/2022 INSC 0796/
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION 
CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 8904­8907 OF 2010
M/S. SHIVALI ENTERPRISES           ...APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
SMT. GODAWARI (DECEASED) 
THR. LRS. AND OTHERS    ...RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
B.R. GAVAI, J.
1. These   appeals   challenge   the   judgment   dated   3 rd
March 2008 passed by  the learned Single Judge of the High
Court   of   Punjab   and   Haryana   at   Chandigarh   in   Regular
Second Appeal Nos. 1206 and 1207 of 2005, thereby allowing
the   appeals   filed   by   the   respondents­defendants   challenging
the   concurrent   judgments   and   decrees   dated   3 rd
  January
2001  passed  by   the   Additional   Civil   Judge  (Senior  Division),
Faridabad (hereinafter referred to as the “trial court”) in RBT
329/90/2000, and 8 th
  February 2005 passed by the learned
1

District   Judge,   Faridabad   (hereinafter   referred   to   as   the
“Appellate   Court”)   in   Civil   Appeal   No.   11   of   2001.     Vide   the
impugned   judgment,   the   learned   Single   Judge   of   the   High
Court directed that, if the plaintiff desires to get the sale deed
executed pursuant to the agreement(s) to sell, he would do so
by   paying   the   present   prevalent   market   value   as   sale
consideration.     The   appellant­plaintiff   has   also   assailed   the
order   dated   10 th
  April   2008   passed   by   the   learned   Single
Judge   of   the   High   Court,   thereby   dismissing   the   review
applications being R.A. No. 19­C of 2008 in R.S.A. No. 1206
of   2005   and   R.A.   No.   18­C   of   2008   in   R.S.A.   No.   1207   of
2005, filed by the appellant­plaintiff.
2. Facts   in   brief   giving   rise   to   the   present   appeals   are
as under:
The   appellant­plaintiff   through   its   partner   Raj
Kumar, entered into an agreement to sell dated 29 th
  October
1983 with the respondents­defendants No. 1 to 4 with regard
to the suit property, which was situated in the revenue estate
of   Chak Salarpur, Tehsil Dadri, District Ghaziabad (U.P.), at
the   rate   of   Rs.   2900/­   per   Bigha.     Though   the  suit  property
initially   was   in   the   State   of   U.P.,   vide   notification   of   the
2

Central Government dated 15 th
 September 1983, it became a
part of the State of Haryana.  At the time of agreement to sell
dated 29 th
 October 1983, earnest amount of Rs.50,000/­ was
paid by the appellant­plaintiff to the respondents­defendants.
3. Due   to   a   dispute   between   the   State   of   U.P.   and
Haryana,   the   aforesaid   sale   deed   could   not   be   executed   in
favour   of   the   appellant­plaintiff.     Therefore,   another
agreement   to   sell   was   executed   between   the   parties   on   23 rd
August 1985.  At the time of execution of the said agreement,
an   additional   amount   of   Rs.1,00,000/­   was   paid   by   the
appellant­plaintiff to the respondents­defendants.  It is not in
dispute that the total amount payable as per the terms of the
agreement   to   sell   dated   29 th
  October   1983   was   Rs.
1,65,000/­   out   of   which,   an   amount   of   Rs.   1,50,000/­   was
duly   received   by   the   respondents­defendants   on   or   before
23 rd
  August   1985.     As   per   the   terms   of   the   agreement(s)   to
sell, the remaining sale price was to be paid before the Sub­
Registrar   at   the   time   of   execution   and   registration   of   sale
deed.   It is not in dispute that the physical possession of the
suit   property   was   also   delivered   to   the   appellant­plaintiff   by
the   respondents­defendants   at   the   time   of   execution   of   the
3

