REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1534 of 2009
FAROOQI BEGUM (D) 
BY LRS.      APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
THE STATE OF 
UTTAR PRADESH      RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
Vikram Nath, J.
Appellant   has   assailed   the   correctness   of
Judgment   and   Order   dated   21.07.2006   passed
by   the   Single   Judge,   Allahabad   High   Court   in
Second Appeal No. 813 of 1975 between Farooqi
Begum   vs.   State   of   Uttar   Pradesh,   whereby   the
Second   Appeal   was   dismissed   giving   rise   to   the
present appeal.
1

FACTS
2. The   State   of   U.P.   through   Collector,
Rampur,   instituted   a   suit   for   declaration,
possession   and   damages   before   the   Court   of
District   Judge,   Rampur,   registered   as   Original
Suit No.1 of 1964, State of U.P. vs. Smt. Farooqi
Begum   with   respect   to   land   in   suit   measuring
20  bighas  10  biswa (pukhta) situated  in   Village
Thotar,   Tehsil   Sadar,   District   Rampur,   that   it
was   a   government   grove   (known   as   ‘ Bagh
Hazoor   Pasand’ )   and   presently   belonging   to   the
U.P. State Garden Department, Rampur.
3. According to the plaint averments, the said
grove   was   rent   free   grant   of   the   defendant   long
before   the   merger   of   Rampur   State   and   like
other   Muafis ;   it   was   granted   by   His   Highness
2

Nawab   Hamid   Ali   Khan   to   his   different   wives
and was liable to resumption at the pleasure of
the   ruler   of   erstwhile   Rampur   State;   after   the
death   of   Nawab   Hamid   Ali   Khan   in   1930,   his
successor Nawab Raza Ali Khan resumed all the
Muafis   of   all   the   widows   of   his   father   including
that   of   the   defendant;   the   possession   of   the
same   was   taken   over   by   the   State   Authorities
soon   after   the   resumption;   the   same   was   given
effect   to   in   the   revenue   papers   and   the   grove
concerned   came   to   be   recorded   in   the   name   of
the   State   ( Shamil   Khalasa );   the   defendant   and
her   Karpoons   through   collusion   of   the   revenue
officers   managed   to   get   her   name   continued   in
the Patwari’s record even though her possession
had   been   removed;   the   grove   in   question   along
with   similarly   resumed   grove   came   into   the
3

hands of the State of U.P. at the time of merger;
ever   since   the   State   has   been   selling   its   Bahar;
the defendant on the basis of continuance of her
name, though illegally, continued to interfere in
the   possession   of   the   State   even   in   1959
claiming the grove in question in her ownership;
the   State   of   U.P.   took   legal   steps   to   get   the
revenue   records   corrected   by   expunging   the
name of the defendant and for incorporating the
name   of   the   State   but   the   revenue   court
declined   such   request   of   the   State   as   such   the
necessity to file the suit arose.
4. Smt.   Farooqi   Begum,   the   sole   defendant,
filed   the   written   statement   denying   the   plaint
allegations   except   that   the   proceedings   before
the   revenue   courts   culminated   in   her   favour;   it
4

was further alleged that the defendant had been
in   continuous   possession   since   1924;   the
property   in   suit   was   the   holding   of   the
defendant   on   the   commencement   of   U.P.
Zamindari   Abolition   and   Land   Reforms   Act,
1952 and as such on the commencement of the
Act,   the   defendant   became   the   ‘Bhumidhar’
thereof;   that   in   proceedings   for   ejectment
against   one   Laddan   Khan   initiated   by   the
defendant,   the   State   being   a   party   had
acquiesced   to   the   defendant’s   title   as   such   the
suit   was   barred   by   estoppel;   further   that   the
Bagh   Hazoor   Pasand   was   in   possession   of
defendant   and   was   her   own   property   and
adjoining   grove   measuring   13   bighas   2   biswas
was   the   grove   of   the   plaintiff   State   and   was   in
its   possession;   both   these   groves   are   separated
5

