/2022 INSC 0366/
NON­REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
  CIVIL APPEAL NO.  3762  OF 2022
(Arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 5863 of 2020)
NOIDA INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT 
AUTHORITY                                    ..… APPELLANT
v.
RAVINDRA KUMAR & ORS.           ..... RESPONDENTS
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3781  OF 2022
(Arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 15759 of 2020)
CIVIL APPEAL NO.    3782  OF 2022
(Arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 15760 of 2020)
CIVIL APPEAL NO.  3783  OF 2022
(Arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 15761 of 2020)
CIVIL APPEAL NO.  3779  OF 2022
(Arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 8336 of 2020)
CIVIL APPEAL NO.  3780  OF 2022
(Arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 8337 of 2020)
CIVIL APPEAL NO.  3778 OF 2022
(Arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 8335 of 2020)
1

CIVIL APPEAL NO.    3777         OF 2022
(Arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 8334 of 2020)
CIVIL APPEAL NO.        3773     OF 2022
(Arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 8332 of 2020)
CIVIL APPEAL NO.    3774         OF 2022
(Arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 8333 of 2020)
CIVIL APPEAL NO.    3768    OF 2022
(Arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 8321 of 2020)
CONMT.PET.(C) No. 237/2021 in 
CIVIL APPEAL NO.     3782         OF 2022
(Arising out of SLP (Civil) No.  15760  of 2020)
CIVIL APPEAL NO.   3765   OF 2022
(Arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 3531 of 2020)
CIVIL APPEAL NO.   3772   OF 2022
(Arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 6761 of 2020)
CIVIL APPEAL NO.  3776  OF 2022
(Arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 6762 of 2020)
CIVIL APPEAL NO.   3764   OF 2022
(Arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 29444 of 2019)
CIVIL APPEAL NO.    3769    OF 2022
(Arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 721 of 2020)
CIVIL APPEAL NO.   3770    OF 2022
(Arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 6379 of 2020)
CIVIL APPEAL NO.   3771    OF 2022
(Arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 2086 of 2020)
CIVIL APPEAL NO.   3775   OF 2022
2

(Arising out of SLP (Civil) No.  7763  of 2020)
CIVIL APPEAL NO.    3767   OF 2022
[Arising out of SLP (Civil) No.8818 OF 2022]
 (D.No.44718 of 2019)
CIVIL APPEAL NO.   3766     OF 2022
(Arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 2081 of 2020)
AND 
CIVIL APPEAL NO.       3763      OF 2022
(Arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 27568 of 2019)
J  U  D  G  M  E  N  T
ABHAY S. OKA, J.
Special Leave Petitions
1. Leave granted.
2. This group of appeals arise out of a common judgment and
order dated 13 th
  September 2019 of a Division Bench of the High
Court of Judicature at Allahabad.   Some of the appeals are filed
by   Noida   Industrial   Development   Authority   (for   short,   ‘the
acquiring body’).   The other appeals are filed by the original writ
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petitioners   before   the   High   Court   who   are   claiming   to   be   the
owners of the acquired lands. 
3. The   State   Government   issued   a   notification   dated   7 th
November   2007   under   Section   4   of   the   Land   Acquisition   Act,
1894   (for   short,   ‘the   1894   Act’).     By   the   said   notification,   the
State   Government   notified   its   intention   to   acquire   108.233
hectares of lands in Village Begumpur, Pargana Dankaur, Tehsil
Sadar,   District   Gautam   Budh   Nagar.   The   purpose   of   the
acquisition was the planned industrial development through New
Okhla   Industrial   Development   Authority   (NOIDA).     The   State
Government invoked the urgency clause under sub­section (1) of
Section 17 of the 1894 Act and also passed an order under sub­
section   (4)   of   Section   17   for   dispensing   with   an   enquiry   under
Section   5A   of   the  1894   Act.     On  17 th
  March   2008,   a   declaration
under   Section   6   of   the   1894   Act   was   issued   by   the   State
Government.
  