agreement(s)   to   sell.     It   is   also   not   in   dispute   that   the
appellant­plaintiff   is   thereafter   in   continuous   possession   of
the suit property.
4. As   per   the   terms   of   the   agreement(s)   to   sell,   the
respondents­defendants   were   required   to   obtain   Income­Tax
Clearance   (for   short   “ITC”)   Certificate   and   to   also   get   the
revenue   records   mutated   to   show   them   as   the   owners
inasmuch   as   the   Central   Government   was   shown   as   the
owner   mistakenly.     The   agreement   to   sell   further   stipulated
that,   in   case   of   default   by   the   respondents­defendants,   the
appellant­plaintiff was at liberty to get the sale deed executed
and registered.
5. After   coming   to   know   that   the   respondents­
defendants   were   trying   to   create   3 rd
  party   rights,   the
appellant­plaintiff   filed   a   suit   for   specific   performance   with
further   prayer   for   permanent   injunction   as   against   the
respondents­defendants.     The   said   suit   was   resisted   by   the
respondents­defendants   by   filing   their   written   statement.
The   learned   trial   court   vide   judgment   and   decree   dated   3 rd
January   2001   decreed   the   suit.     In   an   appeal   filed   by   the
respondents­defendants, the  learned  Appellate Court upheld
4

the findings of the trial court vide judgment and decree dated
8 th
 February 2005.
6. Being aggrieved thereby, the respondents­defendants
filed   second   appeals   before   the   High   Court.     Vide   the
impugned judgment, the High Court reversed the concurrent
findings   recorded   by   the   trial   court   and   the   Appellate   Court
and   passed   the   judgment   as   aforesaid.     Being   aggrieved
thereby,   the   present   appeals   have   been   preferred   by   the
appellant­plaintiff.
7. We have heard Shri Rishi Malhotra, learned counsel
appearing   on   behalf   of   the   appellant­plaintiff   and   Shri   S.R.
Singh,   learned   Senior   Counsel   appearing   on   behalf   of   the
respondents­defendants.
8. Shri   Malhotra   submitted   that   the   High   Court   has
grossly   erred   in   interfering   with   the   concurrent   findings
passed   by   the   trial   court   and   the   Appellate   Court.     He
submitted that, since no substantial question of law arose for
consideration   before   the   High   Court,   the   appeals   deserve   to
be   allowed   on   this   short   ground   alone.     He   relies   on   the
judgment   of   this   Court   in   the   case   of   Kondiba   Dagadu
5

Kadam   v.   Savitribai   Sopan   Gujar   and   Others 1
  in   this
regard.
9. Shri   Malhotra   further   submitted   that,   even
assuming   that   in   view   of  the  provisions   of  Section   41   of  the
Punjab   Courts   Act,   1918   (hereinafter   referred   to   as   the
“Punjab   Act”)   it   is   not   necessary   to   frame   a   substantial
question   of   law,   the   jurisdiction   of   the   learned   Single   Judge
of   the   High   Court   would   still   be   circumscribed   by   the
provisions   of   Section   41   of   the   Punjab   Act   and   any
interference in second appeal would only be warranted if the
case falls within the limited area as earmarked in Section 41
of the Punjab Act.
10. He   further   submitted   that   the   respondents­
defendants   have   not   entered   into   the   witness   box   and   as
such,   the   case   of   the   appellant­plaintiff   on   the   basis   of   the
agreement(s)   to   sell   has   gone   unchallenged.     He   therefore
submitted   that   the   appeals   deserve   to   be   allowed   and   the
impugned judgments are liable to be quashed and set aside.
11. Shri Singh, on the contrary, submitted that the High
Court has rightly allowed the second appeals.   He submitted
1   (1999) 3 SCC 722
6

