/2022 INSC 0799/
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.  1562 OF 2022
ARISING OUT OF SLP (CRL) NO. 9601 OF 2016
KANCHAN KUMAR                  ...APPELLANT
VERSUS
THE STATE OF BIHAR      ...RESPONDENT
J U D G M E N T
PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA J. 
1.  Leave granted.
2. This   appeal   is   against   the   concurrent   dismissals   by   the
Trial 1
 and the High Court 2
 of the application for discharge filed by
the   Appellant   under   Section   227   of   the   Code   of   Criminal
Procedure, 1973 3
.
1  Special Judge (Vigilance), Patna, in Special Case No. 9 of 2000 dated 28.03.2016. 
2   High   Court   of   Judicature   at   Patna,   in   Criminal   Miscellaneous   No.   23031   of   2016   dated
05.10.2016.
3   hereinafter referred to as the ‘Cr.P.C.’
Page  1  of  16

3.   Facts   leading   to   the   filing   of   this   Appeal:   The   Appellant
joined   the   Bihar   State   Financial   Corporation 4
  in   the   capacity   of
an   Assistant   General   Manager   on   19.07.1974.   After   a   period   of
thirteen years, in 1987, a complaint came to be filed against the
Appellant   for   having   allegedly   purchased   three   houses   and   two
pieces of land in Bihar, which according to the complainant, was
disproportionate   to   Appellant’s   known   sources   of   income.   This
complaint   was   inquired   into,   and   after   a   detailed   investigation,
the   allegations   were   found   to   be   false.   Except   for   a   residential
house   in   Patna,   which   the   Appellant   had   purchased   on
29.08.1988   for   Rs.   2,26,500   with   the   help   of   a   loan   from   the
BSFC,   no   other   assets   could   be   traced   to   the   ownership   of   the
Appellant. However, despite finding no merit in the allegation, the
investigation was kept pending. 
4. In the meanwhile, life moved on and in 1996, the Appellant
joined   the   Oil   and   Natural   Gas   Commission 5
  as   Deputy   General
Manager   on   deputation,   keeping   his   lien   with   the   BSFC.     Four
years   after   joining   ONGC,   an   FIR   came   to   be   registered   against
him   on   21.02.2000,   under   Sections   13(l)(d)   and   13(2)   of   the
4  hereinafter referred to as ‘the BSFC’.
5   hereinafter referred to as ‘the ONGC’.
Page  2  of  16

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 6
,   on the same   allegation that
he   possessed   assets   disproportionate   to   his   known   sources   of
income.   These   alleged   assets   were   purportedly   acquired   during
his tenure with the BSFC, and consequently, the check period in
the   FIR   was   considered   from   the   date   he   joined   BSFC,   i.e.,
19.07.1974   to   the   date   of   registration   of   the   residential   house
purchased by  him, i.e., 29.08.1988. The Appellant wrote a letter
to   the   Director   General   of   Police   (Vigilance),   Patna,   on
18.04.2002,   raising   a   grievance   that   the   calculations   in   the   FIR
undervalued   his   income   and   overvalued   his   assets,   thus
depicting a false and inflated account of his expenditure.
5. Eventually   a   charge   sheet   came   to   be   filed   on   11.09.2007,
i.e.,   about   seven   years   after   the   registration   of   the   FIR,   and   in
fact, twenty years after the complaint on this very allegation was
found   to   be   false   by   the   authorities.   Be   that   as   it   may,   the
charge­sheet filed against the Appellant indicated that he earned
a total income of  Rs. 3,01,561 and incurred an expenditure of Rs.
5,24,386   during   the   check   period.   In   view   of   this,   the   charge
against   the   Appellant   was   of   having   amassed   Rs.   2,22,825 ,
disproportionate   to   his   known   sources   of   income.   The   charge­
6   hereinafter referred to as the ‘PC Act’.
Page  3  of  16

