/2022 INSC 0794/
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6544 OF 2022
   (@ SLP (C) NO.12743 OF 2022) 
MOHAMMAD LATIEF MAGREY  …..APPELLANT
VERSUS  
THE UNION TERRITORY OF  …..RESPONDENTS
JAMMU AND KASHMIR & ORS. 
J U D G M E N T
J.B. PARDIWALA, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. “The dead are to rest where they have been lain unless reason
of substance is brought forward for disturbing their repose.”
­ Justice Cardozo 
Yome v. Gorman,  152 N.E. 126, 129 (N.Y. 1926).
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3.     The   leading   case   on   disinterment   in   the   United   States   is
Pettigrew   v.   Pettigrew ,   56   A.   878   (Pa.   1904)   which   was
decided by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in 1904:
“The   presumption   is   against   a   change.   The
imprecation   on   the   tomb   at   Stratford,   “Curst   be   he
that moves my bones,” whether it be Shakespeare’s
own   or   some   reverent   friend’s,   expresses   the
universal   sentiment   of   humanity,   not   only   against
profanation,   but   even   disturbance.   When   a   case
comes   into   court,   the   chancellor   will   regard   this
sentiment,   and   consider   all   the   circumstances   in
that connection.”
4. This   appeal   is   at   the   instance   of   the   original   writ   applicant
(father of the deceased, whose son, namely, Mohd. Amir Magrey
was   killed   in   an   encounter   between   the   police   and   militants)
and   is   directed   against   the   judgment   and   order   passed   by   the
High   Court   of   Jammu   &   Kashmir   and   Ladakh   at   Srinagar   in
Union  Territory of J  & K  and Others  v. Mohammad Latief
Magrey and Another , 2022 SCC OnLine J&K 516 (the Letters
Patent   Appeal   No.   99   of   2022   dated   01.07.2022)   by   which   the
Appeal   Court   modified   the   judgment   and   order   passed   by   the
learned   Single   Judge   of   the   High   Court   in
Mohammad   Latief   Magrey   v.   Union   of   India   and   Others ,
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2022 SCC OnLine J&K 433  (the Writ Petition (C) No. 11 of 2022
decided   on   27.05.2022)   &   thereby   permitted   the   appellant
herein and his family members (maximum up to 10 persons) to
perform   the   Fatiha   Khawani   (religious   rituals/prayers   after
burial) of the deceased at the graveyard while declining to grant
permission to disinter the body of the deceased for the purpose
of religious rituals. 
Factual Matrix
5. It   appears   from   the   materials   on   record   that   on   15.11.2021,
there   was   an   encounter   between   the   militants   and   police   at
the   Hyderpora   area   of   Budgam   in   Kashmir.   Four   militants
were   shot   dead   including   the   son   of   the   appellant   herein.   In
connection   with   the   said   incident,   a   First   Information   Report
No.   193/2021   was   registered   at   the   Saddar   Police   Station   for
the offences punishable under  Sections 307/120­B IPC, 7/27
of   the   Arms   Act   and   16,   18,   20   resply   of   the   ULA   (P)   Act.
During the course of the investigation, the Investigating Officer
recovered   four   bullet   ridden   unidentified   dead   bodies   at   the
site   of   the   encounter.   The   dead   bodies   were   shifted   to   the
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Police   Hospital   at   Srinagar   for   the   medico­legal   formalities.
After   conducting   the   post­mortem   etc.,   the   dead   bodies   were
identified as that of a foreign terrorist viz. Bilal Bhai @ Hyder
@ Saqlain R/O Pakistan, Aamir Latief Magrey S/O Mohammad
Latief   Magrey   R/O   Seeripora   Tehsil   Gool   Ramban,   Altaf
Ahmad   Bhat   S/O   Abdul   Rehman   Bhat   R/O   Old   Barzulla
Srinagar   and   Dr.   Mudasir   Gull   S/O   Ghulam   Mohammad
Rather R/O   Parraypora Srinagar. All the four dead bodies were
shifted to the Handwara Zachaldara for burial. 
6. The   material   on   record   further   reveals   that   the   bodies   of   the
two out  of  the four  persons killed in the encounter  were later
exhumed   and   handed   over   to   their   relatives   for   performing
their   last   rites   at   the   place   of   their   choice.   The   bodies   of   the
other   two   persons   killed   in   the   encounter   i.e.   Bilal   Bhai   @
Hyder and the son of the appellant herein buried through the
Auqaf   Committee,   Wadder   Payeen   were   not   disinterred   and
handed over to their respective family members. 
7. It   appears   that   so   far   as   the   deceased,   namely,   Bilal   Bhai,   a
resident   of   Pakistan   is   concerned,   nobody   claimed   his   body
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nor was there any  demand for handing  over of the dead body
from   any   quarter.   However,   it   is   the   case   of   the   appellant
herein   that   so   far   as   the   dead   body   of   his   son   Amir   is
concerned,   he   had   approached   various   authorities   with   a
request   to   hand   over   the   body   but   none   listened   to   him   and
ultimately   the   body   of   his   son   (deceased)   was   buried   at   the
Wadder Payeen Graveyard. It is his case that he was informed
by the Police Station at Gool on 16.11.2021 that his son Amir
had   been   killed   in   an   encounter   in   Kashmir   and   that   he
should   proceed   to   Kashmir   to   identify   the   body.   On
16.11.2021,   the   appellant   along   with   his   family   members
reached   the   Police   Station   at   Saddar,   where   he   was   told   that
his son Amir Magrey was a militant and was killed along with
three other  associates at the Hyderpora and the dead body of
Amir had been buried. 
8. In such circumstances referred to above, the appellant herein
preferred the Writ Petition (C) No. 11 of 2022 in the High Court
and prayed for the following relief: 
“ In   view   of   the   submissions   made   herein   above   and
those   to   be   urged   at   the   time   of   hearing,   this   Hon’ble
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Court   is   humbly   requested   to   direct   the   respondents   to
handover   the   body   of   Late   Mohammad   Amir   Magray,
who   was   killed   in   a   joint   encounter   by   them   on
15.11.2021 at Hyderpora area of Budgam in Kashmir to
the petitioner who happens to be his biological father on
the facts and grounds mentioned above. ”
9. A learned Single Judge of the High Court adjudicated the writ
application   and   allowed   the   same   directing   the   respondents
herein   to   make   necessary   arrangements   for   the   disinterment
of   the   body/remains   of   the   deceased   Amir   Magrey   from   the
Wadder   Payeen   Graveyard   in   the   presence   of   the   appellant
herein. 
10. The   learned   Single   Judge   while   allowing   the   writ   application
filed by the appellant herein, held as under:  
“15.   The right of   the next of   kin of   the deceased to have
their   dear   one   cremated   or   buried   as   per   the   religious
obligations   and   religious   belief   that   the   dead   person
professed during his life time, is part and parcel of   right
to life guaranteed under Article 21 of   the Constitution of
India.   The   parents   and   close   relations   of   the   deceased
are   well   within   their   right   to   demand   the   dead   body
of   their   dear   one   to   be   cremated   or   buried   as   per   their
traditions, religious obligations and religious belief. This
right   would   also   include   the   choice   of   the   relatives   to
have   the   dead   body   cremated   or   buried   at   his   native
place.   It   is   not   uncommon   that   the   graves   of   the   dead
are maintained by their relatives and are visited by their
relations   and   close   friends   to   pay   respect   and   homage
on certain occasions.
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16.   Without dilating much on the issue, it can be said to
be well settled that right to life and liberty guaranteed to
a   citizen   by   Article   21   of   the   Constitution   of
India   includes   right   of   the   citizen   to   live   with   human
dignity   and   this   right   to   live   with   human   dignity   even
extends   after   death   though   in   a   limited   extent.   Viewed
thus,   the   right   of   the   petitioner   to   claim   the   dead   body
of   his   son   for   performing   last   rites   in   his   own   way   and
in  accordance  with  local traditions,  religious obligations
and   religious   faith,   which   the   deceased   professed
during his life time, cannot be disputed. But the question
that   needs   to   be   addressed   in   the   context   of   present
controversy   is   whether   the   State   can   deny   this   right   in
the   name   of   preventing   law   and   order   situation   going
out of   hand.
17.   It is vehemently contended by the respondents that
the   decision   not   to   hand   over   the   body   of   the   deceased
to the petitioner for performing his last rites, was taken
in the larger public interest and to prevent the situation
of   law  and  order  going  out of   hand. It is  submitted  that
respondents have witnessed such situations in the past
and,   therefore,   have   decided   not   to   handover   the   dead
bodies of   the terrorists killed  in encounters  to their next
of   kin   for   cremation   or   burial   to   prevent   the   law   and
order   situation   getting   worsened.   The   respondents,
however, have not come clear as to why the dead bodies
of   two   of   the   four   killed   in   the   encounter,   namely,   Altaf
Ahmad   Bhat   and   Dr.   Mudasir   Gul   were   exhumed   and
handed   over   to   their   relatives   for   their   last   rites   in   the
graveyards   of   their   choice   and   why   the   similar   right
claimed   by   the   petitioner   was   denied.   The   respondents
have tried to draw distinction by submitting that as per
the   investigation   conducted   by   the   SIT,   the   deceased
son   of   the   petitioner   was   a   confirmed   terrorist   whereas
the other two killed, namely, Altaf Ahmad Bhat and Dr.
Mudasir  Gul  were   only   associates   of  the  terrorists.  I  do
not find any logic or sense in distinction so made by the
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respondents.   It   transpires   that   due   to   public   pressure
and   demand   by   the   relatives   of   the   two   deceased
namely,   Altaf   Ahmad   Bhat   and   Dr.   Mudasir   Gul,   the
respondents relented and permitted their dead bodies to
be   exhumed   and   handed   over   to   their   relatives.   Since
the petitioner was a resident of   Gool, a remote village in
Jammu   Province   and   did   not   much   say   in   the   Valley
and, therefore, his request was arbitrarily turned down.
The   action   of   the   respondents   is   not   traceable   to   any
procedure   established   by   law   which   is   just,   fair   and
equitable. At least none was brought to the notice of   this
Court.   The   decision   of   the   respondents   not   to   allow   the
petitioner   to   take   away   dead   body   of   his   son   to   his
native village for last rites was per­se arbitrary and falls
foul of   Article 14 of   the Constitution of India.
18.   Much has been said by the respondents with regard
to the status of   the body lying buried since 15.11.2021.
While it cannot be disputed that the body of   Amir Latief
Magrey   buried   on   15.11.2021   in   Wadder   Payeen
Graveyard   may   have   putrefied   by   now   but   that   alone
cannot   be   a   reason   not   to   handover   the   remains   of   the
dead  body   to  the  petitioner  who  is   clamoring  at  the  top
of   his   voice   to   get   even   the   remains   of   the   dead   body
of   his   son   so   that   he   could   bury   him   in   his   native
graveyard   in   the   presence   of   relatives   and   after
following   all   religious   obligations.   The   apprehension
of   law   and   order   getting   vitiated   at   this   point   of   time
also appears to be illusory. When the respondents could
maintain   the   law   and   order   situation   when   the   dead
bodies   of   two,   namely,   Altaf   Ahmad   Bhat   and   Dr.
Mudasir   Gul   were   exhumed   and   handed   over   to   their
relatives for last rites on 18.11.2021, it is not difficult for
the   respondents   to   make   necessary   arrangements   for
exhumation of   the dead body of   Amir Latief Magrey, the
son   of   the   petitioner   and   transport   the   same   in   proper
escort to  Village Thatharka Seripora  Tehsil Gool District
Ramban.   The   respondents   can   make   appropriate
arrangements   to   ensure   that   law   and   order   situation
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does not get vitiated in any manner. The petitioner, as is
fervently   contended   by   his   counsel,   is   even   ready   to
undertake   that   he   will   abide   by   all   the   terms   and
conditions   that   may   be   imposed   by   the   respondents
with   regard   to   exhumation,   transportation   and
according of   burial to the dead body.”
11. The   learned   Single   Judge   issued   the   final   directions   in   para
19, which reads thus: 
“19.   For   the   foregoing   reasons,   I   am   inclined   to   allow
this   petition   of   the   father   of   the   deceased   Amir   Latief
Magrey   and   direct   the   respondents   to   make
arrangements   for   exhumation   of   the   body/remains   of
the   deceased   Amir   Latief   Magrey   from   the   Wadder
Payeen   graveyard   in   presence   of   the   petitioner.   The
respondents   shall   also   make   appropriate   arrangement
for   transportation   of   the   dead   body   to   the   village   of   the
petitioner for according burial in his native graveyard in
accordance with the traditions, religious obligations and
religious faith which the deceased  professed  during his
life   time   provided   it   is   in   deliverable   state.   The
respondents   are   free   to   impose   any   reasonable   terms
and   conditions   in   respect   of   exhumation,   transportation
and   burial   of   the   dead   body   of   Amir   Latief   Magrey,   the
son   of   the   petitioner.   Since   the   dead   body   of   the
deceased   must   be   in   advance   stage   of   putrefaction,   as
such,   it   would   be   desirable   that   the   respondents   act
with   promptitude   and   do   not   waste   any   further   time.
However,   if   the   body   is   highly   putrefied   and   is   not   in
deliverable state or is likely to pose risk to public health
and hygiene, the petitioner and his close relatives shall
be   allowed   to   perform   last   rites   as   per   their   tradition
and   religious   belief   in   the   Wadder   Payeen   graveyard
itself.   In   that   situation,   the   State   shall   pay   to   the
petitioner  a compensation of   Rs.  5 lakhs for  deprivation
of   his   right   to   have   the   dead   body   of   his   son   and   give
him   decent   burial   as   per   family   traditions,   religious
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obligations   and   faith   which   the   deceased   professed
when he was alive .”
12. Thus, the learned Single Judge addressed himself essentially on
the following issues: 
a. The State could not have denied the right of the appellant
to claim the dead body of his son for performing the last
rites in accordance with his religious faith on the ground
of likelihood of disturbance of public order. According  to
the   learned   Single   Judge,   such   right   as   asserted   by   the
father is enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution.
 