by a   Nala   (a drain); the plaintiff had filed a suit
on   a   wrong   advice   that   the   grove   in   question
was resumed; other formal pleas of defence were
also taken in the written statement.
5. The   Trial   Court   proceeded   to   frame   issues
on   the   basis   of   pleadings   and   allowed   the
parties   to   lead   their   evidence.   The   defendant
filed   an   application   under   Order   VI   Rule   17   of
the   Code   of   Civil   Procedure,   1908 1
  for
amendment   in   the   written   statement   on
01.11.1965.   The   Trial   Court   vide   judgment
dated   13.11.1966   decreed   the   suit   and   at   the
same   time   rejected   the   amendment   application
on   the   ground   that   it   had   been   filed   at   a   very
belated   stage   after   the   arguments   had   been
heard.   Against   the   said   judgment   dated
1   In short “CPC”
6

13.11.1966,   the   defendant   preferred   an   appeal
which was originally filed before the High Court
and   registered   as   First   Appeal   No.61   of   1967
but  later  on   transferred   to   the  Court   of   District
Judge,   Rampur,   after   the   U.P.   Civil   Laws
Amendment Act, 1970.
6. In   the   Court   of   District   Judge,   Rampur,   it
was   registered   as   Civil   Appeal   No.   50   of   1970,
Smt.   Farooqi   Begum   vs.   State   of   U.P.   The
District   Judge,   Rampur,   vide   judgment   and
order dated 08.09.1971 allowed the amendment
dated 01.11.1965, set aside the judgment of the
Trial Court dated 13.11.1966 and remanded the
matter   to   the   Trial   Court   for   a   fresh   decision
after   necessary   reframing   of   issues   and
opportunity to the parties to adduce evidence.
7

7. After remand, the Trial Court in addition to
the   already   framed   ten   issues,   further   framed
four more issues and allowed the parties to lead
evidence.   The   Trial   court   vide   judgment   and
order dated 01.05.1973 again decreed the suit.
8. The   First   Appeal   filed   by   the   defendant
registered   as   Civil   Appeal   No.73   was   dismissed
by IInd Additional District Judge, Rampur, vide
judgment   dated   06.03.1975.   Aggrieved   by   the
same,   the   defendant   preferred   the   Second
Appeal   before   the   High   Court   registered   as
Second   Appeal   No.   813   of   1975.   The   learned
single   Judge   of   the   Allahabad   High   Court   vide
judgment   and   order   dated   21.07.2006
dismissed   the   Second   Appeal   which   has   given
rise to the filing of the present appeal.
8

9. We   have   heard   Ms.   Nitya   Ramakrishnan,
learned   senior   counsel   for   the   appellants   and
Mr.   Tanmaya   Agarwal,   learned   counsel   for   the
State. We have been taken through the material
on record by the learned counsel for the parties.
Arguments of the appellant:
10. The   following   submissions   have   been
advanced on behalf of the appellant stating that
the   courts   below   committed   the   following
serious errors of law.
i. The   burden   of   proof   was   wrongly   shifted
on the defendant­appellant.
ii. Inadmissible   evidence   was   relied   upon   to
record   finding   in   favour   of   the   plaintiff­
respondent.
9

iii. Secondary   evidence   was   relied   upon
without   the   Record­keeper   being
examined to prove the same.
iv. Even   the   secondary   evidence   relied   upon
smelt   of   manipulation   and   interpolation,
which was illegally ignored.
v. Documents were prepared in the name of
the   defendant­appellant,   which   were
specifically   denied,   but   the   same   was
illegally relied upon.
vi. The   core   issue   as   to   whether   an
unconditional gift by a husband in favour
of   his   wife   during   the   subsistence   of   the
marriage   was   irrevocable,   has   not   been
looked   into,   thereby   resulting   into   grave
error of justice.
10

