/2022 INSC 0792/
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO. 121 OF 2022
VINOD KATARA      .…PETITIONER(S)
Versus
STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH                      ….RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
J.B. PARDIWALA, J.
1. Personal liberty of a person is one of the oldest concepts to be
purported   by   national   courts.   As   long   ago   as   in   1215,   the   English
Magna Carta provided that:­
  "No free man shall be taken or imprisoned.... but..... by law
of the land."
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2.   Today, the concept of personal liberty has received a far more
expansive   interpretation.   The   notion   that   is   accepted   today   is   that
liberty   encompasses   these   rights   and   privileges   which   have   long
been   recognized   as   being   essential   to   the   orderly   pursuit   of
happiness   by   a   free   man   and   not   merely   freedom   from   bodily
restraint.   There   can   be   no   cavil   in   saying   that   lodging   juveniles   in
adult   prisons   amounts   to   deprivation   of   their   personal   liberty   on
multiple aspects.
3. This Writ Application under Article 32 of the Constitution is at
the instance of a convict accused undergoing life imprisonment for
the   offence   of   murder   seeking   appropriate   directions   to   the
respondent   State   of   Uttar   Pradesh   to   verify   the   exact   age   of   the
convict on the date of the commission of the offence as it is the case
of the convict that on the date of the commission of the offence i.e.
10.09.1982 he was a juvenile aged around 15 years.
4. The   facts   giving   rise   to   this   litigation   may   be   summarized   as
under:
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(a) The   writ   applicant   along   with   other   co­accused   persons   was
put to trial for the offence punishable under Section 302 r/w 34 of
the IPC;
(b) The   5 th
  Additional   Sessions   Judge,   Agra   in   the   sessions   trial
No.   535   of   1983   arising   from   the   case   crime   no.   126   of   1982
registered   with   the   Fatehpur   Sikri   District,   Agra   held   the   writ
applicant herein and the co­accused persons guilty of the offence of
murder and sentenced them to life imprisonment;
(c) The   writ   applicant   herein   and   the   other   convicts   went   in
appeal before the Allahabad High Court by filing the Cr. Appeal No.
133 of 1986 questioning the legality and validity of the judgment &
order of conviction passed by the trial court dated 06.01.1986;
(d) The   appeal   was   heard   by   the   High   Court   and   vide   judgment
and order dated 04.03.2016 came to be dismissed thereby affirming
the judgment and order of conviction passed by the trial court;
(e) The writ applicant herein dissatisfied with the order passed by
the   High   Court   dismissing   his   appeal,   referred   to   above,   came
before   this   Court   by   filing   application   for   Special   Leave   to   Appeal
(Crl.)   No.   6048   of   2016.   This   Court   vide   order   dated   16.08.2016
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declined   to   grant   leave   as   prayed   for   and   dismissed   the   Special
Leave Petition.
5. It may not be out of the place to state at this stage that till this
Court   dismissed   the   Special   Leave   Petition   vide   the   order   dated
16.08.2016, the writ applicant herein had not raised the question of
him   being   a   juvenile   on   the   date   of   the   commission   of   the   alleged
offence on 10.09.1982.
6. It   appears   that   while   the   writ   applicant   was   undergoing
sentence   of   life   imprisonment,   he   was   subjected   to   medical
examination   by   the   Medical   Board   constituted   by   the   respondent
State in pursuance of the judgment rendered by a Division Bench of
the   Allahabad   High   Court   in   the   Criminal   Writ   Public   Interest
Litigation   No.   855   of   2012,   wherein   the   Division   Bench   of   the
Allahabad High Court observed as under:
“ Admittedly,   as   per   the   State's   earlier   affidavits,   it   was
claimed that there were 72 prisoners, who may have been
below   18   years   in   age   and   who   are   detained   in   the
various   district   or   Central   jails.   Their   break   up   was   as
follows:
There   were   23   such   prisoners   in   Bareilly,   1   in
Lucknow, 4 in Allahabad, 2 in Etawah, 18 in Agra and
23   in   Fatehgarh.   One   such   prisoner   Raju,   who
belonged   to   Faizabad,   whose   age   was   determined   to
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be below 18 years by the Principal Magistrate, Juvenile
Justice   Board   was   sent   to   Special   Home   after   having
been detained for a long time in Faizabad jail.
Prima   facie   there   appears   to   be   some   material   for
suggesting   that   such   prisoners,   may   have   been   below   18
years on the date of commission of the offences. After the
modification of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of
Children)   Act,   2000,   (hereafter   the   Act)   by   Act   No.   33   of
2006,   under   section   2   (l)   a   juvenile   in   conflict   with   law
means   a   juvenile   who   is   alleged   to   have   committed   an
offence and has not completed eighteen years of age as on
the date of commission of such offence.
Under   the   proviso   to   section   7A   (1)   of   the   Act,   it   is
mentioned   that   a claim   of  juvenility  may  be   raised  before
any   court   and   it   shall   be   recognised   at   any   stage,   even
after the final disposal of the case, and such claim shall be
determined in terms of the provisions contained in this Act
and  the  Juvenile  Justice (Care and  Protection of Children)
Rules, 2007 (hereinafter the Rules).
We,   therefore,   direct   the   District   Judges,   who   are
Chairpersons of their respective Legal Services Authorities
to directly oversee that efficient lawyers are appointed for
the   purpose   of   providing   legal   aid   to   the   prisoners,   (who
are   unable   to   engage   private   lawyers)   who   have   been
mentioned   in   the   list   furnished   by   the   State   Government
and described to be below 18 years in age on the date of
commission   of   offence.   The   said   legal   aid   lawyers   should
get   the   ages   of   the   prisoners   ascertained   by   obtaining
documents   and   carrying   out   the   other   measures   provided
under   Rule   12   of   the   Juvenile   Justice   Act   and   Rules   and
also on the lines suggested by the Delhi High Court in WP
(C)   No.   8889   of   2011   (Court   on   its   own   motion   vs.
Department of Women and Child Development and others)
in its order dated 11.5.2012. Obtaining information about
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the   probable   date   of   birth   of   other   siblings   can   also   be
taken   into   account   for   ascertaining   the   true   age   of   these
prisoners.   The   legal   aid   lawyers   may   also   find   out
whether   there   are   other   prisoners   in   jail,   who   may   be
below   18   years   of   age   on   the   date   of   commission   of   the
offence   and   who   appear   to   be   wrongly   lodged   in   the
regular   prisons   for   adults   and   the   bases   for   their
conclusions.
Thereafter   the   matter   may   be   placed   before   the   Principal
Judge, Juvenile Justice  Board for determining of the  ages
as per the criteria set out above.
The prosecution and the complainant will also of course be
given an opportunity to examine  their own witnesses  and
to   cross­examine   the   witnesses,   who   have   been   got
examined   on   behalf   of   the   accused   and   for   that   purpose
notices   of   the   proceedings   before   the   JJ   Board   shall   be
served   on   the   complainant/   prosecution.   As   it   is   possible
that  in  some  cases  the   prisoners   mentioned  in  the  State's
list   may   indeed   be   below   18   years   in   age   on   the   date   of
offence, but as the basis for arrival at the conclusion in the
State's   list   were   usually   some   preliminary   medical
examinations   and   no   detailed   steps   for   ascertaining   ages
had   been   taken   after   hearing   both   parties,   and   it   cannot
be   ruled   out   that   in   certain   cases   extraneous   measures
may have been used for reducing the ages, we think that
such   an   exercise   as   detailed   above   wherein   the   ages   are
ascertained   after   hearing   both   parties   was   needed.   The
said   exercise   is   to   be   competed   within   a   period   of   two
months and the reports submitted to this Court on its next
listing.
The   District   Judges/District   Legal   Services   Authorities
shall   take   strict   measures   in   future   for   ensuring   that
prisoners below 18 years of age on the date of offence are
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not   lodged   in   adults   prisons   in   violation   of   the   Juvenile
Justice Act and Rules.
So   far   as   district   Allahabad   is   concerned,   we   direct   the
District   Judge,   Allahabad   to   permit   Sister   Sheeba   Jose,
Advocate   and   Shri   Rohan   Gupta,   Advocate   to   visit   and
interview   the   concerned   prisoners   for   the   purpose   of
ascertaining their ages and for submitting the report to the
Court on the next date of listing.
It   was   further   submitted   by   the   learned   counsel   for   the
petitioner   that   so   far   as   the   prisoner   Raju   is   concerned,
whose age was determined to be below 18 years, he was
earlier lodged in Faizabad jail and was subsequently sent
to   the   Special  Home.  As  he   was  convicted   as  far  back  as
in   the   year   2001   in   a   case   under   section   302   IPC.   The
respondents   should   inform   this   Court   about   the   total
period spent in jail by this prisoner and in case it exceeds
3 years (which was the maximum permissible sentence in
view   of   section   15   of   the   Act)   the   basis   for   his   being
presently detained in the Special Home.”
  Thus,   vide   the   order   dated   24.05.2012   referred   to   above
passed in a Public Interest Litigation being Criminal (PIL) Misc. W.P.
No.   855   of   2012,   the   Allahabad   High   Court   directed   the   Juvenile
Justice   Boards   to   hold   an   enquiry   for   determination   of   the   age   of
prisoners languishing in jails who claimed to have been juveniles in
conflict with the law. 
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7. The   Medical   Board   subjected   the   writ   applicant   herein   to
the X­rays of the skull and sternum. Upon medical examination of
the   writ   applicant   herein,   the   Medical   Board   gave   its   report   dated
10.12.2021   certifying   that   on   10.09.1982   i.e.   the   date   of   the
commission   of   the   alleged   offence,   the   writ   applicant   could   have
been   around   15   years   of   age   as   on   the   date   of   the   medical
examination, the convict was around 56 years of age.
8. It   appears   that   sometime   later,   the   writ   applicant   was   in   a
position to obtain a document in the form of Family Register dated
02.03.2021   issued   under   the   U.P.   Panchayat   Raj   (Maintenance   of
Family Registers) Rules, 1970. In the Family Register certificate, the
year of birth of the writ applicant herein is shown as 1968. If 1968
is  the  correct   birth   year   of  the   writ  applicant   herein,  then  in   1982
he was about 14 years of age.
9. In such circumstances referred to above, the writ applicant is
here before this  Court.  He claims  that  as he  was a  juvenile on the
date of the commission of the alleged offence sometime in the year
1982,   he   could   not   have   been   put   to   trial   along   with   other   co­
accused   and   should   have   been   dealt   with   under   the   provisions   of
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the Juvenile Justice Act as prevailing at the relevant point of time.
It   is   the   prayer   of   the   writ   applicant   that   the   respondent   State   be
directed   to   get   the   claim   of   the   writ   applicant   in   regard   to   the
juvenility   verified   through   the   concerned   Sessions   Court   or   the
Juvenile Justice Board.
Submissions on behalf of the writ applicant convict:
10. Mr. Rishi Malhotra, the learned counsel appearing for the writ
applicant   vehemently   submitted   that   although   till   the   dismissal   of
the   Special   Leave   Petition   (Criminal)   No.   6048   od   2016   by   this
Court   vide   order   dated   16.08.2016,   the   convict   had   not   raised   the
plea of juvenility, yet the law permits him to raise such a plea even
at this point of time having regard to the provisions of the Juvenile
Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Amendment Act, 2011. It
is submitted that there is clinching evidence on record as on date in
the   form   of   certificate   issued   by   the   Medical   Board   as   well   as   the
Family Register to indicate that in the year 1982 the writ applicant
could   be   around   15   years   of   age.   The   learned   counsel   would
vehemently   submit   that   there   is   no   good   ground   to   discard   the
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certificate issued by the Medical Board as well as the extract of the
Family Register. 
11. To fortify the aforesaid submissions, the learned counsel seeks
to rely upon a three­Judge Bench decision of this Court in the case
of  Abuzar Hossain  ALIAS  Gulam Hossain   v. State of West Bengal
reported in (2012) 10 SCC 489.
12. In   such   circumstances   referred   to   above,   the   learned   counsel
prays   that   there   being   merit   in   his   writ   petition,   the   same   may   be
allowed   and   appropriate   directions   may   be   issued   to   do   complete
justice in the matter.
Submissions on behalf of the State
13. Mr.   Ardhendhumauli   Kr.   Prasad,   the   learned   Additional
Advocate   General   appearing   for   the   State,   on   the   other   hand,   has
vehemently   opposed   the   present   writ   application.   The   learned
counsel would submit that the Family Register is not admissible in
evidence and the entries made therein are not decisive to determine
the   age.   It   is   argued   that   the   writ   applicant   has   not   placed   on
record   any   document   of   any   educational   institution.   It   is   also
argued   that   no   ossification   test   was   undertaken   or   no   modern
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recognized method was adopted for the purpose of determination of
age.
14. The   learned   counsel   appearing   for   the   State   invited   the
attention   of   this   Court   towards   the   order   passed   by   a   Coordinate
Bench   of   this   Court   in   the   case   of   Ashok   v.   State   of   Madhya
Pradesh , Special Leave to Appeal (Criminal) No. 643 of 2020 dated
29.11.2021. The order  passed by  the Coordinate Bench referred to
above reads thus:­
“By   a   judgment   and   order   dated   29.07.1999,   the
Additional Sessions Judge, Gohad, District Bhind, Madhya
Pradesh,   convicted   the   petitioner   inter   alia   for   offence
under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced
him   inter   alia   to   life   imprisonment   in   Sessions   Trial   No.
260   of   1997.   In   the   cause   title   of   the   said   judgment   and
order,   the   petitioner   has   been   described   as   Ashok,   S/o
Balram   Jatab   age   16   yrs   9   months   and   19   days,   R/o
Village Anjani Pura, District Bhind. 
The   petitioner   filed   an   appeal   being   Criminal   Appeal   No.
455  of  1999 challenging  his  conviction and  sentence. The
said   criminal   appeal   has   been   dismissed   by   the   High
Court   by   an   order   dated   14.11.2017,   which   is   impugned
in the Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 643 of 2020, filed by
the   petitioner.   The   incident   which   led   to   the   conviction   of
the petitioner, took place on 26.07.1997.
The   petitioner   claims   that   the   petitioner   was   born   on
05.01.1981.   The   petitioner   was,   therefore,   approximately
16 years and 7 months old on the date of the incident. In
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this   Court,   the   petitioner   has   for   the   first   time   contended
that   he   was   a   juvenile   on   the   date   of   the   incident.   His
conviction   and   sentence   are,   therefore,   liable   to   be   set­
aside.   The   claim   of   juvenility   was   not   raised   in   the   High
Court.   The   learned   Additional   Advocate   General,
appearing   on   behalf   of   the   State   argued   that   the   claim   of
juvenility has  been raised  for the  first  time  in this  special
leave   petition.  The  Juvenile   Justice   Act,  1986,  which  was
in   force   on   the   date   of   commission   of   the   offence   as   also
the   date   of   the   judgment   and   order   of   conviction   and
sentence   by   the   Sessions   Court   was   repealed   by   the
Juvenile   Justice   (Care   and   Protection   of   Children)   Act,
2000. The Act of 2000 received the assent of the President
of   India   on   30.12.2000   and   came   into   force   on
01.04.2001.   The   Act   of   2000   defined   juvenile   in   conflict
with the law to mean a juvenile, who was alleged to have
committed an offence and had not completed 18th year of
age as on the date of commission of such an offence.
Under   the   1986   Act,   the   age   of   juvenility   was   up   to   the
16th   year.   Section   7A   of   the   2000   Act   as   inserted   by   Act
33   of   2006   with   effect   from   22.08.2006   provided   as
follows:­
 
