by   another   arbitrator.   Reliance   is   placed
upon   the   decisions   of   this   Court   in   the   cases   of   ACC
Limited   v.   Global   Cements   Limited ;   (2012)   7   SCC   71
and   Union   of   India   and   Ors.   v.   Uttar   Pradesh   State
Bridge Corporation Limited ; (2015) 2 SCC 52.
 
4.2 Shri   Lalwani,   learned   counsel   appearing   on   behalf   of
respondent   No.   1   has   further   submitted   that   in   the   facts
and circumstances of the case, the learned Trial Court did
not   commit   any   error   in   rejecting   the   application   under
Order  VII  Rule  11  of  CPC.  It is  urged  that   whether  or   not
there was undue delay on the part of the sole Arbitrator is
a question which is to be adjudicated by the Court and at
the   most   the   same   can   be   said   to   be   a   defence.     That   as
per  the  settled position of law at  the stage of deciding  the
application   under   Order   VII   Rule   11   of   CPC   only   the
averments   in   the   application/plaint   are   required   to   be
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considered   and   not   the   defence   and/or  the   case   stated   in
the written statement and/or reply to any application. It is
submitted   that   therefore,   the   learned   Trial   Court   rightly
rejected   the   application   under   Order   VII   Rule   11   of   CPC
and   rightly   refused   to   reject   the   application   submitted
under  section 14 of the Act, 1996. That in any case, after
passing   the   impugned   order,   the   original   applicants   ­
respondents   have   already   withdrawn   their   applications
under section 14(2) of the Act, 1996. 
4.3 Making the above submissions and relying upon the above
decisions, it is prayed to dismiss the present appeals.     
5. We have heard learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
respective parties at length.
6. The following questions arise for our consideration: ­
(i) Whether   the   High   Court   in   exercise   of   powers   under
section   11(6)   of   the   Act,   1996,   can   terminate   the
mandate of the sole arbitrator?
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(ii) Whether   in   the   absence   of   any   written   contract
containing the arbitration agreement, the application
under   section   11(6)   of   the   Act,   1996   would   be
maintainable?
(iii) Is   there   any   difference   and   distinction   between   sub­
section (5) of section 11 and sub­section (6) of section
11 of the Act, 1996?
(iv) Whether   the   application   under   sub­section   (6)   of
section 11 shall be maintainable in a case where the
parties   themselves   appointed   a   sole   arbitrator   with
mutual consent?
(v) Whether   in   the   facts   and   circumstances   of   the   case
the   High   Court   was   justified   in   terminating   the
mandate   of   the   sole   arbitrator   on   the   ground   that
there   was   undue   delay   on   the   part   of   the   sole
arbitrator   in   concluding   the   arbitration   proceedings
which would lead  to the termination  of  his mandate,
in   an   application   under   section   11(6)   of   the   Act,
1996?
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(vi) Whether   in   the   facts   and   circumstances   of   the   case,
the learned Trial Court was justified in dismissing the
application  submitted  by  the  appellant,  submitted  to
reject   the   application   under   section   14(2)   of   the   Act,
1996 in exercise of powers under Order VII Rule 11 of
CPC?   
Question No. (i) to (v) are interconnected. Therefore, all
are considered and decided together.  
6.1 In   the   present   case   the   sole   Arbitrator   was   appointed   by
the   parties   themselves   by   mutual   consent.   There   was   no
written   agreement/contract   containing   the   arbitration
clause. 
6.2 As per sub­section (2) of section 11, subject to sub­section
(6),   the   parties   are   free   to   agree   on   a   procedure   for
appointment   of   the   arbitrator   or   arbitrators.   Sub­section
(5) of section 11 provides that in an arbitration with a sole
arbitrator, failing any agreement referred to in sub­section
(2), if the parties fail to agree on the arbitrator within thirty
days from receipt of a request by one party from the other
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party   to   so   agree,   the   court   may   appoint   an   arbitrator.
However, in a case where there is an arbitration agreement
and the written contract and the appointment procedure is
agreed upon by the parties, sub­section (6) of section 11 of
the   Act,   1996   shall   be   attracted   and   on   the   eventualities
occurring   in   sub­section   (6)   of   section   11,   a   party   may
approach   the   High   Court   and   request   for   appointment   of
an   arbitrator,   in   exercise   of   powers   under   sub­section   (6)
of section 11 of the Act, 1996. Therefore, sub­section (5) of
section   11   shall   be   attracted   in   a   case   where   there   is   no
procedure for appointment of an arbitrator agreed upon as
per   sub­section   (2)   of   section   11   and   sub­section   (6)   of
section   11   shall   be   applicable   in   a   case   where   there   is   a
contract   containing   an   arbitration   agreement   and   the
appointment   procedure   is   agreed   upon.   Thus,   while
referring   the   matter   for   arbitration   there   need   not   be   any
written contract containing any arbitration agreement. But
the  parties  may  themselves decide to refer  the  dispute for
arbitration   to   the   sole   arbitrator   by   mutual   consent.   In
that case or eventuality, sub­section (6) of section 11 shall
not   be   attracted   at   all   and   therefore,   in   such   a   situation,
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the   application   under   sub­section   (6)   of   section   11   shall
not be maintainable. An  application under  sub­section (6)
of   section   11   shall   be   maintainable   only   in   a   case   where
there   is   a   contract   between   the   parties   containing   the
arbitration   agreement   and   the   appointment   procedure   is
prescribed and is agreed upon in writing. 
6.3 In   the   present   case,   the   sole   arbitrator   was   appointed   by
the   parties   themselves   by   mutual   consent   and   in   the
absence of any  written contract  containing  the arbitration
agreement.   Therefore,   application   under   section   11(6)   of
the   Act,   1996   in   absence   of   any   written   agreement
containing   arbitration   agreement   was   not   maintainable   at
all. 
6.4 Now the next question which is posed for consideration of
this   Court   is,   whether,   in   exercise   of   powers   under   sub­
section   (6)   of   section   11   of   the   Act,   1996,   the   High   Court
can   terminate   the   mandate   of   the   sole   arbitrator   and
