/2022 INSC 0787/
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1514  OF 2022
(Special Leave Petition (Crl.) NO.1354 of 2022)
P. DHARAMARAJ                 …APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
SHANMUGAM & ORS.               ...RESPONDENT(S)
With
CRIMINAL APPEAL Nos. 1515­1516  OF 2022
(@ Special Leave Petition (Crl.) Nos..................... of 2022)
            (@ Special Leave Petition (Crl.) D.No.11748 of 2022)
J U D G M E N T
V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, J.
Permission   to   file   Special   Leave   Petition(s)   is   granted   in
D.No.11748 of 2022.
2. Leave granted.
3. There are three Special Leave Petitions on hand, two of which
challenge   an   Order   passed   by   the   High   Court   of   Judicature   at
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Madras   in   a   Criminal   Original   Petition   filed   under   Section   482   of
the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short “ Cr.P.C ”), quashing
a criminal complaint in CC No.25 of 2021 pending on the file of the
Additional   Special   Court   for   trial   of   cases   related   to   Members   of
Parliament and Members of Legislative Assembly of Tamil Nadu, on
the ground that all the victims have compromised their claims with
the accused. The third Special Leave Petition arises out of an order
of dismissal passed by the High Court in a Criminal Miscellaneous
Petition   filed   by   a   third  party   by   name   Anti   Corruption   Movement,
seeking   the   recall   of   the   order   dated   30.07.2021   in   the   quash
petition.
4. We   have   heard   the   learned   senior     counsel   appearing   for   the
parties, which include the   de facto   complainant, persons named as
accused   as   well   as   third   parties   who   claim   to   be   interested/
affected,  albeit   indirectly.
Background Facts
5. The brief facts sufficient for the disposal of these special leave
petitions are as follows:­
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(i) On   a   complaint   lodged   by   one   K.   Arulmani,   working   in   the
technical   wing   of   the   factory   of   the   Metropolitan   Transport
Corporation   of   Tamil   Nadu,   a   FIR   in   Crime   No.   344   of   2018   was
registered   on   13.08.2018.   To   avoid   any   confusion,   the   contents   of
the said complaint are extracted as follows:
“ I   have   been   working   as   a   Worker   in   the   Technical   Wing   of   the
Factory   of   Metropolitan   Transport   Corporation   (MTC),   at
Perambur.   In   the   year   2014,   an   announcement   in   regard   to
vacancies   existing   for   the   posts   of   Conductor   and   Driver   in   the
Transport   Department.   When   I   went   to   our   Head   Office   in
Pallavan   Salai   in   connection   with   work,   one   Mr.   Rajkumar   got
introduced to me. He told me that he  hails from Pambaipadayur
near   Kumbakonam   and   he   had   got   close   contact   with   the   then
Transport   Minister,   Mr.Senthil   Balaji   and   his   younger   brother
Asok   Kumar,   through   one   Mr.   Shanmugam,   who   was   the
Personal   Assistant   to   Mr.   Senthil   Baljai   and   on   paying   money,
jobs   would   certainly   be   got.   My   friends   by   name   Ambedkar,
Senthil, Vijayakanth, Muthiah and a few others told to get them
jobs   in   the   Transport   Corporation   and   they   are   ready   to   pay
money for the same. 
I   told   that   money   was   to   be   given   to   through   one   Mr.Rajkumar
and   should   there   surface   any   problem,   we   should   be   ready   to
face the same. They also, agreeing to the same, paid me money,
in   several   installments   during   the   period   from   25.12.2014   to
04.01.2015,   amounting   to   Rs.40,00,000/­.   conveyed   those
details   to   Mr.   Rajkumar.   In   the   first   week   of   January   2015,   he
and   myself   went   to   the   house   of   Thiru   Senthil   Balaji   at   R.A.
Puram. At that time, Mr. Shanmugam, P.A. to Thiru Senthil Balaji
came   towards   me   and   received   the   sum   of   Rs.40,00,000/­.   We
insisted   on   Thiru   Shanmugam   to   see   Thiru   Asok   Kumar   and
Thiru   Senthil   Balaji   in   person.   Thiru   Asok   Kumar,   who   came
there, when we gave the amount, had assured that all who have
paid amounts would issued with appointment orders. He took us
then   itself   to   Thiru   Senthil   Balaji.   He   told   in   an   assuring   voice
that   there   is   no   need   to   worry   and   all   those   who   gave   money
would be definitely given appointment orders. 
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In   the   list   of   names   released   by   the   Transport   Corporation,   the
names of persons for whom I gave money, have not appeared in
list   of   appointments.   Hence,   persons   who   gave   money   to   me
started pestering me to return the money. When I asked about it
to   Thiru   Rajkumar,   he   told   that   in   the   next   list,   their   names
would   definitely   come.   But   in   the   next   list   also,   names   of   none
came.   When   I   informed   this   to   Thiru   Rajkumar,   he   said   that   he
would  enquire   about   the  same   to   Asok  Kumar  and  Shanmugam
and then he  would say. But each time when I asked Rajkumar,
giving me the  very same reply, asked  me  to  wait  for some time.
Persons   who   gave   me   money,   started   threatening   me.   On   their
insistence,   I   gave   them   my   cheques   from   my   savings   bank
account with Canara Bank, Ambatur Branch, as security. 
In pursuance of that, when I asked Rajkumar on 12.10.2015 for
returning   the   money,   he   gave   me   two   cheques   drawn   on   City
Union Bank, Mount Road Branch, filling each cheque with a sum
of   Rs.15,00,000/­   He   told   me   to   deposit   the   said   cheques   for
collection at the time when he instructs, on his being paid repaid
the   amounts   by   Thiru   Senthil   Balaji,   Asok   Kumar   and
Shanmugam   and   the   balance   sum   of   Rs.10,00,000/­   would   be
given   by   him   later   on.   When   I   went   to   City   Union   Bank,   Mount
Road  Branch and  checked whether there are  sufficient  amounts
in   their   accounts,   the   Bank   Officer   said   that   there   were   no
sufficient  funds.  When  I   met   Raj   Kumar,   Shanmugam   and   Asok
Kumar several times and requested for returning the money, they
asked   me   to   wait   for   some   time.   Persons   who   gave   me   money
started     pestering   me   very   much   demanding   money.   In   October
2016,   when   I   met   Messrs   Senthil   Balaji,   his   younger   brother
Asok Kumar, and P.A Shanmugam and Rajkumar, and entreated
them   to   return   the   money   to   me,   after   explaining   my   pathetic
position,   each   one   of   them   said   that   they   cannot   return   the
amount,   nothing   can   be   done   against   them   and   if   I   give   them
trouble   demanding   money,   they   would   liquidate   me   along   with
my family.   I am living daily in consternation along with my two
children.   As   Thiru   Senthil   Balaji   was   a   Minister   then   and
subsequently   a   MLA   in   the   ruling   party,   the   situation   posing
threat   to   my   life   in   the   event   of   my   lodging   a   complaint   against
him, was in existence. I came forward to give the complaint now,
since he is not holding any post. I therefore humbly request you
to kindly initiate  appropriate legal action against  Messrs  Senthil
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Balaji, Asok Kumar, Shanmugam and Raj Kumar for their acts of
fraud, deception and also the threats unleashed against me and
get   me   back   the   sum   of   Rs.40,00,000/­   payable   to   me   by   all   of
them. ”
(ii) The FIR was for alleged offences under Sections 405, 420 and
506(1) of  the Indian Penal Code (for  short  “ IPC ”).   Four  persons by
name Shri Senthil Balaji (the then Transport Minister), Shri Ashok
Kumar   (the   brother   of   the   Minister),   Shri   Shanmugam   (Personal
Assistant   to   the   Minister)   and   Shri   Raj   Kumar   were   cited   as   the
accused in the FIR.
(iii) After   investigation,   the   police   filed   a   final   report   dated
12.04.2019   under   Section   173(2)(i)   of   Cr.P.C.,   against   all   the   four
accused   named   in   the   First   Information   Report.   The   final   report
indicted  the  persons  named  as accused,  for  alleged  offences  under
Sections   406,   409,   420,   506(1)   read   with   Section   34   IPC.   The
Special   Court   for   trial   of   cases   related   to   Members   of   Parliament
and   Members   of   Legislative   Assembly   of   Tamil   Nadu   took   the   final
report on file in CC No.25 of 2021.
(iv) Shri   Shanmugam,   named   as   accused   No.3   then   filed   a
criminal original petition in Criminal O.P. No.13374 of 2021 on the
file of the High Court of Judicature at Madras under Section 482 of
the   Cr.P.C.   praying   for   quashing   the   criminal   complaint   CC   No.25
of 2021.
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(v) Before   the   High   Court,   the   de   facto   complainant   Shri   K.
Arulmani   filed   an   affidavit   supporting   the   accused   and   praying   for
quashing   of   the   final   report,   on   the   ground   that   what   the   victims
had with the accused was only a money dispute and that the same
had   been   settled   out   of   Court   and   that   due   to   political   rivalry
between   two   groups,   his   complaint   got   converted   into   a   more
serious   one,   by   including   unwarranted   statements   which   were   not
made by him.  
(vi) The   victims   who   originally   claimed   to   have   paid   money   for
procuring   employment,   also   filed   individual   affidavits   supporting
the accused.
(vii) A   joint   compromise   memo   dated   28.7.2021   containing   the
signatures of 13 victims (who had paid money) on the one hand and
accused   No.3   on   the   other   hand   was   also   filed   before   the   High
Court.
(viii) When   the   quash   petition   came   up   for   hearing,   the   learned
Government   Advocate   appearing   for   the   State   made   a   submission
that the occurrence took place in the year 2014 and that the matter
was compromised between the accused and the victims in the year
2019 after the filing of the final report.
(ix) Interestingly,   all   the   13   victims   also   appeared   before   the
learned   Judge   of   the   High   Court   of   Madras   through   Video
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Conference and claimed that the issues have been resolved between
them and the accused.
(x) In the  light  of  what had  transpired after  the filing  of the final
report, the High Court passed an order dated 30.07.2021 quashing
the criminal complaint on the ground that “ by passage of time, the
