/2022 INSC 0739/
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
C IVIL  A PPEAL  N O . 5784 O F  2022   
(@ S.L.P (C IVIL ) N O . 7015/2022)   
M Y  P ALACE  M UTUALLY  A IDED              …A PPELLANT ( S )
C O ­O PERATIVE  S OCIETY                                                   
V ERSUS
B. M AHESH   & O RS .                                                   …R ESPONDENT ( S )
J U D G M E N T
N. V. Ramana, CJI
1. Leave granted.
2. The   present   Civil   Appeal   has   been   filed   by   the   appellant   against
impugned   final   judgment   and   order   dated   21.09.2021,   passed   by
the   High   Court   of   Telangana   in   Interlocutory   Application   No.
5/2020 in Application No. 837/2013 in CS No. 7/1958. 
3. The brief facts of this case necessary for the disposal of the appeal
are   as   follows:   the   present   dispute   relates   to   Sy.   No.   57   (Old   Sy.
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No.   274)   in   Shamsguda   Village,   Ranga   Reddy   District,   Telangana
forming part of S. No. 252 of the list of Mukthas in the preliminary
decree   dated   06.04.1959   by   the   erstwhile   High   Court   of   Andhra
Pradesh in CS No. 7/1958. 
4. The   underlying  original   suit  was   filed   in   1953  before  the   City   Civil
Court,   Hyderabad   by   one   Smt.   Sultana   Jahan   Begum,   the
daughter   of   Nawab   Moinuddowla   Bahadur.   The   plaintiff   was
seeking partition of properties of the Nawab known as ‘Asman Jahi
Paigah’.  This suit was ultimately transferred to the file of the High
Court   numbered   as   C.S.   No.   7/1958.   The   suit   along   with   certain
applications   were   disposed   of   by   a   preliminary­cum­final   decree
dated   06.04.1959   passed   by   the   learned   Judge   of   the   High   Court
of   Andhra   Pradesh.     The   judgment   recorded   that   the   plaintiff
withdraws   the   suit   against   defendant   Nos.   27   to   49.     It   also
recorded   that   a   compromise   was   affected   amongst   some   of   the
defendants.   The   litigation   relating   to   this   original   suit
subsequently enters a complicated phase, wherein several different
parallel proceedings take place. Suffice to state, that even after 60
years, the issues in the same are not settled. 
5. It is the say of the present appellant that they acquired the property
in   Sy.   No.   57   of   Shamsguda   Village   under   an   Assignment   Deed
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dated   16.09.2000   executed   by   the   earlier   predecessor­in­interest
under   the   preliminary   decree.     The   predecessors­in­interest   had
also   executed   a   Conveyance   Deed   dated   03.08.2003   in   favour   of
the   appellant,   conveying   the   schedule   property   with   specific
boundaries. As the earlier Assignment Deed dated 16.09.2000 and
Conveyance Deed dated 03.08.2003 were unregistered documents,
the   predecessors­in­interest   also   executed   a   registered   document
in   favour   of   the   appellant,   namely   a   ‘Deed   of   Declaration/
Confirmation’ dated 12.08.2011. 
6. On the above basis, an application (No. 837/2013) was filed in C.S.
No. 7/1958 by the appellant herein along with a party (not before
us) for passing a final decree in their favour in respect of property
measuring Acs 92.56 cts. and Acs. 27.00 gts land in Sy. No. 57 of
Shamsguda   Village,   Balanagar   Mandal,   Ranga   Reddy   District.   A
further   prayer   was   made   for   a   direction   to   deliver   the   physical
possession of the said properties.
7. The   learned   Single   Judge   of   the   High   Court   of   Andhra   Pradesh
allowed   the   said   Application   in   part   vide   final   decree   dated
19.09.2013 as sought by the appellant, and granted a declaration
that they are the absolute owners of Acs. 92.56 cts in Sy. No. 57 of
Shamsguda Village.  
