REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.                      OF 2022 
(ARISING OUT OF S.L.P. (CRIMINAL) NO. 4599 OF 2021)
GHULAM HASSAN BEIGH      …APPELLANT(S)
  Versus
MOHAMMAD MAQBOOL MAGREY & ORS.     …RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
J.B. PARDIWALA, J.  :
1. Leave granted.
2. This   appeal   is   at   the   instance   of   the   original   complainant
(husband of the deceased) and is directed against the order passed
by   the   High   Court   of   Jammu   and   Kashmir   at   Srinagar   dated
26.11.2020 in the CM (M) No. 99 of 2020 by which the High Court
rejected   the   revision   application   filed   by   the   appellant   herein
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thereby   affirming   the   order   passed   by   the   Additional   Sessions
Judge, Sopore (trial court) discharging the original accused persons
(respondents   Nos.   1   to   7   herein)   from   the   offence   of   murder
punishable   under   Section   302   of   the   Indian   Penal   Code   (for  short,
‘IPC’).   Upon   affirmation   the   trial   court   proceeded   to   frame   charge
against   the   accused   persons   for   the   offence   of   culpable   homicide
punishable under Section 304 of the IPC.
FACTUAL MATRIX
3. It   appears   from   the   First   Information   Report   (FIR)   bearing
No. 26/20 dated 22.03.2020 lodged by the appellant with the police
station situated at Dangiwacha that on the fateful day, the accused
persons   formed   an   unlawful   assembly   and   laid   an   assault   on   the
appellant   and   his   family   members   after   trespassing   into   the
residential   property   of   the   appellant   herein.   It   is   the   case   of   the
prosecution   that   all   the   accused   persons   trespassed   into   the
residential   property   of   the   appellant   and   started   damaging   the   tin
fence.   When   the   appellant   herein   tried   to   restrain   the   accused
persons   from   causing   any   further   damage,   they   all   started
assaulting   the   appellant   by   giving   fisticuffs.   One   of   the   accused
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persons is said to have hit the appellant with a wooden log. The wife
of   the   appellant   herein   and   his   daughter­in­law   viz.   Rubeena
Ramzan   came  to  the  rescue  of  the  appellant.  The  accused  persons
are   alleged   to   have   caught   hold   of   the   deceased   (wife   of   the
appellant herein) and the daughter­in­law and both were beaten up
causing   injuries.  It  is further   alleged that  the two female members
of   the   family   were   dragged   by   the   accused   persons   as   a   result   the
clothes of the deceased got torned thereby outraging her modesty.
4. In   connection   with   the   aforesaid   incident,   the   appellant   went
to   the   police   station   at   Dangiwacha   and   lodged   the   FIR.     The   FIR
was   initially   registered   for   the   offences   punishable   under   Sections
147, 354, 323 and 451 respectively of the IPC.   The deceased (wife
of   the   appellant)   had   to   be   shifted   to   a   hospital   as   she   suffered
injuries   on   her   body.   No   sooner   the   deceased   was   brought   to   the
hospital than she was declared dead by the doctor on duty.  In such
circumstances, Section 302 of the IPC came to be added in the FIR.
The   post   mortem   of   the   body   of   the   deceased   was   performed.   The
statements   of   the   various   eye   witnesses   to   the   incident   were
recorded.   Various   panchnamas   were   drawn.   At   the   end   of   the
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investigation,   the   police   filed   charge   sheet   against   the   accused
persons   for   the   offence   of   murder   along   with   other   offences   as
enumerated above. 
5. The   cause   of   death   of   the   deceased   as   assigned   in   the   post
mortem   is   “cardio   respiratory   failure”.     No   poison   was   detected   in
the viscera.  
6. It appears that the trial court heard the prosecution as well as
the   defence   on   the   question   of   charge.   Ultimately,   the   trial   court
thought   fit   to   discharge   the   accused   persons   of   the   offence   of
murder punishable under Section 302 of the IPC and proceeded to
frame   charge   against   the   accused   persons   for   the   offence   of
culpable homicide punishable under Section 304 of the IPC.
7. The  appellant  herein,  being   aggrieved  by  such  decision  of  the
trial   court   to   discharge   the   accused   persons   of   the   offence   of
murder, challenged the  legality  and validity  of  the order  by  filing  a
revision application before the High Court. The High Court thought
fit   to   affirm   the   order   passed   by   the   trial   court   discharging   the
accused persons of the offence of murder. 
8. In   such   circumstances   referred   to   above,   the   appellant   has
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come up with the present appeal before this Court.
ANALYSIS
9. Having   heard   the   learned   counsel   appearing   for   the   parties
and having gone through the materials on record, the only question
that   falls   for   our   consideration   is   :   Whether   the   High   Court   was
justified in affirming the order passed by the trial court discharging
the accused persons of the offence of murder?
10. At   this   stage,   we   may   look   into   the   reasons   assigned   by   the
trial   court   as   well   as   by   the   High   Court   for   the   purpose   of
discharging the accused persons of the offence of murder.
11. The   trial   court   in   its   order   dated   23.10.2020   observed   in
paragraphs 29 and 30 respectively as under :­
“29.   Scanning   the   evidence   of   prosecution,   statements   of
the  prosecution witnesses  and  statement  of  the  deceased
before her death who in their statements have stated that
the   accused   persons   entered   the   compound   of   the
complainant   and   gave   a   blow   with   some   object   to   the
complainant,   with   the   result   complainant   got   injured   and
the accused persons outraged the modesty of the wife and
daughter­in­law   of   the   complainant.   While   going   through
the   statement   under   section   161   Cr.P.C.   of   the   deceased,
which   was   recorded   instantly   after   the   alleged
commission   of   offence,   deceased   has   stated   that   the
accused   persons   entered   the   compound   and   attacked   his
husband   who   was   given   a   blow   by   some   object   with   the
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result he got injured while as she and her daughter­in­law
tried to intervene upon which the accused persons caught
hold of them by hair and started beating with hands with
the result she got injured and her modesty was outraged.
Medical opinion on file reflect that  there  was  no  injury on
any   other   part   of   the   body   of   the   deceased   except   over
upper   and   lower   lips   with   abrasions   on   face.   Whether
such   act   has   caused   the   death   of   the   deceased   has   not
been   mentioned   anywhere   in   the   record.     Injury   as
reflected in the injury memo also does not reflect any such
consequence   which   could   lead   to   the   death   of   the
deceased.   Report   received   from   FSL   also   does   not   reflect
anything which could in any way lead to the conclusion of
death   by   the   commission   of   the   offence.   In   these
circumstances   it   could   not   be   said   that   the   ingredients   of
sec   302   IPC   are   made   out   and   the   instant   case   does   not
fall within the paraments laid down under sec 302 IPC.
30.   Penal   code   recognizes   two   kinds   of   homicides   –   i)
culpable   homicide,     that   deals   between   sections   299   and
304 IPC and ii) non­culpable homicides, which deals with
section   304­A   IPC.   There   are   two   kinds   of   culpable
homicides; a) culpable  homicide  amounting to  murder Sec
300 and 302 IPC and b) culpable homicide not amounting
to   murder   Sec   304­II   RPC.   This   section   provides
punishment   for   culpable   homicide   not   amounting   to
murder.   The   accused   person   on   virtual   mode   who   are
lodged in Sub Jail Baramulla, who pleaded not guilty and
claimed   to   be   tried.   Copy   of   charge   sheet   was   sent   to
Superintendent   Sub   Jail   Baramulla   for   obtaining
signatures   of   the   accused   persons   who   shall   after
obtaining   the   same   attest   the   same   and   forward   the
charge   sheet   to   this   court.   Prosecution   shall   produce
evidence   on   next   date   of   hearing.   Put   up   on   04.11.20.”  
  (emphasis supplied)
12. The High Court, while affirming the aforesaid order passed by
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the trial court, held as under:­
“9.  The   perusal   of   the   order  passed   by  trial  court   reveals
that   the   trial   court   after   considering   the   statement   of   the
eye   witnesses   including   the   injured   witnesses   and   the
statement of the deceased has come to the conclusion that
the   ingredients   of   offence   under   section   302   I.P.C   are
lacking.  The injury report of the deceased reflects that she
was   examined   at   3.15   p.m.   on   22.03.2020   and   except
slight   bleeding   over   upper   and   lower   lips,   there   was   no
injury   on   any   part   of   the   body   of   the   deceased   Aisha
Begum   and   at   that   time   she   had   not   suffered   cardiac
arrest .   In   the   post   mortem   report,   the   concerned   Medical
Officer has given opinion regarding death of Aisha Begum
that the deceased died due to cardiac arrest with alleged
history   of   scuffle   with   neighbours.   Even   the   deceased
Aisha   Begum   in   her   statement   has   stated   that   the
respondent   Nos.  1   to   7   entered   their   compound   and   gave
blow   upon   her   husband   (petitioner)   as   result   of   which   he
got injured and when she and her daughter­in­law tried to
intervene,   they   also   got   hold   of   them   and   started   beating
her as a result of which she got injured and outraged her
modesty.   The  cause of death in the  post mortem report  is
cardiac        arrest and not  that  the deceased died  as  a result
of injury suffered by her. It would be relevant to note that
the   deceased   was   examined   on   22.03.2020   at   3.15   P.M
by   Medical   Officer.   She   was   declared   brought   dead   on
23.03.2020   in   the   Hospital   at   1.37   A.M   as   per   the   death
certificate   placed   on   record   by   the   petitioner .   The   trial
court   has   rightly   come   to   the   conclusion   that   no   offence
under   section 302   IPC is made out against the respondent
Nos.   1   to7.   There   is   no   force   in   the   contention   of   the
petitioner   that   the   trial   court   has   critically   evaluated   the
evidence   but   the   trial   court   has   simply   examined   the
material   facts   so   as   to   find   out   as   to   whether   there   is
sufficient   material   to   charge   the   private   respondents   for
commission   of   offence   under   section   302   IPC   or   not   and
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the   conclusion   of   the   trial   court   is   rather   the   only
conclusion that can be drawn from the material brought on
record by the prosecution.”  (emphasis supplied)
13. We   shall   now   take   notice   of   the   individual   orders   passed   by
the   trial   court   framing   charge   against   the   accused   persons.   One
such order framing the charge reads thus:­
“Charge   is   hereby   framed   against   you   Midasir   Ahmad
Magrey   that   on   22.03.20   you   in   collusion   with   the   other
accused   persons   trespassed   into   the   courtyard   of   the
house   of   the   complainant   and   you   all   started   uprooting
the tin fence.  When the complainant asked you and other
accused   persons   not   to   cause   any   damage,   you   all
started   assaulting   the   complainant   with   a   weapon   as   a
result the complainant suffered injuries and fell down on
the   ground.   You   also   caused   injuries   to   the   wife   of   the
complainant   and   outraged   her   modesty.   The   wife   of   the
complainant   died   in   the   midnight   hours   on
22/23.03.2020.   Therefore,   you   are   to   be   tried   for   the
offence punishable under Sections 451, 323, 324 and 304
of the IPC.”
14.  We   shall   now   look   into   the   police  statement   of  one  of   the   eye
witnesses   recorded   under   Section   161   of   the   Code   of   Criminal
Procedure,   1973   (for   short,   ‘CrPC’)   dated   23.03.2020.   The
statements   of   all   other  eye   witnesses   are   on  the   same   footing.  The
statement thus reads:­
“Statement of Wali Mohammad Sheikh R/o: Ghulam Mohi­
ud­din Sheikh R/o Yarbugh, age – 59 Years, Occupation –
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Farmer under Section 161 Cr.PC dated 23­03­2020
I   am   a   resident   of   Yarbugh   and   am   a   Farmer   by
profession.     On   22­03­2020,   I   went   to   offer   Prayers   and
was returning from the Mosque towards my Home. On the
way   I   saw   that   the   accused   persons   namely     1.
Mohammad   Maqbool   Magray     S/o   Mohammad   Shaban
Magray;   2.   Zahoor   Ahmad   Magray   S/o   Mohammad
Shaban Magray; 3. Tariq Ahmad Magray S/o Mohammad
Shaban   Magray;   4.   Mudasir   Ahmad   Magray   S/o
Mohammad   Shaban   Magray;   5.   Abdul   Rashid   Beigh   S/o
Mohammad   Beigh;   6.   Suhail   Ahmad   Beigh   S/o   Abdul
Rashid   Beigh;   and   7.   Nasir   Ahmad   Beigh   S/o   Abdul
Rashid   Beigh   Residents   of   :   Yarbugh   Rafiabad,   in   an
unlawful assembly with a preplanned concert, entered the
residential compound of complainant and started breaking
his   Tin   Fence.   The   complainant   objected   to   such   act   and
told them that the said Tin Wall was constructed mutually.
On   listening   to   this,   the   accused   persons   forming   an
assembly,   caught   hold   of   the   complainant   and   started
beating him up with kicks and blows.  Further, they hit the
complainant with a wooden log as a result he got injured.
The   wife   of   complainant   namely   Mst.   Ashiya   Begum   and
Daughter­in­law   of   the   complainant   namely   Rubeena
Ramzan came to the rescue the complainant. The accused
persons   also   caught   hold   of   them   and   beat   them   up   with
kicks   and   blows   thereby   causing   injuries   to   both.     The
said two ladies were dragged by the accused persons due
to which their modesty was outraged and the Feran worn
by   the   wife   of   the   complainant   was   also   tore   off   by   the
accused   persons.     The   complainant   then   filed   a   written
complaint   with   the   Police   Station   Dangiwacha   in   the
incident. At 10:00 PM, the wife of the complainant namely
Mst.   Ashiya   Begum   who   was   beaten   and   injured   by   the
accused   persons   complained   of   severe   complications   and
was rushed to hospital for medical treatment and on way
she succumbed to death. In fact, the deceased died due to
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the   assault   and   beating   of   accused   persons   and   injuries
by   them.   Today,   Police   Dangiwacha   recorded   my
statement and I attested my signature upon it.  Hence, my
statement.” 
POSITION OF LAW
15.  Section 226 of the CrPC  corresponds to sub­section (1) of the
old   Section   286   with   verbal   changes   owing   to   the   abolition   of   the
jury.  Section 286 of the 1898 Code reads as under:­   
“286. (1)   In   a   case   triable   by   jury,   when   the   jurors   have
been in   chosen or, in any other  case, when the Judge
is ready to hear the case, the prosecutor shall open his
case by reading   from   the   Indian   Penal or other law the
description   of   the   offence   charged,   and   stating   shortly
by   what   evidence   he   expects   to   prove   the   guilt   of   the
accused.    
(2)   The   prosecutor   shall   then   examine   his   witnesses.”
          Section   226   of   the   1973 Code   reads   thus: 
“226.   Opening   case   for   prosecution . ─   When   the   ac ­
cused   appears   or   is   brought   before   the   Court   in   pur ­
suance of a commitment of the case under section 209,
the   prosecutor   shall   open   his   case   by   describing   the
charge   brought   against   the   accused   and   stating   by
what evidence he proposes to prove the guilt of the ac ­
cused.”
 
