REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2397 of 2022 
                                                                                               
Delhi Development Authority             ...Appellant 
Versus
Diwan Chand Anand  & Ors.        …Respondents
With
CIVIL APPEAL NO.2398 OF 2022
Delhi Development Authority …Appellant
Versus
Diwan Chand Anand  & Ors.             …Respondents 
J U D G M E N T 
M. R. Shah, J.
1

1. Feeling   aggrieved   and   dissatisfied   with   the   impugned
order dated 09.07.2007 passed by the High Court of Delhi in
RFA   No.280   of   2001   and   the   subsequent   order   dated
13.01.2012 passed by the High Court in R.P. No.314 of 2008
in   the   very   same   RFA   No.280   of   2001,   the   original   appellant
before   the   High   Court   –   Delhi   Development   Authority   (‘DDA’
for short) has preferred the present appeals.
2. The facts leading to the present appeals in a nutshell are
as under:
The two plaintiffs, namely, Shri Diwan Chand Anand and
Smt. Chanan Kanta Anand claiming to be the co­owners of the
suit property filed the suit before the Civil Court/learned Trial
Court for declaration and permanent injunction.  The suit was
filed   challenging   the   acquisition   proceedings   under   the   Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’).   In
the   plaint   defendant   nos.   8   to   39   were   impleaded   alleging   to
be   co­shares   as   proper   parties   to   the   suit.     The   original
plaintiff   no.2,   Smt.   Chanan   Kanta   Anand,   was   the   wife   of
original defendant no.8 – Shri Dharam Chand Anand.  On the
demise   of   the   husband   and   wife   (original   plaintiff   no.   2   &
2

defendant   no.   8)   their   children   were   substituted   both   as
plaintiff   nos.   2(i)   to   2(x)   and   defendant   nos.   8(i)   to   8(x).     The
suit was contested by the original defendant nos. 1 to 5 and 7
including the appellant DDA.  They filed the written statement
controverting the claim of the plaintiffs.  The suit was resisted
on   the   ground   that   the   Civil   Court   had   no   jurisdiction   with
respect   to   a   challenge   to   the   acquisition   proceedings   under
the   Land   Acquisition   Act.     Other   defendant   nos.   8   to   39   did
not   file   any   written   statement   and   they   were   proceeded   ex­
parte vide order dated 22.03.1983 and 06.10.1983.  
2.1 The   learned   Trial   Court   initially   framed   four   issues   as
under:
“Whether   the   notification   dated   16.01.1969
under   Section   6   of   the   Land   Acquisition   Act   with
respect   to   the   land   in   dispute   is   illegal   due   to   non­
satisfaction   of   the   appropriate   authority   as   to   the
existences of the public purpose? OPP
2.     Whether   the   defendants   withdrew   from   the
acquisition proceedings? OPP
3.   What is the effect of Letter dated 10.01.1967
and February, 1968 filed as Annexure D and G to the
Plaint? OPP.
4.  Relief”
 
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2.2 That   thereafter   one   additional   preliminary   issue   was
framed on 12.12.1995 as under:
“Whether   Civil   Court   has   jurisdiction   to   go   into
the   validity   of   the   notification   under   Section   4   and   6
under Land Acquisition Act?”
2.3 By   judgment   and   decree   dated   12.01.2000,   the   learned
Trial   Court   decreed   the   suit.     It   is   the   case   on   behalf   of   the
appellant – DDA that despite the learned Trial Court giving a
finding that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to go into the
question   of   validity   and   legality   of   the   notification   under
Section   4   of   the   Act,   it   decreed   the   suit   and   held   that   the
notifications   in   question   ceased   to   exist   although   the
notification under Section 48 of the Act had not been issued.
The contesting defendants were restrained from dispossessing
the   plaintiffs   and   other   co­owners   land   so   notified   for
acquisition.
2.4 Feeling   aggrieved   and   dissatisfied   by   the   learned   Trial
Court, DDA preferred the appeal before the High Court being
RFA  No.280  of  2001.    The   original   plaintiff   no.1   was  arrayed
as   Respondent   No.38   whereas   LRs   of   plaintiff   no.2   and
defendant   no.8   were   arrayed   as   Respondent   no.39   (2   –   10),
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and   other   defendants   9­39   were   arrayed   as   Respondent   nos.
7­37   in   the   appeal.     The   appeal   was   admitted   for   hearing.
The   original   plaintiff/respondent   nos.   38   &   39   were
represented   by   counsel.     That   some   of   the   respondents
(original   defendants)   out   of   respondent   nos.   7   to   37   (out   of
original   defendant   nos.   9   to   39)   were   not   served   as   some   of
them   had   died.     By   order   dated   09.07.2007   the   Division
Bench   of   the   High   Court   dismissed   the   entire   appeal   as
having abated by observing as under:
"Many   respondents   have   died   during   the
pendency of the appeal but no steps have been taken
by  the  appellant  to  bring  their  Legal  Representatives
on record.
This appeal accordingly stands abated.”
2.5 That the appellant – DDA filed Review Petition No.314 of
2008 seeking review of the order dated 09.07.2007 dismissing
the appeal as having abated.  The High Court issued notice on
03.09.2008   which   remained   unserved   till   the   decision   in   the
impugned   order   dated   13.01.2012.     In   the   meantime,   the
original plaintiff no.1 Shri Diwan Chand Anand was reported
to   have   expired   on   16.11.2010   and   after   ascertaining   about
his   legal   representatives,   application   for   substitution,   being
5

CM   No.22449   of   2011   was   filed   on   08.11.2012,   which   also
remained pending.   By the impugned order dated 13.01.2012
the High Court has dismissed the review application and has
refused   to   recall   the   order   dated   09.07.2007   dismissing   the
appeal   as   having   abated.     The   original   order   passed   by   the
High   Court   dated   09.07.2007   dismissing   the   main   appeal   as
having   abated   and   the   subsequent   order   dated   13.01.2012
dismissing   the   review   application   and   refusing   to   recall   the
order dated 09.07.2007 are the subject matter of the present
appeals. 
3. Shri   Sanjay   Poddar,   learned   Senior   Advocate   has
appeared   on   behalf   of   the   appellant   –   DDA   and   Shri   Shyam
Divan, learned Senior Advocate has appeared on behalf of the
contesting   respondent   nos.33   and   Shri   Sunil   Gupta,   learned
Senior Advocate has appeared on behalf of respondent nos. 3
to 40.
4. Shri   Poddar,   learned   Senior   Advocate   appearing   on
behalf of the appellant – DDA has vehemently submitted that
the High Court has dismissed the appeal as abated solely on
6

the ground of failure on the part of the appellant to bring on
record   the   legal   representatives   of   certain   respondents
without going into the question as to whether the presence of
such   persons   was   necessary   and   also   without   deciding   the
application   being   CM   No.22449   of   2011   (for   substitution   of
legal   representatives   of   original   plaintiff   ­   Shri   Diwan   Chand
Anand).
4.1 It   is   submitted   that   as   a   matter   of   fact   the   appeal   has
not   been   dismissed   on   the   ground   of   non­substitution   of
plaintiffs, who are necessary parties.  It is contended that the
appeal   as   a   whole   cannot   be   treated   as   abated   on   failure   to
substitute   the   legal   representative   of   such   defendants   who
even   did   not   file   written   statement   and   even   remained   ex­
parte,   in   view   of   the   provisions   of   Order   22   Rule   4(4)   of   the
Code of Civil Procedure (for short ‘CPC’).
4.2 It is further urged that the High Court has dismissed the
appeal on hyper technical ground without examining the core
issue, as to, whether, the Appeal can be heard in the absence
of such respondents/defendants or not.
7

