/2022 INSC 0889/
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL ORIGINAL/ APPELLATE JURISDICTION 
I.A. No.68597 of 2021 AND I.A. No. 51632 of 2022 
IN &
WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.1159 OF 2019
HDFC BANK LTD. & ORS.      ...PETITIONER (S)
 
VERSUS
UNION OF INDIA & ORS.  ...RESPONDENT (S)
WITH 
I.A. No.54521 of 2022
IN &
WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.683 OF 2021
WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 1469 OF 2019
WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.690 OF 2021
WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.709 OF 2021
WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.768 OF 2021
WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.765 OF 2021
SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) NO.14343 OF 2022
 
O R D E R
1

B.R. GAVAI, J.
1. For   the   reasons   stated   in   I.A.   No.68597   of   2021   in   Writ
Petition   (Civil)   No.1159   of   2019   for   Impleadment,   the   same   is
allowed. 
2. This   batch   of   writ   petitions   has   been   filed   by   various
Banks   including   private   banks,   inter   alia,   challenging   the
action   of   the   respondent­Reserve   Bank   of   India   (hereinafter
referred  to   as  “RBI”)   in  directing   disclosure   of  confidential  and
sensitive information pertaining to their affairs, their employees
and   their   customers   under   the   Right   to   Information   Act,   2005
(hereinafter   referred   to   as   “the   RTI   Act”),   which,   in   their
submission, is otherwise exempt under Section 8 thereof.   
3. We   are   treating   Writ   Petition   (Civil)   No.   1159   of   2019   as
the lead matter. 
4. Interlocutory Applications being I.A. No. 51632 of 2022 in
Writ Petition (Civil) No.1159 of 2019 and I.A. No.54521 of 2022
in   Writ   Petition   (Civil)   No.683   of   2021   have   been   filed   by   the
2

applicant­Girish   Mittal,   thereby   seeking   dismissal   of   the
present writ petitions. 
5. It   is   the   contention   of   the   applicant   that   the   present   writ
petitions, in effect, are challenging the final judgment and order
dated 16 th
  December 2015, passed by this Court in the case of
Reserve   Bank   of   India   vs.   Jayantilal   N.   Mistry 1
  and   hence
the same is not maintainable and is liable to be dismissed.  
6. We   have   heard   Mr.   Prashant   Bhushan,   learned   counsel
appearing   on   behalf   of   the   applicant­Girish   Mittal   and   Mr.
Rakesh   Dwivedi,   Mr.   Mukul   Rohatgi,   Mr.   Dushyant   Dave,   Mr.
Jaideep   Gupta,   and   Mr.   K.V.   Viswanathan,   learned   Senior
Counsels and Mr. Divyanshu Sahay, learned counsel appearing
on behalf of the writ petitioners/Banks. 
7. Mr.   Prashant   Bhushan,   learned   counsel,   submitted   that
the   issue   which   is   sought   to   be   raised   in   the   present   writ
petitions   has   already   been   put   to   rest   by   a   judgment   of   this
court in the case of  Jayantilal N. Mistry   (supra) .    It is further
1   (2016) 3 SCC 525 
3

submitted   that   this   Court,   in   the   case   of   Girish   Mittal   vs.
Parvati   V.   Sundaram   and   another 2
,   while   holding   that   the
RBI   has   committed   contempt   of   this   Court   by   exempting
disclosure   of   material   that   was   directed   to   be   given   by   this
Court, has also held that the RBI was duty bound to furnish all
information relating to inspection reports and other materials.  
8. Mr.   Prashant   Bhushan   relies   on   the   judgment   of   a   Nine­
Judge   Bench   of   this   Court   in   the   case   of   Naresh   Shridhar
Mirajkar and others vs. State of Maharashtra and Anr. 3
 in
support   of   his   proposition   that   a   judicial   decision   cannot   be
corrected   by   this   Court   in   exercise   of   its   jurisdiction   under
Article   32   of   the   Constitution   of   India.     He   also   relied   on   the
judgment   of   a   Seven­Judge   Bench   of   this   Court   in   the  case   of
A.R.   Antulay   vs.   R.S.   Nayak   and   another 4
  to   contend   that
the judicial proceedings in this Court are not subject to the writ
jurisdiction thereof.
2  (2019) 20 SCC 747 =  Contempt Petition (C) No.  928 of 2016 in Transfer Case (C) No. 
95 of 2015, decided on 26 th
 April 2019
3   (1966) 3 SCR 744
4   (1988) 2 SCC 602
4

9. Mr.   Prashant   Bhushan   further   submitted   that   this   Court
in   the   case   of   Anil   Kumar   Barat   vs.   Secretary,   Indian   Tea
Association   and   others 5
  has   also   held   that  the   validity   of   an
order   passed   by   this   Court   itself   cannot   be   subject   to   writ
jurisdiction of this Court.  
10. Mr.   Bhushan   also   relied   on   the   judgments   of   a   Three­
Judge Bench of this Court in the cases of  Khoday Distilleries
Ltd.  and  another  vs.   Registrar  General,  Supreme  Court  of
India 6
,   Mohd.   Aslam   vs.   Union   of   India   and   others 7
  and
Union   of   India   and   others   vs.   Major   S.P.   Sharma   and
others 8
  and the judgment of a Five­Judge Bench of this Court
in   the   case   of   Rupa   Ashok   Hurra   vs.   Ashok   Hurra   and
another 9
 to buttress his submissions.
11. Mr.   Bhushan   further   submitted   that   in   the   case   of
Jayantilal   N.   Mistry   (supra) ,   several   Miscellaneous
5   (2001) 5 SCC 42 
6   (1996) 3 SCC 114
7   (1996) 2 SCC 749
8   (2014) 6 SCC 351
9   (2002) 4 SCC 388
5

