/2022 INSC 0856/ 1 Crl.A.@SLP(Crl.)No.7696 of 2021 etc. REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1656   OF 2022 [Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 7696 of 2021] Jigar  @  Jimmy Pravinchandra  Adatiya  …  Appellant v. State of Gujarat                                …  Respondent WITH  Criminal Appeal No.1657   OF 2022 [Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 7609 of 2021] WITH  Criminal Appeal Nos.1658­1659  OF 2022 [Arising out of SLP (Crl.) Nos.7678­7679 of 2021] AND  Criminal Appeal No.  1660   OF 2022 [Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 7758 of 2021] J U D G M E N T Abhay S. Oka, J. Leave granted. 2 Crl.A.@SLP(Crl.)No.7696 of 2021 etc. FACTUAL ASPECTS 2. The   appellants   are   the   accused   in   FIR No.112020082021862020   registered   with   Jamnagar   City   ‘A’ Division   Police   Station   in   Gujarat   for   the   offences   under Sections   3(1),   3(2),   3(3),   3(4),   3(5),   and   4   of   The   Gujarat Control   of   Terrorism   and   Organised   Crime   Act,   2015   (for short   ‘the   2015   Act’).   Section   167   of   the   Code   of   Criminal Procedure,   1973   (for   short   ‘CrPC’)   has   been   amended   in relation to the cases involving offences punishable under the 2015   Act.       By   virtue   of   sub­section   (2)   of   Section   20   of   the 2015   Act,   a   proviso   has   been   added   in   addition   to   the existing   proviso   to   sub­section   (2)   of   Section   167   of   CrPC which permits the Special Court established under the 2015 Act to extend the period of 90 days provided to complete the investigation   up   to   180   days.   The   Special   Court   is empowered to extend the period up to 180 days on a report of the   Public   Prosecutor   setting   out   the   progress   of   the investigation   and   the   specific   reasons   for   continuing detention of the accused beyond the period of 90 days. 3 Crl.A.@SLP(Crl.)No.7696 of 2021 etc. 3. The   aforesaid   First   Information   Report   was   registered on 15 th  October 2020.  The accused were arrested on different dates.   Reports   were   submitted   by   the   Public   Prosecutor seeking   extension   of   time   up   to   180   days   to   complete   the investigation.   In   three   cases,   the   reports   were   submitted   on 8 th   January  2021,  and in  one  case, it was  submitted  on  21 st January 2021.   The prayer  for  extending  the time up to 180 days   was   allowed   by   the   Special   Court   on   the   very   day   on which the applications were filed. Being aggrieved by the said orders   of   the   Special   Court,   separate   applications   under Section 482 of CrPC were preferred by the appellants.  By the impugned   common   Judgment   dated   15 th   September   2021, the   learned   Single   Judge   of   Gujarat   High   Court   rejected   the applications   made   by   the   appellants   under   Section   482   of CrPC.   The details such as the respective dates of arrest and the dates of making applications are as under:­ S.  No. Name   of   the accused Particulars Date   of Arrest Date   of filing application under Section 20(2)(b)   of GUJCTOC Date   of filing application for   default bail 1 Nileshbhai Mansukhbhai Tolia Criminal Misc. Application No.4901   of 16.10.2020 08.01.2021 Allowed   on the   same 04.02.2021 4 Crl.A.@SLP(Crl.)No.7696 of 2021 etc. 2021   (SLP (Crl.) No.7758/ 2021)   day 2 Vasantbhai   @ Vasantrai Liladharbhai Mansata Criminal Misc. Application No.4902   of 2021   (SLP (Crl.) No.7609/ 2021) 01.11.2020 21.01.2021 Allowed   on the   same day 02.02.2021 3 Yashpalsinh Mahendrasinh Jadeja   and Jashpalsinh Mahendrasinh Jadeja Criminal Misc. Application No.4904   of 2021 (SLP   (Crl.) No. 7678­79/ 2021) 28/ 29.10.2020 08.01.2021 Allowed   on the   same day 03.02.2021 4 Jigar  @   Jimmy Pravinchandra Adatiya Criminal Misc. Application No.4928   of 2021   (SLP (Crl.) No.7696/ 2021) 16.10.2020 08.01.2021 Allowed   on the   same day 03.02.2021 4 . The   main   ground   urged   in   support   of   the   appeals   is that   when   the   Special   Court   passed   orders   on   the   reports submitted by the learned Public Prosecutor by which time to complete   investigation   was   extended   up   to   180   days,   the presence   of   none   of   the   accused   was   procured   either physically   or   through   video   conference   and   that   they   were 5 Crl.A.@SLP(Crl.)No.7696 of 2021 etc. not even informed about the reports submitted by the Public Prosecutor. SUBMISSIONS OF THE APPELLANTS 5. Ms.   Nitya   Ramakrishnan,   the   learned   senior   counsel appearing for the appellants has made detailed submissions. Reliance has been placed on the decisions of this Court in the case   of   Hitendra   Vishnu   Thakur   and   others   v.   State   of Maharashtra and others 1  and  Sanjay Dutt  v.  State through CBI,   Bombay   (II) 2 .  Her   submission  is   that   when   the   Special Court   exercised   the   power   under   the   proviso   added   by   sub­ section (2) of Section 20 of the 2015 Act to sub­section (2) of Section   167   of   CrPC,   the   presence   of   the   appellants   was admittedly   not   procured   even   through   video   conference. Admittedly,   before   the   reports   submitted   by   the   Public Prosecutor   seeking   extension   of   time   up   to   180   days   were considered,   the   Special   Court   did   not   inform   the   appellants about such reports being filed by the Public Prosecutor.   Her submission   is   that   in   the   case   of   Sanjay   Dutt 2 ,   the Constitution   Bench   of   this   Court   has   clearly   laid   down   that 1 (1994) 4 SCC 602 2 (1994) 5 SCC 410 6 Crl.A.@SLP(Crl.)No.7696 of 2021 etc. the production of the accused before the Special Court on the date on which such a report is considered is mandatory and that by producing the accused before the Court, he must be informed   about   such   a   report   submitted   by   the   Public Prosecutor.   Thus, there is a violation of the mandate of law laid   down   by   the   Constitution   Bench   of   this   Court.     She pointed out that the appellants moved applications for  grant of   default   bail   as   they   were   not   aware   of   the   filing   of   the reports by the Public Prosecutor and the orders of the Special Court   extending   the   period   for   investigation.   In   view   of   the extension   of   time   granted   by   the   Special   Court,   the   case   of the   appellants   for  grant  of  default  bail  under  sub­section   (2) of   Section   167   of   CrPC   was   not   considered   by   the   Special Court.     On   9 th   April   2021,   a   charge   sheet   was   filed   by   the police.     Her   submission   is   that   the   order   granting   extension to complete investigation is completely illegal as the same has been passed without following the mandate laid down in the case   of   Sanjay   Dutt 2 .     Her   submission   is   that   the   order granting   extension   passed   by   the   Special   Court   deserves   to be set aside.     As the applications for default bail were made by the appellants after the expiry of the statutory period of 90 7 Crl.A.@SLP(Crl.)No.7696 of 2021 etc. days   but   before   filing   the   charge   sheet,   the   appellants   are entitled to default bail. 6. The learned senior counsel submitted that the decision of   this   Court   in   the   case   of   Hitendra   Vishnu   Thakur 1   was modified   by   the   Constitution   Bench   in   the   case   of   Sanjay Dutt 2   on   a   very   limited   aspect.     She   submitted   that   the requirement of law laid down in the case of  Hitendra Vishnu Thakur 1   regarding   procuring   the   presence   of   the   accused   at the   time   of   considering   the   report   seeking   extension   of   time and   requirement   of   putting   the   accused   to   the   notice   of   the filing  of   such   a  report   has   not   been   disturbed   in  the   case  of Sanjay   Dutt 2 .     On   the   contrary,   the   decision   of   the Constitution Bench in the case of  Sanjay Dutt 2  reiterates the mandatory   requirement   of   production   of   the   accused   before the Court at the time of consideration of the report submitted by the Public Prosecutor.  The only modification made by the Constitution   Bench   in   the   decision   of   Hitendra   Vishnu Thakur 1   is   by   holding   that   the   mode   of   giving   notice   to   the accused is by informing him about the filing of such a report by   producing   him   before   the   Special   Court   and   a   written 8 Crl.A.@SLP(Crl.)No.7696 of 2021 etc. notice is not required.   Her  submission is that as this Court in the case of  Sanjay Dutt 2  has laid down the requirement of informing   the   accused   about   the   filing   of   a   report   seeking extension   of   time   up   to   180   days,   it   is   obvious   that   the accused on receiving the intimation is entitled to object to the prayer   made   by   the   Public   Prosecutor   for   grant   of   extension of time.  However, it is not necessary for the Special Court to supply   a   copy   of   the   report   submitted   by   the   Public Prosecutor   to   the   accused.     