/2022 INSC 0913/ REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS. 64­65 OF 2022 Ramanand @ Nandlal Bharti …Appellant  Versus State of Uttar Pradesh …Respondent J U D G M E N T J.B. PARDIWALA, J.      1. Mark   Twain,   the   great   American   writer   and   philosopher,   once said: "It is like this, take a word, split it up into letters, the letters, may   individually   mean   nothing   but   when   they   are combined   they   will   form   a   word   pregnant   with   meaning. That is the way how you have to consider the circumstantial evidence.   You   have   to   take   all   the   circumstances   together and   judge   for   yourself   whether   the   prosecution   have established their case.” 2.  These   appeals,   by   special   leave,   arise   out   of   the   judgment   and order   dated   09.07.2021   passed   by   the   High   Court   of   Judicature   at Allahabad, Bench at Lucknow confirming the death sentence awarded to the accused appellant herein. 3. The   accused   appellant   has   been   held   guilty   of   the   offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code (for short, “the IPC”). The trial court (Sessions Judge, Lakhimpur Kheri) sentenced the accused appellant to death under Section 302 of the IPC and pay fine of   Rs.   20,000/­   and   in   default   of   payment   of   fine   to   undergo   further rigorous   imprisonment   for   one   year.   While   the   Sessions   Judge, Lakhimpur Kheri made a reference to the High Court for confirmation of   death   sentence   under   Section   366   of   the   Code   of   Criminal Procedure   (for   short,   “the   CrPC”),   the   accused   appellant   preferred Criminal Appeal No. 1959 of 2016 putting in issue his conviction and sentence.   The High Court dismissed the Criminal Appeal No. 1959 of 2016   filed   by   the   accused   appellant   thereby   confirming   the   death reference under Section 366 of the CrPC. 4. In such circumstances referred to above, the accused appellant is here before this Court with the present appeals. CASE OF THE PROSECUTION 5. According   to   the   case   of   the   prosecution,   the   accused   appellant Ramanand   was   married   to   Sangeeta   (deceased)   for   the   past   12   years before the incident in question. In the wedlock, five children were born –   one   son   and   four   daughters,   by   name   Gaurav   Ambedkar   aged   10 years,   Tulsi   aged   7   years,   Lakshmi   aged   5   years,   Kajal   aged   3   years and Guddi aged one and a half month.   6.  On   the   fateful   night   of   the   incident   i.e.   the   intervening   night between 21 st   & 22 nd  of January, 2010 while the wife and four children were   sleeping   in   the   house   situated   at   the   village   Basdhiya,   the accused appellant  is said to  have  mercilessly  clobbered all  the  five to death with a sharp cutting weapon called  Banka . At the relevant point of   time,   the   son   of   the   accused   appellant   was   not   residing   with   the family. The son aged 10 years at the time of incident was residing at a different   village   with   one   police   constable.     The   motive   behind   the crime  as   put  forward  by   the   prosecution   is   the  extra   marital   affair   of the   accused   appellant   with   one   married   lady   by   name   Manju. According   to   the   prosecution,   the   accused   appellant   desperately wanted   to   marry   Manju.   Further,   the   wife   of   the   accused   appellant namely, Sangeeta (deceased) was highly opposed to the relationship of her husband with Manju. In such circumstances, it is the case of the prosecution   that  the   accused  appellant  decided  to  terminate  not  only his wife Sangeeta but also his four minor daughters.  7. It all started with the First Information Report (FIR) lodged by the PW­1, Shambhu Raidas, who happens to be the brother­in­law of the accused   appellant   (husband   of   the   accused   appellant’s   sister).     The FIR   came   to   be   lodged   by   the   PW­1,   Shambhu   Raidas   at   the Dhaurhara Police Station, District Lakhimpur Kheri on 22.01.2010 at 9:45 A.M. The FIR (Ext. 40) reads thus:­ “To,   Station   House   Officer,   Kotwali­Dhaurahara,   District Kheri.   Sir,   It   is   submitted   that   the   applicant   Shambhu Raidas son of Late Shri Shyam Lal Raidas is the resident of village   –   Naamdar   Purwa,   Police   Station   –   Kotwali Dhaurahara,   District   Lakhimpur   Kheri.   Today   on 22.01.2010   when   I   was   present   at   my   home   then   at   about 6.30   o’clock   in   the   morning   my   saala   (brother­in­law) Ramanand   Raidas   son   of   Gobre   Raidas   resident   of Naamdar   Purwa,   Hamlet­Amethi,   Police   Station Dhaurahara,   Lakhimpur   Kheri   came   and   told   that,   “Last night I was sleeping with my wife & children. Then at about   1.00   o’clock   in   the   night   someone   knocked   at my door, I woke up and asked who was there but none replied.   Then  I  went   to  the  roof  of my  house  and  saw that   four  persons   were   standing   outside   the  house.     I switched on the torch. I saw that that one person who was   resident   of   village­   Basadiha,   Police   Station Ishanaga   and   known   to   Ramanand   fired   on   me   by gun; I escaped and jumped and came down.  Then one miscreant   hit   on   my   head   by   the   butt   of   a   gun.   I   ran away   and   hid   in   the   fields   and   saw   that   the miscreants   climbed   into   my   home.   I   saw,   smoke coming   out   of   my   home.   Then   I   ran   to   Behnan   Purwa and   told   about   the   incident   at   Crusher   of   Khaliq   and to   the   people   at   Ramnagar   Lahbadi   but   none   came ahead.     I   came   running   here”.     Then   I   alongwith   my nephew   Pratap   reached   the   house   of   Ramanand   and   saw that  the   wife   of  Ramanand   namely  Sangita,  aged  about   35 years,   daughters   Tulsi   aged   about   7   years,   Laxmi   aged about 5 years, Kajal aged about 3 years and a girl child of about 1½  month had been killed and the dead bodies were burning. Then I and Pratap started extinguishing the fire by pouring   water   with   the   aid   of   a   bucket.   Behind   us Ramanand   too   came   to   his   house   &   home,   sat   in   the courtyard   and   started   warming   himself   in   front   of   the   fire (Aag   Taapne   laga).     On   seeing   this,   both   of   us   scolded   him that,   “Your   wife­daughters   have   been   killed   and   you   are sitting   in   the   courtyard   and   warming   yourself   before   fire”. On   this   Ramanand   got   annoyed   and   went   outside   the house.     The   dead   bodies   are   lying   at   the   spot.   I   came   to inform. Lodge the case and take legal action.”  Thumb   Impression   (T.I.)   Shambhu   Raidas,   Applicant, Shambhu Raidas son of Late Shyam Lal Raidas, Resident of village   Naamdar   Purwa,   Hamlet   Amethi,   Police   Station Dhaurahara, District Khera. Date 22.01.2010.”                 [Emphasis supplied] 8. Thus, it is the case of the prosecution that after the incident the accused   appellant   went   straight   to   the   house   of   the   PW­1,   Shambhu Raidas at about 6:30 in the morning. The accused appellant is said to have informed the PW­1, Shambhu Raidas as to what had transpired at around 1 o’clock in the night. PW­1, Shambhu Raidas thought fit to inform  the police and accordingly  lodged the FIR as aforesaid against four unidentified persons. 9. Upon registration of the FIR, the police started the investigation. The investigating officer carried out the inquest proceedings of all the five deceased persons.  The dead bodies were sent to the Civil Hospital for   post   mortem.   Thereafter,   the   investigating   officer   prepared   a   site plan of the crime scene (Ext. 6). The post mortem reports revealed that all the five deceased had suffered incised wounds mostly on the head and   the   neck   region.     The   burn   injuries   were   certified   to   be   post mortem,   whereas   the   incised   wounds   were   certified   as   ante   mortem injuries.  The cause of death assigned in all the post mortem reports is shock and haemorrhage as a result of ante mortem head injuries. 10. The   accused   appellant   is   shown   to   have   been   arrested   by   the investigating   officer   on   24 th   of   January,   2010.   After   the   arrest   and while the accused appellant was in custody, he is said to have made a voluntary   statement   that   he   would   show   the   place   where   he   had hidden the weapon of offence i.e.  Banka  and his blood stained clothes. Accordingly,   the   discovery   panchnama   was   drawn   of   the   weapon   of offence   (Ext.   5).   It   appears   that   in   the   course   of   investigation,   the investigating   officer  recorded the  statements of  PW­3, Baburam   Hans son   of   Ramcharan   and   PW­4,   Ram   Kumar   son   of   Paanchoo   before whom   the   accused   appellant   is   said   to   have   made   extra   judicial confession. The investigating officer also recorded the statement of the PW­1,   Shambhu   Raidas,   the   first   informant   and   PW­2,   Chhatrajpal Raidas (brother of the deceased Sangeeta).   11. At the end of the investigation, charge sheet came to be filed for the   offence   of   murder   punishable   under   Section   302   of   the   IPC.   The Magistrate   committed   the   case   to   the   Court   of   Sessions   Judge, Lakhimpur Kheri under Section 209 of the CrPC. Upon committal, the Sessions Trial No. 379 of 2010 came to be registered. 12. On  06.07.2010 the  Additional  District and  Sessions  Judge, Fast Track   Court,   Lakhimpur   Kheri   framed   charge   against   the   accused appellant.   The statement of the accused appellant was recorded. The appellant did not admit the charge and claimed to be tried.   13. The   prosecution   adduced   the   following   oral   evidence   in   support of its case: S. No. Oral Evidence – Witness 1. PW­1 Shambhu Raidas 2. PW­2 Chhatrapal Raidas 3. PW­3 Babu Ram Hans 4. PW­4 Ram Kumar 5.  PW­5 Dr. A.K. Sharma 6. PW­6 S.I. Uma Shankar Mishra 7. PW­7 Inspector Yogendra Singh 8. PW­8 Dr. S.P. Singh 9. PW­9 Dr. Ankit Kumar Singh 10. PW­10 H.M. Dhani Ram Verma 14. The   prosecution   also   adduced   the   following   documentary evidence: S.No. Documentary Evidence  1. Tahreer  /Written Complaint  [Ex. Ka­1] 2. Post­mortem report of deceased Laxmi  [Ex. Ka­2] 3. Post­mortem report of deceased Kajal  [Ex. Ka­3] 4. Post­mortem report of deceased Chhoti @ Guddi [Ex. Ka­4] 5. Discovery memorandum of murder weapon and clothes  [Ex. Ka­5] 6. Site plan of crime scene  [Ex. Ka­6] 7. Site plan of discovery of murder weapon [Ex. Ka­7] 8. Charge sheet  [Ex. Ka­8] 9. Seizure memo of ash­mixed and plain soil [Ex. Ka­9] 10. Inquest Report of deceased Sangeeta Devi  [Ex. Ka­10] 11. Photo lash of deceased Sangeeta [Ex. Ka­11] 12. Police Paper No. 13 of deceased Sangeeta  [Ex. Ka­12] 13. Specimen seal regarding deceased Sangeeta  [Ex. Ka­13] 14. Letter   to   Reserve   Inspector   regarding   deceased Sangeeta  [Ex. Ka­14] 15. Letter to C.M.O. regarding deceased Sangeeta  [Ex. Ka­15]  16. Inquest Report of deceased Km. Tulsi  [Ex. Ka­16] 17. Photo lash of deceased Km. Tulsi  [Ex. Ka­17] 18. Specimen seal regarding deceased Km. Tulsi  [Ex. Ka­18] 19. Letter   to   Reserve   Inspector   regarding   deceased Km. Tulsi  [Ex. Ka­19] 20. Letter to C.M.O. regarding deceased Km. Tulsi  [Ex. Ka­20] 21. Police Paper No. 13 of deceased Km. Tulsi [Ex. Ka­21]  22. Inquest Report of deceased Km. Kajal [Ex. Ka­22] 23. Police Paper No. 13 of deceased Km. Kajal  [Ex. Ka­23] 24. Photo lash of deceased Km. Kajal [Ex. Ka­24] 25. Specimen seal regarding deceased Km. Kajal [Ex. Ka­25] 26. Letter   to   Reserve   Inspector   regarding   deceased Km. Kajal  [Ex. Ka­26] 27. Letter to C.M.O. regarding deceased Km.Kajal [Ex. Ka­27]  28. Inquest Report  of  deceased  Km.  Laxmi  [Ex. Ka­ 28] 29. Photo lash of deceased Km. Laxmi  [Ex. Ka­29] 30. Police Paper No. 13 of deceased Km. Laxmi [Ex. Ka­30]  31. Specimen seal regarding deceased Km. Laxmi  [Ex. Ka­31] 32. Letter   to   Reserve   Inspector   regarding   deceased Km. Laxmi [Ex. Ka­32] 33. Letter to C.M.O. regarding deceased Km. Laxmi [Ex. Ka­33] 34. Inquest Report of deceased Km. Chhoti  [Ex. Ka­34] 35. Photo lash of deceased Km. Chhoti @ Guddi  [Ex. Ka­35] 36. Police   Paper   No.   13   of   deceased   Km.   Chhoti   @ Guddi  [Ex. Ka­36] 37. Specimen   seal   regarding   deceased   Km.   Chhoti @ Guddi [Ex. Ka­37] 38. Letter   to   Reserve   Inspector   regarding   deceased Km. Chhoti @ Guddi [Ex. Ka­38] 39. Letter to C.M.O. regarding deceased Km. Chhoti @ Guddi [Ex. Ka­39] 40. Chik FIR [Ex. Ka­40] 41. Copy of general diary  [Ex. Ka­41] 42. Post­mortem report of deceased Tulsi [Ex. Ka­42] 43. Post­mortem report of deceased Sangeeta  [Ex. Ka­43] 44. Medical   examination   report   of   the   accused   [Ex. Ka­44] 15. After completion of the oral as well as documentary evidence, the statements   of   the   accused   appellant   under   Section   313   of   the   CrPC were   recorded   in   which   the   accused   appellant   stated   that   he   was innocent   and   had   been   falsely   implicated   in   the   alleged   crime.     The accused appellant took the defence that few individuals of a rival party had   committed   the   murder   of   his   wife   and   daughters   as   Sangeeta (deceased) was the sole eye witness to the murder of the brother of the accused   appellant.   The   trial   against   the   accused   persons   who   had killed the brother  of the accused appellant  was  pending  at  that point of   time.   The   rival   party   wanted   to   terminate   Sangeeta   and   for   that reason,   four   individuals   came   to   his   house   at   about   1   o’clock   in   the night of 22 nd  of January, 2010 and mercilessly killed all his five family members   and   thereafter   set   the   bodies   on   fire.   The   trial   court disbelieved such defence of the accused appellant. 16. At   the   conclusion   of   the   trial,   the   Trial   Judge   convicted   the accused   appellant   for   the   offence   under   Section   302   of   the   IPC   and sentenced   him   to   death   relying   upon   the   following   incriminating circumstances: (i) Discovery   of   weapon   of   offence   and   blood­stained   clothes   at   the instance of the accused appellant.  (ii) Extra   Judicial   confession   of   the   accused   appellant   before   two prosecution witnesses.  (iii) Strong motive to commit the crime.  (iv) False   explanation   at   the   instance   of   the   accused   appellant   and his unnatural conduct.  17. The appeal filed by the accused appellant in the High Court also failed and was ordered to be dismissed. 18. Being   dissatisfied,   the   accused   appellant   has   come   up   with   the present appeals. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE ACCUSED APPELLANT 19. Mr. S. Niranjan Reddy, the learned senior  counsel appearing  for the accused appellant vehemently submitted that both, the trial court and the High Court committed a serious error in holding the accused appellant   guilty   of   the   offence   of   murder   of   his   wife   and   four   minor daughters.   He   would   submit   that   in   the   course   of   the   trial   the prosecution failed to lead any credible evidence to connect the accused appellant   with   the   alleged   crime.   Mr.   Reddy   vehemently   submitted that both the Courts below ought not to have accepted the evidence of PW­3, Babu Ram Hans and PW­4, Ram Kumar resply so as to believe the extra judicial confession alleged to have been made by the accused appellant   before   them.   Mr.   Reddy   submitted   that   both   the   Courts below should have discarded the evidence of discovery of weapon and the   blood­stained   clothes   as   the   prosecution   has   not   been   able   to prove the authorship of concealment. He would submit that in a case of circumstantial evidence, the prosecution is required to establish the continuity in the links of the chain of the circumstances so as to lead to   the   only   and   inescapable   conclusion   of   the   accused   being   the assailant,   inconsistent   or   incompatible   with   the   possibility   of   any other hypothesis compatible with the innocence of the accused. 20. Mr. Reddy vociferously submitted that the PW­3 and PW­4 resply are   ‘got   up’   witnesses.   The   evidence   in   the   form   of   extra   judicial confession is nothing but a fabricated piece of evidence at the instance of the investigating officer just with a view to bolster up the case of the prosecution   in   the   absence   of   any   direct   evidence.   He   would   submit that both these prosecution witnesses are absolutely unreliable.  21. Mr.   Reddy   submitted   that   in   a   case   which   is   based   on circumstantial   evidence,   motive   plays   an   important   role.   He   would submit   that   the   prosecution   has   not   been   able   to   prove   the   motive behind   the   crime.   The   extra   marital   affair   of   the   accused   appellant with Manju and the desire of the accused appellant to marry Manju at any   cost   has   been   put   forward   as   the   motive   behind   the   crime. However, there is no cogent and credible evidence in that regard.   He would submit that even otherwise an accused cannot be convicted and sentenced to death only on the circumstance of motive.  22. Mr. Reddy would submit that the prosecution has not been able to   explain   the   injuries   suffered   by   the   accused   in   any   manner.     He would   submit   that   on   the   contrary,   it   is   the   accused   who   has   been able   to   explain   how   he   suffered   the   injuries   on   his   head   and   chest while   putting   forward   his   defence   before   the   High   Court   in   his statement   recorded   under   Section   313   of   the   CrPC.   Having   noticed that the accused appellant had suffered injuries on his head and was bleeding,   the   accused   appellant   along   with   one   police   constable   was sent   for   medical   examination   at   the   District   Hospital,   District   Kheri. The   accused   appellant   was   taken   to   the   hospital   by   a   constable   viz. Brij   Mohan   Singh,   Dhaurhara,   District   Kheri.   The   PW­9,   Dr.   Ankit Kumar   Singh   has   issued   a   medical   certificate   Ext.   44   stating   the nature of the injuries noticed on the body of the accused appellant.  23. Mr.   Reddy   further   submitted   that   once   the   extra   judicial confession   alleged   to   have   been   made   before   the   two   prosecution witnesses   i.e.   the   PW­3   and   PW­4   resply   and   the   evidence   of   the discovery   of   the   weapon   of   offence   is   discarded   and   eschewed   from consideration, then nothing remains in the case of the prosecution.  24. Lastly,   Mr.   Reddy   would   submit   that   howsoever   unnatural   one may find the conduct of the accused after the alleged crime, the same, by   itself,   is   not   sufficient   to   convict   the   accused   for   an   offence   like murder.   In   such   circumstances   referred   to   above,   Mr.   