Applications were filed on behalf of the Banks for impleadment.
As   such,   the   judgment   delivered   in   the   case   of   Jayantilal   N.
Mistry   (supra)   is   after   consideration   of   rival   submissions,
which now cannot be reopened.  He further submitted that this
Court by order dated 28 th
 April 2021, passed in M.A. No.2342 of
2019   in   Transferred   Case   (Civil)   No.91   of   2015   and   other
connected   matters   has   specifically   rejected   the   prayer   filed   by
the   Banks   (writ   petitioners   herein)   for   recall   of   the   judgment
dated 16 th
  December  2015 passed  by  this  Court in  the  case of
Jayantilal   N.   Mistry   (supra) ,   and   as   such,   the   present   writ
petitions are liable to be dismissed.  
12. Per   contra,   the   learned   Senior   Counsels   appearing   on
behalf   of   the   writ   petitioners/Banks   submit   that   though   M.A.
No.2342 of 2019 in Transferred Case (Civil) No.91 of 2015 and
other   connected   matters   were   rejected   by   this   Court   by   order
dated 28 th
  April 2021, this Court clarified that the dismissal of
those   applications   shall   not   prevent   the   applicant­Banks
therein to pursue other remedies available to them in law. It is
6

thus submitted that the said order would not come in the way
of the present petitioners in filing the present petitions. 
13. It is submitted that Section 11 of the RTI Act provides that
when any information relating to third party has been sought, a
written notice is required to be given to such third party of the
request,   by   the   Central   Public   Information   Officer   or   State
Public   Information   Officer,   as   the   case   may   be,   and   the
submissions   by   such   third   party   are  required  to  be  taken   into
consideration   while   taking   a   decision   about   the   disclosure   of
the information. Reliance in this respect has been placed on the
judgment   of   this   Court   in   the   case   of   Chief   Information
Commissioner   vs.   High  Court   of  Gujarat   and  another 10
.     It
is   submitted   that   this   Court   in   the   case   of   Jayantilal   N.
Mistry   (supra)   has   not   taken   into   consideration   this   aspect   of
the matter.  
14. It   is   further   submitted   on   behalf   of   the   writ
petitioners/Banks that the right to privacy has been said to be
10   (2020) 4 SCC 702
7

as   implicit   fundamental   right   by   a   Five­Judge   Constitution
Bench of this Court in the case of   Supreme Court Advocates­
on­Record   Association   and   another   vs.   Union   of   India 11
.   It
is   submitted   that   the   said   view   is   also   reiterated   by   a   Nine­
Judge   Constitution   Bench   of   this   Court   in   the   case   of   K.S.
Puttaswamy   and   another   vs   Union   of   India   and   others 12
,
which   has   explicitly   and   categorically   recognised   the   right   to
privacy as a fundamental right.   
15. Mr. Rakesh Dwivedi, learned Senior Counsel, relied on the
judgment  of this  Court in  the  case  of   A.R.   Antulay   (supra)   in
support   of   the   proposition   that   no   man   should   suffer   because
of   the   mistake   of   the   Court.       He   submits   that   the   rules   of
procedure are the handmaidens of justice and not the mistress
of   justice.     He   relies   on   the   maxim   “ ex   debito   justitiae ”.     He
further   relies   on   the   judgment   of   this   Court   in   the   case   of
Sanjay   Singh   and   another   vs.   U.P.   Public   Service
11   (2016) 5 SCC 1
12   (2017) 10 SCC 1
8

Commission,   Allahabad   and   another 13
  in   support   of   the
submission that the petition would be tenable.  
16. Mr.   Mukul   Rohatgi,   learned   Senior   Counsel,   submitted
that   the   petitioners   herein   are   private   banks   and   not   a   public
authority   as   defined   under   the   RTI   Act.     He   relies   on   the
judgment   of   this   Court   in   the   case   of   Thalappalam   Service
Cooperative   Bank   Limited   and   others   vs.   State   of   Kerala
and   others 14
  in   that   regard .     He   submitted   that   RBI’s
Inspection   Reports   in   respect   of   the   inspection   carried   out
under   Section   35   of   the   Banking   Regulation   Act,   1949   are   so
confidential that they cannot even be provided to the Directors
individually.  He relies on the communication issued by the RBI
to all the Banks dated 14 th
 March 1998 in this regard.  
17. Mr.   Rohatgi   further   submitted   that   an   earlier   policy   as
notified   by   the   RBI   on   30 th
  June   1992   was   in   tune   with   the
provisions   of   Section   8   of   the   RTI   Act,   the   provisions   of   the
Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934 (hereinafter referred to as “the
13  (2007) 3 SCC 720
14  (2013) 16 SCC 82
9