parties have decided to bury their hatchet and that no useful purpose
would   be   achieved   by   keeping   the   criminal   case   pending” .   After
noticing that the offences are not compoundable in nature, the High
Court   recorded   in   one   sentence   that   it   had   taken   note   of   the
guidelines   issued   by   this   Court   in   Parbatbhai   Aahir   @
Parbatbhai   Bhimsinhbhai   Karmur   and   Ors.   vs.   State   of
Gujarat 1
  and   The   State   of   Madhya   Pradesh   vs.   Dhruv   Gurjar
and Another 2
  and concluded that the complaint could be quashed.
(xi) Upon   coming   to   know   of   the   quashing   of   the   complaint,   a
person by name Shri P.Dharamaraj, who participated in the process
of selection for appointment to the post of drivers/conductors in the
Metropolitan   Transport   Corporation,   but   who   did   not   get   selected,
has   come   up   with   one   special   leave   petition   contending   that   what
happened   was   a   cash­for­job   scam   and   that   he   would   have   got
selected if the scam had not taken place. Since he was not a party
to   the   quash   proceedings   before   the   High   Court,   his   special   leave
petition was accompanied by an application for leave to file Special
1    (2017) 9 SCC 641
2   (2019) 2 MLJ Crl 10
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Leave   Petition.   The   said   application   was   allowed   by   this   Court   on
11.02.2022.
(xii) In   the   meantime,   an   organisation   by   name   Anti   Corruption
Movement,   moved   a   Miscellaneous   Petition   before   the   High   Court
seeking recall of the order dated 30.07.2021 on the ground that the
complaint   involved   allegations   of   corruption   and   abuse   of   official
position   and   that   therefore   the   charge­sheet   could   not   have   been
quashed   on   the   basis   of   a   compromise   between   the   parties.     This
application   for   recall   was   rejected   by   the   High   Court   by   an   Order
dated   14.03.2022,   primarily   on   the   ground   that   this   Court   has
already entertained a special leave petition against the order sought
to be recalled.
(xiii) Therefore,   challenging   the   original   order   dated
30.07.2011 and the order dated 14.03.2022, the said Association,
namely, Anti Corruption Movement has come up with two special
leave petitions.
6. Before we proceed further, it is necessary to take note of the
fact   that   there   are   a   few   interlocutory   applications   whose   details
are as follows:
 IA   No.49555/2022   filed   by   Anti   Corruption   Movement
seeking   intervention   in   SLP   (Crl.)   No.1354   of   2022   filed   by
Dharamaraj;
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 IA   No.59173/2022   filed   by   the   appellant   in   SLP   (Crl.)
No.1354   of   2022,   for   impleading   the   four   persons   named   as
accused.
 IA   No.59176/2022   filed   by   the   appellant   in   SLP   (Crl.)
No.1354 of 2022 seeking the appointment of a Senior Advocate as
Special Public Prosecutor to conduct the trial.
 IA   Nos.126399   and   126400   of   2022   filed   by   one   Y.   Balaji,
who did not get selected for the post of conductor/driver, seeking
impleadment   and   the   appointment   of   an   impartial   Special   Public
Prosecutor.
 IA   No.108569/2022   filed   by   one   Shri   S.   Prithvirajan,   who
claims to be a victim due to non­selection, for impleading himself
as party to the special leave petition.  
Rival Contentions
7. Assailing the order of the High Court, it is contended by  Shri
Siddharth   Bhatnagar   &   Shri   Gopal   Sankaranarayanan,   learned
senior   counsel,   that   it   is   shocking   to   see   that   a   matter   of   this
nature, where the bribe­giver and bribe­taker have come together,
has been allowed to be closed on the basis of a compromise memo;
that   the   original   complainant   Shri   Arulmani   was   himself   an
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employee   of   the   Metropolitan   Transport   Corporation   and
consequently   a   public   servant;   that   the   allegations   revolved
around payment of money to the then Transport Minister through
his   Personal   Assistant   for   procuring   appointment   in   the
Metropolitan Transport Corporation; and   that,   therefore, the High
court committed a serious illegality  in quashing  the complaint on
the basis of a compromise, despite the fact that even the offences
indicated  in  the  charge­sheet  are not  compoundable.  The  learned
senior  counsel drew our  attention to the counter affidavit filed by
the   Investigation   Officer   before   the   High   Court   of   Judicature   at
Madras in a writ petition in WP No.9061 of 2021 to highlight that
the   allegations   are   of   serious   nature   warranting   a   prosecution
under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (for short “P.C. Act”)
and   argued   that   the   shocking   manner   in   which   the   High   Court
had handled it, deserves special attention, if not special treatment.
8. Shri   Prashant   Bhushan,   learned   counsel   appearing   for   Anti
Corruption Movement, which is the appellant in 2 of the appeals,
contended that the prosecution itself was guilty of not including in
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the charge­sheet the offences under the   P.C Act   and   that   even the
opportunity   now   available   to   the   Court   under   Section   216   of   the
Cr.P.C.   is   nipped   in   the   bud   by   the   High   Court   allowing   a
compromise and quashing the complaint.
9. Shri   Rakesh   Dwivedi,   learned   senior   counsel   appearing   for
the   first   respondent   in   these   special   leave   petitions   and   who   was
the   petitioner   before   the   High   Court   in   the   quash   petition,
supported   the   order   of   the   High   Court   contending   inter   alia   that
the   statements   of   the   victims   did   not   make   out   a   case   for
prosecution of the accused under the P.C Act;  that  this is why the
final   report   filed   by   the   police   did   not   implicate   the   accused   for
any   offence   under   the   P.C   Act;   that   the   prosecution   was
constrained   to   include   Section   409   IPC   only   because   of   a
statement as though respondent No.1 was a Personal Assistant to
the   then   Minister       (A­1);   that   however   no   such   order   of
appointment   of   respondent   No.1   as   the   Personal   Assistant   to   the
Minister   was   ever   brought   on   record;   that   in   the   Additional
Affidavit   filed   by   respondent   No.1,   he   categorically   denied   any
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association   with   the   Minister   as   his   Personal   Assistant;   that   an
attempt   was   made   earlier,   by   two   other   individuals   who   made
similar allegations against the then Transport Minister (present A­
1), by filing petitions in Criminal O.P. (MD) No.14067 and 14967 of
2016, seeking  a direction to the police to register a complaint and
investigate   into   the   same;   that   during   the   pendency   of   those
petitions,   a   criminal   complaint   came   to     be   registered   in   Crime
No.15  of  2016;   that   one  of  the  accused (the  Managing   Director  of
the   Transport   Corporation)   immediately   filed   a   quash   petition   in
Crl. O.P. (MD) No. 16023 of 2016 in which the Transport Minister
also got impleaded;  that  all those 3 criminal original petitions were
heard   together   by   the   High   Court;   that   by   a   final   Order   dated
19.09.2016   the   petitions   seeking   a   direction   for   registering   a
complaint   were   rejected   but   the   petition   for   quashing   the
complaint   was   allowed;   that   the   common   order   so   passed   by   the
High   Court   on   19.09.2016   in   Criminal   O.P.   (MD)   Nos.   14067,
14967   and   16023   of   2016   was   challenged   before   this   Court   by   a
third   party,   by   way   of   special   leave   petitions;   that   by   an   order
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dated   05.01.2017   this   Court   refused   to   grant   leave   to   the   third
party to file special leave petitions;   that   the first attempt so made
by   2   individuals   way   back   in   2016   to   somehow   implicate   the
Minister thus failed; and   that,   therefore, the High Court was right
in   this   case,   in   putting   to   rest,   the   repeated   attempts   made   by
rivals in politics to nix the accused.  
10. Shri   Mukul   Rohtagi,   learned   senior   counsel   appearing   for
Shri   Arulmani,   on   whose   complaint   the   FIR   in   Crime   No.344   of
2018 was registered on 13.08.2018, also supported the impugned
order   of   the   High   Court   by   contending   inter   alia   that   the
allegations   made   in   the   complaint   did   not   make   out   a   case   for
prosecution under the P.C Act;  that  the affidavits filed by all the so
called   victims   before   the   High   Court   made   it   crystal   clear   that   it
was   a   simple   money   dispute;   that   the   allegations   complained   of
against   the   accused   do   not   constitute   offences   against   the   State
but   revolved   around   a   private   dispute   with   regard   to   payment   of
money;   that   even   in   cases   arising   out   of   a   prosecution   under   the
P.C   Act,   this   Court   held   in   Sanjay   Tiwari   vs.   State   of   Uttar
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Pradesh   &   Another. 3
  that   a   third   party,   who   is   neither   a   victim
nor   an   accused,   cannot   poke   his   nose   into   the   criminal
proceedings;   that   therefore,   the   appellants   in   the   above   appeals
have no   locus standi   to question the order of the High Court; and
that  in the light of the contents of the affidavit filed by the  de facto
complainant­Shri   Arulmani   before   the   High   Court,   no   conclusion
other than the one reached by the High Court is possible.
11. Shri   C.A.   Sundaram,   learned   senior   counsel   appearing   for
A­1 contended  inter alia ,  that  the appellants who have approached
this   Court   have   no   locus   standi   to   interfere   with   the   proceedings
initiated   at   the   behest   of   individual   complainants;   that   the
appellants   have   taken   cudgels   on   behalf   of   the   political   rivals,   to
undo   a   compromise   reached   between   a   few   individual
complainants   and   persons   who   received   money   from   them;   that
the parameters laid down by this Court for closing criminal cases
on   the   basis   of   the   compromise   reached   between   parties   even   in
the   case   of   non­compoundable   offences,   have   been   followed
3   2020 SCC Online SC 1027
14