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    Section   226   of   the   CrPC   permits   the   prosecution   to   make   the   first
impression   regards   a   case,   one   which   might   be   difficult   to   dispel.   In  
not   insisting   upon   its   right   under   Section   226   of   the   CrPC,   the
prosecution   would   be   doing   itself   a   disfavour.   If   the   accused   is   to
contend that the case against him has not been explained owing to
the   non­compliance   with   Section   226   of   the   CrPC,   the   answer
would   be   that   the   Section   173(2)   of   the   CrPC   report   in   the   case
would   give   a   fair   idea   thereof,   and   that   the   stage   of   framing   of
charges under Section 228 of the CrPC is reached after crossing the
stage   of   Section   227   of   the   CrPC,   which   affords   both   the   prosecu ­
tion   and  accused   a   fair   opportunity   to   put   forward  their   rival   con ­
tentions.
16. Section   227   of   the   CrPC   reads   thus: 
“227.   Discharge.─
If,       upon       consideration       of       the       record       of       the    
case 
and       the   documents     submitted   therewith,   and   after
hearing    the  submissions   of      the     accused     and  the 
prosecution     in      this      behalf,     the      Judge      considers
that       there       is       not   sufficient   ground   for   proceeding
against   the   accused,   he   shall   discharge   the   accused
and record his reasons for so doing.”
   