RBI   Act”)   and   the   Banking   Regulation   Act,   1949.   However,   in
view of the judgment of this Court in the case of   Girish Mittal
(supra) ,   the RBI  has modified the  policy  into a one­line policy,
providing therein that the disclosure of information was to be in
accordance   with   the   judgment   and   order   of   this   Court   in
Girish   Mittal   (supra) .       Mr.   Rohatgi,   learned   Senior   Counsel
relied   on   the   judgment   of   this   Court   in   the   case   of   Bihar
Public Service Commission vs. Saiyed Hussain Abbas Rizwi
and another 15
 in support of his submission that the Court will
have   to   strike   a   balance   between   public   interest   and   private
interest.     He   also   relies   on   the   judgment   of   this   Court   in   the
case   of   Girish   Ramchandra   Deshpande   vs.   Central
Information   Commissioner   and   others 16
  to   contend   that
personal information cannot be directed to be disclosed unless
outweighing public interest demands it to be done.  
18. Mr.   K.V.   Viswanathan,   learned   Senior   Counsel   submits
that   HDFC   Bank,   Kotak   Bank   and   Bandhan   Bank   were   not
15  (2012) 13 SCC 61
16  (2013) 1 SCC 212
10

parties   in   the   case   of   Jayantilal   N.   Mistry   (supra) .     He
submits   that   sub­Section   (5)   of   Section   35   of   the   Banking
Regulation   Act,   1949   provides   a   specific   procedure   as   to   in
what   manner   the   inspection   report   would   be   published.     He
submits   that   when  a  special   Act   provides   a   particular   manner
for disclosure of an information, it will have an overriding effect
over the RTI Act. The learned Senior  Counsel submits that the
said   provisions   were   not   noticed   in   the   case   of   Jayantilal   N.
Mistry   (supra) .
19. Mr. Jaideep Gupta, learned Senior Counsel submitted that
this Court in the case of   Jayantilal N. Mistry (supra)   has not
taken   into   consideration   the   provisions   of   the   Credit
Information Companies (Regulation) Act, 2005.  
20. Mr.   Dushyant   Dave,   learned   Senior   Counsel,   submitted
that   Section   45NB   of   the   RBI   Act   emphasizes   on   the
confidentiality   of   certain   information   with   regard   to   non­
banking companies.  He submits that sub­section (4) of Section
45NB of the RBI Act, which is a non­obstante clause, provides
11

that,   notwithstanding   anything   contained   in   any   law   for   the
time being in force, no court or tribunal or other authority shall
compel   the   Bank   to   produce   or   to   give   inspection   of   any
statement   or   other   material   obtained   by   the   Bank   under   any
provisions   of   this   Chapter.   He   submits   that   this   provision   has
not been noticed in the case of  Jayantilal N. Mistry   (supra) .
21. It is submitted on behalf of all the writ petitioners/Banks
that what is under challenge is the action of the RBI compelling
the   petitioners   to   disclose   certain   information   which   itself   is
exempted under the provisions of the RBI Act.   It is submitted
that various other special enactments specifically prohibit such
information to be disclosed.  It is submitted that since the RBI’s
directions   are   issued   in   pursuance   to   the   judgments   of   this
Court in the cases of   Jayantilal N. Mistry   (supra)  and   Girish
Mittal  (supra) , the petitioners cannot approach the High Court
and   the   only   remedy   that   is   available   to   the   petitioners   is   by
way   of   the   present   writ   petitions.     It   is   submitted   by   learned
Senior   Counsels   appearing   on   behalf   of   the   writ
12

petitioners/Banks   that   this   Court   in   Jayantilal   N.   Mistry
(supra)   does not notice the judgment of this Court in the case
of   Supreme   Court   Advocates­on­Record   Association   and
another   (supra).     The   judgment   of   this   Court   in   the   case   of
Supreme   Court   Advocates­on­Record   Association   and
another   (supra)   was   rendered   on   16 th
  October   2015,   whereas
the judgment of this Court in the case of  Jayantilal N. Mistry
(supra)   was   rendered   on   16 th
  December   2015.     It   is   further
submitted   that,   in   view   of   the   judgment   of   the   Constitution
Bench   consisting   of   Nine   Hon’ble   Judges   in   the   case   of   K.S.
Puttaswamy and another  (supra)  clearly recognizing the right
to   privacy   as   a   fundamental   right,   the   law   laid   down   by   this
Court   in   the   case   of   Jayantilal   N.   Mistry   (supra)   to   the
contrary   is   no   more   a   good   law   and,   therefore,   requires
reconsideration by a larger Bench.
22. In   the   case   of   Naresh   Shridhar   Mirajkar   and   others
(supra) ,   a   Nine­Judge   Constitution   Bench   of   this   Court   was
considering   as   to   whether   an   order   passed   by   the   High   Court
13

on original side in the proceedings before it could be challenged
under   Article   32   of   the   Constitution   for   enforcement   of
fundamental   rights   guaranteed   under   Article   19(1)(a),   (d)   and
(g) of the Constitution of India.  It will be relevant to refer to the
following observations of this Court in the said case:
  “The basis of Mr Setalvad's argument is that
the   impugned   order   is   not   an   order   inter­
partes, as it affects the fundamental rights of
the   strangers   to   the   litigation,   and   that   the
said   order   is   without   jurisdiction.   We   have
already   held   that   the   impugned   order
cannot be said to affect the fundamental
rights of the petitioners and that though
it   is   not   inter­partes   in   the   sense   that   it
affects   strangers   to   the   proceedings,   it
has   been   passed   by   the   High   Court   in
relation to a matter pending before it for
its   adjudication   and   as   such,   like   other
judicial   orders   passed   by   the   High   Court
in   proceedings   pending   before   it,   the
correctness of the impugned order can be
challenged   only   by   appeal   and   not   by
writ   proceedings.   We   have   also   held   that
the   High   Court   has   inherent   jurisdiction   to
pass such an order.
But   apart   from   this   aspect   of   the   matter,
we   think   it   would   be   inappropriate   to   allow
the   petitioners   to   raise   the   question   about
the jurisdiction of the High Court to pass the
impugned order in proceedings under Article
14

