/2022 INSC 0918/
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 242 OF 2022
SUBRAMANYA  …..APPELLANT
VERSUS 
STATE OF KARNATAKA  …..RESPONDENT
J U D G M E N T
J.B. PARDIWALA, J.
1. This   statutory   criminal   appeal   is   at   the   instance   of   a   convict
accused charged with the offence of murder of one Kamalamma
( deceased )   and   is   directed   against   the   judgment   and   order   of
conviction   passed   by   the   High   Court   of   Karnataka   dated
02.07.2019   in   the   Criminal   Appeal   No.   473   of   2013   by   which
the High Court allowed the acquittal appeal filed by the State of
Karnataka   against   the   judgment   and   order   of   acquittal   passed
by the Principal Sessions Judge, Chikmagalur dated 20.12.2012
in   the   Sessions   Case   No.   59   of   2011   and   held   the   appellant
herein guilty of the offence of murder punishable under Section
302   of   the   Indian   Penal   Code,   1860   (for   short,   ‘the   IPC’).   The
High   Court   sentenced   the   appellant   herein   to   undergo   life
imprisonment   with   fine   of   Rs.   25,000/­   and   in   the   event   of

default   of   payment   of   fine   to   undergo   further   simple
imprisonment for a period of six months.
 
CASE OF PROSECUTION
2.  The   appellant   herein   along   with   two   other   co­accused,   namely,
Gowri alias Gowramma wife of late Nagaraj and Seetharam Bhat
son of late Nagabhatt were put to trial in the Sessions Case No.
59   of   2011   for   the   offences   punishable   under   Sections   120­B,
302, 379 and 201 read with Section 34 of the IPC. All the three
accused   were   put   to   trial   in   the   court   of   Principal   Sessions
Judge, Chikmagalur. The original accused No. 2, namely, Gowri
(acquitted) was born in the  wedlock of  one Manjappanaika  and
his   first   wife.   The   deceased,   namely,   Kamalamma   was   the
second   wife   of   the   Manjappanaika.   Gowri   (original   accused   No.
2)   happens   to   be   the   step   daughter   of   the   deceased
Kamalamma. After the demise of Manjappanaika his immovable
properties were divided between  the deceased Kamalamma and
Gowri (A­2). In the wedlock of Manjappanaika and the deceased
two   daughters   were   born,   namely,   Sugandha   (PW   1)   and
Sujatha.   The   deceased   Kamalamma   used   to   reside   all   alone   at
the   village   Horabylu   adjacent   to   the   house   of   the   original

accused No. 2 Gowri. Gowri is a widow and at the relevant point
of time was staying along with her two children. It is the case of
the prosecution that Gowri (A­2) had an illicit relationship with
the   appellant   herein.   The   deceased   Kamalamma   was   highly
opposed to such illicit relationship and used to reprimand both,
the appellant and Gowri. 
3. According   to   the   case   of   the   prosecution,   the   appellant   herein
and   Gowri   conspired   on   23.08.2010   to   do   away   with   the
deceased   Kamalamma.   Both   are   alleged   to   have   entered   her
house   and   somewhere   near   the   cattle   shed,   the   deceased   was
hit on her head and neck with a hard object like a club. Later,
the   appellant   and   Gowri   are   alleged   to   have   removed   the   gold
chain, a pair of ear studs and one gold ring from the body of the
deceased Kamalamma. They took away her mobile also. 
4. It   is   the   case   of   the   prosecution   that   after   the   deceased
Kamalamma   was   done   to   death,   the   original   accused   No.   3,
namely, Seetharam Bhat came into picture. Seetharam Bhat (A­
3) is alleged to have helped the appellant and Gowri in wrapping
the dead body of the deceased in a sari and thereafter dumping
it   on   the   land   of   one   Dinamani.   The   land   of   Dinamani   is
situated besides a water channel. It is alleged that with the aid
of a crowbar, a pit was dug and the dead body of the deceased

was buried with the intention to destroy the evidence. 
5. According to the case of the prosecution, the appellant sold the
gold ornaments to a jeweller, namely, Somashekhara Shetty (PW
9). PW 9 Somashekhara Shetty at the relevant point of time was
running   a   jewellery   shop   at   Rippanpet.   So   far   as   the   mobile   is
concerned, the same is said to have been sold by the appellant
herein   to   one   Ashok   alias   Meeranath   (PW   16).   Ashok   alias
Meeranath (PW 16) is a resident of a place called Surathkal.
6.  On   24.08.2010,   Alok   (son   of   Gowri)   informed   the   son­in­law   of
the   deceased,   namely,   H.T.   Yogesh   (PW   7)   that   his   mother­in­
law   (deceased)   had   been   missing   since   23.08.2010.   In   such
circumstances,   H.T.   Yogesh   went   (PW   7)   to   the   Koppa,   Police
Station (P.S.)  and filed a missing complaint. 
7.  On 09.12.2010 at 21:30 hours, Seetharam Bhat (A­3) is said to
have   met   H.T.   Yogesh   (PW7)   and   made   an   extra   judicial
confession  before him  stating  that  about four  months  back the
appellant   herein   and   Gowri   had   lured   him   with   a   bottle   of
brandy   and   saying   so   had   asked   him   to   accompany   them   as
they   had   some   work.   Thereafter,   the   appellant   and   Gowri   are
said to have revealed or rather made an extra judicial confession
before Seetharam Bhat (A­3) that they had committed murder of
the   deceased   Kamalamma   and   had   kept   the   body   in   a   cattle