“7A.   Procedure   to   be   followed   when   claim  of   juvenility
is   raised   before   any   Court.­(1)   Whenever   a   claim   of
juvenility is raised before any court or a court is of the
opinion   that   an   accused   person   was   a   juvenile   on   the
date of commission of the offence, the court shall make
an   inquiry,   take   such   evidence   as   may   be   necessary
(but not an affidavit) so as to determine the age of such
person,  and  shall  record   a finding  whether   the   person
is a juvenile or a child or not, stating his age as nearly
as may be:
  Provided   that   a   claim   of   juvenility   may   be   raised
before   any   Court   and   it   shall   be   recognised   at   any
stage,   even   after   final   disposal   of   the   case,   and   such
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claim   shall   be   determined   in   terms   of   the   provisions
contained   in   this   Act   and   the   rules   made   thereunder,
even if the juvenile has ceased to be so on or before the
date of commencement of this Act. (2) If the court finds
a person to be a juvenile on the date of commission of
the   offence   under   sub­section(1),   it   shall   forward   the
juvenile   to   the   Board   for   passing   appropriate   orders
and   the   sentence,   if   any,   passed   by   a   court   shall   be
deemed to have no effect.” 
The   claim   of   juvenility   can   thus   be   raised   before   any
Court,   at   any   stage,   even   after   final   disposal   of   the   case
and if the Court finds a person to be a juvenile on the date
of commission of the offence, it is to forward the juvenile to
the   Board   for   passing   appropriate   orders,   and   the
sentence,   if   any,   passed   by   a   Court,   shall   be   deemed   to
have   no   effect.   Even   though   the   offence   in   this   case   may
have   been   committed   before   the   enactment   of   the   Act   of
2000,   the   petitioner   is   entitled   to   the   benefit   of   juvenility
under   Section   7A   of   the   Act   of   2000,   if   on   inquiry   it   is
found that he was less than 18 years of age on the date of
the alleged offence.
It   is   true   as   pointed   out   by   the   learned   Additional
Advocate General appearing on behalf of the State that the
certificate   of   Akikrit   Shash,   High   School   School   Endouri,
District   Bhind,   Madhya   Pradesh   relied   upon   by   the
petitioner   is   stated   to   have   been   issued   on   17.07.2021.
The   said   certificate   does   not   specifically   mention   that   the
date   of   birth   01.01.1982   had   been   entered   at   the   time   of
first admission of the petitioner at the primary school level.
Furthermore, there is a birth certificate issued by the Gram
Panchayat,   Endouri,   District   Bhind,   Madhya   Pradesh
which   indicates   the   date   of   birth   of   the   petitioner   as
05.01.1982 and not 01.01.1982 as recorded in the school
certificate referred to above. 
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The entry in the records of the Gram Panchayat, Endouri,
District Bhind, Madhya Pradesh, also do not appear to be
contemporaneous   and   the   certificate   has   been   issued   in
the year 2017. 
However,   as   pointed   out   by   Mr.   M.P.   Parthiban,   learned
counsel   appearing   on   behalf   of   the   petitioner   that   the
Sessions   Court   has   recorded   the   age   of   the   petitioner   as
16 years, 9 months and 19 days. The petitioner has been
in actual custody for over three years. 
The   2000   Act   has   been   repealed   and   replaced   by   the
Juvenile   Justice   (Care   and   Protection   of   Children)   Act,
2015. Section 21 of the 2015 Act provides as follows: 
“21.   Order   that   may   not   be   passed   against   a   child   in
conflict with law. – No child in conflict with law shall be
sentenced to death or for life imprisonment without the
possibility of release, for any such offence, either under
the provisions of this Act or under the provisions of the
Indian  Penal  Code  or  any  other  law  for  the  time  being
in force.” 
Considering   that   the   Trial   Court   has   recorded   the   age   of
the petitioner as 16 years and odd, and has been in actual
custody   in   excess   of   three   years,   which   is   the   maximum
for   a   juvenile,   we   deem   it   appropriate   to   grant   the
petitioner   interim   bail   on   such   terms   and   conditions   as
may  be  imposed  by  the  Sessions   Court.  We  further  direct
the Sessions Court to examine the claim of the petitioner to
juvenility   in   accordance   with   law,   and   submit   a   report   to
this   Court   within   one   month   from   the   date   of
communication of this order. 
The concerned Sessions Court shall be entitled to examine
the authenticity and genuineness of the documents sought
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to   be   relied   upon   by   the   petitioner,   considering   that   the
documents do not appear to be contemporaneous. 
In   the   event   the   documents   are   found   to   be
questionable/unreliable,   it   will   be   open   to   the   Sessions
Court to have the petitioner medically examined by taking
an   ossification   test   or   any   other   modern   recognized
method of age determination.” 
15. The aforesaid order passed by the Coordinate Bench has been
relied upon by the learned counsel appearing for the State to fortify
his  submission that if at all the issue in  regard to  the juvenility  of
the   writ   applicant   requires   consideration,   the   same   should   be   by
the Sessions Court i.e. the Court which had originally tried the writ
applicant for the alleged offence.
16. In   such   circumstances   referred   to   above,   the   learned   counsel
appearing   for  the  State  prays  that   let  the  Sessions  Court  look  into
the   certificate   issued   by   the   Medical   Board   including   the   Family
Register more particularly its authenticity and genuineness. 
Analysis:
17. Having   heard   the   learned   counsel   appearing   for   the   parties
and having gone through the materials on record, the only question
that   falls   for   our   consideration   is   that   whether   we   should   ask   the
15

Sessions Court to examine the authenticity and genuineness of the
documents   sought   to   be   relied   upon   by   the   writ   applicant   in
support of his plea of being a juvenile on the date of the commission
of the alleged offence in the year 1982 and also subject the convict
to further ossification test?
18. The   first   and   the   foremost   issue   that   arises   for   our
consideration in this writ petition is in regard to the applicability of
the   provisions   of   the   Juvenile   Justice   (Care   and   Protection   of
Children) Act, 2000 (for short, “the 2000 Act”). 
19.  In   the   aforesaid   context,   we   must   first   look   into   the   relevant
dates as follows:­
(a)  The date of the incident is 10.09.1982. Thus, on the date
of incident even the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 was not in
force. What was in force was the Children Act, 1960. The
Children Act, 1960 was a beneficial legislation enacted to
take care of the delinquent and neglected children. Under
the said Act, a child meant a person who had not attained
the age of 16 years in the case of a boy or 18 years in the
case of a girl. 
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(b)   The   petitioner   herein   came   to   be   convicted   by   the   trial
court   vide   judgment   and   order   dated   06.01.1986.     Even
on   the   date   of   conviction,   the  Juvenile   Justice   Act,   1986
was not in force.  The Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 came in
force with effect from 01.12.1986.  Thus, even on the date
of conviction, the Children Act, 1960 governed the field.
(c) The appeal filed by the petitioner herein in the High Court
of Allahabad against the judgment and order of conviction
passed   by   the   trial   court   came   to   be   decided   and   was
ordered   to   be   dismissed   vide   judgment   and   order   dated
04.03.2016.   It is relevant to note that on the date when
the   appeal   came   to   be   dismissed   by   the   High   Court,   the
2000 Act was in force.
(d)   Special   Leave   to   Appeal   (Crl.)   No.   6048   of   2016   filed   by
the   petitioner   herein   in   this   Court   came   to   be   dismissed
vide order dated 16.08.2016.
20. On and with effect from 15.01.2016,  the Juvenile Justice (Care
and   Protection   of   Children)   Act,   2015   (for   short,   “the   2015   Act”)
came   into   force   which   repealed   the   2000   Act.   While   the   appeal   of
the   petitioner   herein   against   his   conviction   and   sentence   was
17

