/2022 INSC 0870/
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NOs.361­362 OF 2018
CHOTKAU         …APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH         ...RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, J.
1. Convicted for the offences punishable under Sections 302 and
376 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short “ IPC ”) and sentenced
to   death   by   the   Sessions   Court,   which   was   also   confirmed   by   the
High   Court   on   a   reference   and   an   appeal,   the   sole   accused   has
come up with the above appeals.
2. We have heard Shri S. Nagamuthu, learned senior counsel for
the   appellant   and   Shri   Ardhendumauli   Kumar   Prasad,   learned
Additional Advocate General for the State of Uttar Pradesh.
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3. The  case  of the  prosecution  was that  on  08.03.2012 at  about
20:10 hrs., one Kishun Bahadur, resident of Village Semgarha, P.S
Ikauna,   District   Shravasti   lodged   a   complaint   at   Police   Station
Ikauna   alleging   that   at   about   4:00   p.m   on   the   same   day,   the
appellant   herein   took   his   niece   aged   about   6   years   under   the
pretext of showing dance and song performances on the occasion of
the Holi Festival. When the girl did not return home, a search was
conducted.   It   was   found   that   the   appellant   was   not   found   in   his
house,   but   the   dead   body   of   the   girl   was   found   in   the   sugarcane
field located on the southern side of the village. Another villager by
name   Fatehpur   Bahadur,   who   was   part   of   the   team   that   searched
for  the missing  girl, claimed to have seen the appellant leaving the
sugarcane   field   after   about   half­an­hour.   Therefore,   invoking   the
last   seen   theory   and   on   the   basis   of   circumstantial   evidence,   the
appellant was charged for the commission of the offences of raping
the minor girl and murdering her.
4. The   prosecution   examined   six   witnesses,   namely,   (i)   Kishun
Bahadur, the first informant and the uncle of the victim, as PW­1;
(ii)   Shri   Raj   Karan,   a   localite   who   claimed   to   have   seen   the
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appellant   carrying   the  victim   towards   the   sugarcane   field   and   who
was   cited   as   a   witness   to   the   inquest,   as   PW­2;   (iii)   one   Fatehpur
Bahadur,   who   was   part   of   the   search   party   and   who   claimed   to
have seen the appellant leaving the sugarcane field after about half
an   hour,   as   PW­3;   (iv)   the   Head   Constable   Balram   Tripathi,   the
scribe   of   the   First   Information   Report   who   registered   the   FIR,   as
PW­4;   (v)   Dr.   Mukesh   Kumar   who   conducted   the   post­mortem,   as
PW­5; and  (vi)  the Investigation Officer Shri Rambali Roy as PW­6.
5. During questioning under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure   (hereinafter   referred   to   as   the   “ Code ”),   the   appellant
denied the charges and claimed that he had been falsely implicated
in   the   case,   at   the   behest   of   one   Mr.   Zalim   Khan,   with   a   view   to
grab   the   property   of   his   mother,   who   was   none   other   than   Zalim
Khan’s brother’s daughter. To substantiate this claim, the appellant
also examined his mother as DW­1.
6. Holding   that   the   guilt   of   the   appellant   stood   established
beyond   reasonable   doubt   by   circumstantial   evidence   and   also
holding that it is one of the rarest of rare cases where a six year old
girl   had   been   raped   and   murdered,   the   Sessions   Court   convicted
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the   appellant   for   the   offences   punishable   under   Sections   302   and
376 of the IPC and awarded death penalty.
7. The proceedings were then submitted to the High Court under
Section 366(1) of the Code for confirmation. The appellant also filed
an   appeal.  The  capital  punishment   reference  as  well  as  the  appeal
filed by the appellant were taken up together by the Division Bench
of the High Court and the High Court confirmed the conviction and
sentence. The High Court came to the said conclusion on the basis
that the evidence of PWs 1 to 3 were trustworthy and that the chain
of   circumstances   pointing   to   the   guilt   of   the   appellant   stood
established   unbroken,   by   their   evidence.   The   discrepancies   in   the
testimonies of PWs 1 to 3 pointed out by the appellant were rejected
as   minor   and   insignificant.   The   theory   of   animosity   and   false
implication put forth by the appellant and sought to be established
through the evidence of DW­1 were rejected by the High Court.  The
High   Court   found   fault   with   the   appellant   for   not   coming   up   with
any   explanation   as   to   what   happened   to   the   girl,   especially   in   the
light   of   the   burden   cast   upon   him   under   Section   106   of   the
Evidence Act.
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8. The arguments of the appellant regarding the delay in sending
the   FIR   to   the   Court   and   the   faulty   manner   in   which   the
questioning under Section 313 of the Code was done, were rejected
by   the   High   Court   and   the   High   Court   finally   agreed   with   the
Sessions   Court   that   it   is   one   of   the   rarest   of   rare   cases   where   the
appellant   has   exhibited   a   deviant   behaviour   and   abnormal   sexual
urge, thereby forfeiting his right to life. Accordingly, the High Court
confirmed   the   death   penalty.   Under   these   circumstances,   the
accused is on appeal before us.
9. Obviously   and   admittedly,   the   prosecution   of   the   appellant   is
based   on   circumstantial   evidence   and   hence   we   may   have   to   see
whether   the   chain   of   circumstances  is  complete  and   unbroken.  As
held   by   this   Court   in   Sharad   Birdhichand   Sarda   vs.   State   of
Maharashtra   1
, the Court must keep in mind five golden principles
or  the   panchsheel,   lucidly  brought out in para 153 of the decision,
as follows:­
“153.  ... ... ...
(1) the circumstances from  which the conclusion of
guilt is to be drawn should be fully established.
1   (1984) 4 SCC 116
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… …. …
(2)  the   facts   so   established   should   be   consistent
only   with   the   hypothesis   of   the   guilt   of   the
accused,   that   is   to   say,   they   should   not   be
explainable on any  other  hypothesis except that
the accused is guilty,
(3)  the   circumstances   should   be   of   a   conclusive
nature and tendency,
(4)  they   should   exclude   every   possible   hypothesis
except the one to be proved, and  
(5)  there must be a chain of evidence so complete as
not   to   leave   any   reasonable   ground   for   the
conclusion   consistent   with   the   innocence   of   the
accused   and   must   show   that   in   all   human
probability   the   act   must   have   been   done   by   the
accused.”
10. In   this   case,   the   prosecution   sought   to   establish   the   guilt   of
the appellant, only through the evidence of PWs 1 to 3.  PWs 1 and
2 had seen the victim being taken towards the sugarcane field. PW­
3 had seen the appellant taking the victim from the house and also
leaving the sugarcane field half­an­hour later. When the search was
conducted   for   the   missing   girl,   her   dead   body   was   found   in   the
sugarcane field and the appellant was absconding. On a cumulative
consideration   of   these   circumstances   and   applying   the   last   seen
theory  and invoking the burden of proof cast under  Section 106 of
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the   Evidence   Act,   the   Sessions   Court   and   the   High   Court   came   to
the conclusion that the appellant was guilty.
11. Assailing the concurrent judgments of the Sessions Court and
the   High   Court,   it   was   contended   by   Shri   S.   Nagamuthu,   learned
senior  counsel for  the  appellant  that  the evidence of PWs 1 to 3 is
untrustworthy;   that   there was an unexplained delay of five days in
forwarding   the   FIR   to   the   jurisdictional   Court;   that   there   were
serious   contradictions   regarding   the   place   where   the   body   of   the
victim   was   kept   and   the   place   where   the   inquest   was   conducted;
that  the evidence to support the last seen theory was insufficient to
convict the appellant;  that  there was complete failure on the part of
the   prosecution   to   examine   material   witnesses;   that   in   a   shocking
abdication   of   duties,   the   I.O.   failed   to   produce   forensic/medical
evidence; and  that  the mandatory requirement of Section 313 of the
Code was not fulfilled.
12. However,   it   was   contended   by   Shri   Ardhendumauli   Kumar
Prasad, learned AAG for the State that there are no reasons for PWs
1 to 3 to implicate the appellant;  that  their evidence was found to be
cogent and trustworthy by two Courts;   that   the delay in forwarding
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the   FIR   to   the   court   did   not   vitiate   the   trial   and   did   not   prejudice
the appellant;   that   any defect in the questioning under Section 313
of the Code, may not  ipso facto  vitiate the findings, unless prejudice
is   shown;   and   that   the   forensic/medical   evidence   is   not   always
mandatory.
13. We   have   carefully   considered   the   rival   contentions.   In   our
view,   the   questions   that   crop   up   for   our   consideration   revolve
around –  (i)  the trustworthiness of the testimonies of PWs 1 to 3, in
the light of certain contradictions;  (ii)  the consequences of the delay
on the part of the Police in forwarding the FIR to the Court;  (iii)  the
failure of the prosecution to produce forensic/medical evidence and
its   effect   and   (iv)   the   manner   in   which   the   questioning   under
Section   313   of   the   Code   was   undertaken   and   its   effect   upon   the
findings recorded.
I.   Trustworthiness of the testimonies of PWs 1 to 3
14. As   we   have   indicated   earlier,   the   guilt   of   the   appellant   is
sought to be established by the prosecution, by   (i)   relying upon the
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testimonies   of   PWs   1   to   3   for   invoking   the   last   seen   theory;   and
(ii)  invoking Section 106 of the Evidence Act.
15. It   is   needless   to   point   out   that   for   the   prosecution   to
successfully invoke Section 106 of the Evidence Act, they must first
establish that there was “ any fact especially within the knowledge of
the ” appellant. This can be done by the prosecution only by proving
that   the   victim   was   last   seen   in   the   company   of   the   appellant.   To
establish   this   last   seen   theory,   the   prosecution   relies   upon   the
evidence   of   PWs   1   to   3.   PWs   1   and   2   claim   to   have   seen   the
appellant   taking   away   the   girl   at   04:00   p.m   on   08.03.2012.   PW­3
