REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 11473­11474 OF 2018
AMARENDRA KUMAR PANDEY  ….APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
UNION OF INDIA & ORS. ….RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
J. B. PARDIWALA, J.
1. These   appeals,   by   special   leave,   are   directed   against   the
judgment and order passed by a Division Bench of the Guwahati High
Court dated 21.12.2017 in the Writ Appeal No. 354 of 2017 by which
the   High   Court   allowed   the   appeal   filed   by   the   Union   of   India   &   Ors.
thereby   setting   aside   the   judgment   and   order   passed   by   a   learned
Single   Judge   of   the   High   Court  dated   19.01.2015   in   the   Writ  Petition
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(C) 2783 of 2004 filed by the appellant herein.
2. The facts giving rise to this appeal may be summarized as under:
(i) The   appellant   herein   (original   writ   petitioner)   had   joined   the
Assam Rifles as a Rifleman in the year 1993. While he was in service,
he   came   to   be   discharged   vide   order   dated   31.01.2004   passed   by   Lt.
Col Offg Comdt.
(ii) The order of discharge referred to above reads thus:
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDANT 24 ASSAM RIFLES, 
C/O 99 APO
ORDER
2401637/AKP/2004 DATED 31.01.2004
1. WHEREAS  it is  considered  that the  conduct of  No
2401637W   Rfn/GD   Amrandra   Kumar   Pandey   of
which   has   led   him   getting   four   Red   Ink   entries   is
such as to render  his further retention in the public
Service undesirable being a incorrigible offender  and
having shown no improvement during his service.
2. AND WHEREAS No. 2401637W Rfn/GD Amrandra
Kumar   Pandey   was   afforded   opportunity   to   show
cause   against   the   proposed   action   vide   24   AR   letter
No. 11014/A36­2003/635 dt. 02 Sep., 2003.
3. AND   WHEREAS   No   2401637W   Rfn/GD   Amrandra
Kumar   Pandey   submitted   his   replies   vide   letter   No.
Nil   dated   01.   Oct.2003.   the   same   was   considered   in
terms   of   ROI   4/99   and   was   found   unsatisfactory   by
the competent authority.
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4. NOW   WHEREFORE,   In   exercise   of   the   powers
conferred   on   me   under   AR   Act   1941   Sec   4(a)   read
with Para 24, Chapter VIII of AR Manual and Para 6
of   ROI   4/99,   the   undersigned   hereby   discharge   the
said   No.2401637W   Rfn/GD   Amrandra   Kumar
Pandey   from   the   Assam   Rifles   being   incorrigible
offender   soldier   with   effect   from   31   Jan.,   2004
(Afternoon)   No.2401637W   Rfn/GD   Amrandra   Kumar
Pandey   is   entitled   to   get   pension   and   gratuity   as
admissible under rule.
s/d
(Santosh Joseph)
Lt. Col Offg Comdt
3. Thus, the aforesaid order of discharge was passed on the basis of
the   four   Red­Ink   entries   received   by   him   during   his   period   of   service.
The four Red­Ink entries were on the following grounds:
Entry 1 (1996) For staying back to take care of his
ailing   mother   –   ‘without   sufficient
cause   over   staying   leave   granted’.
Sentenced   to   14   days   of   rigorous
imprisonment   with   deduction   in
salary.
Entry 2 (1998) For being on the way out to make a
phone   call,   but   stopped   before   he
could leave the compound –  “visited
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out   of   bound   areas   as   specified   in
unit BRO Part I Ser No 202 dated 30
Aug   96   without   permission   from   his
superior   officers”.   Sentenced   to   28
days   of   rigorous   custody   and   14
days of Military Custody.
Entry 3 (1999) For losing his luggage while coming
back   from   home   –   “lost   his   identity
card   bearing   machine   No.   078550
by   neglect   the   property   of   the
Government   issued   to   him   for   his
use”.   Sentenced   to   28   days   of
rigorous imprisonment and 14 days
of detention in AR custody.
Entry 4 (2004)  For   playing   cards   all   alone   by
himself   –   ‘to   obey   unit   standing
orders   and   was   found   Gambling   in
unit   line’.   Sentenced   to   28   days   of
rigorous imprisonment and 14 days
of fine.
4. The appellant herein challenged the order of discharge before the
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Guwahati High Court by filing the Writ Petition (C) No. 2738 of 2002. It
appears   from   the   materials   on   record   that   a   learned   Single   Judge   of
the   Guwahati   High   Court   decided   the   Writ   Petition   filed   by   the
appellant   herein   along   with   two   other   identical   petitions   of   two
similarly situated riflemen and by a common judgment and order dated
19.01.2015   allowed   the   same.   The   impugned   order   of   discharge   came
to   be   set   aside.   The   learned   Single   Judge   remitted   the   matter   to   the
authorities   concerned   for   a   fresh   decision   in   the   light   of   a   Division
Bench decision of the Guwahati High Court.
5. The learned Single Judge while allowing the Writ Petition filed by
the appellant herein held as under:
“The   issue   regarding   discharge   from  Assam   Rifles   on
securing   four   Red   Ink   entries   was   gone   into   by   a
Division   Bench   of   this   Court   in   Balwant   Singh   Vs.
