/2022 INSC 0730/
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION 
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1290 OF 2010
MAKHAN SINGH           ...APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
THE STATE OF HARYANA     ...RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
B.R. GAVAI, J.
1. The   appellant­Makhan   Singh   has   approached   this
Court being aggrieved by  the judgment dated 15 th
  May 2009
passed   by   the   High   Court   of   Punjab   and   Haryana   at
Chandigarh   in   Criminal   Appeal   No.1189­SB   of   2002   vide
which the High Court, though reduced the sentence awarded
from   10   years   to   7   years,   but   concurred   with   the   judgment
and   order   of   conviction   dated   13 th
/16 th
  July   2002   recorded
by   the   trial   court   in   Sessions   Case   No.   55   of   1998   for   the
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offence   punishable  under   Section   304­B   of   the   Indian   Penal
Code, 1860 (for short ‘IPC’). 
2. Deceased Manjit Kaur was married to the appellant­
Makhan   Singh   on   28 th
  January   1996.   It   is   the   prosecution
case   that   the   appellant   used   to   demand   dowry   from   the
parents   of   the   deceased   Manjit   Kaur.     It   is   further   the
prosecution   case   that,   succumbing   to   the   demands   of   the
appellant, an amount of Rs.30,000/­ was paid to him by the
parents   of   the   deceased   Manjit   Kaur.     The   appellant   again
demanded   an   amount   of   Rs.2   lakhs.     According   to   the
prosecution,   the   appellant   had   utilized   the   said   amount   for
going  to Moscow.   However, after coming  back from Moscow
in March 1998, he again tortured deceased Manjit Kaur and
asked   her   to   bring   Rs.6   lakhs   as   he   wanted   to   go   to   USA.
According   to   the   prosecution,   deceased   Manjit   Kaur,   fed   up
with   the   torture,   consumed   poisonous   substance   on   21 st
April   1998.     Deceased   Manjit   Kaur   was   taken   by   the
appellant   initially   to   the   Community   Health   Centre,   Ladwa
and   thereafter,   she   was   referred   to   L.N.J.P.   Hospital,
Kurukshetra.   From   L.N.J.P.   Hospital,   deceased   Manjit   Kaur
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was taken to a private Nursing Home of Dr. H.K. Sobti (PW­1)
at Kurukshetra, wherein she was admitted.
3. Ms.   Vani   Gopal   Sharma,   Judicial   Magistrate,   First
Class, Kurukshetra (DW­1) recorded the dying declaration of
the deceased Manjit Kaur (Ex. DO/C), wherein the deceased
stated   that   she   was   suffering   from   fever   and   since   many
medicines   were   lying   on   the   Angithi,   by   mistake,   she   took
medicine of green colour.  It appears that thereafter, Kamlesh
Kaur (PW­11) and Bhan Singh (P)W­13), parents of deceased
Manjit   Kaur   reached   the   hospital   on   the   next   morning.     On
24 th
  April   1998,   they   made   a   request   for   recording   the
statement of deceased Manjit Kaur under Section 164 of the
Cr.P.C.     On   such   a   request   being   made,   Ms.   Kanchan
Nariala, Judical Magistrate, First Class, Kurukshetra  (PW­6)
recorded  the   statement   of  deceased   Manjit  Kaur   (Ex.   PE)  on
24 th
  April   1998,   wherein   she   stated   that   her   husband   had
demanded   Rs.   6   lakhs   to   go   to   USA.     According   to   the   said
dying   declaration   (Ex.   PE),   the   appellant   as   well   as   his
parents   administered   the   said   poisonous   substance   to
deceased   Manjit   Kaur.   On   the   basis   of   the   second   dying
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declaration   (Ex.   PE),   an   FIR   was   registered   on   25 th
  April
1998.  After the said dying declaration (Ex. PE) was recorded,
Sub­Inspector   Gurdwaya   Ram   (PW­14),   Investigating   Officer
(for   short   ‘IO’)   recorded   her   oral   statement   (Ex.   PV)   on   28 th
April   1998.   On   28 th
  April   1998,   deceased   Manjit   Kaur   was
referred to PGIMS, Chandigarh, where she expired on 9 th
 May
1998.
4. Upon   completion   of   investigation,   though   on
verification by K.K. Rao, DSP (DW­2) who found the accused
innocent,   Sub­Inspector   Gurdwaya   Ram   (PW­14),   IO   was   of
the   opinion   that   there   were   sufficient   grounds   for   trial   and
therefore,   he   filed   the   charge­sheet.     Charges   came   to   be
framed for the offence punishable under Section 304­B of the
IPC.     At  the  conclusion   of  the  trial,  the   trial  court   convicted
the appellant under Section 304­B of the IPC.   However, the
trial court found that the other two accused, i.e., the parents
of   the   appellant   were   entitled   to   get   benefit   of   doubt   and
acquitted   them.   The   appellant   was   sentenced   to   suffer
rigorous imprisonment for a period of 10 years.  In an appeal
preferred by the appellant before the High Court, though the
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High Court confirmed the conviction under Section 304­B of
the   IPC,  it   reduced  the   sentence  awarded  to   7  years.     Being
aggrieved thereby, the present appeal.