32   which   seek   for   the   issue   of   a   writ   of
certiorari   to   correct   the   said   order.   If
questions   about   the   jurisdiction   of   superior
courts   of   plenary   jurisdiction   to   pass   orders
like   the   impugned   order   are   allowed   to   be
canvassed   in   writ   proceedings   under   Article
32,   logically,   it   would   be   difficult   to   make   a
valid   distinction   between   the   orders   passed
by   the   High   Courts   inter­partes,   and   those
which   are   not   inter­partes   in   the   sense   that
they   bind   strangers   to   the   proceedings.
Therefore,   in   our   opinion,   having   regard   to
the   fact   that   the   impugned   order   has   been
passed   by   a   superior   court   of   record   in   the
exercise   of   its   inherent   powers,   the   question
about the existence of the said jurisdiction as
well   as   the   validity   or   propriety   of   the   order
cannot   be   raised   in   writ   proceedings   taken
out   by   the   petitioners   for   the   issue   of   a   writ
of certiorari under Article 32.”
[emphasis supplied]
23. It   could   thus   be   seen   that   the   Nine­Judge   Bench   of   this
Court,   speaking   through   P.B.   Gajendragadkar,   CJ.,
categorically held that the impugned orders could not  affect the
fundamental rights of the petitioners.   It has further been held
that   since   the   order   was   passed   in   the   proceedings   pending
before   the   High   Court,   the   correctness   of   the   impugned   order
could   be   challenged   only   by   appeal   and   not   by   writ
proceedings.  It has been further held that, having regard to the
15

fact   that   the   order   had   been   passed   by   a   superior   court   of
record in the exercise of its inherent powers, the question about
the   existence   of   the   said   jurisdiction   as   well   as   the   validity   or
propriety   of   the   order   could   not   be   raised   in   writ   proceedings
taken out by the petitioners for the issue of a writ of certiorari
under Article 32.  This Court further observed thus:
“We   are,   therefore,   satisfied   that   so   far   as
the   jurisdiction   of   this   Court   to   issue   writs
of certiorari is concerned, it is impossible to
accept   the   argument   of   the   petitioners   that
judicial   orders  passed   by  High   Courts  in   or
in   relation   to   proceedings   pending   before
them,   are   amenable   to   be   corrected   by
exercise   of   the   said   jurisdiction.   We   have
no   doubt   that   it   would   be   unreasonable
to attempt to rationalise the assumption
of   jurisdiction   by   this   Court   under
Article 32 to correct such judicial orders
on   the   fanciful   hypothesis   that   High
Courts   may   pass   extravagant   orders   in
or   in   relation   to   matters   pending   before
them   and   that   a   remedy   by   way   of   a
writ   of   certiorari   should,   therefore,   be
sought for and be deemed to be included
within the scope of Article 32.   The words
used   in   Article   32   are   no   doubt   wide;   but
having   regard   to   the   considerations   which
we   have   set   out   in   the   course   of   this
judgment,   we   are   satisfied   that   the
impugned   order   cannot   be   brought   within
16

the   scope   of   this   Court's   jurisdiction   to
issue a writ of certiorari under Article 32; to
hold   otherwise   would   be   repugnant   to   the
well­recognised limitations within which the
jurisdiction   to   issue   writs   of   certiorari   can
be   exercised   and   inconsistent   with   the
uniform   trend   of   this   Court's   decisions   in
relation to the said point.”
[emphasis supplied]
24. It could thus be seen that this Court held that it would be
unreasonable   to   hold   that   this   Court,   under   Article   32,   could
correct the judicial orders on the   fanciful hypothesis that High
Courts may pass extravagant orders in or in relation to matters
pending   before   them   and   therefore   this   Court   can   correct   the
same by issuance of a writ of certiorari under Article 32.   This
Court  held that  though  the  words  used  in  Article  32  are  wide,
the   order   impugned   before   it   could   not   be   brought   within   the
scope   of   this   Court’s   jurisdiction   to   issue   a   writ   of   certiorari
under Article 32. 
25.     Insofar   as   the   judgment   of   this   Court   in   the   case   of
Khoday  Distilleries  Ltd.   and  another   (supra) , on  which Mr.
Prashant Bhushan placed reliance, is concerned, this Court in
17

the   said   case   was   considering   therein   a   challenge   to   the
correctness of the decision on merits after the appeal as well as
review petition were dismissed.  
26. In the case of   Mohd. Aslam (supra),   this Court held that
Article   32   of   the   Constitution   was   not   available   to   assail   the
correctness of a decision on merits or to claim reconsideration.
It,   however,   considered   the   contention   raised   on   behalf   of   the
petitioners that the judgment in the case of  Manohar Joshi vs.
Nitin   Bhaurao   Patil   and   another 17
  was   in   conflict   with   the
Constitution Bench judgement of this Court in the case of  S.R.
Bommai   and   others   vs.   Union   of   India   and   others 18
.     This
Court   after considering the submissions found that the opinion
so expressed was misplaced. 
27. Insofar as the judgment of this Court in the case of  Major
S.P.   Sharma   and   others   (supra)   is   concerned,   in   the   said
case,   the   first   round   of   litigation   arising   out   of   termination   of
respondent­employee   had   reached   finality   upto   this   Court.
17   (1996) 1 SCC 169
18   (1994) 3 SCC 1
18