17.       Section   228   of   the   CrPC   reads   thus: 
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“228.   Framing   of   charge.­   (1)     If,   after   such   considera ­
tion   and   hearing   as   aforesaid,the   Judge   is   of   opinion
that   there   is   ground   for     presuming   that   the   ac ­
cused   has   committed   an   offence   which­   (a)   is   not   exclu ­
sively   triable   by   the   Court   of     Session,   he
may   frame   a   charge   against   the     accused     and,     by   or ­
der,  
transfer   the   case   for   trial   to   the   Chief   Judicial     Magis ­
trate,   or   any   other   Judicial   Magistrate   of   the   first   class
and direct the accused to appear before the Chief   Judi ­
cial Magistrate, or as the case may be, the Judicial Mag ­
istrate   of   the   first   class,   on   such   date   as   he   deems   fit,
and   thereupon   such   Magistrate   shall   try   the   offence   in
accordance   with   the   procedure     for   the   trial   of   warrant
cases   instituted   on   a   police   report;
(b)   is   exclusively   triable     by   the   Court,     he  
shall   frame   in  
writing   a   charge against the accused.
(2)   Where   the   Judge   frames   any   charge   under   clause   (b)  
of   sub ­section   (1),   the   charge   shall   be   read   and     ex ­
plained   to   the   accused   and   the   accused   shall   be   asked
whether   he   pleads   guilty   of   the   offence   charged   or   claim ­
sto be   tried.” 
     