5. We   have   heard   Shri   R.K.   Rathore,   learned   counsel
appearing   on   behalf   of   the   appellant   and   Shri   Piyush   Hans,
learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State.
6. Shri   Rathore   submitted   that   the   trial   court   and   the
Appellate Court have failed to take into consideration that in
the   very   first  dying   declaration   (Ex.   DO/C),   deceased   Manjit
Kaur   had   stated   that   she   had   consumed   the   medicine   by
mistake.   He   therefore   submitted   that   the   death   was
accidental.     He   further   submitted   that   the   second   dying
declaration   (Ex.   PE),   which   was   recorded   after   3   days,   had
been   recorded   after   the   parents   of   deceased   Manjit   Kaur
instigated her to implicate the appellant.   He submitted that
in   case   of   conflicting   dying   declarations,   the   accused   is
entitled to get benefit of doubt.   He therefore submitted that
the order of conviction deserves to be set aside.
7. Shri   Hans   vehemently   submitted   that   each   of   the
dying   declarations   has  to  be  appreciated  independently.   He
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submitted   that   the   courts   below   have   rightly   found   that   the
first dying declaration (Ex. DO/C) was given by the deceased
Manjit Kaur under the influence of her husband, whereas the
second   dying   declaration   (Ex.   PE)   was   given   by   her
independently out of her free will.  He further submitted that
in   view   of   the   concurrent   findings  of  fact,   this  Court   should
not   interfere.   Shri   Hans   has   relied   on   the   following
authorities in support of his submission:
Harjit   Kaur   v.   State   of   Punjab 1
,   Sayarabano   v.   State   of
Maharashtra 2
,   Sher   Singh   v.   State   of   Punjab 3
,
Munnawar   v.   State   of   U.P. 4
,   Lakhan   v.   State   of   M.P. 5
,
Shudhakar   v.   State   of   M.P. 6
,   Raju   Devade   v.   State   of
Maharashtra 7
,   Kashmira   Devi   v.   State   of   Uttarakhand 8
and  State of U.P. v. Veerpal 9
. 
8. The   law   with   regard   to   dying   declaration   has   been
summarized   by   this   Court   in   the   case   of   Lakhan   (supra) ,
1   (1999) 6 SCC 545
2   (2007) 12 SCC 562
3   (2008) 4 SCC 265
4   (2010) 5 SCC 451
5   (2010) 8 SCC 514
6   (2012) 7 SCC 569
7   (2016) 11 SCC 673
8   (2020) 11 SCC 343
9   (2022) 4 SCC 741
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wherein the Court considered various oral judgments on the
issue and observed thus:  
“ 21.   In   view   of   the   above,   the   law   on   the   issue   of
dying   declaration   can   be   summarised   to   the   effect
that in case the court comes to the conclusion that
the dying  declaration is true and reliable, has been
recorded   by   a   person   at   a   time   when   the   deceased
was   fit   physically   and   mentally   to   make   the
declaration   and   it   has   not   been   made   under   any
tutoring/duress/prompting; it can be the sole basis
for   recording   conviction.   In   such   an   eventuality   no
corroboration is required. In case there are multiple
dying   declarations   and   there   are   inconsistencies
between   them,   generally,   the   dying   declaration
recorded by  the  higher  officer   like  a Magistrate  can
be   relied   upon,   provided   that   there   is   no
circumstance   giving   rise   to   any   suspicion   about   its
truthfulness.   In   case   there   are   circumstances
wherein   the   declaration   had   been   made,   not
voluntarily   and   even   otherwise,   it   is   not   supported
by   the   other   evidence,   the   court   has   to   scrutinise
the   facts   of   an   individual   case   very   carefully   and
take   a   decision   as   to   which   of   the   declarations   is
worth reliance.”
9. It   could   thus   be   seen   that   the   Court   is   required   to
examine   as   to   whether   the   dying   declaration   is   true   and
reliable; as to whether it has been recorded by a person at a
time   when   the   deceased   was   fit   physically   and   mentally   to
make the declaration; as to whether it has been made under
any   tutoring/duress/prompting.     The   dying   declaration   can
be   the   sole   basis   for   recording   conviction   and   if   it   is   found
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reliable   and   trustworthy,   no   corroboration   is   required.     In
case   there   are   multiple   dying   declarations   and   there   are
inconsistencies between them, the dying declaration recorded
by   the   higher   officer   like   a   Magistrate   can   be   relied   upon.