4. The possession of the area of 7.559 hectares was taken over
by   the   State   Government   on   7 th
  June   2008.       The   possession   of
the remaining area of 100.64 hectares of the acquired lands was
taken over  on 15 th
  June 2013.   Two separate awards were made
on   12 th
  January   2011   and   31 st
  December   2013   respectively.
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Under   the   award   dated   12 th
  January   2011,   to   those   who   agreed
to accept compensation as per the Uttar Pradesh (Determination
of Compensation and Declaration of Award by Agreement) Rules,
1997   (for   short,   the   ‘Karar   Niyamawali’),   different   rates   were
fixed.     The   normal   tenure   holders   who   accepted   the
compensation   under   the   Karar   Niyamawali   were   paid
compensation   at   the   rate   of   Rs.870/­   per   square   meter.     To   the
ancestral tenure holders who agreed to accept the compensation
as   per   the   Karar   Niyamawali,   compensation   at   the   rate   of
Rs.1,000/­   per   square   meter   was   paid.     For   the   other   tenure
holders   who   declined   to   receive   the   compensation   as   per   the
Karar   Niyamawali,   market   value   at   the   rate   of   Rs.135.28/­   per
square meter was offered together with 30% solatium under sub­
section (2) of Section 23 of the 1894 Act and interest at the rate
of   12%   under   sub­section   (1A)   of   Section   23   of   the   1894   Act.
Under   the   Award   dated   31 st
  December   2013,   the   same   rate   of
Rs.135.28/­   per   square   meter   along   with   solatium   and   interest
was offered to  those who refused to accept the compensation  by
agreement in  accordance with  the Karar  Niyamawali.     However,
in   the   case   of   normal   tenure   holders   who   agreed   to   accept
compensation as per the Karar Niyamawali, compensation at the
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rate   of   Rs.1,490/­   per   square   meter   was   paid.     Similarly,   to   the
ancestral tenure holders who agreed to accept the compensation
as per the Karar Niyamawali, compensation was paid at the rate
of Rs.1,295/­ per square meter.
5. It appears that from 2011 to 2014, the writ petitions subject
matter   of   these  appeals,  were   filed   before  the   High  Court   by   the
owners/persons   interested   for   challenging   the   acquisition
proceedings and in particular, the application of urgency clause.
In the impugned judgment and order, the High Court recorded a
finding   that   the   action   of   the   State   Government   of   invoking   the
urgency   clause   under   Section   17   of   the   1894   Act   was   illegal.
However,   the   High   Court   did   not   quash   and   set   aside   the
declaration   made   under   Section   6   of   the   1894   Act   and   the
awards.  The High Court held that for balancing individual rights
with   the   public   interest,   the   relief   should   be   moulded   for   the
reason that substantial development work was carried out on the
acquired   lands.   Therefore,   the   High   Court   held   that   those   land
owners/persons   interested   who   have   not   accepted   the
compensation   as   per   Karar   Niyamawali   should   be   paid
compensation   payable   in   accordance   with   the   provisions   of   the
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Right   to   Fair   Compensation   and   Transparency   in   Land
Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (for short
‘the 2013 Act’).   The High Court further directed that the market
value   as   per   the   provisions   of   the   2013   Act   shall   be   determined
on the date of the judgment.   However, the High Court held that
those   who   have   accepted   the   compensation   by   an   agreement
under the Karar Niyamawali were not entitled to any relief.  
 
6. In support of the petitions filed by the acquiring body, it was
submitted   by   Shri   Ravindra   Kumar,   the   learned   senior   counsel
that   the   writ   petitions   suffered   from   gross   delay   and   laches.     It
was   submitted   that   though   after   invoking   the   urgency   clause
under   Section   17,   the   declaration   under   Section   6   of   the   1894
Act was issued in 2008, the petitions  were belatedly  filed by  the
land   owners   from   2011   to   2014.     The   learned   senior   counsel
submitted   that   in   none   of   the   writ   petitions,   there   was   any
explanation for such a long  delay.   He submitted that it was too
late   in   the   day   for   the   writ   petitioners   who   had   challenged   the
urgency clause to invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court under
Article 226 of the Constitution.   He pointed out the reasons given
by the High Court for  holding  that the urgency clause could not
have   been   invoked.     He   would   argue   that   the   said   reasons   are
7

