1 ITEM NO.1503 COURT NO.9 SECTION II-B S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS Criminal Appeal No(s). 1838/2019 AJMAL Appellant(s) VERSUS THE STATE OF KERALA Respondent(s) (IA No. 138723/2019 - EXEMPTION FROM FILING O.T.) (IA No. 111141/2019 - EXEMPTION FROM FILING O.T.) (IA No. 181777/2019 - PERMISSION TO FILE ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTS/ FACTS/ANNEXURES) (IA No. 138721/2019 - PERMISSION TO FILE ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTS/ FACTS/ANNEXURES) WITH Crl.A. No. 1839/2019 (II-B) (IA No. 149320/2019 - EXEMPTION FROM FILING O.T.) (Crl.A. No. 1840/2019 (II-B) (IA No. 153460/2019 - EXEMPTION FROM FILING O.T.) Date : 12-07-2022 These matters were called on for pronouncement of Judgment today. For Appellant(s) Mr. P. V. Dinesh, AOR Mr. Ashwini Kumar Singh, Adv. Mr. Bineesh K., Adv. Mr. Harikumar V., AOR Mr. Anupam Mishra, Adv. Mr. Jenis V. Francis, Adv. Ms. P. S. Chandralekha, Adv. Mr. N. Hariharan, Sr. Adv. Mr. Shinoj K. Narayanan, Adv. Mr. K. Rajeev, AOR For Respondent(s) Mr. Harshad V. Hameed, AOR Mr. Dileep Poolakkot, Adv. Ms. Ashly Harshad, Adv. Hon’ble Mr. Justice Vikram Nath pronounced the reportable Judgment of the Bench comprising Hon’ble Mr. Justice Ajay Rastogi 2 and His Lordship. The operative portion of the Judgment is reproduced hereunder:- “23. Thus, for all the reasons stated above, we are of the view that the appellants would be entitled for acquittal under section 302 IPC but would be liable to be convicted under section 304 Part-II IPC. Rest of the conviction upheld by the High Court and the sentence for the charges under sections 341, 323, 324 and 427 read with section 34 IPC is maintained. It is ordered accordingly. 24. Now coming to the question of sentence upon conviction under section 304 Part-II IPC, we find that all the three appellants are in jail and have undergone several years of incarceration. We accordingly award the sentence for the period already undergone by all the three appellants. The appellants would be released forthwith unless they are required in any other case. 25. Appeals stand partly allowed as above. The impugned judgment of the High Court stands modified to the aforesaid extent.” 3 Pending interlocutory application(s), if any, is/are disposed of. (JAYANT KUMAR ARORA) (RENU BALA GAMBHIR) ASST. REGISTRAR-CUM-PS COURT MASTER (Signed reportable Judgment is placed on the file) 4 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Criminal Appeal No. 1838 of 2019 AJMAL                          APPELLANT(S) VERSUS THE STATE OF KERALA    RESPONDENT(S) WITH Criminal Appeal No. 1839 of 2019 AND WITH Criminal Appeal No. 1840 of 2019 J U D G M E N T Vikram Nath, J. 1. The   present   set   of   three   appeals   filed   by   accused­ appellants   namely,   Biju   (accused   no.1),   Ashique   Salam (accused   no.2)   and   Ajmal   (accused   no.3)   assail   the correctness   of   the   judgment   and  order   dated  30 th   May,   2019 passed   by   the   High   Court   of   Kerala   in   Criminal   Appeal   Nos. 5 91, 238 and 564 of 2014, whereby the aforesaid appeals were partly allowed. The conviction of these three appellants under sections 143, 147, 148 IPC 1  read with section 149 IPC was set aside, however, their conviction and sentence under sections 341,   323,   324,   427   and   302   read   with   section   34   IPC   as awarded by the Trial Court was confirmed. 2. At   the   outset,   it   may   be   pointed   out   that   there   were   10 (ten)   accused,   who   were   charge­sheeted.   The   present appellants   are   accused   nos.   A1,   A2   and   A3.   Four   accused namely accused nos. 4, 5, 7 and 10 were acquitted of all the charges   by   the   Trial   Court.   Further   High   Court   acquitted three   accused   namely   accused   nos.   6,   8   and   9   of   all   the charges.   Thus,   out   of   10   (ten)   accused,   the   present   three accused­appellants   A1,   A2   and   A3   stand   convicted   by   the High Court and, as such, are before this Court. 3. According  to  the  prosecution   case  the  entire  transaction was in three parts.  It is briefly stated as under: 1 IPC – Indian Penal Code, 1860 6 3.1. In   the   last   week   of   January,   2008,   there   were festivals going on in the Church located at Thidanadu and Variyanikkadu.   The   deceased­Varkeychen   @   George Thomas along with his friends initially went to Thidanadu Church in a Scorpio Car, which was driven by Saji Joseph (P.W.­1)   to   attend   a   musical   festival   (gana   mela) .   