/2022 INSC 0807/
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE/ORIGINAL JURISDICTION 
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6681 OF 2022
[Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.19671 of
2021]
PHARMACY COUNCIL OF INDIA     ...APPELLANT(S)
 
VERSUS
RAJEEV COLLEGE OF PHARMACY 
AND ORS.  ...RESPONDENT(S)
WITH 
CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 6682­6683 OF 2022
[Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) Nos.1387­1388
of 2022]
WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.564 OF 2022
WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.565 OF 2022
 CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 6684­6685 OF 2022
[Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) Nos.14295­
14296 of 2021]
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6686 OF 2022
[Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.1050 of
2022]
1

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6687 OF 2022
[Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.1887 of
2022]
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6688 OF 2022
[Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.2570 of
2022]
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6690 OF 2022
[Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.4862 of
2022]
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6689 OF 2022
[Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.5673 of
2022]
WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.406 OF 2022
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6691 OF 2022
[Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.13792 of
2022]
WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.563 OF 2022
JUDGMENT
B.R. GAVAI, J.
1. Leave granted in all the Special Leave Petitions .  
2

2. The   appeals   filed   by   the   Pharmacy   Council   of   India
(hereinafter   referred   to   as   “PCI”)   mainly   challenge   the   (i)
judgments   dated   9 th
  November   2021,   passed   by   the   Division
Bench   of   the   High   Court   of   Karnataka   at   Bengaluru   in   Writ
Appeal   No.   746­748   of   2020;   (ii)   judgment   dated   7 th
  March
2022, passed by the learned Single Judge of the High Court of
Delhi at New Delhi  in Writ Petition  (Civil) No.175 of 2021; and
(iii)   judgment   dated   22 nd
  April   2022,   passed   by   the   learned
Single   Judge   of   the   High   Court   of   Chhattisgarh   at   Bilaspur   in
Writ   Petition   (Civil)   No.3766   of   2021.     Several   interim   orders
passed   by   these   Courts   during   the   pendency   of   these   matters
are also subject to challenge in some of the appeals.   They are
also being disposed of by the present judgment.    
3. By   the   said   judgments   and   orders,   the   aforesaid   three
High Courts of Karnataka, Delhi and Chhattisgarh had allowed
the   writ   petitions   filed   by   the   respondents­institutions,   which
were,   in   turn,   filed   challenging   the
Resolutions/communications   of   the   appellant­PCI   dated   17 th
3

July   2019   and   9 th
  September   2019   and   dismissed   the   Writ
Appeals   filed   by   the   PCI.     Vide   Resolution/Communication
dated   17 th
  July   2019,   the   appellant­PCI   had   resolved   to   put   a
moratorium   on   the   opening   of   new   pharmacy   colleges   for
running   Diploma   as   well   as   Degree   courses  in   pharmacy   for   a
period   of   five   years   beginning   from   the   Academic   Year   2020­
2021.     Vide   Resolution/communication   dated   9 th
  September
2019,   the   aforesaid   moratorium   was   modified,   thereby
exempting   its   application   to   (i)   Government   Institutions;   (ii)
Institutions   in   North   Eastern   region;   and   (iii)   States/Union
Territories  where the  number  of  institutions  offering   D. Pharm
and   B.   Pharm   courses   (both   combined)   is   less   than   50.
Additionally, vide the said Resolution/communication dated 9 th
September 2019, the institutions which had applied for opening
colleges   offering   D.Pharm   and/or   B.   Pharm   courses   for   2019­
2020   academic   session   were   allowed   to   apply   for   conducting
diploma   as   well   as   degree   courses   in   Academic   Session   2020­
2021 and existing approved pharmacy institutions were allowed
4

to   increase   the   intake   capacity   as   per   PCI   norms   and/or   to
start additional pharmacy course(s). 
4. The writ petitions filed by the Institutions before the three
High Courts challenged the validity of the said moratorium and
also prayed for a direction to be issued to the appellant­PCI to
grant   approval   for   opening   new   pharmacy   institutions
imparting   pharmacy   courses   for   the   ensuing   academic   year   of
2022­2023  on  the  basis  of inspection conducted by  the  PCI  in
February 2020 and to not insist  on fresh applications from the
institutions   pursuant   to   the   PCI’s   circular   of   3 rd
  July   2022,
which   was   issued   in   compliance   of   the   interim   order   of   this
Court   dated   31 st
  May   2022   passed   in   Special   Leave   Petition
(Civil) No.4862 of 2022.
5. We   have   heard   Shri   Maninder   Singh,   learned   Senior
Counsel   appearing   on   behalf   of   the   appellant­PCI   and   Shri
Rakesh   Dwivedi   and   Shri   Vinay   Navare,   learned   Senior
Counsel,   Shri   Amit   Pai,   Shri   Sanjay   Sharawat,   Shri   Siddharth
5

R.   Gupta,   and   Shri   Shivam   Singh,   learned   counsel   appearing
on behalf of their respective respondent(s). 
6. Shri   Maninder   Singh,   learned   Senior   Counsel   would
submit   that   the   High   Courts   have   totally   erred   in   interfering
with   the   Resolution   dated   17 th
  July   2019   passed   by   the
appellant­PCI.   He submits that the perusal of the preamble of
the   Pharmacy   Act,   1948   (hereinafter   referred   to   as   “the   said
Act”)   read   with   Sections   3,   10   and   12   thereof   would   clearly
reveal   that   the   appellant­PCI   has   a   power   to   regulate   in   the
field   of   pharmacy   education.     He   submits   that   the   power   to
regulate would also include a power to put a moratorium for a
certain   period.     The   learned   Senior   Counsel   submits   that
perusal   of   Section   3   of   the   said   Act   would   reveal   that   the
Central   Council   of   the   PCI   consists   of   experts   from   various
fields   including   teachers   in   the   subject   concerning   pharmacy,
elected by the University Grants Commission (“UGC” for short),
persons   possessing   a   degree   or   diploma   in   and   practicing
pharmacy   or   pharmaceutical   chemistry,   nominated   by   the
6

