/2022 INSC 0742/
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1333  OF 2022
[ ARISING OUT OF SLP (CRL.) NO.3440 OF 2021 ]
PUSHPENDRA KUMAR SINHA     …..APPELLANT
VERSUS
STATE OF JHARKHAND      ..…RESPONDENT
J U D G M E N T
J.K. Maheshwari, J.
Leave granted. 
2. The   Appellant   has   assailed   the   final   judgment   dated
06.01.2020   passed   by   High   Court   of   Jharkhand   at   Ranchi   in
Criminal   Revision   No.   1057   of   2018,   by   which   the   order   dated
04.07.2018   passed   by   learned   Special   Judge,   Anti­Corruption
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Bureau   dismissing   the   application   for   discharge   filed   by   the
Appellant under Section 239 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
(for   short   “ Cr.P.C. ”)   in   connection   with   Special   Case   No.   02   of
2011 has been affirmed. The criminal case was registered against
the   Appellant   and   others   for   commission   of   offences   under
Sections   109,   409,   420,   467,   471,   477A   and   120B   of   Indian
Penal Code (for short “ IPC ”) and Section 13(1)(c) and 13(1)(d) read
with   13(2)   of   Prevention   of   Corruption   Act,   1988   (for   short   “ PC
Act ”).
3. The facts briefly put are that the Appellant was working as
an Executive Engineer (Electrical) (“ EE ”) in the Accelerated Power
Development   Reforms   Program   (“ APDRP ”)   Wing   of   Jharkhand
State Electricity Board (in short “ JSEB ”) from 07.12.2004. During
his   tenure   as   EE,   one   Ramjee   Power   Construction   Limited
(hereinafter   “ RPCL ”)   was   awarded   a   contract   of   work   under
APDRP vide work order dated 27.01.2005. On account of delay in
execution   of   the   work   and   to   resolve   the   said   issue,   the   then
Chairman   JSEB,   Mr.   Shivendu,   convened   a   meeting   on
21.12.2006,   wherein   he   orally   instructed   Mr.   R.P.   Agarwal,   the
then   Chief   Engineer   (“ CE ”),   to   place   the   agenda   for   next   board
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meeting   for   termination   of   the   contract   of   M/s   RPCL.   Prior   to
convening   of   the   next   Board   meeting,   Mr.   V.N.   Pandey   was
appointed   as  the   new   Chairman,   JSEB   on   04.01.2007.   The   new
Chairman called for a meeting on 06.02.2007/07.02.2007 for the
agenda   to   review   the   progress   of   RPCL’s   work.   In   the   said
meeting,   other   officers   of   JSEB   including   Mr.   R.P.   Agarwal,   CE,
had participated. In the meeting, it was mutually agreed by JSEB
and   RPCL   that   full   effort   to   complete   the   work   within   the
extended   time,   i.e.   July,   2007   shall   be   made   by   RPCL.   In
furtherance   of   the   decision   taken   in   the   aforesaid   meeting,   Mr.
R.P.   Agarwal,   CE,   made   various   correspondences   reminding
RPCL   to   complete   the   pending   work.   On   retirement   of   Mr.   R.P.
Agarwal,   Mr.   S.C.   Shrivastava   Superintending   Engineer
(Electrical)   was   made   in   charge   in   place   of   Mr.   R.P.   Agarwal.
Meanwhile, RPCL sent letters dated 16.05.2007, 18.05.2007 and
08.06.2007   requesting   him   for   further   extension   of   time.   In   the
said correspondences, it was said that RPCL had already invoked
the   arbitration   clause   on   22.12.2006,   in   terms   of   the   contract
and   requested   JSEB   for   appointment   of   an   arbitrator.   The   said
letters   were   handed   over   to   the   Appellant,   on   which   under   the
instructions,   the   Appellant   prepared   a   note   dated   08.06.2007
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and   placed   it   before   the   Chairman   on   the   issue   relating   to
appointment of an arbitrator and waiver of penalty, as advised by
learned   Advocate   General   (“ AG ”)   of   State   of   Jharkhand   in
similarly placed transmission lines projects. 