18.  The     purpose   of   framing   a   charge   is   to   intimate   to   the   accused
the   clear,   unambiguous   and   precise   nature   of   accusation   that   the
accused   is called upon  to  meet  in  the course of  a trial.    [See:   deci ­
sion   of   a   Four   Judge   Bench   of   this   Court   in
V.C.   Shukla   v.   State   through   C.B.I.   reported   in1980   Supp   SCC
92: 1980 SCC (Cri) 695).     
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19. The   case   may   be   a   sessions   case,   a   warrant   case,   or   a   sum ­
mons   case,   the   point   is   that   a   prima   facie   case   must   be   made   out
before   a   charge   can   be   framed.   Basically,   there   are   three   pairs   of
sections   in   the   CrPC.     Those   are   Sections   227   and   228   relating   to
the sessions trial; Section 239 and 240 relatable to trial of warrant
cases, and Sections 245(1) and (2) with respect to trial of summons
case. 
20.   Section   226   of   the   CrPC,   over   a   period   of   time   has   gone,   in
oblivion.   Our   understanding   of   the   provision   of   Section   226   of   the
CrPC is that before the Court proceeds to frame the charge against
the accused, the Public Prosecutor owes a duty to give a fair idea to
the Court as regards the case of the prosecution. 
21.  This Court in the case of   Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar
Samal  and  another , (1979) 3 SCC  4, considered the scope of  en ­
quiry a judge is required to make while considering the question of
framing   of   charges.   After   an   exhaustive   survey   of   the   case   law   on
the   point,   this   Court,   in   paragraph   10   of   the   judgment,   laid   down
the following principles :­
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“(1)   That   the   Judge   while   considering   the   question   of
framing  the  charges  under  section  227  of  the   Code   has
the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for
the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima
facie case against the accused has been made out.
 
(2) Where the materials placed before the Court disclose
grave suspicion against the accused which has not been
properly   explained   the   Court   will   be,   fully   justified   in
framing a charge and proceeding with the trial. 
(3)   The   test   to   determine   a   prima   facie   case   would
naturally   depend   upon   the   facts   of   each   case   and   it   is
difficult   to   lay   down   a   rule   of   universal   application.   By
and large however if two views are equally possible and
the Judge is satisfied that the evidence produced before
him   while   giving   rise   to   some   suspicion   but   not   grave
suspicion against the accused, he will be fully within his
right to discharge the accused. 
(4)   That   in   exercising   his   jurisdiction   under   section   227
of the Code the Judge which under the present Code is a
senior   and   experienced   Judge   cannot   act   merely   as   a
Post   office   or   a   mouth­piece   of   the   prosecution,   but   has
to consider the  broad  probabilities  of  the  case, the  total
effect   of   the   evidence   and   the   documents   produced
before   the   Court,   any   basic   infirmities   appearing   in   the
case   and   so   on.   This   however   does   not   mean   that   the
Judge   should   make   a   roving   enquiry   into   the   pros   and
cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was
conducting a trial.” 
22.   There   are   several   other   judgments   of   this   Court   delineating
the scope of Court’s powers in respect of the framing of charges in a
criminal case, one of those being  Dipakbhai Jagdishchndra Patel
14