Central Government; a representative of the Medical Council of
India; representatives of States elected from the members of the
State   Council,   so   also   a   member   to   represent   each   State
nominated by the State Government, who shall be a registered
pharmacist.     He,   therefore,   submits   that   the   Body,   which
consists of so many experts from various fields, is a Body which
is   competent   to   take   decisions   in   the   best   interests   of   the
pharmacy education.  
7. Shri   Maninder   Singh,   learned   Senior   Counsel   submits
that   the   decision   was   taken   by   the   appellant­PCI   after   a   sub­
committee   of   experts   was   appointed   to   study   the   issue.     It   is
submitted   that   after   the   sub­committee   recommended
moratorium   in   view   of   mushrooming   growth   of   pharmacy
colleges,   the   Central   Council   of   the   appellant­PCI,   after   taking
into   consideration   all   these   aspects,   recommended   a
moratorium.  He submits that this was done in order to prevent
a   situation   which   would   lead   to   uncontrolled   growth   of
pharmacy   colleges,   resultantly   producing   many   pharmacists,
7

who will be without any employment.  It is submitted that these
factors   have   not   been   taken   into   consideration   by   the   High
Courts in the impugned judgments.  
8. Shri Maninder Singh further submitted that the perusal of
the   Communication   of   the   Government   of   India,   Ministry   of
Health   &   Family   Welfare   dated   22 nd
  April   2022   would   reveal
that  the  Central  Government  was  consulted  as required under
Section 10 of the said Act.  
9. Shri Maninder  Singh  further   submitted that  the power  to
regulate would also  include  a power  to  prohibit.     He relies  on
the   judgments   of   this   Court   in   the   case   of   Madhya   Bharat
Cotton   Association   Ltd.   vs.   Union   of   India   and   another 1
and   in   the   case   of   Star   India   Private   Limited   vs.
Department   of   Industrial   Policy   and   Promotion   and
others 2
  in this regard.  
1   AIR 1954 SC 634
2   (2019) 2 SCC 104
8

10. Shri Maninder Singh would further submit that a Division
Bench   of   the   Bombay   High   Court,   Aurangabad   Bench,   in   a
batch   of   writ   petitions   being   Writ   Petition   No.   4919   of   2020
( Sayali   Charitable   Trust’s   College   of   Pharmacy   vs .   The
Pharmacy Council of India, decided on 6 th
 November 2020 )
along with connected matters   has upheld the moratorium.   He
submits that,  however, the  said judgment  of the Bombay  High
Court has not  been  considered by  all the three High  Courts of
Karnataka, Delhi and Chhattisgarh.   
11. Shri   Maninder   Singh   submits   that,   having   regard   to   the
scheme of the said Act and the purpose sought to be achieved
therein, it will have to be held that it is not only the jurisdiction
of   the   PCI,   but   its   duty   and   responsibility   to   impose   a
moratorium so as to prevent mushrooming growth of pharmacy
colleges   in   the   country.     Learned   Senior   Counsel   further
submits   that   the   power   to   impose   such   regulations   has   been
upheld   by   this   Court   in   the   case   of   Jawaharlal   Nehru
Technological   University   Registrar   vs.   Sangam   Laxmi   Bai
9

Vidyapeet   and   others 3
.     He   submits   that   the   facts   in   the
present   case   and   the   facts   in   the   case   of   Jawaharlal   Nehru
Technological   University   Registrar   (supra)   are   totally
identical.     It is, therefore, submitted that the view taken by all
the three High Courts is liable to be set aside and it is required
to   be   held   that   the   moratorium   imposed,   being   in   the   larger
public interest, is legal and valid.  
12. Shri Maninder Singh relies on the judgment of this Court
in   the   case   of   Jigya   Yadav   (Minor)   (Through
Guardian/Father   Hari   Singh)   vs.   Central   Board   of
Secondary   Education   and   others 4
  in   support   of   his
submission   that   the   moratorium   could   also   be   imposed   by   a
resolution   of   the   appellant­PCI   and   it   would   be   a   law   as   per
Article 13 of the Constitution of India. 
13. Per contra, Shri Rakesh Dwivedi, learned Senior Counsel,
submitted   that   it  is  the  fundamental   right   of   the   respondent   –
3   (2019) 17 SCC 729
4   (2021) 7 SCC 535
10

Institutions   to   establish   educational   institutions   under   Article
19(1)(g)   of the Constitution of India.  He relies on the judgments
of   this   Court   in   the   cases   of   T.M.A.   Pai   Foundation   and
others   vs.   State   of   Karnataka   and   others 5
,   Islamic
Academy of Education and another   vs. State of Karnataka
and   others 6
,   and   P.A.   Inamdar   and   others   vs.   State   of
Maharashtra and others 7
  in that regard .  
14. Shri  Rakesh  Dwivedi  submits  that   there  is   no   doubt   that
reasonable   restrictions   could   be   imposed   on   the   fundamental
rights.   However, the burden lies on the State to establish that
the   restrictions   so   imposed   are   reasonable   and   have   a   nexus
with the object to be achieved.   He submits that the appellant­
PCI   has   totally   failed   to   discharge   the   said   burden.     It   is
submitted   that   the   restriction,   which   is   in   the   nature   of
absolute   prohibition,   is   totally   unreasonable,   arbitrary   and
5   (2002) 8 SCC 481 [Para 18 to 25]
6   (2003) 6 SCC 697 [Para 120]
7   (2005) 6 SCC 537 [Para 92]
11