4.3 It   is   also   submitted   that   even   during   the   course   of   the
hearing   of the  SLPs, the  contesting  respondents have  argued
that   said   two   plaintiffs   filed   the   suit   on   behalf   of   other   co­
owners/defendants   and   they   were   prosecuting   the   suit   on
their   behalf   though   these   defendants   remained   ex­parte   and
thus the learned Trial Court rightly passed the decree in their
favour.  Reliance was placed on behalf of the appellants upon
the decision of this Court in the case of  A. Viswanatha Pilliai
and others vs. The Special Tehsildar for Land Acquisition
No.4   and   others,   (1991)   4   SCC   17   in   support   of   the
submission   that   one   co­owner   can   prefer   and   prosecute   the
legal   remedies   for   and   on   behalf   of   other   co­owners.     It   is
submitted that applying the same analogy, the same co­owner
can   also   defend   and   represent   the   entire   estate   of   other   co­
owner.     That   if   the   entire   estate   is   represented   by   the
plaintiffs   in   the   suit,   then   they   are   deemed   to   have
represented the same in the appeal.   It is submitted that the
respondents/defendants   who   died   did   not   file   written
statement and remained ex­parte and therefore they were not
necessary   parties   for   adjudication   of   the   appeal.     Reliance   is
8

placed   upon   the   decision   of   this   Court   in   the   case   of   Mata
Prasad   Mathur   vs.   Jawala   Prasad   Mathur,   (2013)   14   SCC
722   and   Kanhiya   Lal   vs.   Rameshwar,   (1983)   2   SCC   260
(para 6).
4.4 It   is   further   submitted   that   it   is   a   well   settled   law   that
whether the appeal abets as a whole has to depend upon facts
of each case and no straight formula is applicable since each
case   has   its   own   peculiarities.     It   is   submitted   that   the
Hon’ble High Court has failed to examine this important and
vital aspect which was required to be considered as observed
and held by the Constitution Bench Judgment of this Hon’ble
Court in the case of  Sardar Amarjit Singh Kalra vs. Pramod
Gupta, (2003) 3 SCC 272 (para 26).
4.5 It   is   urged   that   in   the   aforesaid   Constitution   Bench
Judgment   this   Hon’ble   Court   has   further   held   that   the
provisions of Order 22 Rule 4 CPC are required to be applied
liberally  with  the object of protecting  the rights of  the  parties
and   not   to   destroy   the   same.     It   is   contended   that   when   the
9

land is sought to be acquired and meant for a public purpose
as   in   the   instant   case   interest   of   justice   warrants   that   the
appeal be heard on  merits in a time bound manner  and may
not be dismissed as abated. 
4.6 Now   so   far   as   on   the   issue   of   abatement   of   present
SLPs/appeals   on   the   alleged   ground   of   non­impleadment   of
the   LRs   of   Jagdish   Anand   in   the   present   SLPs/appeals   who
was   one   of   the   legal   heirs   of   original   plaintiff   no.2   and
defendant no.8, it is submitted that Jagdish Anand was one of
the   legal   representatives   of   original   plaintiff   no.2   and
defendant   no.8,   out   of   the   10.     That   the   other   legal
representatives   are   already   on   record   and   therefore   as   the
estate   is   represented   by   the   other   legal   representatives   the
present appeals can proceed in the presence of the other legal
representatives   who   are   already   on   record   as   all   of   them
represent the estate of their father and mother.
4.7 So   far   as   the   submission   on   behalf   of   the   contesting
respondents   that   on   the   issue   of   finality   of   judgment/decree
on account of non­substitution of legal representatives and/or
there may be conflicting or inconsistent decrees is concerned,
10

it is submitted that as such the judgment and decree passed
by   the   learned   Trial   Court   is   a   nullity   being   without
jurisdiction as this Hon’ble Court in the case of  State of Bihar
vs.   Dharender   Kumar,   (1995)   4   SCC   229   has   held  that   the
Civil   Court   has   no   jurisdiction   to   entertain   a   civil   suit   in
respect of the Land Acquisition Proceedings/Notifications and
cannot   pass   an   injunction   order   to   restrain   the   government
from taking possession.   It is submitted that the decree being
a   nullity   the   validity   of   such   a   decree   can   be   questioned
whenever and wherever it is sought to be relied upon, even at
the   stage   of   execution   and   even   at   the   collateral   stage   of
proceedings.   It is submitted that the defect of jurisdiction as
to the subject matter of the suit land, strikes at the root of the
matter and such a defect cannot be cured even by consent of
the parties. 
4.8 Now   in   so   far   as   the   submission   on   behalf   of   the
contesting   respondents,   that   there   is   a   huge   delay   in
challenging the original order dated 09.07.2007 passed in the
First   Appeal,   it   is   submitted   that   the   appellant   was
prosecuting the Review Application which was filed in the year
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2008 which remained pending till 13.01.2012.  That the delay
in   preferring   the   review   was   condoned   by   the   High   Court.
Therefore,   the   appellant   is   entitled   to   seek   exclusion   of   the
period   during   the   pendency   of   the   review   petition   and   the
same   has   been   challenged   in   the   present   proceeding.     It   is
submitted   that   the   submission   of   the   respondents   in   this
regard   is   liable   to   be   rejected.     This   is   because   as   observed
and held by this Court in the case of  Esha Bhattacharjee vs.
Managing   Committee   of   Ragunathpur   Nafar   Academy   and
others, (2013) 12 SCC  649   as well as in the recent decision
in   the   case   of   Radha   Gajapathi   Raju   &   Ors.   vs.   P.   Maduri
Gajapathi Raju & Ors. In Civil Appeal No.6974­6975/2021
arising   out   of   SLP   (C)   No.3373­3374   of   2020   decided   on
22.11.2021   pendency   of   the   proceedings   in   another   Court
can be said to be a sufficient ground for condonation of delay.
Making   above   submissions   and   relying   upon   the   above
decisions,  it   is  prayed  to   allow   the   present   appeals,   set   aside
the orders passed by the High Court dismissing the appeal as
a   whole   as   having   abated   due   to   non­bringing   the   legal
representatives   of   some   of   the   respondents   –   original
12