that,   as   per   the   terms   of   the   agreement(s)   to   sell,   the   sale
deed   was   to   be   registered   only   after   the   ITC   Certificate   was
obtained   and   the   property   was   mutated   in   the   name   of   the
respondents­defendants. He submitted that the respondents­
defendants   had   filed   a   suit   for   getting   the   suit   property
mutated   in   their   names   on   4 th
  June   1986   and   the   said   suit
came   to   be   decreed   only   on   22 nd
  December   2006.     It   is
therefore   submitted   that   the   suit   filed   by   the   appellant­
plaintiff on 17 th
 October 1989 was premature.  
12. Shri Singh submitted that in view of the Punjab Act,
no substantial question of law was required to be framed.  He
relies on the judgment of this Court in the case of   Kulwant
Kaur   and   Others   v.   Gurdial   Singh   Mann   (Dead)   By   LRs.
and   Others 2
.     The   learned   Senior   Counsel   further   relies   on
the   judgments   of   this   Court   in   the   cases   of   Kirodi   (since
deceased)   Through   His   Legal   Representatives   v.   Ram
Parkash and Others 3
  and   Satyender and Others v. Saroj
and   Others 4
  in   support   of   this   proposition.     Shri   Singh,
further   relying   on   the   judgment   of   this   Court   in   the   case   of
2   (2001) 4 SCC 262
3   (2019) 11 SCC 317
4   2022 SCC OnLine SC 1026
7

Nirmala   Anand   v.   Advent   Corporation   (P)   Ltd.   and
Others 5
,   submitted   that   there   is   no   reason   to   interfere   with
the   direction   of   the   trial   court   which   directs   that   if   the
plaintiff   desires   to   get   the   specific   performance,   the   same
shall   be   done   at   the   prevalent   market   rate.     He   further
submitted   that   the   suit   itself   was   not   tenable   in   view   of
Section 14 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963.  
13. Section 41 of the Punjab Act reads thus:
“ 41. Second appeals   — (1) An appeal shall lie
to the High Court from every decree passed in
appeal   by   any   Court   subordinate   to   the   High
Court on any of the following grounds, namely:
(a)   the   decision   being   contrary   to
law   or   to   some   custom   or   usage
having the force of law: 
(b)   the   decision   having   failed   to
determine   some   material   issue   of
law   or   custom   or   usage   having   the
force of law: 
(c)   a   substantial   error   or   defect   in
the   procedure   provided  by   the   Code
of  Civil  Procedure  1908  [V  of  1908],
or   by   any   other   law   for   the   time
being   in   force   which   may   possibly
have produced error or defect in the
decision   of   the   case   upon   the
merits; 
[Explanation   —   A   question   relating
to   the   existence   or   validity   of   a
custom or usage shall be deemed to
5   (2002) 5 SCC 481
8

be   a   question   of   law   within   the
meaning of his section:] 
(2)   An   appeal   may   lie   under   this   section   from
an appellate decree passed  ex parte .”
14. This Court, in the case of   Randhir Kaur v. Prithvi
Pal   Singh   and   Others 6
,   after   considering   the   scope   of
interference under the old Section 100 of the Civil Procedure
Code,   1908   (for   short   “CPC”)   and   Section   41   of   the   Punjab
Act, has observed thus:
“ 15.   A   perusal   of   the   aforesaid   judgments
would   show   that   the   jurisdiction   in   second
appeal   is   not   to   interfere   with   the   findings   of
fact on the ground that findings are erroneous,
however,   gross   or   inexcusable   the   error   may
seem   to   be.   The   findings   of   fact   will   also
include   the   findings   on   the   basis   of
documentary   evidence.   The   jurisdiction   to
interfere   in   the   second   appeal   is   only   where
there   is   an   error   in   law   or   procedure   and   not
merely an error on a question of fact. ”
15. It could  thus be seen that this Court has held that,
even when a court exercises jurisdiction under Section 41 of
the Punjab Act, it cannot interfere with the findings of fact in
second   appeal   on   the   ground   that   the   said   findings   are
erroneous,   howsoever   gross   or   inexcusable   the   error   may
6   (2019) 17 SCC 71
9

