/2022 INSC 0798/
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.  6554  OF 2022
(@ Special Leave Petition (C) NO.25554 OF 2018)
RAMAN (DEAD) BY LRS.       …APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
R. NATARAJAN       ...RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
Leave granted.
2. The   suit  for  specific   performance   of   an  Agreement   of  Sale   of
an   immovable   property,   filed   by   the   respondent   herein,   was
decreed by the Trial Court but the said decree was reversed by the
First   Appellate   Court.   However,   the   High   Court   reversed   the
Judgment and decree of the First Appellate Court and restored the
decree   for   specific   performance   granted   by   the   Trial   Court.
Aggrieved   by   the   same,   the   legal   representatives   of   the   original
defendant are on appeal.
3. We have heard Mr. G. Sivabalamurugan, learned counsel for
the   appellants   and   Mr.   S.   Nandakumar,   learned   counsel   for   the
respondent.
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4. The respondent herein filed a suit in O.S. No.360 of 2008 on
the   file   of   the   First   Additional   District   Munsif,   Salem,   for   specific
performance   of   an   Agreement   of   Sale   dated   19.06.1993,
contending  inter alia  :
 that   the   appellants   agreed   to   sell   the   suit   property
which   is   a   land   of   the   extent   of   about   76   cents   for   a
total sale consideration of Rs.1,44,000; 
 that   an   advance   of   Rs.25,000   was   paid   at   the   time   of
execution of the Agreement; 
 that   the   defendant   received   further   amounts   of
Rs.50,000/­   on   19.11.1995,   Rs.43,000/­   on
11.05.1998,   Rs.10,000/­   on   27.01.2001   and
Rs.16,400/­ on 10.07.2005;
 that   appropriate   endorsements   were   made   on   the
reverse   of   the   first,   second   and   third   pages   of   the
agreement; 
 that the entire sale consideration thus stood paid; 
 that   it   was   provided   in   the   Agreement   that   the
defendant   should   simultaneously   enter   into   an
agreement with  his brother’s wife for  the purchase of a
portion of her land, to be used as pathway for access to
reach the suit property; 
 that   the   time   for   performance   of   the   obligations   under
the Agreement was fixed as 11 months from the date of
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the   defendant   entering   into   an   agreement   with   his
brother’s   wife   for   the   purchase   of   the   land   for   the
pathway; 
 that   however   when   the   plaintiff   issued   a   legal   notice
dated   27.03.2007,   the   defendant   sent   a   reply   denying
everything; and 
 that   therefore,   the   plaintiff   was   constrained   to   file   the
suit.
5. The   defendant   filed   a   written   statement   denying   everything,
including   the   execution   of   the   Agreement.   Therefore,   the   Trial
Court framed the following issues; 
“(i) Is   the   Agreement   of   Sale   dated   19­8­93   real
and true?
(ii) Is the suit barred by limitation?
(iii)  Is   the   plaintiff   eligible   for   the   relief   of   specific
performance?
(iv) Any other relief?”
6. After   trial,   the   Trial   Court   passed   a   Judgment   and   decree
dated   14.02.2012,   holding   that   the   Agreement   dated   19.06.1993
was true and valid;  that  the suit was not barred by limitation; and
that  the plaintiff was entitled to the relief of specific performance.
7. The First Appellate Court came to the conclusion,
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 that   the   endorsements   made   in   the   Agreement   of   sale
on   12.11.1995,   11.05.1998,   27.01.2001   and
10.07.2005   marked   as   Exhibit   A­2   to   A­5,   were   not
proved; 
 that the plaintiff could not prove that he was ready and
willing to perform his part of the obligations; 
 that the suit was barred by limitation; and 
 that,   therefore,   the   plaintiff   was   not   entitled   to   specific
performance.
8. The   only   substantial   question   of   law   framed   by   the   High
Court   at   the   time   of   admission   of   the   second   appeal   was   as
follows:
“In   the   light   of   the   finding   of   the   trial   Court   that   Ex.