4. Thereafter,   vide   JSEB   resolution   dated   28.06.2007,   a
committee   consisting   of   one   Mr.   GNS   Munda   (Member,
Technical),   Mr.   A.   Banerjee   (Finance)   and   Mr.   A.K.   Mishra   (Law
Officer)   was   constituted,   which   on   09.08.2007   suggested   three
names for  appointment of an Arbitrator. Out of the three names
as   suggested,   Mr.   Ramayan   Pandey   was   appointed   as   the
arbitrator   by   consent.   Arbitration   proceedings   commenced   and
an   interim   award   dated   25.11.2007   was   passed   in   favour   of
RPCL.   Thereafter,   an   agenda   accompanied   with   the   aforesaid
award was put before Chairman, Mr. B.M. Verma prior to asking
for   an   opinion   from   the   AG ,   State   of   Jharkhand,   regarding
enforceability   of   the   award.   Later,   as   per   the   opinion   of   the   AG,
JSEB   vide   Board   Resolution   dated   05.04.2008   and   07.04.2008,
decided to implement the interim award. It is worthwhile to state
that,   Mr.   GNS   Munda   (Member,   Technical)   as   well   as   Smt.
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Rajbala Verma (then Finance Secretary, State of Jharkhand) were
part of this Board meeting. 
5. It   is   pertinent   to   mention   that,   while   giving   effect   to   the
award,   JSEB   was   facing   shortage   of   funds.   However,   JSEB
decided to make internal enquiry into handling the work contract
given   to   RPCL.   On   the   basis   of   the   said   enquiry,   allegations   of
malpractice   and   financial   irregularity   were   levelled   against   the
Appellant and some others. The Secretary, JSEB vide letter dated
30.07.2010,  made  a  request  to  the   Director  General  of  Vigilance
Bureau (“ DGP ”) to lodge an FIR against the Appellant and others
for offences punishable under Sections 109, 409, 420, 467, 471,
477A and 120B of IPC and Section 13(1)(c) and 13(1)(d) read with
13(2)   of   PC   Act.   Additionally,   another   letter   dated   03.09.2010,
was issued by Smt. Rajbala Verma (then Vigilance Commissioner)
to   the   DGP,   recommending   the   same   action   against   the
Appellant. As already noted above, Smt. Rajbala Verma was also
a   part   of   the   Board   meeting   (being   the   then   Finance   Secretary,
State of Jharkhand) that had approved the implementation of the
arbitral   award.   In   the   said   facts,   FIR   dated   20.01.2011   was
lodged   against   the   Appellant   and   other   officers   of   the   JSEB.
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Investigation was carried out, chargesheet dated 08.01.2016 was
filed   and   cognizance   was   taken   by   the   Court   dealing   with
vigilance   cases   vide   order   dated   11.01.2016.   Thereafter,   the
Appellant   moved   a   discharge   petition   under   Section   239   of   the
Cr.P.C.,   which   came   to   be   dismissed   by   the   learned   Special
Judge   vide   order   dated   04.07.2018.   The   Court   observed   that
sufficient   material   exists   to   make   out   a   prima­facie   case   against
the Appellant for framing of charges. 
6. Aggrieved   by   the   same,   the   Appellant   preferred   a   criminal
revision   assailing   the   aforesaid   order.   The   High   Court   vide
impugned   order   dismissed   the   revision   and   affirmed   the   order
passed   by   the   learned   Special   Judge.   The   High   Court   was
prima­facie   influenced   by   the   fact   that   the   previous   chairman,
JSEB,  Mr.  Shivendu   had   orally   instructed  to   put   up  the   agenda
for   termination   of   the   contract   of   RPCL.   On   demitting   the   office
by   the   said   Chairman,   the   Appellant   had   put   the   file   noting
before   the   subsequent   Chairman   Mr.   V.N.   Pandey,   regarding
referral   of   the   matter   for   arbitration   without   mentioning   about
the instructions given by the previous Chairman, JSEB. The High
Court   found   fault   in   the   action   of   the   Appellant   of   having
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proposed   an   agenda   regarding   wrongful   implementation   of   the
award   which   was   challenged   belatedly.   Thus,   having   found   a
prima­facie   case against the Appellant, the High Court dismissed
the revision petition.