vii. The   plaintiff­respondent   had   completely
failed to prove their case as there was no
evidence   to   support   their   claim   but   still
the suit was decreed.
viii. Relevant   and   admissible   evidence   was
illegally ignored.
ix. The   pleadings   of   the   plaintiff­respondent
were vague and not specific, nor was duly
established by evidence despite the same,
the suit was decreed.
x. The   defendant­appellant   was   throughout
in possession and, as such, had perfected
her right, title and interest on the coming
of   the   U.P.   Zamindari   Abolition   &   Land
Reforms   Act,   1951,   which   aspect   has  not
been considered.
11. On   all   the   above   submissions,   learned
11

counsel for the appellants has referred in detail
to the evidence and the relevant material, which
we will refer to at a later stage.
12. On the other hand, learned counsel for the
plaintiff­respondent   made   the   following
submissions:
i. All   the   three   courts   below   have   recorded
concurrent   findings   of   fact   and,   as   such,
do not call for any interference.
ii. Once   the   plaintiff   and   defendant   both
have   equal   opportunity   to   lead   evidence,
the argument regarding shifting of burden
of proof would lose its significance.
iii. The   plaintiff­respondent   had   led   cogent,
reliable   and   admissible   evidence   to
establish his case.
12

iv. The   courts   below   have   taken   into
consideration   all   the   material   placed
before it and after due appreciation of the
same,   in   accordance   with   law,   the
findings have been recorded.
v. All the three courts have dealt with all the
specific   issues   framed   and   have   recorded
their   findings   after   due   consideration   of
the material placed by both the sides.
ANALYSIS:
13. The suit of the respondent instituted for the
relief   of   declaration,   possession   and   mesne
profits   was   based   on   the   averments   that   the
grant   given   by   Nawab   Hamid   Ali   Khan   in   1924
in favour of the appellant, had been resumed by
his successor, Nawab Raza Ali Khan in the year
1930,   thereafter,   the   respondent   had   entered
13

into   possession,   the   records   were   corrected,
however,   the   appellant   on   account   of   some
omission in the maintenance of the records, re­
entered into possession sometimes in 1959 and,
therefore, they were compelled to file a suit. It is
also   stated   that   the   respondent   made   an
attempt to get the records corrected through the
revenue   court   by   way   of   an   application   for
correction of revenue records, but the same was
rejected by the Deputy Collector in 1953.
14. On   the   above   pleadings,   the   first   thing
required to be proved by the plaintiff­respondent
was   that   there   was   resumption   of   the   grant
given   in   favour   of   the   appellant.   For   the   said
purpose,   neither   any   such   order   resuming   the
earlier   grant   was   filed,   nor   any   order   of   the
14

revenue   court   was   filed   to   show   that   the   said
resumption   of   grant   had   been   incorporated   in
the revenue records. The defense taken was that
all   the   records   had   been   destroyed   in   a   fire   in
1947.   The   only   evidence   led   by   the   plaintiff­
respondent   was   filing   of   a   true   copy   of   Muafiat
Register   and   the   statement   of   PW­2   (Roop
Kishore), who was said to be working as a Clerk
in the Revenue Department.
15. We   have   examined   the   statement   of   PW­2.
According   to   learned   counsel   for   the   appellant,
two   basic   objections   were   taken   for   not   relying
upon   the   Muafiat   Register.     Firstly,   it   had   torn
binding   and   had   loose   pages.   Secondly,   the
entire register was written in blue­black ink and
it   is   only   the   entry   relating   to   the   land   in
15