b. Why   the   dead   bodies   out   of   the   four   killed   in   the
encounter   were   permitted   to   be   exhumed   and   handed
over to their relatives for their last rites?
c.  The action on the part of the respondents in not allowing
the appellant to take away the dead body of his son to his
native village was violative of Article 14 & 21 resply of the
Constitution. 
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13. The   Union   Territory   of   Jammu   &   Kashmir   and   others   being
dissatisfied   and   aggrieved   with   the   aforesaid   order   passed   by
the   learned   Single   Judge   of   the   High   Court   challenged   the
same   by   filing   the   Letters   Patent   Appeal   No.   99   of   2022.   The
Appeal Court disposed of the appeal holding as under: 
“15.   Learned   Advocate   General   while   making   his
submission   in   line   with   the   contentions   raised   and
grounds   urged   would   contend   that   the   impugned
judgment   is   not   legally   sound   and   that   writ   petitioner
was   not   entitled   to   any   of   the   reliefs   prayed   in   the
petition   including   the   reliefs   sought   now.   According   to
the learned Advocate General, the writ court misdirected
itself   while   considering   the   controversy   and   did   not
consider   the   matter   in   its   right   and   correct   perspective,
warranting   as   such,   setting   aside   of   the   impugned
judgment   and   dismissal   of   the   petition.   The   learned
Advocate   General,   however,   would   fairly   contend   that
having   regard   to   facts   and   circumstances   of   the   case,
respondent   no.   1   and   his   family   members   can   be
allowed   to   perform   Fatiha   Khawani   (prayers   after
burial)   at   the   grave   of   the   deceased   subject   to   security
measures   as   may   be   required   to   be   put   in   place   by
appellants,   as   according   to   him,   the   last   rites   of
deceased   had   been   performed   as   per   Islamic   Religious
practices   by   giving   a   washing/cleaning   of   dead   body,
shrouding/systematic   wrapping   of   the   body   with   two
white   pieces   of   cloth,   covering   the   whole   body   followed
by   Janaza   prayers   and   consequent   burial   of   the
deceased   in   the   grave,   reciting   verses   from   the   Holy
Book Quran.
16.   Learned   counsel   for   writ   petitioner/respondent   no.
1, however, would controvert the contentions raised and
grounds   urged   by   learned   Advocate   General   inasmuch
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as   the   aforesaid   offer   made   by   learned   Advocate
General, and would insist for exhumation of the body of
the   deceased   for   performance   of   last   rites   by   the   writ
petitioner/respondent no. 1 herein.
17.   In view of giving up of the relief of exhumation of the
body   of   the   deceased   for   performance   of   last   rituals   by
writ   petitioner/respondent   no.   1   before   the   Apex   Court
inasmuch   as   in   view   of   uncontroverted/unopposed
stand   taken   by   appellants   before   the   Writ   Court,   that
last   rites   of   deceased   stand   already   performed   while
burying   deceased   at   Wadder   Payeen   Graveyard,   the
contention   of   the   counsel   for   respondent   no.   1   in   fact
pales into insignificance and is not acceptable.
18.   The   prayer   of   counsel   for   respondent   no.   1   made
during   the   course   of   arguments   that   respondent   no.   1
and his family members be permitted to see the face of
deceased by opening the grave of the deceased, cannot
be accepted and permitted, firstly, in view of pleading of
writ   petitioner   that   the   dead   body   would   start
decomposing   immediately   after   burial,   and   secondly   in
view of the statement made by the writ petitioner before
the Apex Court while giving up the prayer of exhumation
of the dead body of the deceased.
19.   The   aforesaid   offer   made   by   learned   Advocate
General   seemingly   is   fair   and   reasonable   in   the   facts
and circumstances of the present case.
20.   Insofar  as  alternative   relief,   pressed   by   respondent
no.   1   before   the   Apex   Court   qua   payment   of
compensation   as   granted   by   the   Writ   Court   is
concerned,   it   needs   to   be   appreciated   that   appellants
admittedly did not provide opportunity to respondent no.
1   and   his   family   to   associate   in   the   burial   and
performance   of   last   religious   rites   of   the   deceased.
Appellants prima facie have acted unfairly inasmuch as
unreasonably   in   this   regard   notwithstanding   the
allegation   of   appellants   that   person   of   deceased   was   a
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terrorist   even   if   it   may   be   assumed,   as   such,   that   the
deceased   relinquished   his   right   to   be   buried   after
performance   of   last   rites   performed   by   his   family
members in accordance with the faith professed by him,
yet   the   said   right   of   burial   and   performance   of   last
religious rituals of deceased available to respondent no.
1  and  his  family  members   could  not  have  been  denied.
Admittedly,  respondent   no.  1  and  his  family  manifestly
has   been   subjected   to   emotional   and   sentimental
melancholy. Respondent no. 1 and his family have been
deprived   by   appellants   of   the   right   to   perform   last   rites
and   rituals   of   deceased   by   the   appellants   admittedly
without   there   being   any   policy/guideline,   as   such
cannot   be   endorsed   in   law,   in   that,   ours   is   a   Welfare
State acknowledged by the whole globe. The appellants
herein also could not have overlooked the background of
the   family   of   respondent   no.   1   and   his   family's   role   in
fighting   terrorism.   The   Writ   Court   having   regard   to   the
aforesaid   position   has   rightly   awarded   the
compensation   to   the   respondent   no.   1   for   such
deprivation   and   the   award   of   said   compensation
seemingly is appropriate.”
14. The Appeal Court issued the following directions in para 21, as
under: 
“ 21.   For   all   what   has   been   observed,   considered   and
analysed above, and having regard to the peculiar facts
and   circumstances   of   the   present   case,   the   instant
appeal is disposed of as follows:
(i) Appellants to allow respondent no. 1 and his family
members   (maximum   10   persons)   to   perform   Fatiha
Khawani   (religious   rituals/prayers   after   burial)   of
deceased   at   Wadder   Payeen   Graveyard,   on   the
date   and   time   to   be   decided   in   consultation   with
respondent   no.   1,   subject   to   taking   into   account
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security measures which may be required to be put
in place inasmuch as the COVID­19 guidelines.
(ii) Appellants to pay compensation of Rs. 5.00 Lakhs,
awarded   by   the   Writ   Court,   to   respondent   no.   1   is
maintained.   It   is   made   clear   that   the   payment   of
said compensation by appellants to respondent no.
1   shall   not   form   a   precedence   for   future   in   view   of
the   fact   that   the   said   compensation   stands
awarded   to   the   writ   petitioner/respondent   no.   1   in
view of the peculiar facts and circumstances of the
instant case. ”
15. Thus,   from   the   aforesaid,   it   is   evident   that   the   Appeal   Court
did   not   approve   the   decision   of   the   learned   Single   Judge   to
direct   the   respondents   herein   to   exhume   the   body   of   the
deceased and thereby permit the family members to shift and
bury at their native graveyard in accordance with the religious
practice. 
16. The   appellant   (father   of   the   deceased)   being   dissatisfied   with
the order passed by the High Court is here before us with the
present appeal invoking Article 136 of the Constitution. 
Submissions on behalf of the Appellant
17.  Mr.   Anand   Grover,   the   learned   senior   counsel   appearing   on
behalf of the appellant, at the outset, submitted that he would
14