discriminatory.     It   is   submitted   that   it   has   no   nexus   with   the
object to be achieved.  
15. Shri   Rakesh   Dwivedi   further   submits   that   the   impugned
communications of the appellant­PCI are arbitrary.  To buttress
his   submission   that   the   impugned   communications   of   the
appellant­PCI   are   arbitrary,   Shri   Rakesh   Dwivedi   submitted
that the appellant­PCI itself has exempted Government Colleges
from the moratorium imposed, which has in effect added about
34000 seats in the field of pharmacy.   He further submits that
the   impugned   communication   exempts   the   North   Eastern
region   from   its   operation.     As   such,   the   power   has   been
exercised in a manifestly arbitrary manner.  It is submitted that
the only  justification given is that if there is no moratorium, it
will lead to unemployment.  He submits that if such a ground is
to   be   accepted,   then   all   the   colleges   imparting   education   in
different   areas   like   Medicine,   Law,   Engineering,   Technology,
etc. will have to be banned. 
12

16. Shri   Rakesh   Dwivedi   further   submitted   that,   unless   the
power   to   ban   is   specifically   provided   in   the   statute,   such   a
power   cannot   be   exercised.     In   any   case,   he   submitted   that   if
such   a   power   was   to   be   exercised,   the   same   could   have   been
exercised   only   by   framing   a   Regulation   in   accordance   with
Section 10 of the said Act.   He further submitted that for such
a Regulation to be valid, the following four factors are required
to be complied with:
(i) The   copies   of   the   draft   Regulations   should   be
furnished   by   the   Central   Council   to   all   the   State
Governments and before the Central Council submits
the   Education   Regulations   to   the   Central
Government for approval, the comments of the State
Governments are to be invited and considered;
(ii) That   such   Regulations   must   have   approval   of   the
Central Government;
13

(iii) In   view   of   Section   10(4),   such   Regulations   will   have
to be published in the Official Gazette;
(iv) In   view   of   sub­section   (4)   of   Section   18   of   the   said
Act,   such   Regulations   have   to   be   laid   before   each
House of Parliament.
17. Shri Vinay Navare, learned Senior Counsel submitted that
the   perusal   of   Section   3   of   the   said   Act   would   reveal   that   the
Central   Council   of   the   appellant­PCI   consists   essentially   of
persons who are connected with the practice of Pharmacy.   He
submits   that   the   moratorium   is   imposed   with   a   mala   fide
intention by those persons who are already connected with the
profession of Pharmacy so as to create a monopoly in the field.
He submits that if the composition of the Central Council of the
appellant­PCI   under   the   said   Act   is   compared   with   the
composition   of   the   Council   under   the   All   India   Council   for
Technical   Education   Act,   1987   (hereinafter   referred   to   as
“AICTE Act”), it would reveal that the Council under the AICTE
14

Act   has   a   wider   spectrum.     It   also   consists   of   the   persons   not
connected with Technical Education.  
18. Shri   Navare   further   submitted   that   the   powers   under
Section 10 of the AICTE Act are much wider than the powers of
the Central Council under Section 10 of the said Act.  
19. Shri   Navare   further   submitted   that   the   Resolution   which
is   sent   to   the   State   Government   is   only   for   the   purpose   of
intimation   and,   therefore,   there   is   no   sufficient   compliance   of
requirement under Section 10(3) of the said Act.  
20. Relying on the judgment of this Court in the case of   V.T.
Khanzode   and   others   vs.   Reserve   Bank   of   India   and
another 8
, Shri Navare submits that since the appellant­PCI is a
statutory   body,   its   powers   would   be   circumscribed   by   the
statutory   provisions.     He   submitted   that   since   the   power   to
impose prohibition is not provided under the said Act, such an
exercise is wholly impermissible in law.  
8   (1982) 2 SCC 7
15

21. He   further   submits   that   there   can   be   no   restrictions   on
fundamental   rights   except   by   a   valid   law   enacted   by   the
legislature.       In   this   respect,   he   relies   on   the   judgment   of   this
Court   in   the   case   of   Modern   School   vs.   Union   of   India   and
others 9
. 
22. Shri   Navare   further   submits   that   the   words   used   in   sub­
section   (1)   of   Section   10   of   the   said   Act   are   “subject   to   the
approval   of   the   Central   Government”.   He,   therefore,   submits
that   unless   there   is   an   approval   of   the   Central   Government
with regard to the moratorium, the same would not be valid in
law.     He   relies   on   the   judgments   of   this   Court   in   the   cases   of
Padubidri   Damodar   Shenoy   vs.   Indian   Airlines   Limited
and   another 10
,   and   Vijay   S.   Sathaye   vs.   Indian   Airlines
Limited and others 11
   in support of this proposition.  
23. Shri   Amit   Pai,   learned   counsel   also   submitted   that   the
impugned communications are totally beyond the powers of the
9   (2004) 5 SCC 583
10   (2009) 10 SCC 514
11   (2013) 10 SCC 253
16

