/2022 INSC 0793/
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION 
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8247 OF 2009
YASHODA (ALIAS SODHAN)           ...APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
SUKHWINDER SINGH AND OTHERS    ...RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
B.R. GAVAI, J.
1. The   appeal   challenges   the   judgment   dated   28 th
January   2009   passed   by   the   learned   Single   Judge   of   the
High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in Regular
Second   Appeal   No.   3205   of   2007   (O&M),   thereby   dismissing
the appeal filed by the present appellant.
2. Brief   facts   giving   rise   to   the   present   appeal   are   as
under:
1

As   per   Kartar   Singh,   the   original   plaintiff   (since
deceased),   the   grandfather   of   respondent   Nos.1   and   2,   he
had  entered into  an   agreement  to  sell the   agricultural  lands
on   10 th
  January   1993.     As   per   the   said   agreement,   the   sale
deed   was   to   be   executed   before   15 th
  March   1994.   According
to   the   plaintiff,   a   family   settlement   also   took   place   between
him   and   the   appellant­defendant   in   the   month   of   November
1993. It is to be noted that the plaintiff initially filed a suit for
declaration   against   the   appellant­defendant   being   Civil   Suit
No.   141   of   1994   on   10 th
  February   1994.     The   said   suit   was
filed on the basis of the said family settlement that took place
in   the   month   of   November   1993.     On   the   basis   of   the
application filed by the plaintiff, the said suit was dismissed
as withdrawn on 7 th
 May 1994.
3. The plaintiff filed the  present  suit on  2 nd
  June 1994
being   Suit   No.   536   of   1994   seeking   specific   performance   on
the   basis   of   alleged   agreement   to   sell   dated   10 th
  January
1993.     The   appellant­defendant   resisted   the   suit   by   filing
written   statement   on   29 th
  October   1994.     In   the   written
statement,   the   appellant­defendant   categorically   denied   the
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existence   and/or   the   execution   of   any   agreement   to   sell.     It
was   specifically   contended   by   the   appellant­defendant   that
the   second   suit   was   not   maintainable   in   view   of   withdrawal
of   the   first   suit.   The   plaintiff   filed   his   Replication   on   14 th
November 1994 contending that the first suit for declaration
was   filed   only   to   avoid   payment   of   stamp   duty   and
registration charges.
4. The learned Additional Civil Judge (Senior  Division),
Sunam   (hereinafter   referred   to   as   the   “trial   court”)   vide
judgment   and   decree   dated   6 th
  August   1997   dismissed   the
suit   for   specific   performance.   Being   aggrieved   thereby,   the
respondents,   i.e.,   the   legal   representatives   of   the   plaintiff
filed   an   appeal   before   the   learned   Additional   District   Judge,
Sangrur   (hereinafter   referred   to   as   the   “Appellate   Court”).
The Appellate Court vide its judgment and decree dated 26 th
July   2007   allowed   the   appeal   and   decreed   the   suit   of   the
plaintiff   for   specific   performance   of   agreement   to   sell   dated
10 th
  January   1993.   Being   aggrieved   thereby,   the   appellant­
defendant   preferred   an   appeal   before   the   High   Court.     The
High   Court   vide   impugned   judgment   dated   28 th
  January
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2009  dismissed the   appeal.    Hence,  the  appellant­defendant
has approached this Court.
5. We have heard Shri Sidharth Luthra, learned Senior
Counsel appearing  on  behalf  of the  appellant­defendant  and
Shri   Narender   Hooda,   learned   Senior   Counsel   and   Shri
Gagan   Gupta,   learned   counsel   appearing   on   behalf   of   the
respondents­plaintiffs.
6. Shri   Luthra,   learned   Senior   Counsel   submitted   that
the   trial   court,   finding   that   the   plaintiff   had   suppressed   the
fact   with   regard   to   filing   of   the   earlier   suit   and   further   that
the   plaintiff   had   resiled   from   the   stand   taken   by   him   in   the
earlier   litigation   and   taken   a   contrary   stand,   had   dismissed
the   suit.     He   submitted   that   however,   the   learned   Appellate
Court   erroneously   accepted   the   stand   of   the   plaintiff   in
Replication that the earlier suit was filed only in order to save
the   stamp   duty   and   registration   charges   and   allowed   the
appeal.  
7. Shri   Luthra   submitted   that   the   perusal   of   the
evidence   of   the   plaintiff   would   show   that   he   had   not   stated
anything   regarding   the   earlier   suit   in   his   evidence.     He
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submitted that, the learned Appellate Court has failed to take
into   consideration   that   all   the   witnesses   were   closely
associated with the plaintiff and therefore, their evidence was
not   trustworthy.     He   further   submitted   that   the   appellant­
defendant   had   specifically   put   up   a   case   that   she   was   a
parda­nasheen lady and that the plaintiff was her cousin and
she   had   blind   faith   on   him.     He   submitted   that,   taking
disadvantage of such a blind faith, the plaintiff had taken her
thumb   impression   on   some   paper   and   used   it   to   create   an
agreement to sell.   He further submitted that, as a matter of
fact,   an   application   for   partition   was   also   filed   by   the
appellant­defendant   on   4 th
  July   1994.     He   therefore
submitted that the appeal deserves to be allowed and the suit
deserves to be dismissed.
8. Shri   Luthra   relied   on   various   judgments   of   this
Court in support of the submission that, since the act of the
respondents­plaintiffs   of   suppression   of   material   facts
amounted   to   fraud,   he   was   not   entitled   to   a   discretionary
relief.
5