pending   in   the   High   Court,   the   2000   Act   came   into   force   which
repealed   the   Juvenile   Justice   Act,   1986.   The   2000   Act   inter   alia
raised   the   age   of   juvenility   from   16   to   18   years   and   in   terms
of   Section   20   of   the   2000   Act,   the   determination   of   juvenility   was
required   to   be   done   in   all   pending   matters   in   accordance
with   Section 2(1)   of the 2000 Act. 
21.  The   effect   of   Section   20   of   the   2000   Act   was   considered
in   Pratap Singh v. State of Jharkhand , (2005) 3 SCC 551, and it
was stated as under:­
“31.   Section 20   of the Act as quoted above deals with the
special   provision   in   respect   of   pending   cases   and   begins
with   a   non   obstante   clause.   The   sentence
“notwithstanding   anything   contained   in   this   Act,   all
proceedings in respect of a juvenile pending in any court
in   any   area   on   the   date   on   which   this   Act   came   into
force”   has   great   significance.   The   proceedings   in   respect
of   a   juvenile   pending   in   any   court   referred   to   in   Section
20   of the Act are relatable to proceedings initiated before
the   2000   Act   came   into   force   and   which   are   pending
when the 2000 Act came into force. The term “any court”
would   include   even   ordinary   criminal   courts.   If   the
person   was   a   “juvenile”   under   the   1986   Act   the
proceedings   would   not   be   pending   in   criminal   courts.
They would be pending in criminal courts only if the boy
had   crossed   16   years   or   the   girl   had   crossed   18   years.
This   shows   that   Section   20   refers   to   cases   where   a
person   had   ceased   to   be   a   juvenile   under   the   1986   Act
but   had   not   yet   crossed   the   age   of   18   years   then   the
18

pending   case   shall   continue  in   that  court  as   if   the   2000
Act   has   not   been   passed   and   if   the   court   finds   that   the
juvenile   has   committed   an   offence,   it   shall   record   such
finding and instead of passing any sentence in respect of
the   juvenile,   shall   forward   the   juvenile   to   the   Board
which shall pass orders in respect of that juvenile.”
22.  In      Bijender   Singh   v.   State   of   Haryana    ,   (2005)   3   SCC   685,
the   legal   position   as   regards   Section   20   was   stated   in   following
words:­
“8.   One   of   the   basic   distinctions   between   the   1986   Act
and the 2000 Act relates to the age of males and females.
Under   the   1986   Act,   a   juvenile   means   a   male   juvenile
who   has   not   attained   the   age   of   16   years,   and   a   female
juvenile who has not attained the age of 18 years. In the
2000   Act,   the   distinction   between   male   and   female
juveniles   on   the   basis   of   age   has   not   been   maintained.
The age­limit is 18 years for both males and females.
9. A person above 16 years in terms of the 1986 Act was
not   a   juvenile.   In   that   view   of   the   matter   the   question
whether   a   person   above   16   years   becomes   “juvenile”
within   the   purview   of   the   2000   Act   must   be   answered
having regard to the object and purport thereof.
10.   In   terms   of   the   1986   Act,   a   person   who   was   not
juvenile   could   be   tried   in   any   court.   Section   20   of   the
2000   Act   takes   care   of   such   a   situation   stating   that
despite the same the trial shall continue in that court as
if   that   Act   has   not   been   passed   and   in   the   event,   he   is
found to be guilty of commission of an offence, a finding
to   that   effect   shall   be   recorded   in   the   judgment   of
conviction, if any, but instead of passing any sentence in
relation   to   the   juvenile,   he   would   be   forwarded   to   the
Juvenile Justice Board (in short “the Board”) which shall
19

pass  orders in  accordance with  the  provisions  of the  Act
as   if   it   has   been   satisfied   on   inquiry   that   a   juvenile   has
committed   the   offence.   A   legal   fiction   has,   thus,   been
created   in   the   said   provision.   A   legal   fiction   as   is   well
known   must   be   given   its   full   effect   although   it   has   its
limitations. …………
11. ………….
12.   Thus,   by   reason   of   legal   fiction,   a   person,   although
not   a   juvenile,   has   to   be   treated   to   be   one   by   the   Board
for   the   purpose   of   sentencing,   which   takes   care   of   a
situation that the person although not a juvenile in terms
of the 1986 Act but still would be treated as such under
the 2000 Act for the said limited purpose.”
23.  In  Dharambir v. State (NCT of Delhi) , (2010) 5 SCC 344, the
determination   of   juvenility   even   after   conviction   was   one   of   the
issues and it was stated:­
“11.   It   is   plain   from   the   language   of   the   Explanation
to   Section   20   that   in   all   pending   cases,   which   would
include   not   only   trials   but   even   subsequent   proceedings
by   way   of   revision   or   appeal,   etc.,   the   determination   of
juvenility   of   a   juvenile   has   to   be   in   terms   of   clause   (l)
of   Section 2 , even if the juvenile ceases to be a juvenile on
or before 1­4­2001, when the Act of 2000 came into force,
and   the   provisions   of   the   Act   would   apply   as   if   the   said
provision   had   been   in   force   for   all   purposes   and   for   all
material times when the alleged offence was committed.
12. Clause (l) of   Section 2   of the Act of 2000 provides that
“juvenile   in   conflict   with   law”   means   a   “juvenile”   who   is
alleged   to   have   committed   an   offence   and   has   not
completed   eighteenth   year   of   age   as   on   the   date   of
commission   of   such   offence.   Section   20   also   enables   the
20

court to consider and determine the juvenility of a person
even   after   conviction   by   the   regular   court   and   also
empowers the court, while maintaining the conviction, to
set   aside   the   sentence   imposed   and   forward   the   case   to
the   Juvenile   Justice   Board   concerned   for   passing
sentence   in   accordance   with   the   provisions   of   the   Act   of
2000.”
24.   Similarly,   in   Kalu   v.   State   of   Haryana   ,   (2012)   8   SCC   34,
this Court summed up as under:­
“21.   Section   20   makes   a   special   provision   in   respect   of
pending   cases.   It   states   that   notwithstanding   anything
contained   in   the   Juvenile   Act,   all   proceedings   in   respect
of a juvenile pending in any court in any area on the date
on   which   the   Juvenile   Act   comes   into   force   in   that   area
shall be continued in that court as if the Juvenile Act had
not   been   passed   and   if   the   court   finds   that   the   juvenile
has   committed   an   offence,   it   shall   record   such   finding
and   instead   of   passing   any   sentence   in   respect   of   the
juvenile   forward   the   juvenile   to   the   Board   which   shall
pass orders in respect of that juvenile in accordance with
the   provisions   of   the   Juvenile   Act   as   if   it   had   been
satisfied   on   inquiry   under   the   Juvenile   Act   that   the
juvenile   has   committed   the   offence.   The   Explanation
to   Section   20   makes   it   clear   that   in   all   pending   cases,
which would include not only trials but even subsequent
proceedings   by   way   of   revision   or   appeal,   the
determination of juvenility of a juvenile would be in terms
of clause (l) of   Section 2 , even if the juvenile ceased to be
a   juvenile   on   or   before   1­4­2001,   when   the   Juvenile   Act
came   into   force,   and   the   provisions   of   the   Juvenile   Act
would apply as if the said provision had been in force for
all   purposes   and   for   all   material   times   when   the   alleged
offence was committed.”
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25.  It   is   thus   well   settled   that   in   terms   of   Section   20   of   the   2000
Act,   in   all   cases   where   the   accused   was   above   16   years   but   below
18 years of age on the date of occurrence, the proceedings pending
in the Court would continue and be taken to the logical end subject
to   an   exception   that   upon   finding   the   juvenile   to   be   guilty,   the
Court   would   not   pass   an   order   of   sentence   against   him   but   the
juvenile would be referred to the Board for appropriate orders under
the 2000 Act.
26. Thus,   in   view   of   the   aforesaid   discussion,   we   now   proceed   to
consider the matter further keeping in view the 2000 Act. 
27. Section 7A of the 2000 Act reads as under:
“ 7A.   Procedure   to   be   followed   when   claim   of
juvenility is raised before any Court­
(1)   Whenever   a   claim   of   juvenility   is   raised   before   any
court   or   a   court   is   of   the   opinion   that   an   accused   person
was   a   juvenile   on   the   date   of   commission   of   the   offence,
the   court   shall   make   an   inquiry,   take   such   evidence   as
may be necessary (but not an affidavit) so as to determine
the age of such person, and shall record a finding whether
the person is a juvenile or a child or not, stating his age as
nearly as may be:
Provided   that   a   claim   of   juvenility   may   be   raised   before
any   Court   and   it   shall   be   recognised   at   any   stage,   even
22

after   final   disposal   of   the   case,   and   such   claim   shall   be
determined in terms of the provisions contained in this Act
and   the   rules   made   thereunder,   even   if   the   juvenile   has
ceased to be so on or before the date of commencement of
this Act. 
(2) If the court finds a person to be a juvenile on the date of
commission   of   the   offence   under   sub­section   (1),   it   shall
forward   the   juvenile   to   the   Board   for   passing   appropriate
orders and the sentence, if any, passed by a court shall be
deemed to have no effect.” 
28. From   a   reading   of   Section   7A   what   becomes   very   obvious   is
that   whenever   a   claim   of   juvenility   is   raised,   an   inquiry   has   to   be
made   and   such   inquiry   would   take   place   by   receiving   evidence
which   would   be   necessary   but   not   an   affidavit   so   as   to   determine
the age of such person.  
29. Reference   is   also   required   to   be   made   to   Chapter   II   of   the
Juvenile  Justice (Care and  Protection  of  Children)  Rules,  2007   (for
short   “the   2007   Rules”),   more   particularly   to   Rule   3(1)   and
Principles   II,   IV,   XI,   XII,   XIII   &   XIV   enumerated   in   Rule   3(2).   The
said provisions and principles are extracted herein below­
“ 3.   Fundamental   principles   to   be   followed   in
administration of these rules.—  
23

(1) The State Government, the Juvenile  Justice  Board, the
Child Welfare Committee or other competent authorities or
agencies, as the case may be, while 
(2)   The   following   principles   shall,   inter   alia,   be
fundamental   to   the   application,   interpretation   and
implementation of the Act and the rules made hereunder:
  x x x x x 
II. Principle of dignity and worth
(a)   Treatment   that   is   consistent   with   the   Child's   sense
of   dignity   and   worth   is   a   fundamental   principle   of
juvenile   justice.  This  principle  reflects   the   fundamental
human   right   enshrined   in   Article   I   of   the   Universal
Declaration of Human Rights that all human beings are
born   free   and   equal   in   dignity   and   rights.   Respect   of
dignity includes not being humiliated, personal identity
boundaries   and   space   being   respected,   not   being
labeled and stigmatized, being   offered information and
choices and not being blamed for their acts.
(b)   The   juvenile's   or   Child's   right   to   dignity   and   worth
has to be respected and protected throughout the entire
process   of   dealing   with   the   child   from   the   first   contact
with   law   enforcement   agencies   to   the   implementing   of
all measures for dealing with the child.
III. Principle of Right to be heard
Every child's right to express his views freely in all matters
affecting his interest shall be fully respected through every
stage   in   the   process   of   juvenile   justice.   Children's   right   to
be   heard   shall   include   creation   of   developmentally
appropriate   tools   and   processes   of   interacting   with   the
child, promoting Children's active involvement in decisions
regarding   their   own   lives   and   providing   opportunities   for
discussion and debate.
IV. Principle of Best Interest
24