appellant­PCI   and,   as   such,   no   interference   is   warranted   with
the impugned judgments and orders of the High Courts. 
24. Shri   Sanjay Sharawat ,   learned counsel submitted that the
decision   to   impose   moratorium   has   been   taken   by   the
appellant­PCI   without   conducting   any   survey.     No   material   is
placed   on   record   in   support   of   its   decision.     He   submits   that
the   decision   to   impose   moratorium   is   wholly   arbitrary.     He
further   submits   that   the   appellant­PCI   has   acted   in   an
arbitrary   manner.     On   one   hand,   it   has   imposed   ban   and   on
the   other   hand   it   has   granted   permission   to   about   2500
institutions to start pharmacy courses.  As such, it has acted in
a totally arbitrary and discriminatory manner. 
25. Shri   Siddharth   Gupta,   learned   counsel,   submitted   that
the   impugned   communications   are   totally   discriminatory   in
nature and tend to create a monopoly in respect of the existing
colleges   inasmuch   as   they   have   been   permitted   to   expand   the
number of existing seats.  He further submits that the cap of 50
colleges   imposed   for   all   the   States   is   totally   arbitrary.     He
17

submits   that   the   cap   for   a   highly   populated   State   like   Uttar
Pradesh and for a small State like Goa is the same.  He submits
that in the State of Chhattisgarh, 7 colleges have been granted
permission   on   the   ground   that   they   were   in   the   pipeline .     As
such, there is no consistency in the policy of the appellant­PCI.
He   relies   on   the   judgments   of   this   Court   in   the   case   of   Index
Medical College, Hospital and Research Centre vs. State of
Madhya Pradesh and others 12
 in support of his submission. 
26. Relying   on   the   judgment   of   this   Court   in   the   case   of
Modern Dental College and Research Centre and others vs.
State   of   Madhya   Pradesh   and   others 13
,   he   submits   that
unless   the   impugned   restriction   satisfies   the   test   of
proportionality of restrictions, the same would not be tenable in
law.     He   submits   that   it   will   be   necessary   to   find   out   as   to
whether the limitation on constitutional rights is for a purpose
which is reasonable and necessary in a democratic society.  He
submits   that   applying   the   said   test,   the   impugned
12   2021 SCC OnLine SC 318
13   (2016) 7 SCC 353
18

communication   which   imposed   a   total   ban   for   a   period   of   five
years does not stand the proportionality test.  
27. Shri   Shivam   Singh ,   learned   counsel   submitted   that   the
decision­making   process   is   totally   vitiated.     He   submits   that
taking   into   consideration   the   pandemic   situation,   the
Authorities   ought   to   have   considered   that   there   is   a   need   to
have   a   larger   number   of   Pharmacy   colleges.     However,   this
aspect has been totally ignored by the appellant­PCI.  
28. All   the   three   High   Courts,   i.e.,   Karnataka,   Delhi   and
Chhattisgarh,   while   allowing   the   writ   petitions   filed   by   the
respondent­institutions   and   quashing   and   setting   aside   the
Resolutions/communications   of   the   Central   Council   of   the
appellant­PCI, have, in a nutshell, held thus:
(i) That the right to establish educational institutions is
a   fundamental   right   guaranteed   under   Article   19(1)
(g) of the Constitution of India;
19

(ii) That   there   can   be   reasonable   restrictions   on   such   a
right.     However,   such   a   restriction   can   be   imposed
only by law enacted by the competent legislature;
(iii) The   Resolution/communication   dated   17 th
  July
2019, vide which the moratorium was imposed is an
executive   instruction   and   could  not   be   construed  as
a law and, therefore, the moratorium imposed by an
executive instruction is not sustainable in law.  
29. Apart   from   that,   the   learned   Single   Judge   of   the
Karnataka   High   Court   has   further   found   that   the   petitioners
before the High Court were entitled to establish colleges on the
principles   of   promissory   estoppel   and   legitimate   expectation.
The  learned  Single  Judge  of  the  Karnataka  High  Court  as  well
as  the  learned  Single Judge  of  the  Delhi  High  Court  have  also
held   that   the   Resolution   of   the   appellant­PCI   was   violative   of
Article   14   of   the   Constitution   of   India   inasmuch   as   the
government   institutions   and   the   institutions   in   the   North
Eastern   region   were   exempted   from   the   applicability   of   the
20

moratorium.  It was found that such an act was discriminatory.
It   was   further   found   that   the   cap   of   50   Pharma   institutes   per
State   was   also   arbitrary   inasmuch   as   the   appellant­PCI   does
not   take   into   consideration   the   fact   that   the   population   of   the
States varies from State to State and, as such, there could not
have been a uniform formula of capping 50 pharmacy institutes
for every State.  
30. Undisputedly,   the   Central   Council   of   the   appellant­PCI
vide   its   Resolution/communication   dated   17 th
  July   2019   has
resolved as under:
“ RESOLUTION
Taking   into   consideration   the   availability
of   sufficient   qualified   pharmacist
workforce,   the   House   unanimously
resolved   to   put   a   moratorium   on   the
opening   of   new   pharmacy   colleges   for
running   Diploma   as   well   as   Degree
course   in   pharmacy   for   a   period   of   five
years   beginning   from   the   academic   year
2020­2021.     This   moratorium   shall   not
be applicable in the North Eastern region
of   the   country   where   there   is   a   shortage
of pharmacy colleges.”
21

31. It   can   thus   be   seen   that   vide   the   said   Resolution,   the
Central Council resolved to put a moratorium on the opening of
new   pharmacy   colleges   for   running   Diploma   as   well   as   Degree
course in pharmacy for a period of five years beginning from the
academic year 2020­2021.  The said Resolution dated 17 th
 July
2019 was modified in the 107 th
  meeting of the Central Council
of   the   appellant­PCI   held   on   5 th
  and   6 th
  August   2019.     The
relevant part of the modified Resolution reads thus:
 “1252.4 In   view   of   it,   it   was
unanimously   decided   that
moratorium   on   the   opening   of
new   pharmacy   colleges   for
running   Diploma   as   well   as
Degree course in  pharmacy  for
a period of five years beginning
from   the   academic   year   2020­
2021   will   be   subject   to
following conditions­
a) The   moratorium   will   not
apply   to   the   Government
institutions.
b) The   moratorium   will   not
apply   to   the   institutions
in North Eastern region.
c) The   moratorium   will   not
apply to the States/Union
22