Reddy   prayed that there being merit in his appeals, those may be allowed. He prayed that   the   order   of   conviction   and   death   penalty   be   set   aside   and   the appellant may be acquitted of the charge of murder. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE STATE 25. Mr.   Adarsh   Upadhyay,   the   learned   counsel   appearing   for   the respondent­State of Uttar  Pradesh has on the other  hand vehemently opposed  the  appeals.  He would  submit  that  no   error,  not  to   speak  of any error of law, could be said to have been committed by the Courts below in holding the accused appellant guilty of the offence of murder and imposing death penalty upon him for the gruesome murder of five of his family members. He would submit that there is no good reason to   disbelieve   the   evidence   of   PW­3,   Babu   Ram   Hans   and   PW­4,   Ram Kumar   resply   before   whom   the   accused   appellant   made   the   extra judicial confession. He further submitted that there is no good reason to   even   disbelieve   the   discovery   of   the   weapon   of   offence   at   the instance   of   the   accused   appellant.   He   would   submit   that   over   and above the two incriminating circumstances in the form of extra judicial confession and the discovery of weapon of offence, there was a strong motive for the accused appellant to commit the crime.  26. Mr.  Upadhyay  vehemently   submitted  that   the  accused appellant desperately   wanted   to   get   married   to   Manju   and   his   wife   Sangeeta (deceased) was coming in his way. The accused appellant decided not only   to   terminate   his   own   wife   but   also   mercilessly   killed   four   of   his innocent   minor   daughters   so   that   he   may   not   have   to   take   care   of them after marrying Manju. He would submit that it is one of the most heinous and gruesome crimes committed by the accused appellant.  27. He   further   submitted   that   the   prosecution   is   not   obliged   to explain the injuries suffered by the accused appellant as those injuries were found to be superfluous in nature. The prosecution is obliged to explain   the   injuries   suffered   by   an   accused,   if   any,   only   if   such injuries are grievous in nature which may throw a considerable doubt on   the   very   genesis   or   the   origin   of   the   case   of   the   prosecution.     He would   submit   that   the   defence   of   the   accused   appellant   that   four unidentified   persons   were   the   assailants   stands   falsified   by   his   own unnatural   conduct.   Mr.   Upadhyay   would   submit   that   the   accused appellant   has   not   been   able   to   explain   in   what   circumstances   the smell   of   kerosene   was   coming   from   his   clothes   as   deposed   by   the witnesses   and   the   doctor.   He   would   argue   that   if   out   of   fear   he   had escaped   from   his   house   and   ran   away,   then   how   he   came   in   contact with kerosene. He would submit that the case of the accused appellant that one of the unidentified persons fired a shot from a firearm is also falsified as no cartridge or any pellets were recovered from the place of occurrence.      28. Mr.   Upadhyay   would   submit   that   the   scope   of   the   present appeals filed under Article 136 of the Constitution is very limited. It is only   in   exceptional   circumstances   that   this   Court   may   disturb   the concurrent findings of guilt recorded by the trial court and High Court respectively.   He   would   submit   that   the   view   taken   by   the   trial   court and   the   High   Court   is   correct   and   in   no   manner   the   appreciation   of evidence could be termed as perverse.   29.  In   such   circumstances   referred   to   above,   Mr.   Upadhyay   prays that there being no merit in the appeals filed by the accused appellant, those may be dismissed. ORAL EVIDENCE ON RECORD 30.  The PW­1, Shambhu Raidas is the first informant. He happens to be   the   brother­in­law   of   the   accused   appellant   i.e.   husband   of   the accused appellant’s sister. On 22.01.2010 while he was at his house, the   accused   appellant   is   said   to   have   visited   him   at   6:30   in   the morning   and   was   informed   that   at   1   o’clock   in   the   night   four unidentified persons knocked at his door. The accused appellant woke up and enquired who was it. As no one replied, the accused appellant went on the roof of his house and saw four  persons standing outside his   house.   The   accused   appellant   is   said   to   have   seen   those   four persons under the light of a torch. The accused appellant informed the PW­1   that   one   of   the   persons   was   from   the   village   Basadiha.     One among   the   four   persons   fired   at   the   accused   appellant.   The   accused appellant   is   said   to   have   jumped   from   the   roof   top.   At   that   point   of time,   one   of   the   four   hit   the   accused   appellant   on   his   head   with   the butt of the gun. The accused appellant thereafter ran away towards a farm.   The   accused   appellant   is   said   to   have   witnessed   those   persons entering   into   his   house   from   a   distance.   After   sometime,   he   noticed smoke   coming   out   of   his   house.   The   accused   appellant   went   to Behnanpurwa, Khalikpurwa and Lahki for help but he was not able to procure any  help. PW­1 has deposed that after the accused appellant narrated the entire incident, he himself along with one Pratap reached the   house   of   the   accused   appellant.   The   accused   appellant   also accompanied the PW­1, Shambhu Raidas and Pratap. When the   PW­ 1 reached the house of the accused appellant, he saw the dead bodies of   Sangeeta   and   the   four   daughters   burning.   PW­1   with   the   help   of Pratap   started   to   douse   the   fire   with   water.   PW­1   has   deposed   that while he himself and Pratap were trying to douse the fire, the accused appellant   took   out   his   blood   stained   baniyaan   (vest)   and   threw   it   in the   fire.   The   accused   appellant   thereafter   started   warming   his   body. On seeing this, the PW­1 got annoyed and told the accused appellant that   how   could   he   sit   beside   the   fire   when   his   wife   and   children   had been   killed.   The   PW­1,   Shambhu   Raidas   thereafter   went   to   the Dhaurhara   Police   Station   and   lodged   the   FIR.   In   the   FIR,   he   named four   unidentified   persons   as   the   suspects.   The   PW­1   has   further deposed   about   the   illicit   relationship   of   the   accused   appellant   with Manju. He has deposed that while the accused appellant was married to   Sangeeta,   he   decided   to   get   married   to   Manju.   The   engagement ceremony   of   Manju   with   accused   appellant   Ramanand   was   also performed. However, before the accused appellant could get married to Manju,   he   came   to   be   arrested   in   connection   with   one   offence registered against him  under  Section 307 of the IPC. He has deposed that   Sangeeta   (deceased)   was   highly   opposed   to   the   idea   of   her husband Ramanand getting married to Manju. He has further deposed that   the   accused   appellant   killed   his   wife   and   four   children   in   the hope   that   he   may   receive   some   monetary   compensation   from   the Government. In his cross examination, the PW­1 has deposed that his house is at a distance of one kilometre from the house of the accused appellant.   When   the   accused   appellant   reached   his   house   at   6:30   in the   morning   on   the   day   of   the   incident,   the   PW­1   found   the   accused appellant   in   lot   of   tension.   In   his   cross   examination,   he   has categorically   deposed   that   he   was   at   the   police   station   up to 2 o’clock in the night i.e. upto 23 rd   of January, 2010 at 2 A.M.   He has deposed in so many words that the accused appellant Ramanand was also with him at the police station all throughout. He has deposed that   while   he   left   the   police   station,   Ramanand   –   accused   appellant was   not   allowed   to   leave   the   police   station.   He   has   deposed   that Ramanand   was   challaned   by   the   police   on   the   third   day,   till   then Ramanand was continuously staying at the police station. 31. What   emerges   from   the   evidence   of   the   PW­1   is   that   after   the incident,   the   accused   appellant   visited   his   house   at   6:30   in   the morning and narrated as to what had happened. PW­1 along with one Pratap thereafter reached the house of the accused appellant and saw the dead bodies of Sangeeta and four minor daughters burning.  PW­1 tried   to   douse   the   fire   by   pouring   water   on   the   dead   bodies   with   the help of Pratap.   PW­1 has deposed about the illicit relationship of the accused   appellant   with   Manju.   However,   what   is   important   in   the evidence   of   the   PW­1   is   that   from   the   time   the           PW­1   reached   the police   station   till   the   last   the   accused   appellant   was   at   the   police station under the surveillance of the police. 32.  The prosecution has examined the PW­2, Chhatrapal Raidas. The PW­2 happens to be the brother of the deceased Sangeeta Devi.  In his examination in chief, he has deposed about the extra marital affair of the accused appellant with Manju. He has also deposed that ten days before the incident, Sangeeta had visited his house and had narrated about   the   harassment   that   was   meted   towards   her   by   the   accused appellant.   In   his   cross   examination,   he   has   deposed   that   he   came   to know   about   the   incident   at   7   o’clock   in   the   morning   through Ramanand.   According to the PW­2, Ramanand had visited his house and was informed that his wife and four children were burning in the house. According to the PW­2, the accused appellant saying so left his house.   The   PW­2   has   further   deposed   in   his   cross   examination   that Pratap   and   PW­1,   Shambhu   Raidas   were   to   be   seen   at   the   house   of the   accused   appellant   dousing   the   fire   with   water.   He   has   deposed that   villagers   were   standing   outside   the   house   of   the   accused appellant. He has deposed that the clothes of Ramanand were soaked with   blood.   After   sometime,   the   Police   Inspector   reached   the   place   of incident.   The PW­2 has deposed that between 8 A.M. and 9 A.M. the police took the accused appellant to the police station. He has deposed that   within   no   time,   it   was   confirmed   that   none   else   but   Ramanand­ accused appellant was the assailant.  33. What emerges from the evidence of the PW­2 is that the accused appellant   was   in   an   extra   marital   relationship   with   Manju   and desperately   wanted   to   get   married   to   Manju.   Because   of   the   extra marital affair, Sangeeta was being harassed by the accused appellant. However, what is important to note in the evidence of the PW­2 is that Ramanand had visited his house also at 7 o’clock in the morning.  The PW­2 also saw Pratap and PW­1, Shambhu Raidas at the house of the accused   appellant   trying   to   douse   the   fire   with   water.   One   important feature of the deposition of the PW­2 is that the accused appellant was taken away by the police between 8 A.M. and 9 A.M. on the day of the incident.  34. The   prosecution   has   examined   the   PW­3,   Babu   Ram   Hans   to prove   the   extra   judicial   confession.   The   PW­3   in   his   examination   in chief has deposed that on 23.01.2010 while he was at his house, the accused appellant came about 9 o’clock in the morning and informed about   the   incident.   According   to   the   PW­3,   the   accused   appellant   is said to have confessed before him of having brutally killed his wife and four   minor   children.   According   to   the   PW­3,   the   accused   appellant sought   his   help   as   the   PW­3   was   a   leader   of   the   BSP   ruling   party   at the   relevant   point   of   time.   However,   the   PW­3   declined   to   help   the accused appellant in any manner.  The PW­3 has deposed that he had narrated to the police inspector about the confession said to have been made before him by the accused appellant and his statement was also recorded   by   the   police.   The   PW­3   in   his   cross   examination   has deposed that his village is at the distance of 30 to 35 kilometres from Naamdar Purwa.   35. We   shall   explain   as   to   how   we   are   not   inclined   to   believe   the evidence of the PW­3, Babu Ram Hans a little later in our judgment. 36. The   prosecution   has   examined   the   PW­4,   Ram   Kumar   son   of Paanchoo. It is the case of the prosecution that even before the     PW­ 4, the accused appellant had made an extra judicial confession about the   crime.   The   PW­4   in   his   examination   in   chief   has   deposed   that   at the   relevant   time,   he   was   the   member   of   the   District   Panchayat   of BSP.  He  has  deposed  that   on  the   very   day   i.e.  22.01.2010   at  6:30  in the morning Ramanand came to his house and informed that his wife and   children   had   been   assaulted   and   set   on   fire.   The   PW­4   told   the accused  appellant  that   he  would  help  him  provided  he  would  tell  the truth.   According   to   the   PW­4,   thereafter   the   accused   appellant confessed   before   him   that   he   had   killed   his   wife   and   children   as   he wanted to marry Manju and his wife Sangeeta was opposing him to get married. He has further deposed in his examination in chief that when he reached the village of the accused appellant, he saw that the son of Ramanand was sitting on Ramanand’s lap and Ramanand was crying and   talking   to   his   son   saying   that   he   had   killed   his   mother   and sisters.   In   his   cross   examination,   he   has   deposed   that   when   the accused appellant visited his house at 6:30 in the morning, he noticed that there was blood on his shirt and pant. He has further deposed in his cross examination that he had informed the police officers that the accused appellant had visited his house at 6:30 in the morning.  37. What   emerges   from   the   evidence   of   the   PW­4   is   that   on 22.01.2010,   the   accused   appellant   had   visited   the   house   of   the witness at 6:30 in the morning and made an extra judicial confession about   the   alleged   crime   before   him.   We   are   not   prepared   to   even believe the testimony of the PW­4. We shall assign reasons a little later as to why we are not ready to believe the PW­4, Babu Ram Hans. 38. The   prosecution   has   examined   the   PW­5,   Dr.   A.K.   Sharma   who conducted   the   post   mortems   of   the   deceased   Lakshmi,   Kajal   and Chhoti   @   Guddi   resply.   Dr.   Sharma   in   his   examination   in   chief   has deposed   that   on   23.01.2010,   he   was   posted   as   a   radiologist   at   the District   Mahila   Chikitsalaya,   Lakhimpur.   On   that   day,   three   dead bodies were brought to the hospital for post mortem. He has deposed that he had performed the post mortems of all the three dead bodies. He   has   recorded   the   injuries   noticed   by   him   in   the   post   mortem reports   of   each   of   the   three   deceased   persons.   According   to   Dr. Sharma,   the   cause   of   death   of   all   the   three   deceased   persons   was shock   and   haemorrhage   as   a   result   of   the   ante   mortem   injuries.   He has deposed that he also noticed post mortem burn injuries on all the three dead bodies.   He has deposed that the injuries could have been caused by a sharp­edged weapon like  Banka . 39. Nothing turns around so far as the evidence of the PW­5, Dr. A.K. Sharma is concerned.  40.  The  prosecution   has   examined  the   PW­6,  Uma  Shankar   Mishra. At   the   relevant   time,   the   PW­6,   Uma   Shankar   Mishra   was   serving   as the   Sub­Inspector,   Chowki   in­charge   Bahjam,   Police   Station   Neem Gaon,   District   Lakhimpur   Kheri.   He   has   deposed   that   on   24 th   of November,   2010,   he   was   posted   at   the   Dhaurhara   Police   Station. According   to   him,   the   accused  appellant   was   arrested  on   24.11.2010 and was taken in custody. While in custody, the accused appellant is said   to   have   made   a   statement   on   his   own   free   will   and   volition   to show the place where he had hidden the weapon of offence i.e.   Banka and   his   blood   stained   clothes.     According   to   the   PW­6,   upon   such statement   being   made   by   the   accused   appellant,   he   along   with   the investigating   officer,   PW­7   left   for   the   place   as   led   by   the   accused appellant.   On   the   way,   the   PW­6   is   said   to   have   picked   up   PW­2, Chhatrapal   son   of   Rameshwar   and   Pratap   son   of   Asharfi   Lal,   both residents   of   Naamdar   Purwa   to   act   as   the   panch   witnesses   for   the purpose of drawing the discovery panchnama. According to the PW­6, the accused appellant led the police party to a coriander field and took out   the   weapon   of   offence   i.e.   Banka   and   also   the   blood   stained clothes.   The   discovery   panchnama   was   accordingly   drawn   under Section 27 of the Evidence Act, 1872. We do not propose to look into the  cross examination  of the  PW­6  as there is hardly  anything  in  the cross examination and not relevant for our purpose.  41.   The   prosecution   has   examined   the   PW­7,   Inspector   Yogendra Singh as the investigating officer. The PW­7 in his examination in chief has deposed that he had recorded the statements of the             PW­2, Chhatrapal Raidas and others on 23.01.2010. He has deposed that he arrested the accused appellant on 24.01.2010. He has deposed that he recorded   the   statements   of   the   PW­3   and               PW­4   resply   on 25.01.2010.   Nothing   turns   around   in   the   cross   examination   of   the PW­7, Yogendra Singh.  42.  It is not necessary for us to discuss the evidence of the PW­8  Dr. S.P. Singh. Dr. Singh had performed the post mortems of the deceased Tulsi and Sangeeta.  43. The prosecution has examined the PW­9, Dr. Ankit Kumar Singh. According   to   the   PW­9,   the   accused   appellant   was   brought   at   the C.H.C. Dhaurhara on 22.01.2010 at 10:30 in the morning for medical examination.   He   has   deposed   that   on   22.01.2010   he   was   in­charge Medical   Officer   at   the   C.H.C.   Dhaurhara.   He   has   deposed   that   the accused   appellant   Ramanand   was   brought   at   the   C.H.C.   Dhaurhara by Constable Brij Mohan Singh of Police Station Dhaurhara along with a   police   yadi .   During   the   medical   examination   of   the   accused appellant, he noticed the following injuries on the body of the accused appellant: “1. Lacerated wound 2 cm x 0.5 cm on left side of head, 10 cm above left ear. 2. Lacerated wound 5 cm x 0.5 cm on middle of the head; 2 cm away from Injury 1. 3.   Lacerated   wound   4.5   cm   x   0.5   cm   on   middle   of   the head; 1 cm away from Injury No. 2. 