(a)   In   all   decisions   taken   within   the   context   of
administration   of   juvenile   justice,   the   principle   of   best
interest of the juvenile or the juvenile in conflict with law or
child shall be the primary consideration.
(b) The  principle  of  best  interest  of  the  juvenile  or juvenile
in   conflict   with   law   or   child   shall   mean   for   instance   that
the traditional objectives of criminal justice, retribution and
repression, must give way to rehabilitative and restorative
objectives of juvenile justice.
(c)   This   principle   seeks   to   ensure   physical,   emotional,
intellectual,  social  and   moral  development   of  a  juvenile  in
conflict   with   law   or   child   so   as   to   ensure   the   safety,
well   being and permanence for each child and thus enable
each child to survive and reach his or her full potential.
x x x x  x 
XI.   Principle   of   right   to   privacy   and   confidentiality
The juvenile's or Child's right to privacy and confidentiality
shall be protected by all means and through all the stages
of the proceedings ad care and protection processes.
25

XII. Principle of last resort
Institutionalization of a child or juvenile in conflict with law
shall   be   a   step   of   the   last   resort   after   reasonable   inquiry
and that too for the minimum possible duration.
XIII. Principle of repatriation and restoration
(a) Every juvenile or child in conflict with law has the right
to   be   re­united   with   his   family   and   restored   back   to   the
same   socio­economic   cultural   status   that   such   juvenile   or
child enjoyed before  coming within the purview of the Act
or   becoming   vulnerable   to   any   form   of   neglect,   abuse   or
exploitation.
(b)   Any   juvenile   or   child,   who   has   lost   contact   with   his
family,   shall   be   eligible   for   protection   under   the   Act   and
shall   be   repatriated   and   restored,   at   the   earliest,   to   his
family, unless such repatriation and restoration is likely to
be against the best interest of the juvenile or the child.
XIV. Principle of Fresh Start
(a) The principle of fresh start promotes new beginning for
the   child   or   juvenile   in   conflict   with   law   by   ensuring
erasure of his part records.
(b)   The   State   shall   seek   to   promote   measures   for   dealing
with children alleged or recognized as having impinged the
penal law, without resorting to juridical proceedings.”
b.   It   is   submitted   that   Section   51   of   the   Act   provides   that
the report of a probation officer or a social worker shall be
confidential.   It   is   further   submitted   that   Rule   18   provides
for   a   procedure   to   be   followed   in   respect   of   violation   of
Section 21.”
30. Besides the International Convention and the provisions of the
2000 Act resply, it may be noted that the Constitutional guarantee
26

for   the   protection   of   the   child   is   enshrined   in   Article   39   of   the
Constitution.   Article 39   reads as under:­
“39.   Certain   principles   of  policy   to   be   followed   by  the
State­
(e)   that   the   health   and   strength   of   workers,   men   and
women, and the tender age of children are not abused and
that citizens are not forced by economic necessity to enter
avocations unsuited to their age or strength;
(f)   that   children   are   given   opportunities   and   facilities   to
develop in a healthy manner and in conditions of freedom
and   dignity   and   that   childhood   and   youth   are   protected
against   exploitation   and   against   moral   and   material
abandonment.”
31. The   procedure   to   be   followed   for   the   determination   of   age   is
provided under Rule 12(3)( b ) of the 2007 Rules, which reads as:
“ 12.   Procedure   to   be   followed   in   determination   of
age .— (3)   In   every   case   concerning   a   child   or   juvenile   in
conflict   with   law,   the   age   determination   inquiry   shall   be
conducted   by   the   court   or   the   Board   or,   as   the   case   may
be, the Committee by seeking evidence by obtaining—
(a)(i)  the   matriculation   or   equivalent   certificates,
if available; and in the absence whereof;
   (ii) the   date   of   birth   certificate   from   the   school
(other than a play school) first  attended; and in the
absence whereof;
  (iii) the   birth   certificate   given   by   a   corporation
or a municipal authority or a panchayat;
(b) and  only in the absence of either (i), (ii) or (iii) of
clause (a) above, the medical opinion will be sought
from   a   duly   constituted   Medical   Board,   which   will
27

declare the age of the juvenile or child. In case exact
assessment of the age cannot be done, the Court or
the Board or, as the case may be, the Committee, for
the   reasons   to   be   recorded   by   them,   may,   if
considered   necessary,   give   benefit   to   the   child   or
juvenile   by   considering   his/her   age   on   lower   side
within the margin of one year. 
and,   while   passing   orders   in   such   case   shall,   after
taking   into   consideration   such   evidence   as   may   be
available,   or   the   medical   opinion,   as   the   case   may   be,
record   a   finding   in   respect   of   his   age   and   either   of   the
evidence  specified  in any of  the  clauses  (a)(i), (ii),  (iii)  or
in   the   absence   whereof,   clause   (b)   shall   be   the
conclusive proof of the age as  regards  such child  or the
juvenile in conflict with law.”
32. Sub­clause   (3)   of   the   aforesaid   Rule   clearly   mandates   that
while conducting an inquiry about the juvenility of an accused, the
Juvenile   Justice   Board   would   seek   evidence   by   obtaining   the
matriculation or  equivalent certificates and in the absence whereof
the   date   of   birth   certificate   from   the   school   first   attended   and   in
absence   whereof   the   birth   certificate   given   by   a   corporation   or   a
Municipal authority or a Panchayat. It is made clear by sub­clause
(b)   that   only   in   the   absence   of   the   aforesaid   three   documents,
medical   information   would   be   sought   from   a   duly   constituted
Medical   Board   which   will   declare   the   age   of   the   juvenile   or   child.
28

Thus, it is only in the absence of the aforesaid documents that the
Juvenile   Justice   Board   could   have   asked   for   medical
information/ossification test.
33. The 2000 Act stands repealed by the 2015 Act. The procedure
for   determining   the   age   is   now   part   of   Section   94   of   the   2015   Act
which   was   earlier   provided   under   the   abovementioned   Rule   12   of
the Rules.
Family Register
34.   The Family Register Rules prescribes preparation of a Family
Register   in   the   State   of   Uttar   Pradesh   which   contains   family­wise
names   and   particulars   of   all   persons   ordinarily   residing   in   the
village pertaining to the Gaon Sabha. Such Rules have been framed
under Section 110 of the U.P. Panchayat Raj Act, 1947. Such Rules
read as under:
“ 1.   (1) These Rules  may be called the  U.P. Panchayat  Raj
(Maintenance of Family Registers) Rules, 1970.
2.   Form and preparation of family register .—A family
register in form A shall be prepared containing family­wise
the   names   and   particulars   of   all   persons   ordinarily
residing   in   the   village   pertaining   to   the   Gaon   Sabha.
Ordinarily one page shall be allotted to each family in the
register.   There   shall   be   a   separate   section   in   the   register
29

for   families   belonging   to   the   Scheduled   Castes.   The
register shall be prepared in Hindi in Devanagri script.
3.   General conditions for registration in the register .
—Every   person   who   has   been   ordinarily   resident   within
the   area   of   the   Gaon   Sabha   shall   be   entitled   to   be
registered in the family register.
Explanation.—A   person   shall   be   deemed   to   be   ordinarily
resident   in   a   village   if   he   has   been   ordinarily   residing   in
such village or is in possession of a dwelling house therein
ready for occupation.
4.   Quarterly   entries   in   the   family   register .—At   the
beginning   of   each   quarter   commencing   from   April   in   each
year, the Secretary of a Gaon Sabha shall make necessary
changes in the family register consequent upon births and
deaths,   if   any   occurring   in   the   previous   quarter   in   each
family. Such changes shall be laid before the next meeting
of the Gaon Panchayat for information.
5.   Correction   of   any   existing   entry .—The   Assistant
Development   Officer   (Panchayat)   may   on   an   application
made   to   him   in   this   behalf   order   the   correction   of   any
existing   entry   in   the   family   register   and   the   Secretary   of
the   Gaon   Sabha   shall   then   correct   the   Register
accordingly.
6.   Inclusion of names in the Register .—(1) Any person
whose   name   is   not   included   in   the   family   register   may
apply to the Assistant Development Officer (Panchayat) for
the inclusion of his name therein.
(2) The Assistant Development Officer (Panchayat) shall, if
satisfied,   after   such   enquiry   as   he   thinks   fit   that   the
applicant is entitled to be registered in the Register, direct
that the name of the applicant be included therein and the
Secretary   of   the   Gaon   Sabha   shall   include   the   name
accordingly.
6­A.   Any person aggrieved by an order made under Rule 5
or Rule 6 may, within 30 days from the date of such order
30

prefer   and   appeal   to   the   Sub­Divisional   Officer   whose
decision shall be final.
7.   Custody   and   preservation   of   the   register .—(1)   The
Secretary   of   the   Gaon   Sabha   shall   be   responsible   for   the
safe custody of the family register.
(2) Every person shall have a right to inspect the Register
and to get attested copy of any entry or extract therefrom
in   such   manner   and   on   payment   of   such   fees,   if   any,   as
may   be   specified   in   Rule   73   of   the   U.P.   Panchayat   Raj
Rules.
FORM A
(See Rule 2)
***
Note.—In the remarks column the number and date of the
order,   if   any,   by   which   any   name   is   added   or   struck   off
should   be   given   along   with   the   signature   of   the   person
making the entry.”
35. A perusal of the above Rules indicate that one page is allotted
to each family and that any change in the family consequent upon
the births and deaths is required to be incorporated on such page.
The changes are also required to be laid before the next meeting of
the   Gram   Panchayat.   Thus,   it   is   evident   that   such   Rules   are
statutorily   framed   in   pursuance   of   an   Act.   The   entries   in   the
register   are   required   to   be   made   by   the   officials   of   the   Gram
Panchayat as part of their official duty. 
31

36. This   Court   in   the   case   of   Manoj   v.   State   of   Haryana ,
reported   in   (2022)   6   SCC   187,   observed   in   regard   to   the   Family
Register referred to above as under:­
“39.   We   are   unable   to   approve   the   broad   view   taken   by
the High Court in some of the cases   that family register is
not relevant to determine age of the family members. It is a
question of fact as to how much evidentiary value is to be
attached to the family register, but to say that it is entirely
not   relevant   would   not   be   the   correct   enunciation   of   law.
The   register   is   being   maintained   in   accordance   with   the
rules   framed   under   a   statute.   The   entries   made   in   the
regular  course  of  the  affairs  of the  Panchayat  would  thus
be   relevant   but   the   extent   of   such   reliance   would   be   in
view of the peculiar facts and circumstances of each case .”
                                                         (Emphasis supplied)
37. In  Abuzar Hossain  (supra), this Court held as under:­
“30.   As a matter of fact, prior to the decisions of this Court
in   Hari Ram   [(2009) 13 SCC 211 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 987]
and   Akbar  Sheikh   [(2009)  7  SCC  415  :  (2009)   3 SCC  (Cri)
431] , a three­Judge Bench of this Court speaking through
one  of  us  (R.M.  Lodha, J.)  in   Pawan   [(2009) 15 SCC 259 :
(2010)   2   SCC   (Cri)   522]   had   considered   the   question
relating   to   admissibility   of   claim   of   juvenility   for   the   first
time   in   this   Court   with   reference   to   Section   7­A.   The
contention of juvenility was raised for the first time before
this   Court   on   behalf   of   the   two   appellants,   namely,   A­1
and   A­2.   The   argument   on   their   behalf   before   this   Court
was   that   they   were   “juvenile”   within   the   meaning   of   the
2000 Act on the date of incident and the trial held against
them   under   the   Code   was   illegal.   With   regard   to   A­1,   his
school leaving certificate was relied on while as regards A­
2,   reliance   was   placed   on   his   statement   recorded   under
32