defendants on record and to direct to decide the main appeal
on merits.
5. While   opposing   the   present   appeals,   learned   Senior
Advocates appearing on behalf of the contesting  respondents,
have,   firstly,  submitted   that   as  such   there  is  a   huge  delay   of
1811   days   in   filing   Civil   Appeal   No.2398   of   2022   against   the
main   order   dated   09.07.2007   with   no   plausible   justification
and explanation.   As a matter of fact, even the review petition
before the High Court was barred by limitation by 378 days.
5.1 It   is   further   submitted   by   Learned   Senior   Advocates   on
behalf   of   the   Contesting   Respondents   that   in   order   to
appreciate the controversy before the learned Trial Court, few
facts are required to be considered which are as under:
“1.     Plaintiffs   1   &   2,   Diwan   Chand   Anand   and   Smt.
Chanan Kanta Anand, along with Sh. Dharam Chand
Anand,   Sh.   Gian   Chand   etc.   were   migrants   from
Lahore,   Pakistan.     The   said   plaintiffs   along   with   Sh.
Dharam   Chand   Anand   &   others,   in   and   around
1947­48,   purchased   the   disputed   land,   situated   in
Village   Kharera,   Tehsil   Mehrauli,   bearing   Khasra
no.393, 394 & 395, admeasuring 30 bighas 6 biswas
of   land,   along   with   super   structure,   from   one   Sh.
Mohd   Ishaq.   Sh.   Dharam     Chand   Anand   re­started
his   business   of   body   building   on   Trucks   by
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constructing   a   factory   on   the   said   parcels   of   land   in
the   name   of   Anand   Automobiles   and   supplied   bus
bodies to the Military.
2.     Since   Mohd   Ishaq   migrated   to   Pakistan,   the
properties   were   claimed   by   Custodian   of   Evacuee
Properties.     Representation   was   made   by   the
Plaintiffs   &   others   to   de­notify   the   same   as   Evacuee
Property.     The   same   was   duly   considered   and   on   5 th
December 1953, the Custodian of Evacuee Properties
confirmed   the   sale   of   the   said   land   with   the   super­
structure,   in   favour   of   Plaintiffs   &   other   co­sharers.
Sale   Certificate   was   filed   with   the   plaint.     The   said
land is situated within “Lal Dora”.
3.     Subsequently,   two   Deeds   of   Conveyance   with
respect to 30 bighas 6 biswas of land, were executed
by the President of India, in the year 1962, in favour
of   the   said   Plaintiffs   along   with   Sh.   Dharam   Chand
Anand,   Sh.     Gian   Chand   &   other   co­sharers.     The
deeds   neither   specified   the   shares   of   he   said   six
persons   in   the   parcels   of   land   nor   allocated   or
demarcated any portions of the land between them. 
4.    In  the   year   1964,  Notification   under   Section   4  of
the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was issued in respect
to   number   of   parcels   of   land   including   the   aforesaid
land.
5.   On   1 st
  May,   1964,   the   co­sharers   filed   objections
against   the   notification   and   nothing   was   heard   for
almost 5 years.  On 19 th
 September, 1966, one of the
co­sharer   of   the   said   property,   made   representation
against the proposed acquisitions to GoI.
6.   On 23th December, 1966, the Central Govt wrote
to   the   Lt.   Governor   of   Delhi   to   release   the   land
comprised   in   Khasra   nos.   393,   394   &   395,   covered
by notification dated 21 st
 March, 1964
7.     Release   Policy:   On   7 th
  January,   1967,   Central
Govt.   made   a   policy   decision   that   lands   which   were
isolated   and   situated   amidst   built   up   areas   and   not
required for public purposes were to be released from
acquisition.     On   10 th
  January,   1967,   the   Central
Govt.   wrote   to   one   of   the   co­owners,   viz   Shiv   Raj
14

Bahadur that Delhi Administration has been directed
to de­notify the land in dispute.
8.     Thereafter,   on   6 th
  February,   1967,   the   Lt.
Governor   of   Delhi   wrote   to   Central   Govt.   confirming
necessary   draft   to   de­notify   the   land   to   ensure
directions.
9.   Again on 10 th
  October 1967, one of the co­sharer
made another representation requesting for release of
land.
10.     On   9 th
  February   1968,   the   GoI   wrote   to   Delhi
Administration   that   decision   in   letter   dated
23.12.1966   stands   and   directed   to   de­notify   the
parcels of land, which are subject matter of the SLPs.
11.     However,   on   16 th
  January,   1969,   Notification
under   Section   6   of   the   Land   Acquisition   Act   was
issued with respect to the land aforesaid.
12.   Two out of the six persons, in whose favour the
Deeds   of   Conveyance   were   executed,   viz   Dewan
Chand   Anand   &   Chanan   Kanta   Anand   w/o   Dharam
Chand Anand, filed a suit in the High  Court of Delhi,
in   the   year   1974,   seeking   declaration   that   the
Notification dated 21.03.1964 issued under Section 4
of the Land Acquisition Act stands withdrawn and or
cancelled/waived   and   that  the   Section   6   Notification
is   mala­fide,   null   and   void,   inoperative   in   law   and
without   and   or   in   excess   of   jurisdiction   and
acquisition.  It was inter alia the plea of the plaintiffs
in the suit, that the Central Government, upon being
approached   by   some   of   the   owners   of   the   land,   who
were   impleaded   as   defendants,   had   by   a
communication   to   the   then   Delhi   Administration
stated that the subject land was not required for the
stated   purpose   and   thus   the   Notification   under
Section 6 was bad and without application of mind.
13.  The suit was instituted by 2 plaintiffs i.e. 2 of the
co­owenrs.  However, out of the remaining 4 persons,
in   whose   favour   conveyance   deeds   were   executed,   3
had   already   died   and   accordingly   in   the   said   suit,
Dharam   Chand   Anand,   the   co­owner   and   the   legal
heirs   of   the   remaining   3   co­owners   had   to   be   and
were   also   impleaded   as   defendants,   as   being   proper
15

parties, besides the Land Acquisition Authorities and
DDA.”
 
5.2 It   is   submitted   that   the   other   owners   of   the   land
impleaded as defendants, did not contest the suit, as the suit
was in mutual interest.  A preliminary issue, namely, whether
a   civil   suit   impugning   the  notifications   under   Sections  4   &   6
of   the   Act   is   maintainable   was   decided   against   the   plaintiffs.
However,  ultimately,  the   suit  was   decreed   vide  judgment  and
decree dated 12.01.2000 by which a decree of declaration was
passed holding that the notifications under Sections 4 & 6 of
the   Act   had   ceased   to   exist   even   before   filing   of   the   suit   and
the suit lands stood released from the ambit and scope of the
notifications.   The learned Trial Court also passed a decree of
permanent  injunction   restraining   the  official   defendants  from
dispossessing the plaintiffs and other co­sharers from the suit
property.     It   is   submitted   that   thereafter   in   an   appeal
preferred by DDA alone, a number of opportunities were given
to   bring   the   legal   representatives   (LRs)   of   some   of   the
respondents on record.  But the DDA failed to bring on record
the LRs of many of the respondents who died.  It is submitted
that,   at   one   point   of   time,   the   suit   was   dismissed   for   non­
16

prosecution   which   was   later   restored.     Several   of   the   five
respondents i.e. the original purchasers of the lands and their
heirs   died.     Even   the   plaintiff   –   original   plaintiff   no.1   –
respondent   died   on   16.11.2010.     Though   opportunities   were
given for substitution of LRs.  They were not substituted.  It is
submitted   that   in   these   circumstances,   the   High   Court   vide
final order dated 09.07.2007 dismissed the appeal as abated.
It   is   submitted   that   owing   to   the   original   plaintiff   no.1   –
respondent   dying   and   also   a   number   of   other   private
respondents dying, the High Court in the said order, appears
to have not given their details.  It is submitted that however, it
is   not   in   dispute   that   a   large   number   of   private   respondents
did   die   during   the   pendency   of   the   appeal   and   the   LRs   were
not  brought  on   record  despite  more  than  thirty  opportunities
being given to the DDA.
5.3 Now so far as the main issue on merits, that is, whether
on the non­substitution of legal representatives of some of the
respondents ­ owners of the land and/or whether on demise of
the  some of  the respondents  during   the pendency  of  the  first
appeal   and   the   appellant   therein   not   bringing   the   LRs   on
17