Her   submission   is   that   the proviso added by sub­section (2) of Section 20 of the 2015 Act is   pari materia   with the proviso added by  clause (bb) of sub­ section   (4)   of   Section   20   of   the   Terrorist   and   Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 (for short ‘TADA Act”) to sub­ section (2) of Section 167 of CrPC.  Therefore, the decisions of this   Court   in   the   case   of   Hitendra   Vishnu   Thakur 1   and Sanjay Dutt 2  will squarely apply to the facts of the case.  She pointed   out   that   the   decision   of   this   Court   in   the   case   of Sanjay Dutt 2   was consistently followed in many decisions by this   Court.     In   the   case   of   Ateef   Nasir   Mulla   v.   State   of Maharashtra 3 , this Court followed the  law  laid down  by  this 3 (2005) 7 SCC 29 9 Crl.A.@SLP(Crl.)No.7696 of 2021 etc. Court   in   both   the   aforesaid   decisions   while   dealing   with   the similar   provisions   under   clause   (b)   of   sub­section   (2)   of Section   49   of   Prevention   of   Terrorism   Act,   2002   (for   short ‘POTA’).     She   submitted   that   while   dealing   with   a   similar provision in the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (for short ‘NDPS Act’), in the case of  Sanjay Kumar Kedia Alias Sanjay Kedia  v . Intelligence Officer, Narcotics Control   Bureau   and   Another 4 ,   this   Court   followed   the decision   in   the   case   of   Hitendra   Vishnu   Thakur 1 .     The learned senior counsel also invited our attention to a decision of   this   Court   in   the   case   of   S.   Kasi   v .   State   through   the Inspector   of   Police   Samaynallur   Police   Station   Madurai District 5 .   She also invited our attention to another decision in   the   case   of   Bikramjit   Singh   v .   State   of   Punjab 6 .     She urged   that   in   both   the   aforesaid   decisions,   this   Court   held that   the   right   to   get   default   bail   under   sub­section   (2)   of Section   167   of   CrPC   is   not   merely   a   statutory   right   but   a fundamental   right   guaranteed   to   an   accused.     She   also referred   to   another   decision   of   this   Court   in   the   case   of   M. 4 (2009)17 SCC 631 5 2020 SCC OnLine SC 529 6 (2020) 10 SCC 616 10 Crl.A.@SLP(Crl.)No.7696 of 2021 etc. Ravindran   v.   Intelligence   Officer,   Directorate   of   Revenue Intelligence 7  which holds that sub­section (2) of Section 167 of CrPC is integrally linked to the constitutional commitment under   Article   21   of   the   Constitution   of   India   promising protection   of   life   and   personal   liberty   against   unlawful   and arbitrary   detention.     Therefore,   the   provision   of   sub­section (2)   of   Section   167   should   be   interpreted   in   a   manner   that serves   this   object.     She   also   relied   upon   a   decision   of   the Karnataka   High   Court   in   the   case   of   Muzammil   Pasha   & Ors. Etc.  v.  National Investigating Agency etc. 8 .   7. Her submission is that in violation of the law laid down by   the   Constitution   Bench   in   the   case   of   Sanjay   Dutt 2 ,   the time   to   carry   out   the   investigation   was   extended   by   the Special Court.   Therefore, the said order is completely  illegal as   it   infringes   the   right   of   the   appellants   to   get   default   bail which is held to be a fundamental right guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution of India. SUBMISSIONS OF THE RESPONDENT 7 (2021) 2 SCC 485 8 2021 SCC OnLine Kar 12688 11 Crl.A.@SLP(Crl.)No.7696 of 2021 etc. 8. Shri   Aman   Lekhi,   the   learned   Additional   Solicitor General   of   India   (ASG)   submitted   that   the   accused   is   not entitled   to   a   written   notice   of   the   reports   submitted   by   the Public Prosecutor for seeking extension of time. He submitted that  the report of  the Public Prosecutor  is  considered by  the Special Court at a stage when the investigation is in progress. His   submission   is   that   accused   has   no   say   in   the   matter   of grant of extension of time as he has no right of being heard at the   stage   of   the   investigation.   He   relied   upon   a   decision   of this   Court   in   the   case   of   Narender   G.   Goel   v .   State   of Maharashtra and Anr. 9 .   9. Learned ASG further submitted that the inquiry at the time   of   consideration   of   the   report   submitted   by   the   Public Prosecutor   for   extension   of   time   is   very   limited.     He   relied upon   a   decision   of   this   Court   in   the   case   of   State   of Maharashtra   v.   Surendra   Pundlik   Gadling   and   Ors. 10 .     He submitted   that   if   a   report   is   submitted   by   the   Public Prosecutor   indicating   the   progress   of   the   investigation   and the   specific   reasons   for   continuing   the   detention   of   the 9 (2009) 6 SCC 65 10 ( 2019) 5 SCC 178 12 Crl.A.@SLP(Crl.)No.7696 of 2021 etc. accused   beyond   a   period   of   90   days,   the   Special   Court   is empowered to grant the extension.   He submitted that in the present case, the reports submitted by the Public Prosecutor indicate  that there was an application of mind by  the Public Prosecutor   and   all   details   as   required   were   submitted.     He urged   that   the   decision   of   this   Court   in   the   case   of   Sanjay Kumar   Kedia 4  is  per incuriam  as the binding precedent in the case of  Sanjay Dutt 2  was not considered by this Court.   10. His   submission   is   that   the   obligation   to   produce   the accused   before   the   Court   is   mandatory   only   when   his detention   in   police   custody   is   sought.     He   submitted   that mere non­production of the accused on the day on which the Special   Court   considered   the   request   for   the   grant   of extension of time will not vitiate the order extending the time. His   submission   is   that   in   view   of   Section   460   of   CrPC,   the order   will   not   stand   vitiated.     His   submission   is   that   in   any case, no  prejudice  has been  caused  to the appellants  due to their non­production and there has been no failure of justice. Learned   ASG   submitted   that   physical   production   of   the accused was not feasible due to Covid­19 conditions and that 13 Crl.A.@SLP(Crl.)No.7696 of 2021 etc. inadequate bandwidth prevented the virtual production of the accused persons.  He submitted that the reasons given by the High Court are cogent and correct.  REJOINDER OF THE APPELLANTS 11. By   way   of   rejoinder,   the   learned   senior   counsel appearing for the appellant submitted that without disturbing the   law   laid   down   in   the   case   of   Hitendra   Vishnu   Thakur 1 , the Constitution Bench in the case of   Sanjay Dutt 2   has held that service of written notice to the accused is not necessary and  it would suffice if the accused was  present  in the Court and   was   informed   that   the   request   for   extension   of   time   to complete the investigation is being considered. She submitted that   there   is   no   material   placed   on   record   to   show   that   in January   2021   when   the   reports   submitted   by   the   Public Prosecutor   were   considered   by   the   Special   Court,   either   the Standard   Operating   Procedure   prevailing   at   that   time prohibited   the   physical   production   of   the   accused   or   there was   no   proper   connectivity   which   prevented   the   production even   virtually.   Her   submission   is   that   the   said   plea   has   no foundation at all.  14 Crl.A.@SLP(Crl.)No.7696 of 2021 etc. FURTHER SUBMISSIONS 12. On   09 th   February   2022,   submissions   were   concluded. Thereafter,   we   noticed   that   sub­section   (5)   of   Section   20   of the 2015 Act was not brought to our notice during the course of submissions.   Therefore, on 10 th   March 2022, the appeals were again listed on Board for further hearing, and time was granted   to   the   learned   counsel   appearing   for   the   parties   to make   further   submissions   on   the   limited   issue   of   the applicability of sub­section (5) of Section 20 of the 2015 Act. Thereafter,   the   appeals   could   not   be   listed   immediately   due to   the   change   of   the   constitution   of   the   Bench.     Ultimately, further submissions were heard on 23 rd  August 2022.   13.       Ms.   Nitya   Ramakrishnan,   learned   senior   counsel appearing   for   the   appellants   pointed   out   that   though   sub­ section   (5)   of   Section   20,   which   overrides   the   provisions   of CrPC, provides that the accused shall not be granted bail if it is   noticed   by   the   Special   Court   that   he   was   on   bail   in   an offence   under   the   2015   Act   or   under   any   other   Act   on   the date of the offence in question, the same will not come in the way   of   the   appellants   getting   default   bail.     She   pointed   out 15 Crl.A.@SLP(Crl.)No.7696 of 2021 etc. that   an   identical   provision   in   the   form   of   sub­section   (5)   of Section   21   of   the   Maharashtra   Control   of   Organised   Crime Act, 1999 (for  short, ‘the MCOCA’) has been partially  struck down   by   the   Bombay   High   Court   in   the   case   of   Bharat Shanti   Lal   Shah   &   Ors.   v.   State   of   Maharashtra 11 .     