However,   this   is   with   the   condition   that   there   is   no
circumstance   giving   rise   to   any   suspicion   about   its
truthfulness.     In   case   there   are   circumstances   wherein   the
declaration has not been found to be made voluntarily and is
not supported by any other evidence, the Court is required to
scrutinize   the   facts   of   an   individual   case   very   carefully   and
take   a   decision   as   to   which   of   the   declarations   is   worth
reliance.
10. In the present case, there are two dying declarations.
The  first one in  point of  time is recorded by  Ms.  Vani  Gopal
Sharma   (DW­1)   and   the   second   one   is   recorded   by   Ms.
Kanchan   Nariala   (PW­6).     In   her   first   dying   declaration   (Ex.
DO/C),   deceased   Manjit   Kaur   has   exonerated   the   appellant
and   his   family   members.     In   the   second   dying   declaration
(Ex.   PE),   she   has   implicated   the   appellant   as   well   as   his
parents.  In the first dying declaration (Ex. DO/C), she stated
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that she was having fever  and by mistake, she took another
medicine of green colour.   On a specific query being made to
her by Ms. Vani Gopal Sharma (DW­1) as to whether she has
suspicion   on   anyone,   she   has   replied   in   the   negative.     The
first   dying   declaration   (Ex.   DO/C)   is   also   endorsed   by   Dr.
Sobti   (PW­1)   stating   therein   that   the   patient   remained
conscious throughout her statement.
11. In   her   second   dying   declaration   (Ex.   PE),   she   has
stated that the appellant’s father and mother caught hold of
her and the appellant forcibly administered her the medicine.
12. It   is   pertinent   to   note   that   the   prosecution   had   not
examined Ms. Vani Gopal Sharma (DW­1), who had recorded
the   first   dying   declaration   (Ex.   DO/C)   and   therefore,   the
defence was required to examine her as DW­1.   A perusal of
her evidence would reveal that on ASI Ranjit Singh making a
request,   she   went   to   the   hospital   of   Dr.   Sobti   (PW­1)   and
asked   her   whether   Mrs.   Manjit   Kaur   was   fit   to   make   a
statement and thereupon, the doctor opined that she was fit
to   make   the   statement.   Thereafter,   she   recorded   the
statement   of   deceased   Manjit   Kaur.     She   stated   that   when
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she   was   recording   the   statement,   nobody   except   Dr.   Sobti
(PW­1) was present there and everyone else was asked to go
out.     She   stated   that   she   found   that   deceased   Manjit   Kaur
was in sound disposing mind but still she gave her sometime
to   relax   so   that   she   could   compose   herself   and   could   give
statement voluntarily.  She stated that she was satisfied that
the   deceased   Manjit   Kaur   was   prepared   to   make   statement
voluntarily.     Thereafter,   her   statement   was   recorded.     After
recording her statement, right thumb impression of deceased
Manjit   Kaur   was   taken.     She   deposed   that   deceased   Manjit
Kaur   remained   conscious   throughout   and   she   appended   a
certificate to that effect.  She has also deposed with regard to
the certificate issued by Dr. Sobti (PW­1).
13. Ms. Vani Gopal Sharma (DW­1) was cross­examined
by   Additional  Public   Prosecutor.       In   her  cross­examination,
she   has   reiterated   that   she   had   satisfied   herself   that
deceased Manjit Kaur was making statement voluntarily and
only   then,   she   recorded   it   and   even   satisfied   herself   after
recording her statement.
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14. Ms.   Kanchan   Nariala   (PW­6),   who   recorded   the
second   dying   declaration   (Ex.   PE),   has   also   stated   that   she
had satisfied herself that deceased Manjit Kaur was making a
voluntarily   statement.     Attendants   sitting   by   her   side   were
asked to leave the premises.   She stated that  when  she was
recording  the  statement,  except  deceased  Manjit  Kaur,  none
were   present.     She   has   admitted   in   her   cross­examination
that she did not consider obtaining certificate of fitness from
the   Medical   Officer   to   the   effect   that   deceased   Manjit   Kaur
was fit to make a statement.   She has admitted that she did
not   obtain   any   opinion   from   any   Medical   Officer   of   L.N.J.P.
Hospital, where she recorded the dying declaration.  She has
also   admitted   that   Bhan   Singh   (PW­13)   and   Kamlesh   Kaur
(PW­11),   father   and   sister   of   deceased   Manjit   Kaur   were
present in the hospital.