9. Shri   Gupta,   learned   counsel   appearing   on   behalf   of
the respondents­plaintiffs submitted that all the three courts
have concurrently found that the execution of the agreement
to   sell   dated   10 th
  January   1993   was   duly   established.     He
submitted that the trial court as well as the Appellate Court
and   the   High   Court   have   also   found   that   the   appellant­
defendant has failed to establish the fact that the agreement
to   sell   is   a   result   of   fraud   or   misrepresentation.     Having
decided   these   issues   in   favour   of   the   respondents­plaintiffs,
the   trial   court   had   erred   in   non­suiting   the   respondents­
plaintiffs  on  a  technical  ground.   Shri  Gupta,  relying  on  the
judgment   of   this   Court   in   the   case   of   Arunima   Baruah   v.
Union   of   India   and   Others 1
,   submitted   that,   unless   the
suppression of filing of an earlier suit is a material fact, such
non­disclosure would not be fatal to the case of the plaintiff.
Relying on the judgment of this Court in the case of   Harjas
Rai   Makhija   (Dead)   Through   Legal   Representatives   v.
Pushparani   Jain   and   Another 2
,   he   submitted   that   a   mere
concealment   or   non­disclosure   of   relevant   facts   without
1   (2007) 6 SCC 120
2   (2017) 2 SCC 797
6

intent   to   deceive   or   a   bald   allegation   of   fraud   without   proof
and intent to deceive, would not render a decree obtained by
a   party   as   fraudulent.     Shri   Gupta   submitted   that   in   the
present case, the trial court itself has found that the plaintiff
had   failed   to   establish   fraud   and   as   such,   the   Appellate
Court   has   rightly   allowed   the   appeal.     He   also   relies   on   the
judgment   of   this   Court   in   the   case   of   Svenska
Handelsbanken   v.   M/s   Indian   Charge   Chrome   and
Others 3
.     Shri   Gupta   further   relies   on   the   judgment   of   this
Court   in   the   case   of   Union   of   India   v.   M/s   Chaturbhai   M.
Patel  and Co. 4
  in support of his submission that fraud has
to be proved beyond reasonable doubt.
10. Shri Gupta further submitted that the earlier suit for
declaration   was   filed   on   the   claim   that   the   respondents­
plaintiffs   were   owner   in   possession   of   the   suit   property   on
the   basis   of   settlement   deed,   whereas   the   second   suit   was
filed   on   the   basis   of   agreement   to   sell   dated   10 th
  January
1993.   He submitted that there is nothing on record to show
3   (1994) 1 SCC 502
4   (1976) 1 SCC 747
7