A­1   –   sale   agreement   is   true,   whether   the   First
Appellate   Court   was   right   in   holding   that   the
endorsements   made   on   Ex.A.1   under   Exs.A.2   to   A.5
have   not   been   proved   though,   according   to   the
plaintiff, it has been proved by the evidence of P.Ws. 2
and 3?”
9. The High Court recorded its opinion on the above substantial
question of law as follows:
“From   over   all   consideration   of   pleadings,   oral   and
documentary   evidence   and   the   judgment   of   the   trial
Court,   it   is   clear   that   the   first   respondent   only
executed Exs.A.1 to A.5 and the First Appellate Judge
on   erroneous   consideration   of   pleadings   and   evidence
of   P.Ws.2   to   3   held   that   the   appellant   failed   to   prove
the   endorsements   in  Exs.A.2   to   A.5  after   holding   that
Ex.A.1   was   executed   by   the   first   respondent   and
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relying   of   Ex.A.2   to   hold   that   suit   is   barred   by
limitation.”
10. What   was   recorded   as   above   was   not   actually   an   answer   to
the   substantial   question   of   law,   even   if   we   construe   what   was
framed,   to   be   a   substantial   question   of   law.   The   above   finding   is
actually   a   finding   of   fact.   Apart   from   that,   the   High   Court   also
went   beyond   the   substantial   question   of   law   framed   by   it   and
proceeded to  hold that  the suit was not  barred by  limitation. The
High Court opined that the time for performance of the obligations
under   the   Agreement   was   fixed   as   11   months   from   the   date   on
which the defendant entered into an agreement with his brother’s
wife   for   the   purchase   of   a   land   to   be   used   as   pathway.   However,
the defendant did not enter into any agreement with his brother’s
wife.   On   the   other   hand,   the   defendant   chose   to   deny   the   very
execution   of   Agreement   of   Sale   in   his   reply   notice   dated
04.04.2007. Therefore, the High Court held that limitation started
running   from   the   date   of   refusal   and   that   the   suit   filed   in
November, 2007 was within the period of limitation.
11. The   mistakes   committed   by   the   High   Court   were   manifold.
First,   the   High   Court   framed   a   question   which   was   actually   a
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question   of   fact   which   involved   appreciation   of   evidence   and   not   a
substantial question of law. As a consequence, the answer given by
the   High   Court   was   only   a   finding   of   fact.   Next,   the   High   Court
reversed the finding of the First Appellate Court on the question of
limitation,   without   framing   a   substantial   question   of   law   and
without even referring to the statutory provisions.
12. As   we   have   pointed   out   earlier,   the   Agreement   is   dated
19.06.1993.  The  Agreement  contains  four  endorsements  which  are
dated 12.11.1995, 11.05.1998, 27.01.2001, 10.07.2005. 
13. The defendant raised the question of limitation, on the basis of
the fact that the fourth endorsement was made beyond a period of
three years from the date of the third endorsement. Such a defence
was based upon Section 18(1) of the Limitation Act, 1963.
14. But   as   a   matter   of   fact,   the   limitation   for   filing   a   suit   for
specific  performance,  in terms  of Article 54 of  The Schedule  to  the
Limitation   Act,   1963   is   three   years,   “ from   the   date   fixed   for   the
performance or if no such date is fixed, when the plaintiff has notice
that the performance is refused .”
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15. But   in   the   entire   memorandum   of   grounds   of   second   appeal
filed by the respondent­herein before the High Court, there was no
whisper or reference to Article 54 of the Schedule to the Limitation
Act, 1963. The only substantial question of law framed by the High
Court  at the  time of entertaining  the  second  appeal  was not  about
limitation   revolving   around   Article   54   of   the   Schedule   to   the
Limitation Act. Therefore, the High Court could not have answered
the   question   of   limitation   in   favour   of   the   respondent   herein,
(i)   without framing any substantial question of law; and   (ii)   without
even a reference to Article 54.