Union   of   India   &   Ors.,   reported   in   2011   (5)   GLT   640.
That   was   a   case   where   a   Rifleman   was   discharged
from the Assam Rifles on getting four Red Ink entries.
Out   of   the   four   Red   Ink   entries,   three   related   to
intoxication   and   one   related   to   overstay   of   leave
period. The Division Bench examined the provisions of
Clause­5   of   the   Record   Branch   Instruction   (ROI)
No.1/2004.   Clause­5   of   ROI   provides   that   under
Chapter­VIII,   Rule   24   of   the   Assam   Rifles   Manual
power   is   conferred   on   the   Commandant   of   an   Assam
Rifles   battalion   to   discharge   any   member   of   the
Assam Rifles below the rank of Naib Subedar in case
he receives four or more Red Ink entries. The Division
Bench   held   that   the   use   of   the   expression   “four   or
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more   Red   Ink   entries”   and   also   the   use   of   the   word
“may”   in   Clause­5   indicates   that   discretion   is   vested
in   the   disciplinary   authority   to   decide   as   to   whether
the person who is found to have received the Red Ink
entries   ought   to   be   discharged   from   service   or   not.   It
was   held   that   merely   because   a   man   receives   four
Red Ink entries, discharge is not automatic. Discretion
is   given   to   the   Commanding   Officer   to   consider
discharge.   The   severity   and   the   nature   of   the
misconduct will have to be weighed before recourse is
taken   to   exercise   power   conferred   by   Clause­5   of   the
ROI.
It is a settled position in law that when a discretion is
vested   in   an  authority   to   exercise   a   particular   power,
the   same   is   required   to   be   exercised   with   due
diligence,   and   in   reasonable   and   rational   manner.
Since order of discharge and the procedure preceding
such   discharge   is   of   a   summary   nature,   it   is
necessary   that   the   order   of   discharge   is   a   speaking
order and must indicate how and in what manner the
authority   exercised   the   discretionary   power.   The
Hon’ble   Supreme   Court   in   a   catena   of   decisions   has
reiterated   time   and   again   the   necessity   and
importance   of   giving   reasons   by   the   authority   in
support   of   its   decision.   It  has  been  held   that  the   face
of   an   order   passed   by   a   quasi­judicial   authority   or
even   by   an   administrative   authority   affecting   the
rights of parties must speak. The affected party must
know how his case or defence was considered before
passing   the   prejudicial   order.   Coming   back   to   the
three   impugned   orders,   it   is   evident   that   none   of   the
orders   disclose   how   the   responses   of   the   petitioners
were   considered   and   why   discharge   was   necessary.
As   held   by   the   Division   Bench   just   because   the
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petitioners   incurred   four   Red   Ink   entries,   it   does   not
ipso   facto   mean   that   they   are   to   be   discharged   from
the   Assam   Rifles.   As   pointed   out   by   the   Division
Bench,   the   authority   vested   with   the   power   to
discharge   must   examine   the   response   of   the
concerned   person   and   weigh   the   same   vis­à­vis   the
severity of the misconduct which led to incurring of the
Red  Ink  entries  in the  service  rolls.  Such  examination
is not discernible from the impugned orders.
Having   regard   to   the   above,   this   Court   is   of   the   view
that   the   impugned   orders   of   discharge   cannot   be
sustained. Accordingly, the orders of discharge of the
petitioners   are   set   aside   and   quashed.   Matter   is
remanded back to the respondents for a fresh decision
in the light of the Division Bench judgment in Balwant
Singh   (Supra)   and   the   discussions   made   above.
Respondents   may   consider   imposition   of   any   lesser
punishment on the petitioners balancing the interest of
the   organization   and   also   that   of   the   petitioners
subject   to   assessment   of   physical   fitness   of   the
petitioners.
Writ   petitions   are   allowed   to   the   above   extent.   No
costs.”
6. The   Union   of   India   being   dissatisfied   with   the   judgment   and
order passed by the learned Single Judge referred to above challenged
the   same   by   filing   the   writ   appeal   before   the   Division   Bench   of   the
Guwahati High Court. The Division Bench allowed the writ appeal filed
by   the   Union   of   India   and   thereby   set   aside   the   order   passed   by   the
learned   Single   Judge   referred   to   above.   The   Appeal   Court   while
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allowing the writ appeal filed by the Union of India essentially took the
view that neither the Assam Rifles Act, 1941 under which the decision
to   discharge   was   taken   nor   the   Assam   Rifles   Act,   2006   requires   the
authority   to   record   any   reasons   or   the   satisfaction   in   the   order   of
discharge   itself.   The   Appeal   Court   took   the   view   having   regard   to   the
provision of Clause 5 of the ROI 1/2004 that the Commandant has the
discretion to discharge a person who has four or more Red Ink entries.
All   that   is   required   is   to   serve   a   notice   on   the   individual   affording   an
opportunity to explain. The provision of Clause 5 does not require the
Commandant   to   record   the   reasons   of   satisfaction   in   the   order   of
discharge.
7. Being dissatisfied with the impugned order passed by the Appeal
Court of  the  High  Court,   the  appellant herein  (original   writ  petitioner)
is here before this Court with the present appeal.