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8. The   State   of  Andhra  Pradesh   challenged  the   said  order   in   OSA   SR
No. 3744 of 2014. After formation of the State of Telangana on the
bifurcation of the composite State of Andhra Pradesh, the State of
Telangana   filed   IA   No.   2   of   2016   seeking   condonation   of   delay   of
182   days   in   filing   the   Appeal.   Responding   to   the   said   IA,   the
appellant   stated   that   the   delay   in   filing   of   the   Appeal   is   much
longer, amounting to 729 days. Thereafter, I.A. No. 2 of 2017 was
filed by  the  State  of Telangana  to  condone  a delay  of 913 days in
filing the Appeal.
9. By order dated 22.12.2020, the Division bench of the High Court of
Telangana dismissed the two applications for condonation of delay
in filing the appeal, being I.A. No. 2 of 2016 and I.A. No. 2 of 2017.
As   a   consequence   of   the   same,   the   State   of   Telangana’s   appeal,
OSA SR No. 3744 of 2014 was dismissed.
10. In these circumstances, after lapse of nearly 7 years since the final
decree   was   granted   in   favor   of   the   appellant   herein,   the
respondents herein filed 6 IAs (in Application 837/2013 in CS No.
7/1958) before the High Court of Telangana in 2020. The details of
the applications are as follows:
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I.A No. Prayer
1/2020 To grant leave to the respondents to file implead petition
in the above­mentioned application.
2/2020 To   dispense   with   the   filing   of   a   neatly   typed   copy   of
material   papers   in   application   filed   in   the
abovementioned application
3/2020 To allow impleadment
4/2020 To allow impleadment.
5/2020 To   recall   the   order   dated   19.09.2013   passed   in   the
above­mentioned   application   and   to   set   aside   and   pass
such  other   order  or   orders as deemed fit  and proper  in
the circumstances of the case
6/2020 To   direct   the   appellant   to   not   to   alienate,   not   to
interfere, not to change peaceful possession, not register
any   documents   in   scheduled   property   in   Sy   No.57   and
any subdivision numbers in Sy No 57 of Shamsguda in
the above­mentioned application.
11. A   Division   Bench   of   the   High   Court   of   Telangana   vide   order   dated
05.01.2021,   allowed   IA   No.   1/2021   preferred   by   the   respondents
and   granted   them   leave   to   file   the   application   recalling   the   final
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decree   dated   19.09.2013,   passed   by   the   learned   Single   Judge   of
the High Court in Application No. 837/2013 in C.S No. 7/1958. 
12. The   aforesaid   order   was   challenged   before   this   Court   in   an   earlier
Special Leave Petition, being SLP(C) No. 8025/2021. This Court, by
order   dated   06.07.2021,   dismissed   the   said   petition   and   gave   the
parties   liberty   to   raise   all   objections   when   the   substantial
application for recalling the final decree was being heard.
13. After hearing the submissions of the parties, the Division Bench of
the High Court in I.A No. 5/2020 in Application No. 837 of 2013 in
CS   No.   7   of   1958,   passed   the   impugned   order   dated   21.09.2021,
allowing the recall of the final decree dated 19.09.2013. 
14. One of the primary objections taken by the appellant herein before
the   Division   Bench   of   the   High   Court   related   to   the   fact   that   the
senior   member   of   the   Bench   hearing   the   recall   application   was
presiding   over   the   Bench   which   had   heard   and   dismissed   the
appeal   filed   by   the   State   of   Telangana   against   the   same   final
decree   dated   19.09.2013.   On   this   issue,   the   Division   Bench   held
that   the   earlier   appeal   filed   by   the   State   of   Telangana   had   been
dismissed as a consequence of the dismissal of the application for
condonation   of   delay   in   filing   the   appeal   filed   by   the   State.   There
was   no   discussion   on   the   merits   of   the   matter,   particularly   the
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claim   of   the   appellant.   Further,   the   Division   Bench   held   that   as
per   the   roster   prepared   by   the   Hon’ble   Chief   Justice   of   the   High
Court   of   Telangana,   all   matters   arising   out   of   C.S.   No.   7   of   1958
were placed before it. As such, the Division Bench held that there
were   no   strong   reasons   put   forth   by   the   appellant   for   the   said
member   of   the   Bench   to   recuse   from   the   hearing   of   the   present
matter. 
