/2022 INSC 0887/ 1 REPORTABLE   IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6942 of 2022 Rajasthan State Road Transport  Corporation     … Appellant Versus Bharat Singh Jhala (Dead) Son of Shri Nathu  Singh, through Legal Heirs & Anr.                   … Respondents J U D G M E N T M. R. Shah, J. 1. Feeling   aggrieved   and   dissatisfied   with   the   impugned judgment  and  order   dated  12.08.2021 passed by  the  Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan at Jaipur passed   in   D.B.   Civil   Special   Appeal   (Writ)   No.645   of   2020   by which the Division Bench of the High Court has dismissed the said appeal challenging the order passed by the learned Single Judge   dismissing   the   writ   petition   filed   by   the   appellant 2 confirming the order passed by the Labour Court setting aside the   order   of   termination   passed   against   the   workman,   the Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation has preferred the present appeal. 2. The facts leading to the present appeal in a nutshell are as under: 2.1 The   workman   was   serving   on   the   post   of   Conductor.     A departmental   enquiry   was   initiated   against   him   alleging   not issuing   the   tickets   to   10   passengers   though   he   collected   the amount   of   tickets.     In   the   department   inquiry   he   was   found guilty   for   the   misconduct   alleged.     The   employer   –   Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation terminated his services vide Order dated 31.07.2001. 2.2 An   application   for   approval   of   punishment   order   under Section   33(2)(b)   of   Industrial   Dispute   Act,   1947   (hereafter referred   to   as   “the   I.D.   Act”)   was   submitted   before   the Industrial   Tribunal   on   31.07.2001.   The   Industrial   Tribunal 3 held   the   enquiry   bad.     However,   the   Industrial   Tribunal   vide Order dated 12.12.2012 allowed the appellant – Corporation to prove the charges before the Tribunal.  Both the parties led the evidence   before   the   Tribunal   on   the   charges   alleged.   The appellants   led,   both,   oral   as   well   as   documentary   evidences. That   on   appreciation   of   entire   evidence   on   record   and considering   the   submissions   made   on   behalf   of   both   the parties,   the   Industrial   Tribunal   vide   order   dated   21.07.2015 allowed   the   application   under   Section   33(2)(b)   of   the   I.D.   Act and   granted   the   approval   of   the   order   of   termination.     That thereafter   and   after   a   period   of   approximately   19   years   from the   date   of   passing   the   order   of   termination,   the   workman again   raised   the   Industrial   Dispute   challenging   the   order   of termination   of   2001.     By   Judgment   and   Award   dated 19.11.2019   the   Labour   Court,   Jaipur   allowed   the   said reference   and   set   aside   the   order   of   termination.     As   in   the meantime the workman died and the dispute was raised after a   period   of   19   years,   the   Labour   Court   passed   an   order awarding 50% back wages from the date of termination till his 4 death   i.e.   10.12.2018.     The   Judgment   and   Award   passed   by the   Labour   Court   was   challenged   before   the   learned   Single Judge of the High Court.   The learned Single Judge dismissed the   writ   petition.     Against   the   award   passed   by   the   learned Single   Judge   dismissing   the   writ   petition   the   appellant preferred the appeal before the Division Bench.   By impugned judgment   and   order   the   High   Court   has   dismissed   the   said appeal which has given rise to the present appeal. 3. Learned   Counsel   for   the   appellant   has   vehemently submitted that in the facts and circumstances of the case the Hon’ble   High   Court   has   committed   a   serious   error   in dismissing   the   writ   appeal/writ   petition   confirming   the judgment and order passed by the learned Labour Court. 3.1 It is submitted that once in an application under Section 33(2)(b)   of   the   I.D.   Act   and   pursuant   to   the   earlier   order passed by the Industrial Tribunal, the appellant was permitted to   lead   the   evidence   and   prove   the   charge/misconduct   and thereafter when the order of termination was approved by the 5 Industrial   Tribunal,   thereafter   it   was   not   open   for   the workman to again raise the Industrial Dispute that too after a period of 19 years.  It is submitted that the Hon’ble High Court has   materially   erred   in   confirming   the   judgment   and   award passed   by   the   learned   Labour   Court   quashing   and   setting aside the order of termination which as such was approved by the Industrial Tribunal by order dated 21.07.2015. 3.2 Making   above   submissions,   it   is   prayed   to   allow   the present appeal. 4. Present   appeal   is   vehemently   opposed   by   Shri   H.D. Thanvi,   learned   counsel   appearing   on   behalf   of   the respondents.  4.1 Relying   upon   the   decision   of   this   Court   in   the   case   of John   D’Souza   vs.   Karnataka   State   Road   Transport Corporation,   (2019)   14   Scale   57,   it   is   vehemently   submitted that   as   observed   and   held   by   this   Hon’ble   Court   the proceedings   under   Section   33(2)(b)   and   Section   10   of   the   I.D. 6 Act are distinct and different.  