SUBMISSIONS :
8. The   learned   Counsel   appearing   for   the   appellant   vehemently
submitted   that   the   High   Court   committed   a   serious   error   in   passing
the   impugned   order.   He   would   submit   that   there   was   no   good   reason
for the Appeal Court to disturb the order passed by the learned Single
Judge of the High Court.
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9. The   learned   Counsel   has   broadly   classified   his   submissions   as
under:
(a) Discharge is not mandatory even after four Red entries.
(b) There is a difference between cases of major misconducts and
minor misconducts.
(c) In the order of discharge no reasons have been assigned.
(d) The plea of malafide raised against the authority has not been
considered.
10. The   learned   Counsel   appearing   for   the   appellant   invited   the
attention   of   this   Court   to   the   Record   Office   Instruction   No.   4   of   1999
which provides for the procedure for discharge/retirement from service
of Assam Rifles personnel. The same reads thus:
RECORD OFFICE INSTRUCTION NO.4/99
PROCEDURE FOR DISCHARGE/RETIREMENT FROM 
SERVICE ASSAM RIFLES PERSONNEL
1. A comprehensive instruction, containing all existing 
orders on the subject has been compiled in the form of
this ROI for guidance and strict compliance by all 
concerned.
***** ***** *****
***** ***** *****
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***** ***** *****
6. Discharge/Disposal of Undesirable/Inefficient 
Personnel
Chapter   VIII,   Rules   24   of   the   Assam   Rifles   Manual
invests   powers   to   the   Commandant   of   Assam   Rifles
Battalions to ‘dismiss’ or ‘remove’ any member of the
Assam   Rifles   below   the   rank   of   Nb/Sub.   This   power
may   be   invoked   by   a   Commandant   in   case   where   a
person   has   got   four   red   ink   entries.   As   far   as
practicable,   however,   discharge   under   this   provision
should be avoided as personnel sent on discharge on
this   account   are   not   eligible   for   pension.   In   case   it   is
necessary   to   send   an   individual   on   discharge   under
this provision, a notice will be served on the individual
to give opportunity to explain his case. Complete case
will   be   forwarded   to   Range   HQ   alongwith   the   notice
and   reply   received   from   the   individual,   for   the
approval of the DIGAR. The documents will be sent to
this   Directorate   Records   (Doc)/UPAO   (And   the
individual to Depot Coy (No.1 Constr Coy))……
11. The   learned   Counsel   also   invited   the   attention   of   this   Court   to
the   Assam   Rifles   Manual.   The   relevant   clause   of   the   Assam   Rifles
Manual reads thus:
ASSAM RIFLES MANUAL
“24. A Commandant may dismiss any member of the 
Assam Rifles below the rank of Jemadar. 
The word “dismissal” should be restricted to the case
of   an   officer   removed   with   disgrace.   In   other   cases
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“removal” is the proper word to be used. A “dimissed”
officer may not be re­employed.
Dismissal   is   the   last   resource,   and   should   not
ordinarily   be   ordered   until   all   other   means   of
punishment   have   been   tried   and   failed.   For
incorrigible   offenders;   confirmed   bad   characters,
confirmed   drunkards,   for   offences   involving   moral
disgrace, fraud and dishonesty, continued and willful
disobedience   or   neglect,   it   is   generally   the   only
appropriate punishment”
12. The principal argument of the learned Counsel appearing for the
appellant   is   that   the   discharge   from   service   is   not   automatic   or
mandatory   after   four   Red   entries.   Four   Red   entries   are   only   a
minimum   requirement   and   cannot   be   the   sole   ground   to   order
discharge. It  is  argued  that the  Rule  itself  states that the power “may
be invoked”  and  that “as far  as  practicable, however, discharge  under
this provision should be avoided as the Personnel sent on discharge on
this   account   are   not   eligible   for   pension”.   The   submission   is   that   the
provision can be pressed into service only when “continued and willful
disobedience or neglect” comes on record.
13. The   learned   Counsel   with   a   view   to   fortify   his   aforesaid
submission placed strong reliance on the decisions of this Court in the
case   of   Virendra   Kumar   Dubey   v.   Chief   of   Army   Staff   &   Ors. ,
(2016) 2 SCC 627, and  Vijay Shankar Mishra v. Union of India and
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Ors. ,   (2017) 1 SCC 795,   respectively.
14. In   such   circumstances   referred   to   above,   the   learned   Counsel
prays that there being merit in his appeal the same be allowed and the
impugned   judgment   and   order   passed   by   the   High   Court   may   be   set
aside   including   the   order   of   discharge   and   the   appellant   may   be
ordered   to   be   reinstated   in   service   with   all   Full   Back   Wages   and   all
other statutory benefits.
15. On the other hand, this appeal has been vehemently opposed by
the   learned   Counsel   appearing   for   the   respondents.   The   learned
Counsel   would   submit   that   no   error   not   to   speak   of   any   error   of   law
could be said to have been committed by the High Court in passing the
impugned judgment and order. She would submit that the High Court
was absolutely justified in taking the view that it was not necessary for
the   authority   concerned   to   assign   any   reasons   for   the   purpose   of
passing an order of discharge. The four Red Ink entries were sufficient
for   the   authority   to   arrive   at   the   subjective   satisfaction   that   the
appellant   herein   was   not   fit   to   be   retained   in   service   and   more
particularly being a Rifleman with the Assam Rifle. 