like   to   confine   his   prayer   to   the   extent   of   directing   the
respondents to disinter the body so as to enable the appellant
as   a   father   and   other   family   members   to   perform   the
prayers/rituals to their satisfaction. Mr. Grover submitted that
the   body   is   now   buried   past   almost   more   than   eight   months.
In   such   circumstances,   the   family   members   of   the   deceased
would   not   like   to   disturb   the   remains   of   the   dead   body   and
once   the   prayers   are   offered,   the   body   may   be   once   again
buried. However, Mr. Grover clarified that the appellant would
like   to   wash   the   body   with   water   and   wrap   it   up   with   a   new
white cloth. 
18. Mr. Grover further submitted that the Appeal Court ought not
to   have   disturbed   the   order   passed   by   the   learned   Single
Judge   directing   the   respondents   to   exhume   the   body.   He
would submit that the appellant as a father  still believes that
his   son   was   not   a   terrorist   or   a   militant   and   was   killed   in   a
fake encounter. Mr. Grover would submit that assuming for a
moment   without   admitting   that   the   deceased   was   a   militant,
the   police   should   have   handed   over   the   dead   body   to   the
15

family members and could not have buried the body discreetly
at the Wadder Payeen Graveyard. 
19. The entire line of argument of Mr. Grover is that the appellant
has   a   fundamental   right   under   Article   21   of   the   Constitution
to perform the last rites of his dead son in accordance with the
rituals prevailing in Islam. The appellant as a father could not
have   been   deprived   of   such   fundamental   right.   He   would
submit that as the appellant was not permitted or rather given
an opportunity to perform the last rites of his dead son, there
is   no   other   option   but   to   pray   for   exhumation   of   the   dead
body. 
20. In   support   of   his   aforesaid   submissions,   Mr.   Grover   seeks   to
rely upon the following decisions: 
(1) Pt.   Parmanand   Katara,   Advocate   v.   Union   of   India,
(1995) 3 SCC 248, 
(2) S.   Sethu   Raja   v.   The   Chief   Secretary ,   The   Chief
Secretary,   Government   of   Tamil   Nadu   and   Ors.,
WP(MD) No.3888 of 2007 decided on 28.08.2007, 
(3) Ramlila Maidan Incident, In Re , (2012) 5 SCC 1, 
16

(4) Jakir   Sk.   v.   The   State   of   West   Bengal   &   Ors.,   2017
SCC OnLine Cal 3354, 
(5) Vineet   Ruia   v.   Principal   Secretary,   Ministry   of
Health   and   Family   Welfare,   Government   of   West
Bengal,  AIR 2020 Cal 308, 
(6) Ram   Sharan   Autyanuprasi   v.   Union   of   India,   AIR
1989 SC 549, 
(7) Ashray   Adhikar   Abhiyan   v.   Union   of   India ,   (2002)   2
SCC 27, 
(8) Pradeep   Gandhy   v.   State   of   Maharashtra ,   2020   SCC
OnLine Bom 662.
21. In   such   circumstances   referred   to   above,   Mr.   Grover   prays
that there being merit in his appeal, the same may be allowed
and appropriate relief may be granted.
Submissions on behalf of the Respondents
22.  On the other hand, this appeal has been, vehemently, opposed
by   Mr.   Ardhendumauli   Kumar   Prasad,   the   learned   counsel
appearing for the respondents submitting that no error, not to
17

speak of any error of law could be said to have been committed
by the High Court in passing the impugned order. The learned
counsel would submit that the impugned order passed by the
High Court is a balanced order keeping all the relevant aspects
of the matter in mind, more particularly, the issues relating to
public order etc. and no interference is warranted at the end of
this   Court   in   exercise   of   jurisdiction   under   Article   136   of   the
Constitution. 
23. The   learned   counsel   would   submit   that   the   appellant   as   a
father   of   the   deceased   cannot   assert   that   he   has   a
fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution to seek
exhumation   of   the   body   for   the   purpose   of   performing   the
necessary rituals. 
24. The   learned   counsel   invited  the   attention   of  this   Court  to   the
averments   made   in   the   affidavit   in   reply   filed   for   the   purpose
of   opposing   the   present   appeal.   We   quote   the   relevant
averments, as under: 
“4. It is respectfully submitted that in the previous round
of before this Hon'ble Court in SLP(C) No. 10760 of 2022,
the   Petitioner   submitted   that   he   does   not   press   for   the
relief   regarding   exhumation   and   handing   over   of   the
18

body   remains   of   his   deceased   son.   Relevant   extract   of
the   order   dated   27.06.2022   passed   by   this   Hon'ble
Court  in   SLP(C)  No.   10760/2022  are   reproduced   herein
below:
 
"Learned counsel for the petitioner at the outset
states that he does not press for the first relief
granted   by   the   learned   Single   Judge   of   the
High Court regarding exhumation and handing
over of the body remains of his deceased son." 
5.   Pursuant   to   the   above,   the   Hon’ble   High   Court   after
considering  the  said  submission  of the  petitioner  herein
passed the present Impugned Order. Relevant extract of
the   Impugned   Order   dated   01.07.2022   passed   by   the
Hon’ble High Court is reproduced herein below:
"7.   Indisputably,   Respondent   No.   1   herein   has
given up first relief,  granted by the Writ  Court,
before   the   Apex   Court   as   regards   exhumation
and   handing   over   of   the   body­remain   of   his
deceased   son.   As   such,   the   appearing   counsel
for parties were heard on the rest of the reliefs
identified in the order of the Apex Court."
6.   Further,   the   Hon’ble   High   Court   whilst   passing   the
present   impugned   order   was   pleased   to   allow   the
petitioners herein and his family members (maximum 10
persons)   to   perform   Fatiha   Khawani   (religious
rituals/prayers  after  burial)  of the  deceased  at  Wadder
Payeen   Graveyard,   on   the   date   and   time   to   be   decided
in consultations with respondent no. 1, subject to taking
into   account   security   measures   which   may   be   required
to   be   put   in   place   in   as   much   as   the   COVID­19
guidelines. 
7. It is submitted that the respondent is agreeable to the
abovementioned   relief   granted   by   the   Hon'ble   High
Court   with   regards   to   performing   Fatiha   Khawani
(religious   rituals/prayers   after   burial)   subject   to
19