that   the   respondents­plaintiffs   had   any   intention   to   defraud
the appellant­defendant.
11. Shri   Hooda,   learned   Senior   Counsel   submitted   that
after the Replication was allowed by the trial court, it became
a   part  of  the   plaint.   As   such,   the   respondents­plaintiffs   had
sufficiently   proved   as   to   the   circumstances   in   which   the
earlier   suit   was   filed.     He   therefore   submitted   that   the   trial
court   had   erred   in   non­suiting   the   plaintiff   on   a   trivial
ground. Shri Hooda further submitted that after holding that
the   respondents­plaintiffs   had   proved   the   agreement   to   sell,
that   the   appellant­defendant   had   failed   to   prove   that   any
fraud   was   played   on   her   and   that   the   issue   under   Order   II
Rule   2   of   the   Civil   Procedure   Code,   1908   (for   short,   ‘CPC’)
was   also   in   favour   of   the   respondents­plaintiffs,   the   trial
court had grossly erred in dismissing the suit.  He submitted
that   the   said   error   has   been   rightly   corrected   by   the
Appellate Court.
12. It is not in dispute that the plaintiff had filed a suit
for   declaration   being   Civil   Suit   No.   141   of   1994.     It   will   be
relevant to refer to some of the averments in the said plaint:
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1. “That  previously  the  defendant   was  owner   to  the
extent   of   1/3 rd
  share   in   land   measuring   205
Kanal   4   Marla   mustatil   &   killa   numbers   as
detailed   in   the   heading   of   the   plaint.   Copy   of
Jamabandi is attached herewith. 
2. That  previously  the  defendant   was  also  owner  to
the   extent   of   1/6   share   in   land   measuring   139
Kanal   2   Marla   and   land   gair   mumkin   plot
measuring   9   Kanal   2   Marla   mustatil   &   kiolla
numbers as detailed in the heading of the plaint.
Copy of Jamabandi is attached herewith. 
3. ………
4. That   about   three   months   ago   and   a   family
settlement   took   place   between   the   plaintiff   and
defendant and the land in dispute fallen into the
share   of   the   plaintiff   and   the   defendant   had
delivered   the   possession   of   the   suit   property   to
the plaintiff after visiting the spot. In this now the
plaintiff   is   continuous   in   possession   over
disputed   property   as   owner   since   last   three
month. The defendant has remained no concern. 
5. That   the   defendant   was   requested   to   admit   the
claim   of   the   plaintiff   and   to   get   corrected   the
name   of   the   plaintiff   in   revenue   record   as   owner
but   the   defendant   after   dilly­dallying   the   matter
had refused yesterday to do so from which cause
of   action   accrued   to   the   plaintiff   against   the
defendant.”
13. The   said   suit   for   declaration   was   filed   on   10 th
February   1994.     It   is   to   be   noted   that   according   to   the
respondents­plaintiffs,   the   alleged   agreement   to   sell   was
executed on 10 th
  January 1993.   As such it is prior  in point
9

of time to the date of filing of the suit for declaration i.e. 10 th
February   1994.     There   is   no   mention   with   regard   to   the
alleged agreement to sell in the said plaint.
14. The plaintiff filed an application on 7 th
  May 1994 for
withdrawal of the said suit for declaration.   Vide order of the
same   date,   the   trial   court,   after   recording   the   statement   of
the   plaintiff   that   he   did   not   want   to   proceed   with   the   case,
dismissed the same as withdrawn. 
15. Within   a   period   of   one   month,   the   plaintiff   filed   the
present   suit   for   specific   performance.     It   will   be   relevant   to
refer to some of the averments in the plaint:
“2. That the defendant agreed to sell the above said
suit   land   to   the   plaintiff   for   a   consideration   of   Rs.
6,50,000/­   and   the   defendant   executed   an
agreement   on   dated   10.1.1994   at   Patran   in   favour
of   the   plaintiff   and   received   a   sum   of   Rs.   50,000/­
from   the   plaintiff   as   earnest   money   and   remaining
amount   was   to   be   paid   by   the   plaintiff   to   the
defendant   at   the   time   of   sale   deed   before   the   Sub­
Registrar.   The   agreement   was   read   over   to   the
defendant   who   after   admitting   the   same   to   be
correct  put  her   thumb  impressions   in  the  presence
of Lal Singh Lamberdar, Amolak Singh s/o Jagroop
Singh   and   Bhagwant   Singh   S/o   Krishan   Singh
resident   of   Shadihari   and   witnesses   also   attested
the   said   agreement   in   the   presence   of   defendant.
The   plaintiff   put   his   thumb   impression   in   token   of
correctness of the above said agreement.
10

……….
15.   That   there   is   no   litigation   pending   or   decided
between the parties with regard to the agreement in
question.”
16. It   could   thus   clearly   be   seen   that,   the   present   suit
bases   its   claim   only   on   the   agreement   to   sell   dated   10 th
January 1993.   Leave aside there being any reference to the
earlier   suit,   the   plaintiff   baldly   stated   that   there   was   no
litigation pending or decided between the parties with regard
to  the  agreement  in   question.    No  doubt  that  it  is  sought  to
be   argued   by   the   learned   counsel   for   the   respondents­
plaintiffs that the statement in paragraph (15) of the plaint is
only   with   regard   to   the   litigation   with   respect   to   the
agreement   in   question.     It   is   stated   that   the   said   paragraph
does   not   mention   litigation   with   regard   to   the   land   in
question   and   as   such,   there   is   no   suppression   of   material
fact.
17. After   the suit  for  specific performance  was filed, the
written   statement   was   filed   by   the   appellant­defendant   on
29 th
  October   1994.     In   the   written   statement,   the   appellant­
defendant has stated thus:
11