Territories   where   the
number   of   D.   Pharm   and
B.   Pharm   institutions
(both   combined)   is   less
than 50. 
d) The   institutions   which
had   applied   for   opening
D.   Pharm   and/or   B.
Pharm   colleges   for   2019­
20   academic   session
either to the PCI or to the
AICTE   and   the   proposal
was   rejected   or   not
inspected   due   to   some
reason or the other will be
allowed to apply for 2020­
21   academic   session   and
this   relaxations   is   given
only   for   one   year   i.e.   for
2020­21   academic
session only.
e) Existing   approved
pharmacy institutions will
be   allowed   to   apply   for
increase   in   intake
capacity as per PCI norms
and/or  to start additional
pharmacy course(s).”
32. It   is   thus   clear,   and   in   all   fairness,   not   even   disputed   by
the   appellant­PCI,   that   the   moratorium   was   issued   by   the
Central   Council   of   the   appellant­PCI   in   its   executive   powers
23

and not by framing any regulation, as provided under Sections
10 and 18 of the said Act.  
33. The moot question, therefore, that requires consideration,
is   as   to   whether   the   moratorium,   as   imposed   by   the   Central
Council   of   the   appellant­PCI,   could   have   been   imposed   by   the
said   Resolution,   which   is   in   the   nature   of   an   executive
instruction of the Central Council.
34. It  will  be relevant  to  refer  to  the   following  observations  of
the  Constitution  Bench,  consisting   of 11 Judges,  of this  Court
in the case of  T.M.A. Pai Foundation  (supra) :
  “ 18.   With regard to the establishment of
educational   institutions,   three   articles   of
the   Constitution   come   into   play.   Article
19(1)( g )   gives   the   right   to   all   the   citizens
to   practise   any   profession   or   to   carry   on
any   occupation,   trade   or   business;   this
right   is   subject   to   restrictions   that   may
be   placed   under   Article   19(6).   Article   26
gives   the   right   to   every   religious
denomination   to   establish   and   maintain
an   institution   for   religious   purposes,
which   would   include   an   educational
institution. Article 19(1)( g ) and Article 26,
therefore, confer rights on all citizens and
24

religious   denominations   to   establish   and
maintain educational institutions….”
35. It could  thus  clearly  be seen that  the Constitution  Bench
of this Court in the aforesaid case, in unequivocal terms, holds
that in view of Article 19(1)(g) and Article 26 of the Constitution
of India, all citizens and religious denominations are conferred
with a right to establish and maintain educational institutions.
36. Another   Constitution   Bench,   consisting   of   five   Judges,   of
this   Court   in   the   case   of   Islamic   Academy   of   Education
(supra)  has held thus: 
“ 120 .   So   far   as   institutions   imparting
professional   education   are   concerned,
having regard to the public interest, they
are   bound   to   maintain   excellence   in   the
standard   of   education.   To   that   extent,
there cannot be any compromise and the
State   would   be   entitled   to   impose
restrictions and make regulations both in
terms  of  Article  19(1)( g )  and  Article  30  of
the   Constitution   of   India.   The   width   of
the   rights   and   limitations   thereof   of
unaided   institutions   whether   run   by   a
majority   or   a   minority   must   conform   to
the   maintenance   of   excellence.   With   a
25

view   to   achieve   the   said   goal,
indisputably,   the   regulations   can   be
made by the State.
121 . The   right   to   administer   does   not
amount to the right to maladminister and
the   right   is   not   free   from   regulation.   The
regulatory   measures   are   necessary   for
ensuring   orderly,   efficient   and   sound
administration.   The   regulatory   measures
can   be   laid   down   by   the   State   in   the
administration of minority institutions.”
37. It   could   thus   be   seen   that   the   Constitution   Bench   in
Islamic   Academy   of   Education   (supra)   holds   that   the   State
would   be   entitled   to   impose   restrictions   and   make   regulations
both   in   terms   of   Article   19(1)( g )   and   Article   30   of   the
Constitution of India for maintaining excellence in the standard
of   education.     It   has   been   held   that   regulatory   measures   are
necessary   for   ensuring   orderly,   efficient   and   sound
administration. 
38. Thereafter   the   Constitution   Bench,   consisting   of   Seven
Judges,   of   this   Court   in   the   case   of   P.A.   Inamdar   (supra) ,
observed thus:
26