v. State of Gujarat , (2019) 16 SCC 547, wherein the law relating to
the   framing   of   charge   and   discharge   is   discussed   elaborately   in
paragraphs   15   and   23   resply   and   the   same   are   reproduced   as
under: 
“15.   We   may   profitably,   in   this   regard,   refer   to   the
judgment of this Court in State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh
wherein this Court has laid down the principles relating
to framing of charge and discharge as follows:  
“4…..Reading   Sections   227   and   228   together   in
juxtaposition,   as   they   have   got   to   be,   it   would   be
clear   that   at   the   beginning   and   initial   stage   of   the
trial   the   truth,   veracity   and   effect   of   the   evidence
which the prosecutor proposes to adduce are not to
be   meticulously   judged.   Nor   is   any   weight   to   be
attached   to  the   probable   defence  of  the  accused. It
is   not   obligatory   for   the   Judge   at   that   stage   of   the
trial   to   consider   in   any   detail   and   weigh   in   a
sensitive   balance   whether   the   facts,   if   proved,
would   be   incompatible   with   the   innocence   of   the
accused or not. The standard of test and judgment
which   is   to   be   finally   applied   before   recording   a
finding   regarding   the   guilt   or   otherwise   of   the
accused is not exactly to be applied at the stage of
deciding   the   matter   under   Section   227   or   Section
228   of   the   Code.   At   that   stage   the   Court   is   not   to
see whether there is sufficient ground for conviction
of the accused or whether the trial is sure to end in
his   conviction.   Strong   suspicion   against   the
accused,   if   the   matter   remains   in   the   region   of
suspicion, cannot take the place of proof of his guilt
at the conclusion of the trial. But at the initial stage
if there is a strong suspicion which leads the Court
15

to think that there is ground for presuming that the
accused   has   committed   an   offence   then   it   is   not
open   to   the   Court   to   say   that   there   is   no   sufficient
ground   for   proceeding   against   the   accused.   The
presumption  of   the   guilt   of  the  accused   which  is   to
be   drawn  at   the   initial   stage   is   not   in   the   sense   of
the   law   governing   the   trial   of   criminal   cases   in
France where the accused is presumed to be guilty
unless  the  contrary is  proved. But  it  is  only for the
purpose   of   deciding   prima   facie   whether   the   court
should proceed with the trial or not. If the evidence
which   the   prosecutor   proposes   to   adduce   to   prove
the guilt of the accused even if fully accepted before
it is challenged in cross examination or rebutted by
the   defence   evidence,   if   any,  cannot   show  that   the
accused   committed   the   offence,   then   there   will   be
no sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial….
If   the   scales   of   pan   as   to   the   guilt   or   innocence   of
the   accused   are   something   like   even   at   the
conclusion of the trial, then, on the theory of benefit
of doubt the case is to end in his acquittal. But if, on
the other hand, it is so at the initial stage of making
an order under Section 227 or Section 228, then in
such   a   situation   ordinarily   and   generally   the   order
which   will   have   to   be   made   will   be   one   under
Section 228 and not under Section 227.”
“23.   At   the   stage   of   framing   the   charge   in   accordance
with   the   principles   which   have   been   laid   down   by   this
Court, what the Court is expected to do is, it does not act
as   a   mere   post   office.   The   Court   must   indeed   sift   the
material before it. The material to be sifted would be the
material   which   is   produced   and   relied   upon   by   the
prosecution.   The   sifting   is   not   to   be   meticulous   in   the
sense that the Court dons the mantle of the Trial Judge
hearing   arguments   after   the   entire   evidence   has   been
adduced after a full­fledged trial and the question is not
16

whether   the   prosecution   has   made   out   the   case   for   the
conviction   of   the   accused.   All   that   is   required   is,   the
Court   must   be   satisfied   that   with   the   materials
available,   a   case   is   made   out   for   the   accused   to   stand
trial.   A   strong   suspicion   suffices.   However,   a   strong
suspicion   must   be   founded   on   some   material.   The
material   must   be   such   as   can   be   translated   into
evidence   at   the   stage   of   trial.   The   strong   suspicion
cannot   be   the   pure   subjective   satisfaction   based   on   the
moral notions of the Judge that here is a case where it is
possible that accused has committed the offence. Strong
suspicion   must   be   the   suspicion   which   is   premised   on
some   material   which   commends   itself   to   the   court   as
sufficient   to   entertain   the   prima   facie   view   that   the
accused has committed the offence.”
23.  In   Sajjan   Kumar   v.   CBI   [(2010)   9   SCC   368   :   (2010)   3   SCC
(Cri)   1371]   ,   this   Court   had   an   occasion   to   consider   the   scope   of
Sections   227   and   228   CrPC.   The   principles   which   emerged   there ­
from have been taken note of in para 21 as under: (SCC pp. 376­77)
“21. On consideration of the authorities about the scope
of Sections 227 and 228 of the Code, the following prin ­
ciples emerge:
(i)   The   Judge   while   considering   the   question   of
framing   the   charges   under   Section   227   CrPC   has
the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence
for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not
a   prima   facie   case   against   the   accused   has   been
made   out.   The   test   to   determine   prima   facie   case
would depend upon the facts of each case.
17