However, the same was sought to be reopened by filing another
writ   petition   before   the   High   Court.     In   this   background,   this
Court observed thus:
“ 90.   Violation   of   fundamental   rights
guaranteed under the Constitution have to be
protected, but at the same time, it is the duty
of   the   court   to   ensure   that   the   decisions
rendered   by   the   court   are   not   overturned
frequently,   that   too,   when   challenged
collaterally   as   that   was   directly   affecting   the
basic   structure   of   the   Constitution
incorporating   the   power   of   judicial   review   of
this Court. There is no doubt that this Court
has an extensive power to correct an error or
to review its decision but that cannot be done
at the cost of doctrine of finality. An issue of
law can be overruled later on, but a question
of fact or, as in the present case, the dispute
with   regard   to   the   termination   of   services
cannot   be   reopened   once   it   has   been   finally
sealed   in   proceedings   inter   se   between   the
parties up to this Court way back in 1980.”
28. It could thus be seen that this court has held that when a
question   of   fact   has   reached   finality   inter   se   between   the
parties,   it   cannot   be   reopened   in   a   collateral   proceeding.
However,   it   has   been   observed   that   an   issue   of   law   can   be
overruled later on. 
19

29. Mr. Prashant Bhushan strongly relied on the judgment of
this Court in the case of  Rupa Ashok Hurra (supra).   It will be
relevant   to   refer   to   the   following   observations   of   this   Court   in
the judgment of Quadri, J. 
“41. At   one   time   adherence   to   the   principle
of   stare decisis   was so rigidly followed in the
courts   governed   by   the   English
jurisprudence  that  departing   from  an  earlier
precedent   was   considered   heresy.   With   the
declaration   of   the   practice   statement   by   the
House of Lords, the highest court in England
was   enabled   to   depart   from   a   previous
decision   when   it   appeared   right   to   do   so.
The   next   step   forward   by   the   highest
court   to   do   justice   was   to   review   its
judgment   inter   partes   to   correct
injustice.   So   far   as   this   Court   is
concerned,   we   have   already   pointed   out
above   that   it   has   been   conferred   the
power to review its own judgments under
Article   137   of   the   Constitution.   The   role
of   the   judiciary   to   merely   interpret   and
declare   the   law   was   the   concept   of   a
bygone  age.   It  is   no more  open  to debate
as it is fairly settled that the courts can
so   mould   and   lay   down   the   law
formulating principles  and guidelines  as
to   adapt   and   adjust   to   the   changing
conditions   of   the   society,   the   ultimate
objective being to dispense justice. In the
recent   years   there   is   a   discernible   shift
20

in   the   approach   of   the   final   courts   in
favour   of   rendering   justice   on   the   facts
presented   before   them,   without
abrogating but bypassing the principle of
finality   of   the   judgment.   In   Union   of
India   v.   Raghubir   Singh   [(1989)   2   SCC   754]
Pathak,   C.J.   speaking   for   the   Constitution
Bench aptly observed: (SCC pp. 766­67, para
10)
“10. But like all principles evolved by
man   for   the   regulation   of   the   social
order,   the   doctrine   of   binding
precedent   is   circumscribed   in   its
governance by perceptible limitations,
limitations arising by reference to the
need   for   readjustment   in   a   changing
society,   a   readjustment   of   legal
norms demanded by a changed social
context.   This   need   for   adapting   the
law   to   new   urges   in   society   brings
home   the   truth   of   the   Holmesian
aphorism  that ‘the life of the law has
not been logic it has been experience’
(Oliver   Wendell   Holmes   :   The
Common   Law ,   p.   5),   and   again   when
he   declared   in   another   study   (Oliver
Wendell   Holmes   :   Common   Carriers
and   the   Common   Law ,   (1943)   9   Curr
LT   387,   388)   that   ‘the   law   is   forever
adopting   new   principles   from   life   at
one end’, and  ‘sloughing  off’ old  ones
at   the   other.   Explaining   the
conceptual   import   of   what   Holmes
had   said,   Julius   Stone   elaborated
that   it   is   by   the   introduction   of   new
extra­legal   propositions   emerging
21

from experience to serve as premises,
or   by   experience­guided   choice
between competing legal propositions,
rather   than   by   the   operation   of   logic
upon  existing  legal  propositions,  that
the   growth   of   law   tends   to   be
determined   (Julius   Stone   :   Legal
Systems   &   Lawyers   Reasoning ,   pp.
58­59).”
42.  The   concern   of   this   Court   for
rendering justice in a cause is not less
important than the principle of finality
of   its   judgment.   We   are   faced   with
competing   principles   —   ensuring
certainty and finality of a judgment  of
the Court of last resort and dispensing
justice   on   reconsideration   of   a
judgment   on   the   ground   that   it   is
vitiated   being   in   violation   of   the
principles   of   natural   justice   or   giving
scope for apprehension of bias due to a
Judge who participated in the decision­
making process not disclosing his links
with a party to the case, or on account
of   abuse   of   the   process   of   the   court .
Such   a   judgment,   far   from   ensuring
finality,   will   always   remain   under   the
cloud of uncertainty. Almighty alone is the
dispenser   of   absolute   justice   —   a   concept
which   is   not   disputed   but   by   a   few.   We
are   of   the   view   that   though   Judges   of
the highest  court  do  their  best,  subject
of   course   to   the   limitation   of   human
fallibility,   yet   situations   may   arise,   in
the   rarest   of   the   rare   cases,   which
22