7. Learned   counsel   for   the   Appellant,   Mr.   Prashant   Bhushan
strenuously urged as under: 
(i) the   Appellant   was   not   having   decision­making   power   or
financial  authority  to  carry  out   the  contract  and  the  award
passed.   The   nature   of   duty   assigned   to   the   Appellant   was
confined   to   follow   instructions   of   his   superiors   and   by   no
stretch   of   imagination   he   can   be   said   to   have   the   power   to
refer  the   matter  for   arbitration  in  a  case  where  the   dispute
is arising out of a work contract between JSEB and RPCL; 
(ii) there   is   no   concealment   of   the   instruction   of   the   previous
Chairman   pertaining   to   termination   of   the   contract   as
substantiated by noting dated 08.06.2007 on page no. 48 of
the APDRP file which was the next page of noting of the CE
on page no. 47, under instructions from the Chairman; 
(iii) the   prosecution   has   concealed   that   the   verbal   instruction
for  termination  of  contract   given  by  the   previous  Chairman
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in   the   meeting   dated   21.12.2006,   had   been   overturned
within   two   months   by   the   new   Chairman,   Mr.   V.N.   Pandey
in   the   JSEB   tripartite   meeting   held   on   06.02.2007   and
07.02.2007, in which the Appellant was not a member;
(iv) the   questionable   noting   dated   08.06.2007   of   the   Appellant
was   based   on   facts   and   documents   forming   part   of   the
APDRP file endorsed to him by his controlling officer; 
(v) the Appellant is being prosecuted on a wrong  premise from
the   stage   of   granting   time   to   complete   the   work,   reference
made to arbitration and till further directions for making the
payment   for   the   interim   award   passed   against   JSEB,   in
favour   of   the   RPCL.   He   was   not   a   part   of   the   decision­
making  process or  of taking  further steps to implement the
said   award.   Thus,   culpability   as   alleged   against   the
Appellant,   on   the   pretext   of   not   putting   up   the   agenda   for
cancellation of the contract amounts to  abuse of  the  power
and  prima­facie,  no case to prosecute him is made out;
(vi) there is no allegation of illegal gratification, undue benefit or
disproportionate   assets   qua   the   Appellant   in   the   FIR   or
charge­sheet which is also backed by the income tax records
of the Appellant; 
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(vii) prosecution   has   failed   to   establish   any   nexus   between   the
Appellant   and  RPCL  to   whom   the  benefit   is  alleged  to  have
been made; 
(viii) while   granting   bail   to   the   Appellant   on   merits,   it   was
categorically observed by the High Court that the Appellant
had   put   up   the   matter   before   higher   authorities   for
instructions   before   proceeding   further   and   did   not   act
unilaterally;
(ix) except   for   the   Director   of   Finance,   none   of   the   decision­
making   authorities   namely,   members   of   Central   Purchase
Committee and the Board of JSEB have been made accused
in this case;              
8. Per   contra,   learned   counsel   for   the   Respondent­State   has
argued   in   support   of   the   concurrent   findings  of  both   the  Courts
and contended that the entire factual gamut of the instant appeal
stems   around   the   pleadings   of   defence   including   reliance   on
documents which cannot be permitted to be raised at this stage.
It   is   further   urged   that   at   the   stage   of   framing   of   charge,   the
scope of interference is limited, and the Court is not  required to
see as to whether there are sufficient grounds for conviction. The
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Court  has to  only  see  the  material collected during  investigation
and on consideration of the same, a  prima facie  case is made out
or not. 
9. After   having   heard   learned   counsel   for   the   parties   and   on
perusal of the record, which reveals that after the board meeting
dated   21.12.2006,   the   then   Chairman   Mr.   Shivendu   had   orally
instructed the then CE, Mr. R.P. Agarwal to place the agenda for
termination of the contract of RPCL. As per the said instructions,
the agenda was proposed and placed on 27.12.2006 by Mr. R.P.
Agarwal. On the said proposed agenda, Member Technical put up
a note on 19.01.2007, recording   “please discuss” . Thereafter, the
meeting   of   the   JSEB   was   held   on   06.02.2007   and   07.02.2007,
which   was   presided  over   by   the  new   Chairman  Mr.  V.N.   Pandey
and   Mr.   R.P.   Agarwal,   CE,   was   a   member   of   the   said   meeting.