claims   to   have   seen   the   appellant   leaving   the   sugarcane   field   after
about   half­an­hour.   Therefore,   according   to   the   prosecution,   the
burden of showing what happened to the girl was heavily upon the
appellant/accused.  
16. Hence we have to see whether the evidence of PWs 1 to 3 was
trustworthy   and   same   proved   the   last   seen   theory.   Both   the
Sessions Court as well as the High Court have found the evidence of
PWs   1   to   3   to   be   cogent   and   trustworthy.   The   contradictions
pointed   out   by   the   defence   were   held   by   both   the   Courts   to   be
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minor and insignificant.  Therefore, being the third Court exercising
jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution, we have to tread
a   very   careful   path   while   considering   the   question   of
trustworthiness of these witnesses. 
17. Unlike   other   cases,   the   appellant   in   this   case   has   taken   a
defence   right   from   the   beginning   that   he   was   implicated   falsely   at
the behest of a locally powerful person whose wife is the Pradhan of
the   village.   The   case   projected   by   the   appellant   was   (i)   that   his
maternal   grandfather   was   one   Lazim   Khan;   (ii)   that   Lazim   Khan’s
brother   was   one   Zalim   Khan;   (iii)   that   after   the   death   of   Lazim
Khan, his  property  devolved  upon  the  appellant’s mother  Jannatul
Nisha;   (iv)   that Zalim Khan wanted to grab the properties from the
appellant’s   mother   but   the   appellant   and   his   mother   were   not
willing   to   let   the   land   be   taken   away   by   Zalim   Khan;   and   (v)   that
since   Zalim   Khan   is   a   very   powerful   person   in   the   village   and   his
wife is also the Pradhan of the village, he managed to implicate the
appellant falsely in this case.
18. To   demonstrate   the   veracity   of   the  above   claim,   the  appellant
did   3   things.   First   he   confronted   PWs   1   to   3   with   pertinent
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questions in cross­examination. Then the appellant articulated this
theory   in   the   questioning   under   Section   313.   Third,   the   appellant
also examined his mother as DW­1.
19. Let   us   now   take   note   of   the   answers   elicited   by   the   defence
from   PW­1   during   cross­examination.   The   relevant   portion   of   the
testimony of PW­1 in cross­examination reads as follows”
“The   mother   of   accused­Jannatul   Nisha,   was   earlier
living   at   Semgarha;   now   she   lives’   at   Ikauna.   At
Ikauna,   the   mother   of   accused   has   kinship   in   the
family of Jumai Pathan. The mother of accused do not
have   agriculture   land   in   Ikauna.   I   do   not   know   as   to
whether   she   works   there   as  a   labourer.   At   Semgarha,
the mother of accused has 28­30  bighas  of agriculture
land which she had got from the maternal grandfather
of   the   accused.   The   maternal   grandfather   of   the
accused   had   no  son,   that’s   why   the   land   of   accused’s
maternal   grandfather   had   transferred   in   the   name   of
the   mother   of   accused.   The   name   of   the   maternal
grandfather   of   the   accused   is   Lazim   Khan   who   was
resident   of   Semgarha   village   only.   Lazim   Khan   is
pattidar   (relative)   of   the   present   Gram­pradhan   Zalim
Khan. Zalim Khan is very prosperous man. He has 200
bighas of land, 2 tractors, two motorcycles and 4 sons.
Zalim   Khan   has   high   influence   in   my   village.   He   has
prominence there.
... ... ...
Zalim Khan had come at the spot. Zalim Khan had told
to get lodged the F.I.R.
... ... ...
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Zalim   Khan   cultivates   the   land   of   accused   Chotkau.
Zalim   Khan   has   won   the   court   case   related   with   the
land. The suit regarding the land is pending before the
higher   courts.   The   mother   of   Chotkau   lives   at   Ikauna
after this incident.”
20. After   having   said   what   is   extracted   above   during   cross­
examination, PW­1 denied certain suggestions made in this regard.
The portion of his testimony where he denied the suggestions is as
follows:
“It is correct to say that no witness has seen Chotkau
committing   the   rape   and   murder   of   Uma   Devi.   It   is
wrong   to   say   that   I   had   lodged   the   F.I.R.   against
Chotkau   on   being   said   by   Zalim   Khan   Pradhan.   It   is
wrong to say that we are men of Zalim Khan Pradhan.
It is wrong that Zalim Khan Pradhan owes enmity with
the   mother   of   Chotkau   regarding   the   land,   that’s   why
Zalim Khan had got lodged the F.I.R. against Chotkau.
It is wrong to say that Chotkau had neither committed
rape   nor   the   murder   of   Uma   Devi.   It   is   wrong   to   say
that I am submitting false testimony.”
21. Even   PW­2   was   confronted   with   specific   questions   relating   to
the   alleged   role   of   Zalim   Khan   in   implicating   the   appellant.   The
relevant portion of the cross­examination of PW­2 reads as follows:
“I know the mother of accused Chotkau. Her maternal
house is at village Semgarha only and she is daughter
of Lazim Khan. Lazim Khan has died. Lazim Khan had
no son. After the death of Lazim Khan, Zalim Khan­the
present   Pradhan,   got   his   land   and   he   only   cultivates
the land.  The  mother   of accused had not  got  the  land
of   her   father.   Lazim   Khan   and   Zalim   Khan   are   real
brothers.   The   land   would   be   about   18­20   bighas .
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Zalim   Khan   cultivates   the   entire   land.   The   mother   of
Chotkau had fled away from here and living at Ikauna.
Chotkau   has   three   brothers   including   him.   All   the
three   of   them   do   not   have   any   land.   All   the   three   of
them are engaged in the occupation of labourers.”
22. After   having   said   what   is   extracted   above,   PW­2   denied   the
suggestion that it was Zalim Khan who got the appellant implicated
in the case.
23. Even   the   Investigation   Officer   examined   as   PW­6   admitted   in
cross­examination:   “ I   had   detected   that   a   land   dispute   was
proceeding between accused Chotkau and Zalim Khan .”
24. In   answer   to   the   last   question   (Question   No.13)   during   the
questioning under Section 313 of the Code, as to whether he wished
to say anything else, the appellant stated as follows:
“After   death   of   Lazim   Khan,   his   real   brother   Zalim
Khan had usurped all the property of Lazim Khan and
expelled   the   accused.   The   accused   was   not   leaving
possession   of   the   land   of   his   maternal   grandfather
therefore   Zalim   Khan   implicated   him   false   in   this
case.”
25. The appellant’s mother examined as DW­1 not only elaborated
the theory that the appellant was falsely implicated at the instance
of Zalim Khan but also came up with a story as to what could have
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happened to the victim. The relevant portion of the evidence of DW­
1 reads as follows:
“After   the   death   of   father,   finding   me   helpless,   Zalim
Khan gobbled all my property. We have intense enmity
with Zalim Khan for the same reason. My son Chotkau
and   I   opposed   Zalim   Khan   in   the   election   of   Pradhan
and other matters, that is why Zalim Khan implicated
my   son   in   this   false   case.   Zalim   Khan   has   falsely
implicated   my   son   by   making   Kishun   Bahadur   and
Rajkaran the complainant and the witness in the said
case who are the servants of Zalim Khan. The truth is
that the daughter of brother of the complainant of case
Kishun   Bahadur   had   gone   in   the   sugar­cane   field   for
defecation,   there   itself   a   Markaha   (aggressive)   Neelgai
threw her by its horns, due to which she had died. But
giving   this   matter   a   different   color   due   to   enmity,
Zalim   Khan   got   my   son   implicated   as   the   acused   by
putting   pressure   on   the   local   police.   We   got   to   know
the fact of Uma   Devi being killed by the Neelgai when
the son of Behna  had gone for  defecation in the same
field and  Neelgai  had  hit  him  too with its horn due  to
which his scrotum had ruptured.”
26. Keeping in mind the defence so put up by the appellant, let us
now come to the other portions of the evidence of PWs 1 to 3.
The Mode of Lodging of the FIR
27. On the question as to how the complaint was lodged and as to
what   happened   immediately   thereafter,   PW­1   stated   in   Chief­
examination as follows: 
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“ I   went   to   the   police   station   to   inform   about   the   incident,   got   the
application   written   by   a   man   there,   got   read   over   the   application,
marked my signature and handed over the same to the police station.
On the same Tehrir my case had been registered .”
...........
“After I handed over the Tehrir, the police went to the spot, performed
the documentation regarding the corpse and sent the corpse for post­
mortem.  The Investigating Officer had taken my statement and went
to the spot.  He had prepared the site map on pointing out by me. ”
28. During cross­examination, PW­1 said: 
“ I   myself   had   gone   to   the   police   station   to   lodge   the   FIR.   I   had   got
written   the   complaint   by   a   person   who   was   resident   of   Sitkahna.
The   police   station   officials   themselves   provided   the   paper.   The
Inspector had  asked  me  to get  the  FIR written by any person of  my
side ”.
29. But during further cross­examination PW­1 stated thus: 
“ I   had   got   written   the   Tehrir   of   FIR   by   another   person   inside   the
police station itself.  The Inspector had dictated it and got it written.  I
had marked my signature on that. ”  
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30. After   some   time,   PW­1   admitted   during   further   cross­
examination the following: 
“ Zalim Khan had come at the spot. Zalim Khan had told to get lodged
the FIR against Chotkau .”
31. In contra­distinction to what PW­1 said, PW­3 stated that the
“ information   had   been   given   to   police   station   over   telephone,
then police man had come ” . During cross­examination also PW­3
stated   that   police   reached   the   spot   upon   getting   a   phone   call   and
that he did not know who made the call.  
32. PW­4, the Head Constable said in Chief Examination: 
“ On   08.03.2012,   I   was   posted   as   H.C.   at   Police   Station­Ikauna,
District­Shrawasti.   On   that   day   a   written   Hindi   Tahrir   had   been
submitted   by   complainant   of   the   case   Shri   Kishun   Bahadur   s/o
Chintaram,   resident   of   Semgarha,   Police   Station­Ikauna,   District
Shrawasti. ”   During   cross­examination   PW­4   reiterated:   “T he
complainant   of   the   case   had   given   me   a   written   application.   The
complainant of the case had given the Tehrir on 08.03.2012 at 20:10
hrs. .”.
16