She pointed   out   that   this   Court   in   the   case   of   State   of Maharashtra   v.   Bharat   Shanti   Lal   Shah   &   Ors. 12   has affirmed   the   said   view.     This   Court,   for   reasons   recorded, held   that   the   expression   “or   under   any   other   Act”   as appearing in sub­section (5) of Section 21 of the MCOCA was arbitrary and discriminatory.  RESPONSE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL OF INDIA 14. Shri   Tushar   Mehta,   learned   Solicitor   General   of   India submitted   that   in   view   of   the   pronouncement   of  law   by   this Court   in  the   case  of   Bharat   Shanti   Lal   Shah 12 ,  sub­section (5)   of   Section   20   of   the   2015   Act   will   not   by   itself   be   an impediment in the way of the appellants getting default bail. With   the   permission   of   the   Court,   he   made   additional submissions.     He   relied   upon   Section   461   of   CrPC   which 11 2003 All MR (Crl.) 1061 12 (2008) 13 SCC 5 16 Crl.A.@SLP(Crl.)No.7696 of 2021 etc. contains   an   exhaustive   list   of   irregularities   that   vitiate proceedings.     He   urged   that   the   irregularity   alleged   in   this case is not a part of the list of irregularities contained in the said   provision.   He   also   invited   our   attention   to   sub­section (2) of Section 465 of CrPC.  His submission is that as held by this   Court   in   the   case   of   Sanjay   Dutt 2 ,   the   accused   is   not entitled   to   a   written   notice   of   the   application   made   by   the Public   Prosecutor   for   extension   of   the   period   provided   to carry   out   the   investigation   and   only   his   presence   is   to   be procured when the application is heard by the Special Court. He   submitted   that   the   accused   is   not   entitled   to   receive   a copy   of   the   application/   report   made   under   the   proviso   to sub­section (2) of Section 20 of the 2015 Act and, therefore, he  is not entitled  to  make  any  submissions on the  report  of the   Public   Prosecutor.     He   submitted   that   there   is   no prejudice caused to the appellants as a result of the failure of the   investigating   agency   to   produce   them   before   the   Special Court   when   applications   for   extension   were   heard.     He submitted   that   the   failure   to   produce   the   appellants   on   the date   on   which   extension   applications   were   heard,   is   a   mere irregularity   in   the   proceedings   which   will   have   no   effect   on 17 Crl.A.@SLP(Crl.)No.7696 of 2021 etc. further stages such as cognizance, trial, etc.  On this aspect, he relied upon a decision of this Court in the case of  Fertico Marketing & Investment Private Limited & Ors.  v.  Central Bureau   of   Investigation   &   Anr. 13 .     He   also   relied   upon another decision of this Court in the case of   Securities and Exchange Board of India etc.     v.   Gaurav Varshney & Anr. etc. 14 .   He urged that the applications for availing of default bail were filed by the appellants after the time was extended by   the   Special   Court.     He   would,   therefore,   submit   that   the appellants are not entitled to default bail.  He also submitted that   the   allegations   against   the   appellants   are   of   a   very serious   nature.     Even   this   aspect   needs   to   be   taken   into consideration.  CONSIDERATION OF SUBMISSIONS 15. We   have   carefully   considered   the   submissions.   The entire issue revolves around the interpretation of the proviso added   by   the   2015   Act   to   sub­section   (2)   of   Section   167   of CrPC.   For   that   purpose,   we   must   refer   to   Section   20   of   the 2015 Act. The Section reads thus:­ 13 (2021) 2 SCC 525 14 (2016) 14 SCC 430. 18 Crl.A.@SLP(Crl.)No.7696 of 2021 etc. “20.   Modified   Application   of   Certain provisions of Code:   (1)   Notwithstanding   anything   contained   in   the Code or in any other law, every offence punishable under this Act shall be deemed to be a 'cognizable offence' within the meaning of clause (c) of section 2   of   the   Code   and   'cognizable   case'   as   defined   in that clause and shall be construed accordingly. (2) Section 167 of the Code shall apply in relation to   a   case   involving   an   offence   punishable   under this   Act   subject   to   the   modifications   that   in   sub­ section (2), ­ (a)   the   reference   to   "fifteen   days"   and   "sixty days",   wherever   they   occur,   shall   be   construed   as   references   to   "thirty   days"   and   "ninety days", respectively;  (b)   after   the   existing   proviso,   the   following proviso shall be inserted, namely: ­  "Provided   further   that   if   it   is   not   possible to   complete   the   investigation   within   the   said period   of   ninety   days,   the   Special   Court   shall extend   the   said   period   upto   one   hundred   and eighty   days   on   the   report   of   the   Public Prosecutor   indicating   the   progress   of   the investigation   and   the   specific   reasons   for detention   of   the   accused   beyond   the   said period of ninety days.".  (3) Nothing   in   section   438   of   the   Code   shall apply in relation to any case involving the arrest of any   person   accused   of   having   committed   an offence punishable under this Act.  19 Crl.A.@SLP(Crl.)No.7696 of 2021 etc. (4) Notwithstanding   anything   contained   in   the Code, no person accused of an offence punishable under   this  Act  shall,  if   in   custody,   be  released   on bail or on his own bond, unless –  (a)   the   Public   Prosecutor   has   been   given   an opportunity   to   oppose   the   application   of   such release; and  (b)   where   the   Public   Prosecutor   opposes   the application,   the   Special   Court   is   satisfied   that there   are   reasonable   grounds   for   believing   that accused is not guilty of committing such offence and   that   he   is   not   likely   to   commit   any   offence while on bail. (5)   Notwithstanding   anything   contained   in   the Code, the accused shall not be granted bail if it is  noticed  by the  Special  Court  that  he was  on bail in an offence under  this Act, or under any other   Act   on   the   date   of   the   offence   in question.   (6)   The   restriction   on   granting   of   bail   specified   in sub­sections   (4)   and   (5)   are   in   addition   to   the restriction under the Code or any other law for the time being in force on the granting of bail. (7)   The   police   officer   seeking   the   custody   of   any person for pre­indictment or pre­trial interrogation from   the   judicial   custody   shall   file   a   written statement explaining the reasons for seeking such custody   and   also   for   the   delay,   if   any,   in   seeking the police custody.” [emphasis added] We   also   reproduce   sub­sections   (1)   and   (2)   of   Section   167 of CrPC which read thus:­ 20 Crl.A.@SLP(Crl.)No.7696 of 2021 etc. “167.   Procedure   when   investigation   cannot   be completed in twenty­four hours . (1)  Whenever   any  person  is  arrested  and  detained  in custody, and it appears that the investigation cannot be   completed   within   the   period   of   twenty­four   hours fixed   by   section   57,   and   there   are   grounds   for believing   that   the   accusation   or   information   is   well­ founded, the officer in charge of the police station or the police officer making the investigation, if he is not below   the   rank   of   sub­inspector,   shall   forthwith transmit to  the nearest Judicial  Magistrate a copy of the entries in the diary hereinafter prescribed relating to   the   case,   and   shall   at   the   same   time   forward   the accused to such Magistrate. (2)   The   Magistrate   to   whom   an   accused   person   is forwarded under this section may, whether he has or has not jurisdiction to try the case, from time to time, authorise   the   detention   of   the   accused   in   such custody as such Magistrate thinks fit, for a term not exceeding fifteen days in the whole; and if he has no jurisdiction to try the case or commit it for trial, and considers   further   detention   unnecessary,   he   may order   the   accused   to   be   forwarded   to   a   Magistrate having such jurisdiction: Provided that­­ (a) the Magistrate may authorise the detention of the accused person, otherwise than in the custody of the police,   beyond   the   period   of   fifteen   days,   if   he   is satisfied   that   adequate   grounds   exist   for   doing   so, but no Magistrate shall authorise the detention of the accused person in custody under this paragraph for a total period exceeding­­ (i)   ninety   days,   where   the   investigation   relates   to   an offence   punishable   with   death,   imprisonment   for   life or imprisonment for a term of not less than ten years; (ii)   sixty   days,   where   the   investigation   relates   to   any other offence, and, on the expiry of the said period of ninety   days,   or   sixty   days,   as   the   case   may   be,   the 21 Crl.A.