/2022 INSC 0724/
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.            OF 2022
ARISING OUT OF SLP (CRL.) NO.2864 OF 2019
J. Vedhasingh                  …..APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
R.M. Govindan & Ors.              ..…RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
J.K. Maheshwari, J .
Leave granted. 
2. The   instant   appeal   has   been   filed   assailing   the   final   order
dated   06.12.2018   passed   by   the   High   Court   of   Madras   in
CRL.O.P. No. 6750 of 2017, whereby the High Court allowed the
criminal petition filed by the respondents no.1 to 4 under Section
482 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short “ Cr.P.C ”) and
quashed   proceedings   under   Sections   120B,   406,   420   and   34   of
the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short “ IPC ”)   being C.C. No. 33
1

of   2017   pending   before   Judicial   Magistrate   Court   No.   III,
Coimbatore.
3. The brief facts necessary for the instant appeal are that the
appellant herein was working as a Civil Engineer in Saudi Arabia.
On his return back to India in the year 2011, he purchased a site
from   respondent   no.2   who   is   the   father   of   respondent   no.1   in
Coimbatore.   Apart   from   this,   the   respondents   owned   7   other
house   sites   in   total   in   V.C.K.   Layout,   Trichy   Road,   Coimbatore
City,   which   all   were   mortgaged   to   Tamil   Nadu   Industrial
Investment   Corporation,   way   back   from   12.10.2006.   Appellant
contended   that   the   respondents   approached   and   asked   him   to
invest  money  for   the  development  of  the   land  of  the  said  7 sites
and   assured   that   profit   shall   be   divided   amongst   the   appellant
and   respondents.   Pursuant   to   it   a   profit­sharing   agreement   was
executed between the parties. The appellant made the investment
of   a   sum   of   Rs.62,32,754/­,   but   neither   profit   was   shared   nor
any   piece   of   land   was   given   to   the   appellant.   Consequently,   the
appellant   asked   to   repay   the   amount.   Under   guise   of   assurance
of   re­payment   by   respondent   no.1,   the   appellant   did   not   lodge
any criminal prosecution as per his request. The respondent no.1
2

handed   over   a   cheque   dated   09.09.2015   for   an   amount   of
Rs.87,00,000 in lieu of repayment of principal sum and interest. 
4. On   presenting   the   said   cheque   to   the   bank   it   was
dishonored on account of insufficient funds on 09.09.2015. Being
aggrieved,   a   demand   notice   was   issued   on   30.10.2015   and
complaint under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881
(for   short   “ NI   Act ”)   being   S.T.C.   No.792   of   2015   renumbered   as
C.C. No.199 of 2016 on the file of Fast Track Magistrate No.1 of
Coimbatore   (for   short   “ 138   Proceedings ”)   was   lodged   by   the
appellant on 07.12.2015. Prior to initiating 138 proceedings, the
appellant   lodged   a   complaint   under   section   156(3)   Cr.P.C   being
CMP   No.   5083   of   2015   before   Judicial   Magistrate   No.   III
Coimbatore   on   30.10.2015.   The   Magistrate   directed   respondent
no. 5 to register the FIR but by filing a report dated 29.01.2016,
it was said that no offence is made out against the respondents.
The appellant challenged the same by filing CRL.O.P. No. 6766 of
2016   before   the   High   court   of   Madras   and   also   prayed   for
direction against respondent no.5 to conduct fresh investigation.
The   High   Court   disposed   of   the   same   with   an   observation   that
the   appellant   may   raise   objection   on   closure   report   by   way   of
3