15. The High Court, on merits, held that the appellant had obtained the
final   decree   dated   19.09.2013   by   suppressing   certain   information
and   by   exercising   its   powers   under   Section   151,   Code   of   Civil
Procedure, 1908 (“ CPC ”), has recalled its earlier final decree dated
19.09.2013.   At   the   same   time,   the   High   Court   clarified   that
recalling of the order would not enure to the benefit of the State of
Telangana,   whose   appeal   had   already   been   dismissed,   or   the
respondents,   who   would   have   to   establish   their   right,   title   and
interest in the subject property in appropriate proceedings. 
16. Aggrieved by the impugned judgment of the High Court recalling the
final   decree   dated   19.09.2013,   the   appellant   has   approached   this
Court by way of the present Civil Appeal. 
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17. It   is   appropriate   to   mention   here   that   the   State   of   Telangana,
despite   dismissal   of   its   appeal   in   2020,   and   the   specific
observations   of   the   High   Court   in   the   impugned   order,   initially
filed an impleadment application, being IA No. 98965/2022, in the
present   Civil   Appeal.   This   Court   dismissed   the   abovementioned
application for impleadment  vide  order dated 22.07.2022. 
18. The   State   of   Telangana   also   filed   separate   Special   Leave   Petitions
challenging the present impugned order dated 22.12.2020, as well
and the earlier order dated 22.12.2020 dismissing their intra court
appeal [SLP (C) No. 13453 of 2022 and SLP (C) No. 13454­ 13456
of 2022]. These Special Leave Petitions were heard on 01.08.2022
by this Court and were dismissed in light of the observations made
by the High Court in paragraph 116 of the impugned order. In any
case,   the   claim   of   the   State   over   the   scheduled   property   is   not
sufficiently supported by any documentary evidence. 
19. Dr.   A.   M.   Singhvi,   learned   Senior   Counsel   appearing   on   behalf   of
the appellant, submitted as follows:
(i) No recall application could have been filed by the respondents.
Their   only   remedy   was   a   separate   civil   suit   for   declaration   of
title.
(ii) The   preliminary   decree   in   the   matter   was   passed   on
06.04.1959 and the final decree in favour of the appellant was
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passed   on   19.09.2013.   The   appeal   preferred   by   the   State   of
Telangana   challenging   the   final   decree   was   dismissed   by   the
High   Court   on   22.12.2020.   The   respondents’   application   for
recall   of   final   decree,   in   which   the   impugned   order   has   been
passed, was filed before the High Court on 16.12.2020, raising
issues of fraud for the first time. The High Court ought to have
dismissed the application for recall on the grounds of delay. 
(iii) A   reading   of   the   impugned   order   shows   that   the   survey
numbers   claimed   by   the   respondents   are   distinct   from   those
claimed by the appellant. 
(iv) The   Senior   Judge   heading   the   Division   Bench,   Justice   M.S.
Rama   Chander   Rao   who   passed   the   impugned   judgment
appeared   on   behalf   of   one   of   the   parties   who   were   claiming
possession   in   parallel   proceedings   relating   to   the   subject
property,   which   party   had   also   filed   an   FIR   against   the
appellant herein.
(v) The  respondents  alleged  fraud  on  the basis of  non­disclosure
of  certain  orders  passed against  the  appellant. The  first such
order   is   of   10.06.2003,   whereby   the   High   Court   set   aside
recognition   of   the   assignment   deed   in   favor   of   the   appellant.