4.   Superficial   burn   injury   on  left   side  of   neck  in   length   8 cm x 6 cm. 5.   Superficial   burn   injury   on   right   side   of   neck   in   length 10 cm x 7 cm.” 44. Dr. Singh has further deposed that all the injuries were simple in nature and fresh.   During the medical examination, the clothes of the accused   appellant   were   smelling   of   kerosene   oil.   In   the   cross examination   of   Dr.   Singh,   he   has   deposed   that   the   injuries Nos.   1,   2   and   3   resply   noted   during   the   medical   examination   of   the accused appellant could have been caused with the butt of a gun. He has   deposed   that   the   injury   Nos.   4   and   5   resply   could   have   been suffered   by   the   accused   appellant   while   trying   to   rescue.   He   has deposed   that   at   the   time   of   medical   examination   of   the   accused appellant, there was no fresh bleeding from the wounds. At the time of cleaning   the   wounds   with   cotton,   the   blood   started   to   ooze.   He   has deposed that the injuries could not have been 12 hours old.  PRINCIPLES   OF   LAW   RELATING   TO   APPRECIATION   OF CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE 45. In   ‘A Treatise on Judicial Evidence’,   Jeremy Bentham, an English Philosopher   included   a   whole   chapter   upon   what   lies   next   when   the direct   evidence   does   not   lead   to   any   special   inference.   It   is   called Circumstantial   Evidence.   According   to   him,   in   every   case,   of circumstantial   evidence,   there   are   always   at   least   two   facts   to   be considered: a)   The   Factum   probandum ,   or   say,   the   principal   fact   (the   fact   the existence of which is supposed or proposed to be proved;   & b)   The   Factum   probans   or   the   evidentiary   fact   (the   fact   from   the existence of which that of the   factum probandumis inferred). 46.  Although there can be no straight jacket formula for appreciation of   circumstantial   evidence,   yet   to   convict   an   accused   on   the   basis   of circumstantial evidence, the Court must follow certain tests which are broadly as follows: 1. Circumstances   from   which   an   inference   of   guilt   is   sought   to   be drawn must be cogently and firmly established; 2. Those   circumstances   must   be   of   a   definite   tendency   unerringly pointing   towards   guilt   of   the   accused   and   must   be   conclusive   in nature; 3. The circumstances, if taken cumulatively, should form a chain so complete that there is no escape from the conclusion that within all human   probability   the   crime   was   committed   by   the   accused   and none else; and 4. The   circumstantial   evidence   in  order   to   sustain   conviction   must be   complete   and   incapable   of   explanation   of   any   other   hypothesis than   that   of   the   guilt   of   the   accused   but   should   be   inconsistent with   his   innocence.   In   other   words,   the   circumstances   should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved. 47.  There cannot be any dispute to the fact that the case on hand is one of the circumstantial evidence as there was no eye witness of the occurrence.   It   is   settled   principle   of   law   that   an   accused   can   be punished if he is found guilty even in cases of circumstantial evidence provided,   the   prosecution   is   able   to   prove   beyond   reasonable   doubt the   complete   chain   of   events   and   circumstances   which   definitely points  towards  the  involvement  and  guilty   of  the  suspect  or  accused, as   the   case   may   be.   The   accused   will   not   be   entitled   to   acquittal merely   because   there   is   no   eye   witness   in   the   case.   It   is   also   equally true  that   an  accused can   be  convicted  on   the  basis  of  circumstantial evidence   subject   to   satisfaction   of   the   expected   principles   in   that regard. 48.   A   three­Judge   Bench   of   this   Court   in   Sharad   Birdhichand Sarda   v.   State of Maharashtra , (1984) 4 SCC 116, held as under:  “ 152.   Before   discussing   the   cases   relied   upon   by   the High   Court   we   would   like   to   cite   a  few   decisions   on   the nature,   character   and   essential   proof   required   in   a criminal   case   which   rests   on   circumstantial   evidence alone.   The   most   fundamental   and   basic   decision   of   this Court   is   Hanumant   v.   State   of   Madhya   Pradesh   [AIR 1952 SC 343 : 1952 SCR 1091 : 1953 Cri LJ 129] . This case   has   been   uniformly   followed   and   applied   by   this Court in a large number of later decisions up­to­date, for instance,   the   cases   of   Tufail   (Alias)   Simmi   v.   State   of Uttar   Pradesh   [(1969)   3   SCC   198   :   1970   SCC   (Cri)   55] and   Ramgopal   v.   State   of   Maharashtra   [(1972)   4   SCC 625 : AIR 1972 SC 656] . It may be useful to extract what Mahajan, J. has laid down in   Hanumant case   [AIR 1952 SC 343 : 1952 SCR 1091 : 1953 Cri LJ 129] : It   is   well   to   remember   that   in   cases   where   the evidence   is   of   a   circumstantial   nature,   the circumstances   from   which   the   conclusion   of   guilt   is   to be   drawn   should   in   the   first   instance   be   fully established, and all the facts so established should be consistent   only   with   the   hypothesis   of   the   guilt   of   the accused.   Again,   the   circumstances   should   be   of   a conclusive   nature   and   tendency   and   they   should   be such   as   to   exclude   every   hypothesis   but   the   one proposed to be proved. In other words, there must be a chain   of   evidence   so   far   complete   as   not   to   leave   any reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the innocence   of   the   accused   and   it   must   be   such   as   to show   that   within   all   human   probability   the   act   must have been done by the accused. 153.   A   close   analysis   of   this   decision   would   show   that the   following   conditions   must   be   fulfilled   before   a   case against an accused can be said to be fully established: (1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. It   may   be   noted   here   that   this   Court   indicated   that   the circumstances   concerned   ‘must   or   should’   and   not   ‘may be’   established.   There   is   not   only   a   grammatical   but   a legal   distinction   between   ‘may   be   proved’   and   “must   be or should be proved” as was held by this Court in   Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade   v.   State of Maharashtra   [(1973) 2 SCC 793 : 1973 SCC (Cri) 1033 : 1973 Cri LJ 1783] where the following observations were made : [SCC para 19, p. 807 : SCC (Cri) p. 1047] Certainly,   it   is   a   primary   principle   that   the accused   must   be   and   not   merely   may   be   guilty   before a   court   can   convict   and   the   mental   distance   between ‘may   be’   and   ‘must   be’   is   long   and   divides   vague conjectures from sure conclusions.” (2)   the   facts   so   established   should   be   consistent   only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say,   they   should   not   be   explainable   on   any   other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty, (3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency, (4)   they   should   exclude   every   possible   hypothesis except the one to be proved, and (5)   there   must   be   a   chain   of   evidence   so   complete   as not   to   leave   any   reasonable   ground   for   the   conclusion consistent   with   the   innocence   of   the   accused   and   must show   that   in   all   human   probability   the   act   must   have been done by the accused. 154.   These   five   golden   principles,   if   we   may   say   so, constitute the panchsheel of the proof of a case based on circumstantial evidence.” 49.         In   an   Essay   on   the   Principles   of   Circumstantial   Evidence   by William Wills     by      T.     and     J.W.     Johnson     and     Co.     1872, it has been explained   as   under:   “ In   matters   of   direct   testimony,   if   credence   be   given   to   the relators, the act of hearing and the act of belief, though really not   so,   seem   to   be   contemporaneous.   But   the   case   is   very different   when   we   have   to   determine   upon   circumstantial evidence,   the   judgment   in   respect   of   which   is   essentially inferential.   There   is   no   apparent   necessary   connection between   the   facts   and   the   inference;   the   facts   may   be   true, and the inference erroneous, and it is only by comparison with the   results   of   observation   in   similar   or   analogous circumstances,   that   we   acquire   confidence   in   the   accuracy   of our conclusions. ?∙  The   term   PRESUMPTIVE   is   frequently   used   as   synonymous with CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE; but it is not so used with strict   accuracy,   The   word"   presumption,"   ex   vi   termini, imports   an   inference   from   facts;   and   the   adjunct "presumptive,"   as   applied   to   evidentiary   facts,   implies   the certainty   of   some   relation   between   the   facts   and   the inference. Circumstances generally, but not necessarily, lead to   particular   inferences;   for   the   facts   may   be   indisputable, and   yet   their   relation   to   the   principal   fact   may   be   only apparent, and not real; and even when the connection is real, the   deduction   may   be   erroneous.   Circumstantial   and presumptive evidence differ, therefore, as genus and species. The  force  and  effect  of  circumstantial evidence  depend  upon its   incompatibility   with,   and   incapability   of,   explanation   or solution upon any other supposition than that of the truth of the  fact  which it  is  adduced  to  prove; the  mode  of  argument resembling   the   method   of   demonstration   by   the   reductio   ad absurdum.” 50.  Thus,   in   view   of   the   above,   the   Court   must   consider   a   case   of circumstantial   evidence   in   light   of   the   aforesaid   settled   legal propositions.   In   a   case   of   circumstantial   evidence,   the   judgment remains   essentially   inferential.   The   inference   is   drawn   from   the established   facts   as   the   circumstances   lead   to   particular   inferences. The Court has to draw an inference with respect to whether the chain of circumstances is complete, and when the circumstances therein are collectively   considered,   the   same   must   lead   only   to   the   irresistible conclusion   that   the   accused   alone   is   the   perpetrator   of   the   crime   in question. All the circumstances so established must be of a conclusive nature,   and   consistent   only   with   the   hypothesis   of   the   guilt   of   the accused. ANALYSIS   OF   THE   INCRIMINATING   CIRCUMSTANCES   RELIED UPON BY THE TRIAL COURT AND THE HIGH COURT DISCOVERY   OF   WEAPON   OF   OFFENCE   AND   BLOOD­STAINED CLOTHES 51. It is the case of the prosecution that on 24.01.2010 the accused appellant was picked up by the investigating officer from nearby a bus stand and was arrested in connection with the alleged crime. After the arrest   of   the   accused   appellant   and   while   he   being   in   the   custody   at the police station, he is said to have on his own free will and volition made a statement  that he  would like to  point  out the place where he had   hidden   the   weapon   of   offence   ( Banka )   and   his   blood­stained clothes   after   the   commission   of   the   alleged   crime.   According   to   him, after   such   statement   was   made   by   the   accused   appellant,   he   along with   his   subordinates   set   forth   for   the   place   as   led   by   the   accused. There   is   something   very   unusual,   that   we   have   noticed   in   the   oral evidence of the investigating officer. According to him while the police party   along   with   the   accused   were   on   their   way,   all   of   a   sudden,   the investigating   officer   realized   that   he   should   have   two   independent witnesses   with   him   for   the   purpose   of   drawing   the   panchnama   of discovery.   In   such   circumstances,   while   on   the   way   the   investigating officer   picked   up   PW­2,   Chhatarpal   Raidas   and   Pratap   to   act   as   the panch witnesses. According to the investigating officer the accused led them to a coriander field and from a bush he took out the weapon of offence  ( Banka )  and  the  blood­stained  clothes.  The  weapon  of   offence and the blood­stained clothes were collected in the presence of the two panch   witnesses   and   the   panchnama   Exh.   5   was   accordingly   drawn. The   weapon   of   offence   and   the   blood   stained   clothes   thereafter   were sent for the Serological Test to the Forensic Science laboratory. We are of the view that the Courts below committed a serious error in relying upon   this   piece   of   evidence   of   discovery   of   a   fact,   i.e.,   the   weapon   & clothes   at   the   instance   of   the   accused   as   one   of   the   incriminating circumstances   in   the   chain   of   other   circumstances.   We   shall   explain here below why we are saying so. 52.  Section 27 of the Evidence Act, 1872 reads thus: “ 27.   How   much   of   information   received   from accused may be proved.— Provided that, when any fact is   deposed   to   as   discovered   in   consequence   of information   received   from   a   person   accused   of   any offence, in the custody of a police officer, so much of such information,   whether   it   amounts   to   a   confession   or   not, as   relates   distinctly   to   the   fact   thereby   discovered,   may be proved.” 53. If, it is say of the investigating officer that the accused appellant while   in   custody   on   his   own   free   will   and   volition   made   a   statement that   he   would   lead   to   the   place   where   he   had   hidden   the   weapon   of offence   along   with   his   blood   stained   clothes   then   the   first   thing   that the   investigating   officer   should   have   done   was   to   call   for   two independent   witnesses   at   the   police   station   itself.   Once   the   two independent   witnesses   arrive   at   the   police   station   thereafter   in   their presence   the   accused   should   be   asked   to   make   an   appropriate statement as he may desire in regard to pointing out the place where he   is   said   to   have   hidden   the   weapon   of   offence.   When   the   accused while   in   custody   makes   such   statement   before   the   two   independent witnesses   (panch   witnesses)   the   exact   statement   or   rather   the   exact words uttered by the accused should be incorporated in the first part of   the   panchnama   that   the   investigating   officer   may   draw   in accordance with law. This first part of the panchnama for the purpose of Section 27 of the Evidence Act is always drawn at the police station in   the   presence   of   the   independent   witnesses   so   as   to   lend   credence that   a   particular   statement   was   made   by   the   accused   expressing   his willingness   on   his   own   free   will   and   volition   to   point   out   the   place where   the   weapon   of   offence   or   any   other   article   used   in   the commission of the offence had been hidden. Once the first part of the panchnama   is   completed   thereafter   the   police   party   along   with   the accused   and   the   two   independent   witnesses   (panch   witnesses)   would proceed to the particular  place as may be led by  the accused. If from that   particular   place   anything   like   the   weapon   of   offence   or   blood stained clothes or any other article is discovered then that part of the entire process would form the second part of the panchnama. This is how   the   law   expects   the   investigating   officer   to   draw   the   discovery panchnama as contemplated under Section 27 of the Evidence Act. If we   read   the   entire   oral   evidence   of   the   investigating   officer   then   it   is clear that the same is deficient in all the aforesaid relevant aspects of the matter. 54.  The reason why we are not ready or rather reluctant to accept the evidence   of   discovery   is   that   the   investigating   officer   in   his   oral evidence has not said about the exact words uttered by the accused at the   police   station.   The   second   reason   to   discard   the   evidence   of discovery   is   that   the   investigating   officer   has   failed   to   prove   the contents of the discovery panchnama. The third reason to discard the evidence   is   that   even   if   the   entire   oral   evidence   of   the   investigating officer   is   accepted   as   it   is,   what   is   lacking   is   the   authorship   of concealment.   The   fourth   reason   to   discard   the   evidence   of   the discovery   is   that   although   one   of   the   panch   witnesses   PW­2, Chhatarpal Raidas was examined by the prosecution in the course of the   trial,   yet   has   not   said   a   word   that   he   had   also   acted   as   a   panch witness for the purpose of discovery of the weapon of offence and the blood   stained   clothes.   The   second   panch   witness   namely   Pratap though   available   was   not   examined   by   the   prosecution   for   some reason.   Therefore,   we   are   now   left   with   the   evidence   of   the investigating   officer   so   far   as   the   discovery   of   the   weapon   of   offence and   the   blood   stained   clothes   as   one   of   the   incriminating   pieces   of circumstances   is   concerned.   We   are   conscious   of   the   position   of   law that   even   if   the   independent   witnesses   to   the   discovery   panchnama are not examined or if no witness was present at the time of discovery or if no person had agreed to affix his signature on the document, it is difficult   to   lay   down,   as   a   proposition   of   law,   that   the   document   so prepared   by   the   police   officer   must   be   treated   as   tainted   and   the discovery evidence unreliable. In such circumstances, the Court has to consider   the   evidence   of   the   investigating   officer   who   deposed   to   the fact of discovery based on the statement elicited from the accused on its own worth.  55.  Applying   the   aforesaid   principle   of   law,   we   find   the   evidence   of the investigating officer not only unreliable but we can go to the extent to saying that the same does not constitute legal evidence. 56.  