(ii) Where the materials placed before the court dis ­
close   grave   suspicion   against   the   accused   which
has   not   been   properly   explained,   the   court   will   be
fully   justified   in   framing   a   charge   and   proceeding
with the trial.
(iii) The court cannot act merely as a post office or a
mouthpiece   of   the   prosecution   but   has   to   consider
the broad probabilities of the case, the total effect of
the   evidence   and   the   documents   produced   before
the court, any basic infirmities, etc. However, at this
stage, there cannot be a roving enquiry into the pros
and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if
he was conducting a trial.
(iv)   If   on   the   basis   of   the   material   on   record,   the
court could form an opinion that the accused might
have   committed   offence,   it   can   frame   the   charge,
though   for   conviction   the   conclusion   is   required   to
be   proved   beyond   reasonable   doubt   that   the   ac ­
cused has committed the offence.
(v) At the time of framing of the charges, the proba ­
tive  value  of the  material on record  cannot be  gone
into but before framing a charge the court must ap ­
ply   its   judicial   mind   on   the   material   placed   on
record and must be satisfied that the commission of
offence by the accused was possible.
(vi) At the stage of Sections 227 and 228, the court
is required to evaluate the material and documents
on record with a view to find out if the facts emerg ­
ing therefrom taken at their face value disclose the
existence   of   all   the   ingredients   constituting   the   al ­
leged   offence.   For   this   limited   purpose,   sift   the   evi ­
dence   as   it   cannot   be   expected   even   at   that   initial
18

stage   to   accept   all   that   the   prosecution   states   as
gospel   truth  even  if   it   is  opposed  to  common  sense
or the broad probabilities of the case.
(vii) If two views are possible and one of them gives
rise   to   suspicion   only,   as   distinguished   from   grave
suspicion, the trial Judge will be empowered to dis ­
charge   the   accused   and   at   this   stage,   he   is   not   to
see   whether   the   trial   will   end   in   conviction   or   ac ­
quittal.”
24. The   exposition   of   law   on   the   subject   has   been   further
considered   by   this   Court   in   State   v.   S.   Selvi ,   (2018)   13   SCC
455   :   (2018)   3   SCC   (Cri)   710,   followed   in   Vikram   Jo ­
har   v.   State   of   Uttar   Pradesh ,   (2019)   14   SCC   207   :   2019
SCC OnLine SC 609 : (2019) 6 Scale 794.
25. In   the   case   of   Asim   Shariff   v.   National   Investigation
Agency ,   (2019)   7   SCC   148,   this   Court,   to   which   one   of   us   (A.M.
Khanwilkar, J.) was a party, in  so  many  words has expressed that
the   trial   court   is   not   expected   or   supposed   to   hold   a   mini   trial   for
the   purpose   of   marshalling   the   evidence   on   record.   We   quote   the
relevant observations as under:­
“18. Taking  note  of  the  exposition of law  on the  subject
laid   down   by   this   Court,   it   is   settled   that   the   Judge
while   considering   the   question   of   framing   charge
19

under   Section 227   CrPC in sessions cases(which is akin
to   Section   239   CrPC   pertaining   to   warrant   cases)   has
the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for
the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima
facie   case   against   the   accused   has   been   made   out;
where   the   material   placed   before   the   Court   discloses
grave suspicion against the accused which has not been
properly   explained,   the   Court   will   be   fully   justified   in
framing   the   charge;   by   and   large   if   two   views   are
possible   and   one   of   them   giving   rise   to   suspicion   only,
as   distinguished   from   grave   suspicion   against   the
accused, 3 2018(13) SCC 455 4 2019(6) SCALE 794   the
trial   Judge   will   be   justified   in   discharging   him.   It   is
thus   clear   that   while   examining   the   discharge
application   filed   under   Section   227   CrPC,   it   is
expected   from   the   trial   Judge   to   exercise   its
judicial   mind   to   determine   as   to   whether   a   case
for   trial   has   been   made   out   or   not.   It   is   true   that
in   such   proceedings,   the   Court   is   not   supposed   to
hold   a   mini   trial   by   marshalling   the   evidence   on
record .”
(emphasis supplied)
26. In   the   case   of   State   of   Karnataka   v.   M.R.   Hiremath ,
reported in (2019) 7 SCC 515, this Court held as under:­
“25. The High Court ought to have been cognizant of the
fact that the trial court was dealing with an application
for   discharge   under   the   provisions   of   Section   239   CrPC.
The   parameters   which   govern   the   exercise   of   this
jurisdiction   have   found   expression   in   several   decisions
of   this   Court.   It   is   a   settled   principle   of   law   that   at   the
stage   of   considering   an   application   for   discharge   the
court must proceed on the assumption that the material
which has been brought on the record by the prosecution
20