reasonable   conditions   being   imposed   by   the   concerned
District   Magistrate   in   the   interest   of   public   health,
security and maintenance of law and order.
8.   It   is   humbly   submitted   that   further   relief   sought   by
the   Petitioner   before   this   Hon'ble   Court   regarding
exhumation   of   the   body   of   the   deceased   and   offering
prayer thereat is opposed by the answering respondent
authorities   on   the   ground   of   state   security,   law   and
order,   public   health   &   hygiene   apart   from   the   fact   that
the   same   will   open   a   floodgate   of   similar   requests   and
will raise serious security concerns and threat to public
order   and   health.   In   this   regard   detailed   averments
have   already   been   submitted   by   the   answering
respondent before single bench and Divisional Bench of
JK High Court. 
9.   It   is   respectfully   submitted   that   the   deceased   was   a
hard core terrorist associated with a terrorist group and
was   killed   in   an   encounter   with   the   security   forces   on
15.11.2021   along   with   Pakistan   based   terrorist   with
whom he was hatching different terror conspiracies. 
10.   That   pursuant   to   the   fierce   gun   battle/encounter
that   led   to   killing   of   the   deceased   terrorist,   authorities
have performed the last rites of the deceased as per his
religious beliefs and practices and buried the dead body
as per the religious customs. It is respectfully submitted
that the Hon'ble High Court has nowhere observed that
there   has   been   any   violation   of   practice   of   religious
customs during the last rites of the deceased .
11.   It   is   respectfully   submitted   that   it   has   been   more
than 8 months from the date of burial of the dead body
and as of now the same would have decomposed hence,
no purpose would suffice by exhuming the same as the
same   may   lead   to   adverse   public   health   issues.   This
factual   position   is   also   elaborately   admitted   by   the
petitioner   in   its   pleadings   as   well   before   the   Hon'ble
High Court of J&K, Srinagar . 
20

12. That,   it   is   further   respectfully   submitted   that
pursuant   to   the   encounter   of   terrorist   namely   Burhan
Wani, a disturbing trend of glorification of the deceased
terrorists   was   witnessed   in   the   valley   wherein   anti­
national emotions were stoked in the youth and they are
instigated   against   the   Indian   Republic   to   join   various
terror   groups.   It   is   respectfully   submitted   that   in
exhuming   the   remains   of   the   deceased,   such   emotions
may be flared and such activities shall be revived which
may   lead   to   a   further   threat   to   national   security   and
glorification of terrorism.
 
13.  It is respectfully submitted that the valley is affected
by   terror   activities   and   there   are   regular   gun­
battle/encounters   between   the   security   forces   and
terrorists.   Any   direction   of   exhumation   of   the   body   will
lead   to   similar   requests   from   the   family   of   other   killed
terrorists, which may adversely affect security of nation
and   public   order   in   the   entire   Union   Territory   of   JK,   as
mentioned   above   and   averments   already   submitted
before the Honourable High Court . 
14.   Therefore,   in   light   of   the   submissions   made   herein­
above,   it   is   respectfully   submitted   that   the   prayer   of
exhumation   of   the   mortals   of   the   deceased   may   not   be
granted   and   the   direction   of   allowing   the   petitioners
herein   and   family   (maximum   10   persons)   to   perform
Fatiha Khawani (religious rituals/prayers after burial) of
the  deceased  at  Graveyard,  on  the  date  and  time   to  be
decided   in   consultations   with   respondent   no.   1,   subject
to  taking into  account security  measures  which  may be
required to be put in place in as much as the COVID­19
guidelines   may   be   allowed   and   the   present   Special
Leave Petition may be dismissed.”   [Emphasis supplied]
21

25. In   such   circumstances   referred   to   above,   the   learned   counsel
appearing   for   the   respondents   prayed   that   there   being   no
merit in this appeal, the same may be dismissed.
Analysis 
26. Having   heard   the   learned   counsel   appearing   for   the   parties
and having gone through the materials on record, the following
questions of law fall for the consideration of this Court: 
a. Whether   the   appellant   (father   of   the   deceased)   can   pray
for   exhumation   of   the   dead   body   of   his   son   from   the
graveyard   asserting   that   it   is   his   fundamental   right   as
enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution to perform
the last rites of his slained son?
b. Will   it   be   in   the   fitness   of   the   things,   more   particularly,
having regard to the fact that the body is now buried past
more   than   eight   months   to   order,   exhumation   so   as   to
enable the  appellant  and his family  members to  perform
the rituals as followed in Islam?
c. Assuming   for  a  moment   that   it   is   the   fundamental   right
of   the   father   under   Article   21   of   the   Constitution   to
22

perform   the   last   rites  and   rituals  of   his  son  with   dignity
before  being   buried   in  a   graveyard,  should   this   Court  in
exercise   of   its   jurisdiction   under   Article   136   (1)   of   the
Constitution   disturb   the   impugned   order   passed   by   the
High Court at the risk & peril of public order, health etc.
and   grant   the   relief   of   exhumation   after   almost   nine
months?
d. Whether   the   High   Court   in   appeal   committed   any
substantial error in passing the impugned order?
Exhumation of Body
27.   Exhumation   involves   opening   up   a   grave   (or   occasionally   a
vault) and removing the human remains already buried there.
Also   known   as   ‘disinterment’,   exhumation   is   controversial   –
even   if   the   intent   is   usually   to   rebury   the   displaced   remains
elsewhere. Most societies and cultures that embrace burial as
a means of bodily disposal exhibit an entrenched reluctance to
disturb the dead’s earthly  repose mainly for  two reasons. The
first   is   public   health   concerns   around   the   potential
transmission   of   disease   from   the   decaying   corpses.   Secondly,
23

and more fundamentally, exhumation offends the basic moral
premise of allowing the dead to ‘rest in peace’ and is generally
regarded as a forbidden or sacrilegious act. 
28. Ordinarily,   the   request   for   exhumation   would   fall   into   two
broad categories: “public interest and personal reasons.”
29. The   lawful   authority   for   exhumation   is   contained   in   Section
176(3), CrPC, 1973. This activity  is permitted for  the purpose
of   crime   detection   and   other   such   pressing   situations.
Whenever   there   is   a   suspicion   of   foul   play   like   homicide,
criminal   abortion,   disputed   cause   of   death,   poisoning   etc.
exhumation   may   be   carried   out   for   the   purpose   of   post­
mortem examination. 
30. In   the   instant   case,   after   the   deceased   was   killed   in   the
Hyderpora   encounter,   the   authorities   performed   the   last   rites
of   the   deceased   with   all   dignity   with   the   aid   of   the   Auqaf
Committee   as   per   the   religious   beliefs   and   practices   and
buried him in J&K on 15.11.2021.
31. The   stance   of   the   State   on   oath   is,   that   the   dead   body   of
deceased   was   shifted   and   buried   by   the   Auqaf   Committee   in
24

accordance   with   all   the   religious   obligations   at   the   Wadder
Payeen   Graveyard,   in   presence   of   the   Executive   Magistrate,
Zachaldara. The last rites of the deceased had been performed
as   per   the   Islamic   Religious   practices   by   giving   a
wash/cleaning   of   dead   body,   shrouding/systematic   wrapping
of the body with two white pieces of cloth, covering the whole
body followed by the Janaza prayers and consequent burial of
the   deceased   in   the   grave,   reciting   the   verses   from   the   Holy
Book   Quaran.   However,   the   appellant   asserts   that   it   was   his
privilege to perform the last rites of his son as a father.
Scope of Articles 25 & 26 resply of the Constitution
32.   In   Mohd.   Hamid   and   Another   v.   Badi   Masjid   Trust   and
Others , (2011) 13 SCC 61, this Court held that: 
“ 10.   ….. Page   406   of   Hanafi   Law   Relating   to   Wakf   or
Trusts   was   also   placed   before   the   High   Court   and   has
also been placed before us by the counsel appearing for
the   respondents.   Page   406   of   the   said   law   reveals   a
fatwa   contained   in   Fatawa­e­Alamgiri   at   p.   556,   in
which   it   is   stated   under   the   heading   “A   burial   ground”
in the following manner:
25

“ When   a   body   has   been   buried   in   the   ground,
whether   for   a   long   or   short   time,   it   cannot   be
exhumed without some excuse. But it may lawfully
be   exhumed   when   it   appears   that   the   land   was
usurped, or another is entitled to it under a right of
pre­emption .”
xxx  xxx xxx
12.   In this connection, we may also refer to the decision
of   this   Court   in   Gulam   Abbas   v.   State   of   U.P.   [(1984)   1
SCC   81   :   1984   SCC   (Cri)   35]   In   the   said   decision,   this
Court has considered the scope and ambit of Articles 25
and   26   of   the   Constitution   of   India   and   also   the
jurisdiction   of   this   Court   under   Article   32   of   the
Constitution   of   India.   In   the   said   decision,   the   question
which   arose   for   consideration   was   that   whether   two
graves   could   be   shifted   to   some   other   place   for   the
purpose   of   finding   out   some   permanent   solution   to   the
perennial   problem   of   clashes   between   the   two   religious
communities.   While   dealing   with   the   aforesaid   issue,
this Court considered various fatwas issued by religious
heads,   namely,   Head   Muftis   and   Shahi   Imams   from
Delhi, Banaras and Patna stating the position of law for
shifting the graves under the Shariat law.
13.   After   going   through   all   those   fatwas,   this   Court
in   Gulam   Abbas   [(1984)   1   SCC   81   :   1984   SCC   (Cri)   35]
found that: (SCC p. 86, para 6)
“6. …  The common theme in all these fatwas is that
under   the   Shariat   law   respecting   of   graves   is   the
religious obligation of every Muslim, that shifting of
dead bodies after digging old graves in which they
are   lying   buried   is   not   permissible   and   to   do   so
would   amount   to   interference   with   their   religious
rights. ”
26