The requirement of law that needs to be fulfilled before accepting the   evidence   of   discovery   is   that   by   proving   the   contents   of   the panchnama. The investigating officer in his deposition is obliged in law to   prove   the   contents   of   the   panchnama   and   it   is   only   if   the investigating   officer   has   successfully   proved   the   contents   of   the discovery   panchnama   in   accordance   with   law,   then   in   that   case   the prosecution   may   be   justified   in   relying   upon   such   evidence   and   the trial court may also accept the evidence. In the present case, what we have noticed from  the oral evidence of the investigating officer, PW­7, Yogendra Singh is that he has not proved the contents of the discovery panchnama   and   all   that   he   has   deposed   is   that   as   the   accused expressed his willingness to point out the weapon of offence the same was discovered under  a panchnama. We  have  minutely  gone through this part of the evidence of the investigating officer and are convinced that by no stretch of imagination it could be said that the investigating officer   has   proved   the   contents   of   the   discovery   panchnama   (Exh.5). There is a reason why we are laying emphasis on proving the contents of   the   panchnama   at   the   end   of   the   investigating   officer,   more particularly when the independent panch witnesses though examined yet   have   not   said   a   word   about   such   discovery   or   turned   hostile   and have   not   supported   the   prosecution.   In   order   to   enable   the   Court   to safely rely upon the evidence of the investigating officer, it is necessary that the exact words attributed to an accused, as statement made by him,   be   brought   on   record   and,   for   this   purpose   the   investigating officer is obliged to depose in his evidence the exact statement and not by   merely   saying   that   a   discovery   panchnama   of   weapon   of   offence was drawn as the accused was willing to take it out from a particular place. 57.  Let   us   see   what   has   been   exactly   stated   in   the   discovery panchnama   (Exh.5)   drawn   on   24.01.2010.   We   quote   the   relevant portion as under: “ Today   on   24.1.2010,   the   arrested   accused   Ramanand   alias Nandlal   Bharti   son   of   Late   Shri   Gobre,   resident   of­   Naamdar Purwa,   Hamlet­   Amethi,   original   resident   of   village­ Basadhiya, Police Station­ Isanagar, District­ Lakhimpur Kheri has   been   taken   out   of   the   lock­up,   taken   in   confidence   and then   interrogated   by   me­   the   Station   House   Officer   Yogendra Singh   before   Hamrah   S.S.I.   Shri   Uma   Shankar   Mishra,   S.I. Shri Nand Kumar, Co. 374 Mo. Usman, Co. 598 Prabhu Dayal, Co. 993 Santosh Kumar Singh, Co. 394 Shrawan Kumar then he   confessed   the   offence   occurred   in   the   incident   and weepingly   said   in   apologizing   manner   that,   "I   myself   have committed   this   crime   to   get   government   grant   for   being   a   rich man   and   to   marry   Km.   Manju   D/o   Kanhai,   resident   of Pakadiya, Police Station­ Tambaur, District­ Sitapur regarding whereof the detailed statement has been recorded by you. The baanka   used   in   the   incident   and   the   pant­shirt,   on   which blood spilled from the bodies of deceased persons got stained and which had been put off by me due to fear, have been kept hidden   at   a   secret   place   by   me   which   I   can   get   recovered   by going there ." In expectation of recovery of murder weapon and blood­stained   clothes,   I­   the   Station   House   Officer   Yogendra Singh   alongwith   aforesaid   Hamrahis   departed   carrying accused   Ramanand   alias   Nandlal   Bharti   by   official   jeep UP70AG0326   alongwith   driver   Raj   Kishor   Dixit   for   the destination pointed out by the accused, vide Rapat No.­ 7 time 07.15…”         [Emphasis supplied] 58.  We   shall   now   look   into   the   oral   evidence   of   the   PW­7, Investigating   Officer   wherein,   in   his   examination   in   chief,   he   has deposed as under: “In   January   2010   I   was   posted   as   Station   House   Officer, Kotwali   Dhaurahara.   On   22.1.10,   I   myself   had   taken   the investigation   of   aforesaid   case.   On   that   day   I   had   copied chik,   rapat   and   recorded   the   statements   of   chik   writer   H. Constable   Dhaniram   Verma   and   complainant   of   the   case. After   recording   the   statement   of   complainant   of   the   case Shambhu   Raidas   I   inspected   the   occurrence   spot   on   his pointing out and prepared the site plan which is present on record; on which Exhibit Ka­6 has  been marked. And I had also   recorded   the   statement   of   hearsay   witnesses   Ahmad Hussain   and   Nizamuddin.   On   23.1.10,   I   recorded   the statements   of   witnesses   Kshatrapal,   Rustam   Raidas.   On 24.1.10,   I   arrested   accused   Ramanand   and   recorded   his statement   and   when   he   expressed   that      ­      he   may   get recovered   the   murder   weapon   used   in   the   incident,   I recovered  the murder weapon baanka before the  witnesses on   his   pointing   out;   which   had   been   sealed­stamped   at   the spot   and   its   recovery   memo   had   been   prepared   at   the   spot itself, which is present on record as Exhibit Ka­5….”         [Emphasis supplied] 59. We   shall   also   look   into   the   oral   evidence   of   the   PW­6,   Uma Shankar   Mishra   who   at   the   relevant   point   of   time   was   serving   as   a Sub­Inspector   Chowki   In­charge   Bahjam,   Police   Station.   It   appears that   the   PW­6   had   also   participated   in   the   proceedings   of   discovery panchnama. He has deposed in his examination in chief as under:  “On   24.11.2010,   I   was   posted   at   Police   Station­ Dhaurahara. That day, Ramanand S/o Gobre Rio Naamdar Purwa,   Police   Station­Dhaurahara,   domicile   of   village Basadhiya,   Police   Station­   Isha   Ganj,   District­   Kheri,   the arrested accused of Crime No. 49/10 U/S 302 State versus Ramanand alias Nandlal Bharti, was taken out of male lock up   by   the   then   In­charge   Inspector   and   followers   S.I.   Nand Kumar,   Co.   Mo.   Usman,   Co.   Prabhu   Dayal,   Co.   Santosh Kumar  Singh and  Co.  Shravan  Kumar, and   interrogated  by the   Incharge   Inspector   in   my   presence,   during   which   he confessed and told  that  he  would  get  recovered  the murder weapon used in the murder and his blood stained pant­shirt which   he   had   kept   hidden   at   a   secret   place.   On   this, expecting the recovery of murder weapon and blood stained clothes,   the   SHO   along   with   followers   and   force,   carrying accused Ramanand with him, departed on an official jeep ~ vide GD No. 7 time 7:15 a.m dated 24.01.2010. On the way, he   picked   up   public   witnesses   Chhatrapal   S/o   Rameshwar and   Pratap   S/o   Asharfi   Lal,   both   residents   of   Naamdar Purwa, Hamlet­ Amethi for the purpose of recovery. ”                         [Emphasis supplied] 60.  From   the   aforesaid   two   things   are   quite   evident.   In   the   original panchnama   (Exh.5),   the   statement   said   to   have   been   made   by   the accused   appellant   figures,   however,   in   the   oral   evidence   of   the PW­7, investigating officer & PW­6, Sub­Inspector the exact statement has   not   been   deposed,   more   particularly   when   it   comes   to   the authorship of concealment. The contents of the panchnama cannot be read into evidence as those do not constitute substantive evidence. 61.  Further, the examination­in­chief of the PW­6, Sub­Inspector and PW­7,   investigating   officer   does   not   indicate   that  they   were   read   over the panchnama (Exh.5) before it was exhibited, since one of the panch witnesses   was   not   examined   and   the   second   panch   witness   though examined   yet   has   not   said   a   word   about   the   proceedings   of   the discovery   panchnama.   Everything   thereafter   fell   upon   the   oral evidence of the investigating officer and the Sub­Inspector (PW­6).   62.  In   the   aforesaid   context,   we   may   refer   to   and   rely   upon   the decision   of   this   Court   in   the   case   of   Murli   v.   State   of   Rajasthan reported in (2009) 9 SCC 417, held as under: “34.       The contents of the panchnama are not the substantive evidence.   The   law   is   settled   on   that   issue.   What   is substantive   evidence   is   what   has   been   stated   by   the panchas or the person concerned in the witness box …….”        [ Emphasis supplied] 63.  One another serious infirmity which has surfaced is in regard to the   authorship   of   concealment   by   the   person   who   is   said   to   have discovered the weapon. 64.  The conditions necessary for the applicability   of Section  27   of   the Act are   broadly   as   under: (1) Discovery   of   fact   in   consequence   of   an   information   received   from accused;  (2) Discovery of such fact to be deposed to; (3)     The   accused   must   be   in   police   custody   when   he   gave           information; and (4)  So   much   of   information   as   relates   distinctly   to   the   fact   thereby discovered is admissible –  Mohmed Inayatullah v. The State of Maharashtra : AIR (1976) SC 483  Two conditions for application –   (1) information must be such as has caused discovery of the fact; and (2) information   must   relate   distinctly   to   the   fact   discovered   ­ Earabhadrappa  v. State of Karnataka : AIR (1983) SC 446” 65.  We   may   refer   to   and   rely   upon   a   Constitution   Bench   decision   of this   Court   in   the   case   of   State   of   Uttar   Pradesh   v.   Deoman Upadhyaya   reported   in   AIR   (1960)   SC   1125,   wherein,   Paragraph­71 explains   the   position   of   law   as  regards   the  Section   27   of  the   Evidence Act: “71.   The   law   has   thus   made   a  classification   of   accused persons into two: (1) those who have the danger brought home   to   them   by   detention   on   a   charge;   and   (2)   those who   are   yet   free.   In   the   former   category   are   also   those persons   who   surrender   to   the   custody   by   words   or action.   The   protection   given   to   these   two   classes   is different.   In   the   case   of   persons   belonging   to   the   first category the law has ruled that their statements are not admissible, and in the case of the second category, only that   portion,   of   the   statement   is   admissible   as   is guaranteed by the discovery of a relevant fact unknown before   the   statement   to   the   investigating   authority.   That statement may even be  confessional in nature, as when the   person   in   custody   says:   “I   pushed   him   down   such and such mineshaft”, and the body of the victim is found as a result, and it can be proved that his death was due to   injuries   received   by   a   fall   down   the   mineshaft .”                                            [Emphasis supplied] 66.  The   scope   and   ambit   of   Section   27   of   the   Evidence   Act   were illuminatingly   stated  in   Pulukuri   Kottaya  and   Others   v.   Emperor , AIR 1947 PC 67, which have become   locus classicus , in the following words:  " 10.   ….It   is   fallacious   to   treat   the   “fact   discovered” within   the   section   as   equivalent   to   the   object   produced; the   fact   discovered   embraces   the   place   from   which   the object is produced and the knowledge of the accused as to this, and the information given must relate distinctly to this fact. Information as to past user, or the past history, of   the   object   produced   is   not   related   to   its   discovery   in the setting in which it is discovered. Information supplied by   a   person   in   custody   that   “I   will   produce   a   knife concealed   in   the   roof   of   my   house”   does   not   lead   to   the discovery of a knife; knives were discovered many years ago.   It   leads   to   the   discovery   of   the   fact   that   a   knife   is concealed   in   the   house   of   the   informant   to   his knowledge, and if the knife is proved to have been used in   the   commission   of   the   offence,   the   fact   discovered   is very relevant. But if to the statement the words be added “with   which   I   stabbed   A"   these   words   are   inadmissible since   they   do   not   relate   to   the   discovery   of   the   knife   in the house of the informant."  67.   What   emerges   from   the   evidence   in   the   form   of   panchnama   is that the appellant stated before the panch witnesses to the effect that "I will show you the weapon used in the commission of offence". This is   the   exact   statement   which   we   could   read   from   the   discovery panchnama and the Investigating Officer also could not have deposed as regards the exact statement other than what has been recorded in the   panchnama.   This   statement   does   not   suggest   that   the   appellant indicated   anything   about   his   involvement   in   concealment   of   the weapon.   Mere   discovery   cannot   be   interpreted   as   sufficient   to   infer authorship of concealment by the person who discovered the weapon. He   could   have   derived   knowledge   of   the   existence   of   that   weapon   at the   place   through   some   other   source.   He   may   have   even   seen somebody   concealing   the   weapon,   and,   therefore,   it   cannot   be presumed   or   inferred   that   because   a   person   discovered   weapon,   he was   the   person   who   concealed   it,   least   it   can   be   presumed   that   he used it. Therefore, even if discovery by the appellant is accepted, what emerges   from   the   panchnama   of   the   discovery   of   weapon   and   the evidence   in   this   regard   is   that   he   disclosed   that   he   would   show   the weapon   used   in   the   commission   of   offence.   In   the   same   manner   we have also perused the panchnama Exh.32 wherein the statement said to have been made by the accused before the panchas in exact words is "the accused resident of Roghada village on his own free will informs to take out cash and other valuables".  68.  What   emerges   from   the   evidence   of   the   investigating   officer   is that the accused appellant stated before him while he was in custody, “ I   may   get   discovered   the   murder   weapon   used   in   the   incident ”.   This statement   does   not   indicate   or   suggest   that   the   accused   appellant indicated   anything   about   his   involvement   in   the   concealment   of   the weapon. It is a vague statement. Mere discovery cannot be interpreted as   sufficient   to   infer   authorship   of   concealment   by   the   person   who discovered   the   weapon.   He   could   have   derived   knowledge   of   the existence of that weapon at the place through some other source also. He   might   have   even   seen   somebody   concealing   the   weapon,   and, therefore,   it   cannot   be   presumed   or   inferred   that   because   a   person discovered the weapon, he was the person who had concealed it, least it can be presumed that he used it. Therefore, even if discovery by the appellant is accepted, what emerges from the substantive evidence as regards the discovery of weapon is that the appellant disclosed that he would show the weapon used in the commission of offence.  69.  In   Dudh   Nath   Pandey   v.   State   of   U.   P. ,   AIR   (1981)   SC   911 , this   Court   observed   that   the   evidence   of   discovery   of   pistol   at   the instance of the appellant cannot, by itself, prove that he who pointed out   the   weapon   wielded   it   in   the   offence.   The   statement accompanying   the   discovery   was   found   to   be   vague   to   identify   the authorship   of   concealment   and   it   was   held   that   pointing   out   of   the weapon may, at the best, prove the appellant’s knowledge as to where the weapon was kept.  70.  Thus,   in   the   absence   of   exact   words,   attributed   to   an   accused person, as statement made by him being deposed by the investigating officer   in   his   evidence,   and   also   without   proving   the   contents   of   the panchnama (Exh.5), the trial court as well as the High Court was not justified   in   placing   reliance   upon   the   circumstance   of   discovery   of weapon.  71.   If   it   is   the   case   of   the   prosecution   that   the   PW­2,   Chhatarpal Raidas,   s/o   Rameshwar   Raidas   had   acted   as   one   of   the   panch witnesses   to   the   drawing   of   the   discovery   panchnama,   then   why   the PW­2,   Chhatarpal   Raidas   in   his   oral   evidence   has   not   said   a   word about   he   having   acted   as   a   panch   witness   and   the   discovery   of   the weapon   of   the   offence   and   blood   stained   clothes   being   made   in   his presence. The fact that  he  is absolutely  silent in  his  oral  evidence on the   aforesaid   itself   casts   a   doubt   on   the   very   credibility   of   the   two police witnesses i.e. PW­6 and PW­7 respectively. 72.  In   the   aforesaid   context,   we   may   also   refer   to   a   decision   of   this Court   in   the   case   of   Bodhraj   alias   Bodha   and   Others   v.   State   of Jammu and Kashmir  reported in (2002) 8 SCC 45, as under: “ 18.   …..It   would   appear   that   under   Section   27   as   it stands   in   order   to   render   the   evidence   leading   to discovery   of   any   fact   admissible,   the   information   must come   from   any   accused   in   custody   of   the   police.   The requirement   of   police   custody   is   productive   of   extremely anomalous   results   and   may   lead   to   the   exclusion   of much valuable evidence in cases where a person, who is subsequently   taken   into   custody   and   becomes   an accused,   after   committing   a   crime   meets   a   police   officer or   voluntarily   goes   to   him   or   to   the   police   station   and states   the   circumstances   of   the   crime   which   lead   to   the discovery   of   the   dead   body,   weapon   or   any   other material   fact,   in   consequence   of   the   information   thus received   from   him.   This   information   which   is   otherwise admissible becomes inadmissible under Section 27 if the information did not come from a person in the custody of a   police   officer   or   did   come   from   a   person   not   in   the custody   of   a   police   officer.   The   statement   which   is admissible   under   Section   27   is   the   one   which   is   the information   leading   to   discovery.   Thus,   what   is admissible   being   the   information,   the   same   has   to   be proved   and   not   the   opinion   formed   on   it   by   the   police officer. In other words, the exact information given by the accused   while   in   custody   which   led   to   recovery   of   the articles   has   to   be   proved.   It   is,   therefore,   necessary   for the  benefit of both the accused and the prosecution that information   given   should   be   recorded   and   proved   and   if not  so  recorded,  the   exact  information  must   be  adduced through   evidence.   The   basic   idea   embedded   in   Section 27 of the Evidence Act is the doctrine of confirmation by subsequent   events.   