16. It is  argued  that before passing  the order  of discharge, notice to
show  cause   was   issued   to   the  appellant  herein  and   an   opportunity  of
hearing was given to him.
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17. The   learned   Counsel   submitted   that   all   that   the   appellant   did
was to tender an apology for his mistakes. No other ground was raised
in his reply to the show cause notice except that he hails from a poor
family   and   his   parents   and   children   are   dependent   on   him.   Having
regard   to   the   reply   the   authority   concerned   rightly   formed   an   opinion
that the appellant was a habitual offender. She invited the attention of
this   Court   to   Para   6   of   the   impugned   judgment   of   the   High   Court
wherein the High Court has noted that the appellant failed to offer any
explanation   in   the   reply   to   the   show   cause   notice   except   the   family
circumstances.
18. The   learned   Counsel   further   submitted   that   the   decision   of   this
Court in the case of  Union of India v. Balwant Singh ,   (2015) 14 SCC
389,   has   not   been   referred   to   in   the   case   of   Virendra   Kumar   Dubey
(supra).
19. In the last the learned Counsel placed reliance on the decision of
this   Court   in   the   case   of   Satgur   Singh   v.   UOI   &   Ors.   reported   in
(2019)9   SCC   205,  more   particularly,  the   observations   made   in  Para  6
and 7 respectively. Para 6 & 7 respectively are as under: 
“6. We   do   not   find   any   merit   in   the   present
appeal.   Para   5(a)   of   the   circular   dated   28­12­1988
deals   with   an   enquiry   which   is   not   a  court   of   inquiry
into   the   allegations   against   an   army   personnel.   Such
enquiry   is   not   like   departmental   enquiry   but
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semblance of the fair decision­making process keeping
in   view   the   reply   filed.   The   court   of   inquiry   stands
specifically excluded. What kind of enquiry is required
to   be   conducted   would   depend   upon   facts   of   each
case. The enquiry is not a regular enquiry as Para 5(a)
of   the   Army   Instructions   suggests   that   it   is   a
preliminary   enquiry.   The   test   of   preliminary   enquiry
will   be   satisfied   if   an   explanation   of   a   personnel   is
submitted   and   upon   consideration,   and   order   is
passed thereon. In the present case, the appellant has
not   offered   any   explanation   in   the   reply   filed   except
giving   vague   family   circumstance.   Thus,   he   has   been
given   adequate   opportunity   to   put   his   defence.
Therefore,   the   parameters   laid   down   in   Para   5(a)   of
the   Army   Instructions   dated   28­12­1988   stand
satisfied….
7. In   reply   to   the   show­cause   notice,   the
appellant   has   not   given   any   explanation   of   his
absence   from   duty   on   seven   occasions.   He   has   been
punished   on   each   occasion   for   rigorous   imprisonment
ranging   from   2   days   to   28   days.   A   member   of   the
Armed Forces cannot take his duty lightly and abstain
from   duty   at   his   will.   Since   the   absence   of   duty   was
on   several   different   occasions   for   which   he   was
imposed   punishment   of   imprisonment,   therefore,   the
order   of   discharge   cannot   be   said   to   be   unjustified.
The   Commanding   Officer   has   recorded   that   the
appellant   is   a   habitual   offender.   Such   fact   is
supported   by   absence   of   the   appellant   from   duty   on
seven occasions.”
20. In   such   circumstances   referred   to   above   the   learned   Counsel
appearing   for   the   respondents   pray   that   there   being   no   merit   in   this
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appeal, the same may be dismissed.
ANALYSIS
21. Having   heard   the   learned   counsel   appearing   for   the   parties   and
having   gone   through   the   materials   on   record,   the   only   question   that
falls   for   our   consideration   is   whether   the   Division   Bench   of   the   High
Court committed any error in passing the impugned order?
22. We must first look into the decision of this Court rendered in the
case of  Virendra Kumar Dubey  (supra). In the said case, the appellant
Virendra   Kumar   Dubey   was   enrolled   as   an   operator   in   the   corps   of
Artillery of Indian Army on 27.09.1980. Having served in that capacity
for   nearly   twelve   years,   he   received   a   show   cause   notice   pointing   out
that he had been awarded four Red Ink entries for various offences set
out   in   the   notice   and   that   Virendra   Kumar   Dubey   had   become   a
habitual offender, thereby setting a bad  example of indiscipline in the
army.   Virendra   Kumar   Dubey   ultimately   came   to   be   discharged   from
service   by   an   order   dated   14.12.1992.   He   preferred   a   departmental
appeal, which failed. He, thereafter, went to the High Court of Madhya
Pradesh at Jabalpur, however, the High Court declined to entertain the
petition on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction. He, thereafter,
preferred   an   appeal   before   the   Appeal   Court   and   the   writ   appeal   was
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ultimately   ordered   to   be   transferred   to   the   Armed   Forces   Tribunal
Regional   Bench,   Lucknow.   The   Tribunal   ultimately   dismissed   the
transferred petition which gave rise to the appeal before this Court.