Section 313 and the school leaving certificate. Dealing with
the contention of juvenility, this Court stated that the claim
of juvenility could  be raised at  any stage, even after final
disposal   of   the   case.   The   Court   then   framed   the   question
in  para  41   of   the   Report   as   to   whether   an   inquiry   should
be   made   or   report   be   called   for   from   the   trial   court
invariably   where   juvenility   is   claimed   for   the   first   time
before this Court.
31.   It   was  held  in   Pawan,  (2009)   15  SCC  259  that   where
the   materials   placed   before   this   Court   by   the   accused,
prima facie, suggested that he was a “juvenile” as defined
in the 2000 Act on the date of incident, it was necessary to
call   for   the   report   or   an   inquiry   to   be   made   for
determination of the age on the date of incident. However,
where   a   plea   of   juvenility   is   found   unscrupulous   or   the
materials  lack credibility or do not  inspire  confidence  and
even prima facie satisfaction of the court is not made out,
further exercise in this regard may not be required. It was
also   stated   that   if   the   plea   of   juvenility   was   not   raised
before the trial court or the High Court and is raised for the
first   time   before   this   Court,   the   judicial   conscience   of   the
court  must  be  satisfied  by  placing  adequate   material  that
the   accused   had   not   attained   the   age   of   18   years   on   the
date   of   commission   of   the   offence.   In   the   absence   of
adequate   material,   any   further   inquiry   into   juvenility
would not be required.
32.   Having regard to the general guidelines  highlighted in
para 41 of   Pawan case   [(2009) 15 SCC 259 : (2010) 2 SCC
(Cri) 522] with regard to the approach of this Court where
juvenility   is   claimed   for   the   first   time,   the   Court   then
considered   the   documents   relied   upon   by   A­1   and   A­2   in
support of the claim of juvenility on the date of incident. In
respect of the two documents relied upon by A­2, namely,
statement   under   Section   313   of   the   Code   and   the   school
leaving   certificate,   this   Court   observed   that   the   statement
33

recorded   under   Section   313   was   a   tentative   observation
based   on   physical   appearance   which   was   hardly
determinative   of   age   and   insofar   as   school   leaving
certificate was concerned, it did not inspire any confidence
as it was issued after A­2 had already been convicted and
the primary evidence like entry from the birth register had
not   been   produced.   As   regards   school   leaving   certificate
relied   upon   by   A­1,   this   Court   found   that   the   same   had
been   procured   after   his   conviction   and   no   entry   from   the
birth register had been produced. The Court was, thus, not
prima   facie   impressed   or   satisfied   by   the   material   placed
on behalf of A­1 and A­2. Those documents were not found
satisfactory   and   adequate   to   call   for   any   report   from   the
Board or the trial court about the age of A­1 and A­2.”
In Para 39, the Court summarizes the legal position as under:­
“39.1.   A   claim   of   juvenility   may   be   raised   at   any   stage
even after the final disposal of the case. It may be raised
for   the   first   time   before   this   Court   as   well   after   the   final
disposal   of   the   case.   The   delay   in   raising   the   claim   of
juvenility   cannot   be   a   ground   for   rejection   of   such   claim.
The claim of juvenility can be raised in appeal even if not
pressed   before   the   trial   court   and   can   be   raised   for   the
first   time   before   this   Court   though   not   pressed   before   the
trial court and in the appeal court.
39.2.   For   making   a   claim   with   regard   to   juvenility   after
conviction,   the   claimant   must   produce   some   material
which   may   prima   facie   satisfy   the   court   that   an   inquiry
into the claim of juvenility is necessary. Initial burden has
to be discharged by the person who claims juvenility.
39.3.   As   to   what   materials   would   prima   facie   satisfy   the
court   and/or   are   sufficient   for   discharging   the   initial
burden cannot be catalogued nor can it be laid down as to
what weight should be given to a specific piece of evidence
34

which  may  be   sufficient   to   raise   presumption  of  juvenility
but   the   documents   referred   to   in   Rules   12(3)(a)(i)   to   (iii)
shall definitely be  sufficient for prima facie satisfaction of
the   court   about   the   age   of   the   delinquent   necessitating
further   enquiry   under   Rule   12.   The   statement   recorded
under Section 313 of the Code is too tentative and may not
by itself be sufficient ordinarily to justify or reject the claim
of   juvenility.   The   credibility   and/or   acceptability   of   the
documents  like   the  school  leaving  certificate   or  the  voters'
list,   etc.   obtained   after   conviction   would   depend   on   the
facts   and   circumstances   of   each   case   and   no   hard­and­
fast   rule   can  be   prescribed   that   they  must   be   prima   facie
accepted or rejected. In   Akbar Sheikh   [(2009) 7 SCC 415 :
(2009)   3   SCC   (Cri)   431]   and   Pawan   [(2009)   15   SCC   259   :
(2010)   2   SCC   (Cri)   522]   these   documents   were   not   found
prima   facie   credible   while   in   Jitendra   Singh   [(2010)   13
SCC   523   :   (2011)   1   SCC   (Cri)   857]   the   documents   viz.
school   leaving   certificate,   marksheet   and   the   medical
report   were   treated   sufficient   for   directing   an   inquiry   and
verification of the appellant's age. If such documents prima
facie   inspire   confidence   of   the   court,   the   court   may   act
upon such documents for the purposes of Section 7­A and
order   an   enquiry   for   determination   of   the   age   of   the
delinquent.
39.4.   An affidavit of the claimant or any of the parents or
a   sibling   or   a   relative   in   support   of   the   claim   of   juvenility
raised for the first time in appeal or revision or before this
Court  during the   pendency  of  the  matter or  after  disposal
of   the   case   shall   not   be   sufficient   justifying   an   enquiry   to
determine the age of such person unless the circumstances
of   the   case   are   so   glaring   that   satisfy   the   judicial
conscience   of   the   court   to   order   an   enquiry   into
determination of the age of the delinquent.
39.5.   The   court   where   the   plea   of   juvenility   is   raised   for
the first time should always be guided by the objectives of
35

the   2000   Act   and   be   alive   to   the   position   that   the
beneficent   and   salutary   provisions   contained   in   the   2000
Act   are   not   defeated   by   the   hypertechnical   approach   and
the   persons   who   are   entitled   to   get   benefits   of   the   2000
Act   get   such   benefits.   The   courts   should   not   be
unnecessarily   influenced   by   any   general   impression   that
in   schools   the   parents/guardians   understate   the   age   of
their wards by one or two years for future benefits or that
age   determination   by   medical   examination   is   not   very
precise.   The   matter   should   be   considered   prima   facie   on
the touchstone of preponderance of probability.
39.6.   Claim   of   juvenility   lacking   in   credibility   or   frivolous
claim   of   juvenility   or   patently   absurd   or   inherently
improbable claim of juvenility must be rejected by the court
at the threshold whenever raised.”
38. Justice   T.S.   Thakur   (as   His   Lordship   then   was),   by   his
separate but concurring judgment, observed as under:­
“43.2.   The   second   factor   which   must   ever   remain   present
in the mind of the Court is that the claim of juvenility may
at   times   be   made   even   in   cases   where   the   accused   does
not   have   any   evidence   showing   his   date   of   birth   by
reference to any public document like the Register of Births
and   Deaths   maintained   by   the   municipal   authorities,
panchayats   or   hospitals   nor   any   certificate   from   any
school, as the accused was never admitted to any school.
Even   if   admitted   to   a   school   no   record   regarding   such
admission may at times be available for production in the
court.   Again,   there   may   be   cases   in   which   the   accused
may not be in a position to provide a birth certificate from
the corporation, the  municipality or the panchayat, for we
know that the registration of births and deaths may not be
36

maintained   and   if   maintained   may   not   be   regular   and
accurate, and at times truthful.
44.   Rule   12(3)   of   the   Rules   makes   only   three   certificates
relevant. These are enumerated in sub­rules 3(a)(i) to (iii) of
the Rule which reads as under:
“(3)(a)(i)   the   matriculation   or   equivalent   certificates,
if available; and in the absence whereof;
(ii) the date of birth certificate from the school (other
than   a   play   school)   first   attended;   and   in   the
absence whereof;
(iii)   the   birth   certificate   given   by   a   corporation   or   a
municipal authority or a panchayat;
Non­production of the above certificates or any one of them
is not, however, fatal to the claim of juvenility, for sub­rule
(3)(b) to Rule 12 makes a provision for determination of the
question   on   the   basis   of   the   medical   examination   of   the
accused in the “absence” of the certificates.
     45.   Rule 12(3)(b) runs as under:
“12.(3)(b) and only in the absence of either (i), (ii) or (iii) of
clause (a) above, the medical opinion will be sought from
a duly constituted  Medical Board, which will declare  the
age   of   the   juvenile   or   child.   In   case   exact   assessment   of
the age cannot be done, the court or the Board or, as the
case   may   be,   the   Committee,   for   the   reasons   to   be
recorded   by   them,   may,   if   considered   necessary,   give
benefit to the child or juvenile by considering his/her age
on lower side within the margin of one year,”
The expression “absence” appearing in the above provision
is not defined under the Act or the Rules. The word shall,
therefore,   be   given   its   literal   dictionary   meaning   which   is
provided by   Concise Oxford Dictionary   as under:
37

“Absence.—Being away from a place or person; time
of   being   away;   non­existence   or   lack   of;   inattention
due to thought of other things.”
Black's   Law   Dictionary   also   explains   the   meaning   of
“absence” as under:
“Absence.—(1) The state of being away from one's usual
place   of   residence.   (2)   A   failure   to   appear,   or   to   be
available   and   reachable,   when   expected.   (3)   Louisiana
law. The state of being an absent person.— Also termed
(in sense 3) absentia.”
46.   It   is   axiomatic   that   the   use   of   the   expression   and   the
context   in   which   the   same   has   been   used   strongly
suggests   that   “absence”   of   the   documents   mentioned   in
Rule   12(3)(a)(i)   to   (iii)   may   be   either   because   the   same   do
not   exist   or   the   same   cannot   be   produced   by   the   person
relying   upon   them.   Mere   non­production   may   not,
therefore,   disentitle   the   accused   of   the   benefit   of   the   Act
nor  can  it   tantamount  to   deliberate   non­production,  giving
rise   to   an   adverse   inference   unless   the   court   is   in   the
peculiar   facts   and   circumstances   of   a   case   of   the   opinion
that   the   non­production   is   deliberate   or  intended   to   either
mislead the court or suppress the truth. It is in this class of
cases  that  the  court  may have  to  exercise  its  powers  and
discretion with a certain amount of insight into the realities
of life.
47.   One of such realities is that illiteracy and crime have a
close nexus though one may not be directly proportional to
the   other.   Juvenile   delinquency   in   this   country   as
elsewhere   in   the   world,   springs   from   poverty   and
unemployment,   more   than   it   does   out   of   other   causes.   A
large   number  of  those   engaged   in  criminal  activities,  may
never   have   had   the   opportunity   to   go   to   school.   Studies
conducted by the National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB),
Ministry   of   Home   Affairs,   reveal   that   poor   education   and
38

poor   economic   set   up   are   generally   the   main   attributes   of
juvenile   delinquents.   Result   of   the   2011   study   further
show that out of 33,887 juveniles arrested in 2011, 55.8%
were   either   illiterate   (6122)   or   educated   only   till   the
primary level (12,803). Further, 56.7% of the total juveniles
arrested   fell   into   the   lowest   income   category.   A   similar
study   is   conducted   and   published   by   B.N.   Mishra   in   his
book   Juvenile   Delinquency   and   Justice   System,   in   which
the author states as follows:
“One   of   the   prominent   features   of   a   delinquent   is
poor  educational   attainment.   More   than  63  per  cent
of   delinquents   are   illiterate.   Poverty   is   the   main
cause   of   their   illiteracy.   Due   to   poor   economic
condition   they   were   compelled   to   enter   into   the
labour  market   to  supplement  their   family  income.  It
is   also   felt   that   poor   educational   attainment   is   not
due to the lack of intelligence but may be due to lack
of   opportunity.   Although   free   education   is   provided
to   Scheduled   Castes   and   Scheduled   Tribes,   even
then,   the   delinquents   had   a   very   low   level   of
expectations   and   aspirations   regarding   their   future
which   in   turn   is   due   to   lack   of   encouragement   and
unawareness of their parents that they play truant.”
(emphasis supplied)
What   should   then   be   the   approach   in   such   cases,   is   the
question.  Can  the  advantage   of   a  beneficial  legislation be
denied   to   such   unfortunate   and   wayward   delinquents?
Can the misfortune of the accused never going to a school
be   followed   or   compounded   by   denial   of   the   benefit   that
the   legislation   provides   in   such   emphatic   terms,   as   to
permit   an   enquiry   even   after   the   last   Court   has   disposed
of the  appeal and  upheld his conviction?  The  answer has
to be in the negative.
39