substitute   the   arbitrator   in   view   of   section   14(1)(a)   of   the
Act, 1996 on the ground that  he has failed to act without
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undue delay and in such a situation aggrieved party has to
approach the “court” to terminate his mandate.
6.4.1 While answering the aforesaid question/issue, the relevant
provisions of the Act, 1996 on termination of the mandate
of   the   arbitrator   and   the   procedure   to   be   followed   are
required to be referred to: ­ 
“ 11.  Appointment of arbitrators­   (1) A person of any
nationality   may   be   an   arbitrator,   unless   otherwise
agreed by the parties. 
(2)   Subject   to   sub­section   (6),   the   parties   are   free   to
agree   on   a   procedure   for   appointing   the   arbitrator   or
arbitrators. 
(3) Failing any agreement referred to in sub­section (2),
in   an   arbitration   with   three   arbitrators,   each   party
shall   appoint   one   arbitrator,   and   the   two   appointed
arbitrators shall appoint the third arbitrator who shall
act as the presiding arbitrator. 
(3A) The Supreme Court and the High Court shall have
the power to designate, arbitral institutions, from time
to time, which have been graded by the Council under
section 43­I, for the purposes of this Act: 
Provided   that   in   respect   of   those   High   Court
jurisdictions,   where   no   graded   arbitral   institution   are
available,   then,   the   Chief   Justice   of   the   concerned
High   Court   may   maintain   a   panel   of   arbitrators   for
discharging   the   functions   and   duties   of   arbitral
institution and any reference to the arbitrator shall be
deemed to be an arbitral institution for the purposes of
this   section   and   the   arbitrator   appointed   by   a   party
shall be entitled to such fee at the rate as specified in
the   Fourth   Schedule:   Provided   further   that   the   Chief
Justice of the concerned High Court may, from time to
time, review the panel of arbitrators.] 
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(4)   If   the   appointment   procedure   in   sub­section   (3)
applies and— (a) a party fails to appoint  an arbitrator
within thirty days from the receipt of a request to do so
from   the   other   party;   or   (b)   the   two   appointed
arbitrators   fail   to   agree   on   the   third   arbitrator   within
thirty   days   from   the   date   of   their   appointment,   [the
appointment   shall   be   made,   on   an   application   of   the
party,   by   the   arbitral   institution   designated   by   the
Supreme   Court,   in   case   of   international   commercial
arbitration,   or   by   the   High   Court,   in   case   of
arbitrations   other   than   international   commercial
arbitration, as the case may be;]
(5) Failing any agreement referred to in sub­section (2),
in   an   arbitration   with   a   sole   arbitrator,   if   the   parties
fail   to   agree   on   the   arbitrator   within   thirty   days   from
receipt   of  a  request  by   one  party   from  the  other  party
to   so   agree   11[the   appointment   shall   be   made   on   an
application   of   the   party   in   accordance   with   the
provisions contained in sub­section (4);] 
(6)   Where,   under   an   appointment   procedure   agreed
upon by the parties,­ (a) a party fails to act as required
under   that   procedure;   or   (b)   the   parties,   or   the   two
appointed   arbitrators,   fail   to   reach   an   agreement
expected   of   them   under   that   procedure;   or   (c)   a
person,   including   an   institution,   fails   to   perform   any
function entrusted to him or it under that procedure, a
[the   appointment   shall   be   made,   on   an   application   of
the party, by the arbitral institution designated by the
Supreme   Court,   in   case   of   international   commercial
arbitration,   or   by   the   High   Court,   in   case   of
arbitrations   other   than   international   commercial
arbitration, as the case may  be] to take the necessary
measure,   unless   the   agreement   on   the   appointment
procedure   provides   other   means   for   securing   the
appointment. 
(6B)   The   designation   of   any   person   or   institution   by
the   Supreme   Court   or,   as   the   case   may   be,   the   High
Court,   for   the   purposes   of   this   section   shall   not   be
regarded   as   a   delegation   of   judicial   power   by   the
Supreme Court or the High Court.]
(8)   The   arbitral   institution   referred   to   in   sub­sections
(4),   (5)   and   (6)],   before   appointing   an   arbitrator,   shall
seek   a   disclosure   in   writing   from   the   prospective
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arbitrator in terms of sub­section (1) of section 12, and
have due regard to­­ (a) any qualifications required for
the arbitrator by the agreement of the parties; and (b)
the contents of the disclosure and other considerations
as   are   likely   to   secure   the   appointment   of   an
independent and impartial arbitrator.
(9)   In   the   case   of   appointment   of   sole   or   third
arbitrator   in   an   international   commercial   arbitration,
16[the   arbitral   institution   designated   by   the   Supreme
Court] may appoint an arbitrator of a nationality other
than  the   nationalities   of   the   parties   where   the   parties
belong to different nationalities.
(11)   Where   more   than   one   request   has   been   made
under sub­section (4) or sub­section (5) or sub­section
(6)   to   different   arbitral   institutions,   the   arbitral
institution   to   which   the   request   has   been   first   made
under   the   relevant   sub­section   shall   be   competent   to
appoint.
(12)   Where   the   matter   referred   to   in   sub­sections   (4),
(5),   (6)   and   (8)   arise   in   an   international   commercial
arbitration   or   any   other   arbitration,   the   reference   to
the   arbitral   institution   in   those   subsections   shall   be
construed   as   a   reference   to   the   arbitral   institution
designated under sub­section (3A). 
(13)   An   application   made   under   this   section   for
appointment   of   an   arbitrator   or   arbitrators   shall   be
disposed   of   by   the   arbitral   institution   within   a   period
of thirty days from the date of service of notice on the
opposite party. 
(14) The arbitral institution shall determine the fees of
the arbitral tribunal and the manner of its payment to
the   arbitral   tribunal   subject   to   the   rates   specified   in
the Fourth Schedule. 
Explanation.­­   For   the   removal   of   doubts,   it   is   hereby
clarified   that   this   sub­section   shall   not   apply   to
international   commercial   arbitration   and   in
arbitrations   (other   than   international   commercial
arbitration)   where   parties   have   agreed   for
determination   of   fees   as   per   the   rules   of   an   arbitral
institution.]
18