is   true   and   evaluate   the   material   in   order   to   determine
whether  the   facts   emerging   from  the  material,  taken  on
its   face   value,   disclose   the   existence   of   the   ingredients
necessary to constitute the offence.   In State of T.N. v. N.
Suresh   Rajan,   (2014)   11   SCC   709,   adverting   to   the
earlier decisions on the subject, this Court held: (SCC pp.
721­22, para 29) 
“29. … At this stage, probative value of the materials
has   to   be   gone   into   and   the   court   is   not   expected   to
go   deep   into   the   matter   and   hold   that   the   materials
would not warrant a conviction. In our opinion, what
needs to be considered is whether there is a ground
for   presuming   that   the   offence   has   been   committed
and not whether a ground for convicting the accused
has  been made  out. To  put  it  differently, if  the  court
thinks   that   the   accused   might   have   committed   the
offence on the basis of the materials on record on its
probative   value,   it   can   frame   the   charge;   though   for
conviction,   the   court   has   to   come   to   the   conclusion
that the accused has committed the offence. The law
does not permit a mini trial at this stage.”
27.  Thus   from   the   aforesaid,   it   is   evident   that   the   trial   court   is
enjoined   with   the   duty   to   apply   its   mind   at   the   time   of   framing   of
charge  and  should  not  act  as  a  mere  post  office.  The  endorsement
on the charge sheet presented by the police as it is without applying
its   mind   and   without   recording   brief   reasons   in   support   of   its
opinion is not countenanced by law. However, the material which is
required to be evaluated by the Court at the time of framing charge
21

should   be   the   material   which   is   produced   and   relied   upon   by   the
prosecution. The sifting of such material is not to be so meticulous
as   would   render   the   exercise   a   mini   trial   to   find   out   the   guilt   or
otherwise   of   the   accused.   All   that   is   required   at   this   stage   is   that
the   Court   must   be   satisfied   that   the   evidence   collected   by   the
prosecution   is   sufficient   to   presume   that   the   accused   has
committed   an   offence.   Even   a   strong   suspicion   would   suffice.
Undoubtedly,   apart   from   the   material   that   is   placed   before   the
Court   by   the   prosecution   in   the   shape   of   final   report   in   terms   of
Section   173   of   CrPC,   the   Court   may   also   rely   upon   any   other
evidence   or   material   which   is   of   sterling   quality   and   has   direct
bearing   on   the   charge   laid   before   it   by   the   prosecution.   (See   :
Bhawna Bai v. Ghanshyam , (2020) 2 SCC 217).  
28.  In  Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander ,  (2012) 9 SCC 460, this
Court observed in paragraph 30 that  the Legislature in its wisdom
has   used   the   expression   “ there   is   ground   for   presuming   that   the
accused   has   committed   an   offence ”.   There   is   an   inbuilt   element   of
presumption.   It   referred   to   its   judgement   rendered   in   the   case   of
State of   Maharashtra v. Som Nath Thapa and others , (1996) 4
22

SCC   659,   and   to   the   meaning   of   the   word   “ presume ”,   placing
reliance upon Blacks’ Law Dictionary, where it was defined to mean
“   to   believe   or   accept   upon   probable   evidence”;   “to   take   as   true   until
evidence to the contrary is forthcoming”. In other words, the truth of
the matter has to come out when the prosecution evidence is led, the
witnesses are cross­examined by the defence, incriminating material
and evidences put to the accused in terms of Section 313 of the Code,
and   then   the   accused   is   provided   an   opportunity   to   lead   defence,   if
any. It is only upon completion of such steps that the trial concludes
with   the   Court   forming   its   final   opinion   and   delivering   its
judgement.....”                                                                                                          (emphasis
supplied)
29. What did the trial court do in the  case on  hand?  We have no
doubt   in   our   mind   that   the   trial   court   could   be   said   to   have
conducted   a   mini   trial   while   marshalling   the   evidence   on   record.
The   trial   court   thought   fit   to   discharge   the   accused   persons   from
the offence of murder and proceeded to frame charge for the offence
of   culpable   homicide   under   Section   304   of   the   IPC   by   only   taking
into consideration the medical evidence on record. The trial court as
23

well as the High Court got persuaded by the fact that the cause of
death of the deceased as assigned in the post mortem report being
the   “cardio   respiratory   failure”,   the   same   cannot   be   said   to   be
having   any   nexus   with   the   alleged   assault   that   was   laid   on   the
deceased. Such approach of the trial court is not correct and cannot
be countenanced in law. The post mortem report, by itself, does not
constitute   substantive   evidence.   Whether   the   “cardio   respiratory
failure” had any nexus with the incident in question would have to
be determined on the basis of the oral evidence of the eye witnesses
as well as the medical officer concerned i.e. the expert witness who
may be examined by the Prosecution as one of its witnesses. To put
it   in   other   words,   whether   the   cause   of   death   has   any   nexus   with
the   alleged   assault   on   the   deceased   by   the   accused   persons   could
have been determined only after the recoding of oral evidence of the
eye   witnesses   and   the   expert   witness   along   with   the   other
substantive evidence on record. The post mortem repot of the doctor
is   his   previous   statement   based   on   his   examination   of   the   dead
body. It is not substantive evidence. The doctor’s statement in court
is   alone   the   substantive   evidence.   The   post   mortem   repot   can   be
24