The   doctrine   is   founded   on   the principle that if any fact is discovered as a search made on   the   strength   of   any   information   obtained   from   a prisoner,   such   a   discovery   is   a   guarantee   that   the information   supplied   by   the   prisoner   is   true .   The information   might   be   confessional   or   non­inculpatory   in nature but if it results in discovery of a fact, it becomes a reliable   information.   It   is   now   well   settled   that   recovery of   an   object   is   not   discovery   of   fact   envisaged   in   the section.   Decision   of   the   Privy   Council   in   Pulukuri Kottaya   v.   Emperor   [AIR 1947 PC 67 : 48 Cri LJ 533 : 74 IA   65]   is   the   most­quoted   authority   for   supporting   the interpretation that the “fact discovered” envisaged in the section   embraces   the   place   from   which   the   object   was produced, the knowledge of the accused as to it, but the information   given   must   relate   distinctly   to   that   effect. (See   State   of   Maharashtra   v.   Damu   Gopinath Shinde   [(2000) 6 SCC 269 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 1088 : 2000 Cri LJ 2301] .) No doubt, the information permitted to be admitted   in   evidence   is   confined   to   that   portion   of   the information   which   “distinctly   relates   to   the   fact   thereby discovered”. But the information to get admissibility need not   be   so   truncated   as   to   make   it   insensible   or incomprehensible.   The   extent   of   information   admitted should   be   consistent   with   understandability.   Mere statement   that   the   accused   led   the   police   and   the witnesses   to   the   place   where   he   had   concealed   the articles is not indicative of the information given .”                [Emphasis supplied] 73.  Mr.   Upadhyay,   the   learned   counsel   for   the   State   would   submit that   even   while   discarding   the   evidence   in   the   form   of   discovery panchnama   the   conduct   of   the   appellant   herein   would   be   relevant under Section 8 of the Evidence Act. The evidence of discovery would be   admissible   as   conduct   under   Section   8   of   the   Evidence   Act   quite apart from the admissibility of the disclosure statement under Section 27   of   the   said   Act,   as   this   Court   observed   in   A.N.   Venkatesh   vs. State of Karnataka , (2005) 7 SCC 714: “ 9.   By virtue of Section 8 of the Evidence Act, the conduct of   the   accused   person   is   relevant,   if   such   conduct influences or is influenced by any fact in issue or relevant fact.   The   evidence   of   the   circumstance,   simpliciter,   that the   accused   pointed   out   to   the   police   officer,   the   place where   the   dead   body   of   the   kidnapped   boy   was   found and on their pointing out the  body was exhumed, would be  admissible   as   conduct   under Section 8  irrespective  of the   fact   whether   the   statement   made   by   the   accused contemporaneously   with   or   antecedent   to   such   conduct falls   within   the   purview   of   Section   27   or   not   as   held   by this   Court   in        Prakash   Chand        v.        State   (Delhi Admn.)        [(1979) 3 SCC 90 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 656 : AIR 1979 SC   400]   .   Even   if   we   hold   that   the   disclosure   statement made by the accused­appellants (Exts. P­15 and P­16) is not admissible under Section 27 of the Evidence Act, still it is relevant under Section 8…..”         [Emphasis supplied] 74.  In   the   aforesaid   context,   we   would   like   to   sound   a   note   of caution.   Although   the   conduct   of   an   accused   may   be   a   relevant   fact under   Section 8   of the Evidence Act, yet the same, by itself, cannot be a ground to convict him or hold him guilty and that too, for a serious offence   like   murder.   Like   any   other   piece   of   evidence,   the   conduct   of an accused is also one of the circumstances which the   court may take into   consideration   along   with   the   other   evidence   on   record,   direct   or indirect.   What   we   are   trying   to   convey   is   that   the   conduct   of   the accused   alone,   though   may   be   relevant   under   Section   8   of   the Evidence Act, cannot form the basis of conviction.   75.  Thus, in view of the aforesaid discussion, we have reached to the conclusion that the evidence of discovery of the weapon and the blood stained clothes at the instance of the accused appellant can hardly be treated   as   legal   evidence,   more   particularly,   considering   the   various legal infirmities in the same. EXTRA JUDICIAL CONFESSION 76.  It is the case of the prosecution that on 23.01.2010 the accused appellant   is   said   to   have   visited   the   house   of   the   PW­3,   Babu   Ram Hans at about 9:00 o’clock in the morning and sought his help. While seeking help from the PW­3, Babu Ram Hans, the accused appellant is said   to   have   made   an   extra   judicial   confession   that   he   had   brutally killed his wife Sangeeta for not giving consent to him to marry Manju. The   accused   appellant   is   also   said   to   have   made   an   extra   judicial confession   to   the   PW­3,   Babu   Ram   Hans   that   he   had   also   killed   his four daughters viz. Tulsi, Lakshmi, Kajal and Guddi and thereby had committed   a   huge   mistake.   The   trial   court   and   the   High   Court   have believed the so called extra judicial confession said to have been made by the accused appellant before the PW­3, Babu Ram Hans. However, the trial court as well as the High Court should have put a question to themselves   before   believing   the   extra   judicial   confession   whether   the accused   appellant   was   a   free   man   on   23.01.2010   so   as   to   reach   the house   of   PW­3,   Babu   Ram   Hans   at   9:00   o’clock   in   the   morning   and make an  extra judicial  confession.  This is one of  the  basic  infirmities we   have   noticed   in   the   judgment   of   both   the   Courts.   There   is   cogent evidence   on   record   to   indicate   that   on   22.01.2010,   the   accused appellant   first   visited   the   house   of   PW­1,   Shambhu   Raidas   (first informant)   and   narrated   about   the   incident.   The   PW­1,   Shambhu Raidas   thereafter   lodged   the   First   Information   Report   (FIR)   at   the police   station   and   as   deposed   by   him,   the   accused   appellant   all throughout was at the police station. If on 22.01.2010 the accused is sent for medical examination along with a police  yadi  accompanied by a police constable to the hospital then how does it lie in the mouth of the prosecution to say that after the medical examination the accused appellant   was   allowed   to   go   home   and   move   around   freely.   The witnesses  have  said  in  their  oral  evidence  that  the  accused appellant was picked up by the police on 22.01.2010 in the early morning itself. This   entire   case   put   up   by   the   prosecution   that   an   extra   judicial confession was made by the accused appellant before the PW­3, Babu Ram   Hans   on   23.01.2010   appears   to   be   fabricated   and   engineered only to bolster up the case of the prosecution. 77.  It   is   also   the   case   of   the   prosecution   that   similar   such   extra judicial confession was made by the accused appellant before the PW­ 4,   Ram   Kumar,   S/o   Paanchoo   on   the   very   same   day   of   the   incident itself   i.e.   22.01.2010   at   06:30   in   the   morning.   If   we   peruse   the   oral evidence   of   the   PW­4,   Ram   Kumar   then   according   to   him   at   the relevant   point   of   time   he   was   a   member   of   the   District   Panchayat. According to PW­4, Ram Kumar, the accused appellant had visited his house at 06:30 in the morning and made an extra judicial confession that   he   had   committed   a   serious   crime.   How   does   the   prosecution expect   us   to   believe   even   the   second   extra   judicial   confession   alleged to   have   been   made   before   the   PW­4,   Ram   Kumar?   How   does   the prosecution   expect   us   to   believe   that   the   accused   appellant   was present at three different places on or about the same time. Either we believe   PW­1,   Shambhu   Raidas   (first   informant)   that   the   accused appellant visited his house at 06:30 in morning or we believe the PW­ 2,   Chhatrapal   Raidas,   who   has   deposed   that   the   accused   appellant had visited his house at 07:00 o’clock in the morning or we believe the PW­4, Ram Kumar that the accused appellant had visited his house at 06:30 in  the morning. How is it possible for  the accused appellant  to be  present   at   three  different   places  in   or   around  between   06:30  A.M. to 07:30 A.M. One another aspect that makes the oral evidence of the PW­4,   Ram   Kumar   very   doubtful   is   that   his   house   is   situated   at   a distance                    of 6­7 kilometers from Dhaurhara and according to   the   PW­4,   the   accused   appellant   visited   his   house   all   the   way walking   from   his   own   house.   The   PW­4,   Ram   Kumar   also   appears   to be   a   ‘got   up’   witness  only   for   the   purpose   of   creating  evidence   in   the form of extra judicial confession. At this stage, we may once again go back to the oral evidence of the PW­1, Shambhu Raidas (Exh.1). In his evidence,   he   has   said,   “the   inspector   had   not   interrogated   me   at   the police station. The inspector had visited the place of the incident in his vehicle.   I   left   the   police   station   at   the   02:00   o’clock   in   the   night.   I   had stayed   at   the   police   station   right   from   the   time   I   lodged   the   FIR   in   the morning till 02:00 o’clock in the night and Ramanand also stayed with me at the police station. The police official had challaned Ramanand on the   third   day.   Till   then   Ramanand   was   continuously   staying   at   the police station.  [Emphasis supplied] 78.  The   PW­2,   Chhatrapal   Raidas   in   his   evidence   has   deposed,   “ I came to know about the incident at 07:00 o’clock in the morning. I came to   know   through   Ramanand.   Ramanand   had   come   to   my   house   at 07:00 o’clock. Ramanand  was  alone  then. Ramanand   told   me  that  his wife   and   children   were   burning   in   the   house;   someone   had   killed   and set   them   on   fire.   Saying   this   Ramanand   left   for   his   home.   Thereafter, Pratap and Shambhu reached the place of Ramanand on a bicycle and I reached walking. When I reached the house of Ramanand, Pratap and Shambhu   were   dousing   the   fire   at   the   house   with   water.   Ramanand was   warming   his   body   sitting   over   here   and   villagers   were   standing outside.   The   clothes   of   Ramanand   were   soaked   with   blood.   The Inspector   reached   sometime   thereafter.   Thereafter,   I,   Shambhu   and Pratap went with the inspector to the police station in a jeep. It took half an hour for the inspector to arrive at the spot. It was about 8­9 o’clock in the   morning   the   police   officials   took   Ramanand   to   the   police   station before us.” 79.  Thus,   it   is   very   difficult   for   us   to   believe   that   the   accused appellant   could   have   made   extra   judicial   confession   on   23.01.2010 before   the   PW­2   and   also   before   the   PW­4   on   22.01.2010   at   06:30 A.M.   i.e.   on   the   date   of   incident.   We   have   reached   to   the   conclusion that the investigating officer has deliberately shown arrest of accused appellant on 24.01.2010 and that too from a place like bus stand. As discussed   above,   the   accused   appellant   was   arrested   and   taken   in custody   in   the   morning   of   22.01.2010   itself.   One   Police   Constable along   with   a   police   yadi   had   taken   the   accused   appellant   to   the hospital   in   the   morning   itself   for   medical   examination.   Only   with   a view   to   show   that   between   22.01.2010   and   24.01.2010   the   accused appellant   made   extra   judicial   confession   before   two   witnesses,   the investigating   officer   has   shown   arrest   of   the   accused   appellant   on 24.01.2010 which is just unbelievable. 80.  Confessions   may   be   divided   into   two   classes,   i.e.   judicial   and extra   judicial.   Judicial   confessions   are   those   which   are   made   before Magistrate   or   Court   in   the   course   of   judicial   proceedings.   Extra judicial confessions are those which are made by the party elsewhere than   before   a   Magistrate   or   Court.   Extra   judicial   confessions   are generally those made by a party to or before a private individual which includes even a judicial officer in his private capacity. It also includes a   Magistrate   who   is   not   especially   empowered   to   record   confessions under   Section   164   of   the   CrPC   or   a   Magistrate   so   empowered   but receiving   the   confession   at   a   stage   when   Section   164   does   not   apply. As   to   extra   judicial   confessions,   two   questions   arise:   (i)   were   they made   voluntarily?   And   (ii)   are   they   true?   As   the   Section   enacts,   a confession   made   by   an   accused   person   is   irrelevant   in   a   criminal proceedings,   if   the   making   of   the   confession   appears   to   the   Court   to have   been   caused   by   any   inducement,   threat   or   promise,   (1)   having reference   to   the   charge   against   the   accused   person,   (2)   proceeding from   a   person   in   authority,   and   (3)   sufficient,   in   the   opinion   of   the Court to give the accused person grounds which would appear to him reasonable   for   supposing   that   by   making   it   he   would   gain   any advantage   or   avoid   any   evil   of   a   temporal   nature   in   reference   to   the proceedings   against   him.   It   follows   that   a   confession   would   be voluntary if it is made by the accused in a fit state of mind, and if it is not caused by any inducement, threat or promise which has reference to   the   charge   against   him,   proceeding   from   a   person   in   authority.   It would   not   be   involuntary,   if   the   inducement,   (a)   does   not   have reference to the  charge against  the accused person, or  (b) it  does not proceed   from   a   person   in   authority;   or   (c)   it   is   not   sufficient,   in   the opinion of the Court to give the accused person grounds which would appear  to him  reasonable for  supposing  that, by  making  it, he would gain any advantage or avoid any evil of a temporal nature in reference to   the   proceedings   against   him.   Whether   or   not   the   confession   was voluntary   would   depend   upon   the   facts   and   circumstances   of   each case, judged in the light of   Section 24   of the Evidence Act.   The law is clear   that   a   confession   cannot   be   used   against   an   accused   person unless   the   Court   is   satisfied   that   it   was   voluntary   and   at   that   stage the question whether it is true or false does not arise. If the facts and circumstances surrounding the making of a confession appear to cast a   doubt   on   the  veracity   or   voluntariness   of   the   confession,  the   Court may   refuse   to   act   upon   the   confession,   even   if   it   is   admissible   in evidence. One important question, in regard to which the Court has to be   satisfied   with   is,   whether   when   the   accused   made   confession,   he was a free man or his movements were controlled by the police either by themselves or through some other agency employed by them for the purpose   of   securing   such   a   confession.   The   question   whether   a confession   is   voluntary   or   not   is   always   a   question   of   fact.   All   the factors and all the circumstances of the case, including the important factors at the time given for reflection, scope of the accused getting  a feeling   of   threat,   inducement   or   promise,   must   be   considered   before deciding whether the Court is satisfied that its opinion, the impression caused   by   the   inducement,   threat   or   promise,   if   any,   has   been   fully removed.   A   free   and   voluntary   confession   is   deserving   of   highest credit, because it is presumed to flow from the highest sense of guilt. [See  R. V. Warwickshall : (1783) Lesch 263)]. It is not to be conceived that a man would be induced to make a free and voluntary confession of guilt, so contrary to the feelings and principles of human nature, if the   facts   confessed   were   not   true.   Deliberate   and   voluntary confessions   of   guilt,   if   clearly   proved,   are   among   the   most   effectual proofs in law. An involuntary confession is one which is not the result of the free will of the maker of it. So, where the statement is made as a result   of   the   harassment   and   continuous   interrogation   for   several hours   after   the   person   is   treated   as   an   offender   and   accused,   such statement must be regarded as involuntary. The inducement may take the form of a promise or of threat, and often the inducement involves both promise and threat, a promise of forgiveness if disclosure is made and   threat   of   prosecution   if   it   is   not.   (See   Woodroffe   Evidence ,   9th Edn.   Page   284).   A   promise   is   always   attached   to   the   confession, alternative while a threat is always attached to the silence­alternative; thus,  in  the  one   case  the  prisoner   is  measuring  the   net  advantage  of the promise, minus the general undesirability of a false confession, as against the present unsatisfactory situation; while in the other case he is measuring the net advantages of the present satisfactory situation, minus   the   general   undesirability   of   the   confession   against   the threatened   harm.   It   must   be   borne   in   mind   that   every   inducement, threat or promise does not vitiate a confession. Since the object of the rule   is   to   exclude   only   those   confessions   which   are   testimonially untrustworthy, the inducement, threat or promise must be such as is calculated  to   lead  to   an  untrue  confession.  On  the  aforesaid  analysis the   Court   is   to   determine   the   absence   or   presence   of   inducement, promise etc. or  its sufficiency  and  how  or  in  what measure it worked on   the   mind   of   the   accused.   If   the   inducement,   promise   or   threat   is sufficient   in   the   opinion   of   the   Court,   to   give   the   accused   person grounds which would appear to him reasonable for supposing that by making it he would gain any advantage or avoid any evil, it is enough to exclude the confession. The words 'appear to him' in the last part of the   section   refer   to   the   mentality   of   the   accused.   (See   State   of Rajasthan v. Raja Ram , (2003) 8 SCC 180) 81.  