would   require   reconsideration   of   a
final judgment to set right miscarriage
of   justice   complained   of.   In   such   case
it   would   not   only   be   proper   but   also
obligatory   both   legally   and   morally   to
rectify the error.   After giving our anxious
consideration   to   the   question,   we   are
persuaded   to   hold   that   the   duty   to   do
justice   in   these   rarest   of   rare   cases   shall
have  to   prevail   over  the   policy   of   certainty
of   judgment   as   though   it   is   essentially   in
the public interest that a final judgment of
the   final   court   in   the   country   should   not
be   open   to   challenge,   yet   there   may   be
circumstances,   as   mentioned   above,
wherein   declining   to   reconsider   the
judgment   would   be   oppressive   to   judicial
conscience   and   would   cause   perpetuation
of irremediable injustice.
xxx xxx xxx
49.  The   upshot   of   the   discussion   in   our
view is that this Court, to prevent abuse of
its process and to cure a gross miscarriage
of justice, may reconsider its judgments in
exercise of its inherent power.”
[emphasis supplied]
30. This   Court   in   the   aforesaid   case   held   that   the   concern   of
this Court for rendering justice in a cause is not less important
than the principle of finality  of its judgment. The Court has to
balance   ensuring   certainty   and   finality   of   a   judgment   of   the
23

Court   of   last   resort   on   one   hand   and   dispensing   justice   on
reconsideration   of   a   judgment   on   the   valid   grounds   on   the
other   hand.       This   Court   has   observed   that   though   Judges   of
the highest court do their best, yet situations may arise, in the
rarest of the rare cases, which would require reconsideration of
a  final  judgment  to  set  right  miscarriage  of  justice  complained
of.     It has been held that  in such a case it  would not  only  be
proper but also obligatory both legally and morally to rectify the
error.     This   Court   further   held   that   to   prevent   abuse   of   its
process   and   to   cure   a   gross   miscarriage   of   justice,   the   Court
may reconsider its judgments in exercise of its inherent power.
31. This Court in the case of   A.R. Antulay   (supra) ,   speaking
through   Sabyasachi Mukharji, J.  observed thus:
“ 82 . Lord   Cairns   in   Rodger   v.   Comptoir
D'escompte De Paris   [(1869­71) LR 3 PC 465,
475 : 17 ER 120] observed thus:
“Now,   Their   Lordships   are   of
opinion,   that   one   of   the   first   and
highest   duties   of   all   courts   is   to
take   care   that   the   act   of   the   court
does no injury to any of the suitors,
and when the expression ‘the act of
24

the court’ is used, it does not mean
merely the act of the primary court,
or   of   any   intermediate   court   of
appeal, but the act of the court as a
whole, from the lowest court which
entertains   jurisdiction   over   the
matter   up   to   the   highest   court
which   finally   disposes   of   the   case.
It   is   the   duty   of   the   aggregate   of
those   Tribunals,   if   I   may   use   the
expression, to take care that no act
of   the   court   in   the   course   of   the
whole   of   the   proceedings   does   an
injury to the suitors in the court. 
83 . This passage was quoted in the Gujarat
High   Court   by   D.A.   Desai,   J.,   speaking   for
the Gujarat High Court in   Soni Vrajlal   v.   Soni
Jadavji   [AIR   1972   Guj   148   :   (1972)   13   Guj
LR 555] as mentioned before. It appears that
in giving directions on 16­2­1984, this Court
acted   per   incuriam   inasmuch   it   did   not   bear
in   mind   consciously   the   consequences   and
the   provisions   of   Sections   6   and   7   of   the
1952   Act   and   the   binding   nature   of   the
larger   Bench   decision   in   Anwar   Ali   Sarkar
case   [AIR 1952 SC 75 : 1952 SCR 284 : 1952
Cri   LJ   510]   which   was   not   adverted   to   by
this   Court.   The   basic   fundamentals   of   the
administration of justice are simple. No man
should   suffer   because   of   the   mistake   of   the
court.   No   man   should   suffer   a   wrong   by
technical procedure of irregularities. Rules or
procedures are the handmaids of justice and
not   the   mistress   of   the   justice.   Ex   debito
justitiae , we must do justice to him. If a man
has   been   wronged   so   long   as   it   lies   within
the   human   machinery   of   administration   of
25

justice that wrong must be remedied. This is
a   peculiar   fact   of   this   case   which   requires
emphasis.”
32. It   could   thus   be   seen   that   the   principle   of   ex   debito
justitiae   has   been   emphasized.     This   Court   held   that   n o   man
should   suffer   because   of   the   mistake   of   the   court.   No   man
should suffer a wrong by technical procedure of irregularities. It
has been held that the rules of procedure are the handmaidens
of   justice   and   not   the   mistress   of   justice.     It   has   further   been
held that if a man has been wronged, so long as the wrong lies
within   the   human   machinery   of   administration   of   justice,   that
wrong must be remedied. 
33. Ranganath  Misra,  J.,  in  his  concurrent  opinion,   observed
thus:
“ 102 . This   being   the   apex   court,   no
litigant   has   any   opportunity   of   approaching
any   higher   forum   to   question   its   decisions.
Lord  Buckmaster  in   Montreal  Street  Railway
Co.   v.   Normadin   [1917 AC 170] ( sic ) stated:
All   rules   of   court   are   nothing   but
provisions   intended   to   secure   proper
administration   of   justice.   It   is,
26