record   despite   repeated   opportunities,   whether   the   entire
appeal   stood   abated   or   only   in   so   far   as   the   particular
deceased   respondents,   it   is   vehemently   submitted   by   the
learned   Senior   Advocate   for   the   contesting   respondents   that
there   would   be   conflicting   decrees   qua   the   respondents   who
are already served and whose LRs are brought on record and
qua the deceased respondents whose legal representatives are
not brought on record.   It is submitted by  the learned Senior
Advocate that decree dated 12.01.2000 will be in favour of the
legal representatives of all the deceased respondents and if the
appeal   succeeds   in   High   Court,   there   will   be   conflicting
decrees   since   the   property   is   jointly   owned   and   the   decree   is
inseparable or  inseverable as the  property  remains  undivided
with   each   party   having   right,   title   and   interest   in   the   entire
property.
5.4 It   is   submitted   that   factually   there   were   two   deeds   of
conveyance   in   respect   of   the   entire   land   in   favour   of   six
owners, without demarcating their respective shares.  Thus, in
law   each   of   the   six   owners   or   their   heirs   were   the   owners   of
the   entire   land   having   right,   title   and   interest   in   every   part
18

and parcel of land along with others and it cannot be said that
the   said   owners   were   exclusive   owners   of   any   portion   of   the
suit   lands.     It   is   submitted   that   in   the   case   of   K.
Vishwanathan   Pillai   versus   Special   Tehsildar   for   Land
Acquisition   No.IV,   (1991)   4   SCC   17,   it   has   been   held   that
one   of   the   co­owners   can   file   a   suit   and   recover   the   property
against the stranger and the decree would enure to the benefit
of   all   the   co­owners.     It   is   submitted   that   no   co­owner   has
right,   title   and   interest   in   any   of   the   item   or   portion   of   the
property   but   has   a   right,   title   and   interest   in   every   part   and
parcel of the joint property.
5.5 It is submitted that in the present case the learned Trial
Court   vide   judgment   and   decree   had   decreed   that   firstly,   the
notifications   had   ceased   to   exist   even  before   filing   of  the   suit
and   therefore,   the   suit   land   stood   released   from   the   scope   of
the   said   notifications.     Secondly,   the   permanent   injunction
was granted in favour of the plaintiffs and private respondents
(co­sharers)   and   against   the   land   acquisition   authorities   as
well   as   the   DDA,   where   the   DDA   was   restrained   from
19

dispossessing   them.     It   is   submitted   that   considering   the
aforesaid   facts   of   the   case,   in   the   absence   of   legal
representatives   of   the   deceased   respondents,   the   decree   in
respect   of   the   suit   property   would   become   final   vis­à­vis   the
said persons.  But in the present proceedings in respect of the
self­same suit property are allowed to continue as against the
other   respondents,  the  enforcement  of  the  decree  consequent
to   the   possible   success   of   the   proceedings   would   lead   to
conflict   of   decrees   not   permissible   in   law.     The   relief   of
permanent   injunction   in   favour   of   the   deceased   respondents
would continue to be in force, whereas it would not be in force
as against the respondents.  This also will result in passing of
two   conflicting   decrees   which   shall   be   incapable   of
enforcement.
5.6 It is submitted that the present is the case of “joint and
indivisible   decree”/“joint   and   inseverable   or   inseparable
decree”.   Hence   when   there   is   omission   or   lapse   or   failure   to
bring on record the LRs of one or more deceased respondents
on time, it would be fatal and would require the appeal to be
dismissed   in   toto   and   it   would   result   in   abatement   of   entire
20

proceedings.  Otherwise, inconsistent or contradictory decrees
would result with respect to same subject matter vis­à­vis the
others.
Making   the   above   submissions   it   is   vehemently
submitted that the High Court has rightly dismissed the entire
appeal   as   having   abated   and   the   same   is   not   required   to   be
interfered with by this Court.
6. Making   above   submissions   and   relying   upon   the
decisions   of   this   Court   in   the   case   of   State   of   Punjab   vs.
Nathu   Ram,   AIR   1962   SC   89 ;   Hemareddi   vs.
Ramachandra,   (2019)   6   SCC   756 ;   Sunkara
Lakehminarassama   vs.   Sagi,   (2019)   11   SCC   787   and   the
recent   decision   of   this   Court   Venigalla   Koteswaramman   vs.
Malempati   Suryamba,   (2021)   4   SCC   246,   it   is   prayed   to
dismiss the present appeals. 
7. We have heard learned counsel for the respective parties
at length.
21

8. At   the   outset,   it   is   required   to   be   noted   that   by   order
dated 09.07.2007, the High Court dismissed the  First  Appeal
preferred   by   the   appellant   herein   as   having   abated   on   the
ground that with respect to some of the original defendants –
respondents   in   appeal   who   died,   their   legal   representatives
were not brought on record.   Thus, on non­bringing the legal
representatives   of   some   of   the   respondents   who   died   during
the   pendency   of   the   appeal   on   record,   the   High   Court
dismissed  the   appeal  as  a   whole   as  having   abated.     The  said
order dated 09.07.2007 reads as under:
“R.F.A. No.280/2001
Many respondents have died during the pendency of
the   appeal   but   no   steps   have   been   taken   by   the
appellant   to   bring   their   Legal   representatives   on
record.  This appeal accordingly stands abated.”
8.1 Thereafter  the appellant preferred the review application
in the year 2008 which has been dismissed by the High Court
by the impugned order dated 13.01.2012.   At this stage, it is
required   to   be   noted   that   there   was   a   delay   in   preferring   the
Review   Application   which   came   to   be   condoned   by   the   High
Court.     That   subsequently   the   appellant   herein   –   DDA   –
22

original   appellant,   preferred   the   present   two   appeals,   one,
challenging   the   original   order   dated   09.07.2007   dismissing
the   appeal   as   a   whole   as   having   abated   and   the   second,
challenging  the  order  dismissing  the review  application.   It is
sought   to   be   contended   on   or   behalf   of   the   contesting
respondents that there is a huge delay in preferring the appeal
challenging the order dated 09.07.2007 and therefore present
Appeal   may   not   be   entertained.     However,   the   appellant   was
bona   fide   prosecuting   the   review   application.     That   after
dismissal   of   the   review   application   in   which   the   appellant
prayed   to   review   and   recall   the   order   dated   09.07.2007,   that
the   appellant   has   preferred   two   separate   appeals,   one,
challenging   the   dismissal   of   the   review   application   and
another,   challenging   the   original   order   dated   09.07.2007.
Therefore,   once   the   appellant   was   bona   fide   prosecuting   the
review  application,  it was  justified in  waiting  for   the outcome
of the Review Application.  If, without waiting for the outcome
of   the   review   application,   the   appellant   would   have   preferred
the appeal at that stage, the appellant would have been non­
suited on the ground of the pendency of the review application
and   the   appellant   would   have   been   told   to   wait   till   the
23