Either   at   the   stage   of   the   proposed   agenda   or   in   the   meeting   of
the JESB held on 06.02.2007 and 07.02.2007, the Appellant had
not   participated   in   the   decision­making   process.   The   minutes   of
the aforesaid meeting is relevant and reproduced as under: 
“MINUTES OF THE MEETING HELD ON 06.02.2007 &
07.02.2007 AT JSEB HQR.
The following officer, consultant & contractors were present in
the meeting:­
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1.  Shri V.N. Pandey Chairman
2. Shri R.P. Agarwal Chief Engineer (APDRP)
3.  Shri P. Ranjan                               General Manager­cum­      
        Chief Engineer/Jamshedpur
    4. Shri Niranjan Rai        Director (Finance)
5. Shri Madhup Kumar       Director (RE/Plan)
6. Shri P. Raghu       RITES Ltd.
7. Shri Y.P. Singh           do
8. Shri A.K. Singh RPCL
9. Shri T.K. Bhattacharya    do
The   issue   of   M/s   RPCL   was   discussed   in   length.   Work   of
Jamshedpur town under APDRP has been awarded to M/s RPCL
vide   W.O.   Nos.   28   &   29   dated   27.01.2005.   The   progress   was
reviewed   and   found   that   progress   is   very­very   slow.   After
discussion, JSEB & M/s RPCL mutually agreed on the following
points:­
1. M/s RPCL will submit photo copy of all orders placed by them
for   procurement   of   materials   for   the   APDRP   work   of
Jamshedpur to Chief Engineer/APDRP & m/s RITES Ltd., the
consultant.
2. JSEB will help Ms RPCL for procurement of materials.
3. JSEB   will   be   make   payment   immediately  (probably   within   a
week) after submission of bills by M/s RPCL.
4. Approval   of   additional   B.O.Q.   and   items   shall   be   given   by
JSEB immediately.
5. M/s   RPCL   will   submit   fresh   inspection   call   of   materials   to
Electrical   Superintending   Engineer­cum­CEO/General
Manager­cum­Chief   Engineer,   Jamshedpur   for   getting
inspecting officer deputed.
6. M/s RPCL will contract Chief Engineer (APDRP) if here is any
delay in issuing Road permits by Chief Engineer (S&P).
7. M/s   RPCL   agreed   that   they   will   apply   their   full   efforts   to
complete   the   project   so   that   it   may   be   completed   within
extended   completion   period   i.e.   July’   07   instead   of   going   for
Arbitration/Court of Law.
8. JSEB will review the matter of L.D. clause after completion of
the project work.
Sd/­
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(R.P. Agrawal)
Chief Engineer (APDRP)
Memo No.  ­­­­­       
Dated­­­­­­­­
Copy forwarded to all concerned officers/M/s RITES Ltd./ M/s 
RPCL for information and necessary action.
Fax – 2543986”
10. The   perusal   of   the   aforesaid   minutes   and   the   proposed
agenda   dated   27.12.2006   prepared   by   Mr.   R.P.   Agarwal,   CE,
reveals that the oral recommendation of the then Chairman, Mr.
Shivendu,   was   drawn   in   the   proposed   agenda   but   it   was   not
acted   upon   as   per   the   noting   dated   19.01.2007   made   by   the
Member   Technical   who   made   an   endorsement   “Please   discuss” .
Thereafter,   what   was   the   agenda   that   was   put   forth   in   the   next
JSEB   meeting,   is   not   on   record.   The   minutes   of   the   Board
meeting   reflect   that   Mr.   R.P.   Agarwal   who   had   prepared   the
agenda   dated   27.12.2006,   was   a   part   of   the   said   meeting.   The
decisions were taken in the said meeting with the mutual consent
of   the   parties.   The   Appellant   was   not   a   part   of   the   decision­
making   process.   In   the   said   meeting   as   per   clause   (7),   it   was
decided   that   “M/s   RPCL   agreed   that   they   will   apply   their   full
efforts   to   complete   the   project   so   that   it   may   be   completed   within
extended   completion   period,   i.e.,   July’   07,   instead   of   going   for
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Arbitration/Court   of   Law.”   Correspondences   further   reflect   that
prior   to   demitting   the   office,   Mr.   R.P.   Agarwal,   CE,   wrote   three
letters,   of   which   two   were   dated   05.04.2007   and   one   was   dated
25.04.2007,   requesting   RPCL  for  implementation   of   the   contract
as   per   the   decision   of   JSEB.   The   said   correspondence   also   does
not   show   any   involvement   of   the   Appellant.   As   alleged,   the
agenda dated 08.06.2007 was prepared by the Appellant, wherein
the following instructions were required to be obtained:
“…….Hence instruction may be obtained on:
(i) Appointment   of   an   arbitrator   in   light   of   the   advice   of   the
AG Jharkhand.