33. Thus even on the question as to how the first information was
given   to   the   police,   there   are   different   versions.   According   to   one
version, “ PW­1 went to the police station, got the Tehrir written by a
man   there,   got   read   over   the   complaint,   marked   his   signature   and
handed over the same to the police station ”.  According to the second
version, again by PW­1, “ the Inspector dictated it and got it written ”.
According   to   a   third   version   “ Zalim   Khan   had   told   to   get   the   FIR
registered   against   the   appellant ”.   According   to   the   fourth   version,
which was by PW­3, “ the information was given to the police through
phone call ”.
34. Thus   there   were   different   versions,   (i)   as   to   how   the   first
information was given to the police; and  (ii)  by whom the complaint
was written.
The place where the dead body was seen by the police, persons
took   the   body   from   the   place   of   occurrence   and   where   it   was
taken to.
35. There   were   several   contradictions   regarding,   (i)   the   place
where the dead body was first seen by the Police;  (ii)  the person who
took the dead body; and   (iii)   the place to which the dead body was
taken. PW­1 stated in chief­examination as follows: 
17

“ After I handed over the Tehrir, the police went to the spot, performed
the documentation regarding the corpse and sent the corpse for post­
mortem. ”
36. In   cross­examination   PW­1   stated   “ Despite   getting   the   dead
body,   we   did   not   bring   the   dead   body   to   the   home.   When   police
personnel had come, they got carried the dead body .” During further
cross­examination PW­1 stated: “ the dead body was not lying there
for   whole   night.   I   will   not   be   able   to   tell   at   what   time   the   Inspector
had taken away the dead body. The Inspector had come at half past
seven. He had come in his vehicle. The Inspector had taken away the
dead body in his vehicle.......” 
“After   consulting   from   every   one   the   Inspector   had   taken   the   dead
body   to   the   police   station.   He   had   brought   a   cloth   from   the   police
station and took away the dead body wrapping it in the same cloth.
Later on we had gone with the dead body.”
37. But a little while later, PW­1 stated in cross­examination: 
“ when this first information application had been written, the
dead body of the girl was kept inside the police station itself.
18

That time several persons there. The police personnel had carried the
dead   body   by   a   Magic   (brand   of   vehicle)   to   Bahraich   for   post­
mortem” .  
38. PW­3 stated during cross­examination: 
“ the   dead­body   of   the   girl   had   been   sent   for   post­mortem   from   the
occurrence spot itself .”
39. PW­4 the Head Constable who registered the FIR said in cross­
examination:   “ the   dead   body   had   not   been   brought   to   the   police
station. ”
40. But   interestingly   PW­6,   the   Investigation   Officer   stated   the
following during cross­examination:­
“......After   lodging   of   case,   I   had   visited   the   occurrence   spot
same day at 09.00­09.30 o’ clock of the night. It had become
dense   night   when   I   had   reached   the   spot.   The   family
members   were   wailing.     There   was   no   arrangement   of   light
therefore I stayed there itself in the night with a Daroga and
two­three constables.  When I had reached the village, upto
that   time   the   villagers   had   already   brought   the   dead
body to home from the occurrence spot.  Therefore, due to
aforesaid reasons I did not go to the occurrence spot in that
night. Although I have not referred this fact in my case diary
but it is the correct fact.   The dead body was kept in front
of   the   door   of   house   of   first   informant   and   the   family
members were wailing there itself ...”
41. When   confronted   with   the   statements   of   PWs   1   to   3   to   the
effect that the dead body had been taken away to the police station,
19