“ 92.   As   an   occupation,   right   to   impart
education   is   a   fundamental   right   under
Article   19(1)( g )   and,   therefore,   subject   to
control   by   clause   (6)   of   Article   19.   This
right   is   available   to   all   citizens   without
drawing   a   distinction   between   minority
and   non­minority.   Such   a   right   is,
generally   speaking,   subject   to   the   laws
imposing   reasonable   restrictions   in   the
interest   of   the   general   public.   In
particular,   laws   may   be   enacted   on   the
following   subjects:   ( i )   the   professional   or
technical   qualifications   necessary   for
practising   any   profession   or   carrying   on
any  occupation, trade or business; ( ii ) the
carrying   on   by   the   State,   or   by   a
corporation   owned   or   controlled   by   the
State   of   any   trade,   business,   industry   or
service whether to the exclusion, complete
or   partial   of  citizens   or  otherwise.   Care  is
taken of minorities, religious or linguistic,
by   protecting   their   right   to   establish   and
administer   educational   institutions   of
their   choice   under   Article   30.   To   some
extent, what may be permissible by way of
restriction under Article 19(6) may fall foul
of   Article   30.   This   is   the   additional
protection   which   Article   30(1)   grants   to
the minorities.”
39. It  could  thus  be  seen   that  the   Constitution  Bench  of  this
Court   in   P.A.   Inamdar   (supra)   has   again   reiterated   that   the
27

right   to   impart   education   is   a   fundamental   right   under   Article
19(1)( g ) and, therefore, subject to control by clause (6) of Article
19.     It   has   been   held   that   such   a   right   is   subject   to   the   laws
imposing   reasonable   restrictions   in   the   interest   of   the   general
public.   It has further been held that the laws may be enacted
for   prescribing   the   professional   or   technical   qualifications
necessary   for   practising   any   profession   or   carrying   on   any
occupation, trade or business.   The laws could also be enacted
for   the   purposes   of   the   carrying   on   by   the   State,   or   by   a
corporation   owned   or   controlled   by   the   State   of   any   trade,
business,   industry   or   service   whether   to   the   exclusion,
complete or partial of citizens or otherwise. 
40. In   the   case   of   Modern   Dental   College   and   Research
Centre   (supra) ,   the   Constitution   Bench,   consisting   of   Five
Judges, of this Court held that though private unaided minority
and   non­minority   institutions   have   a   right   to   establish
educational institutions, in order to balance the public interest,
the State is also empowered to frame Regulations in the interest
28

of   general   public.     This   Court   held   that,   while   considering   the
scope of reasonable restrictions which are sought to be brought
in,   in   the   interest   of   the   general   public,   the   exercise   that   is
required to be undertaken is the balancing of the fundamental
rights   to   carry   on   a   trade   or   occupation   on   one   hand   and   the
restrictions   so   imposed   on   the   other   hand.     This   Court   held
that it was necessary to find out as to whether the restrictions
so imposed were proportional or not.  
41. It is thus clear that though there is a fundamental right to
establish   educational   institutions,   the   same   can   be   subject   to
reasonable   restrictions,   which   are   found   necessary   in   the
general public interest.   However, the question that requires to
be   answered   is   as   to   whether   the   same   can   be   done   by
executive instructions or not.  
42. The question is directly answered by this Court in the case
of   State   of   Bihar   and   others   vs.   Project   Uchcha   Vidya,
29

Sikshak   Sangh   and   others 14
  in   paragraph   69,   which   reads
thus:
“ 69.   The right to manage an institution is
also   a   right   to   property.   In   view   of   a
decision of an eleven­Judge Bench of this
Court in   T.M.A. Pai Foundation   v.   State of
Karnataka   [(2002)   8   SCC   481]
establishment   and   management   of   an
educational   institution   has   been   held   to
be   a   part   of   fundamental   right   being   a
right   of   occupation   as   envisaged   under
Article   19(1)( g )   of   the   Constitution.   A
citizen cannot be deprived of the said
right   except   in   accordance   with   law.
The   requirement   of   law   for   the
purpose   of   clause   (6)   of   Article   19   of
the   Constitution   can   by   no   stretch   of
imagination   be   achieved   by   issuing   a
circular   or   a   policy   decision   in   terms
of   Article   162   of   the   Constitution   or
otherwise. Such a law, it is trite, must
be one enacted by the legislature .”
[emphasis supplied]
43. It   could   thus   be   seen   that   this   Court   has   categorically
held that a  citizen cannot be deprived of the said right except in
accordance   with   law.   It   has   further   been   held   that   the
requirement of law for the purpose of clause (6) of Article 19 of
14  (2006) 2 SCC 545
30

the   Constitution   can   by   no   stretch   of   imagination   be   achieved
by issuing a circular or a policy decision in terms of Article 162
of   the   Constitution   or   otherwise.   It   has   been   held   that   such   a
law must be one enacted by the legislature.
44. Shri   Maninder   Singh,   learned   Senior   Counsel,   relied   on
the   judgment   of   this   Court   in   the   case   of   Jawaharlal   Nehru
Technological University Registrar (supra)   to submit   that in
the   said   case   also,   a   moratorium   which   was   imposed   by   the
State   of   Telangana   was   found   to   be   valid   since   it   was   done   to
control mushrooming growth of educational institutions. 
45. A   perusal   of   the   judgment   of   this   Court   in   the   case   of
Jawaharlal   Nehru   Technological   University   Registrar
(supra)   would   reveal   that   this   Court   found   that   Section   20   of
the Telangana Education Act, 1982 specifically empowered the
State to issue such a direction imposing a moratorium. No such
provision   can   be   found   in   the   said   Act,   which   would   empower
31

such   a   restriction   to   be   imposed   by   the   Resolution   of   the
Central Council.  
46. It will also be relevant to refer to the following observation
of   the   Constitution   Bench,   consisting   of   five   Judges,   of   this
Court in the case of  State of M.P. vs. Thakur Bharat Singh 15
:
  “Viewed   in   the   light   of   these   facts   the
observations   relied   upon   do   not   support
the   contention   that   the   State   or   its
officers   may   in   exercise   of   executive
authority   infringe   the   rights   of   the
citizens merely because the Legislature of
the   State   has   the   power   to   legislate   in
regard   to   the   subject   on   which   the
executive order is issued.”
47. It   is   thus   clear   that   the   Constitution   Bench   of   this   Court
holds that the   State or its officers cannot exercise its executive
authority   to   infringe   the   rights   of   the   citizens   merely   because
the Legislature of the State has the power to legislate in regard
to the subject on which the executive order is issued.
48. It   could   thus   be   seen   that   the   Constitution   Bench   holds
that   even   an   Executive   cannot   do   something   to   infringe   the
15  (1967) 2 SCR 454
32