question   regarding   resumption   was   written   in
black ink. These two aspects casted a doubt on
the veracity of the entries in the register and in
particular   the   entry   relating   to   the   resumption.
The   document   was,   thus,   a   document   not   free
from   suspicion   and   as   such,   no   reliance   could
be placed upon it.
16. Apart   from   the   above,   no   other   evidence
was led by  the plaintiff­respondent to prove the
resumption. PW­2 in his cross­examination, had
no explanation for the loose pages, the index i.e.
the   first   page   and   the   last   page   being   missing
with no detail of the number of pages in the said
register.   Further,   there   was   no   explanation   for
the difference in the ink and that too only on the
page by which, the entry relating to resumption
16

with   respect   to   the   land   in   dispute   was   made.
The   courts   below   relied   upon   the   entries   in   the
Muafiat Register only for the reason that it was
a document produced by the State and the State
would   have   no   reason   to   make   any   kind   of
interpolation.     There   was   no   other   supporting
document   with   regard   to   presumption   of   the
land in question.
17. Referring   to   the   above   documents   and
statements,   counsel   for   the   appellants
submitted that grave injustice has been done to
the   appellant   by   the   courts   below   in   holding
that   there   was   a   resumption,   in   the   absence   of
any credible, reliable evidence to that effect.
18. Prima   facie,   we   find   substance   in
17

submission   of   the   learned   counsel   for   the
appellants   that   apparently   there   was   no
evidence to prove the resumption of the grant.
19. Insofar   as   the   issue   of   possession   is
concerned,   learned   counsel   for   the   appellant
submitted   that   it   was   the   specific   case   of   the
defendant­appellants that they had continued in
possession   right   from   1924   i.e.   the   time   when
the   grant   was   given.   It   is   also   submitted   that
throughout   in   the   revenue   records,   the
possession   of   the   defendant­appellant   is
recorded.   It   was   also   submitted   that   20   bighas
and odd piece of land given under the grant was
separated by a  Nala (drain) with a separate piece
of   land   measuring   13   bighas   and   odd,   which
was   in   the   possession   of   State   Department   of
18

Government   Garden   and   it   was   this   smaller
piece   of   land,   which   was   being   let   out   by   the
State   of   U.P.,   Garden   Department   by   selling
usufruct thereof. 
20. It was next submitted that Deputy Collector
in   the   proceedings   for   correction   of   records
initiated by the plaintiff­respondent, had made a
spot   inspection   not   once   but   a   couple   of   times.
In   its   order   dated   03.01.1961,   while   rejecting
the   application   of   the   State   for   deleting   the
name   of   the   defendant­appellant   and   recording
the   name   of   the   plaintiff­respondent,   had
categorically   recorded   that   the   defendant­
appellant   was   in   occupation   and   in   possession
of the land in question. 
19

21. It   may   be   noted   that   the   finding   recorded
by   a   Class­I   Officer   of   the   State   could   not   be
easily ignored. It is true that correction of record
proceedings   is   summary   in   nature,   but   when
the   inspection   was   carried   out,   such   finding
recorded   in   the   order   regarding   possession
ought not to have been ignored.
22. It is thus apparent that plaintiff­respondent
led   no   evidence   to   establish   that   it   was
throughout   in   possession   since   1930   after   the
resumption.   The   courts   below   have   proceeded
on   assumptions   and   presumptions   to   hold   in
favour of the State on the question of possession
and to decree the suit.
23. On   the   other   hand,   we   find   that   that   the
20

defendant­appellants   had   filed   not   only
documentary evidence to prove their continuous
possession   but   also   oral   evidence,   which   has
been ignored. 
24. It   was   further   submitted   on   behalf   of   the
appellants   that   courts   below   have   placed
reliance upon a letter of the defendant­appellant
dated 19.07.1954 to draw presumption that the
defendant­appellant   was   not   in   possession   in
1954   and   it   is   for   this   reason   that   she   had
applied   for   seeking   to   be   put   back   into
possession. The contents of the said letter have
been   perused.     According   to   it,   there   is   some
land   of   Government   and   after   merger   the
Government   Garden   Department,   Rampur   has
taken possession over her grove and the request
21