PW­6   denied   the   same   as   wrong.   His   answer   to   this   question   in
cross­examination   was   as   follows:   “ If   the   complainant   of   the   case
would have said that the police man had taken away the dead body
of   Uma   to   the   police   station   in   the   night   itself   and   conducted   the
inquest proceeding there, then this fact is wrong .”
42. Thus, there are different versions  (i)  regarding the place where
the dead body was first seen by the police; and  (ii)  as to who carried
the   dead   body   and   where.   The   first   version   of   PW­1   was   that   “ he
and   other   villagers   who   accompanied   him   did   not   bring   the   dead
body to the house and that when police personnel came, they carried
the dead body ”.  The second version of PW­1 was the “ Inspector took
away   dead   body   in   his   vehicle   to   the   police   station ”.   His   third
version   was   that   “ when   the   first   information   application   had   been
written,  the  dead   body  of  the  girl   was  kept   inside   the   police  station
itself ”. His fourth version was that “ the police personnel had carried
the dead body by a Magic (brand of vehicle) for post mortem ”.  A new
version   was   put   forth   by   PW­3   to   the   effect   that   the   dead   body   of
the   girl   was   sent   for   post­mortem   from   the   occurrence   spot   itself,
meaning   thereby   that   the   body   was   never   taken   to   the   police
20

station.  PW­4, the Head Constable said that the dead body had not
been   brought   to   the   police   station.   PW­6,   the   Investigating   Officer
categorically stated that the police did not take away the dead body
to the police station and that he saw the dead body  near the front
door of the house of the first informant.
43. There   was   yet   another   contradiction   which   is   crucial.   It   was
claimed by PW­1 and confirmed by the others that the police came
to   the   occurrence   spot   only   after   the   FIR   was   lodged.   But   at   one
place   of   the   cross­examination,   PW­1   claimed   that   when   the   first
information   application   was   written,   the   dead   body   of   the   girl   was
kept inside the police station itself. Therefore, it remains a mystery
as   to   whether   the   dead   body   was   ever   taken   to   the   police   station
and if so, how, when and why.
Different   versions   regarding   the   Place,   Date   and   Time   of   conduct   of
the inquest    .
44. There   were   many   discrepancies   regarding   the   place   where
inquest was conducted and the date and time at which inquest was
conducted.  In his chief­examination PW­2 stated as follows :
21

“…Then searching  the girl, family  members  of Chheddan
went   towards   the   sugarcane   field   and   began   searching,
then  they  found  that  the  dead  body  of  Uma  was lying   in
the sugarcane field.   Blood was coming  out of her  urinal
track,   her   clothes   had   torn   up   and   she   had   died.   I   also
went   to   the   spot.   The   family   members   of   Chheddan   had
informed   the   Police   Station,   on   which   the   police   team   of
Police Station Ikauna had arrived.   They had carried out
the   inquest   proceedings   at   the   spot   itself   and
obtained my signature on the Memo of Inquest.   When
the   Memo   of   Inquest   had   been   shown   and   read   over   to
the   witness,   he   said   that   it   was   the   same   Memo   of
Inquest   which   had   been   prepared   in   my   presence   and   I
had market my signature on that which I verify…”
45. Interestingly,   PW­2   stated   in   cross­examination,   the   opposite
of what he stated in chief­examination. What PW­2 stated in cross­
examination was that “ the inquest proceedings on the dead body
of the girl were not performed before me ”.
46. PW­6,   the   Investigation   Officer   stated   in   chief­examination   as
follows:
“….The   inquest   proceedings   could   not   be   performed   due
to   being   night   time.   On   09.03.12   the   inquest
proceedings   had   been   completed   and   the   dead   body
had   been   sent   to   District­   Bahraich   for   postmortem
after   sealing­stamping   the   same.     Same   day   I   recorded
the   statement   of   the   complainant   on   the   spot,   inspected
the spot and recorded the statements of witnesses…”
47. In   cross­examination   PW­6   reiterated   that   the   inquest
proceedings   were   not   conducted   on   the   same   night,   but   were
22

started   at   8   o’   clock   in   the   morning   on   09.03.2012.   PW­6   claimed
that Raj Karan, Vikram, Pesh Ram, Rameshwar Prasad and Raksha
Ram   were   deputed   as   panch   for   the   inquest.   Out   of   these   five
panch   witnesses,   Raj   Karan   alone   was   examined   as   PW­2,   but
according to Raj Karan, examined as PW­2, the police arrived at
the   spot   upon   being   informed   by   the   family   members   of
Chheddan and conducted inquest proceedings at the spot itself .
He also claimed that the I.O recorded his statement on the night of
the incident at 7 o’ clock.
48. Out  of  the five   panch   witnesses mentioned  by  the I.O to  have
been   present   at   the   time   of   inquest,   the   names   of   three   persons
were mentioned by PW­1 also, but according to PW­1, the I.O came
to the spot at half past 7’o clock in his vehicle and noted down the
names of four or five persons including that of PW­2, obtained their
signatures and went away.
49. Therefore,   there   were   two   versions,   regarding   the   date   of
conduct   of   inquest.   According   to   one   version,   it   was   conducted   on
the date of the incident namely, 08.03.2012, but according to I.O.,
it   was   conducted   on   09.03.2012.   Interestingly   the   I.O   added   one
23

more   dimension   to   the   contradiction   at   one   stage   of   the   cross­
examination.   He   claimed   that   after   registering   the   case   he   visited
the   occurrence   spot   same   day   at   9:00­9:30   at   night.   But
subsequently   he   claimed   as   follows:   “ First   I   completed   the   inquest
proceedings   and   inspected   the   occurrence   spot   subsequently,   after
two hours of the inquest proceedings on 09.03.2012 itsel f”.
50. Moreover   the   inquest   ought   to   have   been   conducted   at   the
place where the dead body was found. PW­1 claimed that he did not
bring the dead body to the house and that the police personnel who
had come to the spot, took away the body. But according to PW­6,
the relatives had taken the dead body to the house and that he saw
the   dead   body   only   in   the   house.   If   that   is   so,   the   inquest
proceedings   should   have   been   conducted   there   and   not   elsewhere.
It   is   quite   strange   that   PW­6   claimed   during   cross­examination   to
have   first   completed   the   inquest   and   thereafter   inspected   the
occurrence spot.
Clothes on the body of the victim, recovered by the police.
24

51. According   to   PW­1   “ the   victim   was   clad   in   frock,   brief,   salwar
and   vest.   The   frock   was   red   coloured.   The   brief   was   green.   The
sandow vest was green coloured.  The salwar was red coloured  as
well.”
52. PW­1   also   claimed   that   “ at   the   place   of   occurrence,   the   brief
was torn and lying apart from her limbs ”.  He also stated that salwar
was   lying   away   from   her   and   that   there   was   blood   stain   in   the
salwar  and brief. PW­1 claimed that he had taken the salwar.
53. PW­3   claimed   that   the   police   recovered   and   took   away   the
salwar   of   the   victim.   Interestingly,   PW­3   asserted   that   he   went   to
the occurrence spot and he found that the victim was wearing a red
colour frock and  black colour spotted salwar .
54. The Investigation Officer stated during cross­examination that
the   deceased   was   wearing   a   brick   colour   sandow   vest   and   a   violet
colour frock on the upper portion of her body. He confirmed that he
recovered   the   salwar   from   the   occurrence   spot   and   that   it   was   a
green colour salwar . He further stated that though there was blood
on the occurrence  spot,   no  blood  was  stuck  on the  green  colour
25