It   was   further   found   that   such   religious   rights   of   every
person   and   every   religion   are,   however,   subject   to
“public order”, the maintenance whereof is paramount in
the larger interest of the society. It was also held that if
it becomes necessary to shift graves in certain situations
and   exigencies   of   public   order,   the   same   would   surely
provide   a   requisite   situation,   especially   as   the
fundamental   rights   under   Articles   25   and   26   are
expressly made subject to public order .”
    [Emphasis supplied]
33.     In   Gulam   Abbas   and   Others   v.   State   of   U.P.   and   Others ,
(1984) 1  SCC 81, this Court held that:   
“ 5.   …..Articles   25   and   26  of   the   Constitution,   on   which
strong reliance was placed by counsel for the contesting
respondents   representing   the   Sunni   community   in   that
behalf,   undoubtedly   guarantee   (a)   to   all   persons
freedom of conscience and free profession, practice and
propagation   of   religion   and   (b)   to   every   religious
denomination or any section thereof freedom to manage
its   own   affairs   in   matters   of   religion   but   both   these
fundamental   rights   have   been   expressly   made   “subject
to public order, morality and health”.  In other words, the
exercise of these fundamental rights is not absolute but
must   yield   or   give   way   to   maintenance   of   public   order
and the  impugned  suggestion  was mooted  by  the  Court
and has now been found to be feasible by the Chairman
of  the  Committee in the larger interest  of the society  for
the   purpose   of   maintaining   public   order   on   every
occasion of the performance of their religious ceremonies
and functions by members of both the sects…..  
6.   Counsel   for   the   Sunnis   relied   upon   five   Fatwas
issued by their religious heads (Head Muftis and Shahi
Imams)   from   Delhi,   Banaras   and   Patna   stating   the
position   under   Sheriat   Law.   The   common   theme   in   all
these   Fatwas   is   that   under   Sheriat   Law   respecting   of
27

graves   is   the   religious   obligation   of   every   Muslim,   that
shifting of dead bodies after digging old graves in which
they   are   lying   buried   is   not   permissible   and   to   do   so
would amount to interference with their religious rights.
True, this position under Sheriat Law cannot be doubted
but   as   explained   earlier   the   religious   rights   of   every
person   and   every   religious   denomination   are   subject   to
“public order”, the maintenance whereof is paramount in
the   larger   interest   of   the   society.   For   instance,   the
ecclesiastical   edict   or   right   not   to   disturb   an   interred
corpse   is   not   absolute   as   will   be   clear   from   Section
176(3)   of   Criminal   Procedure   Code   which   permits   its
exhumation   for   the   purpose   of   crime   detection   and   this
provision is applicable to all irrespective of the personal
law governing the dead. In fact, quoting a Hadit, one of
the   Fatwas   relied   upon   by   the   contesting   respondents
states   “unnecessary   shifting   of   graves   is   also   not
permissible”…..”
       [Emphasis supplied]
34. In   Adi Saiva Sivachariyargal Nala Sangam and Others v.
Government of Tamil Nadu and Another ,   (2016) 2 SCC 725,
this Court held that:
“ 43.   …..The   rights   guaranteed   by   Articles   25   and   26,
therefore,   are   circumscribed   and   are   to   be   enjoyed
within   constitutionally   permissible   parameters.   Often
occasions   will   arise   when   it   may   become   necessary   to
determine   whether   a   belief   or   a   practice   claimed   and
asserted   is   a   fundamental   part   of   the   religious   practice
of  a group or denomination making such a claim before
embarking upon the required adjudication. A decision on
such claims becomes the duty of the constitutional court.
It is neither an easy nor an enviable task that the courts
are   called   to   perform.   Performance   of   such   tasks   is   not
28

enjoined   in   the   court   by   virtue   of   any   ecclesiastical
jurisdiction  conferred  on  it  but  in  view of   its  role  as  the
constitutional   arbiter.   Any   apprehension   that   the
determination   by   the   court   of   an   essential   religious
practice   itself   negatives   the   freedoms   guaranteed   by
Articles   25   and   26   will   have   to   be   dispelled   on   the
touchstone   of   constitutional   necessity.   Without   such   a
determination   there   can   be   no   effective   adjudication
whether   the   claimed   right   is   in   conformity   with   public
order,   morality   and   health   and   in   accord   with   the
indisputable   and   unquestionable   notions   of   social
welfare   and   reforms.   A   just   balance   can   always   be
made   by   holding   that   the   exercise   of   judicial   power   to
determine   essential   religious   practices,   though   always
available   being   an   inherent   power   to   protect   the
guarantees   under   Articles   25   and   26,   the   exercise
thereof must always be restricted and restrained . ”
        [Emphasis supplied]
35. Thus, from the aforesaid, it is evident that the religious rights
of every person and every religion are, however, subject to the
“public   order”,   the   maintenance   whereof   is   paramount   in   the
larger   interest   of   the   society.   Both   these   fundamental   rights
have   been   expressly   made   “subject   to   public   order,   morality
and   health”.   The   exercise   of   these   fundamental   rights   is   not
absolute  but  must  yield or   give way  to  maintenance of  public
order, morality and health.
29

Right  to  have  a  decent  burial  as  enshrined  under  Article  21  of
the Constitution
36. In  Pt.   Parmanand Katara  (supra), this Court observed that: 
“ 3.   …..right   to   dignity   and   fair   treatment   under   Article
21 of the Constitution of India is not only available to a
living man but also to his body after his death…..”
37. In  Ashray Adhikar  (supra),   this Court held that: 
“ 1.   ..…On the basis of that letter, an important question
as   to   the   right   of   homeless   deceased,   to   have   a   decent
burial, as per their religious belief and the corresponding
obligation   of   the   State   towards   such   people   having
arisen, the letter was treated as a writ petition and was
listed   for   hearing.   The   letter   prayed   for   an   intervention
by   this   Court   and   to   issue   necessary   directions   to   all
those   concerned,   so   that   a   person   dying   on   the   road,
can at least claim for  a decent burial or cremation as a
person   belonging   to   the   society.   On   the   basis   of   that
letter,   notices   have   been   issued.   The   Deputy
Commissioner   of   Police   (Headquarters)   has   filed   a
counter­affidavit, indicating the role of the police in such
matters. On behalf of Municipal Corporation of Delhi, Dr
Satpal,   Deputy   Municipal   Health   Officer   has   filed   an
affidavit,  indicating  therein  that  when  a  person  dies   on
the   streets   and  the  dead   body   remains   unclaimed,   it   is
handed   over   to   MCD   by   the   Delhi   Police   and   thereafter
the dead body is cremated at electric crematorium, Bela
Road by the Health Department of MCD, free of cost. In
case the dead body is that of a Muslim, then the same is
buried   in   a   burial   ground   near   Delhi   Gate   by   the   Waqf
Board   and   Municipal   Corporation   of   Delhi   bears   the
expenses.   On   behalf   of   the   Ashray   Adhikar   Abhiyan,   a
rejoinder­affidavit   was   filed.   In   course   of   hearing,   the
30

Court wanted from the petitioner, as to what guidelines
the petitioner wants from the Court and pursuant to the
same,   the   proposed   guidelines   were   submitted   by   the
petitioner.   On   going   through   those   guidelines,   we   find
that   apart   from   claiming   a   decent   burial,   the   proposed
guidelines   cover   a   vast   field,   which   we   apprehend,
would   not   come   within   the   purview   of   the   original
prayer.….”
38. In   Ram   Sharan   Autyanuprasi   (supra),   this   Court   opined
that:  
13.   …..It is true that life in its expanded horizons today
includes   all   that   give   meaning   to   a   man's   life   including
his tradition, culture and heritage and protection of that
heritage in its full measure would certainly come within
the compass of an expanded concept of Article 21 of the
Constitution.   Yet,   when   one   seeks   relief   for   breach   of
Article 21, one must confine oneself to some direct, overt
and tangible  act which threatens the fullness  of his life
or the lives of others in the community.”
39.  In   Vineet Ruia  (supra),   the Calcutta High Court held that: 
“ 20.   By   and   large,   whether   it   is   for   a   theist   or   atheist,
freedom   of   conscience   and   free   profession   and   practice
of   religion   is   protected   under   Clause   (1)   of   Article   25   of
the Constitution. The term “religion” in that Clause need
not necessarily be linked to any particular religion as is
understood as a religious denomination. It is a matter of
faith   and   of   one's   own   conscience   which   could   trigger
the   profession   and   practice   of   what   may   be   religion   in
the   larger   sense   to   a   particular   individual.   With   this
concept   in   mind,   it   needs   to   be   delineated   that   it   is   not
the   religious   practices   of   the   different   religious
denominations   which   matter   in   such   instances.   It   is   a
31