(ii) Waiver   of   penalty   in   light   of   the   advice   of   the   AG,
Jharkhand, and
(iii) Putting the agenda for further time extension incorporating
the   condition   of   approval   of   revised   BQO   which   could   not
be given till date.”
11. On   perusal   of   the   JSEB   Board   meeting   dated   06.02.2007
and 07.02.2007, it is clear that extension was granted up to July
2007 instead of going in for arbitration or approaching the Court
of   Law.   The   JSEB   and   its   members   were   not   inclined   to   cancel
the   contract   and   the   decision   was   taken   by   mutual   consent.
Therefore,   the   instructions   sought   by   the   Appellant   as   per   the
agenda dated 08.06.2007, were either based on the advice of the
learned   AG   of   Jharkhand   or   in   furtherance   of   the   previous
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decision of  the  Board. Later, it was directed that  JSEB, Member
Technical may  constitute a committee consisting of officers from
‘Technical’,   ‘Finance’   and   ‘Law’   to   suggest   the   names   to   appoint
an   Arbitrator,   after   approval   of   the   Chairman.   The   Member
Technical   proceeded   in   the   matter   of   appointment   of   Arbitrator
and three names were proposed on 09.08.2007, out of which, Mr.
Ramayan   Pandey,   Ex­Law   Secretary,   State   of   Jharkhand   was
appointed   as   an   arbitrator.   The   Arbitrator   passed   an   interim
award on 25.11.2007, in favour of RPCL. 
12. In   view   of   the   discussion   made   hereinabove,   it   is   apparent
that at the time of taking a decision by the JSEB on 06.02.2007
and 07.02.2007, the Appellant was neither involved nor was part
in the proposal or the decision­making process. He had prepared
the   proposed   agenda   for   instructions   on   08.06.2007,   in
furtherance   of   clause   (7)   of   the   aforesaid   Board   meeting,   and
based on the advice of the learned AG, State of Jharkhand in the
matter of appointment of an Arbitrator  and waiver of penalty, as
suggested. Even after the proposed agenda for termination of the
contract   dated   27.12.2006,   prepared   by   the   then   CE   Mr.   R.P.
Agarwal,   it   was   not   acted   upon   because   Member   Technical   on
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19.01.2007, had put up a note  “Please discuss” . Later, the Board
took a  decision on  06.02.2007 and  07.02.2007.  Thus, it is  clear
that the question of termination of contract in the opinion of the
Board was dropped and the recourse to complete the work within
the   extended   time   was   agreed   in   place   of   going   in   for
arbitration/Court   of   Law.   The   same   has   also   been   observed   by
the High Court in its order dated 02.05.2016, while granting bail
to   the   Appellant   on   merit.   In   the   said   facts,   merely   preparing   a
subsequent   agenda   dated   08.06.2007,   seeking   instructions   for
appointment   of   an   Arbitrator   would   not   bring   the   Appellant
within   the   purview   of   culpability   for   commission   of   the   alleged
offences.   This   Court   has   reason   to   believe   that   the   decisions,   if
any,   taken   by   the   JSEB   and   other   higher   officials   were   after
perusal of the complete noting in the file. After implementation of
the   said   decision,   arbitral   proceedings   were   commenced   and
award   dated   25.11.2007   was   passed.   Thereafter,   the   agenda
regarding   implementation   of   the   award   was   put   up   before   the
Chairman,   Mr.   B.M.   Verma   who   vide   noting   dated   27.01.2008,
made   a   request   to   the   AG   to   give   legal   opinion   about   the
maintainability   and   enforceability   issues   relating   to   the   interim
award.   The   learned   AG   responded   by   letter   dated   31.01.2008,
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opining   that   the   award   did   not   suffer   from   any   illegality   and
should   be   implemented.   Accordingly,   the   Board   of   JSEB
approved   the   interim   arbitral   award   vide   resolution   dated
05.04.2008   and   07.04.2008.   In   the   said   meeting,   Smt.   Rajbala
Verma   (then   Finance   Secretary   to   the   State   of   Jharkhand)   also
participated and duly approved the resolution.