48.   If   one   were   to   adopt   a   wooden   approach,   one   could
say nothing short of a certificate, whether from the school
or   a   municipal   authority   would   satisfy   the   court's
conscience, before directing an enquiry. But, then directing
an enquiry is not the same thing as declaring the accused
to be a juvenile. The standard of proof required is different
for   both.   In   the   former,   the   court   simply   records   a   prima
facie   conclusion.   In   the   latter,   the   court   makes   a
declaration   on   evidence,   that   it   scrutinises   and   accepts
only if it is worthy of such acceptance.  The approach at the
stage of directing the enquiry has  of necessity to be  more
liberal,   lest,   there   is   avoidable   miscarriage   of   justice.
Suffice it to say that while affidavits may not be generally
accepted as a good enough basis for directing an enquiry,
that they are not so accepted is not a rule of law but a rule
of   prudence.   The   Court   would,   therefore,   in   each   case
weigh   the   relevant   factors,   insist   upon   filing   of   better
affidavits   if   the   need   so   arises,   and   even   direct,   any
additional   information   considered   relevant   including   the
information   regarding   the   age   of   the   parents,   the   age   of
siblings and the like, to be furnished before it decides on a
case   to   case   basis   whether   or   not   an   enquiry   under
Section   7­A   ought   to   be   conducted.   It   will   eventually
depend   on   how   the   court   evaluates   such   material   for   a
prima facie conclusion that the court may or may not direct
an enquiry .”                                                                                        (Emphasis
supplied)
39. Thus,   Section   7A(1)   of   the   2000   Act   and   the   proviso   thereto
provided that a claim of juvenility might be raised before any court
and it shall be recognized at any stage, even after the final disposal
of   the   case,   and   such   claim   shall   be   determined   in   terms   of   the
provisions   contained   in   the   2000   Act   and   the   Rules   made
40

thereunder, even if the juvenile has ceased to be so, on or before the
date of commencement of the 2000 Act. 
40. Sub­section (2) of Section 7A mandates that if the Court finds
a   person   to   be  a  juvenile   on   the   date  of   the  commission   of  offence
under   sub­section   (1),   it   shall   forward   the   juvenile   to   the   Juvenile
Justice Board for passing an appropriate order, and the sentence, if
any, passed by a Court shall be deemed to have no effect. 
41. Section 16 of the 2000 Act provides as hereunder:­ 
“ 16.   Order   that   may   not   be   passed   against   juvenile.
—
(1)   Notwithstanding   anything   to   the   contrary   contained   in
any   other   law   for   the   time   being   in   force,   no   juvenile   in
conflict   with   law   shall   be   sentenced   to   death   or
imprisonment   for   any   term   which   may   extend   to
imprisonment   for   life,   or   committed   to   prison   in   default   of
payment of fine or in default of furnishing security: 
Provided   that   where   a   juvenile   who   has   attained   the   age
of  sixteen  years  has  committed  an offence   and   the  Board
is   satisfied   that   the   offence   committed   is   of   so   serious   in
nature  or that his conduct  and behaviour have  been such
that it would not be in his interest or in the interest of other
juvenile   in   a   special   home   to   send   him   to   such   special
home and that none of the other measures provided under
this   Act   is   suitable   or   sufficient,   the   Board   may   order   the
juvenile   in   conflict   with   law   to   be   kept   in   such   place   of
safety and in such manner as it thinks fit and shall report
the case for the order of the State Government. 
41

(2)   On   receipt   of   a   report   from   a   Board   under   sub­section
(1), the State Government may make such arrangement in
respect   of   the   juvenile   as   it   deems   proper   and   may   order
such   juvenile   to   be   kept   under   protective   custody   at   such
place and on such conditions as it thinks fit:
  Provided that the period of detention so ordered shall
not   exceed   in   any   case   the   maximum   period   provided
under Section 15 of this Act.”
42. The   maximum   period   of   detention   in   respect   of   a   juvenile   is
three   years   as   provided   in   Section   15(1)(g).   The   said   Section
provides   that   where   the   Juvenile   Justice   Board   is,   on   inquiry,
satisfied   that   the   juvenile   has   committed   an   offence,   then
notwithstanding   anything   to   the   contrary   contained   in   any   other
law for the time being in force, the Juvenile Justice Board may, if it
thinks   fit,   make   an   order   directing   the   juvenile   to   be   sent   to   a
special home for a period of three years.
43. In view of Section 7A of the 2000 Act referred to hereinabove,
applicable   to   the   writ   applicant   herein,   the   plea   of   juvenility   could
be raised in any court, at any stage even after the final disposal of
the Special Leave Petition under Article 136 of the Constitution. In
the case of the writ applicant herein, his Special Leave Petition had
42

also   been   dismissed   by   this   Court.   However,   this   Court   is   still
obliged to consider the plea of juvenility taken by the writ applicant
and   grant   him   appropriate   relief.   The   fact   that   the   2000   Act   has
later been replaced by the 2015 Act would make no difference.  
44. In regard to the nature of the inquiry to be conducted by the
court in determining the age under Section 7A of the 2000 Act and
Rule   12,   this   Court   in   Ashwani   Kumar   Saxena   v.   State   of
Mahya Pradesh ,   AIR   2013   SC   553,   has held   as   follows:­
“25. Section 7­A, obliges the court only to make an   inquiry,
not   an   investigation   or   a   trial,   an   inquiry   not   under   the
Code   of   Criminal   Procedure,   but   under   the   JJ   Act.   The
criminal   courts,   Juvenile   Justice   Board,   committees,   etc.
we have noticed, proceed as if they are conducting a trial,
inquiry,   enquiry   or   investigation   as   per   the   Code.   The
statute   requires   the   court   or   the   Board   only   to   make   an
“inquiry”   and   in   what   manner   that   inquiry   has   to   be
conducted   is   provided   in   the   JJ   Rules.   Few   of   the
expressions   used   in   Section   7­A   and   Rule   12   are   of
considerable   importance   and   a   reference   to   them   is
necessary   to   understand   the   true   scope   and   content   of
those   provisions.   Section   7­A   has   used   the   expressions
“court shall make an inquiry”, “take such evidence as may
be necessary” and “but not an affidavit”. The Court or the
Board   can   accept   as   evidence   something   more   than   an
affidavit i.e. the Court or the Board can accept documents,
certificates, etc. as evidence, need not be oral evidence.
26.   Rule   12   which   has   to   be   read   along   with   Section   7­A
43

has   also   used   certain   expressions   which   are   also   to   be
borne   in   mind.   Rule   12(2)   uses   the   expression   “prima
facie”   and   “on   the   basis   of   physical   appearance”   or
“documents,   if   available”.   Rule   12(3)   uses   the   expression
“by   seeking   evidence   by   obtaining”.   These   expressions   in
our view re­emphasise the fact that what is contemplated
in   Section   7­A   and   Rule   12   is   only   an   inquiry.   Further,
the   age determination inquiry   has to be completed and age
be determined within thirty days from the date of making
the application; which is also an indication of the manner
in   which   the   inquiry   has   to   be   conducted   and   completed.
The word “inquiry” has not been defined under the JJ Act,
but   Section   2(y)   of   the   JJ   Act   says   that   all   words   and
expressions used and not defined in the JJ Act but defined
in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), shall
have   the   meanings   respectively   assigned   to   them   in   that
Code.
27.   Let   us   now   examine   the   meaning   of   the   words
“inquiry”,   “enquiry”,   “investigation”   and   “trial”   as   we   see
in   the   Code   of   Criminal   Procedure   and   their   several
meanings   attributed   to   those   expressions.   “Inquiry”   as
defined in Section 2(g) CrPC reads as follows:
2.   (g)   ‘inquiry’   means   every   inquiry,   other   than   a
trial, conducted  under this  Code by a Magistrate or
court;”
The word “enquiry” is not defined under the Code of
Criminal   Procedure   which   is   an   act   of   asking   for
information   and   also   consideration   of   some
evidence, may be documentary.
“Investigation” as defined in Section 2(h) CrPC reads
as follows:
2.   (h)   ‘investigation’   includes   all   the   proceedings
under   this   Code   for   the   collection   of   evidence
conducted by a police officer or by any person (other
44

than   a   Magistrate)   who   is   authorised   by   a
Magistrate in this behalf;”
The   expression   “trial”   has   not   been   defined   in   the
Code   of   Criminal   Procedure   but   must   be   understood
in   the   light   of   the   expressions   “inquiry”   or
“investigation” as contained in Sections 2(g) and 2(h)
of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
28.   The   expression   “trial”   has   been   generally   understood
as the examination by court of issues of fact and law in a
case for the purpose of rendering the judgment relating to
some offences committed. We find in very many cases that
the court/the Juvenile Justice Board while determining the
claim of juvenility forget that what they are expected to do
is not to conduct an inquiry under Section 2(g) of the Code
of   Criminal   Procedure,   but   an   inquiry   under   the   JJ   Act,
following the procedure laid  down under Rule  12 and  not
following the procedure laid down under the Code.
29.   The   Code   lays   down   the   procedure   to   be   followed   in
every   investigation,   inquiry   or   trial   for   every   offence,
whether under the Indian Penal   Code or under other Penal
laws.   The   Code   makes   provisions   for   not   only
investigation,   inquiry   into   or   trial   for   offences   but   also
inquiries   into   certain   specific   matters.   The   procedure   laid
down   for   inquiring into the specific matters under the Code
naturally cannot be applied in inquiring into other   matters
like   the   claim   of   juvenility   under   Section   7A   read   with
Rule   12   of   the   2007   Rules.   In   other   words,   the   law
regarding   the   procedure   to   be   followed   in   such   inquiry
must   be   found   in   the   enactment   conferring   jurisdiction   to
hold   inquiry.
30.  Consequently, the   procedure   to  be  followed   under  the
J.J.   Act   in   conducting   an   inquiry   is   the   procedure   laid
down   in   that  statute   itself   i.e.   Rule  12 of the  2007 Rules.
45