The   second   order   is   of   26.08.2013,   passed   in   injunction
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proceedings   preferred   by   the   appellant   against   the   revenue
authorities. However, both these orders were passed at a time
when   the   assignment   deed   in   favour   of   the   appellant   was
unregistered.   At   the   time   when   final   decree   was   passed   in
2013 the appellant had a registered assignment deed in their
favour with respect to the subject property. The earlier orders
are therefore not relevant. 
(vi) The   fact   that   the   subject   property   had   certain   proceedings
pending against it was recorded in the preliminary decree, and
the same was in the notice of the learned Single Judge at the
time   of   passing   of   the   final   decree   in   2013.   No   fraud   can   be
alleged on this ground by the respondents. 
20. Mr.   Dushyant   Dave,   learned   Senior   Counsel   also   appearing   on
behalf of the appellant, submitted as follows:
(i) After   the   final   decree   was   passed   on   19.09.2013,   the
respondents, who are rank outsiders to the proceedings, filed
the  application  for  recall only  in  2020. The  respondents  have
neither provided an explanation as to the delay, nor have they
filed any application for condonation of delay. 
(ii) The  affidavit  supporting   the  application  for  recall  was  filed  by
power  of attorney  holders. The person who signs the affidavit
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must   have   personal   knowledge   of   the   facts.   Without   such
personal   knowledge,   such   an   affidavit   could   not   have   been
filed. 
(iii) The   present   litigation   is   nothing   but   a   proxy   litigation.
Unrelated third parties are seeking to interfere in the present
matter as the value of the subject property is very high.
(iv) The   allegations   of   fraud   were   never   taken   before   any   forum
until   the   impugned   recall   application   before   the   High   Court.
Such   plea   taken   by   the   third   party   without   any   supporting
documents cannot be raised at a belated stage.
(v) Once the State’s appeal against the final decree was dismissed
on   grounds   of   delay,   the   respondents’   recall   application
should have been similarly dismissed. 
21. Mr. C. S. Sundaram, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf
of respondent No. 1, submitted as follows: 
(i) respondent  No.1  is claiming  through  the  original  pattedar  of  the
property.   The   recall   applications   were   filed   soon   after   his
possession   over   the   property   was   sought   to   be   disturbed.
Therefore, the question of delay does not arise.
(ii) The   preliminary   decree   indicates   that   the   title   to   the   suit
property  was  conditional.  The  respondents’  claim  was  upheld
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in   the   Atiyat   Court,   which   was   not   shown   before   the   learned
Single   Judge   at   the   time   of   passing   of   the   final   decree   on
19.09.2013.
(iii) Respondents   had   also   filed   another   application   seeking   leave
to   file   the   recall   application,   which   was   allowed   by   the   High
Court   on   05.01.2021.   The   Special   Leave   Petition   against   the
same   was   dismissed   by   this   Court   on   06.07.2021   and,   as
such,  the locus  of  the parties to  file recall  application  cannot
be questioned at this stage. 
(iv) The Court always has the power to recall its order, if such an
order was obtained by playing fraud upon the Court. 
(v) Ultimately, the impugned order does not decide the title of the
parties.   The   parties   have   been   relegated   to   file   a   civil   suit   to
decide   title.   The   appellant   may   exercise   its   right   and   do   the
same. 
22. Mr.   V.   Giri,   learned   Senior   Counsel   appearing   on   behalf   of   the
respondents no. 3 to 8, submitted as follows:
(i) The preliminary decree was a conditional decree as it was subject
to pending Revenue Court proceedings. 
(ii) The   respondents   are   the   pattedars   of   the   property   who   were
owners in possession.
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(iii) The   appellant’s   earlier   application   seeking   delivery   of   the
property on the basis of assignment deed was remanded to the
Single   Judge   and   subsequently   dismissed   for   non­prosecution
as   it   was   not   pressed.   They   abandoned   their   original
application. Additionally, the civil suit filed by the appellant for
injunction in 2007 was also dismissed. 