The deceased   along   with   his   friends   watched   the   programme for about half an hour and, thereafter, proceeded towards another   Church   at   Variyanikkadu   to   enjoy   the   festival going on there. At about 9:00 p.m., they were returning to Thidanadu   Church,   when   two   motor­bikes   driven   by accused   no.9   (Sabeer)   and   accused   no.3,   Ajmal   were moving   in   front   of   their   Car   and   blocked   their   way. Accused   no.6   (Razique   Jalal   @   Razee)   was   sitting   as   a pillion   on   the   motor­cycle,   driven   by   A3   (Ajmal).   At   that time,   a  verbal  altercation  took  place  between   Saji  Joseph (PW­1) and A3 (Ajmal) regarding the bikes not giving way to their vehicle (four wheeler).  7 3.2. At   around   10:45   p.m.,   deceased   along   with   his friends  were  returning,  when   their  Car  reached  the  place called   Veyilukanampara   Junction   in   Thidanadu   Kara, they   saw   accused   no.9   (Sabeer)   waiting   for   them   by   the side   of   the   road   and   soon   thereafter   the   other   accused also   joined   him   on   different   bikes.   All   the   ten   accused­ persons formed an unlawful assembly and in prosecution of   a   common   object   wrongfully   restrained   the   deceased and   his   friends   and   compelled   them   to   alight   from   their vehicle.   Once,   they   were   out   of   the   vehicle,   they   were attacked   by   the   accused­appellants.   The   accused   no.1 (Biju)   hit   the   deceased   with   a   stick   of   casuarina   tree (marked   as   MO­2).     Whereas   accused   no.2   (Ashique Salam)   hit   on   the   back   of   his   neck   with   a   brick   (marked as   MO­3),   as   a   result   of   these   two   injuries,   deceased   fell on the road. Accused no. 3 (Ajmal) assaulted Saji Joseph (PW­1)   with   a   stick   of   casuarina   tree   (marked   as   MO­1) causing injuries on his head and other parts of the body. 8 As by this time, public had started gathering, the accused left the place of occurrence.  3.3. Further,   when   the   deceased   was   being   taken   in   the car   by   his   friends   towards   the   hospital,   once   again,   the vehicle   was   stopped   by   the   accused­persons   near Chennadu   Junction,   where   accused   no.3,   Ajmal   threw stones at the car causing damage to the wind screen and other glasses.  3.4. The   injured­deceased   was   taken   to   IHM   Hospital, Bharananganam   and   from   there,   he   was   referred   to   the Medical   College   Hospital   at   Kottayam.   His   condition   was deteriorating,   as   such,   he   was   shifted   to   Medical   Trust Hospital, Ernakulam, where he succumbed to the injuries on   the   following   day   at   about   4:45   a.m.   The   First Information   Report   was   lodged   by   Peter   (PW­2)   on   his statement, which was registered as FIR (Ext.P.­1). 4. The investigation  was  taken  over  by  the Circle  Inspector (PW­20), who prepared the inquest report (Ext.­P2). The dead 9 body   was   sent   for   post­mortem,   which   was   conducted   by Assistant   Professor   of   Forensic   Medicine   and   Deputy   Police Surgeon,   Medical   College   Hospital,   Kottayam   (PW­13)   at about   2:05   p.m.   on   28.01.2008.     He   prepared   the   post­ mortem   report   (Ext.P­10)   mentioning   the   following   ante­ mortem injuries: “(1)   Contusion  of  scalp  10  X  8  c.m.   involving  the   full  thickness of left occipital region, its lower extent 3 c.m., above root of neck and 2 c.m. outer to midline. (2) Contusion of right cheek 5 X 4 c.m. X 0.5 c.m. (3)   Abraded   contusion   8   X   1   c.m.­2   c.m.   X   1   c.m.   horizontally oblique   involving   right   side   of   neck   and   fact,   its   lower   outer extent 7 c.m. above root of neck and 10 c.m. outer to midline. The   skull   showed   fissured   fracture   8   c.m.   long   involving   the occipital   bone   of   left   side   of   posterior   cranial   fossa,   1­1.5   c.m. outer to midline, corresponding to injury No.1. Dura was intact had a bluish tint and tense, subdural clots were seen overlying right   frontal   and   temporal   lobe   of   brain   with   bilateral subarachnoid   haemorrhage.   The   pons   on   sectioning   showed haemorrhagic   area   1.5   c.m.   x   1   c.m.   The   right   frontal   pole   of brain had contusion 3 x 2 x 0.5 c.m. Brain showed fattened gyri and narrow sulci. The anterior cranial fossa a right side showed fissured fracture 4 c.m. long. (4) Contusion 5 x 4 x 0.5 c.m. long. (5) Abrasion 2 x 1 c.m. on front of left knee.” 10 5. After   completing   the   investigations,   the   police   report under   section   173(2)   Cr.P.C. 2   was   submitted,   whereupon, cognizance   was   taken   by   the   Magistrate   and   the   matter committed   to   the   Sessions   Court   for   trial.   