properly by the High Court in this case; and  that  since allegations
of corruption are not made out in this case, there is no element of
public   interest   involved.   According   to   the   learned   senior   counsel
for   A­1,   the   appellants   are   relying   heavily   upon   other   cases   filed
under the P.C Act, to upset a compromise reached in a case which
does not concern allegations under the P.C Act.
12. Shri   Manan   Kumar   Mishra,   learned   Senior   Counsel
appearing   for   respondent   No.1   contended   that   the   attempt   of   the
appellants  herein is only  to  harass the Minister. According  to the
learned   senior   counsel,   there   are   two   other   pending   complaints
where   allegations  under   the   P.C  Act  are   included.  The   appellants
have   already   impleaded   themselves   as   parties   to   those   criminal
complaints.   Therefore,   it   is   contended   by   Shri   Manan   Kumar
Mishra   that   the   whole   exercise   is   unwarranted   and   nothing   but
witch  hunting. Insofar  as persons  who  claim  to be victims due to
their   non­selection   for   appointment   to   the   post   of
conductors/drivers are concerned, it is contended by Shri Manan
Kumar   Mishra   that   they   have   already   filed   writ   petitions
15

challenging   their   non­selection   and   hence   their   remedy   does   not
lie in the present proceedings.
13. Shri S. Prabhakaran, learned Senior Counsel contended that
the Minister concerned was a member of the splinter group which
revolted   against   those   in   office   during   the   previous   regime   and
that   therefore   the   present   criminal   complaints   came   to   be
registered   at   the   behest   of   his   political   opponents   and   that   the
same   group   is   now   targeting   him   as   he   had   again   become   a
Minister   in   the   present   regime.   Therefore,   the   learned   Senior
Counsel  submitted   that  this   Court  should   see   through   this   game
before being swayed by legal nuances. 
Discussion and Analysis
14. In   a   nutshell,   the   rival   contentions   revolve   around   three
important issues. They  are:   (i)    the   locus  standi   of the appellants;
(ii)   the effect of the compromise entered into between the   de facto
complainant and 13 named victims on the one hand and the four
16

accused   on   the   other   hand;   and   (iii)   the   non­inclusion   in   the
charge­sheet of the offences under the P.C. Act.
Locus standi
15. The   preliminary   objection   of   the   respondents   to   the   locus
standi   of   the   appellants,   has   to   be   rejected   outright,   for   several
reasons.   The   first   is   that   in   the   counter   affidavit   filed   by   the
Assistant   Commissioner   of   Police,   Central   Crime   Branch,   Job
Racket Wing, Chennai, to the writ petition WP No.9061 of 2021, he
has narrated certain sequence of events which are as follows:
  (i)   Pursuant   to   an   order   passed   by   the   High   Court   on
09.06.2014   in   Writ   Appeal   No.1027   of   2013,   directing   all
appointments   in   all   Government   departments   to   be   made   only
after   due   notification   to   the   public   in   Newspapers   besides
sponsorship   from   the   Employment   Exchange,   the   Secretary   to
Government,   Employment   and   Training   Department   sent   a
communication   to   the   Managing   Directors   of   all   State   Transport
Undertakings   on   30.07.2014   to   follow   the   directions   of   the   High
Court in the matter of appointments;
(ii) All   the   representatives   of   all   the   State   Transport
undertakings resolved in a meeting held on 06.10.2014 to conduct
17

future recruitments only  after  inviting  applications from  the  open
market   through   newspaper   advertisements   apart   from   getting   a
list of candidates sponsored by the Employment Exchange;
(iii) Thereafter, Thiru Senthil Balaji, the then  Transport Minister
(A­1   in   the   present   case)   instructed   the   officers   to   collect   details
regarding   the   day­to­day   progress   of   the   recruitment   in   all   8
Transport Corporations of the State;
(iv) These communications were directed to be transmitted to the
Minister’s   office   via   e­mail   and   the   mail   box   was   operated   and
maintained   by   Shri   B.   Shanmugam   and   not   by   any   of   the   other
Personal Assistants of the Minister; 
(v) The   advertisements   for   recruitment   were   issued   in
newspapers   on   02.11.2014.   Simultaneously,   the   lists   of   eligible
candidates   were   also   invited   from   the   concerned   Employment
Exchanges;
(vi) A   total   of   22602   applications   were   issued   to   the   aspirants
during the period from 0 3.11.2014 to 20.11.2014 ; 
(vii) These   22,602   applications   related   to   the   posts   of   Reserved
Crew Driver, Reserved Crew Conductor, Junior Tradesman, Junior
Engineer and Assistant Engineer;  
(viii) The   total   number   of   filled   in   applications   received   from   the
candidates was 16081; 
(ix) But 12765 candidates attended the interview; 
18

(x) Orders of appointment  were issued to  2209 candidates from
the list given by the Minister;
(xi) There were 5542 other eligible candidates; 
(xii) Many of the note files have been created without any date;
(xiii)  Appointment orders were issued to candidates whose names
were contained in the list sent by the Transport Minister through
his associate Shanmugam.
16. From   what   is   extracted   above   from   the   counter   affidavit   of
the   Investigation   Officer   filed   in   a   connected   writ   petition,   it   is
clear   that   even   according   to   the   Investigating   Officer,   persons
who claim to have paid money, but did not receive orders of
appointment,   were   not   the   only   victims.   Persons   who   were
more meritorious, but who did not get selected, on account of
being   edged   out   by   candidates   who   paid   money   and   got
selected, are also victims of the alleged corrupt practices, if
those   allegations   are   eventually   proved .   Shri   P.   Dharamaraj,
who   is   the   appellant   in   one   of   these   appeals,   claims   to   be   a
candidate who participated in the selection, but could not make it.
19