(iv) None   of   these   facts   and   findings   against   the   appellant   were
disclosed by them in 2013 when the final decree was sought. It
is a clear case of fraud on the Court.
(v) In   any   event,   no   final   decree   could   have   been   passed   on   the
assignment deed as no order for partition of property was ever
passed.
(vi) These points moved the learned Division Bench in allowing the
recall application filed by the respondents. The impugned order
therefore, merits no interference by this Court. 
23. Mr. Yatin Oza, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the
respondent no. 4, submitted as follows:
(i) The   conduct   of   the   appellant   is   clear   for   all   to   see.   They
committed   fraud   on   the   Court   to   have   the   final   decree   dated
19.9.2013  passed   in   their   favour   by   supressing   judgement   of
Nazim Atiyat.
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(ii) The   fundamental   principle   of   equity   is   that   the   parties   must
come   to   Court   with   clean   hands.   In   the   present   case,   this
Court   should   not   show   any   indulgence   to   the   appellant   by
interfering   with   the   well­reasoned   impugned   judgment   of   the
High Court under Article 136 of the Constitution.
24. We   have   heard   the   learned   Senior   counsel   on   either   side,   perused
the entire material on record.   Though several grounds have been
raised,   the   first   ground   taken   is   that   the   High   Court   erred   in
exercising   jurisdiction   under   Section   151   of   the   CPC,   when
alternate remedies exist under the CPC. Second ground is that the
Senior   Judge   on   the   Bench,   who   appeared   for   one   of   the   parties,
ought not to have heard the matter.
25. In   response   to   the   first   leg   of   challenge,   i.e. ,   on   the   procedural
aspect,   we   may   note   that   the   recall   application   was   filed   under
Section 151 of the CPC against the final decree dated 19.09.2013.
It is in this context that we must ascertain whether a third party to
a final decree can be allowed to file such applications, by invoking
the inherent powers of the Court under Section 151 of the CPC.
26. Section   151   of   the   CPC   provides   for   Civil   Courts   to   invoke   their
inherent   jurisdiction   and   utilize   the   same   to   meet   the   ends   of
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justice or to prevent abuse of process. Although such a provision is
worded broadly, this Court has tempered the provision to limit its
ambit   to   only   those   circumstances   where   certain  procedural   gaps
exist, to ensure that substantive justice is not obliterated by hyper
technicalities. As far back as in 1961, this Court in  Padam Sen v.
State of U.P ., AIR 1961 SC 218, observed as under:
“8.   …The   inherent   powers   of   the   Court   are   in
addition   to   the   powers   specifically   conferred   on
the   Court  by   the   Code    .  They   are  complementary
to   those   powers   and   therefore   it   must   be   held
that   the   Court   is   free   to   exercise   them   for   the
purposes   mentioned   in   Section   151   of   the   Code
when   the   exercise   of   those   powers   is   not   in   any
way   in   conflict   with   what   has   been   expressly
provided in the Code or against the intentions of
the Legislature.  It is also well recognized that the
inherent   power   is   not   to   be   exercised   in   a
manner   which   will   be   contrary   to   or   different
from   the   procedure   expressly   provided   in   the
Code.”
( emphasis supplied )
27. In   exercising   powers   under   Section   151   of   the   CPC,   it   cannot   be
said   that   the   civil   courts   can   exercise   substantive   jurisdiction   to
unsettle   already   decided   issues.   A   Court   having   jurisdiction   over
the relevant subject matter has the power to decide and may come
either to a right or a wrong conclusion. Even if a wrong conclusion
is arrived at or  an incorrect decree is passed by the jurisdictional
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court, the same is binding on the parties until it is set aside by an
appellate court or through other remedies provided in law. 