seem to be.   It has been held that t he findings of fact would
also   include   the   findings   on   the   basis   of   documentary
evidence. The jurisdiction under Section 41 of the Punjab Act
would  be  available  only   when  there  is  a  substantial  error  or
defect in the procedure provided by the CPC or by any other
law for the time being in force.
16. A   bench   of   three   learned   Judges   of   this   Court,   in   a
recent   judgment   in   the   case   of   Satyender   and   Others
(supra), has observed thus:
“ 17.   Be   that   as   it   may,   though   the   requirement   of
formulation of a substantial question of law was not
necessary,   yet   Section   41   of   the   Punjab   Courts
Act,   requires   that   only   such   decisions   are   to   be
considered   in   second   appeal   which   are   contrary
to   law   or   to   some   custom   or   usage   having   the
force   of   law   or   the   court   below   have   failed   to
determine some material issue of  law or custom
or usage having the force of law. Therefore, what
is important is still a “question of law”. In other
words, second appeal is not a forum where court
has   to   re­examine   or   re­appreciate   questions   of
fact settled by the Trial Court and the Appellate
Court.   The plaintiffs had claimed right over certain
agricultural land and their case was that they have
the   right   to   be   declared   the   owner   of   this   property
and the possession be handed over to the them, for
the   reasons   that   on   this   particular   property
defendants   and   their   predecessors­in­interest   were
the   tenants   of   the   plaintiffs.   Their   case   was   that
defendant   No.   2   was   their   tenant   who   had   sub­let
the  property   in  favour   of  his  son,  that  is  defendant
10

No. 1 and therefore, the property should be reverted
back   to   the   plaintiffs   and   they   should   be   declared
the owner and should be given the possession of the
property as well. Both the Trial Court as well as the
First   Appellate   Court   had   held   after   evaluating   the
evidence placed by the plaintiffs that the defendant
No.  2   and  his  brothers   (who   were   not   even   made   a
party   by   the   plaintiffs)   were   the   tenants   on   the
property   and   defendant   No.   2   had   not   sub­let   the
property in favour of his son that is defendant No. 1
and   the   revenue   entries   being   made   in   this   regard
in   the   year   1978   are   wrong   and   without   any   basis
as   there   was   no   order   of   any   revenue   authority   for
making   such   an   entry.   In   short,   the   plaintiffs   had
failed   to   prove   their   case   as   owner   of   the   land   in
dispute.   Hence   their   case   of   declaration   and
possession   was   dismissed.   The   Second   Appellate
Court   however,   quite   erroneously,   and   without   any
justification,  gave an entirely  new  finding  regarding
two   Killa   Nos.   21//3/2   and   7//13   on   which   the
plaintiffs   claimed   relief   of   declaration   and
possession, on the same grounds as raised by them
for the other Killa Nos. The pleadings also show that
the   defendants   had   made   a   general   denial   of   the
plaintiffs' claim for all the plots. Yet, the High Court
held   that   since   the   defendants   had   not   made   any
claim   for   plot   nos.   21//3/2   and   7//13   and
therefore   by   logic   a   decree   of   declaration   of
possession ought to have been given to the plaintiffs
for   these   plots!   This   reasoning   of   the   second
Appellate   Court   is   erroneous   for   the   simple   reason
that   the   burden   of   proof   was   on   the   plaintiffs   to
prove   their   case,   which   they   had   failed.   They   have
not been able to prove to the satisfaction of the Trial
Court   as   well   as   the   First   Appellate   Court   about
their   claim   of   any   kind   over   this   property.   Merely
because the defendant did not raise a counter claim
on this property it would not   ipso facto   mean that a
decree   ought   to   have   been   granted   in   favour   of   the
plaintiffs.   Plaintiffs   have   to   prove   their   case   on   the
strength   of   their   evidence.   For   this   reason,   the
reasoning   given   by   the   Second   Appellate   Court   for
11