outcome of the review application.  Therefore, in the facts and
circumstances   of   the   case   the   time   taken   in   prosecuting   the
review  application  is  to  be  excluded  and  the  appeal  preferred
challenging the order dated 09.07.2007 is to be considered on
merits.     Therefore,   the   objection   on   behalf   of   the   contesting
respondents   not   to   consider   the   substantive   appeal
challenging   the   order   dated   09.07.2007   on   merits   is   hereby
overruled   and   we   may   proceed   to   consider   the   order   dated
09.07.2007 dismissing the appeal as a whole as having abated
on merits.
8.2 Before we consider the order dated 09.07.2007 on merits
the   relevant   pleadings   and   the   necessary   averments   in   the
plaint which would have a direct bearing on the controversy in
the   present   appeal   are   required   to   be   referred   to.     It   is
required to be noted and it is not in dispute that the suit was
filed   by   only   two   co­owners   and   rest   of   the   co­owners/co­
sharers   were   joined   as   defendants   as   proper   parties.
According   to   the   original   plaintiffs,   the   land   in   question   was
owned   jointly   by   the   original   plaintiffs   and   the   other   co­
24

sharers which can be culled out from the following averments
in the plaint:
“4.   That   by   order   dated   5th   December,   1953,   the
Custodian   of   Evacuee   Properties   confirmed   the   sale
regarding   the   said   land   in   favour   of   the   Plaintiffs   and
the other co­sharers on condition that they will pay the
amount   of   Rs.   65,399.00   to   the   Custodian   of   Evacuee
Properties.   That   amount   of   Rs.   65,339.00   was   paid   to
the Custodian by the Plaintiffs and other Co­sharers. 
5.   That   on   the   26th   April,   1962,   the   Custodian   of
Evacuee   Properties   issued   Sale   Certificates   regarding
the said land in favour of the Plaintiff and the other co­
sharers.   A   copy   of   the   Sale   Certificate   is   attached
herewith as Annexure "B". 
7.  That   after   the   purchase,   the   Plaintiffs   and   the
other cosharers began to reside on land bearing Khasra
No. 395 and some of the co­sharers made a number of
improvements and constructions from 1947­48 to 1963
in the land comprised in the said Khasra and some co­
sharers   also   set   up   an   Automobile   Factory   for   the
manufacture   of   automobiles   and   ancillary   parts   and
body   building   for   mechanically   propelled   vehicles,   in
the said land.
11. That on 1st May, 1964, the co­sharers of this
property   filed   objections   against   the   said   Notification
and thereafter for almost 5 years, no hearing was fixed
for   the   said   objections   and   no   notice   of   any   kind   was
received by any of the cosharers. 
12. That on 19th September, 1966, Mrs. Shiv Raj
Bahadur, who is one of the co­sharers of this property,
made a representation against the proposed acquisition
to   the   Government   of   India,   through   the   Hon'ble
Minister   Shri   Mehar   Chand   Khanna   of   the   Ministry   of
Works   &   Housing.   A   copy   of   the   representation   made,
is attached herewith as Annexure "C".
25

44.   That   the   Plaintiffs   and   the   other   co­sharers
have all along been harassed for reasons unknown, for
acquiring the said property by the Local Administration
in   spite   of   two   specific   directions   and   decisions   of   the
Central Government to denotify the said property.
(45)   That   the   legal   representatives   of   the   co­
sharers   who   had   died,   were   entitled   to   be   heard   and
although   it   was   brought   to   the   notice   of   the   Land
Acquisition   Collector   that   there   were   legal
representatives   of   the   deceased   owners,   but   they   were
not given any opportunity of being heard, and no notice
was   issued   to   them,   therefore,   the   entire   proceedings
are vitiated.
47.   That   Defendants   nos.   8   to   39   are   co­sharers
in   the   land   in   dispute   and   have   been   impleaded   as
proper parties to the suit”
8.3 That   the   plaintiffs   being   co­owners/co­sharers   of   the
entire suit land in question prayed for the following reliefs:   
“(a)   It   is   declared   that   the­entire   proceedings
adopted under Section SA of the Land Acquisition Act
are   malafide,   illegal   and   incomplete   violation   of   the
letter   and   spirit   of.   the   Land   Acquisition   Act   and   is
contrary to the principles of natural justice, fair­play,
equity and good conscience. 
(b)   It   is   declared   that   the   Notification   no.
F.19(93­A)/63­   L&H(ii)   dated   21st   March,   1964
issued   under,   Section   4   of   the   Land   Acquisition   Act
stands   withdrawn   and/   or   cancelled   and   waived   by
your own conduct. 
(c)   It   be   declared   that   the   Notification   No.
F.19(93­A)/63­   L&H   dated   16th   January,   1969
issued under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act is
malafide,   illegal,   null   and   void,   ultra   vires,
inoperative   in   Law   and   without   jurisdiction   and/   or
in excess of jurisdiction. 
26

(d)   A   permanent   injunction   be   issued   against
the   Defendants   not   to   dispossess   the   Plaintiffs   and
the   other   co­sharers   from   the   property   and   land
bearing Khasra no. 395, 394 and 708/393 of Village
Kharera. 
(e) An ad interim ex­parte injunction in terms of
the proceedings prayer. 
(f)   The   costs   of   the   suit   be   allowed   to   the
Plaintiff against the Defendants. 
(g)   The   Defendants   be   ordered   to   pay   to   the
Plaintiffs the cost of incidentals. 
(h) The Court may pass such other and further
orders   as   may   be   just,   proper   and   necessary   under
the circumstances of the case.”
8.4 Thus, from the aforesaid it can be seen that the original
plaintiffs   –   two   co­owners/co­sharers   of   the   entire   land   in
question   fought   with   respect   to   the   entire   land   belonging   to
the plaintiffs and the co­owners jointly.  It can be said that the
original plaintiffs instituted the suit for themselves as well as
for and/or on behalf of the other co­owners – co­sharers with
respect to the entire land jointly owned by all of them.   Thus,
it   can   safely   be   held   that   the   entire   estate   was   represented
through   original   plaintiffs   in   which   even   the   co­sharers/co­
owners   were   also   joined   as   defendants   as   proper   parties.
Therefore,   even   when   the   learned   Trial   Court   passed   the
judgment and decree, it passed the judgment and decree with
27

respect   to   the   entire   land   and   even   granted   the   permanent
injunction   to   protect   the   ownership   and   protection   of   the
plaintiffs as well as the other co­sharers over the suit land.  In
light   of   the   above   factual   scenario   the   order   passed   by   the
High Court dated 09.07.2007 in dismissing the first appeal as
a whole as having been abated on not taking step to bring on
record   the   legal   representatives   of   some   of   the   original
defendants/respondents in the appeal is required to be tested
and/or considered in light of the settled legal principles.
9. While   considering   the   impugned   order   passed   by   the
High Court dated 09.07.2007, dismissing the appeal as having
abated,   the   law   on   abatement   and   on   Order   22   CPC   is
required to be discussed.   Order 22 CPC fell for consideration
before   this   Court   in   the   recent   decision   in   the   case   of
Venigalla   Koteswaramman   (supra)   in   which   this   Court
considered   in   detail   the   earlier   decisions   of   this   Court   in   the
case   of   Nathu   Ram   (supra)   as   well   as   the   other   decisions
including the later decision in the case of  Hemareddi (supra).
28