rights   of   the   citizens   by   an   executive   action,   though   the   State
Legislature   has   legislative   competence   to   legislate   on   the
subject. 
49. Shri   Maninder   Singh,   learned   Senior   Counsel   appearing
on   behalf   of   the   appellant­PCI,   relies   on   the   judgment   of   this
Court   in   the   case   of   Jigya   Yadav   (Minor)   (Through
Guardian/Father   Hari   Singh)   vs.   Central   Board   of
Secondary   Education   and   others   (supra)   in   support   of   his
contention   that   since   the   Central   Council   of   the   appellant­PCI
is   a   public   authority   and   discharges   public   functions,   the
Resolution   resolved  by  it  would  partake  the  character  of   a  law
within the meaning of Article 13 of the Constitution of India.  It
may   be   noted   that   in   the   case   of   Jigya   Yadav   (Minor)
(Through   Guardian/Father   Hari   Singh)   vs.   Central   Board
of  Secondary   Education   and   others   (supra) , this  Court  was
considering   the   powers   of   the   Central   Board   of   Secondary
Education   (“CBSE”   for   short),   which   is   a   society   registered
33

under the Societies Registration Act, 1860.  CBSE is not a body
incorporated   under   any   statutory   provisions.     However,   the
Central   Council   of   the   appellant­PCI   is   a   statutory   body
constituted under the said Act.  
50. It will be relevant to refer to the observations of this Court
in   the   case   of   Shrimati   Hira   Devi   and   others   vs.   District
Board, Shahjahanpur 16
, which reads thus:
  “The   defendants   were   a   Board   created
by statute and were invested with powers
which   of   necessity   had   to   be   found
within   the   four   corners   of   the   statute
itself. 
51. It   will   also   be   relevant   to   refer   to   paragraph   18   of   the
judgment   of   this   Court   in   the   case   of   V.T.   Khanzode   (supra) ,
which is as follows:
“ 18.   In   support   of   this   submission,
reliance   is   placed   by   the   learned   counsel
on the statement of law contained in para
1326   and   1333   (pp.   775   and   779)
16  (1952) SCR 1122
34

of   Halsbury's   Laws   of   England ,   4th   Edn.
In para 1326 it is stated that:
“Corporations   may   be   either
statutory   or   non­statutory,   and   a
fundamental distinction exists between
the   powers   and   liabilities   of   the   two
classes.   Statutory   corporations   have
such rights and can do such acts only
as   are   authorised   directly  or   indirectly
by   the   statutes   creating   them;   non­
statutory   corporations,   speaking
generally,   can   do   everything   that   an
ordinary   individual   can   do   unless
restricted   directly   or   indirectly   by
statute.”
Para 1333 says that:
“The powers of a corporation created
by   statute   are   limited   and
circumscribed   by   the   statutes   which
regulate it, and extend no further than
is   expressly   stated   therein,   or   is
necessarily   and   properly   required   for
carrying   into   effect   the   purposes   of   its
incorporation,   or   may   be   fairly
regarded   as   incidental   to,   or
consequential   upon,   those   things
which   the   legislature   has   authorised.
What the statute does not expressly or
impliedly authorise is to be taken to be
prohibited.”
There   is   no   doubt   that   a   statutory
corporation   can   do   only   such   acts   as
are authorised by the statute creating
it   and   that,   the   powers   of   such   a
corporation   cannot   extend   beyond
35

what the statute provides expressly or
by   necessary   implication.   If   an   act   is
neither   expressly   nor   impliedly
authorised   by   the   statute   which
creates   the   corporation,   it   must   be
taken   to   be   prohibited.   This   cannot,
however,   produce   the   result   for   which
Shri Nariman contends. His contention is
not that the Central Board has  no power
to frame staff regulations but that it must
do   so   under   Section   58(1)   only.   On   that
argument,   it   is   material   to   note   that
Section   58(1)   is   in   the   nature   of   an
enabling   provision   under   which   the
Central Board “may” make regulations in
order  to  provide for   all matters  for  which
it   is   necessary   or   convenient   to   make
provision   for   the   purpose   of   giving   effect
to   the   provisions   of   the   Act.   This
provision   does   not   justify   the   argument
that   staff   regulations   must   be   framed
under   it   or   not   at   all.   The   substance   of
the   matter   is   that   the   Central   Board   has
the power to frame regulations relating to
the   conditions   of   service   of   the   Bank's
staff. If it has that power, it may exercise
it either in accordance with Section 58(1)
or  by  acting  appropriately in the exercise
of its general power of administration and
superintendence.”
[emphasis supplied]
36