sheet indicated   two components of his income, being ­ i) savings
of   Rs.   1,13,081   (1/3 rd
  of   his   salary),   and   ii)   home   and   car   loan
from   BSFC   worth   Rs.   1,88,480.   On   the   other   hand,   the   charge
sheet   included   six   components   of   his   expenditure,   being   –   i)
payment   of   Rs.   2,26,500   towards   the   construction   of   his   house,
ii) general expenditure during the check period of Rs. 24,800, iii)
amount in bank deposit worth Rs. 55,000, iv) loan repayment of
Rs.   53,467,   v)   LIC   deposit   worth   Rs.   6,057,   and   vi)   estimated
value of articles found during a search conducted on 21.02.2000,
as being Rs. 1,58,562.
6. At   the   relevant   stage,   the   Appellant   applied   for   discharge
under “Section 239” of the Cr.P.C (which should have been under
Section 227 7
) before the Court of Special Judge (Vigilance), Patna,
alleging   that   there   were   glaring   errors   in   the   calculation.
However,   t he   Court   summarily   dismissed   the   application   by   its
order   dated   28.03.2016 ,   without   analysing   or   examining   the
documents   produced   and   the   arguments   advanced.   The   Court
held that:
7   Though the Appellant stated that the application is under Section 239 of the Cr.P.C., as
Special   Judges   appointed   under   the   PC   Act   are   deemed   to   be   Court   of   Session,   the
discharge   application   should   have   been   filed   under   Section   227   of   the   Cr.P.C.,   and   not
under   Section   239   therein.   The   Ld   counsel   for   the   Appellant   Shri   Sunil   Kumar,   Senior
Advocate clarified this position of law while making his submissions.
Page  4  of  16

“ Perused the record and I find that there is
sufficient materials against accused in this case
at   least   prima   facie   at   this   stage   to   frame
charge against the accused against whom there
is   allegation   that   he   during   the   check   period
amassed.   Although   certain   explanations   have
been   advanced   by   the   learned   counsel   for   the
petitioner   but   the   same   appears   to   be   looked
into   and   appreciated   during   the   course   of   trial
when the accused petitioner wife have a chance
to   prevents   innocence   producing   his   oral   or
documentary   evidences.   For   the   present   I   am
not   satisfied   with   the   explanation   so   produced
by   the   accused   in   his   favour   in   support   of   his
discharge application.
Considering   the   aforesaid   facts   and
circumstances   the   charge   petition   of   the
accused   petitioner   namely   Kanchan   Kumar   is
hereby   rejected.   Put   up   on   22.04.2016   for
framing   of   charge.   The   accused   is   directed   to
remaining   physically   present   on   the   date   so
fixed by this court for framing of charge.”
7. Aggrieved   by   the   dismissal   of   his   application   for   discharge,
the   Appellant   moved   the   High   Court.   After   recounting   the
chronology   of   events,   the   High   Court   proceeded   to   quote
judgment   after   judgment,   and   finally   dismissed   the   revision
application by merely holding that: 
“ 15.   In   the   aforesaid   circumstances,   even   if
considering the  submissions  made  on behalf of
petitioner,   for   argument’s   sake   needs   proper
verification   attracting   roving   enquiry   which
could be permissible only during course of trial.
Page  5  of  16

16.  Much emphasis has been laid at the end of
the petitioner relating to valuation. With the cost
of   repetition,   the   contention   of   the   petitioner   is
that as the raid was conducted on 21.02.2000,
on   account   thereof,   the   valuation   having   been
shown   against   the   article   so   seized   at   the   end
of   the   Vigilance   must   be   considered   to   be   in
consonance   with   the   date   of   recovery.   That
argument   happens   to   be   fallacious   in   the
background of the fact that from the case diary,
it   is   evident   that   valuation   has   been   estimated
only. There   happens  to  be   complete  absence  of
prima facie material whereupon one could infer
that   the   value   so   affixed   at   that   very   moment
was   prevailing   rate   on   the   alleged   date   of
seizure.   Furthermore,   to   ascertain   genuineness
on   this   score   will   again   attract   roving   enquiry
which for the present stage is found forbidden. 
17.   Consequent   thereupon,   the   instant   petition
is   found   devoid   of   merit   and   is,   accordingly,
rejected. ”
8. It   is   against   the   aforesaid   order   that   the   Appellant   has
approached this Court.  
9. Submissions of parties : The Ld. Senior Counsel Shri Sunil
Kumar   has   submitted   that   the   basic   objection   relating   to   the
calculation and wrongful inclusion of certain items was sufficient
for   the   Trial   Court   to   discharge   the   Appellant.   In   a   simple   and
straight   forward   submission,   he   took   us   through   certain   glaring
errors   that   were   evident   from   the   record   of   the   case   before   the
Page  6  of  16