salwar .   Thus,   there   were   3  different   versions,   regarding  the   colour
of the salwar, one by PW­1 that it was red, the second by PW­3 that
it was black color  spotted and the third by PW­6 that it was green
colored.   Similarly,   there   were   two   different   versions   regarding   the
presence of blood on the salwar, one by PW­1 and another by PW­6.
55. A   letter   dated   27.03.2012   purportedly   sent   by   the   Deputy
Superintendent of Police to the Forensic Sciences Laboratory, which
formed part of the documents submitted by the police, presumably
along   with   the   final   report,   but   which   was   not   marked   as   Exhibit
indicates   that   the   salwar   worn   by   the   deceased,   with   stains   of
semen on it, was one of the few items sent for forensic examination.
But there was no report of the Forensic Sciences Laboratory. 
56. Strangely,   the   aforesaid   letter   dated   27.03.2012   addressed   to
the Forensic Sciences Laboratory, was not sent by the Investigation
Officer but by the Deputy Superintendent of Police. 
57 . Thus there were very serious contradictions, both mutual and
otherwise,   in   the   evidence   tendered   by   PWs   1   to   3,   on   crucial
aspects   such   as,   (i)   the   mode   of   Lodging   of   the   FIR;   (ii)   the   place
26

where the dead body was first seen by the police, persons took the
body   from   the   place   of   occurrence   and   where   it   was   taken   to;   (iii)
the   Place,   Date   and   Time   of   conduct   of   the   inquest;   and   (iv)   the
clothes   on   the   body   of   the   victim,   recovered   by   the   police.   These
contradictions   make   the   evidence   of   PWs   1   to   3   completely
untrustworthy.   Unfortunately,   the   Sessions   Court   as   well   as   the
High Court have trivialized these major  contradictions to hold that
the chain of circumstances have been established unbroken. 
II.   Delay in transmitting the FIR to court
58. According to the prosecution, the FIR was lodged at 20:10 hrs.
on 08.03.2012. The Court of the CJM, Shravasti, received the copy
of the FIR on 13.03.2012. Therefore, a cloud is sought to be cast on
the genuineness of the FIR.
59. On  the  importance  of  promptitude, both  in  the  registration  of
the FIR and in the transmission of the same to the Court, reliance
is   placed   by   Shri   Nagamuthu,   learned   senior   counsel   on   the
following passage in  Meharaj Singh (L/Nk.)  vs.  State of U.P 2
 
2    (1994) 5 SCC 188
27

“ 12.   FIR   in   a   criminal   case   and   particularly   in   a
murder   case   is   a   vital   and   valuable   piece   of   evidence
for the purpose of appreciating the evidence led at the
trial.   The   object   of   insisting   upon   prompt   lodging   of
the  FIR  is   to  obtain  the  earliest  information  regarding
the   circumstance   in   which   the   crime   was   committed,
including   the   names   of   the   actual   culprits   and   the
parts   played   by   them,   the   weapons,   if   any,   used,   as
also   the   names   of   the   eye   witnesses,   if   any.   Delay   in
lodging   the   FIR   often   results   in  embellishment,   which
is a creature of an after thought. On account of delay,
the   FIR   not   only   gets   bereft   of   the   advantage   of
spontaneity,   danger   also   creeps   in   of   the   introduction
of a coloured version or exaggerated story. With a view
to determine whether the FIR, was lodged at the time it
is   alleged   to   have   been   recorded,   the   courts   generally
look   for   certain   external   checks.   One   of   the   checks   is
the   receipt   of   the   copy   of   the   FIR,   called   a   special
report in a murder case, by the local Magistrate. If this
report is received by the Magistrate late it can give rise
to an inference that the FIR was not lodged at the time
it   is   alleged   to   have   been   recorded,   unless,   of   course
the prosecution can offer a satisfactory explanation for
the   delay   in   despatching   or   receipt   of   the   copy   of   the
FIR   by   the   local   Magistrate.   Prosecution   has   led   no
evidence   at   all   in   this   behalf.   The   second   external
check   equally   important   is   the   sending   of   the   copy   of
the  FIR  along   with  the  dead  body   and  its  reference  in
the   inquest   report.   Even   though   the   inquest   report,
prepared   under   Section   174   Cr.   P.C.,   is   aimed   at
serving   a   statutory   function,   to   lend   credence   to   the
prosecution case, the details of the FIR and the gist of
statements   recorded   during   inquest   proceedings   get
reflected in the report.  The  absence  of those  details is
indicative   of   the   fact   that   the   prosecution   story   was
still in embryo state and had not been given any shape
and   that   the   FIR   came   to   be   recorded   later   on   after
due deliberations and consultations and was then ante
timed to give it the colour of a promptly lodged FIR. In
our   opinion,   on   account   of   the   infirmities   as   noticed
above, the FIR has lost its value and authenticity and
it   appears   to   us   that   the   same   has   been   ante   timed
and had not been recorded till the inquest proceedings
were over at the spot by PW8.”
28

60. While   reiterating   the   above   principles,   a   note   of   caution   was
also added by this Court in  Bhajan Singh alias Harbhajan Singh
and   Others   vs.   State   of   Haryana   3
.   Paragraphs   28   to   30   of   the
said decision read as follows:­
“ 28. Thus,   from   the   above   it   is   evident   that
the   Criminal Procedure Code   provides for  internal and
external   checks:   one   of   them   being   the   receipt   of   a
copy of the FIR by the Magistrate concerned. It serves
the   purpose   that   the   FIR   be   not   anti­timed   or   anti­
dated.   The   Magistrate   must   be   immediately   informed
of every serious offence so that he may be in a position
to act under   Section159   Cr.P.C., if so required.   Section
159   Cr.P.C.   empowers   the   Magistrate   to   hold   the
investigation   or   preliminary   enquiry   of   the   offence
either   himself   or   through   the   Magistrate   subordinate
to   him.   This   is   designed   to   keep   the   Magistrate
informed   of   the   investigation   so   as   to   enable   him   to
control   investigation   and,   if   necessary,   to   give
appropriate direction. 
29. It is not that as if every delay in sending the
report   to   the   Magistrate   would   necessarily   lead   to
the   inference   that   the   FIR   has   not   been   lodged   at
the   time   stated   or   has   been   anti­timed   or   anti­
dated   or   investigation   is   not   fair   and   forthright.
Every   such   delay   is   not   fatal   unless   prejudice   to
the   accused   is   shown.   The   expression   “forthwith”
mentioned therein does not mean that the prosecution
is   required   to   explain   delay   of   every   hour   in   sending
the FIR to the Magistrate. In a given case, if number of
dead   and   injured   persons   is   very   high,   delay   in
dispatching the report is natural. Of course, the same
is   to   be   sent   within   reasonable   time   in   the   prevalent
circumstances.  
30. However,   unexplained   inordinate   delay   in
sending   the   copy   of   FIR   to   the   Magistrate   may   affect
the   prosecution   case   adversely.   An   adverse   inference
3   (2011) 7 SCC 421
29

may be drawn against the prosecution when there are
circumstances   from   which   an   inference   can  be   drawn
that there were chances of manipulation in the FIR by
falsely   roping   in   the   accused   persons   after   due
deliberations.   Delay   provides   legitimate   basis   for
suspicion of the FIR, as it affords sufficient time to the
prosecution   to   introduce   improvements   and
embellishments.   Thus,   a   delay   in   dispatch   of   the   FIR
by itself is not a circumstance which can throw out the
prosecution's case in its entirety, particularly when the
prosecution   furnishes   a   cogent   explanation   for   the
delay   in   dispatch   of   the   report   or   prosecution   case
itself is proved by leading unimpeachable evidence.”
61. It   is   clear   from   the   aforesaid   decisions   that   the   delay   in
forwarding   the   FIR   may   certainly   indicate   the   failure   of   one   of   the
external   checks   to   determine   whether   the   FIR   was   manipulated
later   or   whether   it   was   registered   either   to   fix   someone   other   than
the   real   culprit   or   to   allow   the   real   culprit   to   escape.   While   every
delay in forwarding the FIR may not necessarily be fatal to the case
of   the   prosecution,   Courts   may   be   duty   bound   to   see   the   effect   of
such delay on the investigation and even the creditworthiness of the
investigation.
62. Section 157(1) of the Code requires the officer­in­charge of the
police station to send the FIR, “ forthwith ”.   The legal consequences
of   the   delay   on   the   part   of   the   police   in   forwarding   the   FIR   to   the
court   was   considered   by   this   Court   in   Brahm   Swaroop   and
30