23. This Court in  Virendra Kumar Dubey  (supra) held as under:
 “ 19. It is common ground that a red ink entry may be
earned  by  an  individual for  overstaying  leave  for  one
week   or   for   six   months.   In   either   case   the   entry   is   a
red   ink   entry   and   would   qualify   for   consideration   in
the   matter   of   discharge.   If   two   persons   who   suffer
such entries are treated similarly notwithstanding the
gravity   of   the   offence   being   different,   it   would   be
unfair   and   unjust   for   unequals   cannot   be   treated   as
equals.   More   importantly,   a   person   who   has   suffered
four such entries on a graver misconduct may escape
discharge   which   another   individual   who   has   earned
such   entries   for   relatively   lesser   offences   may   be
asked to go home prematurely. The unfairness in any
such   situation   makes   it   necessary   to   bring   in
safeguards   to   prevent   miscarriage   of   justice.   That   is
precisely   what   the   procedural   safeguards   purport   to
do in the present case.”
Taking   the   aforesaid   view,   this   Court   ultimately   passed   the   following
order:
“21.  In  the  result  this   appeal succeeds   and  is  hereby
allowed.   The   order   of   discharge   passed   against   the
appellant is hereby set aside. Since the appellant has
already crossed the age of superannuation, interest of
justice   will be  sufficiently  served   if   we  direct  that  the
appellant   shall   be   treated   to   have   been   in   service   till
the   time   he   would   have   completed   the   qualifying
16

service   for   grant   of   pension.   No   back   wages   shall,
however,   be   admissible.   Benefit   of   continuity   of
service   for   all   other   purpose   shall   be   granted   to   the
appellant   including   pension.   Monetary   benefits
payable   to   the   appellant   shall   be   released
expeditiously   but   not   later   than   four   months   from   the
date of this order. No Costs.”
24. In   Vijay   Shankar   Mishra   (supra),   the   appellant   therein   was
enrolled in  the Army  Medical  Corps  on 23.06.1984. On  03.10.1997,  a
notice to show cause was issued to him to explain why he should not
be   discharged   from   service   under   Rule   13(3)   Table   (III)(v)   of   the   Army
Rules, 1954 on the ground that his conduct and service had not been
found   satisfactory.   He   ultimately   came   to   be   discharged   from   service.
By   that   time,   he   had   rendered   service   of   thirteen   years   and   eight
months.   The   minimum   qualifying   service   for   earning   pension   under
Rule   132   of   the   Pension   Regulations   for   the   Army   ,1961   is   fifteen
years.   He   filed   a   writ   petition   before   the   Madhya   Pradesh   High   Court
which   was   dismissed   on   21.11.2006.   In   appeal,   a   Division   Bench
directed   reconsideration   of   the   case   of   the   appellant.   Pursuant   to   the
order   of   the   High   Court,   an   order   was   issued   rejecting   his   claim   for
pension   on   the   ground   that   he   had   not   put   in   fifteen   years   of   service
and had been discharged for the reason that he was unlikely to become
an   efficient   soldier.   He   again   filed   a   writ   petition   before   the   Madhya
17

Pradesh   High   Court   which   was   transferred   to   the   Armed   Forces
Tribunal. The Tribunal dismissed the matter. Thereafter, Mishra came
before this Court. The very same argument was canvassed before this
Court on behalf of Vijay Shankar Mishra that the mere fact   that he had
been  punished  while  in  service  on  nine   occasions  inclusive   of  six   Red
entries was no ground to exercise the power under the relevant rule for
the   purpose   of   discharge.   The   Court   relied   upon   Vijay   Shankar
Mishra  (supra) and ultimately held as under:
“9. In the present case, it is evident that there was no
application   of   mind   by   the   authorities   to   the
circumstances   which   have   to   be   taken   into
consideration   while   exercising   the   power   under   Rule
13.   The   mere   fact   that   the   appellant   had   crossed   the
threshold  of four red entries  could  not  be a ground to
discharge   him   without   considering   other   relevant
circumstances  including: (i) the nature of  the violation
which   led   to   the   award   of   the   red   ink   entries;   (ii)
whether   the   appellant   had   been   exposed   to   duty   in
hard stations and to difficult living conditions; (iii) long
years of service, just short of completing the qualifying
period   for   pension.   Even   after   the   Madhya   Pradesh
High   Court   specifically   directed   consideration   of   his
case bearing in mind the provisions of the circular, the
relevant   factors   were   not   borne   in   mind.   The   order
that   was   passed   on   26­2­2007   failed   to   consider
relevant   and   germane   circumstances   and   does   not
indicate a due application of mind to the requirements
of   the   letter   of   Army   Headquarters   dated   28­12­1988
and the Circular dated 10­01­1989.
18

10.   For   these   reasons,   we   are   of   the   view   that   the
Armed   Forces   Tribunal   was   in   error   in   rejecting   the
application.   The   orders   of   the   Tribunal   dated   23­9­
2010   Vijay   Shankar   Mishra   V.   Union   of   India,   2010
SCC   OnLine   AFT   1127   and   15­9­2011   are   set   aside.