matter of connectivity with the person who has died and
the   near   relatives   may   be   in   whatever   degree   of
relationship.   Fundamentally,   human   relationship
between   the   parent   and   child,   husband   and   wife,
grandparent   and   grandchild,   etc.   is   not   based   on   any
religious   tenet.   It   is   a   matter   of   faith   and   conscience   of
every  individual.  If such a person is to  take recourse to
any   practice   and   free   profession   on   the   foundation   of
freedom of conscience in terms of Clause (1) of Article 25
of the Constitution of India, it could get abridged only by
the   reciprocal   covenant   that   such   activity   should   be
subject to public order, morality and health and to other
provisions   of   Part   III   of   the   Constitution.   This   is   the
inbuilt   mode   of   controlling   such   activities   even   in   terms
of   Clause   (1)   of   Article   25.   The   eligibility   of   a   person   to
perform the funeral rites, be it connected to cremation or
burial, may be sometimes guided by factors which may
be   akin   to   accepted   practice   even   in   religious
denominations. If we were to look at the varied practices
among   the   Hindus   as   a   whole   or   different
denominations   of   Hindus,   one   thing   is   clearly   certain;
the   facility   to   provide   ritualistic   offerings   by   way   of
water,   flowers   or   even   certain   grains   are   quite   often
seen as fundamentally for the satisfaction of the person
making   such   offer   to   the   dead   before   burial/cremation,
as   the   case   may   be.   Post   cremation   rites   including,
receiving   the   mortal   remains   in   the   form   of   ashes   and
bones which are treated as sacred to the near relatives
of the departed and further handling of those materials
in accordance with faith and belief also stands accepted
in   such   communities   (profitable   reading   in   this   regard
can   be   had   from   Garuda   Purana,   Vishnu   Purana   and
other   ancient   Hindu   texts   and   scriptures).   In   so   far   as
Christians are concerned, if one were to look at different
denominations,   it   can   be   seen   that   there   are   practices,
which   may   with   slight   variations,   generally   provide   for
prayers   before   the   dead   bodies   are   disposed   of   by
burial   and   by   offering   prayers   even   after   disposal   on
different   dates   and   times   depending   upon   the   faith,
belief   and   practice   in   different   Churches.   A   perusal   of
32

canons   would   show   that   different   ritualistic   processes
are   delineated   for   such   matters.   We   have   mentioned   it
only   to   indicate   that   there   are   different   practices
available.   In   so   far   as   the   Muslims   are   concerned,
whatever   be   the   difference   in   beliefs   and   practices
among the Hanafis, who are treated as a majority group
of   Sunnis   in   India,   on   one   hand,   and   the   Shias   on   the
other   hand,   one   clear   thread   of   connectivity   is   the   faith
and belief that the disposal of human remains is a must
as well as post Kabar (Burial) rituals (Certain passages
from   Al­Bahr­ur­Raiq   will   buttress   this   aspect).   The
family   also   intends   to   have   its   own   practices   carried
forward   to   the   extent   it   relates   to   their   faith   and   belief.
We   refer   to   all   these   only   to   demonstrate   that   by   and
large   the   Indian   community   always   has   the   desire   for
intricate   practices   in   the   form   of   rituals   with   the
participation   of   near   relatives   of   a   deceased,   following
what   could   be   permissible   under   given
circumstances…..
xxx xxx xxx
23.   ….. the   right   of   the   family   of   a   Covid­19   victim   to
perform the last rites before the cremation/burial of the
deceased   person   is   a   right   akin   to   Fundamental   Right
within   the   meaning   of   Article   21   of   the   Constitution   of
India. While exercising their power to impose restrictions
on citizens in their way of life in the wake of outbreak of
an endemic like Covid­19, a fine balance must be struck
by   the   State   and   the   local   self­government   institutions
so   that   the   aforesaid   right   of   a   citizen   to   perform   the
obsequies   of   his   near   and   dear   ones   does   not   stand
abridged   or   abrogated   excepting   for   very   compelling
reasons …..”
       [Emphasis supplied]
33

40. In  Anandhi   Simon v. State of Tamil Nadu, Represented by
Chief   Secretary   to   Government   and   Others ,   (2021)   3   Mad
LJ 479, the Madras High Court held that : 
“16.   The protection of life and personal liberty which is
guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India
has   been   interpreted   by   the   Hon'ble   Supreme   Court   in
many   cases.   There   are   lot   of   rights   which   are   included
in   Article   21   such   as   right   to   privacy,   right   against
solitary   confinement,   right   to   legal   aid,   right   to   speedy
trial etc. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in many cases has
also   observed   and   interpreted   that   right   to   have   a
decent   burial   is   also   included   in   Article   21   of   the
Constitution   of   India.   The   right   to   human   dignity   is   not
restricted   to   living   human   being   but   is   available   even
after the death also…..
xxx xxx xxx
34.   Insofar   as   the   exhumation   for   the   purpose   of
enabling the family members of the deceased to perform
their religious ceremonies and to bury the dead body at
an   appropriate   place   of   their   choice   is   concerned,   there
is a legislative vacuum. Even though under Section 176
Cr.P.C.   and   Section   174(1)   Cr.P.C,   the   Magistrate   and
the Officer­in­charge of the Police Station are having the
powers to order for exhumation, those cases do not deal
with   the   case   on   hand,   where   the   buried   person   or   his
family members are not involved in any criminal offence .
35. (d)   In   Common   Cause   v.   Union   of   India   reported
in   (2008)   5   SCC   511,   the   Hon'ble   Supreme   Court
observed that if there is a buffer zone unoccupied by the
legislature   or   executive   which   is   detrimental   to   the
public   interest,   judiciary   must   occupy   the   field   to   sub­
serve public interest.
34

36.   The   case   on   hand   also   falls   under   the
aforementioned   category   where   there   is   a   legislative
vacuum.   There   is   no   legislation   in   India   dealing   with
cases where family members seek for exhumation of the
dead body  for the purpose of burying the same and for
performing   the   ceremonies   in   the   place   meant   for   their
religious faith .”
         [Emphasis supplied]
41 . In   Pradeep   Gandhy   (supra) ,   the   Bombay   High   Court   held
that: 
“ 38.   …..In   the   system   of   governance   prevailing   in   our
country,   it   is   highly   unlikely   that   a   Governmental
decision   would   please   each   and   every   citizen.   While
dissent   on   valid   grounds   could   contribute   to   newer
developments   in   the   matter   of   framing   of   policies,
resentment   of   the   nature   put   forth   by   the   Petitioners   in
WP­I   leaves   a   bad   taste   in   the   mouth.   We   have   found
the petitioners to be rather insensitive to others' feelings.
The   founding   fathers   of   the   Constitution   felt   that   the
people   of   India   would   strive   to   secure   to   all   its   citizens
FRATERNITY, assuring the dignity of an individual. That
is   the   preambular   promise…..   we   find   little   reason   to
deprive   the   dead   of   the   last   right,   i.e.,   a   decent   burial
according to his/her religious rites…..”  
42.   In  S. Sethu Raja  (supra), the Madras High Court held that:
“ 18.   The   fundamental   right   to   life   and   personal   liberty
guaranteed   under   Article   21   of   the   Constitution   has
been   given   an   expanded   meaning   by   Judicial
pronouncements.   The   right   to   life   has   been   held   to
include   the   right   to   live   with   human   dignity.   By   our
tradition   and   culture,   the   same   human   dignity   (if   not
more), with which a living human being is expected to be
35

treated,   should   also   be   extended   to   a   person   who   is
dead.  The right to accord a decent burial or cremation to
the dead body of a person, should be taken to be part of
the right to such human dignity...”
43.   In  Vikash Chandra @ Guddu Baba v. The Union of India &
Ors. ,   2008   SCC   OnLine   Pat   905   :   (2008)   2   PLJR   127,   the
Patna High Court held that: 
“5.   …..It   is   expected   that   Patna   Medical   College   &
Hospital Officials or the State Officials will see to it that
the disposal of unclaimed and unidentified dead bodies
are done in accordance with law with utmost respect to
the dead and in case it is verifiable the last rites may be
in accordance with known faith of the deceased.”
44. In   Ramji   Singh   @   Mujeeb   Bhai   v.   State   of   U.P.   &   Ors. ,
(2009) 5 All LJ 376, the Allahabad High Court held that: 
“ 17.   We thus find that the word and expression ‘person’
in   Art   21,   would   include   a   dead   person   in   a   limited
sense   and   that   his   rights   to   his   life   which   includes   his
right   to   live   with   human   dignity,   to   have   an   extended
meaning   to   treat   his   dead   body   with   respect,   which   he
would   have   deserved,   had   he   been   alive   subject   to   his
tradition   culture   and   the   religion,   which   he   professed.
The   State   must   respect   a   dead   person   by   allowing   the
body of person to be treated with dignity and unless it is
required   for   the   purposes   of   establishing   a   crime   to
ascertain   the   cause   of   death   and   be   subjected   to
postmortem   or   for   any   scientific   investigation,   medical
education   or   to   save   the   life   of   another   person   in
accordance with law, the preservation of the dead body
and disposal in accordance with human dignity.”
36