Another   vs.   State   of   Uttar   Pradesh 4
.   Incidentally   Brahm
Swaroop  (supra) is also a case where there was a delay of five days
in   sending   the   report   to   the   Magistrate   (as   in   the   present   case).
After   taking   note   of   several   earlier   decisions   of   this   Court,   this
Court held in  Brahm Swaroop  in para 21 as follows:
“ 21.     In   the   instant   case,   the   defence   did   not   put
any   question   in   this   regard   to   the   investigating
officer, Raj Guru (PW.10), thus, no    explanation was
required   to   be   furnished   by   him   on   this   issue.
Thus,   the   prosecution   had   not   been   asked   to
explain   the   delay   in   sending   the   special   report.
More   so,   the   submission   made   by   Shri   Tulsi   that   the
FIR  was  ante­timed   cannot   be  accepted  in  view  of  the
evidence   available   on   record   which   goes   to   show   that
the   FIR   had   been   lodged   promptly   within   20   minutes
of   the   incident   as   the   Police   Station   was   only   1   k.m.
away   from   the   place   of   occurrence   and   names   of   all
the accused had been mentioned in the FIR.”  
63. To  come to  the  above conclusion, reliance was  placed  upon  a
decision of a three member Bench in   Balram Singh and Another
vs.   State   of   Punjab 5
.   In   Balram   Singh   (supra),   a   three   member
Bench of this Court rejected the contention with regard to the delay
in transmitting the FIR to the Magistrate, on the ground that “ while
considering the  complaint  in regard  to the  delay in the  FIR reaching
the Jurisdictional   Magistrate, we will have to also bear in mind the
4    (2011) 6 SCC 288
5   (2003) 11 SCC 286
31

creditworthiness   of   the   ocular   evidence   adduced   by   the   prosecution
and if we find that such ocular evidence is worthy of acceptance, the
element of delay in registering a complaint or sending the same to the
Jurisdictional Magistrate by itself would not weaken the prosecution
case ”.  
64. In  State of Rajasthan  vs.  Daud Khan 6
, this Court referred to
Brahm Swaroop  and interpreted the word “forthwith” appearing in
Section 157 (1) of the Code, as follows:
“26. … … …
The   purpose   of   the   “forthwith”   communication   of   a
copy   of   the   FIR   to   the   Magistrate   is   to   check   the
possibility   of   its   manipulation.   Therefore,   a   delay   in
transmitting   the   special   report   to   the   Magistrate   is
linked to the lodging  of the FIR. If there is no   delay   in
lodging   an   FIR,   then   any   delay   in   communicating   the
special   report   to the Magistrate would really be of little
consequence,   since   manipulation   of   the   FIR   would
then   get   ruled   out.   Nevertheless,   the   prosecution
should   explain   the   delay   in   transmitting   the
special   report   to   the   Magistrate.   However,   if   no
question   is   put   to   the   investigating   officer   concerning
the   delay ,   the   prosecution   is   under   no   obligation   to
give   an   explanation.   There   is   no   universal   rule   that
whenever there is some   delay   in sending the FIR to the
Magistrate,   the   prosecution   version   becomes
unreliable.   In   other   words,   the   facts   and
circumstances of a case are important for a decision in
this regard.”
65. Therefore,   the   learned   Additional   Advocate   General   for   the
State   may   be   right,   in   theory,   that   a   delay   in   transmission   of   the
6    (2016) 2 SCC 607
32

FIR to the court, may not,   per se , be fatal, without anything  more.
But in the  case on  hand, the  delay  was not  small. The FIR said to
have   been   registered   on   08.03.2012   was   received   by   the   Court   of
the   Chief   Judicial   Magistrate   on   13.03.2012.   It   is   true   that   no
question   was   put   in   cross­examination   to   the   Investigation   Officer
about this delay .
66. But   we   have   found   that   the   evidence   of   P.Ws.   1   to   3   is
untrustworthy,   particularly   on   the   question   of   the   origin   and
genesis   of   the   first   information   report.   Therefore   the   inordinate
delay   in   the   FIR   reaching   the   jurisdictional   court   assumes
significance. We agree that the word "forthwith' in Section 157(1) of
the   Code   is   to   be   understood   in   the   context   of   the   given   facts   and
circumstances of each case and a straight­jacket formula cannot be
applied   in   all   cases.   But   where   ocular   evidence   is   found   to   be
unreliable and thus unacceptable, a long delay has to be taken note
of   by   the   Court.   The   mandate   of   Section   157(1)   of   the   Code
being clear, the prosecution is expected to place on record the
basic   foundational   facts,   such   as,   the   Officer   who   took   the
first   information   report   to   the   jurisdictional   court,   the
33

authority   which   directed   such   a   course   of   action   and   the
mode   by   which   it   was   complied.   Explaining   the   delay   is   a
different   aspect   than   placing   the   material   in   compliance   of
the Code .
67. In   the   present   case,   it   is   not   even   known   as   to   who   took   the
first   information   report   from   P.W.6   or   P.W.4   and   submitted   before
the   jurisdictional   court.   Neither   PW­4   nor   PW­6   spoke   about   the
person   who   took   the   FIR   to   the   court.   They   did   not   say   that   they
took it to the court. It is not a case of mere delay in sending the first
information report, but one involving the contradictory evidence by
the   prosecution   witnesses   on   the   manner   in   which   the   first
information report is written.
68. On   the   question   of   compliance   of   Section   157(1)   along   with
logical   reasoning   for   doing   so,   the   following   passage   from   the
decision   in   Jafarudheen   and   Ors.   vs.   State   of   Kerala 7
  may   be
usefully quoted as under:
“26.   The   jurisdictional   Magistrate   plays   a   pivotal   role
during   the   investigation   process.   It   is   meant   to   make   the
investigation   just   and   fair.   The   Investigating   Officer   is   to
7    2022 SCC Online SC 495
34

keep the Magistrate in the loop of his ongoing investigation.
The   object   is   to   avoid   a   possible   foul   play.   The   Magistrate
has a role to play under Section 159 of Cr.PC. 
27. The first information report in a criminal case starts the
process   of   investigation   by   letting   the   criminal   law   into
motion.   It   is   certainly   a   vital   and   valuable   aspect   of
evidence   to   corroborate   the   oral   evidence.   Therefore,   it   is
imperative   that   such   an   information   is   expected   to   reach
the jurisdictional Magistrate at the earliest  point of time to
avoid any possible ante­dating or ante­timing leading to the
insertion   of   materials   meant   to   convict   the   accused
contrary   to   the   truth   and   on   account   of   such   a   delay   may
also   not   only   gets   bereft   of   the   advantage   of   spontaneity,
there   is   also   a   danger   creeping   in   by   the   introduction   of   a
coloured version, exaggerated account or concocted story as
a   result   of   deliberation   and   consultation.   However,   a   mere
delay   by   itself   cannot   be   a   sole   factor   in   rejecting   the
prosecution's   case   arrived   at   after   due   investigation.
Ultimately, it is for the Court concerned to take a call. Such
a view is expected to be taken after considering the relevant
materials."
Therefore, we hold that the delay of 5 days in transmitting the FIR
to the jurisdictional court, especially in the facts and circumstances
of this case was fatal.
III.  Failure to conduct medical examination
69. Despite   the   fact   that   it   was   a   shocking   case   of   rape   and
murder of a six year old girl, the prosecution did not care to subject
the   accused   (appellant   herein)   to   examination   by   a   medical
practitioner.   There   were   two   documents   which   formed   part   of   the
records   submitted   along   with   the   final   report,   but   which   were   not
35