shed.
8. The   appellant   and   Gowri   asked   Seetharam   Bhat   (A­3)   to   help
them   in   disposing   of   the   dead   body.   When   Seetharam   (A­3)
declined to  help them, he was threatened  by  the appellant and
Gowri.   Accordingly,   Seetharam   Bhat   (A­3)   accompanied   them
and helped in removing the gold ornaments from the body of the
deceased and burying the body at the field of one Dinamani. 
9.  On   10.12.2010,   H.T.   Yogesh   (PW   7)   went   to   the   Police   Station
and lodged a First Information Report for the offence of murder. 
10.  Upon   registration   of   the   First   Information   Report,   the
investigation   had   commenced.   All   the   three   accused   persons
came to be arrested. While the appellant herein and Gowri (A­2)
were   in   custody   of   the   Police   they   are   said   to   have   made
statements that they would show the place where the dead body
had been buried and also the place where the weapon of offence
(club)   had   been   concealed.     The   appellant   is   also   said   to   have
made  a  statement  that   he  would  also   show  the  place  where  he
had sold of the ornaments of the deceased. 
11. Accordingly,   a   discovery   panchnama   Ex.   P.3   was   drawn   under
Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. The photographs of
the exhumation of the body were also taken and admitted as Ex.
P.4.   The   Inquest   panchnama   of   the   body   of   the   deceased,   Ex.

P.14 was also drawn. 
12. The ornaments said to have been sold by the appellant herein to
a jeweller, Somashekhara Shetty (PW 9), were collected from his
shop by drawing a panchnama Ex. P.1. 
13. The   clothes   of   the   appellant   herein   are   said   to   have   been
discovered   at   his   instance   from   the   place   nearby   the   house   of
the   deceased  by   drawing   a  panchnama   Ex.  P.6.   The  weapon   of
offence   (club)   was   also   discovered   at   the   instance   of   the
appellant   herein   by   drawing   a   panchnama   Ex.   P.8.   It   appears
that one more weapon in the form of a spade was discovered at
the instance of the original accused No. 3 Seetharam by drawing
a panchnama Ex. P.8.
14. The dead body of the deceased was sent for post­mortem at the
General Hospital, Koppa.  
15. The post­mortem report Ex. P.17 reveals that the cause of death
was due to head injuries in the form of fractures. 
16. At   the   end   of   the   investigation,   the   Investigating   Officer   filed
chargesheet   against   the   appellant   and   the   two   co­accused   for
the   offences   enumerated   above.   Upon  filing   of   the  chargesheet,
the case was committed by the Magistrate under Section 209 of
the Cr.P.C. to the Sessions Court which came to be registered as
the   Sessions   Case   No.   59   of   2011   in   the   court   of   Principal

Sessions Judge, Chikmagalur.
17.  The   trial   court   framed   charge   against   all   the   accused   persons
vide  order dated 20.12.2012. Appellant herein and   the other two
co­accused pleaded not guilty to the charge. 
18.  The prosecution adduced the following oral evidence in support
of its case: 
(1) PW 1 Sugandha, CW 7, daughter of the deceased.
(2) PW 2 Vishwa K. K., CW 9, panch­witness to the discovery
of   the   ornaments   from   the   shop   of   the   jewellery   and   also
the discovery of the dead body. 
(3) PW 3 Nandi Purela, CW 11, panch­witness.
(4) PW 4 H.S. Sathyamurthi, CW 13, panch­witness.
(5) PW 5 T. Somaiah, CW18, panch­witness. 
(6) PW 6 Sridhar Shetty, CW 20, panch­witness. 
(7) PW   7   H.   T.   Yogesh,   CW   1,   son­in­law   of   the   deceased
before   whom   original   accused   No.   3   is   said   to   have   been
made extra judicial confession. 
(8) PW 8 H. M. Ravikanth, CW 4, panch­witness.
(9) PW 9 I. Somashekhara Shetty, CW 14, jeweler to whom the
ornaments were sold. 
(10) PW 10 Ravi Shetty, CW 22, panch­witness to the discovery
of the mobile.