Scope   and   Powers   of   the   Supreme   Court   under   Article   136   of
the Constitution
45. Article   136   of   the   Constitution   empowers   the   Supreme   Court
to   grant   special   leave   in   its   discretion   against   any   judgment,
decree,   determination,   sentence   or   order   in   any   cause   or
matter passed or made by any court or tribunal except by any
court   or   tribunal   constituted   by   or   under   any   law   relating   to
the armed forces. It reads as under:
“136.   Special leave to appeal by the Supreme Court.—(1)
Notwithstanding   anything  in   this   Chapter,   the  Supreme
Court   may,   in   its   discretion,   grant   special   leave   to
appeal   from   any   judgment,   decree,   determination,
sentence   or   order   in   any   cause   or   matter   passed   or
made by any court or tribunal in the territory of India.
(2)   Nothing   in   clause   (1)   shall   apply   to   any   judgment,
determination, sentence or order passed or made by any
court   or   tribunal   constituted   by   or   under   any   law
relating to the Armed Forces.”
46. The   jurisdiction   conferred   by   Article   136   is   divisible   into   two
stages:   the   first   stage   is   upto   the   disposal   of   prayer   for   the
special   leave   to   file   an   appeal   and   the   second   stage
commences if and when the leave to appeal is granted and the
37

special   leave   petition   is   converted   into   an   appeal.   The   legal
position   as   summarised   by   this   Court
in   Kunhayammed   v.   State   of   Kerala ,   (2000)   6   SCC   359;
affirmed   in   Khoday   Distilleries   Ltd.   v.   Sri   Mahadeshwara
Sahakara   Sakkare   Karkhane   Ltd .,   (2019)   4   SCC   376,
regarding the scope of two stages reads as under:
“(a)  While   hearing   the   petition   for   special   leave   to
appeal, the Court is called upon to see whether the
petitioner   should   be   granted   such   leave   or   not.
While   hearing   such   petition,   the   Court   is   not
exercising   its   appellate   jurisdiction;   it   is   merely
exercising   its   discretionary   jurisdiction   to   grant   or
not   to   grant   leave   to   appeal.   The   petitioner   is   still
outside   the   gate   of   entry   though   aspiring   to   enter
the appellate arena of the Supreme Court. Whether
he   enters   or   not   would   depend   on   the   fate   of   his
petition for special leave.
(b)  If   the   petition   seeking   grant   of   leave   to   appeal   is
dismissed,   it   is   an   expression   of   opinion   by   the
Court that a case for invoking appellate jurisdiction
of the court was not made out.
(c)  If   leave   to   appeal   is   granted,   the   appellate
jurisdiction of the court stands invoked; the gate for
entry in appellate arena is opened. The petitioner is
in   and   the   respondent   may   also   be   called   upon   to
face him, though in an appropriate case, in spite of
having   granted   leave   to   appeal,   the   Court   may
dismiss the appeal without noticing the respondent.
(d)  In   spite   of   a   petition   of   special   leave   to   appeal
having   been   filed,   the   judgment,   decree   or   order
against which leave to appeal has been sought for,
continues   to   be   final,   effective   and   binding   as
38

between the parties. Once leave to appeal has been
granted,   the   finality   of   the   judgment,   decree   or
order appealed against is put in jeopardy though it
continues   to   be   binding   and   effective   between   the
parties unless it is a nullity or unless the Court may
pass   a   specific   order   staying   or   suspending   the
operation   or   execution   of   the   judgment,   decree   or
order under challenge. [ Id, 372, para 14.]”
47. In  Pritam Singh v. State , AIR 1950 SC 169, the Constitution
Bench   of   this   Court   has   explained   the   scope   and   powers   of
this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution in detail: 
“ 9.   On   a   careful   examination   of   Article   136   along   with
the   preceding   article,   it   seems   clear   that   the   wide
discretionary   power   with   which   this   Court   is   invested
under   it   is   to   be   exercised   sparingly   and   in   exceptional
cases   only,   and   as   far   as   possible   a   more   or   less
uniform standard should be adopted in granting special
leave   in   the   wide   range   of   matters   which   can   come   up
before   it   under   this   article.   By   virtue   of   this   article,   we
can grant special leave in civil cases, in criminal cases,
in   income   tax   cases,   in   cases   which   come   up   before
different   kinds   of   tribunals   and   in   a   variety   of   other
cases.   The   only   uniform   standard   which   in   our   opinion
can   be   laid   down   in   the   circumstances   is   that   Court
should grant special leave to appeal only in those cases
where   special   circumstances   are   shown   to   exist .   The
Privy   Council   have   tried   to   lay   down   from   time   to   time
certain   principles   for   granting   special   leave   in   criminal
cases,   which   were   reviewed   by   the   Federal   Court
in   Kapildeo   v.   King. It is sufficient for our purpose to say
that though we are not bound to follow them too rigidly
since   the   reasons,   constitutional   and   administrative,
which   sometimes   weighed   with   the   Privy   Council,   need
not   weigh   with   us,   yet   some   of   those   principles   are
39

useful   as   furnishing   in   many   cases   a   sound   basis   for
invoking   the   discretion   of   this   Court   in   granting   special
leave.   Generally   speaking,   this   Court   will   not   grant
special   leave,   unless   it   is   shown   that   exceptional   and
special   circumstances   exist,   that   substantial   and   grave
injustice   has   been   done   and   that   the   case   in   question
presents   features   of   sufficient   gravity   to   warrant   a
review   of   the   decision   appealed   against.   Since   the
present   case   does   not   in   our   opinion   fulfil   any   of   these
conditions,   we   cannot   interfere   with   the   decision   of   the
High Court, and the appeal must be dismissed. ”
       [Emphasis supplied]
48. A   three­Judge   Bench   of   this   Court   in   the   case   of   Hem   Raj,
Son   of   Devilal   Mahajan   of   Bijainagar,   Condemned
Prisoner, at Present Confined in the Central Jail, Ajmer v.
State of Ajmer ,  AIR 1954 SC 462, held as under: 
“2.   Unless   it   is   shown   that   exceptional   and   special
circumstances exist that substantial and grave injustice
has   been   done   and   the   case   in   question   presents
features   of   sufficient   gravity   to   warrant   a  review   of   the
decision   appealed   against,   this   Court   does   not   exercise
its   overriding   powers   under   Article   136(1)   of   the
Constitution   and   the   circumstance   that   because   the
appeal   has   been   admitted   by   special   leave   does   not
entitle   the   appellant   to   open   out   the   whole   case   and
contest   all   the   findings   of   fact   and   raise   every   point
which   could   be   raised   in   the   High   Court.   Even   at   the
final   hearing   only   those   points   can   be   urged   which   are
fit   to   be   urged   at   the   preliminary   stage   when   the   leave
to appeal is asked for. The question for consideration is
whether   this   test   is   satisfied   in   either   of   these   two
appeals .   After   hearing   the   learned   counsel   in   both   the
40