28. Section   151   of   the   CPC   can   only   be   applicable   if   there   is   no
alternate   remedy   available   in   accordance   with   the   existing
provisions   of   law.   Such   inherent   power   cannot   override   statutory
prohibitions or create remedies which are not contemplated under
the Code.  Section 151 cannot be invoked as an alternative to filing
fresh   suits,   appeals,   revisions,   or   reviews.   A   party   cannot   find
solace   in   Section   151   to   allege   and   rectify   historic   wrongs   and
bypass procedural safeguards inbuilt in the CPC.
29. The respondents in the present case had access to recourse under
Section   96   of   the   CPC,   which   allows   for   appeals   from   an   original
decree. It must be remembered that the present matter was being
heard   by   the   High   Court   exercising   its   original   jurisdiction.   The
High   Court   was   in   effect   conducting   a   trial,   and   the   final   decree
passed by the High Court on 19.09.2013 was in effect a decree in
an   original   suit.   As   such,   there   existed   a   right   of   appeal   under
Section 96 of the CPC, for the respondents. Though they were not
parties to the suit, they could have filed an appeal with the leave of
the   Court   as   an   affected   party.   Section   96   of   the   CPC   reads   as
under:
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96.   Appeal   from   original   decree   .­(1)   Save   where
otherwise   expressly   provided   in   the   body   of   this
Code or by any other law for the time being in force,
an appeal shall lie from every decree passed by any
Court   exercising   original   jurisdiction   to   the   Court
authorized   to   hear   appeals   from   the   decisions   of
such Court.
(2) An appeal may lie from an original decree passed
ex parte .
(3)   No   appeal   shall   lie   from   a   decree   passed   by   the
Court with the consent of parties.
[(4) No appeal shall lie, except on a question of law,
from a decree in any suit of the nature cognizable by
Courts of Small Causes, when the amount or  value
of   the   subject­matter   of   the   original   suit   does   not
exceed [ten thousand rupees.]
30. Sections   96   to   100   of   CPC   deals   with   the   procedure   for   filing
appeals   from   original   decrees.   A   perusal   of   the   above   provision
makes it clear that the provisions are silent about the category  of
persons   who   can   prefer   an   appeal.   But   it   is   well   settled   legal
position that a person who is affected by  a judgment but is not a
party to the suit, can prefer an appeal with the leave of the Court.
The   sine   qua   non   for   filing   an   appeal   by   a   third   party   is   that   he
must   have   been   affected   by   reason   of   the   judgment   and   decree
which is sought to be impugned. 
31. In   the   light   of   the   above,   it   can   be   safely   concluded   any   aggrieved
party can prefer an appeal with the leave of the Court. 
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32. The High Court, in the impugned judgment, relied on the judgment
of this Court in  Indian Bank vs Satyam Fibres (India) Pvt. Ltd .,
(1996) 5 SCC 550, wherein this Court acknowledges the possibility
of   maintaining   a   recall   application   against   a   judgement   if   it   is
obtained by fraud on the Court. However, it went on to hold that in
cases   of   fraud,   the   Court   may   direct   the   affected   party   to   file   a
separate   suit   for   setting   aside   the   decree   obtained   by   fraud.   The
Court held as follows:
“ 22.   The   judiciary   in   India   also   possesses
inherent   power,   specially   under   Section   151
CPC,   to   recall   its   judgment   or   order   if   it   is
obtained   by   fraud  on   court.   In   the  case   of   fraud
on   a   party   to   the   suit   or   proceedings,   the   court
may   direct   the   affected   party   to   file   a   separate
suit   for   setting   aside   the   decree   obtained   by
fraud …”
33. The subsequent judgment of this Court in   Ram Prakash Agarwal
v. Gopi Krishan ,   (2013) 11 SCC 296   further   clarifies the law on
the use of the power under Section 151 of the CPC by the Court in
cases of fraud and holds as follows:
“13.   Section   151   CPC   is   not   a   substantive
provision that confers the right to get any relief of
any kind. It is a mere procedural provision which
enables   a   party   to   have   the   proceedings   of   a
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pending   suit   conducted   in   a   manner   that   is
consistent with justice and equity. The court can
do justice between the parties before it. Similarly,
inherent   powers   cannot   be   used   to   re­open
settled matters. The inherent powers of the Court
must, to that extent, be regarded as abrogated by
the legislature. A provision barring the exercise of
inherent power need not be express, it may even
be   implied.   Inherent   power   cannot   be   used   to
restrain the execution of a decree at the instance
of one who was not a party to suit. Such power is
absolutely   essential   for   securing   the   ends   of
justice,   and   to   overcome   the   failure   of   justice.