decreeing   the   claim   of   the   plaintiff   for   plot   nos.
21//3/2   and   7//13   is   incorrect   and   to   that   extent
is liable to be set aside.”
[emphasis supplied]
17. It would thus be clear that this Court has held that,
though   it   is   not   necessary   to   formulate   a   substantial
question   of   law,   the   jurisdiction   under   Section   41   of   the
Punjab   Act   would   permit   only   such   decisions   to   be
considered in second appeal which are contrary to law or to
some   custom   or   usage   having   the   force   of   law,   or   when   the
courts below have failed to determine some material issue of
law   or   custom   or   usage   having   the   force   of   law.     The   Court
held that second appeal is not a forum where the court is to
re­examine or re­appreciate the question of fact settled by the
trial   court   or   the   Appellate   Court.     It   could   thus   clearly   be
seen that though in view of Section 41 of the Punjab Act, it is
not   necessary   to   frame   a   substantial   question   of   law,   the
jurisdiction of the High Court under second appeal cannot be
exercised for re­appreciation of evidence.  
18. A perusal of the plaint filed by the appellant­plaintiff
would   reveal   that   the   appellant­plaintiff   has   specifically
referred   to   the   terms   of   the   agreement(s)   to   sell.     He   has
specifically   stated   that   the   respondents­defendants   have
12

received   an   amount   of   Rs.1,50,000/­.   He   has   further
specifically   stated   that   the   respondents­defendants   have
delivered the actual possession of the suit property to him.  It
is averred that after the respondents­defendants obtained the
requisite   ITC   Certificate   and   got   the   revenue   records
corrected,   they   were   required   to   serve   a   notice   upon   the
appellant­plaintiff informing him about the same having been
done.   After the receipt of such notice, the appellant­plaintiff
was required  to  make the  balance  payment  and get the  sale
deed executed.   The appellant­plaintiff was also given liberty
to use the suit property  in any  manner  so as to plant  trees,
raise construction, install tubewells etc.   It has been averred
in the plaint as under: 
“10.   That   all   the   defendants   have   been
admitting and acknowledging the plaintiff firm
to be in possession of the suit land and seeing
them   spending   huge   amount   over   it.   The
plaintiff   has   been   affecting   costly
improvements   over   the   suit   land   and   the
defendants have been seeing plaintiff spending
huge amount objected to it. They are estopped
from   denying   the   fact   by   their   acts,   conduct,
omissions, laches and admissions. 
11.   That   the   rates   of   the   land   in   the   dispute
have   started   rising   and   the   defendants   out   of
sheer   greed   have   threatened   to   take   forcible
possession,   dispossess   the   plaintiff   and   to
interfere   in   the   peaceful   enjoyment   of   the   suit
13

land   by   the   plaintiff   about   a   month   ago.   They
have   also   threatened   to   alienate   the   suit   land
in   favour   of   the   third   parties.   They   have   also
refused   to   obtain   the   requisite   Income   Tax
Clearance   certificate   and   to   execute   the   sale
deed   in   favour   of   the   plaintiff   firm   as   agreed
upon   in   accordance   with   the   terms   of   the
agreement of sale dated 23.8.1985. 
12. That defendants No.1 to 4 were repeatedly
approached to execute the sale deed in favour
of the plaintiff in accordance with the terms of
the   agreement   of   sale   dated   23.8.1985.   The
defendants   were   also   further   requested   to
desist   from   dispossessing   the   plaintiff,   taking
forcible   possession   or   otherwise   interfering   in
the peaceful enjoyment of the suit land by the
plaintiff.   However,   defendants   after
prevarication   for   some   time   have   finally
refused   to   accede   to   the   reasonable,   just   and
legal request of the plaintiff about a week ago.
Hence this suit. 
13.   That   the   plaintiff   firm   has   all   along   been
ready   and   willing   to   perform   its   part   of   the
contract and is still ready and willing to do so.
It   has   all   along   got   the   requisite   amount   of
balance   sale   consideration   and   expense   etc.
with   it.   The   defendants   have   thus   committed
breaches   of   agreement   of   sale   as   per   details
above with malafide intention. 
14.  That   cause  of  action  arose  about  a  month
ago   and   again   about   a   week   ago   on   the   final
refusal of the defendants.”
19. It   can   thus   clearly   be   seen   that   the   appellant­
plaintiff has specifically averred that due to the rising rate of
the   suit   property,   the   respondents­defendants,   out   of   sheer
14