used   only   to   corroborate   his   statement   under   Section   157,   or   to
refresh   his   memory   under   Section   159,   or   to   contradict   his
statement   in   the   witness­box   under   Section   145   of   the   Evidence
Act,   1872.   A   medical   witness   called   in   as   an   expert   to   assist   the
Court is not a witness of fact and the evidence given by the medical
officer   is   really   of   an   advisory   character   given   on   the   basis   of   the
symptoms found on examination. The expert witness is expected to
put   before   the   Court   all   materials   inclusive   of   the   data   which
induced him to come to the conclusion and enlighten the Court on
the   technical  aspect  of  the  case by   explaining  the  terms  of  science
so   that   the   Court   although,   not   an   expert   may   form   its   own
judgment on those materials after giving due regard to the expert’s
opinion because once the expert’s opinion is accepted, it is not the
opinion of the medical officer but of the Court.
30.    The prosecution should have been given opportunity to prove
all the relevant facts including the post mortem report through the
medical officer concerned by leading oral evidence and thereby seek
the   opinion   of   the   expert.     It   was   too   early   on   the   part   of   the   trial
court   as   well   as   the   High   Court   to   arrive   at   the   conclusion   that
25

since no serious injuries were noted in the post mortem report, the
death   of   the   deceased   on   account   of   “cardio   respiratory   failure”
cannot   be   said   to   be   having   any   nexus   with   the   incident   in
question.
31.   Whether  the case falls under  Section 302 or 304 Part II, IPC
could have been decided by the trial court only after the evaluation
of   the   entire   oral   evidence   that   may   be   led   by   the   prosecution   as
well   as   by   the   defence,   if   any,   comes   on   record.   Ultimately,   upon
appreciation of the entire evidence on record at the end of the trial,
the   trial   court   may   take   one   view   or   the   other   i.e.   whether   it   is   a
case   of   murder   or   case   of   culpable   homicide.     But   at   the   stage   of
framing   of   the   charge,   the   trial   court   could   not   have   reached   to
such   a   conclusion   merely   relying   upon   the   port   mortem   report   on
record.  The High Court also overlooked such fundamental infirmity
in   the   order   passed   by   the   trial   court   and   proceeded   to   affirm   the
same.
32. We   may   now   proceed   to   consider   the   issue   on   hand   from   a
different angle. It is a settled position of law that in a criminal trial,
the   prosecution   can   lead   evidence   only   in   accordance   with   the
26

charge   framed   by   the   trial   court.   Where   a   higher   charge   is   not
framed   for   which   there   is   evidence,   the   accused   is   entitled   to
assume that he is called upon to defend himself only with regard to
the lesser offence for which he has been charged. It is not necessary
then for him to meet evidence relating to the offences with which he
has not been charged. He is merely to answer the charge as framed.
The   Code   does   not   require   him   to   meet   all   evidence   led   by
prosecution.   He   has   only   to   rebut   evidence   bearing   on   the   charge.
The   prosecution   case   is   necessarily   limited   by  the  charge.   It  forms
the foundation of the trial which starts with it and the accused can
justifiably concentrate on meeting  the subject­matter of the charge
against   him.   He   need   not   cross­examine   witnesses   with   regard   to
offences   he   is   not   charged   with   nor   need   he   give   any   evidence   in
defence in respect of such charges.
33. Once   the   trial   court   decides   to   discharge   an   accused   person
from   the   offence   punishable   under   Section   302   of   the   IPC   and
proceeds   to   frame   the   lesser   charge   for   the   offence   punishable
under   Section   304   Part   II   of   the   IPC,   the   prosecution   thereafter
would not  be in a position to  lead any  evidence beyond the  charge
27

as   framed.   To   put   it   otherwise,   the   prosecution   will   be   thereafter
compelled   to   proceed   as   if   it   has  now   to   establish   only   the   case   of
culpable homicide and not  murder. On the  other  hand, even if the
trial   court   proceeds   to   frame   charge   under   Section   302   IPC   in
accordance with the case put up by the prosecution still it would be
open   for   the   accused   to   persuade   the  Court   at  the   end   of   the   trial
that   the   case   falls   only   within   the   ambit   of   culpable   homicide
punishable under Section 304 of IPC. In such circumstances, in the
facts   of   the   present   case,   it   would   be   more   prudent   to   permit   the
prosecution   to   lead   appropriate   evidence   whatever   it   is   worth   in
accordance   with   its   original   case   as   put   up   in   the   chargesheet.
Such   approach   of   the   trial   court   at   times   may   prove   to   be   more
rationale and prudent. 
34. In view of the aforesaid discussion, the order of the High Court
as well as the order of the trial court deserve to be set aside.  
35.  In the result, this appeal succeeds and is hereby allowed.  The
orders passed by the High Court and the trial court are hereby set
aside.   The   trial   court   shall   now   proceed   to   pass   a   fresh   order
framing   charge   in   accordance   with   law   keeping   in   mind   the
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observations made by this Court. 
36. We   clarify   that   we   have   otherwise   not   expressed   any   opinion
on   the   merits   of   the   case.   The   observations   in   this   judgment   are
absolutely   prima facie  and relevant only for the purpose of deciding
the   legality   and   validity   of   the   order   discharging   the   accused
persons   of   the   offence   of   murder   punishable   under   Section   302   of
the IPC. We once again clarify that ultimately it is for the trial court
to take an appropriate decision as regards the nature of the offence
at the end of the trial.
…………………………………….J.
(A.M. KHANWILKAR)
……………………………………..J.
(ABHAY S. OKA)
…………………………………….J.
  (J.B. PARDIWALA)
NEW DELHI;
JULY 26, 2022
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