13. The   perusal   of   material   indicates   that   because   it   was
difficult   for   the   JSEB   to   implement   the   award   due   to   financial
difficulty,   a   roving   and   fishing   enquiry   was   conducted,   in
consequence   of   which,   Secretary,   JSEB   vide   letter   dated
30.07.2010   and   Smt.   Rajbala   Verma   (then   Vigilance
Commissioner) vide letter  dated 03.09.2010, requested the DGP,
Vigilance Bureau to register an FIR against the Appellant. We fail
to understand as to why the same person, who had approved the
implementation of award as a member of the Board, had later as
Vigilance   Commissioner,   recommended   initiation   of   prosecution
against   the   Appellant,   who   had   merely   prepared   the   agenda   for
appointment   of   an   arbitrator   and   had   nothing   to   do   with   the
approval   of   the   award   and   payment   of   money.   In   view   of   the
aforesaid,   if   at   all   any   culpability   had   to   be   assigned,   it   should
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have been assigned after examining the role of senior authorities
who were involved in the decision­making process. Astonishingly,
most   of   the   senior   officials,   who   approved   various   decisions
regarding   extension   of   time,   appointment   of   arbitrator   and
implementation of arbitration award and consequent payment to
RPCL have not been arrayed as accused. In our considered view,
prima­facie   there   is   nothing   which   affixes   culpability   or
constitutes commission of offence including  mens­rea  on the part
of   the   Appellant.   It   seems   that   an   attempt   has   been   made   to
implicate the Appellant for the decisions in which   prima­facie,   he
did   not   have   any   role   to   play,   nor   do   his   acts   establish   any
culpability regarding the alleged offences.
14. If at all there were issues with respect to the maintainability
of the award due to the provisions of the contract, particularly as
per the contended negative covenant, the same should have been
highlighted   by   the   learned   AG,   especially   when   his   opinion   was
expressly sought. We find it difficult to accept that the opinion of
the learned AG was prejudiced merely because he was not made
aware of the negative covenant pertaining to price variation by an
engineer of the JSEB who has limited exposure in the domain of
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law.   We   have   no   hesitation   in   stating   that   AG   being   the   highest
law   officer   of   a   State,   is   competent   to   advise   the   State   on   legal
matters after due diligence, taking into consideration all relevant
factors   and   material.   Therefore,   the   Appellant   cannot   be   said   to
influence   or   impact   the   opinion   of   the   learned   AG   which   had
resulted in approval of JSEB  to implement the award. Hence, in
our  considered view, it cannot be inferred that the Appellant led
the AG and the JSEB to implement the award with fraudulent or
dishonest intention to cause loss to JSEB and benefit to RPCL. 
15. On   a   perusal   of   the   FIR,   we   find   that   it   is   alleged   against
Umesh   Kumar,   Financial   Controller   –   III   and   the   present
Appellant,   CE   (APDRP),   that   they   made   payment   of
Rs.4,89,24,788/­ against the gross value of Rs. 7,89,84,826/­, as
per   the   arbitral   award   without   approval   of   the   competent
authority. Mr. Umesh Kumar had filed quashment petition being
‘Cr.   M.P.   No.   2136/2015’   before   the   High   Court   wherein   the
Court   on   the   allegation   of   payment   without   approval   of   the
competent   authority   (as   alleged   against   Appellant   also)   has
observed as under:
“1. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and on perusal
of   the   records,   I   do   find   that   nothing   is   there   against   the
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petitioner   with   respect   to   appointment   of   M/s   RPCL   nor
anything   is   there   in   the   matter   of   appointment   of   an
Arbitrator. Only when award was given by the Arbitrator, the
petitioner did make payment  of the amount which had  been
awarded   not  from  the   working  fund   but  from  the   loan  fund.