Since   the   appellant   would   have   attained   the   age   of
superannuation, the ends of justice would be met if he
is treated to have been in service till the time he would
have   completed   the   qualifying   service   for   grant   of
pension. No back wages shall however be admissible.
The   benefit   of   continuity   of   service   for   all   other
purposes   shall   be   granted   to   the   appellant   including
pension.   The   monetary   benefits   payable   to   the
appellant   shall   be   released   within   a   period   of   four
months from the date of this order.”
25. In   both   the   aforesaid   decisions,   this   Court   took   into
consideration   the   fact   that   there   was   no   application   of   mind   by   the
authority   to   the   relevant   aspects   which   were   taken   into   consideration
while   exercising   the   power   under   Rule   13   of   the   Rules.   In   both   the
aforesaid   cases,   this   Court   took   the   view   that   the   mere   fact   that   the
Personnel   had   crossed   the   threshold   of   few   Red   Ink   entries   could   not
have been made a ground to discharge them without considering other
relevant   circumstances,   more   particularly,   the   nature   of   the   violation
which led to the award of the Red Ink entries. The crux of the ratio of
the   decision   of   this   Court   in   the   case   on   Veerendra   Kumar   Dubey
(supra) is that the only safeguard against arbitrary exercise of power by
the authority would be to ensure that there is an enquiry, howsoever,
19

summary   and   a   finding   about   the   defence   set   up   by   the   individual
besides   consideration   of   the   factors   made   relevant   under   the
procedure.
26. The   reliance   placed   by   the   learned   Counsel   appearing   for   the
respondents   on   the   decision   of   this   Court   in   the   case   Satgur   Singh
(supra)   is   of   no   avail.   It   was   a   case   in   which   the   appellant   failed   to
furnish any explanation of his absence from duty on seven occasions.
On  facts, this  Court took  the view that as  the  absence  from  duty  was
on several different occasions for which he was imposed punishment of
imprisonment, the order of discharge could not be said to unjustified.  
27. We may elaborate the aforesaid a little further. 
28. Where   an   Act   or   the   statutory   rules   framed   thereunder   left   an
action   dependent   upon   the   opinion   of   the   authority   concerned,   by
some such expression as ‘is satisfied’ or ‘is of the opinion’ or ‘if it has
reason   to   believe’   or   ‘if   it   considered   necessary’,   the   opinion   of   the
authority   is   conclusive,   (a)   if   the   procedure   prescribed   by   the   Act   or
rules   for   formation   of   the   opinion   was   duly   followed,   (b)     if   the
authority  acted   bona  fide , (c) if the authority itself formed the opinion
and   did   not   borrow   the   opinion   of   somebody   else   and   (d)   if   the
authority   did   not  proceed   on   a   fundamental   misconception   of   the   law
and the matter in regard to which the opinion had to be formed.
20

29. The action based on the subjective opinion or satisfaction, in our
opinion, can judicially be reviewed first to find out the existence of the
facts or circumstances on the basis of which the authority is alleged to
have formed the opinion. It is true that ordinarily the court should not
inquire into the correctness or otherwise of the facts found except in a
case  where it is alleged that the facts  which have been found existing
were not supported by any evidence at all or that the finding in regard
to   circumstances   or   material   is   so   perverse   that   no   reasonable   man
would   say   that   the   facts   and   circumstances   exist.   The   courts   will   not
readily defer to the conclusiveness of the authority’s opinion as to the
existence   of   matter   of   law   or   fact   upon   which   the   validity   of   the
exercise of the power is predicated.
30. The   doctrine   of   reasonableness   thus   may   be   invoked.   Where
there   are   no   reasonable   grounds   for   the   formation   of   the   authority’s
opinion, judicial review in such a case is permissible. [See  Director of
Public Prosecutions v. Head,  (1959) AC 83   (Lord Denning).
31.   When we say that where the circumstances or material or state
of affairs does not at all exist to form an opinion and the action based
on such opinion can be quashed by the courts, we mean that in effect
there   is   no   evidence   whatsoever   to   form   or   support   the   opinion.   The
distinction   between   insufficiency   or   inadequacy   of   evidence   and   no
21

evidence   must   of   course   be   borne   in   mind.   A   finding   based   on   no
evidence as opposed to a finding which is merely against the weight of
the evidence is an abuse of the power which courts naturally are loath
to   tolerate.   Whether   or   not   there   is   evidence   to   support   a   particular
decision has always been considered as a question of law. [See  Reg. v.
Governor of Brixton Prison, Armah, Ex Parte,   (1966) 3 WLR 828   at
p. 841 ].
32. It   is   in   such   a   case   that   it   is   said   that   the   authority   would   be
deemed   to   have   not   applied   its   mind   or   it   did   not   honestly   form   its
opinion.   The   same   conclusion   is   drawn   when   opinion   is   based   on
irrelevant   matter.   [See   Rasbihari   v.   State   of   Orissa,   AIR   1969   SC
1081].