The relevant discussion on Order 22 CPC in paragraphs 42 to
44.8 are extracted as under:
“42.   The rules of procedure for dealing with death,
marriage, and insolvency of parties in a civil litigation
are   essentially   governed   by   the   provisions   contained
in Order 22 of the Code.
42.1.   Though the provisions in Rule 1 to Rule 10­
A of Order 22 primarily  refer to the proceedings in a
suit   but,   by   virtue   of   Rule   11,   the   said   provisions
apply   to   the   appeals   too   and,   for   the   purpose   of   an
appeal,   the   expressions   “plaintiff”,   “defendant”   and
“suit” could be read as “appellant”, “respondent” and
“appeal” respectively.
42.2.   Rule 1 of Order 22 of the Code declares that
the   death   of   a   plaintiff   or   defendant   shall   not   cause
the   suit   to   abate   if   the   right   to   sue   survives.   When
read for the purpose  of appeal, this provision means
that   the   death   of   an   appellant   or   respondent   shall
not   cause   the   appeal   to   abate   if   the   right   to   sue
survives.
42.3.   Rule   2   of   Order   22   of   the   Code   ordains   the
procedure   where   one   of   the   several   plaintiffs   or
defendants   dies   and   right   to   sue   survives   to   the
surviving   plaintiff(s)   alone,   or   against   the   surviving
defendant(s)   alone.   The   same   procedure   applies   in
appeal   where   one   of   the   several   appellants   or
respondents   dies   and   right   to   sue   survives   to   the
surviving   appellant(s)   alone,   or   against   the   surviving
respondent(s) alone. The procedure is that the Court
is required to cause an entry to that effect to be made
on   record   and   the   appeal   is   to   proceed   at   the
instance   of   the   surviving   appellant(s)   or   against   the
surviving respondent(s), as the case may be.
29

42.4.   However, by virtue of Rule 4 read with Rule
11 of Order 22 of the Code, in case of death of one of
the several respondents, where right to sue does not
survive   against   the   surviving   respondent   or
respondents   as   also   in   the   case   where   the   sole
respondent   dies   and   the   right   to   sue   survives,   the
contemplated   procedure   is   that   the   legal
representatives of the deceased respondent are to be
substituted   in   his   place;   and   if   no   application   is
made for such substitution within the time limited by
law,   the   appeal   abates   as   against   the   deceased
respondent.
42.5.   Of   course,   the   provisions   have   been   made
for  dealing   with   the  application   for   substitution   filed
belatedly but the same need not be elaborated in the
present   case   because   it   remains   an   admitted   fact
that   no   application   for   substitution   of   legal
representatives of Defendant 2 (who was Respondent
3 in AS No. 1887 of 1988) was made before the High
Court.
42.6.   The   relevant   provisions   contained   in   Rules
1, 2, sub­rules (1), (2) and (3) of Rule 4 and Rule 11
of Order 22 could be usefully reproduced as under 
“ 1.   No   abatement   by   party's   death,   if   right   to
sue   survives .—The   death   of   a   plaintiff   or   defendant
shall   not   cause   the   suit   to   abate   if   the   right   to   sue
survives.
2. Procedure where one of several plaintiffs or
defendants   dies   and   right   to   sue   survives .—
Where   there   are   more   plaintiffs   or   defendants   than
one, and any of them dies, and where the right to sue
survives   to   the   surviving   plaintiff   or   plaintiffs   alone,
or   against   the   surviving   defendant   or   defendants
alone, the Court shall cause an entry to that effect to
30

be made on the record, and the suit shall proceed at
the instance of the surviving plaintiff or plaintiffs, or
against the surviving defendant or defendants.
***
4.   Procedure in case of death of one of several
defendants or of sole defendant .—(1) Where one of
two   or   more   defendants   dies   and   the   right   to   sue
does   not   survive   against   the   surviving   defendant   or
defendants   alone,   or   a   sole   defendant   or   sole
surviving   defendant   dies   and   the   right   to   sue
survives,   the   Court,   on   an   application   made   in   that
behalf,   shall   cause   the   legal   representative   of   the
deceased   defendant   to   be   made   a   party   and   shall
proceed with the suit.
(2)   Any   person   so   made   a   party   may   make   any
defence   appropriate   to   his   character   as   legal
representative of the deceased defendant.
(3)   Where   within   the   time   limited   by   law   no
application is made under sub­rule (1), the suit shall
abate as against the deceased defendant.
***
11.   Application   of   Order   to   appeals .—In   the
application of this Order to appeals, so far as may be,
the   word   “plaintiff”   shall   be   held   to   include   an
appellant,   the   word   “defendant”   a   respondent,   and
the word “suit” an appeal.”
43.   For   determining   if   Order   22   Rule   2   could
apply,   we   have   to   examine   if   right   to   sue   survived
against   the   surviving   respondents.   It   is   not   the   case
that no legal  heirs  were  available  for  Defendant 2. It
is also not the case where the estate of the deceased
Defendant   2   passed   on   to   the   remaining   parties   by
survivorship   or   otherwise.   Therefore,   applicability   of
Order 22 Rule 2 CPC is clearly ruled out.
31

44.   Admittedly,   steps   were   not   taken   for
substitution of the legal representatives of Defendant
2,   who   was   Respondent   3   in   AS   No.   1887   of   1988.
Therefore,   sub­rule   (3)   of   Rule   4   of   Order   22   of   the
Code   directly   came   into   operation   and   the   said
appeal   filed   by   Defendants   16   to   18   abated   against
Defendant   2   (Respondent   3   therein).   We   may
profitably   recapitulate   at   this   juncture   that   in   fact,
the other appeal filed by Defendants 4, 13 and 14 (AS
No.   1433   of   1989)   was   specifically   dismissed   by   the
High   Court   as   against   the   deceased   Defendant   2   on
25­4­2006.
44.1.   Once   it   is   found   that   the   appeal   filed   by
Defendants   16   to   18   abated   as   against   Defendant   2
(Respondent   3),   the   question   arises   as   to   whether
that   appeal   could   have   proceeded   against   the
surviving   respondents   i.e.   the   plaintiff   and
Defendants 1 and 3 (who were Respondents 1, 2 and
4).   For   dealing   with   this   question,   we   may   usefully
refer   to   the  relevant  principles,  concerning  the   effect
of   abatement   of   appeal   against   one   respondent   in
case   of   multiple   respondents,   as   enunciated   and
explained by this Court.
44.2.   The   relevant   principles   were   stated   and
explained   in   depth   by   this   Court   in   State   of
Punjab   v.   Nathu   Ram   [ State   of   Punjab   v.   Nathu   Ram ,
AIR   1962   SC   89].   In   that   case,   the   Punjab
Government   had   acquired   certain   pieces   of   land
belonging   to   two   brothers   jointly.   Upon   their   refusal
to   accept   the   compensation   offered,   their   joint   claim
was referred to arbitration and an award was passed
in   their   favour   that   was   challenged   by   the   State
Government in appeal before the High Court. During
pendency   of   appeal,   one   of   the   brothers   died   but   no
application   was   filed   within   time   to   bring   on   record
his   legal   representatives.   The   High   Court   dismissed
32