It is submitted that as observed and   held   by   this   Hon’ble   Court   in   the   aforesaid   decision   the proceedings   under   Section   33(2)(b)   of   the   I.D.   Act   are summary   in   nature   and   findings   recorded   while   deciding   the application   under   Section   33(2)(b)   of   the   Act   shall   not   affect the   substantive   right   in   a   reference   under   Section   10   of   the I.D. Act.   4.2 It   is   submitted   that   therefore,   the   Labour   Court   did   not commit   any   error   in   considering   the   validity   of   the   order   of termination   and   thereafter   quashing   and   setting   aside   the same and ordering 50% back wages. 4.3 It   is   submitted   that   considering   the   fact   that   the workman has died and his heir ­ widow is awarded 50% back wages   only,   the   same   may   not   be   interfered   by   this   Court   in exercise   of   powers   under   Article   136   of   the   Constitution   of India. 7 5. We   have   heard   the   learned   counsel   for   the   respective parties at length. 5.1. At the outset, it is required to be noted that the workman was subjected to departmental enquiry and the charge against the   deceased   workman   was   not   issuing   the   tickets   to   10 passengers though he collected the fare.  On conclusion of the departmental   enquiry   his   services   were   terminated.     The termination was the subject matter of the approval application before the Industrial Tribunal in an application under Section 33(2)(b)   of   the   I.D.   Act.     In   the   said   proceedings   the management was permitted to lead the evidence and prove the charge/misconduct   before   the   Tribunal.     In   the   said application   the   parties   led   the   evidence,   both,   oral   as   well   as documentary.     Thereafter   on   appreciation   of   evidence   on record,   the   Industrial   Tribunal   by   order   dated   21.07.2015 approved   the   order   of   termination.     That   thereafter   the workman   raised   the   Industrial   Dispute   challenging   the   order of   termination   which   as   such   was   proved   by   the   Industrial 8 Tribunal by order dated 21.07.2015.  Therefore, once the order of   termination   was   approved   by   the   Industrial   Tribunal   and the management was permitted to lead the evidence and prove the   misconduct   before   the   Court   and   thereafter   on appreciation   of   evidence   the   order   of   termination   was approved,   thereafter   the   fresh   reference   under   Section   10   of the   I.D.   Act   challenging   the   order   of   termination   was   not permissible.     It   is   required   to   be   noted   that   the   order   dated 21.07.2015 passed by the Industrial Tribunal which as such is a   higher   forum   than   the   Labour   Court   had   attained   the finality.   Though the aforesaid fact was pointed out before the High   Court,   the   High   Court   has   not   at   all   considered   and/or appreciated   the   same   and   has   confirmed   the   judgment   and award passed by the Labour Court for  setting aside the order of   termination   which   as   such   was   approved   by   the   Industrial Tribunal. 5.2 Now   so   far   as   the   reliance   placed   upon   the   decision   of this Court in the case of  John D’Souza  (supra) by the learned 9 counsel   appearing   on   behalf   of   the   respondent   is   concerned, on facts the said decision shall not be applicable to the facts of the   case   on   hand.     In   the   present   case   by   specific   order   the Industrial   Tribunal   permitted   the   management   to   lead   the evidence and prove the misconduct before the Court which as such was permissible.   That thereafter the Industrial Tribunal approved   the   order   of   termination.   Once   the   order   of termination   was   approved   by   the   Industrial   Tribunal   on appreciation   of   evidence   led   before   it,   thereafter   the   findings recorded by the Industrial Tribunal were binding  between the parties.     No   contrary   view   could   have   been   taken   by   the Labour   Court   contrary   to   the   findings   recorded   by   the Industrial Tribunal. 6. In view of the above, the judgment and award passed by the   Labour   Court   confirmed   by   the   High   Court   is unsustainable.   The High Court has committed a very serious error in dismissing the writ petition/writ appeal confirming the 10 judgment and award passed by the Labour Court setting aside the order of termination. 7. In view of the above and for  the reason stated above the present   appeal   succeeds.     The   impugned   judgment   and  order passed by the High Court confirming the judgment and award passed   by   the   Labour   Court   setting   aside   the   order   of termination   and   the   judgment   and   award   passed   by   the Labour Court setting aside the order of termination are hereby quashed and set aside. The   Present   Appeal   is   Allowed   to   the   aforesaid   extent. However,   in   the   facts   and   circumstances   of   the   case,   there shall be no order as to costs. …………………………………J.             (M. R. SHAH) …………………………………J. New Delhi,     (KRISHNA MURARI) September 30, 2022.