12.   Grounds   for   challenge­   (1)   When   a   person   is
approached   in   connection   with   his   possible
appointment   as   an   arbitrator,   he   shall   disclose   in
writing  any  circumstances,­­ (a) such as the existence
either   direct   or   indirect,   of   any   past   or   present
relationship with or interest in any of the parties or in
relation   to   the   subject­matter   in   dispute,   whether
financial,   business,   professional   or   other   kind,   which
is   likely   to   give   rise   to   justifiable   doubts   as   to   his
independence   or   impartiality;   and   (b)   which   are   likely
to   affect   his   ability   to   devote   sufficient   time   to   the
arbitration and in particular his ability to complete the
entire   arbitration   within   a   period   of   twelve   months.
Explanation   1.­­   The   grounds   stated   in   the   Fifth
Schedule   shall   guide   in   determining   whether
circumstances   exist   which   give   rise   to   justifiable
doubts   as   to   the   independence   or   impartiality   of   an
arbitrator.   Explanation   2.­­   The   disclosure   shall   be
made by such person in the form specified in the Sixth
Schedule.] 
(2) An arbitrator, from the time of his appointment and
throughout   the   arbitral   proceedings,   shall,   without
delay,   disclose   to   the   parties   in   writing   any
circumstances   referred   to   in   sub­section   (1)   unless
they have already been informed of them by him.
(3)   An   arbitrator   may   be   challenged   only   if­   (a)
circumstances exist that give rise to justifiable doubts
as   to   his   independence   or   impartiality,   or   (b)   he   does
not possess the qualifications agreed to by the parties. 
(4)   A   party   may   challenge   an   arbitrator   appointed   by
him,   or   in   whose   appointment   he   has   participated,
only   for   reasons   of   which   he   becomes   aware   after   the
appointment has been made. 
[(5)   Notwithstanding   any   prior   agreement   to   the
contrary,   any   person   whose   relationship,   with   the
parties or counsel or the subject­matter of the dispute,
falls   under   any   of   the   categories   specified   in   the
Seventh Schedule shall be ineligible to be appointed as
an   arbitrator:   Provided   that   parties   may,   subsequent
to   disputes   having   arisen   between   them,   waive   the
applicability   of   this   sub­section   by   an   express
agreement in writing.]
19

13. Challenge procedure .— (1) Subject to sub­section
(4),   the   parties   are   free   to   agree   on   a   procedure   for
challenging an arbitrator. 
(2) Failing any agreement referred to in sub­section (1),
a   party   who   intends   to   challenge   an   arbitrator   shall,
within   fifteen   days   after   becoming   aware   of   the
constitution   of   the   arbitral   tribunal   or   after   becoming
aware  of  any   circumstances  referred  to in  sub­section
(3)   of   section   12,   send   a   written   statement   of   the
reasons for the challenge to the arbitral tribunal. 
(3) Unless the arbitrator challenged under sub­section
(2) withdraws from his office or the other  party agrees
to   the   challenge,   the   arbitral   tribunal   shall   decide   on
the challenge. 
(4) If a challenge under any procedure agreed upon by
the   parties   or   under   the   procedure   under   sub­section
(2)   is   not   successful,   the   arbitral   tribunal   shall
continue the arbitral proceedings and make an arbitral
award. 
(5) Where an arbitral award is made under sub­section
(4),   the   party   challenging   the   arbitrator   may   make   an
application for setting aside such an arbitral award in
accordance with section 34. 
(6)   Where   an   arbitral   award   is   set   aside   on   an
application made under sub­section (5), the Court may
decide   as   to   whether   the   arbitrator   who   is   challenged
is entitled to any fees.
14.   Failure   or   impossibility   to   act. —(1)   3   [The
mandate   of  an  arbitrator   shall  terminate   and   he  shall
be   substituted   by   another   arbitrator,   if]—   (a)   he
becomes   de   jure   or   de   facto   unable   to   perform   his
functions   or   for   other   reasons   fails   to   act   without
undue   delay;   and   (b)   he   withdraws   from   his   office   or
the parties agree to the termination of his mandate. 
(2)   If   a   controversy   remains   concerning   any   of   the
grounds   referred   to   in   clause   (a)   of   sub­section   (1),   a
party   may,   unless   otherwise   agreed   by   the   parties,
apply  to the Court to decide on the termination of the
mandate. 
20