@SLP(Crl.)No.7696 of 2021 etc. accused   person   shall   be   released   on   bail   if   he   is prepared   to   and   does   furnish   bail,   and   every   person released   on   bail   under   this   sub­section   shall   be deemed   to   be   so   released   under   the   provisions   of Chapter XXXIII for the purposes of that Chapter; (b)   no   Magistrate   shall   authorise   detention   of  the accused   in   custody   of   the   police   under   this section unless the accused is produced before him in   person   for   the   first   time   and   subsequently every time till the accused remains in the custody of   the   police,   but   the   Magistrate   may   extend further   detention   in   judicial   custody   on production   of   the   accused   either   in   person   or through the medium of electronic video linkage ; (c)   no   Magistrate   of   the   second   class,   not   specially empowered   in   this   behalf   by   the   High   Court,   shall authorise detention in the custody of the police. Explanation   I.­­For the avoidance of doubts, it is hereby   declared   that,   notwithstanding   the   expiry   of the   period   specified   in   paragraph   (a),   the   accused shall   be   detained   in   custody   so   long   as   he   does   not furnish bail. Explanation   II.­­If   any   question   arises   whether an   accused   person   was   produced   before   the Magistrate   as   required   under   clause   (b),   the production   of   the   accused   person   may   be   proved   by his   signature   on   the   order   authorising   detention   or by   the   order   certified   by   the   Magistrate   as   to production   of   the   accused   person   through   the medium   of   electronic   video   linkage,   as   the   case   may be. Provided further that in case of a woman under eighteen   years   of   age,   the   detention   shall   be authorised to be in the custody of a remand home or recognised social institution.” [emphasis added] 22 Crl.A.@SLP(Crl.)No.7696 of 2021 etc. 16. Thus,   in   a   case   involving   the   offences   punishable under   the   2015   Act,   the   Special   Court   is   authorized   to detain   the   accused   person   in   custody   for   a   period   not exceeding  90 days. The proviso added by  sub­section (2) of Section 20 of the 2015 Act to sub­Section (2) of Section 167 of CrPC enables the Special Court to extend the said period to a total of 180 days on the basis of a report of the Public Prosecutor setting out the progress of the investigation and incorporating   the   specific   reasons   for   the   detention   of   the accused beyond the period of 90 days.  17. Thus,   unless   the   Special   Court   exercises   the   power under the proviso added by the 2015 Act to sub­section (2) of   Section   167   of   CrPC,   on   the   expiry   of   the   period   of   90 days, the  accused will be entitled to  default  bail. When  the Special   Court   exercises   the   power   under   the   proviso   added to   sub­section   (2)   of   Section   167   of   CrPC   and   extends   the time up to 180 days, the accused will be entitled to default bail only if the charge sheet is not filed within the extended period. 23 Crl.A.@SLP(Crl.)No.7696 of 2021 etc. 18. As   can   be   seen   from   sub­section   (2)   of   Section   20   of the 2015 Act, the provisions of Section 167 of CrPC and in particular   sub­section   (2)   thereof   containing   entitlement   of the   accused   to   default   bail   will   apply   to   the   2015   Act   with the   modification   that   the   reference   to   the   period   of   “fifteen days” and “sixty days” provided in sub­section (2) of Section 167   of   CrPC   is   required   to   be   construed   as   a   reference   to “thirty days” and “ninety days” respectively.   The proviso to sub­section   (2)   of   Section   20   of   the   2015   Act   enables   the Special   Court   to   extend   the   period   provided   in   sub­section (2) of Section 167 of CrPC up to 180 days. GENERAL PRINCIPLES GOVERNING DEFAULT BAIL 19. Before   we   go   to   the   main   controversy   concerning   the legality   of   the   order   of   extension   passed   in   exercise   of   the power  under  the  proviso  to   sub­section   (2) of  Section  20  of the 2015 Act, it is necessary  to recapitulate the settled law relating   to   default   bail.     Three   decisions   of   the   Benches   of three   Hon’ble   Judges   of   this   Court   have   laid   down   the   law on this aspect.   24 Crl.A.@SLP(Crl.)No.7696 of 2021 etc. 19. (a) The first decision is in the case of  Uday Mohanlal Acharya   v.   State   of   Maharashtra 15 .     In   paragraph   13 thereof,   the   majority   view   has   been   summarised   which reads thus :  “…. …. …. …. On   the   aforesaid   premises,   we   would   record   our conclusions as follows: 1 .   Under   sub­section   (2)   of   Section   167,   a   Magistrate before   whom   an   accused   is   produced   while   the   police   is investigating   into   the   offence   can   authorise   detention   of the accused in such custody  as the Magistrate thinks fit for a term not exceeding 15 days on the whole. 2 . Under the proviso to the aforesaid sub­section (2) of Section   167,   the   Magistrate   may   authorise   detention   of the accused otherwise than in the custody of police for a total   period   not   exceeding   90   days   where   the investigation   relates   to   offence   punishable   with   death, imprisonment   for   life   or   imprisonment   for   a   term   of   not less   than   10   years,   and   60   days   where   the   investigation relates to any other offence. 3 . On the expiry of the said period of 90 days or 60 days,   as   the   case   may   be,   an   indefeasible   right accrues in favour of the accused for being released on bail on account of default by the investigating agency in   the   completion   of   the   investigation   within   the period   prescribed   and   the   accused   is   entitled   to   be released on bail, if he is prepared to and furnishes the bail as directed by the Magistrate. 4 . When an  application  for bail  is filed by  an  accused for   enforcement   of   his   indefeasible   right   alleged   to   have been   accrued   in   his   favour   on   account   of   default   on   the part   of   the   investigating   agency   in   completion   of   the investigation   within   the   specified   period,   the Magistrate/court   must   dispose   of   it   forthwith,   on   being satisfied that in fact the accused has been in custody for 15 (2001) 5 SCC 453 25 Crl.A.@SLP(Crl.)No.7696 of 2021 etc. the   period   of   90   days   or   60   days,   as   specified   and   no charge­sheet   has   been   filed   by   the   investigating   agency. Such   prompt   action   on   the   part   of   the   Magistrate/court will   not   enable   the   prosecution   to   frustrate   the   object   of the   Act   and   the   legislative   mandate   of   an   accused   being released  on  bail  on  account of  the   default  on  the  part  of the   investigating   agency   in   completing   the   investigation within the period stipulated. 5 .   If   the   accused   is   unable   to   furnish   the   bail   as directed by the Magistrate, then on a conjoint reading of Explanation   I   and   the   proviso   to   sub­section   (2)   of Section   167,   the   continued   custody   of   the   accused   even beyond   the   specified   period   in   para   ( a )   will   not   be unauthorised,   and   therefore,   if   during   that   period   the investigation   is   complete   and   the   charge­sheet   is   filed then the so­called indefeasible right of the accused would stand extinguished. 6 .   The   expression   “if   not   already   availed   of”   used by this Court in   Sanjay Dutt case   [(1994) 5 SCC 410 : 1994   SCC   (Cri)   1433]   must   be   understood   to   mean when the accused files an application and is prepared to   offer   bail   on   being   directed.   In   other   words,   on expiry   of   the   period   specified   in   para   ( a )   of   the proviso   to   sub­section   (2)   of   Section   167   if   the accused files an application for bail and offers also to furnish   the   bail   on   being   directed,   then   it   has   to   be held   that   the   accused   has   availed   of   his   indefeasible right   even   though   the   court   has   not   considered   the said application and has not  indicated the terms and conditions of bail, and the accused has not furnished the same. With   the   aforesaid   interpretation   of   the   expression “availed of” if the charge­sheet is filed subsequent to the   availing   of   the   indefeasible   right   by   the   accused then   that   right   would   not   stand   frustrated   or extinguished,   necessarily   therefore,   if   an   accused entitled   to   be   released   on   bail   by   application   of   the proviso   to   sub­section   (2)   of   Section   167,   makes   the application   before   the   Magistrate,   but   the   Magistrate erroneously   refuses   the   same   and   rejects   the application   and   then   the   accused   moves   the   higher 26 Crl.A.