(11) PW   11   Dr.   J.   Neelakantappa   Gowda,   CW   29,   panch­
witness.
(12) PW 12 C.V. Harish, CW 26 panch­witness.
(13)  PW 13 Thousif Ahmed, CW 32, panch­witness to the place
of incident.
(14) PW 14 J.K. Shivakumar, CW 37, Revenue Officer.
(15) PW15 Dayanand Gowda, CW 28, Assistant Commissioner.
(16) PW   16   Meeranath   Gowda,   CW   24,   Cook   at   Sharath   Bar
and Restaurant. The appellant used to assist the PW 16 at
the restaurant.
(17) PW 17 Mahesh E.S., CW 41, Police Officer.
(18) PW 18 Manjeshwara Kalappa, CW 40, Police Officer.
(19) PW 19 T. Sanjeeva Naik, CW 42, Police Officer.
19. The prosecution also adduced documentary evidence in the form
of FIR, Inquest panchnama, discovery panchnamas etc.
20. The trial court framed the following points of determination in its
judgment: 
“1)   Whether   the   prosecution   proves   that   Kamalamma,
w/o late Manjappanaika died a homicidal death?
2)   Whether   the   prosecution   proves   that   on   or   about
23.8.2010,   in   Hirekudige   village   in   Koppa   Taluk,
accused   Nos.   1   and   2,   in   furtherance   of   their   common
intention   or   otherwise,   agreed   and   conspired   with   each
other   to   murder   Kamalamma,   w/o   late   Manjappanaika,

and thereby committed an offence of criminal conspiracy,
punishable under Section 120­B read  with Section 34 of
I.P.C?
3)   Whether   the   prosecution   proves   that   on   the   aforesaid
date   at   about   9.00   PM,   in   the   house   of   Kamalamma   at
Hirekudige village in Koppa Taluk, accused Nos.1 and 2,
in   furtherance   of   common   intention,   did   commit   murder
by   intentionally   and   knowingly   causing   the   death   of
Kamalamma,   by   assaulting   on   her   head   and   neck   by
means   of   club,   and   thereby   committed   an   offence
punishable   under   Section   302   read   with   Section   34   of
I.P.C? 
4)   Whether   the   prosecution   proves   that   on   the   aforesaid
date, time and place, accused No.1, committed theft of a
gold chain, a pair of earstuds, one gold ring and a mobile
handset belonging to deceased Kamalamma and thereby
committed   an   offence   punishable   under   Section   379   of
I.P.C?
5)   Whether   the   prosecution   proves   that   on   or   about   the
aforesaid   date,   in   furtherance   of   common   intention,
accused   Nos.1   and   3,   knowing   that   the   offence   of
murder,   punishable   with   death   or   imprisonment   for   life,
has   been   committed   by   accused   Nos.   1   and   2,   caused
certain   evidence   to   disappear,   to   wit,   buried   the   dead
body   of   Kamalamma,   by   the   side   of   the   Government
channel   at   Horabylu,   with   an   intention   to   screen   the
offenders   (accused   Nos.1   and   2)   from   legal   punishment,
and   thereby   committed   an   offence   punishable   under
Section 201 read with Section 34 of I.P.C? 
6) What order?”
21.  The   aforesaid   points   of   determination   came   to   be   answered   by
the trial court as under: 
“POINT No. 1: ­ In the affirmative; 
POINT No.2: ­ In the negative; 
POINT No.3: ­ In the negative; 

POINT No.4: ­ In the negative; 
POINT No.5: ­ In the negative;
POINT No.6: ­ As per final order, for the following:”
22. The   prosecution   in   the   course   of   the   trial   relied   upon   the
following   circumstances   to   prove   its   case   against   the   accused
persons: 
(1) Motive to commit the crime. According  to the prosecution,
the appellant herein had illicit relationship with original accused
No. 2, namely, Gowri and the deceased was coming in their way.
In   such   circumstances,   the   appellant   herein   and   the   original
accused No. 2 had the motive to commit the crime.
(2) Extra judicial confession alleged to have been made by the
accused   No.   3   Seetharam   Bhat   before   the   PW   7  Yogesh   (son­in­
law of the deceased) after four months of the date of incident.
(3) Discovery of the dead body at the instance of the appellant
herein   by   drawing   a   panchnama   under   Section   27   of   the
Evidence Act.
(4) Recovery   of   the   ornaments   from   the   shop   of   the   Jeweller
(PW   9)   at   the   instance   of   the   appellant   herein   by   drawing   a
panchnama. 
(5) The   discovery   of   the   weapon   of   offence,   mobile   of   the
deceased and the clothes of the appellant accused at the instance
of the appellant herein under Section 27 of the Evidence Act.