An extra judicial confession, if voluntary and true and made in a fit state of mind, can be relied upon by the Court. The confession will have to be proved like any  other  fact. The value of the evidence as to confession,  like  any  other   evidence,  depends  upon   the  veracity   of  the witness to whom it has been made. The value of the evidence as to the confession   depends   on   the   reliability   of   the   witness   who   gives   the evidence. It is not open to any Court to start with a presumption that extra   judicial   confession   is   a   weak   type   of   evidence.   It   would   depend on the nature of the circumstances, the time when the confession was made   and   the   credibility   of   the   witnesses   who   speak   to   such   a confession.  Such  a  confession  can  be  relied  upon  and  conviction  can be   founded   thereon   if   the   evidence   about   the   confession   comes   from the mouth of witnesses who appear to be unbiased, not even remotely inimical   to   the   accused,   and   in   respect   of   whom   nothing   is   brought out   which   may   tend   to   indicate   that   he   may   have   a   motive   for attributing an untruthful statement to the accused, the words spoken to   by   the   witness   are   clear,   unambiguous   and   unmistakably   convey that the accused is the perpetrator of the crime and nothing is omitted by   the   witness   which   may   militate   against   it.   After   subjecting   the evidence   of   the   witness   to   a   rigorous   test   on   the   touchstone   of credibility,   the   extra   judicial   confession   can   be   accepted   and   can   be the basis of a conviction if it passes the test of credibility. 82.  Extra   judicial   confession   is   a   weak   piece   of   evidence   and   the court   must   ensure   that   the   same   inspires   confidence   and   is corroborated   by   other   prosecution   evidence.   It   is   considered   to   be   a weak   piece   of   evidence   as   it   can   be   easily   procured   whenever   direct evidence is not available. In order to accept extra judicial confession, it must   be   voluntary   and   must   inspire   confidence.   If   the   court   is satisfied that the extra judicial confession is voluntary, it can be acted upon to base the conviction.   83.  Considering   the   admissibility   and   evidentiary   value   of   extra judicial   confession,   after   referring   to   various   judgments, in   Sahadevan   and   Another   v.   State   of   Tamil   Nadu ,   (2012)   6   SCC 403, this Court held as under:­   “ 15.1.   In   Balwinder   Singh   v.   State   of   Punjab   [1995 Supp (4) SCC 259 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 59] this Court stated the principle that: (SCC p. 265, para 10) “10.   An   extra­judicial   confession   by   its   very   nature   is rather   a   weak   type   of   evidence   and   requires appreciation   with   a   great   deal   of   care   and   caution. Where   an   extra­judicial   confession   is   surrounded   by suspicious   circumstances,   its   credibility   becomes doubtful and it loses its importance .” x x x x 15.4.   While   explaining   the   dimensions   of   the   principles governing   the   admissibility   and   evidentiary   value   of   an extra­judicial   confession,   this   Court   in   State   of Rajasthan   v.   Raja   Ram   [(2003)   8   SCC   180   :   2003   SCC (Cri)   1965]   stated   the   principle   that:   (SCC   p.   192,   para 19) “19. An extra­judicial confession, if voluntary and true and made in a fit state of mind, can be relied upon by the   court.   The   confession   will   have   to   be   proved   like any   other   fact.   The   value   of   the   evidence   as   to confession, like any other evidence, depends upon the veracity of the witness to whom it has been made.” The  Court  further expressed  the  view  that: (SCC p. 192, para 19) “19.   …   Such   a   confession   can   be   relied   upon   and conviction   can   be   founded   thereon   if   the   evidence about   the   confession   comes   from   the   mouth   of witnesses   who   appear   to   be   unbiased,   not   even remotely   inimical   to   the   accused,   and   in   respect   of whom   nothing   is   brought   out   which   may   tend   to indicate   that   he   may   have   a   motive   of   attributing   an untruthful statement to the accused.…” x x x x   15.6.   Accepting   the   admissibility   of   the   extra­judicial confession,   the   Court   in   Sansar   Chand   v.   State   of Rajasthan   [(2010)   10   SCC   604   :   (2011)   1   SCC   (Cri)   79] held that: (SCC p. 611, paras 29­30) “29.   There   is   no   absolute   rule   that   an   extra­judicial confession   can   never   be   the   basis   of   a   conviction, although ordinarily an extra­judicial confession should be corroborated by some other material. [Vide   Thimma and   Thimma   Raju   v.   State   of   Mysore   [(1970)   2   SCC 105   :   1970   SCC   (Cri)   320]   ,   Mulk   Raj   v.   State   of U.P.   [AIR   1959   SC   902   :   1959   Cri   LJ 1219]   ,   Sivakumar   v.   State   [(2006)   1   SCC   714   :   (2006) 1 SCC (Cri) 470] (SCC paras 40 and 41 : AIR paras 41 and   42),   Shiva   Karam   Payaswami   Tewari   v.   State   of Maharashtra   [(2009)   11   SCC   262   :   (2009)   3   SCC   (Cri) 1320] and   Mohd. Azad   v.   State of W.B.   [(2008) 15 SCC 449 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 1082] ]””                                             [Emphasis supplied] 84.  It   is   well   settled   that   conviction   can   be   based   on   a   voluntarily confession but the rule of prudence requires that wherever possible it should   be   corroborated   by   independent   evidence.   Extra   judicial confession of accused need not in all cases be corroborated.   In   Madan Gopal Kakkad v. Naval Dubey and Another ,  (1992) 3 SCC 204, this Court after referring to   Piara Singh and Others v. State of Punjab , (1977) 4 SCC 452, held that the law does not require that the evidence of an extra judicial confession should in all cases be corroborated. The rule   of   prudence   does   not   require   that   each   and   every   circumstance mentioned   in   the   confession   must   be   separately   and   independently corroborated. 85.  The sum and substance of the aforesaid is that an extra judicial confession   by   its   very   nature   is   rather   a   weak   type   of   evidence   and requires   appreciation   with   great   deal   of   care   and   caution.   Where   an extra   judicial   confession   is   surrounded   by   suspicious   circumstances, its   credibility   becomes   doubtful   and   it   loses   its   importance   like   the case   in   hand.   The   Courts   generally   look   for   an   independent   reliable corroboration   before   placing   any   reliance   upon   an   extra   judicial confession. MOTIVE 86.  The   Courts   below   have   relied   upon   the   strong   motive   for   the accused   appellant   to   commit   the   crime   as   one   of   the   incriminating circumstances.   It   is   the   case   of   the   prosecution   that   the   accused appellant   desperately   wanted   to   get   married   to   Manju.   Manju   herself at  the   relevant  point   of   time   was   a   married   lady.   It   appears   from   the evidence   on   record   that   the   accused   appellant   had   even   got   engaged with Manju during the subsistence of his marriage with the deceased Sangeeta.   It   also   appears   that   the   engagement   ceremony   was celebrated   with   pomp   and   show.   However,   before   the   accused appellant   could   get   married   to   Manju,   he   got   arrested   in   one   offence under Section 307 of the IPC. According to the prosecution thereafter, although the accused appellant tried his best to get married to Manju, more   particularly,   after   being   released   on   bail   yet   as   there   was   lot   of opposition at the end of his wife deceased Sangeeta, he was not able to marry   her.   In   such   circumstances,   it   is   the   case   of   the   prosecution that   the  accused  appellant   decided  to   terminate  his   wife  Sangeeta   as well his four minor daughters on the fateful night of the incident. 87.  It   is   a   settled   principle   of   criminal   jurisprudence   that   in   a   case based on circumstantial evidence, motive for committing the crime on the   part   of   the   accused   assumes   greater   importance.   This   Court   in various decisions has laid down the principles holding that motive for commission of offence no doubt assumes greater importance in cases resting on circumstantial evidence than those in which direct evidence regarding   commission   of   offence   is   available.   It   is   equally   true   that failure   to   prove   motive   in   cases   resting   on   circumstantial   evidence   is not fatal by itself. However, it is also well settled and it is trite in law that   absence   of   motive   could   be   a   missing   link   of   incriminating circumstances,   but   once   the   prosecution   has   established   the   other incriminating circumstances to its entirety, absence of motive will not give any benefit to the accused. 88.  Having   regard   to   the   nature   of   the   evidence   on   record,   there   is something   to   indicate   that   the   accused   appellant   had   illicit relationship   with  Manju   and   wanted  to   settle   in   life   marrying   Manju. As   noted   above,   in   the   past   accused   appellant   had   got   engaged   with Manju and was on the verge of getting married. At the relevant point of time  when  the   accused  appellant  got  engaged  with  Manju,  it  appears that   one   and   all   including   the   deceased   Sangeeta   were   consenting parties.   There   is   nothing   on   record   to   indicate   that   at   the   time   of engagement   of   accused  appellant   with   Manju,   the   deceased  Sangeeta had raised hue and cry or had opposed such decision of her husband. Of course, this is something which is very personal. If at all we believe the  illicit relationship of  the  accused  appellant  with Manju,  then  it  is possible   that   the   deceased   Sangeeta   might   be   an   absolutely   helpless lady   and   could   not   have   done   anything   in   that   regard.   However,   the moot   question   is   should   this   motive   by   alone   be   held   sufficient   to convict the accused appellant for  the alleged crime and sentence him to death. 89.  In   the   case   of   Sampath   Kumar   v.   Inspector   of   Police Krishnagiri ,   (2012)   4   SCC   124,   decided   on   02.03.2012,   this   Court held as under: “ 29.   In   N.J.   Suraj   v.   State   [(2004)   11   SCC   346   :   2004 SCC   (Cri)   Supp   85]   the   prosecution   case   was   based entirely   upon   circumstantial   evidence   and   a   motive. Having   discussed   the   circumstances   relied   upon   by   the prosecution, this Court rejected the motive which was the only   remaining   circumstance   relied   upon   by   the prosecution stating that the presence of a motive was not enough   for   supporting   a   conviction,   for   it   is   well   settled that the chain of circumstances should be such as to lead to an irresistible conclusion, that is incompatible with the innocence of the accused. 30.   To   the   same   effect   is   the   decision   of   this   Court in   Santosh   Kumar   Singh   v.   State   [(2010)   9   SCC   747   : (2010)   3   SCC   (Cri)   1469]   and   Rukia   Begum   v.   State   of Karnataka   [(2011) 4  SCC 779 :  (2011)  2 SCC (Cri)  488 : AIR   2011   SC   1585]   where   this   Court   held   that   motive alone in the absence of any other circumstantial evidence would   not   be   sufficient   to   convict   the   appellant . Reference may also be made to the decision of this Court in   Sunil   Rai   v.   UT,   Chandigarh   [(2011)   12   SCC   258   : (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 543 : AIR 2011 SC 2545] . This Court explained   the   legal   position   as   follows:   (Sunil   Rai case   [(2011)   12   SCC   258   :   (2012)   1   SCC   (Cri)   543   :   AIR 2011 SC 2545] , SCC p. 266, paras 31­32) “31.   …   In   any   event,   motive   alone   can   hardly   be   a ground for conviction. 32.   On   the   materials   on   record,   there   may   be   some suspicion   against   the   accused,   but   as   is   often   said, suspicion,   howsoever   strong,   cannot   take   the   place   of proof.” 31.   Suffice it to say although, according to the appellants the   question   of   the   appellant   Velu   having   the   motive   to harm   the   deceased   Senthil   for   falling   in   love   with   his sister, Usha did not survive once the family had decided to   offer   Usha   in   matrimony   to   the   deceased   Senthil.   Yet even   assuming   that   the   appellant   Velu   had   not reconciled   to   the   idea   of   Usha   getting   married   to   the deceased   Senthil,   all   that   can   be   said   was   that   the appellant   Velu   had   a   motive   for   physically   harming   the deceased.   That   may   be   an   important   circumstance   in   a case   based   on   circumstantial   evidence   but   cannot   take the   place   of   conclusive   proof   that   the   person   concerned was the author of the crime. One could even say that the presence of motive in the facts and circumstances of the case creates a strong suspicion against the appellant but suspicion, howsoever strong, also cannot be a substitute for   proof   of   the   guilt   of   the   accused   beyond   reasonable doubt .”       [Emphasis supplied] 90.  Thus,   even   if   it   is   believed   that   the   accused   appellant   had   a motive   to   commit   the   crime,   the   same   may   be   an   important circumstance   in   a   case   based   on   circumstantial   evidence   but   cannot take the place as a conclusive proof that the person concerned was the author of the crime. One could even say that the presence of motive in the   facts   and   circumstances   of   the   case   creates   a   strong   suspicion against   the   accused   appellant   but   suspicion,   howsoever   strong, cannot   be   a   substitute   for   proof   of   the   guilt   of   the   accused   beyond reasonable doubt. 91.  The fact that we have ruled out the circumstances relating to the making of an extra judicial confession and the discovery of the weapon of offence as not having been established, the chain of circumstantial evidence snaps so badly that to consider any other circumstance, even like motive, would not be necessary. FALSE   EXPLANATION   OFFERED   BY   THE   ACCUSED   APPELLANT AS AN ADDITIONAL LINK 92.  It is the case of the prosecution all throughout that the accused appellant   offered   false   explanation   in   his   defence.   To   put   it   in   other words, according to the courts below the say of the accused appellant that   on   the   fateful   night   of   the   incident   four   unidentified   persons killed his wife and daughters mercilessly and thereafter, set their dead bodies   on   fire   stood   falsified,   in   view   of   the   incriminating circumstances pointing towards the guilt of the accused. According to the   trial   court   and   the   High   Court,   the   explanation   offered   by   the accused   appellant   in   regard   to   the   injuries   suffered   by   him   on   his head is established to be false. In such circumstances, both the courts took   the   view   that   the   false   explanation   offered   by   the   accused appellant is an additional link in the chain of circumstances.  93. It appears from the materials on record that in all, three further statements   of   the   accused   appellant   were   recorded   by   the   trial   court under Section 313 of the CrPC. This is one another unusual feature of this   matter.   Ordinarily   and   more   particularly   having   regard   to   the language   of   Section   313   of   the   CrPC,   the   further   statement   of   an accused is to be recorded once the prosecution closes its evidence and before the accused enters his defence. In the case on hand, it appears that on 19.07.2013, in all eight prosecution witnesses were examined. At the end of the day, the trial court recorded the further statement of the accused appellant. The Question No. 12 reads thus: “ Question 12:  ­ Do you want to submit anything else?  Answer:   ­ Manua alias Ramakant, Kamlkant and Ramakant had killed my elder brother Siyaram, & for that I had lodged F.I.R. My wife Sangita and Siyaram's daughter Gudiya were the   eye   witnesses   of   this   case.   The   accused   persons,   with intention   to   erase   evidence,   had   assaulted   me   and   my   wife Sangita, and burnt her by pouring kerosene oil. They wanted to kill me too. That's why they poured kerosene oil on me as well. The daughter of Siyaram died of sickness. This incident had been caused by Ramakant, Kamlakant and Ramakant.” 94. On   14.11.2013,   the   second   further   statement   of   the   accused appellant was recorded by the trial court wherein the Question No. 8 reads thus:  “ Question 8:­  Do you want to submit anything else?  Answer:­  I am innocent. I may be acquitted.” 95. On   21.07.2016,   the   third   further   statement   of   the   accused appellant came to be recorded by the trial court wherein the Question No. 4 reads thus:  “ Question 4:­   Do you want to submit anything else? Answer:- I and my brother Siyaram were living at village Basadiya, Police Station- Dhaurhara. The brahmins of Basadiya had committed murder of my brother Siyaram. I was complainant in that case. Due to their fear, I started living at Naamdar Purwa. My wife and the daughter of Siyaram were witnesses of his murder. His daughter had died. The accused persons of the murder of Siyaram had killed my wife and family for erasing the evidence. They intended to kill me as well due to which I sustained injuries. ” 96. It   is   well   settled   that   the   prosecution   must   stand   or   fall   on   its own  legs  and  it  cannot   derive any  strength  from   the  weakness  of  the defence.   Where   various   links   in   a   chain   are   in   themselves   complete, then a false plea or a false defence may be called into aid only to lend assurance   to   the   Court.   In   other   words,   before   using   the   additional link it must be proved that all the links in the chain are complete and do   not   suffer   from   any   infirmity.   It   is   not   the   law   where   there   is   any infirmity or lacunae in the prosecution case, the same could be cured or supplied by a false defence or a false plea which is not accepted by a Court. 97.  Before a false explanation can be used as an additional link, the following essential conditions must be satisfied: (i) Various   links   in   the   chain   of   evidence   led   by   the   prosecution have been satisfactorily proved. (ii) Such   circumstances   points   to   the   guilt   of   the   accused   as reasonable defence. (iii) The circumstance is in proximity to the time and situation. 98.   If   the   aforesaid   conditions   are   fulfilled   only   then   a   Court   use   a false   explanation   or   a   false   defence   as   an   additional   link   to   lend   as assurance to the Court and not otherwise. [see  Sharad Biridhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra , AIR (1984) SC 1622] 99. It   is   sufficient   if   the   accused   person   succeeds   in   proving   a preponderance of probability in favour of his case. It is not necessary for the accused person to prove his case beyond a reasonable doubt or in default to incur a verdict of guilty. The onus of proof lying upon the accused person is to prove his case by a preponderance of probability. In   the   American   Jurisprudence,   2nd   Edition,   Vol.   30,   the   expression “ preponderance   of   evidence ”   has   been   defined   in   Article   1164.   