greed,   had   threatened   to   take   forcible   possession   and   also
threatened   to   alienate   the   suit   property   in   favour   of   a   3 rd
party.
20. In   the   written   statement,   the   respondents­
defendants   have   stated   that   the   appellant­plaintiff   had
obtained Power of Attorney from the respondents­defendants
and   had   undertaken   to   obtain   the   ITC   Certificate.     It   was
further   stated   by   the   respondents­defendants   that   they   had
executed the Power of Attorney and one Mukhtar, an agent of
the   appellant­plaintiff,   was   required   to   take   all   the   requisite
steps to get the revenue records corrected.  It will be relevant
to   refer   to   paragraph   (11)   of   the   written   statement   of   the
respondents­defendants as under:
“11. In reply to Para No.11 it is denied that the
plaintiffs are in possession of the land in suit;
it   is   also   denied   that   defendants   Nos.   l   to   4
had   to   obtain   the   ITCC;   it   is   also   denied   that
the   Plaintiff   had   the   financial   capability   to
purchase   the   land;   it   is   submitted   that
defendants  Nos.   1   to  4  are  in   possession  of
the   suit   land   as   owners   thereof   and   an
entitled   to   alienate   the   same   if   so   desired.
It   is   also   denied   that   the   agreement   to   sell
dated 23.8.1985 is in force. ”
[emphasis supplied]
15

21. A   perusal   of   the   aforesaid   paragraph   would   reveal
that   the   respondents­defendants   had   denied   that   the
appellant­plaintiff   was   in   possession   of   the   suit   property.
The   respondents­defendants   further   asserted   their   right   to
alienate the suit property, if they so desired.
22. The trial court, after perusal of the evidence, came to
a   finding   that   the   execution   of   the   agreement(s)   to   sell   was
admitted   by   the   respondents­defendants.     The   trial   court
further   came   to   a   specific   finding   of   fact   that   the   appellant­
plaintiff  was   always  ready  and  willing   to   perform   his  part  of
contract.     It   found   that,   upon   the   respondents­defendants
complying   with   the   conditions   as   provided   in   the
agreement(s)   to   sell,   they   were   required   to   issue   a   notice   to
the appellant­plaintiff and after receipt of the said notice, the
sale   consideration   was   required   to   be   paid   within   30   days
from receipt of the said notice.
23. In   appeal,   the   learned   Appellate   Court   affirmed   the
findings   of   fact   recorded   by   the   trial   court.     It   held   that   the
execution   of   the   agreement   to   sell   (Ex.   PW1/3)   and   the
16

receipt of earnest money of Rs. 1,50,000/­ was not disputed.
It found that, as per the terms of the agreement(s) to sell, it
was   for   the   respondents­defendants   No.   1   to   4   to   get   the
revenue records corrected and they had also agreed to obtain
the   ITC   Certificate   and   to   send   a   copy   of   the   same   to   the
vendee.     The   learned   Appellate   Court   held   that   even   oral
evidence   to   controvert   these   conditions   incorporated   in   the
written statement cannot be led in  view of Section 92 of the
Evidence   Act,   1872.     It   held   that   the   self­serving   oral
statement of Ajit Singh, defendant No. 7 was not sufficient to
controvert   the   terms   and   conditions   incorporated   in   the
agreement(s)   to   sell.     Insofar   as   the   argument   that   the   suit
for   specific   performance   was   filed   without   the   correction   of
revenue   records,   the   learned   Appellate   Court   found   that
since  the   respondents­defendants  were  intending   to   alienate
the suit property, the appellant­plaintiff was justified in filing
the suit.
24. The   learned   Appellate   Court   came   to   a   specific
finding   that   none   of   the   respondents­defendants   No.   1   to   4,
who were signatories to the agreement, had entered into the
witness box.  Though Ajit Singh, defendant No. 7, who is the
17