therefore, essential that they  should be
made   to   serve   and   be   subordinate   to
that purpose.
This   Court   in   State   of
Gujarat   v.   Ramprakash P. Puri   [(1969) 3 SCC
156 : 1970 SCC (Cri) 29 : (1970) 2 SCR 875]
reiterated the position by saying [SCC p. 159
: SCC (Cri) p. 31, para 8]
Procedure   has   been   described   to   be   a
handmaid   and   not   a   mistress   of   law,
intended   to   subserve   and   facilitate   the
cause   of   justice   and   not   to   govern   or
obstruct   it.   Like   all   rules   of   procedure,
this rule demands a construction which
would promote this cause
Once judicial satisfaction is reached that the
direction   was   not   open   to   be   made   and   it   is
accepted  as   a   mistake   of   the   court,   it   is  not
only   appropriate   but   also   the   duty   of   the
court   to   rectify   the   mistake   by   exercising
inherent   powers.   Judicial   opinion   heavily
leans in favour of this view that a mistake of
the court can be corrected by the court itself
without   any   fetters.   This   is   on   the   principle
as   indicated   in   ( Alexander )   Rodger
case   [(1969­71) LR 3 PC 465 : 17 ER 120] . I
am of the view that in the present situation,
the court's inherent powers can be exercised
to   remedy   the   mistake.   Mahajan.,   J.
speaking   for   a   Four   Judge   Bench
27

in   Keshardeo   Chamria   v.   Radha   Kissen
Chamria   [1953   SCR   136   :   AIR   1953   SC   23]
at Page 153 stated:
The judge had jurisdiction to correct his
own   error   without   entering   into   a
discussion of the grounds taken by the
decree­holder   or   the   objections   raised
by the judgment­debtors.  
103 . The   Privy   Council   in   Debi   Bakhsh
Singh   v.   Habib   Shah   [ILR   (1913)   35   All   331]
pointed   out   that   an   abuse   of   the   process   of
the  court  may  be committed by   the court  or
by   a   party.   Where   a   court   employed   a
procedure in doing something which it never
intended   to   do   and   there   is   an   abuse   of   the
process of the court it can be corrected. Lord
Shaw spoke for the Law Lords thus: 
Quite apart from Section 151, any court
might   have   rightly   considered   itself   to
possess an inherent power to rectify the
mistake   which   had   been   inadvertently
made.
It   was   pointed   out   by   the   Privy   Council
in   The Bolivar   [AIR 1916 PC 85] that:
Where   substantial   injustice   would
otherwise   result,   the   Court   has,   in
Their   Lordships'   opinion,   an   inherent
power to set aside its own judgments of
condemnation   so   as   to   let   in   bona   fide
claims by parties...
Indian   authorities   are   in   abundance   to
support   the   view   that   injustice   done   should
be   corrected   by   applying   the   principle   actus
28

curia neminem gravabit —   an act of the court
should prejudice no one. 
104 . To   err   is   human,   is   the   oft­quoted
saying. Courts including the apex one are no
exception.   To   own   up   the   mistake   when
judicial   satisfaction   is   reached   does   not
militatte   against   its   status   or   authority.
Perhaps it would enhance both.”
34. It has been held that t his being the apex court, no litigant
has   any   opportunity   of   approaching   any   higher   forum   to
question   its   decisions.     It   has   further   been   held   that   once   a
judicial satisfaction is reached that the direction was not open
to be made and it is accepted as a mistake of the court, it is not
only   appropriate   but   also   the   duty   of   the   court   to   rectify   the
mistake   by   exercising   its   inherent   powers.   It   has   been   held
that, to err is human, and the Courts including the Apex Court
are no exception.  
35. This   Court   in   the   case   of   Sanjay   Singh   and   another
(supra)   has observed thus:
“ 10.   The   contention   of   the  Commission   also
overlooks   the   fundamental   difference   between
challenge to the final order forming part of the
judgment   and   challenge   to   the   ratio   decidendi
of   the   judgment.   Broadly   speaking,   every
29

judgment   of   superior   courts   has   three
segments, namely, ( i ) the facts and the point at
issue; ( ii ) the  reasons for  the decision;  and ( iii )
the   final   order   containing   the   decision.   The
reasons   for   the   decision   or   the   ratio   decidendi
is   not   the   final   order   containing   the   decision.
In fact, in a judgment of this Court, though the
ratio decidendi may point to a particular result,
the   decision   (final   order   relating   to   relief)   may
be   different   and   not   a   natural   consequence   of
the   ratio   decidendi   of   the   judgment.   This   may
happen   either   on   account   of   any   subsequent
event   or   the   need   to   mould   the   relief   to   do
complete   justice   in   the   matter.   It   is   the   ratio
decidendi of a judgment and not the final order
in the judgment, which forms a precedent. The
term   “judgment”   and   “decision”   are   used,
rather   loosely,   to   refer   to   the   entire   judgment
or   the   final   order   or   the   ratio   decidendi   of   a
judgment.   Rupa   Ashok   Hurra   [(2002)   4   SCC
388]   is   of   course,   an   authority   for   the
proposition   that   a   petition   under   Article   32
would   not   be   maintainable   to   challenge   or   set
aside   or   quash   the   final   order   contained   in   a
judgment of this Court.   It does not lay down
a   proposition   that   the   ratio   decidendi   of
any earlier decision cannot be examined or
differed in another case. Where violation of
a fundamental right of a citizen is alleged
in a petition under Article 32, it cannot be
dismissed,   as   not   maintainable,   merely
because   it   seeks   to   distinguish   or
challenge  the  ratio  decidendi  of  an   earlier
judgment,   except   where   it   is   between   the
same   parties   and   in   respect   of   the   same
cause of action.   Where a legal issue raised in
a   petition   under   Article   32   is   covered   by   a
30