Special Judge (Vigilance). In support of his submissions, he   also
referred to the decisions of this Court in  Union of India  v.  Prafulla
Kumar Samal and Anr. 8
 and  Ghulam Hassan Beigh  v.  Mohammad
Maqbool Magrey 9
.
10. The counsel for the Respondent   Shri Abhinav Mukerji AOR,
has   contended   that   the   Trial   Court   was   right   in   dismissing   the
discharge   application.   He   submitted   that   the   Courts   could   not
have   conducted   a   roving   inquiry   while   adjudicating   an
application under Section 239 of the Cr.P.C.
11. Issue:   The   short   question   arising   for   consideration   is
whether   the   Appellant   is   entitled   to   be   discharged   of   the
proceedings initiated against him under the PC Act. 
12. Legal provision and precedents:  Section 227 of the Cr.P.C
relating to discharge is as under : 
“ 227.   Discharge   —   If,   upon   consideration   of
the   record   of   the   case   and   the   documents
submitted   therewith,   and   after   hearing   the
submissions of the accused and the prosecution
in this behalf, the Judge considers that there is
not sufficient ground for proceeding against the
accused,   he   shall   discharge   the   accused   and
record his reasons for so doing. ”
8   (1979) 3 SCC 4.
9   2022 SCC OnLine SC 913.
Page  7  of  16

13. The   threshold   of   scrutiny   required   to   adjudicate   an
application   under   Section   227   of   the   Cr.P.C.,   is   to   consider   the
broad probabilities of the case and the total effect of the material
on   record,   including   examination   of   any   infirmities   appearing   in
the case.  In  Prafulla Kumar Samal  (supra), it was noted that:
“10.   Thus, on a consideration of the authorities
mentioned   above,   the   following   principles
emerge:  
(1)   That   the   Judge   while   considering   the
question   of   framing   the   charges   under
Section   227   of   the   Code   has   the   undoubted
power to  sift  and  weigh the  evidence  for the
limited purpose of finding out whether or not
a   prima   facie   case   against   the   accused   has
been made out.
(2)   Where   the   materials   placed   before   the
Court   disclose   grave   suspicion   against   the
accused   which   has   not   been   properly
explained   the   Court   will   be   fully   justified   in
framing   a   charge   and   proceeding   with   the
trial.
(3)   The   test   to   determine   a   prima   facie   case
would   naturally   depend   upon   the   facts   of
each   case   and   it   is   difficult   to   lay   down   a
rule   of   universal   application.   By   and   large
however   if   two   views   are   equally   possible
and   the   Judge   is   satisfied   that   the   evidence
produced   before   him   while   giving   rise   to
some   suspicion   but   not   grave   suspicion
against   the   accused,   he   will   be   fully   within
his right to discharge the accused.
Page  8  of  16

(4)   That   in   exercising   his   jurisdiction   under
Section   227   of   the   Code   the   Judge   which
under   the   present   Code   is   a   senior   and
experienced   court   cannot   act   merely   as   a
Post   Office   or   a   mouthpiece   of   the
prosecution,   but   has   to   consider   the   broad
probabilities of the case, the total effect of the
evidence and the documents produced before
the   Court,   any   basic   infirmities   appearing   in
the   case   and   so   on .   This   however   does   not
mean   that   the   Judge   should   make   a   roving
enquiry  into  the  pros  and   cons   of  the  matter
and   weigh   the   evidence   as   if   he   was
conducting a trial.”      
                                         (emphasis supplied)
14.   In   Sajjan   Kumar   v.   Central   Bureau   of   Investigation 10
,   the
Court   cautioned   against   accepting   every   document   produced   by
the prosecution on face value, and noted that it was important to
sift the evidence produced before the Court. It observed that:
“ 21.   On   consideration   of   the   authorities   about
the scope of Sections 227 and 228 of the Code,
the following principles emerge:
...
(v)   At   the   time   of   framing   of   the   charges,   the
probative value of the material on record cannot
be   gone   into   but   before   framing   a   charge   the
court   must   apply   its   judicial   mind   on   the
material placed on record and must be satisfied
that   the   commission   of   offence   by   the   accused
was possible .
(vi)   At   the   stage   of   Sections   227   and   228,   the
court   is   required   to   evaluate   the   material   and
10  (2010) 9 SCC 368.
Page  9  of  16