33. In   the   case   of   Rohtas   Industries   Ltd.   v.   S.D.   Agarwal   and
another,   AIR   1969   SC   707,   it   was   held   that   the   existence   of
circumstances   is   a   condition   precedent   to   form   an   opinion   by   the
Government.   The   same   view   was   earlier   expressed   in   the   case   of
Barium   Chemicals   Ltd.   and   another   v.   Company   Law   Board   and
others,  AIR 1967 SC 295 .
34. Secondly,   the   court   can   inquire   whether   the   facts   and
circumstances   so   found   to   exist   have   a   reasonable   nexus   with   the
22

purpose   for   which   the   power   is   to   be   exercised.   In   other   words,   if   an
inference from facts does not logically accord with and flow from them,
the Courts can interfere treating them as an error of law. [See  Bean v.
Doncaster   Amalgamated  Collieries,   (1944)   2  All   ER   279   at   p.   284 ].
Thus,   this   Court   can   see   whether   on   the   basis   of   the   facts   and
circumstances found, any reasonable man can say that an opinion as
is   formed   can   be   formed   by   a   reasonable   man.   That   would   be   a
question   of   law   to   be   determined   by   the   Court.   [See   Farmer   v.
Cotton’s Trustees,  1915 AC 922]. Their Lordships observed:
“………..   in   my   humble   judgment   where   all   the
material facts are fully found, and the only question is
whether the facts are such as to bring the case within
the   provisions   properly   construed   of   some   statutory
enactment, the question is one of law only.”
[See also   Muthu Gounder v. Government  of Madras,   (1969) 82 Mad
LW 1].
35. Thirdly, this Court can interfere if the constitutional or statutory
term essential for the exercise of the power has either been misapplied
or   misinterpreted.   The   Courts   have   always   equated   the   jurisdictional
review with the review for error of law and have shown their readiness
to   quash   an   order   if   the   meaning   of   the   constitutional   or   statutory
term   has   been   misconstrued   or   misapplied.   [See   Iveagh   (Earl   of)   v.
23

Minister of Housing and Local Govt.,  (1962) 2 QB 147;  Iveagh (Earl
of) v. Minister of Housing and Local Govt.  (1964) 1 AB 395].
36. Fourthly, it is permissible to interfere in a case where the power
is exercised  for improper purpose. If a power granted for one purpose
is   exercised   for   a   different   purpose,   then   it   will   be   deemed   that   the
power has not been validly exercised. If the power in this case is found
to   have   not   been   exercised   genuinely   for   the   purpose   of   taking
immediate   action   but   has   been   used   only   to   avoid   embarrassment   or
wreck personal vengeance, then the power will be deemed to have been
exercised   improperly.   [See   Natesa   Asari   v.   State   of   Madras,   AIR
1954 Mad 481].
37. Fifthly, the grounds which are relevant for the purpose for which
the power can be exercised have not been considered or grounds which
are not relevant and yet are considered and an order is based on such
grounds, then the order can be attacked as invalid and illegal. In this
connection,   reference   may   be   made   to   Ram   Manohar   v.   State   of
Bihar,   AIR   1966   SC   740;   Dwarka   Das   v.   State   of   J.   and   K.,   AIR
1957 SC 164 at   p. 168   and   Motilall  v.  State of Bihar,   AIR 1968 SC
1509.   On   the   same   principle,   the   administrative   action   will   be
invalidated if it can be established that the authority was satisfied on
the wrong question: [See   (1967) 1 AC 13].
24

38. At   this   stage,   it   may   be   apposite   to   refer   to   the   Assam   Rifles
Regulation,   2016.   We   are   conscious   of   the   fact   that   these   regulations
do not apply to the case on hand as the order of discharge is of 2004.
However,   we   deem   fit   to   reproduce   the   relevant   regulations,   more
particularly, 107(c) and 108 respectively, as these regulations seem to
have been enacted and brought into force having regard to the ratio of
the   decision   of   this   Court   in   the   case   of   Veerendra   Kumar   Dubey
(supra). Regulation 107(c) reads thus:
“ 107.   Removal   of   undesirable,   incorrigible   and
inefficient   Subordinate   Officers,   Under   Officers   and
other enrolled persons. 
(a) …………
(b) …………
(c)   The   procedure   for   dismissal/discharge   of   unsuitable
subordinate   officer/under   officer/enrolled   person   will   be
as under:­ 
(i) As   provided   under   Rules   24   and   25   of   Assam
Rifles   Rules,   the   person   concerned,   subject   to   the
exception   mentioned   therein,   shall   be   served   with   a
Show Cause Notice against the contemplated action. 
(ii) Preliminary   enquiry .   Before   recommending
discharge  or  dismissal  of  an  individual   the  authority
concerned  will  ensure  that  an   impartial  enquiry   (not
necessarily   a   Court   of   Inquiry)   has   been   made   into
the   allegations   against   him   and   that   he   has   had
adequate opportunity of hearing. 
25

(iii) Rule   24   of   the   Assam   Rifles   confers   powers   on
the   Commandants   of   the   Assam   Rifles   Units/
establishment   to   discharge   any   subordinate
officer/under   officer/enrolled   persons   of   Assam
Rifles.   However,   the   power   of   discharge   by   the
Commandant   shall   be   exercised   with   prior   approval
of   immediate   superior   officer   not   below   Sector
Commander   in   case   of   Under   Officers   and   other
enrolled person and that of Inspector General Assam
Rifles in case of Subordinate Officers. 