The Court under Section 151 CPC may adopt any
procedure   to   do   justice,   unless   the   same   is
expressly prohibited.
Xxx
19. In view of the above, the law on this issue
stands   crystallised   to   the   effect   that   the
inherent powers enshrined under Section 151
CPC   can   be   exercised   only   where   no   remedy
has   been   provided   for   in   any   other   provision
of CPC . In the event that a party has obtained a
decree   or   order   by   playing   a   fraud   upon   the
court,   or   where   an   order   has   been   passed   by   a
mistake   of   the   court,   the   court   may   be   justified
in rectifying such mistake, either by recalling the
said   order,   or   by   passing   any   other   appropriate
order.   However,   inherent   powers   cannot   be
used   in   conflict   of   any   other   existing
provision,   or   in   case   a   remedy   has   been
provided   for   by   any   other   provision   of   CPC.
Moreover,   in   the   event   that   a   fraud   has   been
played   upon   a   party,   the   same   may   not   be   a
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case where inherent powers can be exercised .”
(emphasis supplied)
34. The   High   Court,   relying   upon   the   above   judgments   of   this   Court
which   recognizes   the   power   to   recall,   seems   to   have   lost   sight   of
the   restrictions   imposed   while   exercising   jurisdiction   under
Section 151 of the CPC, which were elaborately  discussed by  this
Court in the above referred judgment about exercising of the power
under  Section  151  of  the   CPC  being  only  in  circumstances  where
alternate remedies do not exist. 
35. Therefore, we are of the firm opinion that recalling a final decree in
such circumstances cannot be countenanced under Section 151 of
the CPC. The High Court erred in exercising its jurisdiction under
Section   151   of   the   CPC,   to   hear   and   pass   a   detailed   judgment
recalling   its   earlier   final   decree   dated   19.09.2013,   rather   than
directing   the   respondents   to   pursue   the   effective   alternate
remedies   under   law.   Having   said   the   above,   we   must   clarify   that
we are not, in any way, doubting the proposition of law that fraud
nullifies   all   proceedings,   or   that  the   Court  has   power  to   recall   an
order   which   was   passed   due   to   a   fraud   played   on   the   Court.
However,   while   exercising   the   power   under   Section   151   CPC   for
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setting   aside   the   final   judgment   and   decree,   the   Division   Bench
should   have   taken   into   consideration   the   restriction   which   was
observed   by   this   Court   in   the   captioned   judgment.   Once   we   have
come   to   the   irresistible   conclusion   that   exercising   power   under
Section 151 CPC in the facts and circumstances of the case is bad,
we are not inclined to go into further  issues that were extensively
argued. 
36. The   other   ground   that   the   learned   senior   judge   who   passed   the
present   impugned   order   had   represented   one   of   the   opposite
parties   in   certain   collateral   proceedings   related   to   the   subject
property,   merits   some   discussion.   It   appears   that   although   the
appellant raised this ground before us, it was neither raised before
the   High  Court  nor  brought  to   the  attention   of  the  learned senior
Judge. The party ought to have raised this issue also at the time of
arguments,   particularly   when   the   issue   of   recusal   of   the   learned
Judge had been specifically raised on the other ground that he had
been the presiding member of the Bench which had dismissed the
appeal filed by the State. 