“3.   That   the   plaintiff   file   the   said   suit   no.141   dt.
10.2.1994   in   the   Court   of   P.C.S.   Sub   Judge   First
Class   Sunam   on   10.2.1994   which   was   dismiss   on
7.5.1994,   but   the   plaintiff   ending   between   the
parties, on this ground only  the suit of the plaintiff
is   liable   to   be   dismissed.   In   case   any   agreement
executed   earlier   between   the   parties,   the   plaintiff
must  mention about  this in the  suit, hence  on this
alone ground the suit is liable to be dismissed. 
4)   That   the   plaintiff   on   10.2.1994   in   regard   to   the
land   filed   Suit   for   pre­emption   Right   against   the
defendant   in   which   the   plaintiff   shown   himself
owner   in   possession   of   the   land   in   question,   the
said   suit   was   consigned   to   record   on   7.5.1994.   In
the   said   suit   the   defendant   did   not   mention
anything in regard to the agreement DT 10.1.1994.
5) That the plaintiff did not come before the Hon'ble
Court   in   clean   hand   and   he   has   concealed   the
matter   before   the   Hon'ble   Court,   hence   the   suit   is
liable to be dismissed. 
6) That the plaintiff and Defendant are having close
relations with each other. The plaintiff is uncle's son
of   Defendant.   Defendant   has   no   brother,   hence   he
treated plaintiff as her real brother and believe upon
him.   Defendant   is   aged   lady   her   eye   sight   is   very
week and villager lady, she has no legal knowledge.
The plaintiff getting the wrongful gain of her believe
with   the   intention   to   grab   her   share   has   taken   the
thumb   impression   on   the   writing   by   committing
cheating and fraudulent means.”
18. After   the   appellant­defendant   took   objection   with
regard to the earlier suit being withdrawn, the plaintiff came
with the Replication application wherein, for the first time, he
12

came   up   with   a   story   that   the   earlier   suit   was   filed   only   to
save   the   stamp   duty   and   registration   fee   and   since   the
appellant­defendant   became   dishonest   later   on,   the   plaintiff
withdrew   the   suit.     It   is   thus   clear   that   the   Replication   was
filed   as   an   after­thought   only   to   cure   the   lacuna   as   pointed
out   in   the   written   statement.     The   trial   court   found   that   a
person cannot be permitted to assume inconsistent positions
in the court of law to play fast and loose and to blow hot and
cold.   The trial court, relying on the judgment of the Punjab
and   Haryana   High   Court   in   the   case   of   Jaspal   Singh   v.
Sardul   Singh 5
,   held   that   a   party   cannot   be   permitted   to
approbate   and   reprobate   and   resile   from   that   position.     The
trial court has also found that the explanation submitted by
the   plaintiff   with   regard   to   the   circumstances   under   which
the   earlier   suit   was   filed,   speaks   volumes   of   the   dishonest
intention of the plaintiff.   The trial court also found that the
plaintiff   has   made   an   attempt   to   defraud   the   State   of   its
revenue.   The trial court found that the past litigation has a
direct   bearing   on   the   merits   of   the   present   controversy.     It
observed that the plaintiff was duty bound to plead the same
5   1994 (3) Recent Revenue Reports 106 (Punjab and Haryana)
13

in the plaint.  The trial court found that under Order VII Rule
1 (j) of the CPC (as applicable in Punjab), the statement with
regard   to   earlier   litigation   has   to   be   made   in   the   plaint.     It
will be relevant to refer to the said provision:
“ORDER VII
PLAINT
1. Particulars to be contained in plaint.
………….
(j)   a statement to the effect that no suit between
the   same   parties,   or   between   the   parties   under
whom they or any of them claim, litigating on the
same   grounds   has   been   previously   instituted   or
finally   decided   by   a   Court   of   competent
jurisdiction or limited jurisdiction, and if so, with
what results.” 
19. The trial court  therefore,  relying  on  the  judgment  of
this Court in the case of   S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu (Dead)
By   LRs.   v.   Jagannath   (Dead)   By   LRs.   and   Others 6
,
dismissed the suit, though it had answered the other issues
in favour of the respondents­plaintiffs.
20. This  well­reasoned  judgment  of   the   trial   court  came
to   be   reversed   by   the   Appellate   Court.     Accepting   the
6   (1994) 1 SCC 1
14