This   has   been   taken   by   the   Vigilance   to   be   illegal   as
according to it the payment should not have been made from
the  existing loan  amount, as  the  loan  had  never been taken
for   the   purpose   of   making   payment   of   the   amount   awarded
by   the   Arbitrator.   This   accusation   cannot   be   the   subject
matter of the prosecution in absence of anything being placed
that   there   was   restriction   on   the   part   of   the   authority   of   the
Board   to   make   payment   of   the   amount   covered   under   the
award passed against the Board from the loan account. It is
opinion   of   the   Vigilance   not   based   on   any   circular   or
guideline   that   the   payment   should   have   been   made   after
having   a   fresh   loan   from   the   Power   Finance   Corporation.   It
be   stated   that   the   petitioner   is   to   act   according   to   his   own
wisdom and not as per the wishes of others and if nothing is
there showing any culpability in the matter of payment of the
amount, the petitioner cannot be said to have committed any
wrong.
2. Coming   further,   it   be   stated   that   the   petitioner   passed
release   order   with   respect   to   payment   of   a   sum   of   Rs.
4,89,24,788/­   but   that   release   order   was   passed   without
having any approval of the Chairman though such post facto
approval according to the petitioner has been granted by the
Chairman   not   on   the   file   but   on   separate   sheet   which
according to the Vigilance is bad but even if this irregularity
is   there   in   the   matter   of   payment   of   the   said   amount,   his
culpability can only be  found  when  something is more  there
showing   his   connivance   or   conspiracy   with   the   contractor
though the Vigilance has tried to establish that the file moved
so   fast   but   that   never   indicates   about   the   culpability   of   the
petitioner, as  there  may be  conspiracy of other officials with
the   contractor   on   account   of   which   the   file   moved   so   fast.
Furthermore, it has never been the case of the vigilance that
the   aforesaid   payments   were   made   without   the   materials
being supplied or short supplied.
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3. Further,   it   be   stated   that   the   ingredients   of   the   offence   of
criminal   conspiracy   are   that   there   should   be   an   agreement
between   the   persons   who   are   alleged   to   conspire   and   the
said   agreement   should   be   for   doing   of   an   illegal   act   or   for
doing,   by   illegal   means,   an   act   which   by   itself   may   not   be
illegal. In  other words, the  essence  of  criminal  conspiracy is
an agreement to do an illegal act and such an agreement can
be   proved   either   by   direct   evidence   or   by   circumstantial
evidence or by both and it is a matter of common experience
that   direct   evidence   to   prove   conspiracy   is   rarely   available.
Accordingly,   the   circumstances   proved   before   and   after   the
occurrence   have   to   be   considered   to   decide   about   the
complicity   of   the   accused.   Even,   if   some   acts   are   proved   to
have   been   committed,   it   must   be   clear   that   they   were   so
committed in pursuance of an agreement  made between the
accused persons who were parties to the alleged conspiracy.
Inferences   from   such   proved   circumstances   regarding   the
guilt   may   be   drawn   only   when   such   circumstances   are
incapable   of   any   other   reasonable   explanation.   In   other
words,   an   offence   of   conspiracy   cannot   be   deemed   to   have
been   established   on   mere   suspicion   and   surmises   or
inference which are not  supported by cogent and acceptable
evidence. This proposition of law has been laid down by the
Hon’ble   Supreme   Court   in   a   case   of   Central   Bureau   of
Investigation,   Hyderabad   Vs.   K.   Narayana   Rao   {(2012)   9
SCC   512}.   Here   in   the   instant   case,   nothing   appears   to   be
there for showing connivance or conspiracy except aforesaid
two facts which have been dealt with hereinabove regarding
payment of the amount to the contractor.”
16. The   High   Court   quashed   the   criminal   proceedings   against
Umesh   Kumar   with   the   above   said   observations.   Assailing   the
same,   Special   Leave   Petition   (Criminal)   No.   4062   of   2017,   was
filed   by   the   State   of   Jharkhand,   which   was   dismissed   by   this
Court vide order dated 05.02.2020, after condoning the delay. As
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per   the   FIR  allegations,   it  is  alleged  that   Umesh  Kumar   and   the
present   Appellant   had   made   the   payment   of   Rs.4,89,24,788/­
against   the   gross   value   of   Rs.7,89,84,826/­   without   approval   of
the competent authority. In this regard, the allegation against the
Appellant   is   that   he   suggested   that   part   payment   of   the   arbitral
award   may   be   made   to   RPCL   from   the   working   fund,   on
refundable  basis  since  there  was  no  fund  available  in  the   Power
Finance   Corporation   Account.   It   is   not   the   case   of   the
prosecution that the Appellant had made payment to the agency.