23. We shall now look into the reasonings assigned by the trial court
while   not   accepting   any   of   the   aforesaid   circumstances,   as
incriminating   circumstances,   establishing   the   guilt   of   the
accused persons. We quote as under: 
“34.   The   first   circumstance   which   the   prosecution   is
intending   to   rely   upon   is   motive   that   A­1   was   having
illicit   relation   with   A­2   and   in   that   context,   deceased
Kamalamma   used   to   abuse   them   and   she   was   also
making   propaganda   about   the   same   and   the   accused
persons   were   enraged   by   that   and   thinking   that   she   is
an obstacle for their relation, they conspired to get rid of
her   and   murdered   the   deceased.   In   circumstantial
evidence,   motive   plays   important   role   and   it   must   be
strong   and   reliable.   If   prosecution   fails   to   prove   the
motive,   it   will   be   beneficial   to   the   accused.   Even   though
P.Ws.1, 2 and 7 have deposed that the mother of P.W.1,
the deceased used to tell her that A­1 and A­2 are having
illicit relation and she used to scold them for having such
illicit relation, but if we see the cross­examination of P.W.
1, it discloses that A­1 is distant brother to A­2 and that
there   was   a   panchayath   before   the   division   of   the
properties   between   the   deceased   and   A­2.   Even   in   the
case   of   the   prosecution,   the   prosecution   has   not   proved
by   examining   any   witness   to   substantiate   the   said   fact
of   illicit   relation   between   A­1   and   A­2,   who   have   either
seen   them   together   or   that   they   have   advised   them   to
give up the same. Even though P.W.1, the daughter and
P.W.7,   the   son­in­law   of   the   deceased   have   deposed
about   the   illicit   relation   between   A­1   and   A­2,   but   they
have   deposed   that   the   deceased   used   to   tell   about   the
illicit   relations   and   they   are   not   the   direct   witnesses   to
substantiate the said fact. Their evidence is only hearsay
in   nature.   As   such,   the   evidence   regarding   the   illicit
relation is not acceptable and reliable in law.
35.   The   second   circumstance   which   the   prosecution   is
intending   to   rely   upon   is   the   confession   made   by   A­3
before   P.W.7,   the   son­in­law   of   the   deceased.   It   is   the

specific case of the prosecution that on 9.12.2010 he had
been to Gadikallu and at about 9.30 PM, near the Circle,
A­3   met   him   and   there   he   told   that   about   3   or   3   1/2
months back he had been called by A­1 and told that he
had   murdered   Kamalamma   and   in   order   to   bury   the
dead   body,   asked   his   help   by   providing   two   bottles   of
brandy and he also told that if he is not going to obey, he
will also kill him as done  to his  brother­in­law Srinivase
Gowda.   He   also   told   that   he   helped   him   in   carrying   the
dead body to the mound near the land of Dinamani and
buried it. During the  course  of crossexamination, he has
admitted   that   he   is   not   going   to   ask   any   personal
matters   of   A­3   nor   he   will   tell   his   personal   matters   to
him.   He   has   further   admitted   that   he   is   not   having   any
confidence in him and vice versa, A­3 is also not having
any confidence in him. A­3 is also not a friend or relative
of   P.W.7.   In   order   to   establish   that   A­3   made   a
confession   before   P.W.7,   A­3   must   have   reposed
confidence in him and he must have some faith with the
person   to   whom   he   is   making   such   a   confession.   When
P.W.7 is neither a relative nor a friend, why A­3 is going
to   make   such   a   confession   before   P.W.7   who   is   a   close
relative   of   the   deceased,   is   a   mystery.   Under   the   facts
and circumstances of the present case on hand, it is very
difficult   to   believe   that   A­3   would   make   such   a
confession   before   P.W.7   about   the   crime   committed   by
them.   While   considering   the   evidence   of   extra   judicial
confession,   the   Court   must   also   verify   whether   the
accused could repose  confidence  in such a person so as
to disclose a secret aspect of his life. For this proposition
of   law,   I   want   to   rely   upon   the   decision   reported   in   AIR
1975   SUPREME   COURT   258,   [THE   STATE   OF   PUNJAB
v/s   BHAJAN   SINGH   &   OTHERS]   wherein   it   is   held   as
under: ­
“(C)   Evidence   Act   (1872),   S.24   ­   Extra   judicial
confession   –   Value   of   the   evidence   of   extra   judicial
confession   in   the   very   nature   of   things   is   a   weak
piece   of   evidence.   (The   evidence   adduced   in   this
respect   in   the   instant   case,   held,   lacked   plausibility
and did not inspire confidence.) Para 15”
36. In another decision reported in [2011] ACR 704 in the