15. In   the   present   case,   we   are   faced   with   two   dying
declarations, which are totally inconsistent and contradictory
to  each other.   Both are recorded by  Judicial Magistrates. A
difficult question that we have to answer is which one of the
dying declarations is to be believed. 
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16. The first dying declaration (Ex. DO/C) is recorded by
Ms. Vani Gopal Sharma (DW­1).  A perusal of the said would
reveal   that   prior   to   recording   the   statement   of   deceased
Manjit   Kaur,   Dr.   Sobti   (PW­1)   had   examined   as   to   whether
she   was   in   a   fit   state   of   mind   and   conscious   to   make   the
statement.     After   certification,   Ms.   Vani   Gopal   Sharma
(DW­1)   got   herself   satisfied   as   to   whether   deceased   Manjit
Kaur   was   voluntarily   making   the   statement   or   not   and
thereafter,   recorded   her   statement.   The   said   dying
declaration   (Ex.  DO/C)  is   also  endorsed  by   Dr.   Sobti   (PW­1)
with   the   remarks   that   deceased   Manjit   Kaur   was   conscious
throughout while making statement. Ms. Vani Gopal Sharma
(DW­1)   has   also   deposed   that   even   after   making   the
statement,   she   confirmed   from   the   deceased   as   to   whether
the statement was voluntarily made by her.
17. As   against   this,   as   far   as   the   second   dying
declaration (Ex. PE) which was recorded by another Judicial
Magistrate   Ms.   Kanchan   Nariala   (PW­6)   after   3   days   is
concerned,   it   was   recorded   without   there   being   examination
by a doctor with regard to the fitness of the deceased Manjit
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Kaur   to   make   the   statement.     Though   the   statement   is
recorded   in   L.N.J.P.   Hospital   and   though   doctors   were
available,   Ms.   Kanchan   Nariala   (PW­6)   did   not   find   it
necessary   to   get   the   medical   condition   of   the   deceased
examined   from   the   doctors   available   in   the   hospital.     It   is
further to be noted that Ms. Kanchan Nariala (PW­6) herself
has   admitted   that   Bhan   Singh   (PW­13)   and   Kamlesh   Kaur
(PW­11),   father   and   sister   of   deceased   Manjit   Kaur   were
present   in   the   hospital.     The   possibility   of   the   second   dying
declaration (Ex. PE) being given after tutoring by her relatives
cannot therefore be ruled out.  
18. Not   only   that,   it   is   also   relevant   to   refer   to   the
testimony   of   K.K.   Rao   (DW­2),   who   was   the   Deputy
Superintendent   of   Police   (DSP).     He   has   stated,   in   his
deposition, thus:
“However, no witness supported the version detailed
Mrs.   Manjit   Kaur   in   that   statement.     According   to
my   investigation   the   said   statement   dated
24.4.1998   was   made   by   Mrs.   Manjit   after   being
tutored   by   her   relatives   and   it   did   not   contain   the
true version of the incident.”
19. It   is   also   relevant   to   note   that   the   prosecution   had
not examined Ms. Vani Gopal Sharma (DW­1) and K.K. Rao,
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DSP (DW­2).  It therefore creates a serious doubt with regard
to fairness and impartiality of the IO.  Apart from that, it is to
be   noted   that   on   the   basis   of   very   same   evidence,   the   trial
court, by giving benefit of doubt, has acquitted the father and
mother of the appellant. In that view of the matter, conviction
of the appellant on the very same evidence, in our view, was
improper.
20. We   therefore   find   that   in   the   facts   and
circumstances of the present case, the first dying declaration
(Ex. DO/C) will have to be considered to be more reliable and
trustworthy as against the second one (Ex. PE).  In any case,
the   benefit   of   doubt   which   has   been   given   to   the   other
accused by  the trial court, ought to  have been  equally  given
to   the   present   appellant   when   the   evidence   was   totally
identical against all the three accused.
21. Before   we   part   with   the   judgment,   we   place   on
record   our   appreciation   for   the   painstaking   efforts   made   by
Shri Piyush Hans, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
State for supporting the conviction.
22. In the result, we pass the following order:
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(i) The appeal is allowed;  
(ii) The   judgment   dated   15 th
  May   2009   passed   by   the
High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in
Criminal   Appeal   No.1189­SB   of   2002   and   the
judgment and order dated 13 th
/16 th
 July 2002 passed
by the trial court in Sessions Case No. 55 of 1998 are
quashed and set aside;
(iii) The appellant is acquitted of all the charges charged
with and his bail bonds shall stand discharged.
23. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of
in the above terms. 
…..….......................J.
[B.R. GAVAI]
…….................................................J.
[PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA]
NEW DELHI;
AUGUST 16, 2022.
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