[ Province   of   East   Punjab   v.   Labhu   Ram ,   1954   SCC
OnLine   P&H   132]   the   appeal   while   observing   that   it
had   abated   against   the   deceased   brother   and
consequently,   abated   against   the   surviving   brother
too.   The   order   so   passed   by   the   High   Court   was
questioned   before   this   Court   in   appeal   by   certificate
of fitness.
44.3.   While   dismissing   the   appeal   and   affirming
the views of the High Court, this Court in   Nathu Ram
case   [ State of Punjab   v.   Nathu Ram , AIR 1962 SC 89]
enunciated   the   principles   concerning   the   effect   of
abatement   and   explained   as   to   why,   in   case   of   joint
and   indivisible   decree,   the   appeal   against   the
surviving   respondent(s)   cannot   be   proceeded   with
and has to be dismissed as a result of its abatement
against   the   deceased   respondent;   the   basic   reason
being that in the absence of the legal representatives
of   deceased   respondent,   the   appellate   court   cannot
determine   between   the   appellant   and   the   legal
representatives  anything  which may  affect  the  rights
of   the   legal   representatives.   This   Court   pointed   out
that   by   abatement   of   appeal   qua   the   deceased
respondent, the decree between the appellant and the
deceased respondent becomes final and the appellate
court cannot, in any way modify that decree, directly
or indirectly.
44.4.   The   Court   observed   in   that   case,   inter   alia ,
as   under:   ( Nathu   Ram   case   [ State   of   Punjab   v.   Nathu
Ram , AIR 1962 SC  89] ,  AIR pp.  90­91, paras  4­6 &
8)
“ 4 . It is not disputed that in view of Order 22 Rule
4,  Civil   Procedure   Code,   hereinafter   called   the   Code,
the   appeal   abated   against   Labhu   Ram,   deceased,
when   no   application   for   bringing   on   record   his   legal
representatives   had   been   made   within   the   time
33

limited   by   law.   The   Code   does   not   provide   for   the
abatement   of   the   appeal   against   the   other
respondents.   Courts   have   held   that   in   certain
circumstances,   the   appeals   against   the   co­
respondents   would   also   abate   as   a   result   of   the
abatement   of   the   appeal   against   the   deceased
respondent.   They   have   not   been   always   agreed   with
respect   to   the   result   of   the   particular   circumstances
of   a   case   and   there   has   been,   consequently,
divergence   of   opinion   in   the   application   of   the
principle.   It   will   serve   no   useful   purpose   to   consider
the cases. Suffice it to say that when Order 22 Rule 4
does   not   provide   for   the   abatement   of   the   appeals
against   the   co­respondents   of   the   deceased
respondent there can be no question of abatement of
the   appeals   against   them.   To   say   that   the   appeals
against them abated in certain circumstances, is not
a   correct   statement.   Of   course,   the   appeals   against
them   cannot   proceed   in   certain   circumstances   and
have   therefore   to   be   dismissed.   Such   a   result
depends   on   the   nature   of   the   relief   sought   in   the
appeal.
5 .   The   same   conclusion   is   to   be   drawn   from   the
provisions   of   Order   1   Rule   9   of   the   Code   which
provides   that   no   suit   shall   be   defeated   by   reason   of
the misjoinder or non­joinder of parties and the court
may,   in   every   suit,   deal   with   the   matter   in
controversy so far as regards the rights and interests
of   the   parties   actually   before   it.   It   follows,   therefore,
that   if   the   court   can   deal   with   the   matter   in
controversy so far as regards the rights and interests
of   the   appellant   and   the   respondents   other   than   the
deceased   respondent,   it   has   to   proceed   with   the
appeal and decide it.   It is only when it is not possible
for   the   court   to   deal   with   such   matters,   that   it   will
have to refuse to proceed further with the appeal and
therefore dismiss it .
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6 .   The   question   whether   a   court   can   deal   with
such matters or not, will depend on the facts of each
case   and   therefore   no   exhaustive   statement   can   be
made about the circumstances when  this is possible
or   is   not   possible.   It   may,   however,   be   stated   that
ordinarily   the   considerations   which   weigh   with   the
court   in   deciding   upon   this   question   are   whether   the
appeal   between   the   appellants   and   the   respondents
other   than   the   deceased   can   be   said   to   be   properly
constituted   or   can   be   said   to   have   all   the   necessary
parties   for   the   decision   of   the   controversy   before   the
court. The test to determine this has been described in
diverse forms. Courts will not proceed with an appeal
(a)   when   the   success   of   the   appeal   may   lead   to   the
court's   coming   to   a   decision   which   be   in   conflict   with
the  decision  between  the  appellant  and  the  deceased
respondent   and   therefore   which   would   lead   to   the
court's passing a decree which will be contradictory to
the decree which had become final with respect to the
same   subject­matter   between   the   appellant   and   the
deceased respondent; (b) when the appellant could not
have   brought   the   action   for   the   necessary   relief
against   those   respondents   alone   who   are   still   before
the   court;   and   (c)   when   the   decree   against   the
surviving   respondents,   if   the   appeal   succeeds,   be
ineffective,   that   is   to   say,   it   could   not   be   successfully
executed .
***
8 . The difficulty arises always when there is a joint
decree. Here again, the consensus of opinion is that if
the decree is joint and indivisible, the appeal against
the other respondents also will not be proceeded with
and   will   have   to   be   dismissed   as   a   result   of   the
abatement   of   the   appeal   against   the   deceased
respondent.   Different   views   exist   in   the   case   of   joint
decrees in favour of respondents whose rights in the
subject­matter   of   the   decree   are   specified.   One   view
35

is   that   in   such   cases,   the   abatement   of   the   appeal
against the deceased respondent will have the result
of making the decree affecting his specific interest to
be   final   and   that   the   decree   against   the   other
respondents   can   be   suitably   dealt   with   by   the
appellate court. We do not consider this view correct.
The   specification   of   shares   or   of   interest   of   the
deceased respondent does not affect the nature of the
decree   and   the   capacity   of   the   joint   decree­holder   to
execute   the   entire   decree   or   to   resist   the   attempt   of
the   other   party   to   interfere   with   the   joint   right
decreed   in   his   favour.   The   abatement   of   an   appeal
means not only that the decree between the appellant
and   the   deceased   respondent   has   become   final,   but
also, as a necessary corollary, that the appellate court
cannot,   in   any   way,   modify   that   decree   directly   or
indirectly. The reason is plain. It is that in the absence
of   the   legal   representatives   of   the   deceased
respondent,   the   appellate   court   cannot   determine
anything   between   the   appellant   and   the   legal
representatives   which   may   affect   the   rights   of   the
legal   representatives   under   the   decree.   It   is
immaterial that the modification which the Court will
do is one to which exception can or cannot be taken.”
9.1 After referring to the decision of this Court in the case of
Nathu   Ram   (supra),   in   the   case   of   Vennigalla
Koteswaramma   vs.   Malampati   Suryamba   and   Others,
(2003)   3   SCC   272 ,   it   is   observed   by   this   Court   that   the
nature   and   extent   of   the   abatement   in   a   given   case   and   the
decision   to   be   taken   thereon   will   depend   upon   the   facts   of
36

each   case   and,   therefore,   no   exhaustive   statement   can   be
made either  way  and that the decision will ultimately depend
upon the fact whether the decree obtained was a joint decree
or   a   separate   one.     It   is   further   observed   that   this   question
cannot and should not also be tested merely on the format of
the   decree   under   challenge   or   it   being   one   or   the   manner   in
which it was dealt with before or by the Court which passed it.
Thus, as observed and held by the Court:
(i) The   death   of   a   plaintiff   or   defendant   shall   not   cause
the suit to abate if the right to sue survives;
(ii) If   t here   are   more   plaintiffs   or   defendants   than   one,
and   any   of   them   dies,   and   where   the   right   to   sue
survives to the surviving plaintiff or plaintiffs alone, or
against   the   surviving   defendant   or   defendants   alone,
the   Court   shall   cause   an   entry   to   that   effect   to   be
made on the record, and the suit shall proceed at the
instance   of   the   surviving   plaintiff   or   plaintiffs,   or
against   the   surviving   defendant   or   defendants   (Order
22 Rule 2);
37