We cannot import other   procedures   laid   down   in   the   Code
of   Criminal   Procedure   or   any   other   enactment   while
making   an   inquiry   with   regard   to   the   juvenility   of   a
person,   when   the   claim   of   juvenility   is   raised   before   the
court exercising powers under Section   7A of the Act. Many
of   the   cases,   we   have   come   across,   it   is   seen   that   the
Criminal   Courts   are   still   having   the   hangover   of   the
procedure of trial or   inquiry under the Code as if they are
trying   an   offence   under   the   Penal   laws   forgetting   the   fact
that   the   specific   procedure   has   been   laid   down   in   Section
7A   read   with Rule 12.
31.   We   also   remind   all   Courts/J.J.   Board   and   the
Committees   functioning   under   the   Act   that   a   duty   is   cast
on   them   to   seek   evidence   by   obtaining   the   certificate   etc.
mentioned   in   Rule   12   (3)   (a)   (i)   to   (iii).   The   courts   in   such
situations   act   as   a   parens   patriae   because   they   have   a
kind   of   guardianship   over   minors   who   from   their   legal
disability   stand   in need of protection.
32.   “Age   determination   inquiry"   contemplated   under
Section   7A   of   the   Act   r/w   Rule   12   of   the   2007   Rules
enables   the   court   to   seek   evidence   and,   in   that   process,
the   court   can   obtain   the   matriculation   or   equivalent
certificates,   if   available.   Only   in   the   absence   of   any
matriculation   or   equivalent   certificates,   the   court   need
obtain   the   date   of   birth   certificate   from   the   school   first
attended other than a play school.   Only   in   the   absence   of
matriculation   or   equivalent   certificate   or   the   date   of   birth
certificate   from   the   school   first   attended,   the   court   need
obtain   the   birth   certificate   given   by   a   corporation   or   a
municipal   authority   or   a   panchayat   (not   an   affidavit   but
certificates   or   documents).   The   question   of   obtaining
medical   opinion   from   a   duly   constituted   Medical   Board
arises   only   if   the   above   mentioned   documents   are
unavailable.   In   case   exact   assessment   of   the   age   cannot
46

be done, then the court, for reasons   to be recorded, may, if
considered   necessary,   give   the   benefit   to   the   child   or
juvenile   by   considering his or her age on lower side within
the   margin   of   one year.
33.   Once       the       court,   following       the       above   mentioned
procedures,   passes   an   order;   that   order   shall   be   the
conclusive   proof   of   the   age   as   regards   such   child   or
juvenile   in   conflict   with   law.   It   has   been   made   clear   in   sub­
section   (5)   or   Rule   12   that   no   further   inquiry   shall   be
conducted   by   the   court   or   the   Board   after   examining   and
obtaining   the   certificate   or   any   other   documentary   proof
after   referring   to   sub­rule   (3)   of   the   Rule   12.   Further,
Section 49 of the J.J. Act   also   draws   a   presumption   of   the
age   of   the   juvenility   on its   determination.
34.   Age   determination   inquiry   contemplated   under   the   JJ
Act   and   Rules   has   nothing   to   do   with   an   enquiry   under
other   legislations,   like   entry   in   service,   retirement,
promotion   etc.   There   may   be   situations   where   the   entry
made   in   the   matriculation   or   equivalent   certificates,   date   of
birth   certificate   from   the   school   first   attended and even the
birth   certificate   given   by   a   Corporation   or   a   Municipal
Authority   or   a   Panchayat   may   not   be   correct.   But   Court,
J.J.   Board or a Committee functioning under the J.J.   Act is
not   expected   to   conduct   such   a   roving   enquiry   and   to   go
behind   those   certificates   to   examine   the   correctness   of
those   documents,   kept   during   the   normal   course   of
business.   Only   in   cases   where   those   documents   or
certificates   are  found  to be fabricated or manipulated, the
Court,   the   J.J.   Board   or   the   Committee   need   to   go   for
medical   report   for   age   determination”.
47

45. What   is   discernible   from   the   dictum   laid   down   in   Ashwani
Kumar  Saxena   (supra) is that, in   deciding  whether  an  accused is
juvenile or not, a hyper technical   approach should not be adopted.
While   appreciating   the   evidence   adduced   on   behalf   of   the   accused
in support of the plea that he is  a   juvenile, if two views are possible
on   the   same   evidence,   the   C ourt   should   lean   in   favour   of   holding
the   accused   to   be   juvenile   in   borderline   cases.   The   inquiry
contemplated   is   not   a   roving   inquiry.   The   Court   can   accept   as
evidence   something   more   than   an   affidavit   i.e.   documents,
certificates   etc.   as   evidence   in   proof   of   age.   A   mere   opinion   by   a
person   as   to   the   accused   looking   one   or   two   years   older   than   the
age   claimed   by   him   (as   the   opinion   of   the   head   master   in   the
present   case)   or   the   fact   that   the   accused   told   his   age   to   be   more
than what he alleges in the case while being arrested by the police
officer  would not  hold much water. It is the documentary  evidence
placed on record that plays a major role in determining the age of a
juvenile   in   conflict   of   law.   And,   it   is   only   in   the   cases   where   the
documents   or   certificates   placed   on   record   by   the   accused   in
support   of   his   claim   of   juvenility   are   found   to   be   fabricated   or
48

manipulated,   that   the   Court,   the   Juvenile   Justice   Board   or   the
Committee need to go for medical test for age determination.
46. Clause   (a)   of   Rule   12(3)   of   the   2007   Rules   contains   a
hierarchical   ordering,   evident   from   the   use   of   the   language   "in   the
absence   whereof".   This   indicates   that   where   a   matriculation   or
equivalent   certificate  is   available,   the  documents   adverted  to   in   (ii)
and   (iii)   cannot   be   relied   upon.   The   matriculation   certificate,   in
other   words,   is   given   precedence.   It   is   in   the   absence   of   a
matriculation   certificate   that   the   date   of   birth   certificate   of   the
school first   attended, can be relied upon. It is in the absence of both
the   matriculation   and   the   birth   certificates   of   the   first   school
attended   that   a   birth   certificate   issued   by   the   corporation,
municipal   authority   or   panchayat   could   be   obtained.
47. In   Shah   Nawaz   v.   State   of   Uttar   Pradesh ,   (2011)   13   SCC
751, this  Court,  while  examining  the  scope of  Rule 12 of the 2007
Rules,   has   reiterated   that   medical   opinion   from   the   Medical   Board
should   be   sought   only   when   the   matriculation   certificate   or
equivalent certificate or the date of birth certificate from the school
first   attended   or   any   birth   certificate   issued   by   a   corporation   or   a
49

municipal authority or a panchayat or municipality is not available.
This   Court   had   held   that   the   entry   related   to   the   date   of   birth
entered in the marksheet is a valid evidence for determining the age
of   the   accused   person   so   also   the   school   leaving   certificate   for
determining the age of the appellant.
48. In   the   instant   case,   the   accused   has   not   produced   any
matriculation   certificate   or   equivalent   certificate   to   prove   his   age.
What is produced by  him  is only  the  Family  Register  issued under
the   U.P.   Panchayat   Raj   Act,   1947.     The   document   cannot   be
accepted as  equivalent   to  matriculation   certificate  to  prove the  age
of   the   accused.     However,   the   evidentiary   value   of   the   Family
Register will have to be looked into in the course of the inquiry that
we may order. 
Determination of plea of juvenility at a belated stage
49.  Ideally,   there   should   not   be   any   dispute   as   to   the   age   of   a
person if the birth is registered in accordance with law and date of
birth is entered in the school records on the basis of genuine record
of   birth.   However,   in   India,   the   factors   like   poverty,   illiteracy,
50

ignorance,   indifference   and   inadequacy   of   the   system   often   lead   to
there   being   no   documentary   proof   of   a   person’s   age.   Therefore,   in
those cases where the plea of juvenility is raised at a belated stage,
often   certain   medical   tests   are   resorted   to   forage   determination   in
absence   of   the   documents   enumerated   in   Section   94   of   the   Act
2015.   The   rule   allowing   plea   of   juvenility   to   be   raised   at   a
considerably   belated   stage   has   its   rationale   in   the   contemporary
child rights jurisprudence which requires the stakeholders to act in
the best interest of the child.
50.  In   Court   On  Its   Own  Motion  v.  Dept.   of Women  and  Child
Development ,   reported   in   2012   SCC   OnLine   Del   2774,   the
petitioners   therein   highlighted   that   how   several   hundred   children
were   languishing   in   the   Tihar   Jail   because   the   police   mentioned
them as adults in the arrest memo.  
51. The same is the story in the State of Uttar Pradesh which led
the High Court of Allahabad to pass the order in Writ Petition Public
Interest Litigation referred to above in para 6. 
51

52.  Awareness about  the rights of  the  child and  correlated duties
remain   low  among  the  functionaries  of  the  juvenile  justice  system.
Once a child is caught in the web of adult criminal justice system, it
is difficult for the child to get out of it unscathed. The bitter truth is
that   even   the   legal   aid   programmes   are   mired   in   systemic
bottlenecks   and   often   it   is   only   at   a   considerably   belated   stage   of
the   proceeding   that   the   person   becomes   aware   of   the   rights,
including   the   right   to   be   differently   treated   on   the   ground   of
juvenility.
53. W hat needs to be kept in mind is the main object and purpose
of   the   Juvenile   Justice   Act.   The   focus   of   this   legislation   is   on   the
juvenile’s   reformation   and   rehabilitation   so   that   he   also   may   have
an   opportunity   to   enjoy   as   other   children.   In      Pratap   Singh
(supra) ,   this   Court,   elaborating   on   the   objects   and   purpose   of   the
Juvenile Justice Act, made the following observations:­
"...The said Act is not only a beneficent legislation, but also
a   remedial   one.   The   Act   aims   at   grant   of   care,   protection
and   rehabilitation   of   a   juvenile   vis­à­vis   the   adult
criminals.   Having   regard   to   Rule   4   of   the   United   Nations
Standard   Minimum   Rules   for   the   Administration   of
Juvenile   Justice,   it   must   also   be   borne   in   mind   that   the
moral   and   psychological   components   of   criminal
52

responsibility   were   also   one   of   the   factors   in   defining
a   juvenile. The first objective, therefore, is the promotion of
the   well­being   of   the   juvenile   and   the   second   objective   to
bring   about   the   principle   of   proportionality   whereby   and
whereunder   the   proportionality   of   the   reaction   to   the
circumstances   of   both   the   offender   and   the   offence
including   the   victim   should   be   safeguarded..."
 