documents   on   record   with   a   view   to   find   out   if
the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face
value   disclose   the   existence   of   all   the
ingredients constituting the alleged offence.   For
this   limited   purpose,   sift   the   evidence   as   it
cannot  be  expected  even at  that  initial stage  to
accept all that the  prosecution states as gospel
truth   even   if   it   is   opposed   to   common   sense   or
the broad probabilities of the case ...” (emphasis
supplied)
15.   Summarising the principles on discharge under Section 227
of   the   Cr.P.C,   in   Dipakbhai   Jagdishchandra   Patel   v.   State   of
Gujarat , 11
 this Court recapitulated:
“ 23.   At   the   stage   of   framing   the   charge   in
accordance with the principles which have been
laid   down   by   this   Court,   what   the   court   is
expected to do is, it does not act as a mere post
office.   The   court   must   indeed   sift   the   material
before it.   The material to be sifted would be the
material  which is  produced  and  relied  upon by
the   prosecution .   The   sifting   is   not   to   be
meticulous in the sense that the court dons the
mantle   of   the   trial   Judge   hearing   arguments
after   the   entire   evidence   has   been   adduced
after a full­fledged trial and the question is  not
whether the prosecution has made out the case
for   the   conviction   of   the   accused.   All   that   is
required is, the court must be satisfied that with
the   materials   available,   a  case   is   made   out   for
the   accused   to   stand   trial .   A   strong   suspicion
suffices.   However,   a   strong   suspicion   must   be
founded   on   some   material.   The   material   must
be   such   as   can   be   translated   into   evidence   at
11  (2019) 16 SCC 547.
Page  10  of  16

the   stage   of   trial.   The   strong   suspicion   cannot
be the pure subjective satisfaction based on the
moral   notions   of   the   Judge   that   here   is   a   case
where   it   is   possible   that   the   accused   has
committed the offence.  Strong suspicion must be
the   suspicion   which   is   premised   on   some
material   which  commends  itself  to  the  court  as
sufficient  to  entertain the  prima facie  view  that
the   accused   has   committed   the   offence .”
(emphasis supplied)
16.1 Analysis:   Without   getting   into   too   many   details,   we
consider it to be appropriate and in fact sufficient to confine our
inquiry   to   three   heads   of   expenditure   indicated   in   the   charge­
sheet itself. This limited inquiry will also satisfy the requirements
of Section 227 of the Cr.P.C. 
16.2   The first objection pertains to the inclusion an amount
of Rs. 55,000, recorded as the balance amount in the Appellant’s
bank   account   during   the   check  period,   and  accordingly   counted
as   an   expenditure   in   the   charge   sheet.   However,   the   Bank
Passbook   filed   by   the   Appellant,   which   was   available   to   the
Investigation   Officer   and   the   Special   Judge   (Vigilance),   evidently
records   a   balance   amount   of   only   Rs.   11,998   during   the   check­
period.   The   difference   in   the   figures   was   not   explained   by   the
Prosecution.   Accordingly,   the   Special   Judge   (Vigilance)   and   the
Page  11  of  16

High Court failed to reconcile such a simple and straightforward
inconsistency in the Prosecution’s evidence.  We are of the opinion
that   only   an   amount   of   Rs.   11,998,   recorded   in   the   Appellant’s
Bank Passbook during  the check­period as the balance amount,
is validly admissible as expenditure under this head.
16.3 The   second   objection   relates   to   the   inclusion   of   an
amount   of   Rs.   53,467   as   expenditure   towards   repayment   of   the
loan   from   the   BSFC.   However,   the   amount   repaid   towards   loan
instalments   was   already   deducted   from  Appellant’s   gross  salary,
and   the   deducted   figure   was   recorded   as   the   total   disposable
income   with   the   Appellant   during   the   check   period.   Hence,   the
loan repayment cannot be separately counted as an expenditure
yet again. This is a glaring mistake. The Special Judge (Vigilance)
as  well  as  the  High  Court  did  not  consider   this  objection   on  the
ground   that   a   roving   inquiry   is   not   permissible   the   stage   of
discharge. 
16.4 The   third   objection   relates   to   the   inclusion   of   Rs.
1,58,562   as   the   value   of   the   articles   found   during   a   search
conducted in Appellant’s house on 21.02.2000, twelve years after
the   check   period   of   1974   to   1988.   There   is   nothing   to   indicate,
Page  12  of  16