There is also an intervenor by name Shri Prithivirajan who was the
petitioner   in   WP   No.9061   of   2021,   in   which   the   counter   affidavit
referred   to   in   the   preceding   paragraph   was   filed   by   the
Investigation   Officer.     This   candidate   was   not   selected   and
according   to   him,   he   would   have   got   selected,   had   there   been   no
corrupt practices on the part of the concerned.
17. Even   the   learned   senior   counsel   appearing   on   behalf   of   the
respondents could not contest the position that a victim is entitled
to file an appeal against the impugned order of the High Court.   If
persons   who   participated   in   the   selection   process   but   who
could  not  make  it   to the  final  list   of selected  candidates   on
account of the alleged corrupt practices adopted by those in
power   are   not   victims,   we   do   not   know   who   else   could   be   a
victim .
18. We   cannot   shy   away   from   the   fact   that   candidates,   who   are
selected   and   appointed   to   posts   in   the   Government/public
corporations   by   adopting   corrupt   practices,   are   eventually   called
20

upon to render public service. It is needless to say that the quality
of   public   service   rendered   by   such   persons   will   be   inversely
proportionate to the corrupt practices adopted by them. Therefore,
the   public,   who   are   recipients   of   these   services,   also   become
victims,   though   indirectly,   because   the   consequences   of   such
appointments   get   reflected   sooner   or   later   in   the   work   performed
by the appointees. Hence, to say that the appellants have no  locus
standi , is to deny the existence of what is obvious.
19. The   decision   in   Sanjay   Tiwari   (supra),   relied   upon   by   Shri
Mukul   Rohtagi,   learned   senior   Counsel   for   the   de   facto
complainant, is of no application to the case on hand. The appeal
in  Sanjay Tiwari’ s  case arose out of an application for expediting
the trial of a criminal case pending on the file of the Special Judge,
Gorakhpur,   for   alleged   offences   under   Sections   420,   467,   468,
471,   477A,   120B   IPC   and   Section   13(1)(c)(d)   read   with   Section
13(2) of P.C. Act. The said application for expediting the trial was
moved   by   a   person   who   was   neither   the   victim   nor   the   accused.
Therefore, this Court found out that a person who has nothing to
21

do   with   the   pending   trial,   cannot   seek   to   expedite   the   trial,
Paragraphs 11 to 15 of the said decision on which heavy reliance
is placed read as follows:­
“11.   It is well settled that criminal trial where offences involved
are   under   the   Prevention   of   Corruption   Act   have   to   be
conducted   and   concluded   at   the   earliest   since   the   offences
under Prevention of Corruption Act are offences which affect not
only the accused but the entire society and administration. It is
also   well   settled   that   the   High   Court   in   appropriate   cases   can
very well under Section 482 Cr.P.C. or in any other  proceeding
can   always   direct   trial   court   to   expedite   the   criminal   trial   and
issue such order as may be necessary. But the present is a case
where proceeding initiated by respondent No. 2 does not appear
to   be   a   bona   fide   proceeding.   Respondent   No.   2   is   in   no   way
connected   with   initiation   of   criminal   proceeding   against   the
appellant.   Respondent   No.   2   in   his   application   under   Section
482 Cr. P. C in paragraph 6 has described him as social activist
and an Advocate. An application by  a person who is in no way
connected   with   the   criminal   proceeding   or   criminal   trial   under
Section   482   Cr.P.C.   cannot   ordinarily   be   entertained   by   the
High   Court.   A   criminal   trial   of   an   accused   is   conducted   in
accordance   with   procedure   as   prescribed   by   the   Criminal
Procedure   Code.     It   is   the   obligation   of   the   State   and   the
prosecution   to   ensure   that   all   criminal   trials   are   conducted
expeditiously   so   that   justice   can   be   delivered   to   the   accused   if
found   guilty.   The   present   is   not   a   case   where   prosecution   or
even   the   employer   of   the   accused   have   filed   an   application
either   before   the   trial   court   or     in   any   other   court   seeking
direction   as   prayed   by   respondent   No.   2   in   his   application
under Section 482 Cr.P.C. 
12. With   regard   to   locus   of   a   third   party   to   challenge   the
criminal   proceedings   or   to   seek   relief   in   respect   of   criminal
proceedings   of   accused   had   been   dealt   with   by   this   Court
Janata   Dal   v.  H.S.  Chowdhary ,(1991)   3   SCC   756.   In   the   above
case the CBI had registered FIR under the IPC as well as under
the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 against 14 accused. On
22

an application filed by the CBI the learned trial Judge allowing
the application to the extent that request to conduct necessary
investigation   and   to   collect   necessary   evidence   which   can   be
collected in Switzerland passed order on 05.02.1990 which is to
the following effect:
“ In   the   result,   the   application   of   the   CBI   is   allowed   to   the
extent that a request to conduct the necessary investigation and
to   collect   necessary   evidence   which   can   be   collected   in
Switzerland   and   to   the   extent   directed   in   this   order   shall   be
made   to   the   Competent   Judicial   Authorities   of   the
Confederation   of   Switzerland   through   filing   of   the
requisite/proper   undertaking   required   by   the   Swiss   law   and
assurance for reciprocity.”
13. A   criminal   miscellaneous   application   was   filed   by   Shri
H.S.   Chowdhary   seeking   various   prayers   before   the   Special
Judge   which   petition   was   dismissed   by   the   Special   Judge.   A
criminal Revision under Sections 397/482 Cr. P.C. was filed by
H.S.   Chowdhary   in   the   High   Court   to   quash   the   order   of   the
Special   Judge,   which   Revision   was   also   dismissed   by   the   High
Court.   The   appeals   were  filed   in   this   Court   by   different  parties
challenging   the   said   order   including   H.S.   Chowdhary.   This
court while dismissing the appeals filed by the H.S. Chowdhary
and others made the following observations:
“26.   Even   if   there   are   million   question   of   law   to   be   deeply
gone   into   and   examined   in   the   criminal   case   of   this   nature
registered against specified accused persons, it is for them and
them   alone   to   raise   all   such   questions   and   challenge   the
proceedings   initiated   against   them   at   the   appropriate   time
before the proper forum and not for third parties under the garb
of public interest litigants.
“27.   We,   in   the   above   background   of   the   case,   after
bestowing   our   anxious   and   painstaking   consideration   and
careful thought to all aspects of the case and deeply examining
the   rival   contentions   of   the   parties   both     collectively   and
individually give our conclusions as follows:
1. Mr.   H.S.   Chowdhary   has   no   locus   standi   (a)   to   file
the   petition   under   Article   51A   as   a   public   interest   litigant
praying   that   no   letter   rogatory/request   be   issued   at   the
request   of   the   CBI   and   he   be   permitted   to   join   the   inquiry
23

before the Special Court which on 5.2.90 directed issuance
of   letter   rogatory/request   to   the   Competent   Judicial
Authorities   of   the   Confederation   of   Switzerland;     (b)   to
invoke   the   revisional   jurisdiction   of   the   High   Court   under
Section   397   read   with   401   of   the   CrPC   challenging   the
correctness, legality or propriety of the order dated 18.8.90
of   the   Special   Judge;   and   (c)   to   invoke   the   extraordinary
jurisdiction   of   the   High   Court   under   Section   482   of   the
CrPC   for   quashing   the   First   Information   Report   dated
22.1.90   and   all   other   proceedings   arsing   therefrom   on   the
plea of preventing the abuse of the process of the Court.
28. In the result, we agree with the first part of the Order dated
19.12.90   of   Mr.   Justice   M.K   Chawla   holding   that   Mr.   H.S.
Chowdhary and other intervening parties have no locus standi. We,
however, set aside the second part of the impugned order whereby
he has taken suo moto cognizance and issued show cause notice to
the State and CBI and accordingly the show cause notice issued by
him is quashed.” 
14 .  This   Court   in   the   above   case   laid   down   that   it   is   for   the
parties   in   the   criminal   case   to   raise   all   the   questions   and
challenge   the   proceedings   initiate   against   them   at   appropriate
time before the proper forum and not for third parties under the
grab of Public Interest Litigants.
15 .  We are fully satisfied that respondent No. 2 has no locus
in the present case to file application under Section 482 Cr.P.C.
asking   the   Court   to   expedite   the   hearing   in   criminal   trial.   We
have   already   observed   that   all   criminal   trials   where   offences
involved   under   the   prevention   of   Corruption   Act   have   to   be
concluded   at   an   early   date   and   normally   no   exception   can   be
taken to the order of the High Court directing the trial court to
expedite   the   criminal   trial   but   in   the   present   case   the   fact   is
that   proceedings   have   been   initiated   by   respondent   No.   2   who
was not concerned with the proceedings is any manner and the
respondent No. 2 has no locus to file application which was not
clearly   maintainable,   we   are   of   the   view   that   the   impugned
judgment   of   the   High   Court   dated   09.09.2020   cannot   be
sustained.”
24