@SLP(Crl.)No.7696 of 2021 etc. forum   and   while   the   matter   remains   pending   before the   higher   forum   for   consideration   a   charge­sheet   is filed,   the   so­called   indefeasible   right   of   the   accused would   not   stand   extinguished   thereby,   and   on   the other   hand,   the   accused   has   to   be   released   on   bail. Such   an  accused,  who  thus  is  entitled  to  be  released  on bail in enforcement of his indefeasible right will, however, have   to   be   produced   before   the   Magistrate   on   a   charge­ sheet being filed in accordance with Section 209 and the Magistrate must deal with him in the matter of remand to custody   subject   to   the   provisions   of   the   Code   relating   to bail   and   subject  to   the   provisions   of   cancellation   of   bail, already granted in accordance with the law laid down by this   Court   in   the   case   of   Mohd.   Iqbal   v.   State   of Maharashtra   [(1996) 1 SCC 722 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 202] .” [emphasis added] 19 (b) The   second   decision   is   in   the   case   of   M. Ravindran 7 .     The   conclusions   in   the   said   decision   can   be summarised as under :  (i) Majority   view   in   the   case   of   Uday   Mohanlal Acharya 15  is correct; (ii) Sub­section (2) of Section 167 of CrPC was enacted for   providing   an   outer   time   limit   to   the   period   of remand   of   the   accused   proportionate   to   the seriousness of the offence alleged. On the failure to complete   the   investigation   within   the   defined   outer limit,   the accused acquires an indefeasible right to get default bail; 27 Crl.A.@SLP(Crl.)No.7696 of 2021 etc. (iii) The   timelines   provided   under   sub­section   (2)   of Section 167, CrPC ensure that investigating officers are   compelled   to   act   swiftly   and   efficiently   without misusing   the   prospect   of   further   remand.     This provision   ensures   that   the   Court   takes   cognizance of   the   case   without   undue   delay   after   investigation is   completed   within   the   time   provided   in   sub­ section (2) of Section 167, CrPC; (iv) The   Legislature   has   enacted   sub­section   (2)   of Section   167   for   balancing   the   need   to   provide sufficient   time   to   complete   the   investigation   with the   need   to   protect   civil   liberties   of   the   accused which   is   given   paramount   importance   in   our Constitution; (v) Sub­section (2) of Section 167 is integrally linked to the   constitutional   commitment   under   Article   21   of the Constitution of India promising protection of the personal   liberty   against   unlawful   and   arbitrary detention; (vi) The   decision   of   this   Court   in   the   case   of   S.   Kasi 5 was quoted with the approval which holds that the indefeasible   right   to   default   bail   is   an   integral   part 28 Crl.A.@SLP(Crl.)No.7696 of 2021 etc. of the right to personal liberty under Article 21 and the said right cannot be suspended even during the pandemic situation; and (vii) It is well settled that in case of any ambiguity in the construction   of   a   penal   statute,   the   Court   must favour   the   interpretation   which   leans   towards protecting the rights of the accused.   This principle is   applicable   even   in   the   case   of   a   procedure providing for curtailment of liberty of the accused.  19. (c)  The   third   decision   is   in   the   case   of   Rakesh Kumar Paul   v.   State of  Assam 16 .   This decision holds that it   is   the   duty   of   the   learned   Magistrate   to   inform   the accused,   of   the   availability   of   indefeasible   right   under   sub­ section (2) of Section 167 of CrPC once it accrues to him.  It was   held   that   this   will   ensure   that   dilatory   tactics   of   the prosecution are thwarted and obligations under Article 21 of the Constitution are upheld. 20.   The   issue   involved   in   these   appeals   will   have   to   be decided   in   the   context   of   the   legal   position   that   the indefeasible   right   to   default   bail   under   sub­section   (2)   of 16 (2017) 15 SCC 67 29 Crl.A.@SLP(Crl.)No.7696 of 2021 etc. Section   167,   CrPC   is   an   integral   part   of   the   fundamental right to personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. IMPEDIMENT OF SUB­SECTION (5) OF  SECTION 20 OF THE 2015 ACT 21. Sub­section (5) of Section 20 reads thus :  “ 20 . Modified application of certain provisions of Code. … … … … … (5)   Notwithstanding   anything   contained   in   the Code, the accused shall not be granted bail if it is noticed by the Special Court that he was on bail in an offence under  this Act, or  under any other Act on the date of the offence in question.” Sub­section   (5)   of   Section   21   of   the   MCOCA   contained identical   provision.     In   the   case   of   Bharat   Shanti   Lal Shah 12 ,   this   Court,   for   the   reasons   recorded   in   paragraphs 62   to   65,   concurred   with   the   view   of   Bombay   High   Court that   the   expression   “or   under   any   other   Act”   appearing   in sub­section (5) of Section 21 of the MCOCA was violative of Articles   14   and   21   of   the   Constitution   and,   therefore,   it must be struck down.   Hence, the same expression used in sub­section   (5)   of   Section   20   of   the   2015   Act   infringes Articles   14   and   21   of   the   Constitution.     In   the   facts   of   the 30 Crl.A.@SLP(Crl.)No.7696 of 2021 etc. case,   none   of   the   appellants   were   on   bail   for   any   offence under   the   2015   Act   and   hence,   no   impediment   has   been created by sub­section (5) of Section 20 in the facts of these cases for considering the prayer for default bail.  THE  EFFECT  OF  THE  FAILURE  OF   THE  RESPONDENTS TO PRODUCE  THE  APPELLANTS  BEFORE THE  SPECIAL COURT   AT   THE   TIME   OF   CONSIDERATION   OF   THE EXTENSION APPLICATION 22. The question before us is about the legal consequences of   the   failure   of   the   Special   Court   under   the   2015   Act   to procure   the   presence   of   the   accused   at   the   time   of   the consideration   of   the   reports   submitted   by   the   Public Prosecutor   for   a   grant   of   extension   of   time   to   complete   the investigation. In addition, we will have to consider the effect of   the   failure   to   give   notice   to   the   accused   of   the   reports submitted by the Public Prosecutor.  23.   Under   Clause   (bb)   of   sub­Section   (4)   of   Section   20   of TADA,   there   is   a   pari   materia   proviso   that   empowers   the Designated Court to extend the period provided in clause (a) of Sub­Section (2) of Section 167 of CrPC. Clause (bb) reads thus : 31 Crl.A.@SLP(Crl.)No.7696 of 2021 etc. “( bb )   in   sub­section   (2),   after   the   proviso,   the   following proviso shall be inserted, namely:— ‘Provided   further   that,   if   it   is   not   possible   to complete the investigation within the said period of one hundred and eighty days, the Designated Court shall  extend the said period up to one year, on the report   of   the   Public   Prosecutor   indicating   the progress   of   the   investigation   and   the   specific reasons for the detention of the accused beyond the said period of one hundred and eighty days; and’ ” The   said   proviso   came   up   for   consideration   before   this Court   in   the   case   of   Hitendra   Vishnu   Thakur 1 .     In paragraph 23 this Court held thus: “23. We may at this stage, also on a plain reading of clause (bb) of sub­section (4) of Section 20, point out   that   the   Legislature   has   provided   for   seeking extension of time for completion of investigation on a   report of the public prosecutor.   The  Legislature did   not   purposely   leave   it   to   an   investigating officer   to   make   an   application   for   seeking extension   of   time   from   the   court.   This provision   is   in   tune   with   the   legislative   intent to   have   the   investigations   completed expeditiously and not to allow an accused to be kept   in   continued   detention   during unnecessary   prolonged   investigation   at   the whims   of   the   police.   The   Legislature   expects that   the   investigation   must   be   completed   with utmost   promptitude   but   where   it   becomes necessary   to   seek   some   more   time   for completion   of   the   investigation,   the investigating   agency   must   submit   itself   to   the scrutiny   of   the   public   prosecutor   in   the   first instance   and   satisfy   him   about   the   progress   of the   investigation   and   furnish   reasons   for 32 Crl.A.@SLP(Crl.)No.7696 of 2021 etc. seeking further custody of an accused.   A public prosecutor   is   an   important   officer   of   the   State Government   and   is   appointed   by   the   State   under the Code of Criminal Procedure. He is not a part of the   investigating   agency.   He   is   an   independent statutory   authority.   The   public   prosecutor   is expected   to   independently   apply   his   mind   to   the request   of   the   investigating   agency   before submitting   a   report   to   the   court   for   extension   of time with a view to enable the investigating agency to   complete   the   investigation.   He   is   not   merely   a post   office   or   a   forwarding   agency.   A   public prosecutor may or may not agree with the reasons given   by   the   investigating   officer   for   seeking extension   of   time   and   may   find   that   the investigation   had   not   progressed   in   the   proper manner   or   that   there   has   been   unnecessary, deliberate   or   avoidable   delay   in   completing   the investigation.   