decision   of   this   Court,   the   Court   may   dismiss
the petition following the ratio decidendi of the
earlier   decision.   Such   dismissal   is   not   on   the
ground   of   “maintainability”   but   on   the   ground
that   the   issue   raised   is   not  tenable,   in   view   of
the law laid down in the earlier decision.  But if
the Court is  satisfied that  the issue raised
in the later petition requires consideration
and   in   that   context   the   earlier   decision
requires   re­examination,   the   Court   can
certainly proceed to examine the matter (or
refer   the   matter   to   a   larger   Bench,   if   the
earlier   decision   is   not   of   a   smaller   Bench).
When   the   issue   is   re­examined   and   a   view   is
taken   different   from   the   one   taken   earlier,   a
new   ratio   is   laid   down.   When   the   ratio
decidendi   of   the   earlier   decision   undergoes
such   change,   the   final   order   of   the   earlier
decision   as   applicable   to   the   parties   to   the
earlier   decision,   is   in   no   way   altered   or
disturbed. Therefore, the contention that a writ
petition   under   Article   32   is   barred   or   not
maintainable   with   reference   to   an   issue   which
is   the   subject­matter   of   an   earlier   decision,   is
rejected.”
[emphasis supplied]
36. After referring to the judgment of this Court in the case of
Rupa   Ashok   Hurra   (supra) ,   this   Court   has   held   that   it   does
not lay down a proposition  that the ratio decidendi of an earlier
decision   cannot   be   examined   or   differed   with   in   another   case.
31

It   has   been   held   that   if   the   Court   is   satisfied   that   the   issue
raised   in   the   later   petition   requires   consideration   and   in   that
context, the earlier decision requires re­examination, the Court
can certainly proceed to examine the matter or refer the matter
to   a   larger   Bench,   if   the   earlier   decision   is   not   of   a   smaller
Bench.     This   Court,   therefore,   specifically   rejected   the
contention   that   a   writ   petition   under   Article   32   of   the
Constitution   was   barred   or   not   maintainable   with   reference   to
an issue which was the subject matter of an earlier decision. 
37. In   the   present   case,   admittedly,   the   writ
petitioners/Banks were not parties in the case of  Jayantilal N.
Mistry   (supra) . Though the Miscellaneous Applications filed by
HDFC Bank and others for recall of the judgment and order in
the case of   Jayantilal N. Mistry   (supra)   were rejected by this
Court   vide   order   dated   28 th
  April   2021,   this   Court   in   the   said
order specifically observed thus:
“The dismissal of these applications shall not
prevent   the   applicants   to   pursue   other
remedies available to them in law.”
32

38. It  is  thus  clear  that  this  Court  did not  foreclose  the  right
of the  petitioners/Banks to  pursue other   remedies available  to
them in law. 
39. In   view   of   the   judgment   of   this   Court   in   the   case   of
Jayantilal   N.   Mistry   (supra) ,   the   RBI   is   entitled   to   issue
directions to the petitioners/Banks to disclose information even
with regard to the   individual customers   of the Bank .   In effect,
it   may   adversely   affect   the   individuals’   fundamental   right   to
privacy.  
40. A Nine­Judge Constitution Bench of this Court in the case
of   K.S.   Puttaswamy   and   another   (supra)   has   held   that   the
right to privacy is a fundamental right.   No doubt that the right
to   information   is   also   a   fundamental   right.     In   case   of   such   a
conflict, the Court is required to achieve a sense of balance.  
41. A   perusal   of   the   judgments   of   this   Court   cited   supra
would   reveal   that   it   has   been   held   that   though   the   concept   of
finality of judgment has to be preserved, at the same time, the
33

principle of   ex debito  justitiae   cannot be given a go­bye.   If the
Court   finds   that   the   earlier   judgment   does   not   lay   down   a
correct position of law, it is always permissible for this Court to
reconsider   the   same   and   if   necessary,   to   refer   it   to   a   larger
Bench.  
42. Without expressing any final opinion,   prima facie , we find
that   the   judgment   of   this   Court   in   the   case   of   Jayantilal   N.
Mistry   (supra)   did   not   take   into   consideration   the   aspect   of
balancing the right to information and the right to privacy.  The
petitioners   have   challenged   the   action   of   the   respondent­RBI,
vide   which   the   RBI   issued   directions   to   the   petitioners/Banks
to   disclose   certain   information,   which   according   to   the
petitioners   is   not   only   contrary   to   the   provisions   as   contained
in   the   RTI   Act,   the   RBI   Act   and   the   Banking   Regulation   Act,
1949,   but   also   adversely   affects   the   right   to   privacy   of   such
Banks   and   their   consumers.     The   RBI   has   issued   such
directions   in   view   of   the   decision   of   this   Court   in   the   case   of
Jayantilal   N.   Mistry   (supra)   and   Girish   Mittal   (supra) .     As
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such,   the   petitioners   would   have   no   other   remedy   than   to
approach   this   Court.     As   observed   by   Ranganath   Misra,   J.   in
the   case   of   A.R.   Antulay   (supra)   that,   this   being   the   Apex
Court,   no   litigant   has   any   opportunity   of   approaching   any
higher   forum   to   question   its   decision.     The   only   remedy
available to the petitioners would be to approach this Court by
way of writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India
for protection of the fundamental rights of their customers, who
are citizens of India.   
43. We,   therefore,   hold   that   the   preliminary   objection   as
raised is not sustainable.   The same is rejected.  I.A. No.51632
of   2022   in   Writ   Petition   (Civil)   No.1159   of   2019   and   I.A.
No.54521   of   2022   in   Writ   Petition   (Civil)   No.683   of   2021   are
accordingly dismissed. 
…….........................J.       
[B.R. GAVAI]
…….........................J.       
[C.T. RAVIKUMAR]
NEW DELHI;
SEPTEMBER 30, 2022.
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