The   Trial   Court framed charges under sections 143, 147, 148, 341, 323, 324, 427   and   302   read   with   section   149   IPC.   The   charges   were read   over   to   the   accused,   who   pleaded   not   guilty   and,   as such, were put to trial. 6. The prosecution  examined  21  witnesses as PW­1  to  PW­ 21   and   exhibited   as   many   as   74   documentary   evidence marked as Exts:P­1 to P­74 and further produced 19 material objects   marked   as   MO­1   to   MO­19.   After   the   close   of   the prosecution   evidence,   the   accused   were   examined   under section 313 Cr.P.C. and the incriminating material was put to them.   They   denied   all   such   circumstances   and   reiterated their   innocence.   The   Investigating   Officer   also   conducted   a test identification parade.  2 Cr.P.C. – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 11 7. After   considering   the   material   evidence   on   record   and after   hearing   the   learned   counsel   for   the   parties,   the   Trial Court   acquitted   four   accused   namely,   accused   nos.4,   5,   7 and   10   namely,   Nijas,   Naseebulla   @   Nazeeb,   Seenaj   and Shihab.   It   further   convicted   the   rest   of   the   6   (six)   accused nos. 1, 2, 3, 6, 8 and 9, namely, Biju, Ashique Salam, Ajmal, Razique   Jalal   @   Razee,   Salim   Basheer   @   Saly   and   Sabeer respectively. 8. Aggrieved   by   the   conviction,   all   the   6   (six)   accused preferred   appeals   before   the   High   Court.   Criminal   Appeal No.87 of 2014 was filed by the accused nos.6 and 8 namely, Razique   Jalal   @   Razee   and   Salim   Basheer   @   Saly,   whereas Criminal   Appeal   No.132   of   2014   was   filed   by   accused   no.9­ Sabeer.   As   already   recorded   above,   the   other   three   appeals bearing   nos.564,   238   and   91   of   2014   were   filed   by   the accused   nos.1,   2   and   3   respectively   namely,   Biju,   Ashique Salam and Ajmal. As already recorded above, the High Court allowed   Appeal   Nos.87   and   132   of   2014   acquitting   the   three accused   nos.6,   8   and   9   of   all   the   charges,   whereas   it   partly 12 allowed   the   appeal   nos.564,   238   and   91   of   2014   of   the present   three   appellants.   Aggrieved   by   the   judgment   of   the High Court, the three appellants are before this Court. 9. The prosecution has established: (i)   that   the   death   of   deceased­Varkeychen   @   George Thomas was homicidal; (ii)   that   PW­1,   PW­2   and   PW­4   suffered   simple   and grievous hurt which took place at the date, time and place stated in the FIR. (iii)  that the FIR was promptly lodged;  (iv) the ante­mortem injuries suffered by the deceased is in   consonance   with   the   report   registered   by   PW­2 and   also   established   from   the   statements   of   PW­1, PW­2 and PW­4, who are the injured eye­witnesses. (v) The   recovery   of   the   material   objects   (MO   nos.1,   2 and   3)   used   by   the   three   appellants   in   causing   the fatal  injuries  to   the deceased  as  also   the  injuries  to PW­1, PW­2 and PW­4.  13 10. Insofar as the test identification parade is concerned, the same   has   not   been   found   to   be   very   reliable   by   the   courts below,   however,   as   the   witnesses   and   the   injured   knew   the accused,   their   identification   in   Court   has   been   found   to   be sufficient   by   the   Courts   below.   They   were   all   residents   of neighbourhood and knew each other.  11. We are, thus, satisfied that the occurrence in the manner as set up by the prosecution   has been   duly established.  The deceased   died   due   to   the   injuries   caused   by   accused   nos.1 and   2   by   using   a   stick   (MO­2)   and   a   brick   (MO­3),   whereas, the   injuries   caused   to   the   PW­1,   PW­2   and   PW­4   is   on account of the assault by accused no.3 by using a stick (MO­ 1). The only question which requires consideration is whether it was a culpable homicide amounting to  murder punishable under section 302 IPC as has been held by the courts below or   it   was   a   culpable   homicide   not   amounting   to   murder punishable   under   section   304   of   IPC   as   submitted   by   the Counsel for the appellants. 14 12. Learned   counsel   for   the   appellants   have   led   great emphasis   on   the   manner,   in   which   the   incident   occurred. According to them,  (i) there was no pre­meditation of committing murder.  (ii)   the   accused,   admittedly,   when   they   accosted   the vehicle   and   compelled   the   deceased   and   the   injured   to come   out   of   the   vehicle,   were   not   armed   with   any weapons.  (iii)   It   was   only   when   they   alighted   from   the   vehicle   and some   heated   arguments   took   place   as   a   result   of   the earlier   verbal   altercation   in   not   giving   a   pass   to   the Scorpio   vehicle   to   overtake   the   motor­bikes,   that   the accused­appellants picked up the stick of casuarina tree from the decorations, which had been made at that place and   also   the   brick   from   the   side   of   the   road   and assaulted with it.  (iv)   both   these   weapons   used   could   not   be   said   to   be deadly   weapons   but   could   have   definitely   caused 15 grievous   hurt   and   may   be   injuries,   which   could   result into death.  (v)   it   is   true   that   the   injuries   noted   in   the   post­mortem report of the deceased were on the vital part i.e. the head and neck and which, according to the medical evidence, was sufficient in ordinary course to cause death, but the same was unintentional.  (vi) only one blow each was given by accused nos. 1 and 2 to the deceased.  There was no repeated assault. (vii) there was no   mens rea   to commit murder, therefore, the   same   would   fall   within   the   exception   of   section   300 IPC.  (viii) On the own findings of the High Court, it was not a case of culpable homicide amounting to murder.  (ix)   Our   attention   has   been   drawn   to   paragraph   nos.27 and   28   of   the   judgment   of   the   High   Court,   which   took into   consideration   the  evidence   led   by   the   eye­witnesses and injured namely, PW­1, PW­2 and PW­4, according to which, the charge under section 302 ought to have been 16 converted   to   section   304   IPC.   The   appellants   ought   to have   been   acquitted   under   section   302   IPC   and   at   best could have been convicted under section 304 IPC. (x) Paragraph Nos.27 and 28 of the judgment of the High Court are reproduced below: “27. We have no dispute with the proposition that common object may  be formed at the spur  of the moment, and that prior   meeting   of   minds   or   a   formal   assembly   consisting   of the   members   of   the   unlawful   assembly   to   commit   a particular crime may not be essential. The precedent on the point   referred   to   earlier   would   indicate   that   the   knowledge of the members of the assembly that the act which actually occurred   was   very   likely   to   be   caused   by   their   acts,   is sufficient   to   make   them   vicariously   liable   for   the   ultimate consequences. But,  in the instant case, wheat  we see from the   evidence   is   that   the   first   part   of   the   occurrence   at Chemmalamattom   was   only   an   altercation   between   P.W.­1 and   A3   in   the   presence   of   A6   and   A9   with   regard   to   the bikers   not   giving   way   and   passage   to   the   car   driven   by P.W.­1 for overtaking. The altercation also did not last long enough   so   as   to   form   a   vengeance   in   the   mind   of   A3,   A6 and A9 so as to garner support of the remaining accused to form   an   unlawful   assembly   with   the   common   object   of committing   murder,   particularly   of   the   deceased,   because the   altercation   was   only   with   A3   and   P.W.­1   and   the deceased had nothing to do with the altercation. Under the circumstances,   we   are   of   the   opinion   that   the   accused 17 definitely   did   not   have   a   common   object   of   murdering   the deceased.   It   is   also   relevant   to   note   that   had   the   accused entertained   the   common   object   to   commit   murder   or   even previous   act,   they   would   have   been   lying   in   wait   for   the Scorpio   car   armed   with   deadly   weapons..   None   of   the prosecution   witness   has   a   case   that   the   accused   had accosted   them   at   the   scene   of   occurrence   armed   with deadly weapons. It is only after the witnesses alighted from the   car,   P.W.­1   had   a   conversation   with   A9   and   accused nos.1, 2 and 3 picked up the weapons which were available there and attacked the passengers in the car, including the deceased.   Even   if   A3   had   called   for   others   to   kill,   it   could not   have   been   the   deceased   because   he   only   had   a vengeance   against   P.W.