case   of   SK.   YUSUF   v/s   STATE   OF   WEST   BENGAL,   the
Hon'ble Supreme Court of India has again held as under:
­
"C.   Evidence   Act,   1872   ­   S.25   ­   Extra   judicial
confession   –   Extra   judicial   confession   must   be
established to be true and made voluntarily and in a
fit   state   of   mind   ­   Extra   judicial   confession   can   be
accepted   and   can   be   the   basis   of   a   conviction   if   it
passes the test of credibility. Para 22"
37.   Leave   apart   this,   as   per   the   evidence   of   P.W.7,   A­3
met   him   3   1/2   months   or   4   months   after   the   incident.
Usually, if at all, a confession is going to be made by the
offenders   in   respect   of   the   commission   of   the   offence,   it
will   be   made   immediately   after   the   incident   which   they
have   committed   and   not   after   a   long   gap   and   the
confession   is   going   to   be   made   immediately   before   the
person who come across with him and with whom he is
having   full   faith.   In   this   behalf   also   the   evidence   which
has   been   produced   before   the   court   is   not   cogent   and
reliable   and   the   prosecution   has   utterly   failed   to   prove
the said circumstance which it is intending to rely upon.
38.   The   third   circumstance   which   the   prosecution   is
intending   to   rely   upon   is   that   of   accused   showing   the
place of commission of offence and the place of burial of
the   dead   body.   As   per   the   evidence   of   P.W.19,   the
Investigating   Officer,   on   10.12.2010,   C.Ws.36   and   37
produced   accused   No.1   at   about   9.00   PM;   C.Ws.34   and
35   produced   accused   No.2   at   the   same   time;   and
P.Ws.17 and C.W.38 produced accused No.3 at the same
time. He has further deposed that thereafter he recorded
their   voluntary   statements   and   on   the   basis   of   that,   he
traced   the   place   of   burial.   If   we   see   the   voluntary
statement   of   A­1   as   per   Ex.P.28,   he   has   stated   that   he
will   show   the   place   of   burial.   He   has   also   volunteered
that   he   has   committed   the   murder   of   deceased
Kamalamma and he will produce the club, mobile, spade
and another club which has been used for the purpose of
transportation of the dead body and he will also produce
the   ornaments   which   he   has   taken   from   the   body   and
the   same   has   been   marked   as   Ex.P.28.   Accused   nos.2

and   3   have   volunteered   to   show   the   place   where   they
have buried the dead body. If we see the evidence of this
witness with the evidence of the other witnesses, it is not
accused   nos.2   and   3   who   took   the   IO   and   the   panch
witnesses and showed the place of burial. P.Ws.2 and 8
have   deposed   that   about   one   year   back,   he   saw   the
dead   body   of   deceased   near   a   halla   situated   at
Dinamani   land   at   a   mound   and   there,   the   Dy.S.P.   and
the   A.C.,   were   also   present.   A­1   and   A­3   showed   the
place   of   burial   of   the   dead   body.   But,   nowhere   these
witnesses   have   spoken   that   A­1   and   A­3   led   them   and
showed   the   place   of   burial.   If   already   the   said   burial
spot was known to the Dy.S.P, and the   A.C.,   then under
such   circumstances,   it   cannot   be   held   that   it   is   at   the
instance   of   the   accused   that   the   said   place   has   been
discovered.   If   we   see   the   evidence   of   P.W.8,   he   has
deposed   that   the   said   body   was   fully   decomposed   and
one   blouse   and   one   petticoat   were   found   on   the   dead
body   and   if   we   see   the   evidence   of   P.   W.15,   he   has
deposed that accused nos.1 and 3 led them to a mound
in survey No.121 and showed the place where they had
buried   the   dead   body   of   deceased   Kamalamma   and   he
got   it   exhumed   through   A­1,   A­3   and   P.W.3.   The   said
body   was   highly   decomposed   and   an   old   type   blouse
and a petticoat were there over the said body. But if we
see   the   cross­examination   of   this   witness,   he   received
the   requisition   on   10.12.2010   and   thereafter   on
11.12.2010 he  fixed  the  timing  to  exhume  the  body and
he   went   there   at   about   10.30   AM   and   when   he   was
about   to   enter   the   village,   police   were   also   there   along
with   A­1   and   A­3   and   other   witnesses,   Doctor   and
Videographer   were   also   present.   Then,   under   such
circumstances,   the   evidence   of   P.W.15   that   A­1   and   A­3
led   them   and   showed   the   place   where   they   had   buried
the dead body is also not believable and reliable. It is not
for   the   first   time   that   he   came   to   know   about   the   dead
body in that place. He has categorically deposed that the
body was highly decomposed. But if we see the evidence
of P.W.11, the Doctor, he found a semi decomposed, legs
little   semi   flexed   in   position,   head   was   covered   with
black   and   gray   hairs   measuring   12   inches   in   length,
2/3rd of the body was decomposed and breast was also
semi­decomposed. If the alleged murder has taken place