20. All that this Court pointed out in paragraph 11 of the decision
in  Sanjay Tiwari  (supra) was that an application for expediting the
trial, filed by a person who is in no way connected with the criminal
proceeding or criminal trial cannot “ ordinarily be entertained by
the High Court. ”
21. The   decision   in   Janata   Dal   vs.   H.S   Chowdhary   and
Others 4
 cited in paragraphs 12 and 13 of  Sanjay Tiwari  also has
no application to the case on hand. In   Janata Dal   (supra), which
arose out of Bofors case, the Special Court allowed an application
of CBI to conduct necessary investigation and to collect necessary
evidence, in Switzerland. A letter rogatory was also issued. At that
stage   an   Advocate   by   name   H.S.   Chowdhary   filed   a   petition   in
public   interest   before   the   Special   Judge,   invoking   Article   51A   of
the   Constitution.   He   sought   several   reliefs   including   a   direction
not   to   issue   letter   rogatory   and   to   allow   him   to   join   the   enquiry
before   the   Special   Court   in   the   capacity   of   a   public   interest
4   (1991) 3 SCC 756
25

litigant.   The   Special   Court   dismissed   the   petition   filed   by   H.S.
Chowdhary, but took up for  consideration   suo  moto , the question
as to whether any   action under Section 340 of the Cr.PC. should
be initiated or not. The order of the Special Judge was challenged
by H.S. Chowdhary by way of revision before the High Court. The
High   Court   held   that   H.S.   Chowdhary   did   not   have   any   locus
standi   to   maintain   the   petition.   It   was   the   said   order   that   was
challenged by H.S. Chowdhary before this Court. The order of the
Special   Judge   taking   suo   moto   action   was   also   challenged   by
political parties.
22. While disposing of those appeals, this Court held that a third
party   has   no   locus   standi   in   a   matter   of   this   nature.   It   must   be
noted that the attempt made by H.S. Chowdhary was to upset the
move   initiated   by   CBI   to   have   a   letter   rogatory   issued.   He   also
wanted the FIR to be quashed. It is in that context that this Court
answered the question of  locus standi  as aforesaid.
26

23. Today, we have travelled a long way from the position of law
as   it   stood   then.   By   Act   5   of   2009,   the   definition   of   the   word
“ victim ” was inserted in Section 2(wa) of the Cr.P.C. It reads thus:
“ victim ”   means   a   person   who   has   suffered   any   loss   or   injury
caused by  reason  of the act  or  omission  for  which the accused
person   has   been   charged   and   the   expression   “ victim ”   includes
his or her guardian or legal heir.”
Simultaneously, a   proviso   was also inserted under  Section 372 of
the Code providing a right of appeal to the victims. 
24. In fact, long before the aforesaid amendment, the question of
locus   standi   was   considered   by   this   Court   in   P.S.R.
Sadhanantham   vs .   Arunachalam  and   Another 5
.   The  said case
arose under  peculiar  circumstances. A person  who was convicted
by the Sessions Court for an offence under Section 302 and whose
conviction was set aside by the High Court, was convicted by this
Court   in   a   criminal   appeal,   filed   not   by   the   State,   but   by   the
brother of the victim, though he was neither the complainant nor
the   first   informant.   Thereafter,   the   accused   filed   a   writ   petition
under Article 32 contending that this Court had no power to grant
5  (1980) 3 SCC 141
27

special leave to  the brother  of  the victim  to  file an  appeal against
the   judgment   of   the   High   Court.   While   rejecting   the   contention,
Hon’ble   Justice   V.R.   Krishna   Iyer   (as   he   then   was)   said   in   his
inimitable style: 
“……the   bogey   of   busybodies   blackmailing   adversaries   through
frivolous   invocation   of   Article136   is   chimerical.   Access   to   Justice   to
every   bona   fide   seeker   is   a   democratic   dimension   of   remedial
jurisprudence   even   as   public   interest   litigation,   class   action,   pro   bono
proceedings,   etc.   We   cannot   dwell   in   the   home   of   processual
obsolescence when our Constitution highlights social justice as a goal.”
Therefore, the objection about the  locus standi  of the appellants is
without   any   merit.   In   any   case,   the   appellant   in   one   of   these
appeals, is a victim, as he could not get selected on account of the
alleged   corrupt   practices.   Therefore,   the   contention   regarding   the
locus standi  of the appellants is to be rejected.
25. In   fact,   it   is   surprising   that   the   de   facto   complainant   Shri
Arulmani has raised the question of   locus  standi .   It is seen from
his   complaint   dated   13.08.2018   that   he   is   working   in   the
Technical   Wing   of   the   factory   of   the   Metropolitan   Transport
Corporation.   Therefore,   he   should   not   have,   in   the   first   instance,
become   a   party   to   the   transactions   narrated   in   his   complaint.
28

After having been a party to the collection of money for illegitimate
purposes, even while working in the Transport Corporation, the  de
facto   complainant   Shri   Arulmani   has   committed   the   second
mistake   of   filing   an   affidavit   supporting   the   compromise   and
claiming therein as though he never  made allegations against the
Minister. 
26. The   stand   taken   by   Arulmani   before   the   High   Court   is
deplorable for one more reason. It is seen from an entry in the FIR
out of which the present case arises, that Arulmani filed a criminal
original   petition   in   Crl.   O.P.No.   24029   of   2017   on   the   file   of   the
High Court, complaining that he lodged a complaint against these
4 accused way back on 21.09.2017 and that no action was taken.
On   16.11.2017,   the   High   Court   passed   an   order   directing   the
Police to act in accordance with the law laid down by this Court in
Lalita Kumari  vs.  Government of Uttar Pradeshand Others 6
.  It
is   only   thereafter   that   the   Police   registered   the   FIR   in   Crime   No.
344   of   2018   on   13.08.2018.   Therefore,   we   would   have   hardly
6  (2014) 2 SCC 1
29

expected   Shri   Arulmani   to   say   that   the   allegations   against   the
Minister were added up later by the Police and that it was a simple
money   dispute.   His   present   stand   supporting   the   accused   and
questioning the   locus standi   of the appellants, is, to say the least,
shocking and warrants something more than mere condemnation.
We   leave   it   at   that   in   the   hope   that   the   employer   and   the   State
would take notice of his conduct. Suffice it to say for our present
purpose   that   the   objection   relating   to   the   locus   standi   of   the
appellants is liable to be rejected. Accordingly, it is rejected. 
The Effect of the compromise and the non­inclusion of the
offences under the P.C. Act
27. The   second   issue   arising   for   consideration   is   about   the   effect
of   the   compromise   entered   into   between   the   de   facto   complainant
and   13   named   victims   on   the   one   hand   and   the   4   accused   on   the
other hand.
28. As we have pointed out earlier, the FIR was registered only for
offences   under   Sections   405,   420   &   506(1)   of   the   IPC.   This   was
despite the fact that the allegations contained in the complaint very
30

clearly   pointed   to   payment   of   money   for   procuring   employment   in
the   Public   Transport   Corporation.   We   have   already   extracted   the
entire   complaint   in   paragraph   5(i)   above.   It   was   stated   in   the   said
complaint   that   in   the   year   2014,   an   announcement   for   filling   up
vacant posts of Conductor and Driver in the Transport Corporation
was   issued   and   that   the   complainant   got   introduced   to   one   Mr.
Rajkumar. In fact there is also an averment in the complaint that in
the   first   week   of   January   2015,   the   complainant   went   along   with
the   said   Rajkumar   to   the   residence   of   Thiru   Senthil   Balaji   at   R.A.
Puram and that the amount of Rs.40 lakhs was paid therein to Shri
Shanmugam, P.A. to the Minister. The complainant had gone on to
state that upon his insistence, he was allowed to meet the Minister
and his brother and that the Minister and his brother assured him
that   all   those   who   gave   money   would   definitely   be   given
appointment orders.
29. It must be recalled that though the FIR came to be registered
only on 13.08.2018, it was actually in pursuance of an order passed
by   the   High   Court   on   16.11.2017   in   Crl.   O.P.   No.   24029   of   2017.
31