even   prima   facie ,   that   these   articles   found   during   the   search   in
the   year   2000   were   acquired   during   the   check   period.   In   the
absence   of   any   material   to   link   these   articles   as   having   been
acquired   during   the   check   period,   it   is   impermissible   to   include
their   value   in   the   expenditure.   We   are   therefore   of   the   opinion
that   the   Appellant’s   objection   about   inclusion   of   this   amount   in
the   list   of   expenditure   is   fully   justified.   Unfortunately,   even   this
objection, which did not require much scrutiny of the material on
record, was not considered by the Special Judge (Vigilance) or the
High Court.
17.  The three heads of expenditure discussed hereinabove must
be excluded from Appellant’s total alleged expenditure during the
check   period.   First,   the   Appellant’s   actual   balance   amount
reflected   in   the   Bank   Passbook,   i.e.,   Rs.   11,998,   as   against   the
purported   account   balance   of   Rs.   55,000,   must   be   taken   into
account.   Further,   the   second   and   third   amounts,   as   indicated
above,   must   be   excluded   from   Appellant’s   total   expenditure
mentioned in the charge­sheet. Accordingly, the total expenditure
comes only to Rs. 2,69,355, and not Rs. 5,24,386, which is based
on certain mistakes that we have indicated hereinabove. It is this
Page  13  of  16

expenditure   of   Rs.   2,69,355   which   is   to   be   contrasted   with   the
income   of   Rs.   3,01,561   during   the   check­period.   These   facts
clearly demonstrate that there is no  prima facie  case made out by
the   prosecution   and   therefore   the   Appellant   was   entitled   to   be
discharged. 
18. The conclusions that we have drawn are based on materials
placed   before   us,   which   are   part   of   the   case   record.   This   is   the
same record that was available with the Special Judge (Vigilance)
when the application under Section 227 of the Cr.P.C. was taken
up.   Despite   that,   the   Special   Judge   (Vigilance)   dismissed   the
discharge application on the simple ground that a roving inquiry
is   not   permitted   at   the   stage   of   discharge.   What   we   have
undertaken   is   not   a   roving   inquiry,   but   a   simple   and   necessary
inquiry for a proper adjudication of an application for discharge.
The   Special   Judge   (Vigilance)   was   bound   to   conduct   a   similar
inquiry for coming to a conclusion that a  prima facie  case is made
out for the Appellant to stand trial. Unfortunately, the High Court
committed   the   same   mistake   as   that   of   the   Special   Judge
(Vigilance).
Page  14  of  16

19. Apart   from   the   above   analysis,   we   would   note   with   great
distress   that   the   allegation   relating   to   Appellant’s
disproportionate   income   in   the   period   between   1974   and   1988
was   levelled   in   an   FIR   filed   twelve   years   after   the   said   period
concluded.   The   charge­sheet   came   to   be   filed   seven   years   after
the registration of the FIR. The application for discharge came to
be dismissed on 28.03.2016, almost after a decade of filing of the
charge   sheet.   The   dismissal   was   affirmed   by   the   High   Court
seven   months   thereafter,   i.e.,   on   05.10.2016.   Finally,   and   most
unfortunately,   the   present   SLP   has   been   pending   before   this
Court   for   the   last   six   years.   In   the   meanwhile,   the   Appellant
superannuated from service in 2010, but had no option except to
contest   the   case.   He   is   now   72   years.   Continuation   of   the
prosecution,   apart   from   the   illegality   as   indicated   hereinabove,
would also be unjust. 
20. For the reasons stated above, we allow the Criminal Appeal
arising   out   of   SLP   (Crl)   No.   9601   of   2016,   and   set   aside   the
judgment   and   order   of   the   High   Court   of   Patna   in   CRLM   No.
23031 of 2016 dated 05.10.2016, and that of the  Court of Special
Page  15  of  16

Judge   (Vigilance),   Patna   in   Special   Case   No.   09   of   2000 ,   dated
28.03.2016, and d ischarge the Appellant.  
21. No order as to costs.
……………………………….J.
                                                            [B.R. GAVAI]
……………………………….J.
[PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA]
NEW DELHI;
SEPTEMBER 14, 2022              
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