on   23.8.2010,   with   the   above   condition   of   the   body,   the
exhumation   of   the   body   must   have   been   done   earlier   to
11.12.2010   and   not   on   11.12.2010,   3   1/2   months   later
as contended by the prosecution, or else, the death must
have   taken   place   at   a   later   date   which   is   closer   to   the
date   of   exhumation   and   examination.   According   to
P.W.19,   accused   nos.2   and   3   volunteered   to   show   the
place where they have buried the dead body, but as per
the   case   of   the   prosecution,   accused   nos.1   and   3   have
showed   the   place.   That   also   creates   a   doubt.   In   that
behalf,   there   is   no   consistency   in   the   evidence   to   show
that it is at the instance of A­1 and A­3 by their voluntary
statement,   the   fact   about   the   place   of   burial   has   been
discovered. Under such circumstances, this circumstance
which   the   prosecution   is   intending   to   rely   upon,   cannot
be said to be proved beyond reasonable doubt.
39.   The   next   circumstance   which   the   prosecution   is
intending   to   rely   upon   is   that   of   recovery   of   the
ornaments   at   the   instance   of   accused   No.   1.   In   this
behalf,   the   prosecution   is   intending   to   rely   upon   the
evidence  of  P.W.2  and   P.W.9. P.W.2  in  his   evidence  has
deposed   that   after   2   or   3   days   again   police   called   him
and   along   with   C.W.13,   A­1   was   also   present   and   that
himself, C.W.13 and the   PI were led by A­1 to Rippanpet.
There, A­1 took them to Someshwara Jewellers shop and
there A­1 asked to give the gold ornaments given by him
and   C.W.14   returned   the   said   gold   ornaments   and   the
same were seized by drawing a Mahazar as per Ex.P.1.
Admittedly,   this   witness   is   the   nephew   of   the   deceased
and even though by the side of the Police Station and the
jewellery   shop   there   are   so   many   shops   and   other
persons   were   available,   but   why   this   particular   person
has been chosen as a witness is also not forthcoming.
40.   P.W.9   is   the   owner   of   the   jewellery   shop.   He   has
deposed that A­1 came and sold the gold articles prior to
3   1 /2   months   back   by   coming   to   his   shop   and   he
returned   the   said   articles   and   they   were   seized   by
drawing   a   Mahazar   as   per   Ex.P.1.   During   the   course   of
cross­examination,   he   has   deposed   that   they   will   not
maintain any receipt book for having purchased the gold
and he has also further deposed that when he

purchased the gold articles, they were just like new and
there   will   be   wear   and   tear   found   on   the   gold   articles
even though they have been renewed with new coatings.
When   the   said   articles   appear   to   be   new   one   and   even
after  3   1/2   months   of  their  purchase  by  P.W.9  who   is   a
jeweller,   they   were   in   the   same   condition   in   which   they
have   been   recovered   at   the   instance   of   A­1   is   hard   to
believe   and   in   this   behalf   also,   the   case   of   the
prosecution is not worthy of acceptance.
41.   The   next   circumstance   which   the   prosecution   is
intending   to   rely   upon   is   the   recovery   of   the   club,
umbrella,   mobile   and   spade   and   the   seizure   of   the
clothes   of   A­1   and   A­3.   Even   though   the   recovery
evidence   has   been   given   by   P.Ws.8,   10,16   and   P.Ws.4
and 5, but if we closely scrutinise their evidence, the club
which has been recovered  is also  not having stains  and
it   is   a   new   one.   Even   it   is   not   believable   that   the   said
clubs which have been thrown by the accused persons in
that   particular   area   will   be   available   in   the   condition   in
which   they   have   been   thrown   even   after   3   1/2   months.
By   bare   looking   by   this   court,   M.Os.   9   and   14   are   just
like   new   clubs.   If   they   are   exposed   to   rain,   water   and
sun, definitely they would have changed their colour and
shape. So also, the recovery of the clothes of the accused
persons.  In  this   behalf   also,  the   recovery  evidence   of   all
these   articles   has   not   been   proved   by   the   prosecution
beyond all reasonable doubt.
42.   Even   though   the   learned   Public   Prosecutor
vehemently argued and contended that at the instance of
the   accused,   the   body   has   been   exhumed   and   the
recovery   has   been   done   and   A­3   has   also   confessed
before   P.W.7   and   the   prosecution   has   also   proved   the
motive   that   A­1   and   A­2   were   having   illicit   relation,   the
same   is   not   acceptable   under   the   above   said
circumstances.
43.   The   material   witnesses   in   this   case   have   not   been
examined by the prosecution for the reasons best known
to   it.   It   is   the   specific   case   of   the   prosecution   that   one
Alok,   son   of   accused   No.2   informed   P.W.7   about   the
missing of the deceased. But the said Alok has not been