erroneous.     He   submitted   that   the   reliance   placed   by   the   High
Court on the decision of this Court in the case of  Radhey Shyam
(Dead)   thru   LRs.   and   others   v.   State   of   U.P.   and   others 1
,   is
completely misplaced as in that case, the land owners were able
to   establish   the   prejudice   caused   to   them   as   a   result   of   the
failure to hold an enquiry under Section 5A of the 1894 Act.   He
submitted   that   most   of   the   land   owners   had   accepted   the
compensation   and   only   few   of   the   land   owners   had   filed   writ
petitions very belatedly.  He submitted that issuing a direction to
pay   compensation   as   per   the   2013   Act   by   taking   the   market
value   as   on   the   date   of   the   judgment   of   the   High   Court   is
completely illegal. He would, therefore, submit that the impugned
judgment deserves to be set aside. 
7. The land owners who had not received compensation under
the Karar Niyamawali have supported the impugned judgment by
submitting   that   the   order   passed   by   the   High   Court   is   very
equitable   which   balances   the   rights   of   the   land   owners   with   the
rights of the acquiring body. The land owners who have accepted
compensation   under   the   Karar   Niyamawali,   in   support   of   their
appeals, submitted that the High Court ought not to have made a
1   (2011) 5 SCC 553
8

distinction   between   those   who   have   accepted   the   compensation
and   those   who   have   not   accepted   the   compensation   especially
after recording a finding that the invocation of the urgency clause
and   the   order   dispensing   with   enquiry   under   Section   5A   was
illegal.   Their submission is that such arbitrary distinction ought
not to have been made by the High Court. 
8. A   submission   was   made   on   behalf   of   the   land   owners   by
relying   upon   a   decision   of   this   Court   in   the   case   of   Radhey
Shyam 1
  by   contending   that   once   it   is   held   that   the   action   of
invoking sub­section (1) read with sub­section (4) of Section 17 of
1894 Act is illegal, the acquisition cannot be sustained at all.   It
is pointed out that the view taken in the case of  Radhey Shyam 1
was   followed   by   this   Court   in   the  case   of   Garg   Woollen   Private
Ltd.  v.  State of U.P. & Ors. 2
9. The   learned   counsel   appearing   for   the   land   owners   also
relied upon a decision of Bench of three Judges of this Court in
the case of  Savitri Devi etc.  v . State of U.P. & Ors. 3
 by which a
direction   was   issued   to   enhance   the   market   value   by   64.7%.
Moreover, directions were issued to make allotment of developed
2   (2012) 11 SCC 784
3   (2015) 7 SCC 21
9

land   to   the   extent   of   10%   of   the   land   acquired   to   each   land
owners.
10. We have given careful consideration to the submissions.  We
have   already   referred   to   the   factual   position   which   is   not
disputed.     Though   the   declaration   under   Section   6   of   the   1894
Act was made on 17 th
 March 2008, the writ petitions were filed in
the year 2011 and thereafter.  As narrated earlier, the possession
of   a   part   of   the   acquired   land   was   taken   over   on   7 th
  June   2008
and the possession of the remaining land was taken over on 15 th
June 2013.  There is a finding of fact recorded by the High Court
that many land owners agreed to accept the  compensation under
the   Karar   Niyamawali.     Moreover,   substantial   work   of
development   was   carried   out   by   the   acquiring   body   on   the
acquired lands. 
11. The   first   question   which   arises   for   our   consideration   is
whether  the High  Court  committed an error  by  not setting  aside
the acquisition after recording a finding that the orders by which
sub­section (1) and sub­section (4) of Section 17 of the 1894 Act
were invoked were illegal.   We may  note here that after invoking
the urgency clause and dispensing with an enquiry under Section
10