(3)   If,   under   this   section   or   sub­section   (3)   of   section
13,   an   arbitrator   withdraws   from   his   office   or   a   party
agrees   to   the   termination   of   the   mandate   of   an
arbitrator, it shall not imply acceptance of the validity
of any ground referred to in this section or sub­section
(3) of section 12.
15.   Termination   of   mandate   and   substitution   of
arbitrator .—(1)   In   addition   to   the   circumstances
referred to in section 13 or section 14, the mandate of
an arbitrator shall terminate— (a) where he withdraws
from   office   for   any   reason;   or   (b)   by   or   pursuant   to
agreement of the parties. 
(2)   Where   the   mandate   of   an   arbitrator   terminates,   a
substitute   arbitrator   shall   be   appointed   according   to
the   rules   that   were   applicable   to   the   appointment   of
the arbitrator being replaced. 
(3)   Unless   otherwise   agreed   by   the   parties,   where   an
arbitrator   is   replaced   under   sub­section   (2),   any
hearings   previously   held   may   be   repeated   at   the
discretion of the arbitral tribunal. 
(4) Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, an order or
ruling   of   the   arbitral   tribunal   made   prior   to   the
replacement   of   an   arbitrator   under   this   section   shall
not be invalid solely because there has been a change
in the composition of the arbitral tribunal.
xxx xxx xxx
25.   Default   of   a   party .—Unless   otherwise   agreed   by
the parties, where, without showing sufficient cause,—
(a)  the claimant fails to communicate his statement
of   claim   in   accordance   with   sub­section   (1)   of
section   23,   the   arbitral   tribunal   shall   terminate
the proceedings; 
(b)  the   respondent   fails   to   communicate   his
statement   of   defence   in   accordance   with   sub­
section   (1)   of   section   23,   the   arbitral   tribunal
shall   continue   the   proceedings   without   treating
that   failure   in   itself   as   an   admission   of   the
allegations by the claimant 3 [and shall have the
discretion to treat the right of the respondent to
21

file   such   statement   of   defence   as   having   been
forfeited]. 
(c)  a   party   fails   to   appear   at   an   oral   hearing   or   to
produce   documentary   evidence,   the   arbitral
tribunal   may   continue   the   proceedings   and
make   the   arbitral   award   on   the   evidence   before
it.
xxx xxx xxx
30.   Settlement .—(1)   It   is   not   incompatible   with   an
arbitration   agreement   for   an   arbitral   tribunal   to
encourage   settlement   of   the   dispute   and,   with   the
agreement of the parties, the arbitral tribunal may use
mediation, conciliation or other procedures at any time
during   the   arbitral   proceedings   to   encourage
settlement. 
(2) If, during arbitral proceedings, the parties settle the
dispute,   the   arbitral   tribunal   shall   terminate   the
proceedings   and,   if   requested   by   the   parties   and   not
objected   to   by   the   arbitral   tribunal,   record   the
settlement   in  the   form   of   an   arbitral  award   on   agreed
terms. 
(3) An arbitral award on agreed terms shall be made in
accordance with section 31 and shall state that it is an
arbitral award. 
(4)   An   arbitral   award   on   agreed   terms   shall   have   the
same status and effect as any other  arbitral award on
the substance of the dispute.
xxx xxx xxx
32.   Termination   of   proceedings .—(1)   The
arbitral   proceedings   shall   be   terminated   by   the   final
arbitral   award   or   by   an   order   of   the   arbitral   tribunal
under sub­section (2). 
(2)   The   arbitral   tribunal   shall   issue   an   order   for   the
termination of the arbitral proceedings where— 
(a)  the   claimant   withdraws   his   claim,   unless
the   respondent   objects   to   the   order   and
the   arbitral   tribunal   recognises   a
legitimate interest on his part in obtaining
a final settlement of the dispute, 
22

(b)  the parties agree on the termination of the
proceedings, or 
(c)  the   arbitral   tribunal   finds   that   the
continuation   of   the   proceedings   has   for
any   other   reason   become   unnecessary   or
impossible. 
(3) Subject to section 33 and sub­section (4) of section
34,   the   mandate   of   the   arbitral   tribunal   shall
terminate   with   the   termination   of   the   arbitral
proceedings.”
Except   the   aforesaid   provisions,   there   is   no   other
provision  under  the  Act,  1996 dealing  with   termination  of
the   mandate   of   the   arbitrator   and/or   termination   of   the
arbitral proceedings. 
6.4.2 Section   13   provides   that   subject   to   sub­section   (4),   the
parties are free to agree on a procedure for challenging an
arbitrator   and   failing   any   agreement   on   a   procedure   for
challenging an arbitrator, a party who intends to challenge
an   arbitration   shall,   within   fifteen   days   after   becoming
aware   of   the   constitution   of   the   arbitral   tribunal   or   after
becoming   aware   of   any   circumstances   referred   to   in   sub­
section   (3)   of   section   12,   send   a   written   statement   of   the
reasons   for   the   challenge   to   the   arbitral   tribunal.   As   per
sub­section   (3)   of   section   13,   unless   the   arbitrator
challenged under sub­section (2) withdraws from his office
23