explanation   of   the   respondents­plaintiffs   in   Replication   that
the earlier suit was filed in order to save the registration fee
and   the   stamp   duty,   the  Appellate   Court   held   that  the   non­
disclosure of the plaintiff about earlier litigation in the plaint
but   clarifying   it   later   in   the   Replication,   was   not   such   a
crucial point on the basis of which he could be non­suited in
toto.
21. Though the suit was dismissed by the trial court and
decreed   by   the   Appellate   Court,   the   High   Court   observed
thus:
“The   learned   trial   Court   came   to   the   conclusion
that   the   agreement   to   sell   and   the   default   on   the
part   of   the   appellant   has   been   established   and
therefore   directed   the   agreement   to   be   enforced   by
way of execution of the sale deed. 
In appeal, the findings of the learned trial Court
were affirmed.”
22. It   could   thus   be   seen   that   there   is   total   non­
application  of   mind   by  the   High   Court.     The   High   Court  did
not   even   care   to   refer   to   the   grounds   raised   in   the   appeal
with   regard   to   the   effect   of   non­disclosure   of   filing   and
withdrawal of the earlier suit.  The High Court dismissed the
15

suit on the basis that it arises out of the concurrent findings
of fact and no question of law is involved.
23. What   would   be   the   effect   of   suppression   of   earlier
proceedings has been considered by this Court in the case of
S.P.   Chengalvaraya   Naidu   (supra).     The   Court   observed
thus:
“ 5.   The   High   Court,   in   our   view,   fell   into   patent
error. The short question before the High Court was
whether in the facts and circumstances of this case,
Jagannath   obtained   the   preliminary   decree   by
playing   fraud   on   the   court.   The   High   Court,
however,   went   haywire   and   made   observations
which are wholly perverse. We do not agree with the
High   Court   that   “there   is   no   legal   duty   cast   upon
the   plaintiff   to   come   to   court   with   a   true   case   and
prove   it   by   true   evidence”.   The   principle   of   “finality
of litigation” cannot be pressed to the extent of such
an   absurdity   that   it   becomes   an   engine   of   fraud   in
the   hands   of   dishonest   litigants.   The   courts   of   law
are meant for imparting justice between the parties.
One who comes to the court, must come with clean
hands.   We   are   constrained   to   say   that   more   often
than   not,   process   of   the   court   is   being   abused.
Property­grabbers,   tax­evaders,   bank­loan­dodgers
and   other   unscrupulous   persons   from   all   walks   of
life   find   the   court­process   a   convenient   lever   to
retain   the   illegal   gains   indefinitely.   We   have   no
hesitation to say that a person, who's case is based
on falsehood, has no right to approach the court. He
can   be   summarily   thrown   out   at   any   stage   of   the
litigation.
16

6.   The facts of the present case leave no manner of
doubt   that   Jagannath   obtained   the   preliminary
decree by  playing  fraud on the court. A fraud is an
act   of   deliberate   deception   with   the   design   of
securing   something   by   taking   unfair   advantage   of
another.   It   is   a   deception   in   order   to   gain   by
another's   loss.   It   is   a   cheating   intended   to   get   an
advantage.   Jagannath   was   working   as   a   clerk   with
Chunilal  Sowcar. He purchased the property  in the
court auction on behalf of Chunilal Sowcar. He had,
on   his   own   volition,  executed   the  registered   release
deed   (Ex.   B­15)   in   favour   of   Chunilal   Sowcar
regarding the property in dispute. He knew that the
appellants had paid the total decretal amount to his
master   Chunilal   Sowcar.   Without   disclosing   all
these facts, he  filed  the suit  for  the  partition  of the
property   on   the   ground   that   he   had   purchased   the
property   on   his   own   behalf   and   not   on   behalf   of
Chunilal   Sowcar.   Non­production   and   even   non­
mentioning   of   the   release   deed   at   the   trial   is
tantamount   to   playing   fraud   on   the   court.   We   do
not   agree   with   the   observations   of   the   High   Court
that   the   appellants­defendants   could   have   easily
produced   the   certified   registered   copy   of   Ex.   B­15
and   non­suited   the   plaintiff.   A   litigant,   who
approaches   the   court,   is   bound   to   produce   all   the
documents   executed   by   him   which   are   relevant   to
the   litigation.   If   he   withholds   a   vital   document   in
order   to   gain   advantage   on   the   other   side   then   he
would be guilty of playing fraud on the court as well
as on the opposite party.”
24. Again   in   the   case   of   A.V.   Papayya   Sastry   and
Others   v.   Govt.   of   A.P.   and   Others 7
,   this   Court   observed
thus:
7   (2007) 4 SCC 221
17