Therefore,   we   are   surprised   that   the   FIR   did   not   include   the
offences under the P.C. Act, 1988.
30. While   filing   a   final   report,   the   Investigation   Officer   seems   to
have   been   little   more  gracious  by   including   Section   409  IPC,  since
Sh.   Shanmugam,   the   person   who   received   the   money   from   the
complainant and the victims was stated to be a Personal Assistant
to the Minister. Additionally, the money was said to have been paid
at the residence of the Minister with his knowledge and the Minister
is   stated   (in   the   FIR)   to   have   acknowledged   that   those   who   paid
money will be rewarded with the appointment orders.
31. Thus it is clear that the final report implicated the accused for
offences   under   Sections   406,   409,   420   and   506(1)   IPC.   None   of
these   offences   except   the   one   under   Section   506   IPC   is
compoundable   under   sub­Section   (1)   of   Section   320,   Cr.P.C.     The
offences under Sections 406 and 420 are compoundable under sub­
Section (2) of Section 320.
32. Sub­section   (9)   of   Section   320   makes   it   clear   that   no   offence
shall be compounded except as provided by the Section.  Therefore,
32

there   was   no   way   the   offence   under   Section   409   IPC,   included   in
the final report, could have been compounded.   As a matter of fact,
the High Court has recognised in the penultimate paragraph of the
impugned   order   that   the   final   report   includes   offences   which   are
not   compoundable.   However,   the   High   Court   proceeded   to   quash
the final report, purportedly on the basis of the guidelines issued by
this   Court   in   Parbatbhai   Aahir   @   Parbathbhai   (supra)   and   The
State of Madhya Pradesh   (supra). Therefore we may now proceed
to examine whether the High Court was right in doing so.
33. In   Gian   Singh   vs.   State   of   Punjab   and   another 7
,   a   three
Member Bench of this Court was concerned with a reference made
by   a   two   Member   Bench,   which   doubted   the   correctness   of   the
decisions   in   B.S.   Joshi   and   Others   vs.   State   of   Haryana   and
another 8
,   Nikhil  Merchant   vs.   Central   Bureau   of   Investigation
and Anr . 9
 and  Manoj Sharma vs. State and Others 10
.
7   (2012) 10 SCC 303
8   (2003) 4 SCC 675
9   (2008) 9 SCC 677
10  (2008) 16 SCC 1
33

34. B.S. Joshi   (supra) was a case where the dispute was a family
dispute   and   the   offences   complained   were   under   Sections   498A,
323 and 406. Therefore, this Court appears to have taken a lenient
view. 
35. Nikhil   Merchant   (supra)   is   a   case   where   a   borrower
committed   default   in   repayment   of   the   loans   taken   from   Andhra
Bank. Apart from filing a suit for recovery of money, the Bank also
filed a criminal complaint both against the officers of the company
and against the officers of the bank, not only for offences under the
IPC   but   also   for   offences   under   the   PC   Act.   After   the   suit   was
compromised,   the   Managing   Director   of   the   borrower   Company
sought   to   get   discharged   from   the   complaint.   The   special   Judge
(CBI)   rejected   the   application   for   discharge.   The   High   Court
confirmed   the   same.   But   this   Court   reversed   the   decision   of   the
High   Court,   solely   on   the   ground   that   the   amount   payable   to   the
Bank   stood   settled.   However,   it   must   be   noticed   that   in   Nikhil
Merchant ,   the   operative   portion   of   the   order   of   this   Court   merely
34

stated   that   the   criminal   proceedings   were   quashed   against   the
appellant therein. There   is   no   indication   therein   that   the
complaint   against   the   officers   for   offences   under   the   P.C.   Act   were
also quashed. 
36. Manoj   Sharma   (supra)   was   a   case   where   the   offences
complained   were   under   Sections   420,   468,   471,   34   read   with
Section   120B   IPC.   Though   this   Court   quashed   the   criminal
complaint   in   the   said   case   also,   one   of   the   learned   Judges
constituting   the   Bench   ( Markandey   Katju,   J. )   reserved   the
question   regarding   the   power   of   the   High   Court   to   quash   non­
compoundable cases under Section 482 Cr.P.C or Article 226 of the
Constitution,  on  the   basis  of   the  compromise   reached   between   the
parties,   to   be   decided   by   a   larger   bench   at   an   appropriate   time.
Paragraph 27 of the decision in  Manoj Sharma  which contains the
opinion of  Markandey Katju, J ., reads as follows:  
“ 27 . There can be no doubt that a case under   Section 302   IPC
or   other   serious   offences   like   those   under   Sections   395 ,   307   or
304­B   cannot   be   compounded   and   hence   proceedings   in   those
provisions   cannot   be  quashed   by   the   High   Court   in   exercise   of
its   power   under   Section   482   Cr.P.C.   or   in   writ   jurisdiction   on
35

the   basis   of   compromise.   However,   in   some   other   cases,   (like
those akin to a civil nature) the proceedings can be quashed by
the   High   Court   if   the   parties   have   come   to   an   amicable
settlement   even   though   the   provisions   are   not   compoundable.
Where a line is to be drawn will have to be decided in some later
decisions   of   this   Court,   preferably   by   a   larger   bench   (so   as   to
make   it   more   authoritative).   Some   guidelines   will   have   to   be
evolved in  this  connection and the matter  cannot  be  left  at the
sole   unguided   discretion   of   Judges,   otherwise   there   may   be
conflicting   decisions   and   judicial   anarchy.   A   judicial   discretion
has   to   be   exercised   on   some   objective   guiding   principles   and
criteria, and not on the whims and fancies of individual Judges.
Discretion, after all, cannot be the Chancellor's foot.”
37. Therefore   in   Gian   Singh   (supra),  the   three   Member   Bench   of
this   Court   took   up   for   consideration   the   question   regarding   the
difference   between   the   power   of   the   court   to   quash   a
complaint/charge­sheet   and   the   power   to   compound   an   offence.
After analysing the statutory provisions and the various decisions of
this Court, this Court summarised the position, in paragraph 61 of
its decision in  Gian Singh , as follows:
“The   position   that   emerges   from   the   above   discussion   can   be
summarised   thus:   the   power   of   the   High   Court   in   quashing   a
criminal   proceeding   or   FIR   or   complaint   in   exercise   of   its
inherent   jurisdiction   is   distinct   and   different   from   the   power
given   to   a   criminal   court   for   compounding   the   offences
under   Section   320   of   the   Code.   Inherent   power   is   of   wide
plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised
in   accord   with   the   guideline   engrafted   in   such   power   viz;   (i)   to
secure the ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process
of   any   Court.   In   what   cases   power   to   quash   the   criminal
36

proceeding   or   complaint   or   F.I.R   may   be   exercised   where   the
offender and victim have settled their dispute would depend on
the   facts   and   circumstances   of   each   case   and   no   category   can
be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High
Court   must   have   due   regard   to   the   nature   and   gravity   of   the
crime.   Heinous   and   serious   offences   of   mental   depravity   or
offences   like   murder,   rape,   dacoity,   etc.   cannot   be   fittingly
quashed   even   though   the   victim   or   victim’s   family   and   the
offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private
in   nature   and   have   serious   impact   on   society.   Similarly,   any
compromise   between   the   victim   and   offender   in   relation   to   the
offences   under   special   statutes   like   Prevention   of   Corruption
Act   or the offences committed by public servants while working
in   that   capacity   etc;   cannot   provide   for   any   basis   for   quashing
criminal   proceedings   involving   such   offences.   But   the   criminal
cases having overwhelmingly and pre­dominatingly civil flavour
stand   on   a   different   footing   for   the   purposes   of   quashing,
particularly   the   offences   arising   from   commercial,   financial,
mercantile,   civil,   partnership   or   such   like   transactions   or   the
offences arising  out  of  matrimony  relating  to dowry, etc. or  the
family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal
in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In
this   category   of   cases,   the   High   Court   may   quash   criminal
proceedings   if   in   its   view,   because   of   the   compromise   between
the   offender   and   victim,   the   possibility   of   conviction   is   remote
and bleak and continuation of the criminal case would put the
accused   to   great   oppression   and   prejudice   and   extreme
injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal
case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with
the   victim.   In   other   words,   the   High   Court   must   consider
whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice
to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the
criminal   proceeding   would   tantamount   to   abuse   of   process   of
law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and
wrongdoer   and   whether   to   secure   the   ends   of   justice,   it   is
appropriate   that   the   criminal   case   is   put   to   an   end   and   if   the
answer to the above question(s) is in affirmative, the High Court
shall   be   well   within   its   jurisdiction   to   quash   the   criminal
proceeding.”
37