or   the   other   party   agrees   to   the   challenge,   it   is   for   the
arbitral tribunal  to  decide on the  challenge. If a  challenge
to the arbitrator is not successful in that case, the arbitral
tribunal shall continue the arbitral proceedings and make
an   arbitral   award   and   when   an   arbitral   award   is   made
under  sub­section (4), the party  challenging  the arbitrator
may make an application for setting aside such an arbitral
award   in   accordance   with   section   34   of   the   Act,   1996.
Therefore, as per section 13 of the Act, the challenge to the
arbitrator shall be made before the arbitral tribunal itself. 
However,   section   13   of   the   Act,   1996   shall   be
applicable only in a case where the arbitrator is challenged
on the grounds mentioned in section 12 of the Act, 1996. 
6.5 Sections 14 and 15 provide for termination of the mandate
of the arbitrator. Section 14 of the Act, 1996 provides that
the mandate of the arbitrator shall terminate and he shall
be   substituted   by   another   arbitrator   in   case   of   any
eventuality   mentioned   in   section   14(1)(a).   As   per   sub­
section   (2)   of   section   14,   if   a   controversy   remains
concerning   any   of   the   grounds   referred   to   in   clause   (a)   of
24

sub­section (1), a party may, apply to the “court” to decide
on the termination of the mandate. The expression “court”
is defined under section 2(e) of the Act, 1996, which reads
as under:­  
“(e) “Court” means— 
(i)  in   the   case   of   an   arbitration   other   than
international   commercial   arbitration,   the
principal   Civil   Court   of   original   jurisdiction   in  a
district, and includes the High Court in exercise
of   its   ordinary   original   civil   jurisdiction,   having
jurisdiction   to   decide   the   questions   forming   the
subject­matter of the arbitration if the same had
been   the   subject­matter   of   a   suit,   but   does   not
include   any   Civil   Court   of   a   grade   inferior   to
such principal Civil Court, or any Court of Small
Causes; 
(ii)  in   the   case   of   international   commercial
arbitration,   the   High   Court   in   exercise   of   its
ordinary   original   civil   jurisdiction,   having
jurisdiction   to   decide   the   questions   forming   the
subject­matter of the arbitration if the same had
been   the   subject­matter   of   a   suit,   and   in   other
cases,   a   High   Court   having   jurisdiction   to   hear
appeals   from   decrees   of   courts   subordinate   to
that High Court;]”
6.6 Section   15   provides   other   grounds   for   termination   of   the
mandate   of   the   arbitrator.   It   provides   that   in   addition   to
the   circumstances  referred   to   in   section   13   or   section   14,
the   mandate   of   an   arbitrator   shall   terminate   (a)   where   he
withdraws from office for any reason; or (b) by or pursuant
to an agreement of the parties. 
25

Where   the   mandate   of   an   arbitrator   is   terminated   on
the aforesaid grounds mentioned in section 15(1)(a) and (b)
in such a situation a substitute arbitrator shall have to be
appointed   and   that   too,   according   to   the   rules   that   were
applicable   to   the   appointment   of   the   arbitrator   being
replaced. 
6.7 Therefore, on a conjoint reading of section 13, 14 and 15 of
the Act, if the challenge to the arbitrator is made on any of
the grounds mentioned in section 12 of the Act, the party
aggrieved has   to  submit  an  appropriate  application   before
the  Arbitral Tribunal  itself. However, in  case of any  of the
eventualities mentioned in section 14(1)(a) of the Act, 1996
and   the   mandate   of   the   arbitrator   is   sought   to   be
terminated   on   the   ground   that   the   sole   arbitrator   has
become   de   jure   and/or   de   facto   unable   to   perform   his
functions   or   for   other   reasons   fails   to   act   without   undue
delay,   the   aggrieved   party   has   to   approach   the   concerned
“court” as defined under section 2(e) of the Act, 1996.  The
concerned court has to adjudicate on whether, in fact, the
sole   arbitrator/arbitrators   has/have   become   de   jure   and
26

de facto   unable to perform his/their functions or for other
reasons   he   fails   to   act   without   undue   delay.   The   reason
why such a dispute is to be raised before the court is that
eventualities   mentioned   in   section   14(1)(a)   can   be   said   to
be   a   disqualification   of   the   sole   arbitrator   and   therefore,
such   a   dispute/controversy   will   have   to   be   adjudicated
before the concerned court as provided under section 14(2)
of the Act, 1996. 
So   far   as   the   termination   of   the   mandate   of   the
arbitrator   and/or   termination   of   the   proceedings
mentioned   in   other   provisions   like   in   section   15(1)(a)
where he withdraws from office for any reason; or (b) by or
pursuant to an agreement of the parties, the dispute need
not   be   raised   before   the   concerned   court.   For   example,
where the sole arbitrator himself withdraws from office for
any   reason   or   when   both   the   parties   agree   to   terminate
the   mandate   of   the   arbitrator   and   for   substitution   of   the
arbitrator,   thereafter,   there   is   no   further   controversy   as
either   the   sole   arbitrator   himself   has   withdrawn   from
office   and/or   the   parties   themselves   have   agreed   to
terminate the mandate of the arbitrator and to substitute
27