protest   petition.   In   pursuance   thereof,   the   appellant   filed   a
protest   petition   being   Crl.M.P.   No.   3891   of   2016,   which   was
allowed   by   the   Magistrate   vide   order   dated   24.09.2016   directing
the respondent no. 5 to register the case against the respondent
no. 1 to 4 and to complete the investigation. Thereafter only, the
respondent no.5 registered the case against respondent no.1 to 4
at   Crime   No.49   of   2016   for   the   offences   under   Sections   120B,
406,   420   and   34   of   IPC   on   01.10.2016,   and   after   investigation,
challan   was   filed   before   the   competent   Magistrate   on   which
cognizance was taken by him. 
5. The   respondents,   being   aggrieved   by   the   same,   filed
CRL.O.P.   No.   6750   of   2017   before   the   High   Court   of   Madras   for
quashment   of   the   aforesaid   proceedings.   The   High   Court   by   the
impugned   order   allowed   the   said   petition   and   quashed   the
proceedings   taking   into   consideration   that   proceedings   under
Section 138 of the N.I. Act pertaining to the same cause of action
and   on   the   same   facts   and   grounds   are   pending,   prior   to   the
registration   of   the   present   proceedings.   It   was   observed   that,
looking   to   the   allegations   made   in   the   FIR,   only   offence   under
section   138   of   NI   Act   can   be   made   out   and   continuance   of   the
4

present   proceedings   for   offences   under   sections   406,   420,   120B
and   34   of   IPC   would   amount   to   abuse   of   process   of   the   Court.
The   said   order   passed   by   the   High   Court   is   assailed   by   the
appellant in the instant appeal.
6. Learned senior counsel Mr. S. Nagamuthu contends that in
the facts of the present case the plea of double jeopardy or bar of
Section   300(1)   of   Cr.P.C.   would   attract   only   when   the   earlier
offence   and   the   later   offence   is   same   or   have   same   ingredients.
The identity of the allegations on fact is not relevant, in fact, the
identity   of   the   ingredients   of   the   offence   is   relevant.   The   plea
taken   by   respondent   no.1   to   4   that   a   person   who   is   previously
acquitted   cannot   be   tried   for   the   same   offence   subsequently,
shall apply only when it is shown that acquittal for the previous
charge   would   lead   to   acquittal   in   the   subsequent   charge.   In   an
offence   under   Section   138   of   the   NI   Act,   requirement   to   prove
mens rea   is not necessary although for an offence under Section
420, fraudulent and dishonest intention i.e.   mens rea   is relevant
to   prove.   In   support   of   the   said   contention,   reliance   has   been
placed on the judgment of  Sangeetaben Mahendrabhai Patel v.
State   of   Gujarat   and   Anr,   (2012)   7   SCC   621 .   The   said
5

judgment has also been relied in the case of  M/s V.S. Reddy and
Sons v. Muthyala Ramalinga Reddy and Anr.   (Crl Appeal No.
1285   of   2015)   decided   on   28.09.2015.   Therefore,   urged   the
quashment of the proceedings for an offence under Sections 420,
406,   120(B)   and   34   IPC   as   directed   by   the   High   Court   is   wholly
unjustified. 
7. On   the   other   hand,   learned   counsel   for   the   respondents
contends that as per the judgment of   Kolla Veera  Raghav Rao
v.   Gorantla   Venkateswara   Rao   and   Anr,   (2011)   2   SCC   703 ,
this Court has held that if the offences are different and the facts
are   the   same,   the   prosecution   under   Section   420   of   the   IPC   is
barred by virtue of Section 300(1) of the Cr.P.C. Further reliance
has   been   placed   on   a   judgment   of   this   Court   in   the   case   of   G.
Sagar Suri and Anr. v. State of UP and Others, (2000) 2 SCC
636 ,   wherein   also   the   offences   under   Section   138   of   NI   Act   as
well   as   the   offence   under   Sections   406   and   420   of   IPC   were
allegedly committed by the accused of that case. After lodging the
complaint   under   Section   138  of   NI   Act,  a  petition   under   Section
482   before   the   High   Court   was   filed   for   quashment   of   the
complaint   which   was   dismissed.   On   filing   the   special   leave
6