16. In   any   case,   the   High   Court   ought   to   have   seen   that   a   Court
cannot   grant   the   relief   of   specific   performance   against   a   person
compelling   him   to   enter   into   an   agreement   with   a   third   party   and
seek   specific   relief   against   such   a   third   party.   In   other   words,   the
specific   performance   of   the   agreement   by   the   appellants   herein,
depended upon  (i)  the appellants entering into an agreement with a
third   party;   and   (ii)   appellants   being   in   a   position   to   compel   such
third party to perform her obligations under such agreement. 
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17. The   High   Court   ought   to   have   seen   that   the   specific
performance   of   the   Agreement   in   question   comprised   of   two   parts
namely,   (i)   the   defendant   entering   into   an   agreement   with   his
brother’s wife for the purchase of a land for providing access to the
land agreed to be sold under the suit Agreement of Sale; and  (ii)  the
defendant   thereafter   executing   a   sale   deed   conveying   the   property
covered by the suit Agreement of Sale.
18. Since the defendant’s brother’s wife was not a party to the suit
agreement   of   sale,   the   Court   cannot   compel   her   to   enter   into   an
agreement   with   the   defendant.   In   other   words,   the   performance   of
the   first   part   of   the   obligation,   which   we   have   indicated   in   the
preceding   paragraph,   cannot   be   compelled   by   the   Court,   as   it
depended   upon   the   will   of   a   third   party.   As   a   consequence,   the
performance   of   the   second   part   of   the   obligation,   may   be   hit   by
Section   12(1)   of   the   Specific   Relief   Act,   1963   which   reads   as
follows:­
“ 12.     Specific   Performance   of   part   of   contract. ­(1)
Except   as   otherwise   hereinafter   provided   in   this
section   the   court   shall   not   direct   the   specific
performance of a part of contract.
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        xxx                             xxx                          xxx”
19. From   the   pleadings   on   record,   it   appears   that   the   case   on
hand   will   not   even   be   covered   by   sub­sections   (2),   (3)   &   (4)   of
Section 12 of the Specific Relief Act. Since it is stated very clearly in
the suit Agreement of Sale that the land covered by the Agreement
will   not   have   any   access,   unless   the   defendant   entered   into   an
agreement   with   his   brother’s   wife,   it   is   clear   that   none   of   the
exceptions   contained   in   sub­sections   (2),   (3)   and   (4)   of   Section   12
will apply.
20. Even   the   limited   rights   conferred   by   Section   13(1)(b)   of   the
Specific Relief Act are not available to the respondent, as there was
no legal right in the defendant to compel 3 rd
  parties to convey their
land   to   him   for   the   purpose   of   providing   a   pathway   to   the   land
agreed to be sold to the respondent herein. Section 13(1)(b) reads as
follows:
“ 13 .   Rights   of   purchaser   or   lessee   against   person
with no title or imperfect title .— (1)    Where a person
contracts   to   sell   or   let   certain   immovable   property
having no title or only an imperfect title, the purchaser
or   lessee   (subject   to   the   other   provisions   of   this
Chapter), has the following rights namely: -
(a)          xxx                  xxx xxx
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(b)   where   the   concurrence   of   other   persons   is
necessary   for   validating   the   title,   and   they   are   bound
to   concur   at   the   request   of   the   vendor   or   lessor,   the
purchaser   or   lessee   may   compel   him   to   procure   such
concurrence, and when a conveyance by other persons
is necessary to validate the title and they are bound to
convey   at   the   request   of   the   vendor   or   lessor,   the
purchaser   or   lessee   may   compel   him   to   procure   such
conveyance;”
21. Therefore,   the   High   Court   committed   a   grave   error   in   law   in
granting   a   decree   for   specific   performance.   Hence   the   appeal   is
allowed, the impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside and
the   relief   of   specific   performance   claimed   by   the   respondent   is
rejected. However, there will be a decree directing the appellants to
pay   to   the   respondent,   the   amount   of   Rs.1,44,400/­   paid   by   the
respondent,   with   interest   @   9%   p.a.   from   the   date   of   filing   of   the
suit,   till   the   date   of   repayment.   The   parties   shall   bear   their
respective costs throughout.
…………………………….J.
(Indira Banerjee)
…………………………….J.
(V. Ramasubramanian)
New Delhi
September  13,  2022
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