examined.   The   body   of   deceased   is   found   buried   in
Survey   No.121   of   Dinamani   and   Narayanaswamy,   and
when   the   said   body   was   found   there   in   the   said   land
belonging to them, then, under such circumstances, they
are   considered   to   be   material   witnesses.   Non­
examination of these material witnesses will also not fill
up   the   gap   which   the   prosecution   has   to   fill   up   to   prove
its   case   beyond   all   reasonable   doubt.   From   what   date
that the deceased was missing and how nobody noticed
about the missing of the deceased is also not brought on
record by the prosecution, for the reasons best known to
it.   This   particular   doubt   also   goes   to   the   benefit   of   the
accused.   Even   though   P.W.   1   was   knowing   that   the
deceased,   her   mother,   was   having   a   mobile   and   after
coming   to   know   about   the   missing   of   her   mother   on
24.8.2010, she   will  not  make  any  efforts   to  make  a  call
to   the   mobile   of   her   mother   which   is   an   unnatural
conduct   on   her   part.   No   daughter,   after   coming   to   know
that the mother is missing, will keep quiet, that too when
she knows that her mother is having a mobile. Definitely
she could have made a call. For what reasons P.W. 1 did
not   make   any   call   to   her   mother's   mobile   is   also   a
doubtful circumstance.
44. It is settled principle of law that when two views are
possible from the prosecution evidence, the one which is
favourable to the accused shall have to be taken and the
benefit   of   doubt   shall   have   to   be   given   to   the   accused.
Taking   into   consideration   the   above   said   facts   and
circumstances   of   the   case,   I   answer   point   Nos.2   to   5   in
the negative.”
24. Thus,   the   trial   court,   upon   appreciation   of   the   oral   as   well   as
documentary   evidence,   came   to   the   conclusion   that   the
prosecution   had   failed   to   prove   its   case   against   the   accused
persons   beyond   reasonable   doubt   and   accordingly,   vide   the
judgment   and   order   dated   20.12.2012,   acquitted   the   appellant

herein and the other two co­accused of all the charges. 
25. The State of Karnataka being dissatisfied with the judgment and
order   of   acquittal   passed   by   the   trial   court   challenged   the   same
by filing  the Criminal Appeal No. 473 of 2013 in the High Court
of   Karnataka.   The   High   Court   upon   reappreciation   of   the   entire
oral as well as the documentary evidence on record dismissed the
acquittal appeal so far as the original accused No. 2 Gowri alias
Gowramma   is   concerned   thereby   affirming   her   acquittal.
However,   the   appellant   herein   came   to   be   convicted   for   the
offence   of   murder   punishable   under   Section   302   of   the   IPC   and
was   sentenced   to   undergo   life   imprisonment   with   fine   of   Rs.
25,000/­.  Appellant was also convicted for the offence punishable
under   Section   201   read   with   Section   34   of   the   IPC   and   was
sentenced   to   undergo   simple   imprisonment   for   five   years   with
fine   of   Rs.   5,000/­.   The   original   accused   No.   3   Seetharam   Bhat
came   to   be   convicted   for   the   offence   punishable   under   Section
201   read   with   Section   34   of   the   IPC   and   was   sentenced   to
undergo simple imprisonment for a period of three years with fine
of   Rs.   5,000/­   and   in   case   of   default   to   undergo   further   simple
imprisonment for a period of two months. 
26. We are informed that the original accused No. 3 Seetharam Bhat
accepted   the   conviction   and   has   undergone   the   sentence.   The

original   accused   No.   3   thought   fit   not   to   file   any   appeal   before
this Court. 
27. It   is   the   appellant   herein   (original   accused   No.   1),   who   is   here
before this Court with the present appeal. 
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT CONVICT
28. Mr.   Krishna   Pal   Singh,   the   learned   counsel   appearing   for   the
appellant   convict   vehemently   submitted   that   the   High   Court
committed   a   serious   error   in   passing   the   impugned   judgment
and order  of conviction by  reversing  the well­reasoned judgment
and order of acquittal passed by the trial court. According to the
learned counsel, while sitting in judgment over an acquittal, the
appellate court is first required to seek an answer to the question
whether   the   findings   of   the   trial   court   are   palpably   wrong,
manifestly   erroneous   or   demonstrably   unsustainable.   If   the
appellate   court   answers   the   above   question   in   the   negative,   the
order   of   acquittal   is   not   to   be   disturbed.   Conversely,   if   the
appellate  court  holds,  for   reasons  to  be  recorded,  that   the  order
of acquittal cannot at all be sustained, in view of any of the above
infirmities, it can then – and then only –   reappraise the evidence
to   arrive   at   its   own   conclusions.   The   principal   argument   of   the