In   that   event,   he   may   not   submit any   report   to   the   court   under   clause   (bb)   to   seek extension   of   time.   Thus,   for   seeking   extension   of time under clause (bb), the public prosecutor after an   independent   application   of   his   mind   to   the request   of   the   investigating   agency   is   required   to make   a   report   to   the   Designated   Court   indicating therein   the   progress   of   the   investigation   and disclosing   justification   for   keeping   the   accused   in further   custody   to   enable   the   investigating   agency to   complete   the   investigation.   The   public prosecutor   may   attach   the   request   of   the investigating   officer   along   with   his   request   or application   and   report,   but   his   report,   as envisaged   under   clause   (bb),   must   disclose   on the face of it that he has applied his mind and was   satisfied   with   the   progress   of   the investigation   and   considered   grant   of   further time   to   complete   the   investigation   necessary. The use of the expression “on the   report   of the public prosecutor   indicating the progress   of the investigation   and   the   specific   reasons   for   the 33 Crl.A.@SLP(Crl.)No.7696 of 2021 etc. detention   of   the   accused   beyond   the   said period”   as   occurring   in   clause   (bb)   in   sub­ section   (2)   of   Section   167   as   amended   by Section   20(4)   are   important   and   indicative   of the legislative intent not to keep an accused in custody   unreasonably   and   to   grant   extension only   on   the   report   of   the   public   prosecutor. The   report   of   the   public   prosecutor,   therefore, is not merely a formality but a very vital report, because   the   consequence   of   its   acceptance affects   the   liberty   of   an   accused   and   it   must, therefore,   strictly   comply   with   the requirements   as   contained   in   clause   (bb) .   The request   of   an   investigating   officer   for   extension   of time   is   no   substitute   for   the   report   of   the   public prosecutor.  Where  either   no   report   as  is  envisaged by   clause   (bb)   is   filed   or   the   report   filed   by   the public   prosecutor   is   not   accepted   by   the Designated   Court,   since   the   grant   of   extension   of time   under   clause   (bb)   is   neither   a   formality   nor automatic,   the   necessary   corollary   would   be   that an   accused   would   be   entitled   to   seek   bail   and   the court   ‘shall’   release   him   on   bail   if   he   furnishes bail   as required by  the  Designated  Court. It is not merely   the   question   of   form   in   which   the   request for extension under clause (bb) is made but one of substance.   The   contents   of   the   report   to   be submitted   by   the   public   prosecutor,   after proper application of his mind, are designed to assist   the   Designated   Court   to   independently decide   whether   or   not   extension   should   be granted   in   a   given   case.   Keeping   in   view   the consequences   of   the   grant   of   extension   i.e. keeping   an   accused   in   further   custody,   the Designated   Court   must   be   satisfied   for   the justification,   from   the   report   of   the   public prosecutor,   to   grant   extension   of   time   to complete the investigation . 34 Crl.A.@SLP(Crl.)No.7696 of 2021 etc. Where   the   Designated   Court   declines   to   grant such   an   extension,   the   right   to   be   released   on bail   on   account   of   the   ‘default’   of   the prosecution   becomes   indefeasible   and   cannot be   defeated   by   reasons   other   than   those contemplated   by   sub­section   (4)   of   Section   20 as   discussed   in   the   earlier   part   of   this judgment.   We   are   unable   to   agree   with   Mr. Madhava Reddy or the Additional Solicitor General Mr.   Tulsi   that   even   if   the   public   prosecutor ‘presents’ the request of the investigating officer to the   court   or   ‘forwards’   the   request   of   the investigating   officer   to   the   court,   it   should   be construed to be the   report   of the public prosecutor. There is no scope for such a construction when we are dealing with the liberty of a citizen. The courts are   expected   to   zealously   safeguard   his   liberty. Clause   ( bb )   has   to   be   read   and   interpreted   on   its plain   language   without   addition   or   substitution   of any   expression   in  it.   We   have   already  dealt   with the   importance   of   the   report   of   the   public prosecutor and emphasised that he is neither a ‘post   office’   of   the   investigating   agency   nor   its ‘forwarding   agency’   but   is   charged   with   a statutory   duty.   He   must   apply   his   mind   to   the facts   and   circumstances   of   the   case   and his   report   must   disclose   on   the   face   of   it   that he had applied his mind to the twin conditions contained   in   clause   ( bb )   of   sub­section   (4)   of Section   20.   Since   the   law   requires   him   to submit   the   report   as   envisaged   by   the   section, he   must   act   in   the   manner   as   provided   by   the section   and   in   no   other   manner.   A   Designated Court   which   overlooks   and   ignores   the requirements   of   a   valid   report   fails   in   the performance   of   one   of   its   essential   duties   and renders   its   order   under   clause   ( bb )   vulnerable. Whether   the   public   prosecutor   labels   his   report   as 35 Crl.A.@SLP(Crl.)No.7696 of 2021 etc. a   report   or   as   an   application   for   extension,   would not   be   of   much   consequence   so   long   as   it demonstrates on the face of it that he has applied his   mind   and   is   satisfied   with   the   progress   of   the investigation   and   the   genuineness   of   the   reasons for   grant   of   extension   to   keep   an   accused   in further   custody   as   envisaged   by   clause   ( bb ) ( supra ).   Even   the   mere   reproduction   of   the application or request of the investigating officer by the   public   prosecutor   in   his   report,   without demonstration   of   the   application   of   his   mind   and recording   his   own   satisfaction,   would   not   render his report as the one envisaged by clause ( bb ) and it would not be a proper report to seek extension of time.   In   the   absence   of   an   appropriate   report   the Designated   Court   would   have   no   jurisdiction   to deny   to   an   accused   his   indefeasible   right   to   be released   on   bail   on   account   of   the   default   of   the prosecution   to   file   the   challan   within   the prescribed   time   if   an   accused   seeks   and   is prepared   to   furnish   the   bail   bonds   as   directed   by the   court.   Moreover,   no   extension   can   be granted   to   keep   an   accused   in   custody   beyond the   prescribed   period   except   to   enable   the investigation   to   be   completed   and   as   already stated   before   any   extension   is   granted   under clause   ( bb ),   the   accused   must   be   put   on   notice and   permitted   to   have   his   say   so   as   to   be   able to object to the grant of extension. ” [emphasis added] 24.   The  same  issue  came  up for  consideration   before  the Constitution Bench in this Court in the case of  Sanjay Dutt 2 . A   specific   submission   was   made   before   the   Constitution Bench   that   the   notice   to   the   accused   of   the   application   for 36 Crl.A.@SLP(Crl.)No.7696 of 2021 etc. the extension as contemplated by the decision in the case of Hitendra   Vishnu   Thakur 1   is   not   a   written   notice.   The argument was that when the report of the Public Prosecutor is   considered   by   the   Special   Court,   it   is   enough   that   the presence of the accused is procured before the Special Court and   the   accused   is   informed   that   such   a   report   has   been submitted   by   the   Public   Prosecutor.   By   accepting   the   said submission,   the   Constitution   Bench   summarised   its conclusions as under:­ “53.  (2)(a)   Section  20(4)  (bb)  of  the  TADA   Act  only requires   production   of   the   accused   before   the court   in   accordance   with   Section   167(1)   of   the Code   of   Criminal   Procedure   and   this   is   how   the requirement   of   notice   to   the   accused   before granting   extension   beyond   the   prescribed   period of   180   days   in   accordance   with   the   further proviso to clause (bb) of Sub­section (4) of Section 20   of   the   TADA   Act   has   to   be   understood   in   the judgment   of   the   Division   Bench   of   this   Court   in Hitendra Vishnu Thakur.   The requirement of such notice   to   the   accused   before   granting   the extension   for   completing   the   investigation   is   not a   written   notice   to   the   accused   giving   reasons therein. Production of the accused at that time in the   court   informing   him   that   the   question   of extension   of   the   period   for   completing   the investigation   is   being   considered,   is   alone sufficient for the purpose. ” [emphasis added] 37 Crl.A.