In America the term means “ the weight, credit and value of the aggregate evidence   on   either   side,   and   is   usually   considered   to   be   synonymous with the term greater weight of the evidence”,   or   “greater weight of the credible   evidence” .   It   is   a   phrase   which,   in   the   last   analysis,   means probability   of   the   truth.   To   be   satisfied,   certain,   or   convinced   is   a much   higher   test   than   the   test   of   “preponderance   of   evidence”.   The phrase   “preponderance   of   probability”   appears   to   have   been   taken from   Charles   R.   Cooper   v.   F.   W.   Slade ,   (1857­59)   6   HLC   746.   The observations made therein make it clear  that what “preponderance of probability” means “more probable and rational view of the case”, not necessarily as certain as the pleading should be.  100. Again,   at   the   cost   of   repetition,   we   may   state   that   it   is   not necessary for us to go into the issue of false explanation, said to have been   offered   by   the   accused   appellant   as   at   the   most   a   false explanation can be used as an additional link in the chain of evidence led   by   the   prosecution.   This   issue   pales   into   insignificance   as   the various   links   in   the   chain   of   evidence   led   by   the   prosecution   having not been satisfactorily proved.  101. The   inalienable   interface   of   presumption   of   innocence   and   the burden   of   proof   in   a   criminal   case   on   the   prosecution   has   been succinctly   expounded   in   the   following   passage   from   the   treatise   "The Law of Evidence" fifth edition by Ian Dennis at page 445: “The   presumption   of   innocence   states   that   a   person   is presumed   to   be   innocent   until   proven   guilty.   In   one   sense this   simply   restates   in   different   language   the   rule   that   the burden   of   proof   in   a   criminal   case   is   on   the   prosecution   to prove the defendant's guilt. As explained above, the burden of   proof   rule   has   a   number   of   functions,   one   of   which   is   to provide a rule of decision for the fact­finder in a situation of uncertainty.   Another   function   is   to   allocate   the   risk   of   mis­ decision in criminal trials.   Because the outcome of wrongful conviction   is   regarded   as   a   significantly   worse   harm   than wrongful  acquittal  the  rule   is   constructed   so  as  to  minimise the   risk   of   the   former.   The   burden   of   overcoming   a presumption   that   the   defendant   is   innocent   therefore requires the state to prove the defendant's guilt ."                                                  [Emphasis supplied] 102. The   above   quote   thus   seemingly   concedes   a   preference   to wrongful   acquittal   compared   to   the   risk   of   wrongful   conviction.   Such is   the   abiding   jurisprudential   concern   to   eschew   even   the   remotest possibility of unmerited conviction. 103. This applies with full force particularly in fact situations like the one   on   hand   where   the   charge   is   sought   to   be   established   by circumstantial   evidence.   These   enunciations   are   so   well   entrenched that we do not wish to burden the present narration by referring to the decisions of this Court in this regard. 104. Addressing   this   aspect,   however,   is   the   following   extract   also from   the   same   treatise   "The   Law   of   Evidence"   fifth   edition   by   Ian Dennis at page 483: "Where   the   case   against   the   accused   depends   wholly   or partly on inferences from circumstantial evidence, fact­finders cannot   logically   convict   unless   they   are   sure   that   inferences of   guilt   are   the   only   ones   that   can   reasonably   be   drawn.   If they   think   that   there   are   possible   innocent   explanations   for circumstantial evidence that are not "merely fanciful", it must follow   that   there   is   a   reasonable   doubt   about   guilt.   There   is no   rule,  however,  that   judges   must  direct   juries   in terms   not to   convict   unless   they   are   sure   that   the   evidence   bears   no other   explanation   than   guilt.   It   is   sufficient   to   direct   simply that   the   burden   on   the   prosecution   is   to   satisfy   the   jury beyond reasonable doubt, or so that they are sure. The   very   high   standard   of   proof   required   in   criminal   cases minimises   the   risk   of   a   wrongful   conviction .   It   means   that someone   whom,   on   the   evidence,   the   fact­finder   believes   is "probably"   guilty,   or   "likely"   to   be   guilty   will   be   acquitted, since   these   judgments   of   probability   necessarily   admit   that the fact­finder is not "sure".  It is generally accepted that some at least of these acquittals will be of persons who are in fact guilty of the offences charged, and who would be convicted if the   standard   of   proof   were   the   lower   civil   standard   of   the balance of probabilities. Such acquittals are the price paid for the   safeguard   provided   by   the   "beyond   reasonable   doubt" standard against wrongful conviction. "          [Emphasis supplied] 105. We   must   remind   ourselves   of   what   this   Court   observed   in   the case   of   Shankarlal   Gyarasilal   Dixit   v.   State   of   Maharashtra reported in (1981) 2 SCC 35. We quote as under:  “ 32.   …..But, while formulating its own view the High Court, with   respect,   fell   into   an   error   in   stating   the   true   legal position   by   saying   that   what   the   court   has   to   consider   is whether   the   cumulative   effect   of   the   circumstances establishes  the  guilt  of  the  accused  beyond  the  “shadow of doubt”. In the first  place, “shadow of doubt”, even in cases which depend on direct evidence is shadow of “reasonable” doubt.   Secondly,   in   its   practical   application,   the   test   which requires  the  exclusion of  other alternative  hypotheses  is  far more   rigorous   than   the   test   of   proof   beyond   reasonable doubt. ”           [Emphasis supplied] INJURIES ON THE BODY OF THE ACCUSED APPELLANT 106. It   appears   from   the   materials   on   record   that   the   accused appellant   was   forwarded   to   the   Community   Health   Centre   (CHC) Dhaurhara, accompanied by the police constable Brij Mohan Singh for the purpose of medical examination on the date of the incident itself, i.e.,   22.01.2010.   PW­9,   Dr.   Ankit   Kumar   Singh   had   examined   the accused   appellant   and   in   the   medical   certificate   issued   by   him   Exh. 44, he noted five injuries in or around the head and the neck region. The   first   three   injuries   noted   are   in   the   form   of   lacerated   wounds, whereas   the   other   two   injuries   as   superfluous   burn   injuries.   It   was argued   before  us   by   the   learned   counsel   appearing   for   the   State  that the injuries found on the body of the accused appellant points towards his   complicity   in   the   crime.   It   was   also   sought   to   be   argued   that   the explanation offered by  the accused appellant in regard to the injuries suffered   by   him   is   falsified   by   the   circumstantial   evidence   on   record. On the other  hand, the defence also argued that the non­explanation of   the   injuries   suffered   by   the   accused   appellant   at   the   end   of   the prosecution   is   fatal.     Thus,   both   the   sides   want   to   make   the   most   of the injuries which were found on the body of the accused appellant.  107. We   are   of   the   view   that   both   the   sides   are   wrong   in   their   own way.   The   settled   law   is   that   if   there   are   serious   injuries   or   grievous injuries found on the body of the accused then the prosecution owes a duty   to   explain   such   injuries   and   the   failure   on   the   part   of   the prosecution   to   explain   may   point   towards   the   innocence   of   the accused.   At   the   same   time,   the   well­settled   law   is   that   if   the   injuries are   superfluous   or   minor   in   nature   then   the   prosecution   need   not explain such injuries. In the case on hand, the accused appellant has offered   some   explanation   which   could   be   said   to   be   compatible   with the defence he has put forward. As explained earlier, the accused has to   establish   his   defence   on   preponderance   of   probability   and   not beyond   reasonable   doubt.   The   accused   in   his   statement   recorded under   Section   313   of   the   CrPC   has   said   that   he   suffered   the   head injuries   as   one   of   the   assailants   out   of   the   four   had   hit   him   on   his head   with   the   butt   of   the   gun.   PW­9,   Dr.   Ankit   Kumar   Singh   in   his evidence has said that the injurie Nos. 1, 2                   and 3 resply could have   been   caused   by   the   butt   of   the   gun.   PW­9,     Dr.   Ankit   Kumar Singh has not said that the injuries suffered by the accused appellant were self­inflicted injuries.  108. The   prosecution   wants   us   to   accept   the   other   side   of   the   story. What   the   prosecution   wants   to   convey   is   that   the   accused   appellant suffered the injuries while committing the crime. This is suggestive of the   fact   that   the   accused   appellant   might   have   suffered   the   injuries only   if   one   of   the   deceased   persons   had   retaliated   in   defence   at   the time of the assault. Such is not even the case of the prosecution. We rule   out   this   theory   of   counter   defence   at   the   end   of   any   of   the deceased   persons   because   out   of   five   deceased   persons   four   were minor children. 109. If   anyone   could   have   offered   any   resistance,   then   it   could   have been the deceased Sangeeta. However, having regard to the nature of the   injuries   suffered   by   the   deceased   Sangeeta,   it   is   difficult   to   even say   that   she   might   have   realised   for   even   a   second   as   to   what   was happening.  110. We   see   it   from   a   different   perspective.   For   the   time   being,   we proceed   on   the   footing   or   the   assumption   that   the   accused   appellant wanted   to   do   away   with   his   wife   and   children.   We   fail   to   understand what   could   be   the   good   reason   for   the   accused   appellant   after   the assault   to   cut   the   bodies   into   pieces.   We   find   some   merit   in   the submission   of   Mr.   S.   Niranjan   Reddy,   the   learned   senior   counsel   for the accused appellant that it could be a sign of grave warning from the other   side   who   belong   to   the   upper­caste   ( Brahmins )   as   to   how revengeful and venomous they could be.  111. In   Dhananjay   Shanker   Shetty   v.   State   of   Maharashtra , (2002) 6 SCC 596, in paragraph 10 in reference to the circumstantial evidence,   in   the   case   of   murder,   the   non­explanation   of   injuries   on accused   by   prosecution   was   held   to   be   significant   when   there   are circumstances   which   makes   prosecution   case   doubtful.   For   the relevant purpose, the relevant extract of paragraph 10 is extracted as below:  “ 10 . .... But non­explanation of injuries assumes significance when   there   are   material   circumstances   which   make   the prosecution case doubtful . Reference in this connection may be   made   to   recent   decisions   of   this   Court   in   the   cases of   Takhaji   Hiraji   v.   Thakore   Kubersing   Chamansing   [(2001) 6 SCC 145 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 1070] and   Kashiram   v.   State of M.P.   [(2002)   1   SCC   71   :   2002   SCC   (Cri)   68].   In   the   present case,   non­explanation   of   injuries   on   the   appellant   by   the prosecution   assumes   significance   as   there   are circumstances   which   make   the   prosecution   case,   showing the   complicity   of   the   appellant   with   the   crime,   highly doubtful.”                                                                       [Emphasis supplied] 112. In   Mohar   Rai   and   Bharath   Rai   v.   State   of   Bihar ,   AIR   1968 SC 1281, it was observed:  “ 6.   …..In our judgment the failure of the prosecution to offer any   explanation   in   that   regard   shows   that   evidence   of   the prosecution   witnesses   relating   to   the   incident   is   not   true   or at   any   rate   not   wholly   true.   Further   those   injuries probabilise the plea taken by the appellants .”                                        [Emphasis supplied] 113. In   another   important   case   Lakshmi   Singh   and   Others   v. State   of   Bihar ,   (1976)   4   SCC   394,   after   referring   to   the   ratio   laid down in  Mohar Rai   (supra), this Court observed:  “ 12.  …..where the prosecution fails to explain the injuries on the   accused,  two   results  follow:  (1)   that  the  evidence   of   the prosecution   witnesses   is   untrue;   and   (2)   that   the   injuries probabilise the plea taken by the appellants…..”   114. It was further observed that:  “ 12.  …..in a murder case, the non­explanation of the injuries sustained by the accused at about the time of the occurrence or   in   the   course   of   altercation   is   a   very   important circumstance   from   which   the   court   can   draw   the   following inferences: (1)   that   the   prosecution   has   suppressed   the   genesis and   the   origin   of   the   occurrence   and   has   thus   not presented the true version; (2)   that   the   witnesses   who   have   denied   the   presence of  the  injuries  on the   person  of  the   accused  are  lying on a most  material point and therefore their evidence is unreliable; (3)   that   in   case   there   is   a   defence   version   which explains the injuries on the person of the accused it is rendered   probable   so   as   to   throw   doubt   on   the prosecution case…..” 115. In   Mohar   Rai   (supra)   it   is   made   clear   that   failure   of   the prosecution   to   offer   any   explanation   regarding   the   injuries   found   on the accused may show that the evidence related to the incident is not true,   or   at   any   rate,   not   wholly   true.   Likewise   in   Lakshmi   Singh (supra) it is observed that any non­explanation of the injuries on the accused   by   the   prosecution   may   affect   the   prosecution   case.   But such   a   non­explanation   may   assume   greater   importance   where   the defence gives a version which competes in probability with that of the prosecution. But where the evidence is clear, cogent and creditworthy and   where   the   court   can   distinguish   the   truth   from   falsehood,   the mere   fact   that   the   injuries   are   not   explained   by   the   prosecution cannot itself be a sole basis to reject such evidence, and consequently the   whole   case.   Much   depends   on   the   facts   and   circumstances   of each   case.   These   aspects   were   highlighted   by   this   Court   in   Vijay Singh and Ors. v. State of        U.P. , (1990) CriLJ 1510. CONCLUSION 116. Thus, none of the pieces of evidence relied on as incriminating by the   courts   below,   can   be   treated   as   incriminating   pieces   of circumstantial   evidence  against   the   accused.  Realities  or   truth   apart, the   fundamental   and   basic   presumption   in   the   administration   of criminal law and justice delivery system is the innocence of the alleged accused   and   till   the   charges   are   proved   beyond   reasonable   doubt   on the   basis   of   clear,   cogent,   credible   or   unimpeachable   evidence,   the question   of   indicting   or   punishing   an   accused   does   not   arise,   merely carried away by heinous nature of the crime or the gruesome manner in which it was found to have been committed.   Though the offence is gruesome   and   revolts   the   human   conscience   but   an   accused   can   be convicted only  on legal evidence and if only a chain of circumstantial evidence has been so forged as to rule out the possibility of any other reasonable   hypothesis   excepting   the   guilt   of   the   accused.   In Shankarlal   Gyarasilal   (supra),   this   Court   cautioned   ­   "   human nature is too willing, when faced with brutal crimes, to spin stories out of strong suspicions    " . This Court has held time and again that between “may   be   true”   and   “must   be   true”   there   is   a   long   distance   to   travel which  must   be   covered  by   clear,  cogent   and   unimpeachable  evidence by   the   prosecution   before   an   accused   is   condemned   a   convict.   [See Ashish Batham v. State of M.P. , (2002) 7 SCC 31]. 117. Before parting with the case, we would like to place on record an observation of ours, touching an important aspect of the case. Without any   hesitation   and   with   disappointment,   we   state   that   the   case   on hand   is   one   of   most   perfunctory   investigation.   It   appears   that   the accused herein was provided with a legal aid. He might not have been able   to   afford   a   good   and   experienced   trial   side   lawyer   to   defend himself. We have noticed that the cross­examination of each and every witness   is   below   average.   Questions,   which   the   defence   counsel   was not   supposed   to   put   to   the   prosecution   witnesses   were   put   without realising   or   understanding   the   legal   implications   of   the   answers   to such questions, more particularly, when they were not necessary. The defence   counsel   remained   oblivious   of   the   position   of   law   that suggestions made to the witnesses by the defence the answers to those are binding to the accused.  118. Any   defence   counsel   with   a   reasonable   standing   at   the   Bar   is expected   to   know   that   cross­examination   is   not   the   only   method   of discrediting   a   witness.   If   the   oral   testimony   of   certain   witnesses   is contrary  to the proved facts and if their  testimony  is on the face of it unacceptable,   their   evidence   might   well   be   discarded   on   that   ground alone. 119. It   is   by   far   now   well­settled   for   a   legal   proposition   that   it   is   the duty of the court to see and ensure that an accused put on a criminal trial   is   effectively   represented   by   a   defence   counsel,   and   in   the   event on   account   of   indigence,   poverty   or   illiteracy   or   any   other   disabling factor, he is not able to engage a counsel of his choice, it becomes the duty of the court to provide him appropriate and meaningful legal aid at the State expense. What is meant by the duty of the State to ensure a   fair   defence   to   an   accused   is   not   the   employment   of   a   defence counsel   for   namesake.   