(iv) After   compliance   of   the   provisions   enumerated
above,   a   show   cause   notice   will   be   served   on   the
individual affording him an opportunity to explain his
case.   Thereafter,   the   complete   case   file   will   be
forwarded   to   next   superior   authority/Sector
Headquarters   for   approval   of   the   superior
authority/Sector Commander.
(v) The   authority   competent   to   sanction   the
dismissal/discharge   of   the   individual   will   before
passing orders re­consider the case in the light of the
individual   reply   to   the   show   cause   notice.   A   person
who   has   been   served   a   show   cause   notice   for
proposed  dismissal  may   be  ordered  to  be discharged
if it is considered that discharge would meet the end
of   justice.   If   the   competent   authority   accepts   the
reply   of   the   individual   to   the   show   cause   notice   as
entirely satisfactorily, he will pass orders accordingly.
108.   Discharge   on   ground   of   red   ink   entries.   A
Subordinate   Officer,   Under   Officer   or   other   enrolled
person who has incurred four or more red ink entries may
be   recommended   for   discharge   from   the   service   on   the
ground   of   unsuitability,   subject   to   the   following
conditions:­ 
(a) After   an   individual   has   earned   three   red   ink
entries, he shall be warned in writing that his service
will   be   liable   to   be   terminated   by   the   competent
authority if he earns one more red ink entry. Such a
warning   letter   shall   be   issued   to   him   by   the
26

concerned Sector Commander through Commandant
of the individual. 
(b) Each  case   of  individuals   having   earned   four  or
more   red   ink   entries   shall   be   examined   on   its   own
merit   depending   upon   the   nature   and   gravity   of   the
offences   and   the   aggravating   circumstances   under
which   these   were   committed.   The   authority
competent   to   sanction   discharge   under   this   para
shall   record   reasons   for   ordering   the   discharge,   or
otherwise. 
(c) A   person   who   has   put   in   eighteen   years   of
qualifying   service   for   pension   may   be   allowed   to
complete   the   required   qualifying   service   for   grant   of
pension   before   he   is   recommended   for   discharge   on
ground   of   four   or   more   red   ink   entries,   unless   there
are   compelling   reasons   to   sanction   his   discharge
before   completion   of   the   qualifying   service   for
pension,   which   must   be   specified   in   the   discharge
order. 
(d) Before   taking   the   final   decision   to   order   the
discharge,   the   person   concerned   shall   be   informed
through a show cause notice that his retention in the
service is considered undesirable for having incurred
four   or   more   red   ink   entries,   thereby   also   calling
upon him to show cause as to why he should not be
discharged   from   the   service   for   being   considered
unsuitable   for   the   service   in   the   Assam   Rifles.   The
individual shall be given minimum fifteen days, after
receipt of Show Cause Notice, to submit his reply.
 
(e) After receipt of the individual’s reply, if any, the
case   shall   be   put   up   to   the   authority   competent   to
sanction   the   discharge   alongwith   recommendations
of   the   Commandant   of   the   unit   concerned.   Before
passing the discharge order, the authority competent
to   sanction   the   discharge   under   this   para   may   seek
the advise of the Law Officer concerned. 
(f) An   order   of   discharge   under   this   para   shall   be
27

passed   by   an   officer   not   less   than   a   Sector
Commander   in   the   case   of   Under   Officer   or   other
enrolled   persons   and   an   officer   not   less   than
Inspector   General   Assam   Rifles/Additional   Director
General   Assam   Rifles   in   case   of   Subordinate
Officers.”
39. Having regard to the nature of the misconduct alleged against the
appellant we are of the view that the ends of justice would be met if we
set aside the order of discharge and treat the appellant herein to have
been   in   service   till   the   time,   he   could   be   said   to   have   completed   the
qualifying service for grant of pension. We are inclined to pass such an
order with a view to do substantial justice as there is nothing on record
to   indicate   that   the   nature   of   the   misconduct   leading   to   the   award   of
four Red Ink entries was so unacceptable that the competent authority
had no option but to direct his discharge to prevent indiscipline in the
force.
40. The   order   of   discharge   passed   against   the   appellant   herein   is
hereby set aside. The appellant shall be treated to have been in service
till the time he would have completed the qualifying service for grant of
pension.   We   are   informed   that   only   six   months   were   left   for   the
qualifying   service   to   be   completed   before   the   appellant   came   to   be
discharged.   No   back   wages   shall,   however,   be   admissible.   The   benefit
of   continuity   of   service   for   all   other   purpose   shall   be   granted   to   the
28

appellant   including   pension.   The   monetary   benefits   payable   to   the
appellant   shall   be   released   expeditiously   but   not   later   than   four
months from the date of this order.
41. The   appeals   are   allowed   in   the   aforesaid   terms.   No   order   as   to
costs.  
42.  Pending application, if any, stands disposed of.
………………………………………..J.
     (SURYA KANT)
………………………………………..J.
                              (J.B. PARDIWALA)
NEW DELHI
JULY 14, 2022
29