the arbitrator. Thus, there is no question of raising such a
dispute   before   the   court.   Therefore,   the   legislation   has
deliberately   provided   that   the   dispute   with   respect   to   the
termination of the mandate of the arbitrator under section
14(1)(a)   alone   will   have   to   be   raised   before   the   “court”.
Hence,   whenever   there   is   a   dispute   and/or   controversy
that  the mandate  of the  arbitrator  is to  be terminated on
the   grounds   mentioned   in   section   14(1)(a),   such   a
controversy/dispute has to be raised before the concerned
“court”   only   and   after   the   decision   by   the   concerned
“court” as defined under section 2(e) of the Act, 1996 and
ultimately   it   is  held  that   the  mandate  of  the   arbitrator   is
terminated,   thereafter,   the   arbitrator   is   to   be   substituted
accordingly,   that   too,   according   to   the   rules   that   were
applicable   to   the   initial   appointment   of   the   arbitrator.
Therefore,   normally   and  generally,   the  same  procedure  is
required  to  be  followed which  was followed  at  the time of
appointment   of   the   sole   arbitrator   whose   mandate   is
terminated and/or who is replaced.            
28

7. Now the next question which is posed for consideration of
this   Court   is,   whether,   in   a   case   where   the   parties
themselves   have   referred   the   dispute   for   arbitration   and
appointed and/or nominated the sole arbitrator by mutual
consent   and   in   the   absence   of   any   arbitration   agreement
and contract containing an arbitration agreement once the
arbitrator is appointed, an application under section 11(6)
of the Act, 1996 to terminate the mandate of the arbitrator
and to substitute the arbitrator would be maintainable.
7.1 It   is   to   be   noted   that   in   the   present   case   as   such   the
application   under   section   14(2)   of   the   Act,   1996   to
terminate   the   mandate   of   the   arbitrator   was   already
pending before the concerned court on the ground that his
mandate stood terminated in view of section 14(1)(a) of the
Act, 1996. 
7.2 As   observed   hereinabove,   there   is   a   difference   and
distinction   between   the   arbitrator   to   be   appointed   under
section 11(5) and under section 11(6) of the Act, 1996. As
observed   above,   even   in   the   absence   of   any   arbitration
agreement in writing between the parties, with consent the
29

parties may refer the dispute for arbitration and appoint a
sole   arbitrator/arbitrators   by   mutual   consent   and   parties
may   agree   mutually   on   a   procedure   for   appointing   an
arbitrator or arbitrators even in the absence of any written
agreement.   In   such   a   situation   and   failing   an   agreement
referred   to   sub­section   (2),   the   aggrieved   party   may
approach  the   High  Court   for   appointment  of  an arbitrator
under sub­section (5) of section 11 and in such a situation
sub­section   (5)   of   section   11   shall   be   attracted.   However,
where   there   is   a   written   agreement   on   the   appointment
procedure agreed upon by the parties and there is a failure
to   appoint   an   arbitrator   or   arbitrators,   in   that   case,   sub­
section   (6)   of   section   11   shall   be   attracted   and   an
aggrieved   party   may   approach   the   High   Court   for
appointment   of   an   arbitrator   under   sub­section   (6)   of
section   11   of   the   Act,   1996.   Therefore,   an   application
under section 11(6) of the Act, 1996 shall be maintainable
only   in   a   case   where   there   is   a   written   agreement   and/or
the  contract containing  the  arbitration  agreement  and the
appointment   procedure   agreed   upon   by   the   parties,
application   under   section   11(6)   of   the   Act,   1996   shall   be
30

maintainable.   Otherwise,   the   application   under   section
11(6) of the Act, 1996 shall not be maintainable. 
7.3 In   the   present   case,   the   parties   themselves   agreed   on   a
procedure for appointment of the arbitrator and appointed
and   nominated   an   arbitrator   by   mutual   consent.
Therefore,   the   application   under   section   11(6)   of   the   Act,
1996 was not maintainable at all. 
8. Even   otherwise,   once   the   arbitrator   was   appointed   by
mutual consent and it was alleged that the mandate of the
sole arbitrator  stood terminated in view of section 14(1)(a)
of the Act, 1996, the application under section 11(6) of the
Act,   1996   to   terminate   the   mandate   of   the   arbitrator   in
view   of   section   14(1)(a)   of   the   Act   shall   not   be
maintainable.   Once   the   appointment   of   the   arbitrator   is
made,   the   dispute   whether   the   mandate   of   the   arbitrator
has   been   terminated   on   the   grounds   set   out   in   section
14(1)(a)   of   the   Act,   shall   not   have   to   be   decided   in   an
application   under   section   11(6)   of   the   Act,   1996.   Such   a
dispute cannot be decided on an application under section
31