@SLP(Crl.)No.7696 of 2021 etc. 25. In   the   case   of   Devinderpal   Singh   v.   Government   of National   Capital   Territory   of   Delhi 17 ,   this   Court   in paragraphs 14 and 15 held thus :  “ 14.  In  Hitendra Vishnu Thakur case  [(1994) 4 SCC 602 :   1994   SCC   (Cri)   1087]   it   was   also   opined   that   no extension   can   be   granted   by   the   Designated   Court under   clause   ( bb )   unless   the   accused   is   put   on   notice and permitted to have his say so as to be able to object to the grant of extension. 15.     The   Constitution   Bench   in   Sanjay   Dutt   case [(1994)   5   SCC   410   :   1994   SCC   (Cri)   1433]   did   not express   any   contrary   opinion   insofar   as   the requirement   of   the   report   of   the   Public   Prosecutor for grant of extension is concerned or on the effect of the absence of such a report under clause ( bb ) of Section   20(4),   but   observed   that   the   ‘notice’ contemplated   in   the   decision   in   Hitendra   Vishnu Thakur   case   [(1994)   4   SCC   602   :   1994   SCC   (Cri) 1087]   before   granting   extension   for   completion   of investigation   is   not   to   be   construed   as   a   “written notice”   to   the   accused   and   that   only   the production   of   the   accused   at   the   time   of consideration of the report of the Public Prosecutor for   grant   of   extension   and   informing   him   that   the question   of   extension   of   the   period   for   completing the   investigation   was   being   considered   would   be sufficient notice to the accused.” [emphasis added] 26 . In   the   case   of   Ateef   Nasir   Mulla 3 ,   this   Court considered   a   similar   provision   under   POTA.   In   the   said decision, the law laid down in the case of   Sanjay  Dutt 2   was 17 (1996) 1 SCC 44 38 Crl.A.@SLP(Crl.)No.7696 of 2021 etc. followed.   In   the   facts   of   the   case,   it   was   found   that   the accused   along   with   his   Advocate   were   present   when   the request for extension of time to carry on the investigation was considered   by   the   Court   and,   in   fact,   a   copy   of   the   report praying   for   the   extension   was   provided   to   the   accused   to enable him to file a reply. 27.       In   the   case   of   Sanjay   Kumar   Kedia 4 ,   this   Court considered a similar provision under the NDPS Act. However, this Court did not consider the binding precedent in the case of   Sanjay   Dutt 2 .     Therefore,   this   decision   will   not   be   a binding precedent. 28. Clause   (b)   of   sub­section   (2)   of   Section   167   of   CrPC lays down that no Magistrate shall authorise the detention of the accused in the custody of the police unless the accused is produced before him in person.  It also provides that judicial custody   can   be   extended   on   the   production   of   the   accused either   in   person   or   through   the   medium   of   electronic   video linkage.     Thus,   the   requirement   of   the   law   is   that   while extending the remand to judicial custody, the presence of the accused   has   to   be   procured   either   physically   or   virtually. 39 Crl.A.@SLP(Crl.)No.7696 of 2021 etc. This   is   the   mandatory   requirement   of   law.   This   requirement is   sine   qua   non   for   the   exercise   of   the   power   to   extend   the judicial custody remand. The reason is that the accused has a right to oppose the prayer for the extension of the remand. When   the   Special   Court   exercises   the   power   of   granting extension   under   the   proviso   to   sub­section   (2)   of   Section   20 of the 2015 Act, it will necessarily lead to the extension of the judicial custody beyond the period of 90 days up to 180 days. Therefore,   even   in   terms   of   the   requirement   of   clause   (b)   of sub­section   (2)   of   Section   167   of   CrPC,   it   is   mandatory   to procure the presence of the accused before the Special Court when a prayer of the prosecution for the extension of time to complete investigation is considered. In fact, the Constitution Bench of this Court in the first part of paragraph 53(2)(a) in its   decision   in   the   case   of   Sanjay   Dutt 2   holds   so.   The requirement of the report under proviso added by sub­section (2) of Section 20 of the 2015 Act to clause (b) of sub­section (2) of Section 167 of CrPC is two­fold.  Firstly, in the report of the   Public   Prosecutor,   the   progress   of   the   investigation should   be   set   out   and   secondly,   the   report   must   disclose specific   reasons   for   continuing   the   detention   of   the   accused 40 Crl.A.@SLP(Crl.)No.7696 of 2021 etc. beyond the said period of 90 days.   Therefore, the extension of time is not an empty formality.  The Public Prosecutor has to apply his mind before he submits a report/ an application for   extension.     The   prosecution   has   to   make   out   a   case   in terms of both the aforesaid requirements and the Court must apply its mind to the contents of the report before accepting the prayer for grant of extension.   29. As   noted   earlier,   the   only   modification   made   by   the larger   Bench   in   the   case   of   Sanjay   Dutt 2   to   the   decision   in the   case   of   Hitendra   Vishnu   Thakur 1   is   about   the   mode   of service of notice of the application for extension.  In so many words,   in   paragraph   53(2)(a)   of   the   Judgment,   this   Court   in the case of  Sanjay Dutt 2  held that it is mandatory to produce the   accused   at   the   time   when   the   Court   considers   the application   for   extension   and   that   the   accused   must   be informed   that   the   question   of   extension   of   the   period   of investigation   is   being   considered.     The   accused   may   not   be entitled   to   get   a  copy   of   the   report  as   a  matter   of   right   as  it may   contain   details   of   the   investigation   carried   out.     But,   if we   accept   the   submission   of   the   respondents   that   the 41 Crl.A.@SLP(Crl.)No.7696 of 2021 etc. accused  has  no   say  in  the  matter,  the  requirement  of  giving notice   by   producing   the   accused   will   become   an   empty   and meaningless   formality.   Moreover,   it   will   be   against   the mandate   of   clause   (b)   of   the   proviso   to   sub­section   (2)   of section 167 of CrPC.   It cannot be accepted that the accused is   not   entitled   to   raise   any   objection   to   the   application   for extension.   The scope of the objections may  be limited.   The accused   can   always   point   out   to   the   Court   that   the   prayer has   to   be   made   by   the   Public   Prosecutor   and   not   by   the investigating   agency.     Secondly,   the   accused   can   always point   out   the   twin   requirements   of   the   report   in   terms   of proviso   added   by   sub­section   (2)   of   Section   20   of   the   2015 Act   to   sub­section   (2)   of   Section   167   of   CrPC.     The   accused can   always   point   out   to   the   Court   that   unless   it   is   satisfied that full compliance is made with the twin requirements, the extension cannot be granted. 30. The   logical   and   legal   consequence   of   the   grant   of extension   of   time   is   the   deprivation   of   the   indefeasible   right available to the accused to claim a default bail.   If we accept the   argument   that   the   failure   of   the   prosecution   to   produce 42 Crl.A.@SLP(Crl.)No.7696 of 2021 etc. the   accused   before   the   Court   and   to   inform   him   that   the application of extension is being considered by the Court is a mere procedural irregularity, it will negate the proviso added by sub­section (2) of Section 20 of the 2015 Act and that may amount   to   violation   of   rights   conferred   by   Article   21   of   the Constitution. The reason is the grant of the extension of time takes away the right of the accused to get default bail which is   intrinsically   connected   with   the   fundamental   rights guaranteed   under   Article   21   of   the   Constitution.       The procedure   contemplated   by   Article   21   of   the   Constitution which is required to be followed before the liberty of a person is taken away has to be a fair and reasonable procedure.   In fact,   procedural   safeguards   play   an   important   role   in protecting the liberty guaranteed by Article 21.  The failure to procure   the   presence   of   the   accused   either   physically   or virtually  before the Court and the failure to inform  him  that the   application   made   by   the   Public   Prosecutor   for   the extension   of   time   is   being   considered,   is   not   a   mere procedural irregularity.   It is gross illegality that violates the rights of the accused under Article 21.  43 Crl.A.@SLP(Crl.)No.7696 of 2021 etc. 31. An   attempt   was   made   to   argue   that   the   failure   to produce the accused will not cause any prejudice to him. As noted   earlier,   the   grant   of   extension   of   time   to   complete   the investigation takes away the indefeasible right of the accused to   apply   for   default   bail.     