petition before this Court, it was allowed and the Court directed
that  the  prosecution   under  Sections  420 and   406  is  not  tenable
and quashed. 
8. After   having   heard   learned   counsel   appearing   on   behalf   of
the appellant as well as the respondents who have advanced their
contentions   relying   upon   the   judgments   of   this   Court.   The
reliance   placed   by   the   appellant   is   on   a   judgment   of
Sangeetaben   Mahendrabhai   Patel   (supra)   wherein   this   Court
has   considered   various   judgments.   The   relevant   portion   of   the
judgment   of   Sangeetaben   Mahendrabhai   Patel   (supra)   is
reproduced as thus:
“ 35.   The learned counsel for the appellant has further
placed   reliance   on   the   judgment   in   G.   Sagar
Suri   v.   State   of   U.P.   [(2000)   2   SCC   636   :   2000   SCC
(Cri)   513]   wherein   during   the   pendency   of   the
proceedings   under   Section   138   of   the   NI   Act,
prosecution   under   Sections   406/420   IPC   had   been
launched.   This   Court   quashed   the   criminal
proceedings   under   Sections   406/420   IPC,   observing
that it would amount to the abuse of process of law. In
fact,   the   issue   as   to   whether   the   ingredients   of   both
the   offences   were   same,   had   neither   been   raised   nor
decided. Therefore, the ratio of that judgment does not
have application on the facts of this case.
7

36.   Same   remained   the   position   so   far   as   the
judgment   in   Kolla   Veera   Raghav   Rao   v.   Gorantla
Venkateswara Rao   [(2011) 2 SCC 703 : (2011) 1 SCC
(Cri) 882 : (2011) 1 SCC (Civ) 547] is concerned. It has
been   held   therein   that   once   the   conviction   under
Section   138   of   the   NI   Act   has   been   recorded,   the
question of trying the same person under Section 420
IPC or any other provisions of IPC or any other statute
is   not   permissible   being   hit   by   Article   20(2)   of   the
Constitution and Section 300(1) CrPC.
37.   Admittedly,   the   appellant   had   been   tried   earlier
for   the   offences   punishable   under   the   provisions   of
Section   138   of   the   NI   Act   and   the   case   is   sub   judice
before   the   High   Court.   In   the   instant   case,   he   is
involved   under   Sections   406/420   read   with   Section
114   IPC.   In   the   prosecution   under   Section   138   of   the
NI   Act,   the   mens   rea   i.e.   fraudulent   or   dishonest
intention   at   the   time   of   issuance   of   cheque   is   not
required to be proved. However, in the case under IPC
involved   herein,   the   issue   of   mens   rea   may   be
relevant.   The   offence   punishable   under   Section   420
IPC is a serious one as the sentence of 7 years can be
imposed. 
38.   In   the   case   under   the   NI   Act,   there   is   a   legal
presumption   that   the   cheque   had   been   issued   for
discharging   the   antecedent   liability   and   that
presumption   can   be   rebutted   only   by   the   person   who
draws  the  cheque. Such a requirement  is  not  there  in
the offences under IPC. In the case under the NI Act, if
a   fine   is   imposed,   it   is   to   be   adjusted   to   meet   the
legally   enforceable   liability.   There   cannot   be   such   a
requirement in the offences under IPC. The case under
the   NI   Act   can   only   be   initiated   by   filing   a  complaint.
However, in a case under IPC such a condition is not
necessary. 
8

39.   There   may   be   some   overlapping   of   facts   in   both
the   cases   but   the   ingredients   of   the   offences   are
entirely   different.   Thus,   the   subsequent   case   is   not
barred by any of the aforesaid statutory provisions. 
40.   The   appeal   is   devoid   of   any   merit   and   is
accordingly dismissed.”
On perusal of the same, it is clear that the judgment of  G. Sagar
Suri   (supra)   has   been   considered   but   because   the   issue
regarding   the   ingredient   of   both   offences   were   same   was   not
raised or decided, it has been said that the ratio of that judgment
does   not   have   application   in   the   facts   of   the   case.   Similarly,   the
judgment   of   Kolla   Veera   Raghav   Rao   (supra)   has   also   been
considered but distinguished on fact while observing that when a
conviction under Section 138 of the NI Act has been recorded, the
prosecution to try the same person under Section 420 of the IPC
is not permissible as per Section 300(1) of Cr.P.C. The judgment
of  Sangeetaben Mahendrabhai Patel (supra)  has been relied in
the case of  M/s. V.S. Reddy and Sons (supra) .  
9. Learned   counsel   for   the   respondents   have   relied   upon   the
judgment  of   G.  Sagar  Suri  (supra)   and  contended that  the said
9