­1,   and,   therefore,   the   entire occurrence   as   appeared   to   us   from   the   oral   testimony   of witnesses would indicate that it is only a chance encounter without any premeditated motive in prosecution of common object. 28. It is also pertinent to note that P.W.­1 had testified that   he   had   a   friendly   conversation   with   A9   in   the beginning   after   he   alighted   from   the   car   at   the   scene   of occurrence.   It   is   also   testified   that   when   the   accused   went to   attack   the   passengers   of   the   car,   including   the   P.W.­1, A9   had   prevented   others   from   causing   injuries.   This particular   statement   in   the   testimony   of   P.W.­1   clearly exonerated   A9   of   the   allegations   of   having   acted   in prosecution   of   common   object   of   committing   murder.   He was   not   even   wielding   any   weapon   in   his   hands.   In   fact, except A1, A2 and A3, none of the other accused had picked up any weapon from the scene of occurrence. Even A1 and A3  had  picked  up  sticks,  which  were  hanging  at the  scene 18 of   occurrence   as  part  of  the   decoration   done  in   connection with   the   Church   festival.   MO3   brick   was   picked   up   by   A2 from   the   side   of   the   road   abruptly   during   the   scuffle   that ensued   in   consequence   of   the   passengers   of   the   car alighting.   Under   the   circumstances,   we   are   of   the considered opinion that apart from A1, A2 and A3, none of the   other   accused   could   be   guilty   for   attacking   the deceased,   P.W.­1   and   P.W.­2.   The   prosecution   has   not succeeded   in   establishing   that   there   was   formation   of   an unlawful assembly acting in furtherance of common object. The finding of the learned Sessions Judge roping in all  the appellants   resorting   to   section   149   is   therefore   not   held good.   It   is   also   pertinent   to   note   that   none   of   the   accused were   earlier   armed   with   deadly   weapons   and   therefore   it cannot   be   said   that   they   were   guilty   of   committing   riot armed   with   deadly   weapons,   an   offence   punishable   under section 148 of the IPC.” (xi) As there was no intention to commit murder or a pre­ planned   attempt   to   commit   murder,   section   302   IPC, charge could not have been sustained.  (xii)   that   appellants   are   in   jail   and   have   suffered incarceration of several years.  13. On  behalf of the State of Kerala, it is submitted  that the entire transaction took place in three parts. The first incident took place when a verbal altercation took place in overtaking 19 the   vehicles.   The   second   incident   took   place,   in   which   the physical   assault   occurred   causing   fatal   injuries   to   the deceased   and   causing   simple   and   grievous   hurt   to   the   three witnesses  namely, PW­1,  PW­2 and PW­4. The third incident took place when the injured was being taken to the hospital; stones   were   pelted   by   accused   no.3   causing   damage   to   the vehicle. 14.   Learned   counsel   for   the   State   further   submitted   that there   was   clear   motive   to   commit   murder   as   after   the   first episode   of   verbal   altercation   took   place,   it   was   only   with   an intention   to   commit   murder   that   all   the   accused   joined together   by   forming   an   unlawful   assembly   accosting   the vehicle in  which  the deceased was travelling  with  his friends compelling   them   to   come   out   of   the   vehicle   and   thereafter   it was an open assault with sticks and bricks, which were used with   such   force   causing   fatal   injuries   to   the   deceased   and, therefore,   it   was   nothing   short   of   committing   a   pre­planned murder.   Even   after   having   caused   the   fatal   injuries,   the accused   further   tried   to   prevent   the   deceased   from   being 20 taken to the hospital and the intention was to stop the vehicle and   cause   enough   delay   so   that   the   deceased,   who   was   still alive may ultimately die. The judgment of the High Court does not suffer from any infirmity and the appeal, acco rdingly deserves   to   be   dismissed.   Learned   counsel   has   placed reliance upon a judgment of this Court in   Gulab vs. State of U.P. 3 15.   Having   considered   the   submissions   and   having   perused the   material   on   record,   we   do   not   find   any   infirmity   in   the prosecution   establishing   the   incident   as   set   up   in   the   First Information   Report.   