(iii) where   one   of   two   or   more   defendants   dies   and   the
right   to   sue   does   not   survive   against   the   surviving
defendant or defendants alone, or a sole defendant or
sole   surviving   defendant   dies   and   the   right   to   sue
survives,   the   Court,   on   an   application   made   in   that
behalf,   shall   cause   the   legal   representative   of   the
deceased   defendant   to   be   made   a   party   and   shall
proceed   with   the   suit.     Where   within   the   time  limited
by   law   no   application   is   made   under   sub­rule   1   of
Order   22   Rule   4,   the   suit   shall   abate   as   against   the
deceased defendant;
(iv) the   provision   of   Order   22   shall   also   apply   to   the
appeal proceedings also.
9.2 As   observed   and   held   by   this   Court   in   the   aforesaid
decisions   while   considering   whether   the   suit/appeal   has
abated   due   to   non­bringing   the   legal   representatives   of
plaintiffs/defendants   or   not,   the   Court   has   to   examine   if   the
right   to   sue   survives   against   the   surviving   respondents.
Thereafter   the   Appellate   Court   has   to   consider   the   question
whether non­bringing the legal representatives of some of the
38

defendants,   the   appeal   could   have   proceeded   against   the
surviving  respondents.   Therefore, the Appellate Court  has  to
consider the effect of abatement of the appeal against each of
the respondents in case of multiple respondents.
9.3 Applying the law laid down by this Court in the aforesaid
decisions   to   the   impugned   judgment   and   order   dated
09.07.2007   passed   by   the   High   Court,   it   appears   that   the
High Court has mechanically and without holding any further
enquiry   which   was   required   to   be   conducted   as   observed
hereinabove, has simply dismissed the entire appeal as having
abated due to non­bringing on record the legal representatives
of  some of the respondents  – the  original  defendants  who,  as
such,   neither   contested   the   suit   nor   filed   the   written
statements.     At   the   cost   of   repetition,   it   is   observed   that   as
such   the   original   plaintiffs   instituted   the   suit   being   co­
owners/co­sharers   and   for   and   on   behalf   of   all   the   co­
owners/co­sharers   of   the   entire   land   sought   to   be   acquired
under the Land Acquisition Act.
39

9.4 As   observed   and   held   by   this   Court   in   the   case   of   K.
Vishwanathan   Pillai   (supra),   the   co­owner   is   as   much   an
owner   of   the   entire   property   as   a   sole   owner   of   the   property.
No   co­owner   has   a   definite   right,   title   and   interest   in   any
particular   item   or   a   portion   thereof.     On   the   other   hand,   he
has   right,   title   and   interest   in   every   part   and   parcel   of   the
joint   property.     He   owns   several   parts   of   the   composite
property   along   with   others   and   it   cannot   be   said   that   he   is
only a part owner or  a fractional owner  in the property.   It is
observed   that,   therefore,   one   co­owner   can   file   a   suit   and
recover   the   property   against   strangers   and   the   decree   would
enure   to   all   the   co­owners.     The   aforesaid   principle   of   law
would   be   applicable   in   the   appeal   also.     Thus,   in   the   instant
case,   when   the   original   plaintiffs   –   two   co­owners   instituted
the   suit   with   respect   to   the   entire   suit   land   jointly   owned   by
the   plaintiffs   as   well   as   defendants   nos.   9   to   39   and   when
some of the defendants/respondents in appeal died, it can be
said   that   estate   is   represented   by   others   –   more   particularly
the plaintiffs/heirs of the plaintiffs and it cannot be said that
on not bringing the legal representatives of the some of the co­
40

sharers   –   defendants   –   respondents   in   appeal   the   appeal
would abate as a whole.
9.5 While passing the impugned order dated 09.07.2007, the
High   Court   has   neither   considered   the   relevant   provisions   of
CPC   namely   Order   22   Rule   1   to   11   nor   held   any   enquiry
which was required to be conducted as observed hereinabove.
9.6 One   another   important   aspect   which   is   also   required   to
be noted is that the suit was filed challenging  the acquisition
proceedings   under   the   Land   Acquisition   Act,   that   too,   with
respect   to   the   land   in   question.     It   was   the   specific   case   on
behalf of the appellant and even the issue was framed by the
learned   Trial   Court   on   the   jurisdiction   of   the   Civil   Court   to
entertain   the   suit   challenging   the   acquisition   proceedings
under   the   Land   Acquisition   Act.     From   the   findings   recorded
by the learned Trial Court, it appears that though the learned
Trial   Court   held   the   issue   of   jurisdiction   in   favour   of   the
appellant   herein,   still   thereafter   it   granted   the   relief   and
decreed the suit which was the subject matter before the High
Court.  Thus, according to the appellant ­ DDA – the judgment
and   decree   passed   by   the   learned   Trial   Court   was   a   nullity
41

and   wholly   without   jurisdiction.     If   that   be   so,   then,   another
question which may be required to be considered is, when the
original plaintiffs/legal heirs are on record, can it be said that
the entire appeal has abated, if in the appeal it is held that the
decree   was   a   nullity   and/or   wholly   without   jurisdiction   then
the   decree   will   be   nullity   for   all   purposes.     The   aforesaid
aspect is also required to be determined. 
9.7 In   any   case   what   would   have   been   the   consequences   of
not   bringing   the   legal   representatives   of   some   of   the
respondents/defendants who died during the pendency of the
appeal   and   whether   the   right   to   sue   survives   against   the
original   plaintiffs   and/or   surviving   respondents/defendants
was to be considered by the High Court, which the High Court
failed to consider in the instant case.
10. In view of the above discussion and for the reason stated
above   both   these   appeals   succeed.     The   impugned   judgment
and   order   passed   by   the   High   Court   dated   09.07.2007
dismissing   the   appeal   as   a   whole   as   having   abated   for   not
bringing   the   legal   representatives   of   some   of   the
42

respondents/original   defendants   who   died   during   the
pendency of the appeal is hereby set aside.  The High Court to
consider   the   Appeal   now   in   accordance   with   law   and   on   its
own merits and in light of the observations made hereinabove,
more   particularly,   the   High   Court   shall   have   to   consider   and
hold   an   enquiry,   whether,   on   the   death   of   some   of   the
respondents in the appeal (defendants in suit) the right to sue
against   the   remaining   respondents   –   original   plaintiffs/the
remaining   original   defendants   would   survive   or   not   including
the   fact   that   the   estate   is   being   represented   by   surviving
original   plaintiffs/heirs   of   the   original   plaintiffs/surviving
defendants having a bearing on the enquiry to be held. 
With these observations the present Appeals are Allowed
accordingly   to   the   aforesaid   extent.     However,   there   shall   be
no order as to costs.
 
…………………………………J.
              (M. R. SHAH)
…………………………………J.
                                                  (B.V. NAGARATHNA)
New Delhi, 
July 11, 2022.
43