appeals   we   are   satisfied   that   none   of   them   raise   any
questions which fall within the rule enunciated above.”
       [Emphasis supplied]
49. The   Constitution   Bench   of   this   Court   in   the   case   of   P.S.R.
Sadhanantham   v.   Arunachalam   and   Another ,   (1980)   3
SCC 141, has explained the Article 136 of the Constitution as
under:  
“7.     …..In   express   terms,   Article   136   does   not   confer   a
right of appeal on a party as such but it confers a wide
discretionary power on the Supreme Court to interfere in
suitable   cases.   The   discretionary   dimension   is
considerable   but   that   relates   to   the   power   of   the   court.
The   question   is   whether   it   spells   by   implication,   fair
a   procedure   as  contemplated  by  Article  21.  In our  view,
it   does.   Article   136   is   a   special   jurisdiction.   It   is
residuary power; it is extraordinary in its amplitude, its
limit,   when   it   chases   injustice,   is   the   sky   itself.   This
Court   functionally   fulfils   itself   by   reaching   out   to
injustice wherever it is and this power is largely derived
in the common run of cases from Article 136. Is it merely
a   power   in   the   court   to   be   exercised   in   any   manner   it
fancies? Is there no procedural limitation in the manner
of   exercise   and   the   occasion   for   exercise?   Is   there   no
duty to act fairly while hearing a case under Article 136,
either in the matter of grant of leave or, after such grant,
in the final disposal of the appeal? We have hardly any
doubt that here is a procedure necessarily implicit in the
power   vested   in   the   summit   court.   It   must   be
remembered   that   Article   136   confers   jurisdiction   on   the
highest court. The founding fathers unarguably intended
in the very terms of Article 136 that it shall be exercised
by   the   highest   judges   of   the   land   with   scrupulous
adherence   to   judicial   principles   well   established   by
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precedents   in   our   jurisprudence.   Judicial   discretion   is
canalised   authority,   not   arbitrary   eccentricity.   Cardozo,
with   elegant   accuracy,   has   observed:   [Benjamin
Cardozo   :   The   Nature   Of   The   Judicial   Process,   Yale
University Press (1921)]
“The   Judge,   even   when   he   is   free,   is   still   not   wholly
free.   He   is   not   to   innovate   at   pleasure.   He   is   not   a
knight­errant   roaming   at   will   in   pursuit   of   his   own
ideal   of   beauty   or   of   goodness.   He   is   to   draw   his
inspiration   from   consecrated   principles.   It   is   not   to
yield   to   spasmodic   sentiment,   to   vague   and
unregulated   benevolence.   He   is   to   exercise   a
discretion   informed   by   tradition,   methodized   by
analogy,   disciplined   by   system,   and   subordinated   to
‘the   primordial   necessity   of   order   in   the   social   life’.
Wide enough in all conscience is the field of discretion
that remains.”
8.   It   is   manifest   that   Article   136   is   of   composite
structure,   is   power­cum­procedure   —   power   in   that   it
vests   jurisdiction   in   the   Supreme   Court,   and   procedure
in   that   it   spells   a   mode   of   hearing.   It   obligates   the
exercise of judicial discretion and the mode of hearing so
characteristic   of   the   court   process.   In   short,   there   is   an
in­built   prescription   of   power   and   procedure   in   terms   of
Article 136 which meets the demand of Article 21.
9.   We may eye the issue slightly differently. If Article 21
is telescoped into Article 136, the conclusion follows that
fair procedure is imprinted on the special leave that the
court   may   grant   or   refuse.   When   a   motion   is   made   for
leave   to   appeal   against   an   acquittal,   this   Court
appreciates   the   gravity   of   the   peril   to   personal   liberty
involved   in   that   proceeding.   It   is   fair   to   assume   that
while considering the petition under Article 136 the court
will   pay   attention   to   the   question   of   liberty,   the   person
who seeks such leave from the court, his motive and his
locus   standi   and   the   weighty   factors   which   persuade
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the court to grant special leave. When this conspectus of
processual   circumstances   and   criteria   play   upon   the
jurisdiction   of   the   court   under   Article   136,   it   is
reasonable   to   conclude   that   the   desideratum   of   fair
procedure implied in Article 21 is adequately answered .
xxx  xxx xxx
11.   The wider the discretionary power the more sparing
its exercise. Times out of number this Court has stressed
that   though   parties   promiscuously   “provoke”   this
jurisdiction, the court parsimoniously invokes the power.
Moreover,   the   court   may  not,   save   in   special  situations,
grant  leave  to  one who  is  not eo  nomine  a party on  the
record.   Thus,   procedural   limitations   exist   and   are
governed by well worn rules of guidance .”
[Emphasis supplied]
50. Thus,   the   principles   of   law   discernible   from   the   aforesaid   are
that   unless,   it   is   shown   that   exceptional   and   special
circumstances   exist;   that   substantial   and   grave   injustice   has
been   done   and   the   case   and   question   presents   features   of
sufficient gravity  to warrant a review of the decision appealed
against,   this   Court   would   not   exercise   its   overriding   powers
under   Article   136   (1)   of   the   Constitution.   The   wide
discretionary   power   with   which   this   Court   is   invested   under
Article   136   is   to   be   exercised   sparingly   and   in   exceptional
cases   only.   Keeping   these   principles   in   mind,   we   need   to
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decide whether the relief prayed for by the appellant should be
granted or not?
Condition of the Body after Burial
51. Even   the   writ   court   had   allowed   disinterment   subject   to   the
condition that the body should be found to be in a deliverable
state.   It   further   stated   that   if   the   body   is   found   to   be   highly
putrefied then it may pose a risk to public health and hygiene.
In   such   a   situation   the   family   of   the   deceased   would   only   be
allowed to perform the last rites in the graveyard itself. 
52. It   has   been   argued   on   behalf   of   the   appellant   that   the
respondents themselves had disinterred the dead bodies of two
persons, who were killed along with the appellant’s son. One of
them was shot dead by a foreign militant, while the other was
killed during the crossfire and they were disinterred  within two
days  of burial on the directions of District Magistrate Kupwara
and   handed  over  to   their   next  of  kin  for  performing   their  last
rites   in   their   own   way.   It   can   be   easily   assumed   that   the
bodies  must  not   have  decomposed  much  in   two   days  thereby
leaving them in a deliverable state.
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53. The   appellant   himself   has   relied   on   an   expert,   namely,   Dr.
Arpad   A.   Vass,   a   Senior   Staff   Scientist   at   the   Oak   Ridge
National   Laboratory   and   Adjunct   Associate   Professor   at   the
University   of   Tennessee   in   Forensic   Anthropology,   who   has
stated that decomposition of the human body begins around 4
minutes after a person dies. The expert has said that the body
starts   to   liquify   after   one   1   month   of   decomposition.   As   each
day   passes   by,   more   putrefaction   is   undergone   by   the   body.
Even the learned Single judge by order dated 27.05.2022, had
mentioned   that   the   dead   body   of   the   deceased   must   be   in
advanced stage of putrefaction. Almost 9 months have passed
post burial which is suggestive that the body may not be in a
deliverable   state.   It   will   be   too   much   at   this   stage   to   disinter
the body. The dead should not be disturbed and some sanctity
should be attached to the grave.
54. It   goes   without   saying   that   the   right   to   live   a   dignified   life   as
enshrined   under   Article   21   of   the   Constitution   is   not   only
available to a living person but also to the “dead”. Even a dead
person has the right of treatment to his body with respect and
45

dignity   which   he   would   have   deserved   had   he   been   alive,
subject   to   his   tradition,   culture   and   religion   which   he
professed. These rights are not only  for  the deceased but, his
family   members   also   have   a   right   to   perform   the   last   rites   in
accordance   with   the   religious   traditions.   We   are   of   the   view
that it would have been appropriate and in fitness of things to
hand   over   the   dead   body   of   the   deceased   to   the   family
members, more particularly, when a fervent request was made
for   the   same.   It   is   of   course   true   that   for   any   compelling
reasons   or   circumstances   or   issues   relating   to   public   order
etc. more particularly in cases of encounter with the militants
the agency concerned may decline to part with the body. These
are   all   very   sensitive   matters   involving   security   of   nation   and
as   far   as   possible   the   court   should   not   interfere   unless
substantial   &   grave   injustice   has   been   done.   Although,   for
some   reason   or   the   other,   the   body   of   the   deceased   was   not
handed   over   to   the   family   members   yet   the   same   was   buried
with   respect   &   dignity,   with   the   help   of   the   Auqaf   Committee
at   the   Wadder   Payeen   Graveyard.   We   are   convinced   of   one
46

thing  that the body  was  buried with dignity. There is nothing
on record to indicate that the dead body was dealt with in any
manner insulting or hurting the religious feelings of the family
members. 
55. However,   what   is   not   appealing   to   us   is   the   vociferous
submission   on   behalf   of   the   appellant   that   with   a   view   to
remedy   the   wrong,   as   alleged,   this   Court   should   direct   the
respondents to exhume the body and permit the appellant and
his   family   members   to   thereafter   perform   the   rituals.   It   is   for
this very wrong as alleged that the High Court has awarded a
monetary compensation of the amount of Rs. 5,00,000/­. 
56. After   a   body   has   been   buried,   it   is   considered   to   be   in   the
custody   of   the   law;   therefore,   disinterment   is   not   a   matter   of
right.   The   disturbance   or   removal   of   an   interred   body   is
subject to the control and direction of the court. The law does
not   favour   disinterment,   based   on   the   public   policy   that   the
sanctity   of   the   grave   should   be   maintained.   Once   buried,   a
body should not be disturbed. A court will not ordinarily order
or   permit   a   body   to   be   disinterred   unless   there   is   a   strong
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showing   of   necessity   that   disinterment   is   within   the   interests
of justice. Each case is individually decided, based on its own
particular facts and circumstances. 
57. The   respondents   have   stated   on   oath   that   the   body   of   the
deceased   was   buried   with   all   honour.   The   body   was   first
washed   and   thereafter   wrapped   in   a   fresh   white   cloth.   The
prayers were also performed at the time of the burial. There is
nothing   to   indicate   that   the   deceased   was   not   given   a   decent
burial   as   enshrined   under   Article   21   of   the   Constitution.   The
right   to   dignity   and   fair   treatment   under   Article   21   of   the
Constitution   is   not   only   available   to   a   living   man   but   also   to
his   body   after   his   death.   We,   as   a   court   of   law,   respect   the
emotions   and   sentiments   expressed   by   the   appellant   as   the
father   of   the   deceased.   However,   the   court   of   law   should   not
decide   the   rights   of   the   parties   considering   their   sentiments.
The   court  of   law  has  to   decide   the  matter   in   accordance  with
law, more particularly, keeping in mind the doctrine of Rule of
Law.
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58. We take notice of the fact that India has no legislation relating
to   exhumation   except   Section   176(3)   of   the   CrPC.   As   noticed
by   the   Madras   High   Court   in   the   case   of   Anandhi   Simon
(supra), very few countries are having a legislation in regard to
exhumation. One such legislation available is in Ireland under
Section   46   of   the   Local   Government   (Sanitary   Services)   Act,
1948 as amended by Section 4 (2) and the Second Schedule of
the Local Government Act, 1994.
59. The   Union   of   India   may   consider   enacting   an   appropriate
legislation   on   exhumation   so   as   to   tackle   the   situations   like
the one on hand. 
60. We are of the view that the relief granted by the High Court as
contained in para 21 of the impugned judgment can be termed
as   just,   proper   and   equitable.   We   direct   the   respondents   to
comply   with   the   directions   issued   by   the   High   Court,   as
contained in para 21 of the impugned judgment and order. 
61. In the result, this appeal fails and is hereby dismissed with no
order as to costs.  
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62. Pending application, if any, also stands disposed of.
…………………………J.
(SURYA   KANT)
…………………………J.
(J.B.   PARDIWALA)
New Delhi;
September 12, 2022
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