38. After   Gian   Singh ,   this   Court   was   concerned   in   Narinder
Singh  and  Others     vs.     State   of  Punjab   and  Another 11
  with  the
perennial problem of courts swinging from one extreme to the other
in  respect of  cases involving  offences under  Section 307 IPC. A via
media was struck by this Court in the said decision, by holding that
it   would   be   open   to   the   High   Court   to   go   into   the   nature   of   the
injury   sustained,   nature   of   the   weapons   used   etc.   This   was   after
holding that an offence under Section 307 would fall in the category
of heinous and serious offence.
39. Then   came   the   decision   in   State   of   Maharashtra   through
Central   Bureau   of   Investigation   vs.   Vikram   Anantrai   Doshi
and Others 12
,  where this Court was concerned with an order of the
High   Court   of   Bombay   quashing   the   criminal   proceedings   for
offences punishable under Sections 406, 420, 467, 468 & 471 read
with   Section   120B   IPC.   It   was   a   case   involving   credit   facilities
provided by the Banks and the failure of the borrowers to repay the
11   (2014) 6 SCC 466
12   (2014) 15 SCC 29
38

loan. After the debts due to the bank were assigned in favour of an
Asset   Reconstruction   Company,   a   settlement   was   reached   and   the
borrower   took   a   “ No   Due   Certificate ”.   Therefore,   relying   upon   the
decisions   of   this   Court   in   Madan   Mohan   Abbot   vs.   State   of
Punjab 13
  and   Central   Bureau   of   Investigation   vs.   A.
Ravishankar   Prasad   and   Others 14
,   the   High   Court   of   Bombay
quashed   the   proceedings   on   the   ground   that   no   useful   purpose
would   be   served   by   allowing   the   matter   to   proceed   for   trial.   It   is
interesting   to   note   that   Madan   Mohan   (supra),   as   seen   from   the
last paragraph of the order, was passed in the peculiar facts of the
case.   But   in   so   far   as   A.   Ravishankar   Prasad   (supra)   is
concerned, the High Court quashed the proceedings on the basis of
a   settlement   reached   between   the  borrowers   and   the   Indian   Bank.
But the decision of the High Court was over turned, by a two Judge
Bench of this Court even after taking note of  B.S.Joshi  and  Nikhil
13   (2008) 4 SCC 582
14   (2009) 6 SCC 351
39

Merchant .     In   paragraph   46   of   its   decision,   this   Court   said   in   A.
Ravishankar Prasad  :­
“ 46. Before parting with the case we would like to observe that
mere   repayment   of  loan  under   a   settlement   cannot   exempt   the
accused from the criminal proceeding in the facts of this case.”
40. Therefore, in  Vikram Anantrai Doshi  (supra), this Court took
note of the aforesaid decisions and held in paragraph 26 as follows:­
“26.    We are in respectful agreement with the aforesaid view. Be
it stated, that availing of money from a nationalised bank in the
manner, as alleged by the investigating agency, vividly exposits
fiscal   impurity   and,   in   a   way,   financial   fraud.   The   modus
operandi   as   narrated   in   the   charge­sheet   cannot   be   put   in   the
compartment   of   an   individual   or   personal   wrong.   It   is   a   social
wrong   and   it   has   immense   societal   impact.   It   is   an   accepted
principle   of   handling   of   finance   that   whenever   there   is
manipulation   and   cleverly   conceived   contrivance   to   avail   of
these   kinds   of   benefits   it   cannot   be   regarded   as   a   case   having
overwhelmingly   and   predominatingly   civil   character.   The
ultimate   victim   is   the   collective.   It   creates   a   hazard   in   the
financial   interest   of   the   society.   The   gravity   of   the   offence
creates   a   dent   in   the   economic   spine   of   the   nation.   The
cleverness which has been skillfully contrived, if the allegations
are true, has a serious consequence. A crime of this nature, in
our view, would definitely fall in the category of offences which
travel   far   ahead   of   personal   or   private   wrong.   It   has   the
potentiality to usher in economic crisis. Its implications have its
own seriousness, for it creates a concavity in the solemnity that
is expected in financial transactions. It is not such a case where
one can pay the amount and obtain a “no dues certificate” and
enjoy the benefit of quashing of the criminal proceeding on the
hypostasis that nothing more remains to be done. The collective
interest of which the Court is the guardian cannot be a silent or
a   mute   spectator   to   allow   the   proceedings   to   be   withdrawn,   or
40

for   that   matter   yield   to   the   ingenuous   dexterity   of   the   accused
persons   to   invoke   the   jurisdiction   under   Article   226   of   the
Constitution   or   under   Section   482   of   the   Code   and   quash   the
proceeding.   It   is   not   legally   permissible.   The   Court   is   expected
to be on guard to these kinds of adroit moves. The High Court,
we   humbly   remind,   should   have   dealt   with   the   matter   keeping
in   mind   that   in   these   kinds   of   litigations   the   accused   when
perceives   a   tiny   gleam   of   success,   readily   invokes   the   inherent
jurisdiction for quashing of the criminal proceeding. The Court's
principal   duty,   at   that   juncture,   should   be   to   scan   the   entire
facts   to   find   out   the   thrust   of   allegations   and   the   crux   of   the
settlement.   It   is   the   experience   of   the   Judge   that   comes   to   his
aid and the said experience should be used with care, caution,
circumspection   and   courageous   prudence.   As   we   find   in   the
case   at   hand   the   learned   Single   Judge   has   not   taken   pains   to
scrutinise   the   entire   conspectus   of   facts   in   proper   perspective
and   quashed   the   criminal   proceeding.   The   said   quashment
neither   helps   to   secure   the   ends   of   justice   nor   does   it   prevent
the abuse of the process of the court nor can it be also said that
as   there   is   a   settlement   no   evidence   will   come   on   record   and
there will be remote chance of conviction. Such a finding in our
view   would   be   difficult   to   record.   Be   that   as   it   may,   the   fact
remains   that   the   social   interest   would   be   on   peril   and   the
prosecuting   agency,   in   these   circumstances,   cannot   be   treated
as an alien to the whole case. Ergo, we have no other option but
to   hold   that   the   order   [ Vikram   Anantrai   Doshi   v.   State   of
Maharashtra ,   Criminal   Application   No.   2239   of   2009,   order
dated   22­4­2010   (Bom)]   of   the   High   Court   is   wholly
indefensible.
41. In  Parbatbhai Aahir  (supra), referred to by the High Court in
the   impugned   order,   a   3   member   Bench   of   this   Court   again
summarised the broad principles on this question in paragraph 16.
Paragraph 16.6 and 16.8 to 16.10 of the decision read as follows:­
41