For   the   said   conclusion,   we   have   taken note of the following: (i) First Information Report was promptly lodged. (ii) The   prosecution   story   as   set   up   in   the   FIR   appears to be probable. (iii) The   medical   evidence   fully   corroborates   the prosecution story. 3 2021(12) JT 134 21 (iv) PW­1, PW­2 and PW­4, the three eye­witnesses have fully supported the prosecution story  and have narrated the same incident as it occurred.  (v)   Formal   witnesses   have   discharged   their   burden   by proving   the   police   papers   and   other   documentary evidence placed on record by the prosecution.  (vi)   The   material   objects   recovered   have   also   been   duly proved.  (vii)   According   to   the   medical   evidence,   the   material objects   alleged   to   have   been   used   in   the   commission   of crime   could   have   been   actually   used   in   causing   the injuries. 16.  The   only  question  which   falls  for  our  consideration   is  as to   whether   the   manner   in   which   the   entire   transaction   took place   in   particular   relating   to   the   physical   assault,   would amount   to   culpable   homicide   amounting   to   murder   or culpable homicide not amounting to murder. 17.   The   distinctive   features   and   the   considerations   relevant for   determining   a   culpable   homicide   amounting   to   murder 22 and   distinguishing   it   from   the   culpable   homicide   not amounting   to   murder   has   been   a   matter   of   debate   in   large number   of   cases.   Instead   of   referring   to   several   decisions   on the  point  reference  is  being  made  to  a  recent  decision   in  the case   of   Mohd.   Rafiq   vs.   State   of   M.P. 4 ,   wherein   Justice Ravindra   Bhatt,   speaking   for   the   Bench,   relied   upon   two previous   judgments   dealing   with   the   issue   as   narrated   in paragraph   nos.11,   12   and   13   of   the   report   which   are reproduced below: ­ “ 11.   The   question   of   whether   in   a   given   case,   a   homicide   is murder   3,   punishable   under   section   302   IPC,   or   culpable homicide,  of either  description,  punishable  under  section  304 IPC   has   engaged   the   attention   of   courts   in   this   country   for over one and a half century, since the enactment of the IPC; a welter   of   case   law,   on   this   aspect   exists,   including   perhaps several   hundred   rulings   by   this   court.   The   use   of   the   term “likely”   in   several   places   in   respect   of   culpable   homicide, highlights   the   element   of   uncertainty   that   the   act   of   the accused   may   or   may   not   have   killed   the   person.   Section   300 IPC   which   defines   murder,   however   refrains   from   the   use   of the   term   likely,   which   reveals   absence   of   ambiguity   left   on behalf of the accused. The accused is for sure that his act will definitely   cause   death.   It   is   often   difficult   to   distinguish between culpable homicide and murder as both involve death. Yet,   there   is   a   subtle   distinction   of   intention   and   knowledge involved   in   both   the   crimes.   This   difference   lies   in   the   degree of the act. There is a very wide variance of degree of intention and knowledge among both the crimes. 4 (2021) 10 SCC 706 23 12.   The   decision   in   State   of   Andhra   Pradesh   v   Rayavarapu Punnayya & Anr 5  notes the important distinction between the two provisions, and their differing, but subtle distinction. The court   pertinently   pointed   out   that:   "12.   In   the   scheme   of   the Penal   Code,   "culpable   homicide"   is   genus   and   "murder"   its specie. All "murder" is "culpable homicide" but not vice­ versa. Speaking   generally,   "culpable   homicide"   sans   "special characteristics   of   murder",   is   "culpable   homicide   not amounting to murder". For the purpose of fixing punishment, proportionate   to   the   gravity   of   this   generic   offence,   the   Code practically  recognises three degrees of culpable homicide. The first   is,   what   may   be   called,   "culpable   homicide   of   the   first degree". This is the greatest form of culpable homicide, which is   defined   in   section   300   as   "murder".   The   second   may   be termed   as   "culpable   homicide   of   the   second   degree".   This   is punishable   under   the  first  part  of   section  304.  Then,  there  is "culpable homicide of the third degree". This is the lowest type of   culpable   homicide   and   the   punishment   provided   for   it   is, also, the lowest among the punishments provided for the three grades.   