5A   of   the   1894   Act,   Section   6   declaration   was   issued   on   17 th
March   2008.     All   the   writ   petitions   filed   by   the   owners   were
belatedly   filed   after   more   than   3   to   4   years   from   the   date   of
declaration   under   Section   6.    It   is   true   that   the   High   Court   was
right   in   holding   that   the   urgency   clause   could   not   have   been
invoked   in   the   facts   of   the   case.     However,   a   finding   of   fact   has
been recorded by the High Court that after the possession of the
acquired   land   was   handed   over   to   the  acquiring   body,   the   same
has   been   developed   and   allotted   to   third   parties.     A   very   large
area   of   108.233   hectares   owned   by   the   various   individuals   was
acquired.     However,   only   11   persons   claiming   to   be   the   land
owners belatedly  filed  writ  petitions.     Taking  note  of  these  facts,
the   H igh   Court,   for   balancing   the   private   interests   of   the   land
owners with the public interest, declined to quash the acquisition
proceedings.   The High Court passed an order  directing  that the
compensation   payable   shall   be   in   terms   of   the   provisions   of   the
2013   Act   on   the   date   of   its   judgment.     Writ   jurisdiction   under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India is always discretionary.  It
is an equitable remedy. It is not necessary for the High Court to
correct   each   and   every   illegality.     If   the   correction   of   illegality   is
likely to have unjust results, High Court would normally refuse to
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exercise   its   jurisdiction   under   Article   226.       While   maintaining
the acquisition proceedings, the High Court granted a substantial
relief   to   the   land   owners   by   directing   payment   of   compensation
under   the   2013   Act   which   is   higher   than   the   compensation
payable under the 1894 Act.  This approach cannot be faulted.
12.   The   second   question   which   arises   is   whether   the   High
Court   ought   to   have   granted   relief   of   higher   market   value   and
allotment   of   developed   land   in   accordance   with   the   decision   of
this   Court   in   the   case   of   Savitri   Devi 3
.     In   paragraph   50   of   the
said decision, this Court observed thus:
“ 50 .   Keeping   in   view   all   these   peculiar
circumstances,   we   are   of   the   opinion   that   these
are   not   the   cases   where   this   Court   should
interfere   under   Article   136   of   the   Constitution.
However,   we   make   it   clear   that   directions   of
the   High   Court   are   given   in   the   aforesaid
unique and  peculiar/specific background   and,
therefore,   it   would   not   form   precedent   for
future cases .”
                      (emphasis added)
It   appears   from   the   facts   of   the   said   case   that   in   the   three
villages subject matter of the appeals, no development had taken
place on the acquired lands.  In the cases in hand, we are dealing
with   a   completely   different   fact   scenario   and   therefore,   reliance
12

on the said decision will not help the land owners.   The decision
in   the   case   of   Savitri   Devi 3
  was   limited   to   the   peculiar   fact
situation of the case.
13. In   the   case   of   Sahara   India   Commercial   Corporation
Limited and Others  v.  State of Uttar Pradesh and Others 4
, this
Court   found   that   invocation   of  urgency   clause  under   Section  17
was   invalid   and   illegal.     This   Court   moulded   the   relief   and
directed   payment   of   compensation   in   terms   of   the   2013   Act   by
treating the relevant date as the date of its judgment.  Therefore,
we   find   no   error   in   the   approach   of   the   High   Court   when   it
directed payment of market value computed as per the 2013 Act
to   those   land   owners   who   have   not   accepted   the   compensation
under Karar Niyamawali by taking the date of the judgment as a
deemed   date   after   following   the   2013   Act.     The   High   Court   has
done   the   balancing   act   by   saving   the   acquisition   proceedings
while granting the aforesaid monetary relief to the land owners.
14. The   third   question   is   whether   the   relief   of   the   grant   of
market value in terms of the 2013 Act could have been denied to
the   land   owners   who   had   accepted   the   compensation   by
4   (2017) 11 SCC 339
13

agreement in terms of the  Karar Niyamawali.  The High Court has
given  reasons  for  adopting   the  said  approach.    The  main  reason
is   that   without   any   grievance,   the   land   owners   voluntarily
accepted   the   compensation   by   an   agreement   in   terms   of   the
Karar   Niyamawali.     After   lapse   of   considerable   time   thereafter,
the   land   owners   chose   to   file   writ   petitions   in   the   High   Court.
After   having   acquiesced   to   the   action   of   the   Government   by
accepting   the   compensation   under   an   agreement,   the   land
owners   were   not   justified   in   making   a   grievance   at   a   belated
stage.     Therefore,   we   find   no   error   with   the   view   taken   by   the
High   Court   in   relation   to   those   land   owners   who   had   accepted
compensation under Karar Niyamawali.
Contempt Petition (C) No.237 of 2021
15. In the  Contempt Petition (Civil) No.237 of  2021 filed by  the
appellants   in   Civil   Appeal   arising   out   of   Special   Leave   Petition
(Civil)   No.   15760   of   2020,   the   appellants   have   alleged   that   in
violation   of   interim   order   passed   by   this   Court   on   28 th
  January
2021,   the   acquiring   body   started   construction.     In   the   counter
filed by the acquiring body, the allegations made in the contempt
petition   have   been   denied.     In   any   case,   now   we   are   confirming
14

the   impugned   judgment.     Therefore,   there   is   no   necessity   of
initiating any action on the basis of the contempt petition.
All the matters
16. We,   therefore,   find   no   error   in   the   impugned   judgment.
Accordingly,  the  appeals  are dismissed.   The   contempt  petition  is
disposed of.  
…………..…………………J
(AJAY RASTOGI)
…………..…………………J
(ABHAY S. OKA)
New Delhi;
May 09, 2022. 
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