However, it can be inferred that the Appellant has suggested the
possible   mode   of   payment   in   furtherance   of   the   Board’s   office
order   no.   243   dated   16.03.2006,   after   passing   of   the   arbitral
award   which   was   required   to   be   paid   alongwith   interest,   but   to
satisfy the award by noting, the said suggestion was made. In our
view,   this   itself   is   not   sufficient   to   implicate   the   Appellant.   In
addition   thereto,   it   is   most   pertinent   that   even   on   such   a
suggestion, the payments were not made from the working fund,
rather, part payment of the award was made from the loan taken
from   Power   Finance   Corporation   on   the   recommendation   of
Umesh   Kumar,   against   whom   criminal   proceedings   have   been
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quashed   as   indicated   hereinabove   and   the   said   order   has   not
been interfered with by this Court. 
17. It   is   also   worthwhile   to   mention   that   during   the
investigation,   no   incriminating   material   or   money   was   seized
from   the   house   of  the   Appellant.   Further,   it   is  not   a   case   where
allegations  of   illegal   gratification  or   disproportionate   assets   have
been successfully found by prosecution against the Appellant. On
the contrary, when the Income Tax Department had assessed the
block   income   tax   return   for   seven   years,   the   Department
recorded   a   refund   Rs.8843   to   the   Appellant   after   detailed
scrutiny of the records. 
18. It   is   a   well   settled   law   that   at   the   time   of   framing   of   the
charges, the probative value of the material on record cannot be
gone into but before framing of charge the Court must apply it’s
judicial   mind   on   the   material   placed   on   record   and   must   be
satisfied   that   the   commission   of   offence   by   the   accused   was
possible. Indeed, the Court has limited scope of enquiry and has
to see whether any   prima­facie   case against the accused is made
out   or   not.   At   the   same   time,   the   Court   is   also   not   expected   to
mirror   the   prosecution   story,   but   to   consider   the   broad
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probabilities   of   the   case,   weight   of   prima­facie   evidence,
documents produced and any basic infirmities etc. In this regard
the   judgment   of   “ Union   of   India   Vs.   Prafulla   Kumar   Samal,
(1979)   3   SCC   4”   can   be   profitably   referred   for   ready   reference.
Having due regard to the documents placed before us and in the
light   of   the   submissions   and   discussion   made   above,   we   are   of
the   considered   view   that   sufficient   grounds   casting   a   grave
suspicion   on   the   Appellant,   do   not   exist.   It   is   observed   that   the
ingredients   of   alleged   offences   cannot   be   prima­facie   established
against   the   Appellant   as   neither   had   he   been   entrusted   with
funds   of   JSEB   nor   he   had   fraudulently   or   dishonestly   deceived
senior   officials of  the JSEB  to cause  any  benefit to  RPCL  or  any
wrongful   loss   to   JSEB   and   no   evidence   of   illegal   gratification   or
disproportionate assets has been found against the Appellant.  
19. In view of the foregoing discussion, we are of the considered
opinion   that   the   High   Court   erred   in   refusing   to   exercise   the
revisional powers vested in it under Sections 397 and 401 of the
Cr.P.C.   and   dismissing   the   criminal   revision   preferred   by   the
Appellant.   In   the   facts   and   circumstances   of   the   case   as
discussed, the inescapable conclusion that can be drawn in this
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case   that   ingredients   of   the   alleged   offences   are   not   prima­facie
made out against the Appellant. Therefore, we deem it fit to allow
the   instant   appeal   and   set­aside   the   impugned   order.
Consequently,   the   Appellant   is   discharged   in   the   criminal
proceedings arising out of Special Case No.02 of 2011.
……………………..CJI.
[N.V. Ramana]
………………………..J.
[J.K. Maheshwari]
………………………..J.
[Hima Kohli]
New Delhi;
August 24, 2022
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