52. It   could   thus   be   seen   that   this   Court   has   approved
paragraph   1326   and   1333   (pp.   775   and   779)   of   Halsbury's
Laws   of   England ,   4th   Edition,   to   the   effect   that   a   statutory
corporation   can   do   only   such   acts   as   are   authorised   by   the
statute   creating   it   and   that   the   powers   of   such   a   corporation
cannot extend beyond what the statute provides expressly or by
necessary implication.  Though in the said case, this Court held
that   the   said   principle   is   not   applicable   inasmuch   as   the
Central   Board   has   the   power   to   frame   regulations   relating   to
the   conditions   of   service   of   the   Bank's   staff,   the   said   principle
will indeed be applicable to the case at hand.
53. Shri   Maninder   Singh,   learned   Senior   Counsel,   further
submitted that the preamble of the said Act itself used the word
“regulate”   and   the   word   “regulate”   would   include   within   its
ambit  the  power   to  “prohibit”.  Strong  reliance is placed on  the
judgment   of   this   Court   in   the   case   of   Star   India   Private
Limited   (supra) .     However,   it   is   to   be   noted   that   in   the   said
case,   certain   clauses   of   the   Telecommunication   (Broadcasting
37

and   Cable)   Services   Interconnection   (Addressable   Systems)
Regulations, 2017 notified on 3­3­2017, made under Section 36
of the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India Act, 1997, together
with the Telecommunication (Broadcasting and Cable) Services
(Eighth)   (Addressable   Systems)   Tariff   Order,   2017   notified   on
the same date were  under challenge .   In the   present   case, what
is   being   sought   to   be   done   was   done   by   a   Resolution   of   the
Central Council of the appellant­PCI and not by any Regulation
framed   under   the   provisions   of   the   said   Act.     As   such,   the
judgment   of   this   Court   in   the   case   of   Star   India   Private
Limited   (supra)   is   not   applicable   to   the   facts   of   the   present
case.  
54. Shri Maninder Singh further relied on the judgment of the
Division Bench of the Bombay High Court,   Aurangabad Bench,
in   Sayali   Charitable   Trust’s   College   of   Pharmacy   (supra) .
However,   since   we   have   h eld   that   the   right   to   establish   an
educational   institution   is   a   fundamental   right   under   Article
19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India and reasonable restrictions
38

on   such   a   right   can   be   imposed   only   by   a   law   and   not   by   an
execution   instruction,   we   are   of   the   view   that   the   Division
Bench   of   the   Bombay   High   Court,   Aurangabad   Bench,   in   the
said case does not lay down the correct position of law.   In our
view,   the   view   taken   by   the   High   Courts   of   Karnataka,   Delhi
and Chhattisgarh lays down the correct position of law.  
55. Since we have held that the Resolutions/communications
dated   17 th
  July   2019   and   9 th
  September   2019   of   the   Central
Council   of   the   appellant­PCI,   which   are   in   the   nature   of
executive   instructions,   could   not   impose   restrictions   on   the
fundamental   right   to   establish   educational   institutions   under
Article   19(1)(g)   of   the   Constitution   of   India,   we   do   not   find   it
necessary   to   consider   the   submissions   advanced   on   other
issues.     We   find   that   the   Resolutions/communications   dated
17 th
  July  2019 and   9 th
  September  2019  of  the  Central  Council
of the appellant­PCI are liable to be struck down on this short
ground.  
39

56. Before parting, we may observe that there could indeed be
a   necessity   to   impose   certain   restrictions   so   as   to   prevent
mushrooming   growth   of   pharmacy   colleges.     Such   restrictions
may   be   in   the   larger   general   public   interest.     However,   if   that
has   to   be   done,   it   has   to   be   done   strictly   in   accordance   with
law.  If and when such restrictions are imposed by an Authority
competent   to   do   so,   the   validity   of   the   same   can   always   be
scrutinized   on   the   touchstone   of   law.     We,   therefore,   refrain
from considering the rival submissions made on that behalf.   
57. It   is   further   to   be   noted   that   the   applications   seeking
approval for D. Pharm and B. Pharm courses are required to be
accompanied   by   a   “No   Objection   Certificate”   (“NOC”)   from   the
State Government and consent of affiliation from the affiliating
bodies.     While scrutinizing such applications, the Council can
always   take   into   consideration   various   factors   before   deciding
to   allow   or   reject   such   applications.     Merely   because   an
institution   has   a   right   to   establish   an   educational   institution
does not mean that such an application has to be allowed.  In a
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particular   area,   if   there   are   more   than   sufficient   number   of
institutions   already   existing,   the   Central   Council   can   always
take   into   consideration   as   to   whether   it   is   necessary   or   not   to
increase the number of institutions in such an area.   However,
a   blanket   prohibition   on   the   establishment   of   pharmacy
colleges cannot be imposed by an executive resolution.  
58. In the result, the appeals filed by the Pharmacy Council of
India  are  dismissed.    However, in   the  facts  and  circumstances
of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.   
59. The   writ   petitions   filed   by   the   institutions   shall   stand
disposed of in terms of the above. 
60. Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of.
CIVIL APPEAL ARISING OUT OF SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION
(CIVIL)   NO.1887   OF   2022   [SHAHEED   TEG   BAHADUR
COLLEGE   OF   PHARMACY   VS.   PHARMACY   COUNCIL   OF
INDIA]
61. The   appeal   filed   by   Shaheed   Teg   Bahadur   College   of
Pharmacy   challenges   the   order   dated   23 rd
  December   2021
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passed by  the  learned Single Judge of  the  High  Court of Delhi
at   New   Delhi   in   CM   Application   No.   41337   of   2021   in   Writ
Petition (Civil) No.175 of 2021.
62. In view of the judgment passed by this Court today in Civil
Appeal  arising  out  of   Special  Leave  Petition   (Civil)  No.19671  of
2021   and   connected   matters,   this   appeal   has   been   rendered
infructuous   and   is   disposed   of   as   such.     However,   there   shall
be   no   order   as   to   costs.     Pending   application(s),   if   any,   shall
stand disposed of.  
…….........................J.       
[B.R. GAVAI]
………………….…….........................J.       
[PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA]
NEW DELHI;
SEPTEMBER 15, 2022.
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