What is bone ossification test?
54. The famous American philosopher Mark Twain once said, “ Age
is an issue of Mind over matter. If you don’t mind, it doesn’t matter .”
But   the   above   is   not   the   case   in   criminal   jurisprudence   when   it
comes to age. Here, age matters because law is mindful to it.
55. The   bone   ossification   test   (hereinafter   “ossification   test”)   is   a
test that determines age based on the “degree of fusion of bone” by
taking   the   x­ray   of   a   few   bones.   In   simple   words,   the   ossification
test   or   osteogenesis   is   the   process   of   the   bone   formation   based   on
the fusion of joints between the birth and age of twenty­five years in
an individual.   Bone age is an indicator of the skeletal and biological
maturity   of   an   individual   which   assists   in   the   determination   of
age.   The most common method used for the calculation of the bone
age  is radiography  of  the  hand  and   wrist  until   the  age of   18  years
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beyond   which   the   medial   age   of   clavicle   is   used   for   bone   age
calculation   till   the   age   of   22   years   as   the   hand   and   wrist   bone
radiographs   cannot   be   computed   beyond   18   years   of   age   as   the
elongation   of   the   bone   is   complete   after   adolescence.   However,   it
must   be   noted   that   the   ossification   test   varies   slightly   based   on
individual   characteristics,   therefore   the   ossification   test   though   is
relevant however it cannot be called solely conclusive.
56. The   2015   Act   under   Section   94(2)( iii )   read   with   Rule   12(3)   of
the   2007  Rules  provides  the  legislative  sanction   for  the   conduct  of
ossification test or other medical age determination test available in
the   absence   of   other   documentary   proof   of   age   i.e.   matriculation
certificate or birth certificate, which has to be given within 15 days
from   the   date   of   such   order.   The   test   is   to   be   conducted   by   the
Child Welfare Committee (CWC).   The provision mentioned herein is
the   basis   for   determining   the   age   of   a   child   under   the   2000   Act
which even includes a child who is a victim of crime in addition to a
child in conflict with the law.  
57. In   Vishnu   v.   State   of   Maharashtra ,   (2006)   1   SCC   283,   this
Court clarified that the ossification test by the medical officer is to
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assist   the   court   which   falls   under   the   ambit   of   medical   expert
opinion i.e., advisory in nature and not binding. However, such an
opinion cannot override ocular or documentary evidence, which has
been proved to be true and admissible as they constitute “statement
of   facts”.   This   Court   in   Vishnu   (supra)   placed   reliance   on   Madan
Gopal   Kakkad   v.   Naval   Dubey ,   (1992)   3   SCC   204,   to   hold   that   a
medical   witness   is   not   a   witness   of   fact   therefore   the   opinion
rendered by such a medical expert is merely advisory until accepted
by   the   Court,   however,   once   accepted,   they   become   the   opinion   of
the Court.
Margin of error principle
58. The   bone   ossification   test   is   not   an   exact   science   that   can
provide us with the exact age of the person. As discussed above, the
individual   characteristics   such   as   the   growth   rate   of   bones   and
skeletal   structures   can   affect   the   accuracy   of   this   method.   This
Court   has   observed   in   Ram   Suresh   Singh   v .   Prabhat   Singh ,
(2009)   6   SCC   681:   (2010)   2   SCC   (Cri)   1194,   and   Jyoti   Prakash
Rai   v.   State of Bihar , (2008) 15 SCC 223: (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 796,
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that   the   ossification   test   is   not   conclusive   for   age   determination
because   it   does   not   reveal   the   exact   age   of   the   person,   but   the
radiological examination leaves a margin of two years on either side
of the age range as prescribed by the test   irrespective of whether the
ossification test of multiple joints is conducted.   The courts in India
have   accepted   the   fact   that   after   the   age   of   thirty   years   the
ossification   test   cannot   be   relied   upon   for   age   determination.   It   is
trite   that   the   standard   of   proof   for   the   determination   of   age   is   the
degree of probability and not proof beyond reasonable doubt. 
59.  In the aforesaid context, we may also refer to a decision of this
Court in the case of  Mukarrab v. State of Uttar Pradesh , reported
in (2017) 2 SCC 210, wherein this Court has observed in para 27 as
under:­
“…  Following Babloo Pasi v. State of Jharkhand, (2008) 13
SCC 133 and  State  of  M.P.  v. Anoop Singh, (2015)  7 SCC
773,  we  hold   that  ossification test  cannot   be   regarded   as
conclusive   when   it   comes   to   ascertaining   the   age   of   a
person.   More   so,   the   appellants   herein   have   certainly
crossed   the   age   of   thirty   years   which   is   an   important
factor   to   be   taken   into   account   as   age   cannot   be
determined with precision . …”
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60. In   Arnit   Das   v.   State   of   Bihar ,   (2000)   5   SCC   488,   it   was
observed that the Court should not take a hyper­technical approach
while appreciating evidence for determination of age of the accused.
If two views are possible, the Court should lean in favour of holding
the accused to be a juvenile in border line cases. This approach was
further reiterated by this Court in   Rajendra Chandra v. State of
Chhattisgarh ,   (2002)   2   SCC   287,   in   which   it   laid   down   that   the
standard   of   proof   of   age   determination   is   the   degree   of   probability
and not proof beyond reasonable doubt.
61. In   Rishipal   Singh   Solanki   v.   State   of   Uttar   Pradesh ,
(2021)   SCC   OnLine   SC   1079,   this   Court   observed   explicitly   that
Section   94   of   the   2015   Act   does   not   give   precedence   to   the
matriculation and other certificates, to determine the age of person,
since the said section only deals with the matter of procedure. This
Court held that   lex  non cogit  ad impossibilia   (law does not demand
the   impossible)   and   when   the   ossification   test   cannot   yield
trustworthy  and reliable results, such test cannot be made a basis
to   determine   the   age   of   the   person   and   other   available   certificates
may be taken into consideration.
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62. Similarly,   in   the   case   of   Ram   Vijay   Singh   v.   State   of   U.P. ,
( 2021)   SCC   Online   SC   142,   this   Court,   while   negativing   the
contention canvassed on behalf of the appellant convict therein that
the procedure as contained in Rule 12(3)(b) of the 2007 Rules now
being   part  of  Section  94   of   the   2015  Act  and   once   the   statute   has
provided the ossification test as the basis for determining juvenility,
the   findings   of   such   ossification   test   cannot   be   ignored,   held   in
paras 15 and 16 resply as under:­
“15. We find that the procedure prescribed in Rule 12 is not
materially   different   than   the   provisions   of   Section   94   of   the
Act   to   determine   the   age   of   the   person.   There   are   minor
variations   as   the   Rule   12(3)(a)(i)   and   (ii)   have   been   clubbed
together with slight change in the language.   Section 94   of the
Act   does   not   contain   the   provisions   regarding   benefit   of
margin   of   age   to   be   given   to   the   child   or   juvenile   as   was
provided   in   Rule   12(3)(b)   of   the   Rules.   The   importance   of
ossification   test   has   not   undergone   change   with   the
enactment   of   Section   94   of   the   Act.   The   reliability   of   the
ossification test remains vulnerable as was under Rule 12 of
the Rules.
16.   As   per   the   Scheme   of   the   Act ,   when   it   is   obvious   to   the
Committee   or   the   Board,   based   on   the   appearance   of   the
person,   that   the   said   person   is   a   child,   the   Board   or
Committee   shall   record   observations   stating   the   age   of   the
Child   as   nearly   as   may   be   without   waiting   for   further
confirmation   of   the   age.   Therefore,   the   first   attempt   to
determine   the   age   is   by   assessing   the   physical  appearance
of   the   person   when   brought   before   the   Board   or   the
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Committee.   It   is   only   in   case   of   doubt,   the   process   of   age
determination   by   seeking   evidence   becomes   necessary.   At
that   stage,   when   a   person   is   around   18   years   of   age,   the
ossification   test   can   be   said   to   be   relevant   for   determining
the   approximate   age   of   a   person   in   conflict   with   law.
However, when the person is around 40­55 years of age, the
structure of bones cannot be helpful in determining the age.
This Court in   Arjun Panditrao         Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao
Gorantyal   and   Ors .     held,   in   the   context   of   certificate
required   under   Section   65B   of   the   Evidence   Act,   1872,   that
as   per   the   Latin   maxim,   lex   non   cogit   ad   impossibilia,   law
does not demand the impossible. Thus, when the ossification
test   cannot   yield   trustworthy   and   reliable   results,   such   test
cannot   be   made   a  basis   to   determine   the   age   of   the   person
concerned on the date of incident. Therefore, in the absence
of any reliable trustworthy medical evidence to find out age
of the appellant, the ossification test conducted in year 2020
when   the   appellant   was   55   years   of   age   cannot   be
conclusive   to   declare   him   as   a   juvenile   on   the   date   of   the
incident.”
63. We   are   conscious   of   the   fact   that   in   the   case   on   hand   the
convict was subjected to medical examination after being referred to
the   Medical   Board.   However,  the   report   on   record   does   not   inspire
much   confidence.   Over   and   above   the   same,   the   decision   in   the
case   of   Ram   Vijay   Singh   (supra)   makes   it   very   clear   that   in   the
absence   of   a   reliable   and   trustworthy   medical   evidence   to   find   out
the   age   of   the   appellant   herein,   the   ossification   test   conducted   in
the year 2021 when the appellant was above 50 years of age cannot
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be   conclusive   to   declare   him   as   a   juvenile   on   the   date   of   the
incident.   This   Court   observed   that   when   a   person   is   around   18
years   of   age,   the   ossification   test   can   be   said   to   be   relevant   for
determining   the   approximate   age   of   a   person   in   conflict   with   law.
However,   when   the   person   is   around   40­55   years   of   age,   the
structure   of   bones   cannot   be   helpful   in   determining   the   age.   In
such circumstances, it will be a matter of debate as to what extent
the   new   ossification   test   report   that   may   come   on   record   can   be
relied   upon   and   to   what   extent   the   same   would   be   helpful   to   the
appellant herein.
64. Despite all the odds against the writ applicant, we would still
like to look into the matter in the larger interest of justice. It will be
in   fitness   of   things   if   the   writ   applicant   convict   is   once   again
subjected to the ossification test at the Civil Hospital, Allahabad or
any other latest medical age determination test and such test shall
be   carried   out   by   a   team   of   three   doctors,   one   of   whom   should   be
the head of the Department of Radiology. 
65. In view of the aforesaid, we issue the following directions:
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(i) We direct the Sessions Court, Agra to examine the claim of the
writ   applicant   to   juvenility   in   regard   with   law   within   one
month from the date of communication of this order;
(ii) The   concerned   Sessions   Court   shall   also   examine   the
authenticity and genuineness of the Family Register sought to
be   relied   upon   by   writ   applicant   convict   considering   that   the
document   does   not   appear   to   be   contemporaneous.   This
document   assumes  importance,  more  particularly   in  the   light
of   the   fact   that   the   ossification   test   report   may   not   be
absolutely   helpful   in   determining   the   exact   age   of   the   writ
applicant   on   the   date   of   incident.   If   the   Family   Register   on
record   is   ultimately   found   to   be   authentic   and   genuine,   then
we   may   not   have   to   fall   upon   the   ossification   test   report.   In
such circumstances, the Presiding Officer concerned shall pay
adequate attention towards this document and try to ascertain
the authenticity and genuineness of the same. If need be, the
statements   of   the   persons   concerned   i.e.   from   the   concerned
government department may also be recorded;
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(iii) The   Sessions   Court   shall   ensure   that   the   writ   applicant
convict is medically examined by taking an ossification test or
any other modern recognized method of age determination;
(iv) The   Sessions   Court   concerned   shall   submit   its   report   as
regards the aforesaid to this Court within one month from the
date of communication of this order;
(v) The   Registry   is   directed   to   forward   one   copy   of   this   order   to
Sessions Court, Agra;
(vi) We request the learned counsel appearing for the State to take
appropriate   steps   to   facilitate   the   Sessions   Court   to   complete
the enquiry.
66. Notify   this   matter   after   a   period   of   four   weeks   along   with   the
report   that   may   be   received   from   the   Sessions   Court,   Agra.     The
final  order   shall be passed after  perusal  of the  report  upon  receipt
from the Sessions Court, Agra. 
………………………………………..J.
    (DINESH MAHESHWARI)
………………………………………..J.
    (J.B. PARDIWALA)
NEW DELHI;
SEPTEMBER 12, 2022
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