exhibited. One of them  appears to be a Memo signed by PW­5, the
Doctor   who   conducted   the   post­mortem.   This   Memo   is   dated
09.03.2012   addressed   to   the   Senior   Pathologist,   District   Hospital,
Bahraich. The Memo reads as follows:
“ Vaginal smear prepared in two slides from the body of
Km.   Uma   D/o   Chhedam   Lal,   R/o   Semgadha,   PS
Ikauna, Dist: Shravasti .”
70. The second is a Report dated 10.03.2012. It reads as follows:­
“ Report­   In   microscopic   examination   of   supplied
specimen,   no   spermatozoa   seem   alive   or   dead.     No
(unclear) seen .
71. Despite the fact that the author of the Memo dated 09.03.2012
was   examined   as   PW­5,   he   never   spoke   about   this.   The   Report   of
the   Forensic   Sciences   Laboratory,   to   whom   the   salwar   was
forwarded, was also not obtained by the Investigating Officer.  
72. Section 53(1) of the Code enables a police officer not below the
rank   of   Sub­Inspector   to   request   a   registered   medical   practitioner,
to   make   such   an   examination   of   the   person   arrested,   as   is
reasonably  necessary  to ascertain the facts which may  afford such
evidence, whenever a person is arrested on a charge of committing
an   offence   of   such   a   nature   that   there   are   reasonable   grounds   for
36

believing   that   an   examination   of   his   person   will   afford   evidence   as
to the commission of an offence.  Section 53(1) reads as follows:
“ 53.   Examination   of   accused   by   medical
practitioner   at   the   request   of   police   officer .­
(1)   When   a   person   is   arrested   on   a   charge   of
committing   an   offence   of   such   a   nature   and   alleged
to   have   been   committed   under   such   circumstances
that   there   are   reasonable   grounds   for   believing   that
an   examination   of   his   person   will   afford   evidence   as
to the commission of an offence, it shall be lawful for
a   registered   medical   practitioner,   acting   at   the
request of a police officer not below the rank of sub­
inspector,   and  for any person  acting  in  good  faith  in
his   aid   and   under   his   direction,   to   make   such   an
examination   of   the   person   arrested   as   is   reasonably
necessary   in   order   to   ascertain   the   facts   which   may
afford   such   evidence,   and   to   use   such   force   as   is
reasonably necessary for that purpose.”
73. By Act 25 of 2005, a new Explanation  was substituted under
Section   53,   in   the   place   of   the   original   Explanation.   The
Explanation   so   substituted   under   Section   53,   by   Act   25   of   2005
reads as follows:
“Explanation .­In   this   section   and   in   sections   53A   and
54,­
(a)   "examination"   shall   include   the   examination   of
blood,   blood   stains,   semen,   swabs   in   case   of
sexual offences, sputum and sweat, hair samples
and   finger   nail   clippings   by   the   use   of   modern
and scientific techniques including DNA profiling
and   such   other   tests   which   the   registered
medical   practitioner   thinks   necessary   in   a
particular case;
37

(b)   "registered medical practitioner" means a medical
practitioner   who   possess   any   medical
qualification  as defined  in clause  (h)  of  section 2
of   the   Indian   Medical   Council   Act,   1956   (102   of
1956)   and   whose   name   has   been   entered   in   a
State Medical Register.”
74. Simultaneously   with   the   substitution   of   a   new   Explanation
under   Section   53,   Act   25   of   2005   also   inserted   a   new   provision   in
Section 53A.  Section 53A reads as follows:
“ 53A .   Examination   of   person   accused   of   rape   by
medical practitioner , ­ 
(1)   When   a   person   is   arrested   on   a   charge   of   committing   an
offence   of   rape   or   an   attempt   to   commit   rape   and   there   are
reasonable   grounds   for   believing   that   an   examination   of   his
person will afford evidence as to the commission of such offence,
it   shall   be   lawful   for   a   registered   medical  practitioner   employed
in a hospital run by the Government or by a local authority and
in the absence of such a practitioner within the radius of sixteen
kilometers from the place where the offence has been committed
by   any   other   registered   medical   practitioner,   acting   at   the
request of a police officer not below the rank of a sub­inspector,
and for any person acting in good faith in his aid and under his
direction,   to   make   such   an   examination   of   the   arrested   person
and   to   use   such   force   as   is   reasonably   necessary   for   that
purpose.
(2) The   registered   medical   practitioner   conducting   such
examination   shall,   without   delay,   examine   such   person   and
prepare   a   report   of   his   examination   giving   the   following
particulars, namely;
“(i)  the name and address of the accused and of the person by
whom he was brought,
(ii) the age of the accused,
(iii) marks of injury, if any, on the person of the accused,
(iv) the   description   of   material   taken   from   the   person   of   the
accused for   DNA   profiling, and
(v) other material particulars in reasonable detail.
(3) The   report   shall   state   precisely   the   reasons   for   each
conclusion arrived at.
38

(4)   The   exact   time   of   commencement   and   completion   of   the
examination shall also be noted in the report.
(5) The   registered   medical   practitioner   shall,   without   delay,
forward the report of the investigating officer, who shall forward
it   to   the   Magistrate   referred   to   in   Section   173   as   part   of   the
documents   referred   to   in   Clause   (a)   of   sub­section   (5)   of   that
section.”
75. Even in a case where the victim of rape was alive and testified
before   the   Court   and   the   accused   was   also   examined   by   a   doctor,
this Court found in   Krishan Kumar Malik   vs.   State of Haryana 8
that   the   failure   to   obtain   the   report   of   the   Forensic   Sciences
Laboratory   was   fatal.   Paragraph   40   of   the   said   decision   reads   as
follows:
“ 40. The   appellant   was   also   examined   by   the   doctor,
who   had   found   him   capable   of   performing   sexual
intercourse.   In   the   undergarments   of   the   prosecutrix,
male   semen   were     found   but   these   were   not   sent   for
analysis   in   the   forensic   laboratories   which   could   have
conclusively   proved,  beyond  any   shadow   of  doubt  with
regard   to   the   commission   of   offence   by   the   appellant.
This lacuna on the part of the prosecution proves to be
fatal and goes in favour of the appellant.”
76. On   the   scope   of   the   newly   inserted   Section   53A,   this   Court
said in  Krishan Kumar Malik  (supra) as follows:
“ 44. Now,   after   the   incorporation   of   Section   53A
in   the   Criminal   Procedure   Code ,   w.e.f.   23.6.2006,
brought   to   our   notice   by   the   learned   counsel   for   the
respondent   State,   it   has   become   necessary   for   the
prosecution to go in for DNA test in such type of cases,
8   (2011) 7 SCC 130
39

facilitating   the   prosecution   to   prove   its   case   against
the accused. Prior to 2006, even without the aforesaid
specific   provision   in   CrPC   the   prosecution   could   have
still resorted to this procedure of getting the DNA test
or   analysis   and   matching   of   semen   of   the   Appellant
with   that   found   on   the   undergarments   of   the
prosecutrix   to   make   it   a   fool   proof   case,   but   they   did
not do so, thus they must face the consequences.”
77. It is true that a three member Bench of this Court indicated in
Rajendra   Pralhadrao   Wasnik   vs.   State   of   Maharashtra 9
  that
Section 53A is not mandatory. It was held in paragraphs 49 and 50
of the said decision as follows:­
“ 49. While   Section   53­A   CrPC.   is   not   mandatory,   it
certainly   requires   a   positive   decision   to   be   taken.
There  must  be reasonable grounds for  believing  that
the examination of a person will afford evidence as to
the commission of an offence of rape or an attempt to
commit   rape.   If   reasonable   grounds   exist,   then   a
medical   examination   as   postulated   by   Section   53­
A(2)   CrPC   must   be   conducted   and   that   includes
examination   of   the   accused   and   description   of
material   taken   from   the   person   of   the   accused   for
DNA profiling.  Looked  at  from   another point   of view,
if  there   are   reasonable   grounds   for  believing   that   an
examination   of   the   accused   will   not   afford   evidence
as   to   the   commission   of   an   offence   as   mentioned
above,   it   is   quite   unlikely   that   a   charge­sheet   would
even   be   filed   against   the   accused   for   committing   an
offence of rape or attempt to rape.
50. Similarly,   Section   164­A     CrPC   requires,
wherever   possible,   for   the   medical   examination   of   a
victim   of   rape.   Of   course,   the   consent   of   the   victim   is
necessary   and   the   person   conducting   the   examination
must   be   competent   to   medically   examine   the   victim.
Again,   one   of   the   requirements   of   the   medical
9    (2019) 12 SCC 460
40