issue has been settled more than two decades prior. The relevant
paragraphs of the said judgment are reproduced as thus: 
“ 13.   In   the   circumstances   of   the   case   in   hand   the
conclusion is inescapable that invoking the jurisdiction
of   a   criminal   court   for   allegedly   having   committed
offences   under   Sections   406/420   IPC   by   the
appellants is certainly an abuse of the process of law.
In   the   counter­affidavit   filed   on   behalf   of   the
complainant   it   is   now   admitted   that   none   of   the   two
appellants   is   a   Director   of   Ganga   Automobiles   Ltd.
Only in respect of the first appellant it is stated that he
is the authorised signatory of that Company and that
in   fact   he   had   signed   the   cheques   which   were
returned dishonoured. Apart from making the omnibus
statement   that   the   first   appellant   with   dishonest
intentions   and   misrepresentations   got   a   loan   of   Rs
50,00,000   from   the   complainant   Company   for   Ganga
Automobiles Ltd. there is nothing said as to what were
those   misrepresentations   and   how   the   complainant
Company   was   duped.   The   only   part   attributed   to   the
second appellant is that the first appellant along with
Ashwani   Suri,   Managing   Director   and   Mukender
Singh,   Director   approached   the   complainant   in   June
1996 and had represented that they and Shalini Suri,
Shama   Suri   (Appellant   2),   Charanjit   Singh   and   M.L.
Kampani   were   the   Directors   of   Ganga   Automobiles
Ltd.   There   is   nothing   stated   in   the   counter­affidavit
about the role, if any, played by the second appellant.
A   complaint   under   Section   138   of   the   Negotiable
Instruments   Act   has   already   been   filed   by   the
complainant.   There   is   no   allegation   of   any   corrupt
practice   by   any   of   the   accused   as   if   they   duped   the
Finance   Company   in   parting   with   the   amount   of   Rs
50,00,000. As normally understood, the business of a
finance company is  to invite  deposits, pay interest  on
that   and   also   to   give   loans   and   earn   interest.   A
finance   company   also   advances   short­term   loans.   In
10

that   case   it   is   essentially   a   commercial   transaction.
After   the   first   two   cheques   were   dishonoured   two
cheques   were   again   issued,   which   again   were
dishonoured   resulting   in   filing   of   complaint   under
Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. None of
the   respondents   has   been   able   to   explain   as   to   why
offences under Sections 406/420 IPC were not added
in   the   complaint   filed   under   Section   138   of   the
Negotiable   Instruments   Act   and   why   resort   was   had
to filing of a separate first information report. A certain
motive   has   been  attributed   to   the   investigating   officer
but we think we need not go into that. There is also no
answer   as   to   why   the   investigation   against   the   three
other Directors was still stated to be pending when the
same role is assigned to all the accused. In the FIR it
is   Sukhvinder   Singh,   who   first   approached   the
complainant,   but   later   it   is   Mukender   Singh.   There   is
no   answer   as   to   why   there   are   two   different   names.
As to who are the Directors of Ganga Automobiles Ltd.
could have been easily found by the complainant after
going   through   the   records   of   the   Registrar   of
Companies and also about its status. As noted above,
in   the   subsequent   statement   by   the   complainant   he
does   not   assign   any   role   to   the   first   appellant.   The
allegation   that   in   the   first   instance   three   persons
contacted   the   complainant   Company,   who   told   the
complainant   of   other   Directors   with   whom   the
complainant   conversed   on   telephone   appears   to   be
rather improbable.
14.   We   agree   with   the   submission   of   the   appellants
that the whole attempt of the complainant is evidently
to   rope   in   all   the   members   of   the   family   particularly
those who are the parents of the Managing Director of
Ganga   Automobiles   Ltd.   in   the   instant   criminal   case
without   regard   to   their   role   or   participation   in   the
alleged   offences   with   the   sole   purpose   of   getting   the
loan due to the Finance Company by browbeating and
tyrannising   the   appellants   with   criminal   prosecution.
11