11(6)   of   the   Act   and   the   aggrieved   party   has   to   approach
the   concerned  “court”   as  per   sub­section  (2)   of  section   14
of   the   Act.   In   the   case   of   Antrix   Corporation   Limited
(supra)   in   para   31   and   33,   it   is   observed   and   held   as
under: ­    
“31.   The   matter  is   not   as  complex   as  it   seems   and   in
our   view,   once   the   arbitration   agreement   had   been
invoked   by   Devas   and   a   nominee   arbitrator   had   also
been   appointed   by   it,   the   arbitration   agreement   could
not   have   been   invoked   for   a   second   time   by   the
petitioner,   which   was   fully   aware   of   the   appointment
made   by   the   respondent.   It   would   lead   to   an
anomalous   state   of   affairs   if   the   appointment   of   an
arbitrator   once   made,   could   be   questioned   in   a
subsequent   proceeding   initiated   by   the   other   party
also for the appointment of an arbitrator. In our view,
while the petitioner was certainly entitled to challenge
the   appointment   of   the   arbitrator   at   the   instance   of
Devas,   it   could   not   do   so   by   way   of   an   independent
proceeding under Section 11(6) of the 1996 Act. While
power  has been vested in the Chief Justice to appoint
an   arbitrator   under   Section   11(6)   of   the   1996   Act,
such appointment can be questioned under Section 13
thereof. In a proceeding  under  Section 11 of the 1996
Act,   the   Chief   Justice   cannot   replace   one   arbitrator
already   appointed   in   exercise   of   the   arbitration
agreement.
33.   Sub­section (6) of Section 11 of the 1996 Act, quite
categorically provides that where the parties fail to act
in   terms   of   a   procedure   agreed   upon   by   them,   the
provisions of sub­section (6) may be invoked by any of
the   parties.   Where   in   terms   of   the   agreement,   the
arbitration  clause  has  already   been  invoked  by   one  of
the parties thereto under the ICC Rules, the provisions
of   sub­section   (6)   cannot   be   invoked   again,   and,   in
case the other party is dissatisfied or aggrieved by the
appointment   of   an   arbitrator   in   terms   of   the
agreement,   his/its   remedy   would   be   by   way   of   a
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petition   under   Section   13,   and,   thereafter,   under
Section 34 of the 1996 Act.”
9. Following   the   aforesaid   decision   in   the   subsequent
decision   of   this   Court   in   the   case   of   S.P.   Singla
Constructions Private Limited  (supra), it is observed and
held   by   this   Court   that   once   the   arbitrator   had   been
appointed as per clause 65 of the agreement (in that case)
and as per provisions of the law, the arbitration agreement
could not have been invoked for second time. 
9.1 Now  so  far   as  reliance  being   placed  upon   the  decisions  of
this   Court   by   learned   counsel   appearing   on   behalf   of
respondent No. 1 in the cases of  ACC Limited  (supra) and
Uttar Pradesh State Bridge Corporation Limited   (supra)
are   concerned   as   such   there   cannot   be   any   dispute   with
respect   to   the   position   of   law   laid   down   by   this   Court   in
the   aforesaid   decisions   to   the   effect   that  in   case   of   any   of
the eventualities occurring as mentioned in section 14 and
15   of   the   Act,   1996,   the   mandate   of   the   arbitrator   shall
stand terminated. However, the question is in a case where
there   is   a   dispute/controversy   on   the   mandate   of   the
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arbitration   being   terminated   on   the   ground   set   out   in
section   14(1)(a)   of   the   Act,   whether   such   a   dispute   shall
have   to   be   raised   before   the   concerned   “court”   defined
under   section   2(e)   of   the   Act   or   such   a   dispute   can   be
considered   on   an   application   under   section   11(6)   of   the
Act?   Before   this   Court   in   the   aforesaid   decisions   such   a
controversy   was   not   raised.   Therefore,   the   aforesaid
decisions   shall   not   be   of   any   assistance   to   respondents
and/or the same shall not be applicable to the facts of the
case   on   hand,   while   deciding   the   issue,   whether
termination of the mandate of the arbitrator on the ground
mentioned   under   section   14(1)(a)   of   the   Act,   1996   can   be
decided   under   section   14(2)   or   under   section   11(6)   of   the
Act, 1996. 
10. It   is   to   be   noted   that   as   such   in   the   present   case   the
proceedings   before   the   concerned   court   under   section
14(2) of the Act, 1996 at the instance of respondent No. 1
and   3   herein   to   terminate   the   mandate   of   the   sole
respondent   under   section   14(1)(a)   of   the   Act   were   already
pending before the concerned court when respondent No. 1
moved   an   application   under   section   11(6)   of   the   Act   and
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such   a   dispute   was   at   large   before   the   court   in   a
proceeding under section 14(2) of the Act. 
11. In   view   of   the   aforesaid   discussion   and   for   the   reasons
stated above, it is observed and held as under: ­ 
(i) That   there   is   a   difference   and   distinction   between
section 11(5) and section 11(6) of the Act, 1996;
(ii) In   a   case   where   there   is   no   written   agreement
between   the   parties   on   the   procedure   for   appointing
an   arbitrator   or   arbitrators,   parties   are   free   to   agree
on a procedure by mutual consent and/or agreement
and   the   dispute   can   be   referred   to   a   sole
arbitrator/arbitrators   who   can   be   appointed   by
mutual consent and failing any agreement referred to
section   11(2),   section   11(5)   of   the   Act   shall   be
attracted and in such a situation, the application for
appointment   of   arbitrator   or   arbitrators   shall   be
maintainable   under   section   11(5)   of   the   Act   and   not
under section 11(6) of the Act; 
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(iii) In  a  case  where  there  is  a  written   agreement   and/or