It   has   to   be   the   provision   of   a   counsel   who defends   the   accused   diligently   to   the   best   of   his   abilities.   While   the quality  of the defence or the caliber  of the counsel would not militate against  the guarantee  to a fair  trial sanctioned by  Articles 21 and 22 resply   of   the   Constitution,   a   threshold   level   of   competence   and   due diligence   in   the   discharge   of   his   duties   as   a   defence   counsel   would certainly be the constitutional guaranteed expectation. The presence of counsel on record means effective, genuine and faithful presence and not a mere farcical, sham or  a virtual presence that is illusory, if not fraudulent. 120. Article 39A of the Constitution speaks about free legal aid which reads thus: “ 39A .   Equal   justice   and   free   legal   aid.— The   State   shall secure that the operation of the legal system promotes justice, on   a   basis   of   equal   opportunity,   and   shall,   in   particular, provide free legal aid, by suitable legislation or schemes or in any   other   way,   to   ensure   that   opportunities   for   securing justice are not denied to any citizen by reason of economic or other disabilities.” 121. Section 304 of the CrPC refers to legal aid to the accused at State expenses in certain cases which reads thus: “ 304.  Legal aid to accused at State  expense in certain cases. — (1)Where,   in   a   trial   before   the   Court   of   Session,   the accused   is   not   represented   by   a   pleader,   and   where   it appears   to   the   Court   that   the   accused   has   not   sufficient means to engage a pleader, the Court shall assign a pleader for his defence at the expense of the State. (2)   The   High   Court   may,   with   the   previous   approval   of   the State Government, make rule providing for — (a) the mode of selecting pleaders for defence under sub­ section (1); (b)   the   facilities   to   be   allowed   to   such   pleaders   by   the Courts; (c)   the   fee   payable   to   such   pleaders   by   the   Government, and   generally,   for   carrying   out   the   purposes   of   sub­ section (1). (3) The State Government may, by notification, direct that, as from   such   date   as   may   be   specified   in   the   notification   the provisions of sub­sections (1) and (2) shall apply in relation to any   class   of   trials   before   other   Courts   in   the   State   as   they apply in relation to trials before the Courts of Session.” 122. Under  Section  9  of  the  Legal  Services  Authorities Act,  1987,  the District Legal Services Authorities are constituted for every District in the   State   to   exercise   powers   and   perform   functions   conferred   on,   or assigned to, the District Authority under the said Act. 123. This   Court   in   para   13   of   the   judgment   reported   in   Kishore Chand   v.   State of Himachal Pradesh , (1991) 1 SCC 286,   held thus: “ 13.   Though   Article   39­A   of   the   Constitution   provides fundamental   rights   to   equal   justice   and   free   legal   aid   and though   the   State   provides   amicus   curiae   to   defend   the indigent   accused,   he   would   be   meted   out   with   unequal defence   if,   as   is   common   knowledge   the   youngster   from   the bar   who   has   either   a   little   experience   or   no   experience   is assigned   to   defend   him.   It   is   high   time   that   senior   counsel practising   in   the   court   concerned,   volunteer   to   defend   such indigent accused as a part of their professional duty. If these remedial   steps   are   taken   and   an   honest   and   objective investigation is done, it will enhance a sense of confidence of the public in the investigating agency.” 124. This   Court,   in   the   case   of   Zahira   Habibullah   Sheikh   (5)   and Another   v.   State   of   Gujarat   and   Others ,   reported   in   (2006)   3   SCC 374,   has observed in paragraphs 30, 35, 38 and 39 as under: “ 30.   Right   from   the   inception   of   the   judicial   system   it   has been  accepted  that  discovery,  vindication  and  establishment of   truth   are   the   main   purposes   underlying   existence   of   the courts   of   justice.   The   operative   principles   for   a   fair   trial permeate the common law in both civil and criminal contexts. Application   of   these   principles   involves   a   delicate   judicial balancing   of   competing   interests   in   a   criminal   trial:   the interests of the accused and the public and to a great extent that   of   the   victim   have   to   be   weighed   not   losing   sight   of   the public   interest   involved   in   the   prosecution   of   persons   who commit offences. x x x x 35.   This Court has often emphasised that in a criminal case the   fate   of   the   proceedings   cannot   always   be   left   entirely   in the hands of the parties, crime being public wrong in breach and   violation   of   public   rights   and   duties,   which   affects   the whole   community   as   a   community   and   is   harmful   to   the society   in   general.   The   concept   of   fair   trial   entails   familiar triangulation   of   interests   of   the   accused,   the   victim   and   the society   and   it   is   the   community   that   acts   through   the   State and   prosecuting   agencies.   Interest   of   society   is   not   to   be treated   completely   with   disdain   and   as   persona   non   grata. The   courts   have   always   been   considered   to   have   an overriding   duty   to   maintain   public   confidence   in   the administration   of   justice­often   referred   to   as   the   duty   to vindicate   and   uphold   the   “majesty   of   the   law”.   Due administration   of   justice   has   always   been   viewed   as   a continuous   process,   not   confined   to   determination   of   the particular case, protecting its ability to function as a court of law in the future as in the case before it. If a criminal court is to   be   an   effective   instrument   in   dispensing   justice,   the Presiding   Judge   must   cease   to   be   a   spectator   and   a   mere recording   machine   by   becoming   a   participant   in   the   trial evincing   intelligence,   active   interest   and   elicit   all   relevant materials   necessary   for   reaching   the   correct   conclusion,   to find   out   the   truth,   and   administer   justice   with   fairness   and impartiality   both   to   the   parties   and   to   the   community   it serves. The  courts  administering  criminal  justice  cannot   turn a   blind   eye   to   vexatious   or   oppressive   conduct   that   has occurred   in   relation   to   proceedings,   even   if   a  fair  trial   is   still possible, except at the risk of undermining the fair name and standing   of   the   judges   as   impartial   and   independent adjudicators. x x x x 38.  Failure to accord fair hearing either to the accused or the prosecution violates even minimum standards of due process of law. It is inherent in the concept of due process of law, that condemnation should be rendered only after the trial in which the   hearing   is   a   real   one,   not   sham   or   a   mere   farce   and pretence.   Since   the   fair   hearing   requires   an   opportunity   to preserve   the   process,   it   may   be   vitiated   and   violated   by   an over hasty stage­managed, tailored and partisan trial. 39.   The   fair   trial   for   a   criminal   offence   consists   not   only   in technical observance of the frame, and forms of law, but also in   recognition   and   just   application   of   its   principles   in substance,   to   find   out   the   truth   and   prevent   miscarriage   of justice.” 125. In   Ranchod   Mathur   Wasawa   v.   State   of   Gujarat ,   (1974)   3 SCC   581,   it   is   observed   that,   the   Sessions   Judge   should   view   with sufficient   seriousness   the   need   to   appoint   State   Counsel   for undefended   accused   in   grave   cases.   Indigence   should   never   be   a ground   for   denying   fair   trial   or   equal   justice.   Therefore,   particular attention   should   be   paid   to   appoint   competent   advocates,   equal   to handling the complex cases, not patronising gestures to raw entrants to   the  Bar.  Sufficient  time  and  complete  papers  should  also  be made available   to   the   advocate   chosen   so   that   he   may   serve   the   cause   of justice with all the ability at his command, and the accused also may feel confident that his counsel chosen by the court has had adequate time and material to defend him properly. 126. This   case   provides   us   an   opportunity   to   remind   the   learned District  and  Sessions  Judges across  the  country  conducting   sessions trials,   more   particularly   relating   to   serious   offences   involving   severe sentences,   to   appoint   experienced   lawyers   who   had   conducted   such cases   in   the   past.   It   is   desirable   that   in   such   cases   senior   advocate practising   in   the   trial   court   shall   be   requested   to   conduct   the   case himself   or   herself   on   behalf   of   the   undefended   accused   or   at   least provide   good   guidance   to   the   advocate   who   is   appointed   as   amicus curiae  or an advocate from the legal aid panel to defend the case of the accused   persons.   Then   only   the   effective   and   meaningful   legal   aid would be said to have been provided to the accused. 127. This   Court,   in   the   case   of   Madhav   Hayawadanrao Hoskot   v.   State of Maharashtra , reported in   (1978) 3 SCC 544, had emphasized   upon   the   need   of   securing   the   competent   and   efficient legal services for a prisoner who is standing trial in a criminal case or for the commission of alleged offence. This Court, in paragraphs 14,15 and 18 of the above judgment, held as under: “ 14.   The   other   ingredient   of   fair   procedure   to   a   prisoner, who   has   to   seek   his   liberation   through   the   court   process   is lawyer's   services.   Judicial   justice,   with   procedural intricacies,   legal   submissions   and   critical   examination   of evidence, leans upon professional expertise; and a failure of equal   justice   under   the   law   is   on   the   cards   where   such supportive   skill   is   absent   for   one   side.   Our   judicature, moulded   by   Anglo­American   models   and   our   judicial process, engineered by kindred legal technology, compel the collaboration   of   lawyer­power   for   steering   the   wheels   of equal justice under the law. Free legal services to the needy is   part   of   the   English   criminal   justice   system.   And   the American jurist, Prof. Vance of Yale, sounded sense for India too when he said:   What   does   it   profit   a   poor   and   ignorant   man   that he   is   equal   to   his   strong   antagonist   before   the   law   if there   is   no   one   to   inform   him   what   the   law   is?   Or   that the   courts   are   open  to   him   on   the   same   terms   as   to   all other persons when he has not the wherewithal to pay the admission fee? 15.   Gideon's   trumpet   has   been   heard   across   the   Atlantic. Black, J. there observed: Not   only   those   precedents   but   also   reason   and reflection   require   us   to   recognise   that   in   our   adversary system of  criminal  justice,  any  person  haled  into   court, who   is   too   poor   to   hire   a   lawyer,   cannot   be   assured   a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him. This seems to   us   to   be   an   obvious   truth.   Governments,   both   State and   Federal,   quite   properly   spend   vast   sums   of   money to   establish   machinery   to   try   defendants   accused   of crime.   Lawyers   to   prosecute   are   everywhere   deemed essential   to   protect   the   public’s   interest   in   an   orderly society.   Similarly,   there   are   few   defendants   charged with crime who fail to hire the best lawyers they can get to prepare and present their defences. That government hires   lawyers   to   prosecute   and   defendants   who   have the   money   hire   lawyers   to   defend   are   the   strongest indications   of   the   widespread   belief   that   lawyers   in criminal courts are necessities, not luxuries. The right of one   charged   with   crime   to   counsel   may   not   be   deemed fundamental   and   essential   to   fair   trial   in   some countries,   but   is   in   ours.   From   the   very   beginning,   our state   and   national   constitutions   and   laws   have   laid great   emphasis   on   procedural   and   substantive safeguards   designed   to   assure   fair   trials   before impartial   tribunals   in   which   every   defendant   stands equal before the law. This noble idea cannot be realised if   the   poor   man   charged   with   crime   has   to   face   his accusers without a lawyer to assist him. x x x x 18.   The   American   Bar   Association   has   upheld   the fundamental premise that counsel should be provided in the criminal   proceedings   for   offences   punishable   by   loss   of liberty,   except   those   types   of   offences   for   which   such punishment   is   not   likely   to   be   imposed.   Thus,   in   America, strengthened   by   the   Powell,   Gideon   and   Hamlin   cases, counsel   for   the   accused   in   the   more   serious   class   of   cases which   threaten   a   person   with   imprisonment   is   regarded   as an   essential   component   of   the   administration   of   criminal justice and as part of procedural fair­play. This is so without regard to the sixth amendment because lawyer participation is ordinarily an assurance that deprivation of liberty will not be in violation of procedure established by law. In short, it is the   warp   and   woof   of   fair   procedure   in   a   sophisticated, legalistic   system   plus   lay   illiterate   indigents   aplenty.   The Indian   socio­legal   milieu   makes   free   legal   service,   at   trial and higher levels, an imperative processual piece of criminal justice where deprivation of life or personal liberty hangs in the judicial balance.” 128. In   the   aforesaid   context,   we   may   refer   to   the   National   Legal Services   Authority   (Free   and   Competent   Legal   Services)   Regulations, 2010, more particularly, the Regulation­15, which reads thus: “ 15.   Special   engagement   of   senior   advocates   in appropriate cases.­ (1)   If   the   Monitoring   and   Mentoring   Committee   or   Executive Chairman   or   Chairman   of   the   Legal   Services   Institution   is   of the   opinion   that   services   of   senior   advocate,   though   not included   in   the   approved   panel   of   lawyers,   has   to   be provided in any particular case the Legal Services Institution may engage such senior advocate. (2)   Notwithstanding   anything   contained   in   the   State regulations, the Executive Chairman or Chairman of the Legal Services Institution may decide the honorarium of such senior advocate.”  129. This   Court  in   Subhash   Chand   v.   State   of   Rajasthan   reported in   (2002)   1   SCC   702   in   para   26,   while   allowing   the   appeal   and acquitting   the   accused   appellant   therein   under   Sections   302   and 376(2)(f) of the IPC, observed as under:  “ 26.   Before   parting   with   the   case   we   would   like   to   place   on record,   an   observation   of   ours,   touching   an   aspect   of   the case.   There   are   clueless   crimes   committed.   The   factum   of   a cognizable crime having been committed is known but neither the   identity   of   the   accused   is   disclosed   nor   is   there   any indication   available   of   the   witnesses   who   would   be   able   to furnish   useful   and   relevant   evidence.   Such   offences   put   to test   the   wits   of   an   investigating   officer.   A   vigilant investigating   officer,   well   versed   with   the   techniques   of   the job, is  in a position to  collect  the  threads  of evidence  finding out   the   path  which  leads   to  the  culprit.  The  ends,  which  the administration   of   criminal   justice   serves,   are   not   achieved merely by catching hold of the culprit. The accusation has to be   proved   to   the   hilt   in   a   court   of   law.   The   evidence   of   the investigating  officer given in  the  court   should  have  a  rhythm explaining   step   by   step   how   the   investigation   proceeded leading to detection of the offender and collection of evidence against   him.   This   is   necessary   to   exclude   the   likelihood   of any innocent having been picked up and branded as a culprit and   then   the   gravity   of   the   offence   arousing   human sympathy   persuading   the   mind   to   be   carried   away   by doubtful   or   dubious   circumstances   treating   them   as   of “beyond doubt” evidentiary value. ”   [Emphasis supplied] 130.   In   the   result,   the   appeals   are   allowed.   The   conviction   of   the accused   appellant   under   Section   302   of   the   IPC   is   set   aside.   He   is acquitted of the charge framed against him. He shall be set at liberty forthwith   if   not   required   to   be   detained   in   connection   with   any   other offences.  131. Pending application, if any, also stands disposed of. ………………………….CJI.    (UDAY UMESH LALIT)   …..……………………….J.   (S. RAVINDRA BHAT)   …..……………………….J.    (J.B. PARDIWALA)  NEW DELHI;  OCTOBER 13, 2022. ITEM NO.1503 COURT NO.9 SECTION II (For Judgment) S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS Criminal Appeal No(s). 64-65/2022 RAMANAND @ NANDLAL BHARTI Appellant(s) VERSUS STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH Respondent(s) (IA No. 109475/2021 - EXEMPTION FROM FILING C/C OF THE IMPUGNED JUDGMENT) Date : 13-10-2022 These matters were called on for pronouncement of judgment today. For Appellant(s) Mr. S. Niranjan Reddy, Sr. Adv. Mr. Vibhor Jain, Adv. Ms. Stuti Rai, Adv. Mr. Sahil Raveen, Adv. Ms. Akhila Palem, Adv. Mr. Mahfooz Ahsan Nazki, AOR Mr. Polanki Gowtham, Adv. Ms. Rajeswari Mukherjee, Adv. Ms. Niti Richhariya, Adv. For Respondent(s) Mr. Adarsh Upadhyay, AOR Mr. Abhishek Chaudhary, Adv. Mr. Anurag Kishore, Adv. Mr. Amit Singh, Adv. Mr. Aman Pathak, Adv. Mr. Ajay Prajapati, Adv. Hon’ble Mr. Justice J. B. Pardiwala, pronounced the reportable judgment of the Bench comprising Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India, Hon’ble Mr. Justice S. Ravindra Bhat and His Lordship. T he appeals are allowed in terms of the signed reportable judgment. The conviction of the accused appellant under Section 302 of the IPC is set aside. He is acquitted of the charge framed against him. He shall be set at liberty forthwith if not required to be detained in connection with any other offences. Pending application, if any, also stands disposed of. (SNEHA DAS) (RANJANA SHAILEY) SENIOR PERSONAL ASSISTANT COURT MASTER (NSH) (Signed reportable judgment is placed on the file)