A   criminal   complaint   under   Section   138   of   the
Negotiable Instruments Act is already pending against
the   appellants   and   other   accused.   They   would   suffer
the   consequences   if   offence   under   Section   138   is
proved against them. In any case there is no occasion
for the complainant to prosecute the appellants under
Sections 406/420 IPC and in his doing so it is clearly
an   abuse   of   the   process   of   law   and   prosecution
against the appellants for those offences is liable to be
quashed, which we do.
15.   The   appeal   is   allowed   and   the   judgment   of   the
High   Court   dated   6­5­1999   is   set   aside   and
prosecution of the appellants under Sections 406/420
IPC   in   Criminal   Case   No.   674   of   1997   (now   Criminal
Case   No.   6054   of   1998)   and   pending   in   the   Court   of
Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ghaziabad is quashed.”
10. Similarly   in   the   case   of   Kolla   Veera   Raghav   Rao   (supra)
this Court reaffirmed the view taken in the said case. The relevant
paragraphs are reproduced as thus:
“ 4.   It   may   be   noticed   that   there   is   a   difference
between   the   language   used   in   Article   20(2)   of   the
Constitution   of   India   and   Section   300(1)   CrPC.   Article
20(2) states:
“20.   (2)   No   person   shall   be   prosecuted   and   punished
for the same offence more than once.”
On the other hand, Section 300(1) CrPC states:
“300.   Person   once   convicted   or   acquitted   not   to   be
tried   for   same   offence.—(1)   A   person   who   has   once
been   tried   by   a   court   of   competent   jurisdiction   for   an
offence   and   convicted   or   acquitted   of   such   offence
shall,   while   such   conviction   or   acquittal   remains   in
force,   not   be   liable   to   be   tried   again   for   the   same
12

offence, nor on the same facts for any other offence for
which   a   different   charge   from   the   one   made   against
him   might   have   been   made   under   sub­section   (1)   of
Section   221,   or   for   which   he   might   have   been
convicted under sub­section (2) thereof.”
5.   Thus,   it   can   be   seen   that   Section   300(1)   CrPC   is
wider   than   Article   20(2)   of   the   Constitution.   While
Article   20(2)   of   the   Constitution   only   states   that   “no
person shall be prosecuted and punished for the same
offence   more   than   once”,   Section   300(1)   CrPC   states
that   no   one   can   be   tried   and   convicted   for   the   same
offence or even for a different offence but on the same
facts. 
6.   In   the   present   case,   although   the   offences   are
different   but   the   facts   are   the   same.   Hence,   Section
300(1)   CrPC   applies.   Consequently,   the   prosecution
under   Section   420   IPC   was   barred   by   Section   300(1)
CrPC.”
11. In that case, on similar set of allegations, cognizance under
Section 138 of NI Act on filing a private complaint was taken and
accused were tried, while in other complaint it is alleged that the
offence under Sections 406 and 420 is also made out, however, as
directed by Court separate prosecution  was lodged. On filing  the
quash petition, this Court held that on the same set of allegations
two   different   offences   i.e.,   under   NI   Act   and   IPC   cannot   be
proceeded with and the proceedings under Sections 420 and 406
of IPC is liable to be quashed. 
13

12. On perusal of the judgment of   Sangeetaben M ahendrabhai
Patel   (supra)   relied   in   the   case   of   M/S.   V.S.   Reddy   and   Sons
(supra)   by   the   appellant   and   the   judgments   relied   upon   by   the
respondents   in   the   case   of   G.   Sagar   Suri   (supra)   and   Kolla
Veera Raghav Rao (supra)  as afore quoted, the facts and the
allegations   were   similar   and   that   too   the   prosecution   for   the
offences under Section 138 of the NI Act and, under Sections 406
and   420   of   the   IPC   were   also   similar.   In   the   judgment   of
Sangeetaben  Mahendrabhai  Patel  (supra)   it was held that  the
requirement to prove an offence under the NI Act and an offence
under the IPC is different, and it was observed that there may be
some   overlapping   of   facts   but   the   ingredients  of   the   offences  are
entirely  different,  therefore, the  subsequent  cases are not  barred
by   any   statutory   provisions.  While  in  the  case  of   G.   Sagar   Suri
(supra)   and   Kolla   Veera   Raghav   Rao   (supra) ,   the   Court
concluded that as per Section 300(1) Cr.P.C. no one can be tried
and convicted for the same offence or even for a different offence
on   the   same   facts,   therefore,   the   prosecution   under   Section   420
of   the   IPC   is   barred   by   Section   300(1)   of   Cr.P.C   and   accordingly
liable   to   be   quashed.   It   is   to   observe   that   in   the   case   of
14