“ 21.   Now,   it   is   well­settled   principle   of   law   that   if
any   judgment   or   order   is   obtained   by   fraud,   it
cannot   be   said   to   be   a   judgment   or   order   in   law.
Before   three   centuries,   Chief   Justice   Edward   Coke
proclaimed:
“Fraud   avoids   all   judicial   acts,
ecclesiastical or temporal.”
22.   It   is   thus   settled   proposition   of   law   that   a
judgment, decree or order obtained by playing fraud
on   the   court,   tribunal   or   authority   is   a   nullity   and
non   est   in   the   eye   of   the   law.   Such   a   judgment,
decree   or   order—by   the   first   court   or   by   the   final
court—has   to   be   treated   as   nullity   by   every   court,
superior   or   inferior.   It   can   be   challenged   in   any
court,  at  any   time,  in  appeal,  revision,  writ  or  even
in collateral proceedings.
23.   In   the   leading   case   of   Lazarus   Estates
Ltd.   v.   Beasley   [(1956)   1   All   ER   341   :   (1956)   1   QB
702   :   (1956)   2   WLR   502   (CA)]   Lord   Denning
observed : (All ER p. 345 C)
“No   judgment   of   a   court,   no   order   of   a
Minister, can be allowed to stand if it has
been obtained by fraud.”
24.   In   Duchess of Kingstone, Smith's Leading Cases ,
13th   Edn.,   p.   644,   explaining   the   nature   of   fraud,
de Grey, C.J. stated that though a judgment would
be res judicata and not impeachable from within, it
might be impeachable from without. In other words,
though   it   is  not   permissible   to   show  that   the  court
was   “mistaken”,   it   might   be   shown   that   it   was
“misled”.   There   is   an   essential   distinction   between
mistake   and   trickery.   The   clear   implication   of   the
distinction is that an action to set aside a judgment
cannot   be   brought   on   the   ground   that   it   has   been
decided   wrongly,   namely,   that   on   the   merits,   the
decision   was   one   which   should   not   have   been
18

rendered,   but   it   can   be   set   aside,   if   the   court   was
imposed upon or tricked into giving the judgment.
25.   It has been said : fraud and justice never dwell
together ( fraus et jus nunquam cohabitant ); or fraud
and   deceit   ought   to   benefit   none   ( fraus   et   dolus
nemini patrocinari debent ).
26.   Fraud   may   be   defined   as   an   act   of   deliberate
deception with the design of securing some unfair or
undeserved   benefit   by   taking   undue   advantage   of
another.   In   fraud   one   gains   at   the   loss   of   another.
Even most solemn proceedings stand vitiated if they
are   actuated   by   fraud.   Fraud   is   thus   an   extrinsic
collateral act which vitiates all judicial acts, whether
in   rem   or   in   personam.   The   principle   of   “finality   of
litigation”   cannot   be   stretched   to   the   extent   of   an
absurdity   that   it   can   be   utilised   as   an   engine   of
oppression by dishonest and fraudulent litigants.”
25. As   observed,   there   is   an   essential   distinction
between   mistake   and   trickery.     In   the   present   case,   it   is
sought   to   be   argued   on   behalf   of   the   respondents­plaintiffs
that   the   averment   in   paragraph   (15)   of   the   plaint   was   with
regard to a lis on the basis of the agreement.  It is submitted
that the earlier suit was not based on the agreement and as
such, there was no suppression.  We find the argument to be
unsustainable.  We are of the view that such a statement was
19

made   as   a   trickery   so   as   to   obtain   the   judgment   by
misleading the court.  
26. In the case of  H.N. Jagannath and Others v. State
of Karnataka and Others 8
, the land owners filed civil suits
one   after   other   in   respect   of   acquired   lands.     The   said   suits
were withdrawn without liberty to approach the court again.
Simultaneously,   land   owners   also   filed   writ   petitions
challenging   the   acquisition   on   different   grounds.     The   same
were   dismissed.     Thereafter,   the   land   owners   submitted   an
application to the State Government for  denotification of the
land.     Since   it   was   not   considered,   one   more   writ   petition
came   to   be   filed   in   which   a   direction   was   issued   for
consideration of the representation.   The said representation
was rejected in the year 1992.  The land owners filed another
writ   petition   questioning   the   rejection   of   its   representation.
The   same   was   also   dismissed.     Thereafter,   six   more   writ
petitions   were   filed   again   questioning   the   validity   of
acquisition   proceedings   and   yet   again,   they   were   dismissed.
In   an   intra­court   appeal,   the   Division   Bench   relegated   the
parties   to   the   civil   court   to   work   out   their   remedies.
8   (2018) 11 SCC 104
20