It   takes   away   the   right   of   the accused   to   raise   a   limited   objection   to   the   prayer   for   the extension.     The   failure   to   produce   the   accused   before   the Court   at   the   time   of   consideration   of   the   application   for extension   of   time   will   amount   to   a   violation   of   the   right guaranteed   under   Article   21   of   the   Constitution.     Thus, prejudice   is   inherent   and   need   not   be   established   by   the accused. 32 . The   learned   Additional   Solicitor   General   relied   upon the  decision  of this  Court in  the  case  of   Narender  G.   Goel 9 . The  issue  involved  in  that   case  was  not  of  extension  of  time for   completion   of   the   investigation.     The   issue   generally discussed therein is about the right of hearing of the accused at the stage of the investigation.  His reliance on the decision of this Court in the case of   Surendra Pundlik Gadling 10   will not help him at all.   This was a case where the accused was 44 Crl.A.@SLP(Crl.)No.7696 of 2021 etc. not   only   produced   before   the   Court   but   he   was   provided   a copy   of   the   application   for  extension   of   time.     The   grievance of the accused was that time of only one day was granted to contest the application. This contention was rejected.  33 . In   the   facts   of   the   cases   in   hand,   when   the   Special Court   considered   the   reports   submitted   by   the   Public Prosecutor for grant of extension of time, the presence of the appellants   was   admittedly   not   procured   before   the   Special Court either personally or through video conference. It is also an admitted position that information about the filing of such reports   by   the   Public   Prosecutor   was   not   provided   to   the accused. It is mentioned in the impugned judgment that due to   COVID  –  19,  it  was  not   permissible  to  physically  produce the accused before the Special Court. Moreover, the accused were   in   different   prisons   and,   therefore,   the   production through   video   conference   would   have   been   very   slow. Assuming   that   the   process   of   production   would   have   been slow, that is no excuse for not procuring the presence of the accused   through   video   conference.   Nothing   is   placed   on record either before this Court or High Court to show that as 45 Crl.A.@SLP(Crl.)No.7696 of 2021 etc. per   the   Standard   Operating   Procedure   applicable   to   the concerned Court in January 2021 when the impugned orders were passed granting the extension, it was not permissible to physically   produce   the   accused   before   the   Special   Court. There is no material placed on record to show that technical reasons/difficulties   prevented   the   prosecution   from producing   the   accused   before   the   Special   Court   through video conference. It is not possible to accept that in January 2021 in the Court at Rajkot in the State of Gujarat, there was any   connectivity   issue.       In   fact,   admittedly,   no   such   case was   pleaded   before   the   High   Court   in   the   pleadings   of   the respondents. 34. We must note here that the reports were submitted by the   Public   Prosecutor   nearly   a   week   before   the   expiry   of   the period   of   90   days.     In   every   case,   period   of   seven   days   or more   was   available   for   completion   of   the   period   of   ninety days.     The   orders   were   passed   by   the   Special   Court   on   the reports   of   the   Public   Prosecutor   on   the   very   day   on   which reports were submitted.  There was no reason for such hurry. The Special Court could have always granted time of a couple 46 Crl.A.@SLP(Crl.)No.7696 of 2021 etc. of   days   to   the   prosecution   to   procure   the   presence   of   the accused   either   physically   or   through   video   conference.     The accused   may   not   be   entitled   to   know   the   contents   of   the report   but   he   is   entitled   to   oppose   the   grant   of   extension   of time on the  grounds available  to  him  in  law.   In  the  facts  of the   present   case,   the   grant   of   extension   of   time   without complying   with   the   requirements   laid   down   by   the Constitution Bench has deprived the accused of their right to seek default bail.  It has resulted in the failure of justice. 35. The   orders   passed   by   the   Special   Court   of   extending the   period  of  investigation   are  rendered  illegal  on   account   of the failure of the respondents to produce the accused before the   Special   Court   either   physically   or   virtually   when   the prayer   for   grant   of   extension   made   by   the   Public   Prosecutor was   considered.   It   was   the   duty   of   the   Special   Court   to ensure   that   this   important   procedural   safeguard   was followed.   Moreover, the  oral notice, as contemplated by  this Court in the case of   Sanjay Dutt 2 , was also not given to the accused. 47 Crl.A.@SLP(Crl.)No.7696 of 2021 etc. 36. Once   we   hold   that   the   orders   granting   extension   to complete investigation are illegal and stand vitiated, it follows that the appellants are entitled to default bail.   37. When   they   applied   for   bail,   the   appellants   had   no notice   of   the   extension   of   time   granted   by   the   Court. Moreover,   the   applications   were   made   before   the   filing   of charge   sheet.     Hence,   the   appellants   are   entitled   to   default bail.     At   this   stage,   we   may   note   here   that   in   the   case   of Sanjay Dutt 2  as well as in the case of  Bikramjit Singh 6 , this Court   held   that   grant   of   default   bail   does   not   prevent   re­ arrest   of   the   petitioners   on   cogent   grounds   after   filing   of charge­sheet.     Thereafter,   the   accused   can   always   apply   for regular   bail.     However,   as   held   by   this   Court   in   the   case   of Mohamed   Iqbal   Madar   Sheikh   &   Ors.   v.   State   of Maharashtra 18 , re­arrest cannot be made only on the ground of   filing   of   charge   sheet.     It   all   depends   on   the   facts   of   each case. 38. Accordingly,   the   impugned   orders   passed   by   the Special   Court   granting   extension   to   complete   investigation and   impugned   judgment   of   the   High   Court   are   hereby 18 (1996) 1 SCC 722 48 Crl.A.@SLP(Crl.)No.7696 of 2021 etc. quashed and set aside.   The appellants shall  be enlarged on default   bail under  sub­section  (2)  of  Section  167  of  CrPC   on following conditions :  (a) The   appellants   shall   furnish   a   bail   bond   of Rs.2,00,000/­   with   appropriate   sureties   as   may   be decided by the Special Court; (b) The   appellants   shall   surrender   their   passports   to   the Special Court at the time of furnishing security; (c) The   appellants   shall   not   interfere   in   any   manner   with the further investigation, if any and shall not make any effort to influence the prosecution witnesses; and (d) The appellants shall mark regular attendance with such police   station   and   at   such   periodical   intervals,   as   may be determined by the Special Court; and  (e) The   appellants   shall   cooperate   with   the   Special   Court for early conclusion of the trial. 39. The appeals are allowed on the above terms. ………..…………………J. [AJAY RASTOGI] ………..…………………J. [ABHAY S. OKA] New Delhi; September 23, 2022.  49 Crl.A.@SLP(Crl.)No.7696 of 2021 etc. ITEM NO.1501 COURT NO.3 SECTION II-B S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No(s). 7696/2021 (Arising out of impugned final judgment and order dated 15-09-2021 in CRLMA No. 4928/2021 passed by the High Court Of Gujarat At Ahmedabad) JIGAR @ JIMMY PRAVINCHANDRA ADATIYA Petitioner(s) VERSUS STATE OF GUJARAT Respondent(s) ([HEARD BY: HON. AJAY RASTOGI AND HON. ABHAY S. OKA. JJ].............FOR ADMISSION and I.R. and IA No.129630/2021- EXEMPTION FROM FILING C/C OF THE IMPUGNED JUDGMENT and IA No.129632/2021-EXEMPTION FROM FILING O.T. ) WITH SLP(Crl) No. 7609/2021 (II-B) (FOR ADMISSION and I.R. and IA No.128171/2021-EXEMPTION FROM FILING C/C OF THE IMPUGNED JUDGMENT and IA No.128172/2021-EXEMPTION FROM FILING O.T.) SLP(Crl) No. 7678-7679/2021 (II-B) (FOR ADMISSION and I.R. and IA No.129241/2021-EXEMPTION FROM FILING C/C OF THE IMPUGNED JUDGMENT and IA No.129242/2021-EXEMPTION FROM FILING O.T.) SLP(Crl) No. 7758/2021 (II-B) Date : 23-09-2022 These appeals were called on for pronouncement of judgment today. For Petitioner(s) Ms. Nitya Ramakrishnan, Sr. Adv. Mr. Pradhuman Gohil, Adv. Mrs. Taruna Singh Gohil, AOR Ms. Ranu Purohit, Adv. Mr. Alapati Sahithya Krishna, Adv. Mr. Nikhil Goel, AOR For Respondent(s) Mr. Rajat Nair, Adv. Ms. Deepanwita Priyanka, AOR 50 Crl.A.@SLP(Crl.)No.7696 of 2021 etc. T he Court pronounced the following J U D G M E N T Leave granted. Hon'ble Mr. Justice Abhay S. Oka pronounced the judgment for the Bench comprising Hon'ble Mr. Justice Ajay Rastogi and His Lordship. The appellants are enlarged on default bail in terms of the signed reportable judgment. The appeals are allowed. Pending application(s) stand(s) disposed of. (ASHA SUNDRIYAL) (POONAM VAID) ASTT. REGISTRAR-cum-PS COURT MASTER (NSH) [Signed reportable judgment is placed on the file]