Culpable  homicide  of  this   degree  is  punishable   under the   second   part   of   section   304..   13.   The   academic   distinction between   "murder"   and   "culpable   homicide   not   amounting   to murder"   has   vexed   the   courts   for   more   than   a   century.   The confusion   is   caused,   if   courts   losing   sight   of   the   true   scope and   meaning   of   the   terms   used   by   the   legislature   in   these sections,   allow   themselves   to   be   drawn   into   minute abstractions. The safest way of approach to the interpretation and   application   of   these   provisions   seems   to   be   to   keep   in focus the keywords used in the various clauses of sections 299 and 300." 13.   The   considerations   that   should   weigh   with   courts,   in discerning   whether   an   act   is   punishable   as   murder,   or culpable homicide, not amounting to murder, were outlined in Pulicherla   Nagaraju   @   Nagaraja   Reddy   v   State   of   Andhra Pradesh 6   . This court observed that: "29. Therefore, the Court should proceed to decide the pivotal question of intention, with care   and   caution,   as   that   will   decide   whether   the   case   falls under section 302 or 304 Part I or 304 Part II. Many  petty or insignificant   matters   ­   plucking   of   a   fruit,   straying   of   cattle, quarrel   of   children,   utterance   of   a   rude   word   or   even   an objectionable   glance,   may   lead   to   altercations   and   group clashes   culminating   in   deaths.   Usual   motives   like   revenge, 5 1976 (4) SCC 382 6 (2006) 11 SCC 444 24 greed,   jealousy   or   suspicion   may   be   totally   absent   in   such cases.   There   may   be   no   intention.   There   may   be   no premeditation.   In   fact,   there   may   not   even   be   criminality.   At the  other  end  of  the spectrum,  there  may  be cases of murder where the accused attempts to avoid the penalty for murder by attempting   to   put   forth   a   case   that   there   was   no   intention   to cause   death.   It   is   for   the   courts   to   ensure   that   the   cases   of murder  punishable  under  section  302,  are   not  converted  into offences   punishable   under   section   304   Part   I/II,   or   cases   of culpable   homicide   not   amounting   to   murder   are   treated   as murder punishable under section 302. The intention to cause death can be gathered generally from a combination of a few or several of the following, among other, circumstances; (i) nature of the weapon used; (ii) whether the weapon was carried by the accused or was picked up from the spot; (iii) whether the blow is   aimed   at   a   vital   part   of   the   body;(iv)   the   amount   of   force employed   in   causing   injury;   (v)   whether   the   act   was   in   the course   of   sudden   quarrel   or   sudden   fight   or   free   for   all   fight; (vi)   whether   the   incident   occurs   by   chance   or   whether   there was   any   premeditation;   (vii)   whether   there   was   any   prior enmity   or   whether   the   deceased   was   a   stranger;(viii)   whether there   was   any   grave   and   sudden   provocation,   and   if   so,   the cause   for   such   provocation;   (ix)   whether   it   was   in   the   heat   of passion; (x) whether the person inflicting the injury has taken undue advantage or has acted in a cruel and unusual manner; (xi)   whether   the   accused   dealt   a  single   blow   or   several   blows. The   above   list   of   circumstances   is,   of   course,   not   exhaustive and   there   may   be   several   other   special   circumstances   with reference   to   individual   cases   which   may   throw   light   on   the question of intention.” ” 18. For the said purpose, we examined the evidence on record as   narrated   in   the   First   Information   Report,   during investigation   as   per   the   evidence   collected   by   the Investigating   Officer   and   also   the   evidence   led   during   the course of trial in particular by the injured eye­witnesses. 25 19.   From   the   perusal   of   all   the   above   material,   the prosecution story as set up and as established in brief can be summarized as under: (i) On the fateful evening of 27 th   January, 2008, the first incident   took   place   around   9:00   p.m.   regarding   the overtaking   of   the   vehicles   of   one   party   and   the   other resulting   into   a   verbal   altercation   at   that   stage   between PW­1 and A9.  (ii) Both the parties went in separate directions after the verbal altercation.  (iii)   Later   on,   at   about   10:45   p.m.,   when   the   deceased along with his other friends PW­1, PW­2 and PW­4 were returning,   they   were   stopped   by   the   accused   10   (ten)   in number,   they   were   wrongfully   restrained,   compelled   to alight from their vehicle. (iv)   Again,   a   verbal   altercation   took   place   whereafter accused nos. 1 and 3 picked up a stick of casuarina tree from the decoration set up on the road side and accused No.2 picked up a brick from the road side. Accused No.1 26 hit   the   deceased   with   a   stick   on   his   head,   whereas accused No.2 hit the deceased with the brick, as a result of which, the deceased fell on the ground. Accused No.3 attacked the others with a stick and caused them simple and grievous hurt.   (v) Accused Nos.1 and 2 had caused only one injury each on the deceased. It was not a repeat or a multiple assault by them.  (vi) Although, role of exhortation to kill the deceased was assigned   to   accused   No.3,   but   during   trial   and   in   the cross­examination,   all   the   three   witnesses   PW­1,   PW­2 and   PW­4   stated   that   they   were   not   sure   whether   they have   said   so   in   their   statements   under   section   161 Cr.P.C.   Thus,   apparently,   there   was   no   role   assigned   to exhortation to any of the accused to kill the deceased. 20.   The   Trial   Court   had   acquitted   4   (four)   accused   namely accused   nos.4,   5,   7   and   10   and   the   High   Court   acquitted 27 three other accused namely accused nos.6, 8 and 9 of all the charges.  21. Considering the statutory provisions laid down in IPC and the  law on  the point, we find that the present case falls  into the category of a culpable homicide not amounting to murder falling under section 304 Part­II IPC for the following reasons: (i) There   was   no   pre­meditation   of   mind   to   commit murder. (ii) All   the   accused   were   admittedly   not   armed   when they stopped the vehicle of the deceased and his friends and compelled them to alight from the same. (iii) It   was   during   the   verbal   altercation   at   that   stage that  the   three   accused   picked   up   the   weapon   of  assault namely,   sticks   of   casuarina   tree   and   a   brick   from   the road side.  (iv) Single blow was given to the deceased by the accused nos.1 and 2. 28 (v)   The   case   set   up   for   exhortation   to   kill   the   deceased has not been found to be proved.  (vi) Both the groups consisted of young men.  (vii)   The   High   Court   found   that   there   was   no   unlawful assembly  formed  with  a  common  object  and  accordingly had   acquitted   three   other   accused   and   also   the   present appellants   from   the   charge   of   unlawful   assembly   under section 149 IPC.  (viii)   The   appellants   have   been   convicted   with   the   aid   of section 34 IPC. 22. The reference to the judgment in the case of  Gulab Singh (supra)   by the learned counsel for the State of Kerala, in our opinion,  is  of no  relevance  to   the  facts  and  circumstances   of the present case. There was no issue involved relating to the distinction   between   culpable   homicide   amounting   to   murder or not amounting to murder. The issue involved in the case of Gulab   Singh   was   relating   to   the   applicability   of   section   34 IPC. 29 23. Thus, for all the reasons stated above, we are of the view that   the   appellants   would   be   entitled   for   acquittal   under section   302   IPC   but   would   be   liable   to   be   convicted   under section  304   Part­II  IPC.   Rest  of  the  conviction   upheld   by   the High   Court   and   the   sentence   for   the   charges   under   sections 341,   323,   324   and   427   read   with   section   34   IPC   is maintained.  It is ordered accordingly. 24.  Now  coming   to  the  question  of  sentence  upon   conviction under   section   304   Part­II   IPC,   we   find   that   all   the   three appellants   are   in   jail   and   have   undergone   several   years   of incarceration.   We   accordingly   award   the   sentence   for   the period   already   undergone   by   all   the   three   appellants.   The appellants   would   be   released   forthwith   unless   they   are required in any other case. 30 25. Appeals   stand   partly   allowed   as   above.     The   impugned judgment  of the  High  Court  stands  modified  to   the  aforesaid extent. …………..........................J. [AJAY RASTOGI] ………….........................J. [VIKRAM NATH] NEW DELHI JULY 12, 2022.