contract containing the arbitration agreement and the
appointment   or   procedure   is   agreed   upon   by   the
parties, an application under section 11(6) of the Act
shall   be   maintainable   and   the   High   Court   or   its
nominee   can   appoint   an   arbitrator   or   arbitrators   in
case any of the eventualities occurring under section
11(6) (a) to (c) of the Act;
(iv) Once   the   dispute   is   referred   to   arbitration   and   the
sole arbitrator  is appointed by  the parties by  mutual
consent   and   the   arbitrator/arbitrators   is/are   so
appointed,   the   arbitration   agreement   cannot   be
invoked for the second time;
(v) In a case where there is a dispute/controversy on the
mandate   of   the   arbitrator   being   terminated   on   the
ground mentioned in section 14(1)(a), such a dispute
has   to   be   raised   before   the   “court” ,   defined   under
section   2(e)   of   the   Act,   1996   and   such   a   dispute
cannot   be   decided   on   an   application   filed   under
section 11(6) of the Act, 1996.           
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12. Now the next question which is posed for consideration of
this Court is whether the learned Trial Court was justified
in   rejecting   the   application   submitted   by   the   appellant,
which was filed to reject the applications under section 14
of the Act, in exercise of powers under Order VII Rule 11 of
CPC   is   concerned,   having   gone   through   the   averments   in
the application under Order VII Rule 11 of CPC, it appears
and it is not in dispute that the application under section
14(2)   of   the   Act   was   sought   to   be   rejected   on   the   ground
that there was no undue delay on the part of the arbitrator
and   therefore,   his   mandate   is   not   required   to   be
terminated   under   section   14(1)(a)   of   the   Act,   1996.
However, such a dispute is to be adjudicated on merits by
the   concerned   court   before   whom   the   proceedings   under
section   14(2)   of   the   Act   were   initiated   and   at   the   most,   it
can be said to be the defence, which was to be adjudicated
by the concerned court. As per the settled position of law,
at   the   stage   of   deciding   the   application   under   Order   VII
Rule 11 of  CPC  only  the  averments and allegations  in  the
application/plaint are to be considered and not the written
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statement   and/or   reply   to   the   application   and/or   the
defence. Therefore, as such the learned Trial Court rightly
dismissed the application under Order VII Rule 11 of CPC.
13. In   view   of   the   aforesaid   discussion   and   for   the   reasons
stated above, the impugned judgment and order passed by
the High Court is unsustainable and the same deserves to
be quashed and set aside and is accordingly quashed and
set aside. The controversy and/or the dispute, whether the
mandate of the sole arbitrator under section 14(1)(a) of the
Act,   1996   stands   terminated   or   not   shall   have   to   be
considered   by   the   court   on   an   application   filed   under
section 14(2) of the Act, 1996. It is reported that after the
impugned   order   passed   by   the   High   Court,   respondent
Nos.   1   and   3   have   withdrawn   their   applications   under
section   14(2)   of   the   Act,   1996.   To   do   substantial   justice
between the parties and to ensure that respondent Nos. 1
and   3   are   not   left   remediless,   we   direct   that   the
application/applications   submitted   by   respondent   Nos.   1
and   3   before   the   concerned   court   under   section   14(2)   of
the Act, 1996 shall stand revived. Now the concerned court
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before   whom,   the   application/applications   under   section
14(2)   of   the   Act,   1996   were   filed,   shall   consider   the   same
in   accordance   with   law   and   on   their   own   merits   at   the
earliest and preferably within a period of four months from
the   date   of   receipt   of   the   present   order.   It   goes   without
saying,   that   if,   ultimately,   it   is   held   that   the   mandate   of
the   sole   arbitrator   is   terminated   as   per   section   14(1)(a)   of
the   Act,   1996   and   more   particularly   on   the   ground   that
there   was   undue   delay   on   the   part   of   the   arbitrator   in
concluding   the   arbitration   proceedings,   the   arbitrator   has
to   be   substituted   and   a   fresh   arbitrator   has   to   be
appointed   by   following   the   same   procedure   which   was
followed   earlier   while   appointing   the   present   sole
arbitrator.  In case the parties do not agree to the name of
the   sole   arbitrator,   the   aggrieved   party   may   approach   the
appropriate   court   for   appointment   of   an   arbitrator   under
section   11(5)   of   the   Act.   In   case   application(s)   under
section 14(2) of the Act is/are dismissed and it is held that
the   mandate   of   the   sole   arbitrator   is   not   terminated   and
there was no undue delay on his part, in such a situation
the sole arbitrator  to conclude the arbitration proceedings
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and declare the award within a period of nine months from
the   decision   of   the   court   that   will   be   taken   under   section
14(2)   of   the   Act,   1996.   The   impugned   judgment(s)   and
order(s) passed by the High Court in AC No. 29/2015 and
in   Review   Petition   No.   655/2017   are   hereby   quashed   and
set   aside.   The   appeals   arising   out   of   the   aforesaid   orders
are   hereby   accordingly   Allowed.   However,   the   appeals
challenging   the   impugned   judgment   and   order   passed   in
W.P.   No.   11258/2010   and   W.P.   No.   11259/2010,
confirming   the   order/orders   passed   by   the   learned   Trial
Court rejecting the application under Order VII Rule 11 of
CPC   are   hereby   dismissed.   In   the   facts   of   the   case,   there
shall be no order as to costs. 
…………………………………J.
                  (M. R. SHAH)
…………………………………J.
 (B.V. NAGARATHNA)
New Delhi, 
May 5, 2022.
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