examination   is   an   examination   of   the   victim   and
description   of   material   taken   from   the   person   of   the
woman for DNA profiling.”
78. After   saying   that   Section   53A   is   not   mandatory,   this   Court
found   in   paragraph   54   of   the   said   decision   that   the   failure   of   the
prosecution   to   produce   DNA   evidence,   warranted   an   adverse
inference to be drawn. Paragraph 54 reads as follows:­
“ 54 .   For   the   prosecution   to   decline   to   produce   DNA
evidence   would   be   a   little   unfortunate   particularly
when   the   facility   of   DNA   profiling   is   available   in   the
country.     The   prosecution   would   be   well   advised   to
take   advantage   of   this,   particularly   in   view   of   the
provisions   of   Section   53­A   and   Section   164­A   CrPC.
We   are   not   going   to   the   extent   of   suggesting   that   if
there is no DNA profiling, the prosecution case cannot
be   proved   but   we   are  certainly   of   the   view   that   where
DNA   profiling   has   not   been   done   or   it   is   held   back
from   the   trial   court,   an   adverse   consequence   would
follow for the prosecution.”
79. It   is   necessary   at   this   stage   to   note   that   by   the   very   same
Amendment   Act   25   of   2005,   by   which   Section   53A   was   inserted,
Section   164A   was   also   inserted   in   the   Code.   While   Section   53A
enables   the   medical   examination   of   the   person   accused   of   rape,
Section   164A   enables   medical   examination   of   the   victim   of   rape.
Both   these   provisions   are   somewhat   similar   and   can   be   said
41

approximately   to   be   a   mirror   image   of   each   other.   But   there   are
three distinguishing features. They are:­
(i) Section   164A   requires   the   prior   consent   of   the
women   who   is   the   victim   of   rape.   Alternatively,   the
consent   of   a   person   competent   to   give   such   consent   on
her   behalf   should   have   been   obtained   before   subjecting
the victim  to medical examination. Section 53A does not
speak about any such consent;
(ii) Section   164A   requires   the   report   of   the   medical
practitioner   to   contain   among   other   things,   the   general
mental condition of the women. This is absent in Section
53A;
(iii) Under Section 164A(1), the medical examination by
a   registered   medical   practitioner   is   mandatory   when,   “ it
is proposed to get the person of the women examined by a
medical expert ” during the course of investigation. This is
borne   out   by   the   use   of   the   words,   “ such   examination
shall   be   conducted”.   In   contrast,   Section   53A(1)   merely
makes   it   lawful   for   a   registered   medical   practitioner   to
make an examination of the arrested person if “ there are
reasonable   grounds   for   believing   that   an   examination   of
his   person   will   afford   evidence   as   to   the   commission   of
such offence ”.
42

80. In cases where the victim of rape is alive and is in a position to
testify   in   court,   it   may   be   possible   for   the   prosecution   to   take   a
chance by not medically examining the accused. But in cases where
the  victim  is dead and the  offence is sought  to  be established only
by   circumstantial   evidence,   medical   evidence   assumes   great
importance.   The   failure   of   the   prosecution   to   produce   such
evidence,   despite   there   being   no   obstacle   from   the   accused   or
anyone,   will   certainly   create   a   gaping   hole   in   the   case   of   the
prosecution   and   give   rise   to   a   serious   doubt   on   the   case   of   the
prosecution. We do not wish to go into the question whether Section
53A   is   mandatory   or   not.   Section   53A   enables   the   prosecution   to
obtain   a   significant   piece   of   evidence   to   prove   the   charge.   The
failure   of   the   prosecution   in   this   case   to   subject   the   appellant   to
medical   examination   is   certainly   fatal   to   the   prosecution   case
especially when the ocular evidence is found to be not trustworthy.
81. Their   failure   to   obtain   the   report   of   the   Forensic   Sciences
Laboratory   on   the   blood/semen   stain   on   the   salwar   worn   by   the
victim, compounds the failure of the prosecution.
43

IV.  Argument revolving around section 313 of the Code
82 . Though   arguments   were   advanced   even   on   (i)   the   manner   in
which   the   statement   of   the   accused   was   recorded   under   Section
313   of   the   Code;   (ii)   the   failure   of   the   Court   to   comply   with   the
mandate   of   Section   313(1)(b)   of   the   Code   in   letter   and   spirit;   and
(iii)   the consequences of such failure, we do not think it necessary
to   go   into   the   said   question.     This   is   for   the   reason   that   we   have
found in Part­I of this order that the evidence of P.Ws 1 to 3 are not
trustworthy   and   in   Part­III   of   this   order   that   the   failure   of   the
prosecution   to   subject   the   appellant   to   medical   examination   was
fatal.   These   findings   are   sufficient   to   overturn   the   verdict   of
conviction and penalty.
Reasoning of the Sessions court and the High Court
83. Before wrapping up, it   is necessary to say something about the
approach   adopted   by   the   Sessions   Court   and   the   High   Court.   In
cases   of   this   nature   the   court   is  obliged   to   assess  the   evidence   on
the test of probability. Though wide discretion is given to the Court
to consider the “matters before it”, such an evidence has to be sifted
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carefully   before   recording   satisfaction.   It   is   not   the   quantum,   but
what   matters   is   the   quality.   Both   the   Courts   below   found   the
evidence   of   P.Ws.   1   to   3   acceptable.   The   seriously   inherent
contradictions in the statements made by them have not been duly
taken note of by both the courts. When the offence is heinous, the
Court   is   required   to   put   the   material   evidence   under   a   higher
scrutiny.   On   a   careful   consideration   of   the   reasoning   of   the   Trial
Court, as confirmed by the High Court, we find that sufficient care
has   not   been   taken   in   the   assessment   of   the   statements   made   by
P.Ws. 1 to 3. No one spoke as to who sent the FIR to the court and
when it was sent. Strangely even the copy of the post­mortem report
was admittedly received by SHO on the 13.03.2012 though the post
mortem was conducted on the 09.03.2012,. It was the same date on
which   the   FIR   reached   the   Court.   These   factors   certainly   create   a
strong   suspicion   on   the   story   as  projected   by   the   prosecution,   but
both   the   Courts   have   overlooked   the   same   completely.   This
erroneous approach on the part of the Sessions Court and the High
Court   has   led   to   the   appellant   being   ordained   to   be   dispatched   to
the gallows.
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Conclusion
84 . We  cannot   shy  away  from  the  fact  that  it  is  a  ghastly   case  of
rape   and   murder   of   a   6   year   old   child.   By   not   conducting   the
investigation   properly,   the   prosecution   has   done   injustice   to   the
family of the victim. By fixing culpability upon the appellant without
any shred of evidence which will stand the scrutiny, the prosecution
has done injustice to the appellant. Court cannot make someone, a
victim of injustice, to compensate for the injustice to the victim of a
crime.
85 . In   fact   this   is   a   case   where   the   appellant   is   so   poor   that   he
could   not   afford   to   engage   a   lawyer   even   in   the   Sessions   Court.
After   his   repeated   requests   to   the   Court   of   District   and   Sessions
Judge, the service of an advocate was provided as   amicus . In cases
of   such   nature,   the   responsibility   of   the   Court   becomes   more
onerous.   When   we   analyse   the   evidence   with   such   a   sense   of
responsibility,   we   are   not   convinced   that   the   guilt   of   the   appellant
stood  established  beyond   reasonable  doubt.   Therefore,  the   appeals
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are   allowed   and   the   conviction   and   penalty   are   set   aside.     The
appellant   shall   be   released   forthwith   if   not   wanted   in   connection
with any other case.
…………………………….J.
(S. Abdul Nazeer)
…………………………….J.
(A.S. Bopanna)
…………………………….J.
(V. Ramasubramanian)
NEW DELHI
SEPTEMBER  28, 2022
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