Sangeetaben Mahendrabhai Patel (supra)   the judgments of   G.
Sagar  Suri  (supra)   and   Kolla   Veera   Raghav  Rao  (supra)   have
been   referred   but   distinguished   on   the   ground   that   it   was   not
raised   and   decided   that   ingredients   of   both   offences   were   not
same, and the bar of Section 300(1) of Cr.P.C. would not attract.
It   is   relevant   to   note   here   that   the   judgments   cited   by   both   the
parties   are   rendered   by   benches   having   the   strength   of   two
Judges.   In   our   considered   view,   the   bench   of   this   Court   in   the
case   of   Sangeetaben   Mahendrabhai   Patel   (supra)   followed   in
M/s.   V.S.   Reddy   and   Sons   (supra)   has   taken   a   different   view
from the previous judgments of  G. Sagar Suri (supra)  and  Kolla
Veera   Raghav   Rao   (supra)   rendered   by   the   bench   of   the   same
strength. The view taken in both the cases are conflicting to each
other.   Needles   to   observe   that   it   is   a   trite   law,   if   any   issue   is
decided in a previous judgment by a bench of the same strength,
conflicting   view   in   the   subsequent   judgment   should   not   be
rendered   on   the   pretext   that   the   issue   has   not   been   raised   or
considered in the previous judgment. In this regard the judgment
in   District   Manager,   APSRTC,   Vijaywada   v.     K.   Sivaji,   (2001)
2 SCC 135 ,   Chandra Prakash   v.   State of U.P. ,  2002 AIR SCW
15

1573   can   be   profitably   referred   whereby   it   is   observed   that
judicial   decorum   demands   that   if   judgments   passed   by   two­
judges’   bench   of   equal   strength   are   conflicting,   the   issue   of   law
involved   must   be   referred   to   a   larger   bench   as   the   same   is
desirable  to  avoid   confusion   and  maintain   consistency   of  law.  In
our   view,  the  aforesaid  judgments cited by  the  respective  parties
are   conflicting,   however,   to   avoid   any   further   confusion   and   to
maintain   consistency,   we   deem   it   appropriate   to   refer   this   issue
for   decision   by   the   larger   bench   to   answer   the   following
questions:
(1) Whether the ratio of the judgment, in the case of   G. Sagar
Suri (supra)  and  Kolla Veera Raghav Rao (supra ) lay down the
correct law?
or
The   view   taken   in   the   case   of   Sangeetaben   Mahendrabhai
Patel   (supra)   as   followed   in   M/s   V.S.   Reddy   and   Sons   (supra)
which   is   subsequent   and   conflicting,   lay   down   the   correct
proposition of law? 
16

(2) Whether on similar set of allegations of fact the accused can
be   tried   for   an   offence   under   NI   Act   which   is   special   enactment
and also for offences under IPC unaffected by the prior conviction
or   acquittal   and,   the   bar   of   Section   300(1)   Cr.P.C.   would   attract
for such trial? 
13. In view of the above discussion, in our  view, the judgments
relied by learned counsel for both the parties are in conflict with
each   other   on   the   legal   issue.   Therefore,   the   above   questions   of
law   have   been   formulated   for   answer   by   a   larger   bench   for
decision. In such circumstances, we request the Registry to place
the file before Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India for orders.   
       ..………….……………….J.
           ( S. ABDUL NAZEER )
       ……...……………………J.
( J.K. MAHESHWARI )
NEW DELHI;
AUGUST 11, 2022.       
17