Criticizing   the   approach   of   the   Division   Bench,   this   Court
observed thus:
“ 14.   It   is   not   in   dispute   that   the   property   in   question
along with other properties was acquired by the BDA in
accordance   with   law   by   issuing   notifications   under
Sections 17(1) and 19(1) of the BDA Act as far  back as
in the year 1977 and in the year 1979. BDA has formed
and   allotted   the   sites.   Most   of   the   allottees   have
constructed   houses   and   are   residing   peacefully.
However,   Respondent   4   still   contends   that   possession
has   remained   with   it   and   therefore   the   acquisition
needs   to   be   set   aside   and   that   the   land   should   be
denotified. As detailed supra, Respondent 4 has already
approached the civil court thrice and High Court on six
occasions.   Whenever   the   suits   are   withdrawn,
Respondent   4   has   not   sought   any   liberty   to   approach
the   civil   court   once   again.   Thus,   it   was   not   open   for
Respondent 4 to approach the civil court repeatedly for
the   very   same   reliefs.   Consistently,   the   civil   court   on
three   occasions   has   negatived   the   contention   of   the
appellant.
15.   Even   when   Respondent   4   approached   the   High
Court of Karnataka by filing  the writ petitions and writ
appeals,   it   has   failed.   Futile   attempts   have   been   made
by   Respondent   4   only   to   see   that   the   allottees   are
harassed   and   to   keep   the   litigation   pending.   After   the
final   notification,   an   award   was   passed   and
compensation was deposited. Possession was taken and
the same was evidenced by the panchnama prepared as
far   back   as   on   23­9­1986.   The   notification   under
Section 16(2) of the Land Acquisition Act was issued on
20­1­1987 disclosing the factum of taking possession of
the land in question. Attempt made by Respondent 4 for
getting   the   disputed   land   denotified   has   also   failed   as
far   back   as  on   15­1­1993,  when  the   State  Government
had rejected the representation of Respondent 4 seeking
21

denotification.   The   writ   petition   filed   by   Respondent   4
challenging   such   order   of   dismissal   of   the
representation   was   also   dismissed.   Despite   the   same,
Respondent   4   is   pursuing   the   matter   by   filing   writ
petition after writ petition. It is a clear case of abuse of
process of law as well as the court.
16.   We do not find any reason to interfere in the finding
of   fact   rendered   by   the   learned   Single   Judge   that
possession   was   taken   by   BDA   on   23­9­1986.   There   is
nothing  to  be adjudicated further  in respect of the  title
or   possession   of   the   property.   The   title   as   well   as   the
possession   of   the   property   has   vested   with   BDA   for
about   more   than   30   years   prior   to   this   day   and   sites
were   formed   and   allotted   to   various   persons   including
the   appellant   herein.   In   the   light   of   such   voluminous
records and having regard to the fact that Respondent 4
has   been   repeatedly   making   futile   attempts   by
approaching   the   courts   of   law   by   raising   frivolous
contentions,   the   Division   Bench   ought   not   to   have
granted   liberty   to   Respondent   4   to   approach   the   civil
court   once   again   for   the   very   same   relief,   for   which   it
has failed earlier. In view of this, the learned counsel for
the appellant is justified in contending that the Division
Bench   has   completely   erred   in   reviving   the   dispute
which had long been given a legal quietus after a series
of   litigations.   The   judgment   of   the   Division   Bench,   if
allowed to stand, will unsettle the settled state of affairs
involving   hundreds   of   allottees   of   sites   who   have
constructed   the   houses   and   are   residing   therein.   The
impugned judgment of the Division Bench virtually sets
at naught a number of judgments rendered by the civil
court as well as the High Court in the very matter (and
was given without any reason much less a valid reason).
17.   ……..
18.   ……..
19.   Having regard to the discussion made supra, in our
considered   opinion,   it   is   a   clear   case   of   contempt
22

committed   by   Respondent   4  by  repeatedly   approaching
the   courts   of   law   for   almost   the   same   relief   which   was
negatived by the courts for  three decades. However, we
decline   to   initiate   contempt   proceedings   and   to   impose
heavy costs, under the peculiar facts and circumstance
of this case.”
27. We find that the Appellate Court has grossly erred in
reversing   the   judgment   and   decree   of   the   trial   court   which
had dismissed the suit taking into consideration the conduct
of the respondents­plaintiffs.  
28. Insofar  as   the   reliance   placed  by   Shri   Gupta   on   the
judgment   of   this   Court   in   the   case   of   Arunima   Baruah
(supra) is concerned, the Court observed thus:
“ 12.   It  is  trite  law  that  so  as  to  enable  the   court  to
refuse   to   exercise   its   discretionary   jurisdiction
suppression   must   be   of   material   fact.   What   would
be   a   material   fact,   suppression   whereof   would
disentitle   the   appellant   to   obtain   a   discretionary
relief,   would   depend   upon   the   facts   and
circumstances   of   each   case.   Material   fact   would
mean   material   for   the   purpose   of   determination   of
the   lis,   the   logical   corollary   whereof   would   be   that
whether the same was material for grant or denial of
the   relief.   If   the   fact   suppressed   is   not   material   for
determination   of   the   lis   between   the   parties,   the
court   may   not   refuse   to   exercise   its   discretionary
jurisdiction.   It   is   also   trite   that   a   person   invoking
the discretionary jurisdiction of the court cannot be
allowed   to   approach   it   with   a   pair   of   dirty   hands.
But   even   if   the   said   dirt   is   removed   and   the   hands
23