made   was   to   direct   the   Government   Garden
Department, Rampur to remove their possession
from   her   garden   so   that   she   may   have   full
possession of her share. This clearly means that
there was issue of some part of the land granted
to the defendant­appellants being in possession
of the Garden Department, Rampur.
25. This   letter   has   been   heavily   relied   upon   by
the   courts   below   to   record   the   finding   of
possession in favour of the plaintiff­respondent.
The signatures on the said letter were denied by
the   defendant­appellant,   but   the   same   was
sought   to   be   proved   through   a   nephew   of   step­
sister   instead   of   getting   the   same   verified   by   a
hand­writing expert.
22

26. P.W.­3, Shakir Ali Khan, who claims to be a
Clerk posted as Clerk in the Garden Department
Office,   in   his   examination­in­chief   has   stated
that   he   recognizes   the   signature   of   the
defendant­appellant   as   his   wife   is   the   step­
daughter   of   the   sister   of   the   defendant­
appellant.   However,   in   his   cross­examination,
he states that:
i. he   does   not   know   the   name   of   the   sister
of   Farooqui   Begum,   the   defendant­
appellant,   whose   step­daughter   was   his
wife;   he   even   does   not   know   the   name   of
her   father;   he   had   never   exchanged   any
letter   with   the   defendant­appellant;   he
had not seen defendant­appellant reading
and   writing;   he   does   not   have   any   direct
relationship   with   the   defendant.     The
23

credibility   of   the   statement   of   PW­3   to
prove   the   signature   of   the  defendant  also
appears   to   be   far­fetched   and   doubtful.
We   may   also   note   here   that   even   if   the
said   letter   contain   the   signature   of   the
defendant,   it’s   content   cannot   be   read   to
mean   that   the   defendant   was   expecting
complete   loss   of   possession   over   her
entire   piece   of   land   but   it   was   only   with
respect   to   part   of   the   land   where   the
Government   Garden   Department   had
apparently   encroached   upon   while
demarcating.
27. Learned counsel for the plaintiff­respondent
has   sought   to   justify   the   findings   recorded   by
the courts below referring to the various parts of
24

the   judgments   and   also   taking   us   through   the
evidence on record.
28. Learned   Counsel   for   the   defendant­
appellant has vehemently argued that the gift by
a   muslim   husband   to   his   wife   during   marriage
will   be   irrevocable.     She   has   placed   reliance
upon   a   few   judgements   in   support   of   the   said
submission.     We   are   not   inclined   to   enter   into
that question as prima facie, we are of the view
that   the   matter   requires   reconsideration   by   the
High Court and such an issue could be raised at
that stage.
29. We have given our anxious consideration to
the   arguments   advanced   and   are   of   the   view
that   the   High   Court   fell   in   error   in   not   taking
25

into   consideration   the   relevant   material   and
instead   relying   upon   inadmissible   evidence   or
evidence   which   had   no   bearing   to   the   findings.
Even   the   burden   had   been   wrongly   placed   on
the   defendant­appellant.   Further,   the   High
Court   ought   to   have   carefully   scrutinized   the
evidence available on record and only thereafter
arrived at a conclusion.
30. In view of the above, the appeal deserves to
be allowed.   It is, accordingly,  allowed.
31. The   judgment   of   the   High   Court   impugned
in the appeal is set aside. The matter is remitted
back to the High Court.
32. The   Second   Appeal   be   restored   to   its
original number and may be heard and disposed
of   afresh   in   the   light   of   the   observations   made
26

above.
33. Learned counsel for the parties would be at
liberty   to   raise   all   the   points   before   the   High
Court.   They   undertake   to   extend   all   co­
operation in the hearing of the appeal before the
High Court.   We also request the High Court to
decide the appeal as expeditiously as possible.
…..……..........................J.
[S. ABDUL NAZEER]
………….........................J.
[VIKRAM NATH]
NEW DELHI
JULY 12, 2022. 
27