“ 16.6 . In the exercise of the power under Section 482 and while
dealing with a plea  that the dispute has been settled, the High
Court   must   have   due   regard   to   the   nature   and   gravity   of   the
offence.   Heinous   and   serious   offences   involving   mental
depravity or  offences such as murder, rape and dacoity  cannot
appropriately be quashed though the victim or the family of the
victim   have   settled   the   dispute.   Such   offences   are,   truly
speaking, not private in nature but have a serious impact upon
society. The decision to continue with the trial in such cases is
founded   on   the   overriding   element   of   public   interest   in
punishing persons for serious offences.
16.8.   Criminal   cases   involving   offences   which   arise   from
commercial,   financial,   mercantile,   partnership   or   similar
transactions with an essentially civil flavour may in appropriate
situations   fall   for   quashing   where   parties   have   settled   the
dispute.
16.9 .   In   such   a   case,   the   High   Court   may   quash   the   criminal
proceeding if in view of the compromise between the disputants,
the possibility of a conviction is remote and the continuation of
a   criminal   proceeding   would   cause   oppression   and   prejudice;
and
16.10.   There   is   yet   an   exception   to   the   principle   set   out   in
propositions 16.8. and 16.9. above. Economic offences involving
the   financial   and   economic   well­being   of   the   State   have
implications   which   lie   beyond   the   domain   of   a   mere   dispute
between private disputants. The High Court would be justified in
declining   to   quash   where   the   offender   is   involved   in   an   activity
akin   to   a   financial   or   economic   fraud   or   misdemeanour.   The
consequences   of   the   act   complained   of   upon   the   financial   or
economic system will weigh in the balance.”
42. Thus it is clear from the march of law that the Court has to go
slow  even while  exercising  jurisdiction  under  Section  482 Cr.PC  or
Article 226 of the Constitution in the matter of quashing of criminal
proceedings   on   the   basis   of   a   settlement   reached   between   the
42

parties,   when   the   offences   are   capable   of   having   an   impact   not
merely on the complainant and the accused but also on others.  
43. As seen from the final report filed in this case and the counter
affidavit   filed   by   the   I.O.,   persons   who   have   adopted   corrupt
practices   to   secure   employment   in   the   Transport   Corporation   fall
under   two   categories   namely,     (i)   those   who   paid   money   and   got
orders of appointment; and   (ii)   those who paid money but failed to
secure   employment.   If   persons   belonging   to   the   2 nd
  category   are
allowed to settle their dispute by taking refund of money, the same
would   affix   a   seal   of   approval   on   the   appointment   of   persons
belonging to the 1 st
 category. Therefore, the High Court ought not to
have   quashed   the   criminal   proceedings   on   the   basis   of   the
compromise.
44. It is needless to point out that corruption by a public servant
is an offence against the State and the society at large.   The Court
cannot   deal   with   cases   involving   abuse   of   official   position   and
adoption   of   corrupt   practices,   like   suits   for   specific   performance,
where the refund of the money paid may also satisfy the agreement
43

holder.   Therefore   we   hold   that   the   High   Court   was   completely   in
error in quashing the criminal complaint.
45. Coming   to   the   next   issue   regarding   the   non­inclusion   in   the
final   report,   of   the   offences   under   the   P.C.   Act,   the   less   said   the
better.   In   the   counter   affidavit   filed   by   the   I.O.   to   the   writ   petition
W.P.No.9061   of   2021,   filed   by   the   non­selected   candidates,   the
modus   operandi   adopted   by   the   accused   has   been   given   in   detail.
We   have   provided   a   gist   of   the   contents   of   such   counter   affidavit
elsewhere in   this  judgment.  We  are  constrained  to  say  that   even  a
novice   in   criminal   law   would   not   have   left   the   offences   under   the
P.C. Act, out of the final report.   The attempt of the I.O. appears to
be of one, “ willing to strike but afraid to wound ” (the opposite of
what Alexander Pope wrote in “ Epistle to Dr.Arbuthnot ”) 15
.
46. An   argument   was   sought   to   be   advanced   as   though   the
Minister   was   not   involved   and   that   Shri   Shanmugam   who   is
allegedly   involved,   was   not   the   P.A.   to   the   Minister.   But   this
argument   flies   in   the   face   of   the   contents   of   paragraph   11   of   the
15   Damn with faint praise, assent with civil leer, And without sneering, teach the rest to sneer,   Willing
to wound and yet afraid to strike , just hint a fault, and hesitate dislike.
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counter   affidavit   filed   by   the   I.O.   in   W.P.   No.9061   of   2021   which
reads as follows:­
“11. It   is   respectfully   submitted   that,   after   the   Notification
process   Tr.V.Senthil   Balaji,   then   Minister   for   Transport
instructed   Tr.Sarangan,   Special   Officer,   Tr.K.T.Govindarajan,
Senior   Deputy   Manager,   Administration,   Tr.   V.Venkadarajan,
who   were   serving   in   the   Chairman   office,   to   collect   the   details
regarding   the   day­to­day   progress   of   the   recruitment   such   as,
sale   of   application,   receipt   of   filled   application,   interviews
conducted,   etc…     Accordingly,   they   have   collected   the   details
from   all   the   eight   Transport   Corporations   through   their   email
address   ‘ chotpt@gmail.com’   and   on   the   same   day,   they
transmitted   it   to   the   Minister’s   office   email   id
‘ ministertransport@yahoo.com ’.   The   e­mail   communications
made   between   Chairman   office   and   Transport   Corporations   on
03.11.2014,   04.11.2014   and   05.12.2014   from   the   office   of   the
Chairman, Transport Corporations, Chennai.   Many a time, the
data had also been sent to Tr.M. Vetrichelvan, Public Relations
Officer   (PRO)   of   MTC   to   his   email   address   ‘ vetri67@gmailcom ’,
as   he   was   very   close   to   the   then   Transport   Minister   Tr.V.
Senthil   Balaji.     It   is   pertinent   to   mention   here   that   the   e­mail
named   ‘ ministertransport@yahoo.com’   had   been   maintained
only   by   Tr.B.Shanmugam   and   not   by   any   of   the   Personal
Assistants of the Minister Tr.V.Senthil Balaji.”
Therefore,   the   argument   that   there   is   nothing   on   record   to   show
that  Shri  Shanmugam   was  appointed  as  P.A.  to   the  Minister,  is  to
be stated only to be rejected.
47. Yet another   contention  raised  on  behalf  of  the respondents  is
that   there   are   two   other   cases   where   allegations   of   corruption   are
made and that CC No.25 of 2021 with which we are concerned now,
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did not involve allegations of corruption. But the said contention is
abhorring, for the simple reason that all criminal complaints arose
out   of   the   very   same   cash­for­job   scam.   We   are   informed   that   the
proceedings in respect of those two cases have also been stayed by
the   High   Court.   We   do   not   know   how   the   High   Court   could   have
stayed   prosecution   of   persons   under   the   P.C.   Act,   especially   in
matters of this nature.
48. As   a   matter   of   fact,   the   State   ought   to   have   undertaken   a
comprehensive investigation  into  the  entire  scam,  without  allowing
the   accused   to   fish   out   one   case   as   if   it   was   a   private   money
dispute.
49. The reliance placed by the respondents on an order passed by
the Madurai Bench of the Madras High Court on an earlier occasion
in   Criminal   O.P.(MD)Nos.14067,   140967,   16023   of   2016,   will   not
have bearing upon the present complaints. In fact, the SLP filed by
a   3 rd
  party   against   the   order   passed   in   those   petitions   was
dismissed   by   this   Court   on   05.01.2017   even   at   the   stage   of
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permission to file SLP. Therefore the respondents cannot rely upon
the same as if it constitutes a precedent.
Conclusion
50. In the light of what is stated above, the impugned order of the
High   Court   is   wholly   unsustainable.   Therefore   the   appeals   are
allowed and the impugned order of the High Court is set aside.  The
criminal   complaint   is   restored   to   file.     The   I.O.   shall   now   proceed
under  Section   173(8)   of  the   Code  to   file   a  further   report,   based   on
the   observations   made   in   the   preceding   paragraphs.
Additionally/alternatively, the Special Court before which the CC is
pending,   shall   exercise   power   under   Section   216   of   the   Cr.P.C.,   if
there   is   any   reluctance   on   the   part   of   the   State/I.O.     If   two   other
cases where offences under the P.C. Act are included, are under the
orders   of   stay   passed   by   the   High   Court,   the   State   should   take
appropriate steps to have the stay  vacated. The Court dealing  with
those   two   cases   should   also   keep   in   mind   the   disastrous   effect   of
putting on hold the prosecution under the P.C. Act.
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51. At present we are not passing any  orders on the prayer made
by the intervenors either to constitute a Special Investigation Team
or   to   appoint   Special   Public   Prosecutor,   since   we   do   hope   that
based on the observations made above, the State itself may do the
needful. We also make it clear  that at the time of trial, the Special
Court may not be swayed by the observations contained herein, but
proceed on the merits of the case and the law on the points.
The appeals are allowed.  I.As stand closed.
……………………………J.
(S.Abdul Nazeer)
…………………………...J.
(V. Ramasubramanian)
New Delhi
September  8, 2022
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