37. When   an   issue   was   not   raised   before   the   learned   Division   Bench,
we   do   not   wish   to   spill   much   ink   on   this   issue.   However,   the
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material placed on record by the counsel for the appellant cannot
be   ignored.   Annexure   P8   of   the   appeal   paper   book   indicates   that
the   Senior   Judge   heading   the   Division   Bench,   while   being   an
advocate,   had   represented   the   Andhra   Pradesh   State   Financial
Corporation   in   one   of   the   connected   proceedings   related   to   this
case.
38. Although we have no doubt in our mind about the absence of bias
of any form of the learned senior Judge, we must at the same time
also   look   at   the   issue   of   whether   right   minded   persons   could
consider   there   exists   any   real   likelihood   of   bias.   In   the   case   of
State of West Bengal v. Shivananda Pathak,   1998 5 SCC 513,
this Court held as under: 
“34.   In   Metropolitan   Properties   Co.   v.   Lannon
[(1968) 1 WLR  815  :  (1968) 1  All ER 354] it was
observed   “whether   there   was   a   real   likelihood   of
bias   or   not   has   to   be   ascertained   with   reference
to   right­minded   persons;   whether   they   would
consider that there was a real likelihood of bias”.
Almost the same test has also been applied here
in   an   old   decision,   namely,   in   Manak   Lal   v.   Dr
Prem   Chand   Singhvi   [AIR   1957   SC   425   :   1957
SCR   575]   .   In   that   case,   although   the   Court
found   that   the   Chairman   of   the   Bar   Council
Tribunal appointed by the Chief Justice of the
Rajasthan   High   Court   to   enquire   into   the
misconduct of Manak Lal, an advocate, on the
complaint   of   one   Prem   Chand   was   not   biased
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towards   him,   it   was   held   that   he   should   not
have   presided   over   the   proceedings   to   give
effect   to   the   salutary   principle   that   justice
should   not   only   be   done,   it   should   also   be
seen   to   be   done   in   view   of   the   fact   that   the
Chairman,   who,   undoubtedly,   was   a   Senior
Advocate   and   an   ex­Advocate   General,   had,   at
one time, represented Prem Chand in some case.
These   principles   have   had   their   evolution   in   the
field   of   administrative   law   but   the   courts
performing   judicial   functions   only   cannot   be
excepted   from   the   rule   of   bias   as   the   Presiding
Officers   of   the   court   have   to   hear   and   decide
contentious   issues   with   an   unbiased   mind.   The
maxim   nemo   debet   esse   judex   in   propria   sua
causa   and   the   principle   “justice   should   not   only
be   done   but   should   manifestly   be   seen   to   be
done” can be legitimately invoked in their cases.”
( emphasis supplied )
39. It   is   a   well­established   principle,   both   in   our   jurisprudence   and
across the world, that “ [N]ot only must justice be done; it must also
be   seen   to   be   done ”. 1
  In   the   present   circumstances,   it   may   have
been more apposite for the concerned Judge to have recused from
this case. The appellant should have brought it to the notice of the
learned   senior   Judge   at   the   very   first   instance,   and   not   at   this
belated stage.
1  R v. Sussex Justices, ex parte McCarthy, 1924 (1) KB 256.
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40. In   the   above   circumstances,   we   are   of   the   opinion   that   the   High
Court   should   not   have   decided   the   recall   application   filed   by   the
respondents,   let   alone   pass   such   extensive   orders   which   has   the
effect   of   unsettling   proceedings   and   transactions   which   have   a
history   of   more   than   60   years   in   a   proceeding,   basing   on   an
application filed under Section 151 of the CPC. 
41. In view of the above, the appeal is allowed by setting aside the order
dated 21.09.2021 passed in I.A No. 5/2020 in Application No. 837
of 2013 in CS No. 7 of 1958.
............................CJI.
(N. V. RAMANA)
..…..........................J.
(KRISHNA MURARI)
.........…………….......J.
    (HIMA KOHLI)
NEW DELHI;
AUGUST 23, 2022.
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