become   clean,   whether   the   relief   would   still   be
denied is the question.”
29. It   could   thus   be   seen   that   this   Court   has   held   that
w hat would be a ‘material fact’ would depend upon the facts
and   circumstances   of   each   case.   It   has   also   been   held   that
‘material   fact’   would   mean   material   for   the   purpose   of
determination  of the  lis. It has  also been  held that a  person
invoking the discretionary jurisdiction of the court cannot be
allowed   to   approach   it   with   a   pair   of   dirty   hands.     In   the
present case, filing of the earlier suit and withdrawal thereof
without   liberty   to   file   another   suit   was   a   material   fact.
Undisputedly,   the   respondents­plaintiffs   had   failed   to
approach the court with clean hands.   As such, we find that
the   said   judgment   would   be   of   no   assistance   to   the   case   of
the respondents­plaintiffs. 
30. Insofar   as   the   judgment   in   the   case   of   Harjas   Rai
Makhija   (supra)   is   concerned,   in   the   facts   of   the   said   case,
the   Court   held   that   though   the   appellant   Makhija   had   an
opportunity to prove the allegation of fraud when he filed an
application   under   Order   XLI   Rule   27   of   the   CPC,   he   missed
24

that   opportunity   right   up   to   this   Court.     He   took   a   second
shot   at   alleging   fraud   and   filed   another   suit.     However,   he
failed in the trial court as well as the High Court as he could
not produce any evidence to prove that fraud was committed
by   the   respondent   when   she   obtained   the   decree   dated   4 th
October   1999.     As   such,   the   said   judgment   would   not   be
applicable to the facts of the present case.
31. Insofar   as   the   judgment   in   the   case   of   M/s
Chaturbhai   M.   Patel   and   Co.   (supra)   is   concerned,   it   was
the   case   of   defendant   that   some   amount   of   fraud   had   been
played on the defendant by the collusion of the plaintiff with
his   father.     This   Court,   concurring   with   the   findings   of   the
High   Court,   found   that   the   circumstances   relied   on   by   the
appellant   were   not   at   all   conclusive   to   prove   the   case   of
fraud.     The   present   case   is   a   case   of   suppression   of   a
material   fact   with   regard   to   filing   and   withdrawal   of   earlier
proceedings.     As   such,   the   said   judgment   would   not   be
applicable to the facts of the present case.
32. Similarly,   the   facts   in   the   case   of   Svenska
Handelsbanken   (supra)   were   also   totally   different   and   as
25

such, reliance on the said judgment is also of no assistance
to the case of the respondents­plaintiffs in the present case.
33. In that view of the matter, we find that the Appellate
Court   has   grossly   erred   in   reversing   the   well­reasoned
judgment and decree of the trial court.   As already observed
hereinabove,   the   judgment   of   the   High   Court   is   passed
without application of mind.   The High Court has gone on a
premise   that   the   trial   court   had   decreed   the   suit   and   the
Appellate   Court   has   dismissed   the   appeal.     This   is   factually
erroneous.
34. In the result, we pass the following order:
(i) The appeal is allowed;
(ii) The   judgment   and   decree   dated   26 th
  July   2007
passed by the Appellate Court in Civil Appeal No. 191
of 2006 and the judgment passed by the High Court
dated   28 th
  January 2009 in R.S.A. No. 3205 of 2007
(O&M)  are quashed and set aside; and
(iii) The   judgment   and   decree   dated   6 th
  August   1997
passed   by   the   trial   court   in   Suit   No.   536   of   1994
26

thereby   dismissing   the   suit   of   the   respondents­
plaintiffs is upheld. 
35. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of
in the above terms.  No order as to costs.
…..….......................J.
[B.R. GAVAI]
 …….......................J.       
[C.T. RAVIKUMAR]
NEW DELHI;
SEPTEMBER 12, 2022.
27