husband of defendant No. 3, had appeared as a witness, the
Appellate  Court found that  he  was not  a  good  substitute  for
defendants No. 1 to 4, who, being vendors, were the material
witnesses.     The   learned   Appellate   Court,   relying   on   the
judgment   of   this   Court   in   the   case   of   Vidhyadhar   v.
Manikrao   and   Another 7
,   held   that   on   account   of   non­
examination   of   any   of   the   vendors,   an   adverse   inference
could be drawn against them.
25. The learned Single Judge of the High Court, vide the
impugned   judgment,   has   held   that   the   appellant­plaintiff
could seek specific performance of the contract only after the
revenue   record   was   corrected.     It   held   that   the   suit   for
correction   of   the   revenue   record   was   filed   by   the
respondents­defendants on 4 th
  June 1986 and the same was
decreed   on   22 nd
  December   2006.     It   therefore   held   that   the
suit of the appellant­plaintiff which was filed on 17 th
 October
1989   was   not   tenable.     The   learned   Single   Judge   therefore
allowed the appeals and held that, in view of the judgment of
this   Court   in   the   case   of   Nirmala   Anand   (supra),   if   the
7   (1999) 3 SCC 573
18

plaintiff desires to get the sale deed executed, he is required
to pay the present prevalent market rate of the suit property.
26. We   find   that   the   learned   Single   Judge   of   the   High
Court has erred in interfering with the concurrent findings of
fact   recorded   by   the   trial   court   as   well   as   by   the   Appellate
Court.     The   trial   court   as   well   as   the   Appellate   Court   had
specifically   found   on   the   basis   of   the   evidence   that,   though
as   per   the   terms   and   conditions   of   the   agreement(s)   to   sell,
the sale deed was to be executed only after the respondents­
defendants   obtained   the   ITC   Certificate   and   got   the   revenue
records corrected, the appellant­plaintiff was compelled to file
the   suit   since   the   respondents­defendants   were   trying   to
alienate the suit property.
27. It is pertinent to note that the appellant­plaintiff has
specifically averred that, though the respondents­defendants
had neither obtained the ITC Certificate nor had the revenue
records   corrected,   they   were   threatening   to   dispossess   him
and   create   3 rd
  party   rights   over   the   suit   property.   In   these
circumstances, the appellant­plaintiff was constrained to file
the   suit.   In   the   written   statement,   the   respondents­
defendants have specifically stated that they were entitled to
19

create   3 rd
  party   rights.     In   this   factual   situation,   the
concurrent findings of the trial court and the Appellate Court
that   the   appellant­plaintiff   was   justified   in   filing   the   suit
could not have been faulted with.
28. The   respondents­defendants   cannot   be   permitted   to
blow   hot   and   cold   at   the   same   time.     On   one   hand,   they
contended   that   the   suit   could   not   have   been   filed   without
getting the ITC Certificate and correction of revenue records,
whereas on the other hand, they assert their right to alienate
the suit property.
29. Shri Singh has heavily relied on the judgment of this
Court in the case of  Kulwant Kaur and Others  (supra).  No
doubt   that   where   it   is   found   that   the   findings   of   the   trial
court and the Appellate Court are vitiated on wrong test and
on the basis of assumptions and conjectures and resultantly,
there   is   an   element   of   perversity,   the   High   Court   will   be
within   its   jurisdiction   to   deal   with   the   same.     However,   this
can   be   permitted   only   in   the   event   where   such   a   fact   is
brought   to   light   by   the   High   Court   explicitly   and   the
judgment   should   also   be   categorical   as   to   the   issue   of
perversity vis­à­vis the concept of justice.
20

30. In   the   present   case,   apart   from   there   being   no
perversity in the concurrent findings of fact, there is not even
an   observation   in   the   judgment   of   the   High   Court   to   that
effect. The judgment of the learned Single Judge of the High
Court   also   does   not   discuss   the   issue   of   perversity   vis­à­vis
the   concept   of   justice.     As   such,   the   said   judgment,   in   our
view, is not applicable to the facts of the present case.
31. Insofar   as   the   reliance   placed   by   the   respondents­
defendants   on   the   judgment   of   this   Court   in   the   case   of
Nirmala   Anand   (supra)   is   concerned,   the   said   judgment,
rather   than   supporting   the   case   of   the   respondents­
defendants, would support the case of the appellant­plaintiff.
In   the   said   case,   the   suit   filed   by   the   appellant   was   partly
decreed,   thereby   only   awarding   damages.     The   same   was
upheld by the Division Bench of the High Court.  The defence
of   the   defendant   therein   was   with   regard   to   impossibility   of
performance   of   the   agreement   entered   into   by   the   appellant
with   the   respondents   No.   1   and   2.     In   the   said   case,   this
Court   found   that   the   respondents­defendants   could   not   be
solely   blamed   for   delay   inasmuch   as   the   completion   of   the
building   was   dependent   upon   certain   acts   that   were   to   be
21

done   by   the   Corporation   and   the   Government.     In   this
background,  this  Court  directed  an  additional  amount  to  be
paid by the appellant­plaintiff to the respondents­defendants
to get the sale deed executed in her favour.
32. In the  present  case,  it would  be seen  that out  of an
agreed   amount   of   Rs.1,65,000/­,   the   appellant­plaintiff   has
already   paid   an   amount   of   Rs.1,50,000/­   on   or   before   23 rd
August 1985.   He was already put in possession at the time
of   execution   of   the   agreement(s)   to   sell.     The   balance   sale
consideration that was to be paid was only about 10% of the
total   agreed   amount.     Though   the   sale   deed   was   to   be
executed   upon   the   respondents­defendants   getting   the   ITC
Certificate   and   getting   the   revenue   records   corrected   in   the
year   1986,   in   view   of   their   greed   since   the   prices   were
escalating, the respondents­defendants had tried to create 3 rd
party   rights.     In   these   circumstances,   the   appellant­plaintiff
was   required   to   file   the   suit.     The   respondents­defendants
have  also   asserted   in  their   written   statement   that   they  were
entitled   to   alienate   the   suit   property.     Having   accepted   the
agreement(s)   to   sell   and   the   receipt   of   an   amount   of   Rs.
1,50,000/­   out   of   the   total   amount   of   Rs.1,65,000/­,   the
22

respondents­defendants   could   not   have   been   permitted   to
take a contrary stand that on one hand, the suit could not be
filed before the ITC Certificate was obtained and the revenue
records were corrected, and on the other hand that they were
entitled to alienate the suit property.
33. We are of the considered view that the learned Single
Judge   of   the   High   Court   has   erred   in   interfering   with   the
concurrent   findings   of   fact   arrived   at   by   the   trial   court   and
the   Appellate   Court   upon   correct   appreciation   of
documentary as well as oral evidence.
34. In the result, we pass the following order:
(i) The appeals are allowed;
(ii) The   judgment   3 rd
  March   2008   passed   by   the   High
Court  in Regular Second Appeal Nos. 1206 and 1207
of   2005   and   order   dated   10 th
  April   2008   passed   by
the High Court  in R.A. No. 19­C of 2008 in R.S.A. No.
1206 of 2005 and R.A. No. 18­C of 2008 in R.S.A. No.
1207 of 2005  are quashed and set aside; and
(iii) The   judgments   and   decrees   dated   3 rd
  January   2001
passed   by   the   trial   court   in   RBT   329/90/2000   and
23

dated   8 th
  February   2005   passed   by   the   Appellate
Court in Civil Appeal No.  11 of 2001 are  upheld. 
35. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of
in the above terms.  No order as to costs.
…..….......................J.
[B.R. GAVAI]
…….......................J.       
[C.T. RAVIKUMAR]
NEW DELHI;
SEPTEMBER 13, 2022.
24