learned counsel appearing for the appellant convict is that in the
case on hand, there is no finding recorded by the High Court that
the   judgment   of   the   trial   court   is   palpably   wrong,   manifestly
erroneous or demonstrably unsustainable. 
29. The   learned   counsel   would   further   submit   that   the   High   Court
committed a serious error in making the extra judicial confession
alleged   to   have   been   made   by   the   original   accused   No.   3
Seetharam  Bhat  before  the  PW  7  almost   after  four  months   from
the   date   of   the   incident   is   the   basis   and   thereafter,   trying   to
search   for   corroboration.   It   was   argued   that   even   otherwise,   an
extra   judicial   confession   is   a   weak   piece   of   evidence.   He   would
argue that in the case on hand, the High Court should not have
relied   upon   the   extra   judicial   confession   alleged   to   have   been
made   by   the   accused   No.   3   Seetharam   before   the   PW   7   Yogesh
for the purpose of convicting the appellant herein. 
30. The   learned   counsel   also   submitted   that   the   High   Court
committed a serious error in relying upon the various discoveries
like   the   weapon   of   offence,   jewellery,   mobile,   clothes   etc.   under
Section 27 of the Evidence Act. 
31. In   such   circumstances   referred   to   above,   the   learned   counsel
prays   that   there   being   merit   in   his   appeal,   the   same   may   be
allowed   and   the   impugned   judgment   and   order   passed   by   the

High Court may be set aside. 
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE STATE
32. Mr. V.N. Raghupathy, the learned counsel appearing for the State
of   Karnataka,   on   the   other   hand,   has   vehemently   opposed   this
appeal submitting  that no error not to speak of any  error  of law
could   be   said   to   have   been   committed   by   the   High   Court   in
passing   the   impugned   order.   He   would   submit   that   the
circumstances   are   fully   established   pointing   only   towards   the
guilt   of   the   appellant   convict.   In   such   circumstances   referred   to
above,   the   learned   counsel   appearing   for   the   State   prayed   that
there   being   no   merit   in   the   present   appeal,   the   same   may   be
dismissed.
ANALYSIS
33. Having   heard   the   learned   counsel   appearing   for   the   parties   and
having   gone   through   the   material   on   record,   the   only   question
that   falls   for   our   consideration   is   whether   the   High   Court
committed   any   error   in   passing   the   impugned   judgment   and
order of conviction. 
34. The High Court should have been mindful of the fact that it was

dealing with an acquittal appeal filed by the State under Section
378 of the Cr.PC. It would be useful to review the approach to be
adopted   while   deciding   an   appeal   against   the   acquittal   by   the
trial court. 
35. In   one   of   the   earliest   cases   on   the   powers   of   the   High   Court,   in
dealing   with   an   appeal   against   an   order   of   acquittal   the   Judicial
Committee   of   the   Privy   Council,   in   Sheo   Swarup   v.   King­
Emperor ,   1934   SCC   OnLine   PC   42   :   (1933­34)   61   IA   398   :   AIR
1934 PC 227 (2), considered the provisions relating to the power of
an   appellate   court   in   dealing   with   an   appeal   against   an   order   of
acquittal and observed as under: 
“…..But   in   exercising   the   power   conferred   by   the   Code
and   before   reaching   its   conclusions   upon   fact,   the   High
Court   should   and   will   always   give   proper   weight   and
consideration to such matters as: (1) the views of the trial
Judge   as   to   the   credibility   of   the   witnesses;   (2)   the
presumption   of   innocence   in   favour   of   the   accused,   a
presumption   certainly   not   weakened   by   the   fact   that   he
has   been   acquitted   at   his   trial;   (3)   the   right   of   the
accused to the benefit of any doubt; and (4) the slowness
of   an   appellate   court   in   disturbing   a   finding   of   fact
arrived at by a Judge who had the advantage of seeing
the witnesses. To state this, however, is only to say that
the   High   Court   in   its   conduct   of   the   appeal   should   and
will   act   in   accordance   with   rules   and   principles   well
known and recognised in the administration of justice.”
It was stated that the appellate court has full powers to review and
to reverse the acquittal.

36. Following   the   Sheo   Swarup   (supra)   this   Court   in   Chandrappa
and Others v. State of Karnataka   reported in (2007) 4 SCC 415
held as under: 
“16.   It   cannot,   however,   be   forgotten   that   in   case   of
acquittal,  there   is   a  double  presumption  in  favour  of  the
accused.   Firstly,   the   presumption   of   innocence   is
available   to   him   under   the   fundamental   principle   of
criminal   jurisprudence   that   every   person   should   be
presumed to be innocent unless he is proved to be guilty
by   a   competent   court   of   law.   Secondly,   the   accused
having   secured   an   acquittal,   the   presumption   of   his
innocence   is   certainly   not   weakened   but   reinforced,
reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. ”
37. In   Atley   v.   State   of   Uttar   Pradesh ,   AIR   1955   SC   807,   the
approach   of   the   appellate   court   while   considering   a   judgment   of
acquittal   was   discussed   and   it   was   observed   that   unless   the
appellate court comes to  the conclusion that the judgment  of the
acquittal   was   perverse,   it   could   not   set   aside   the   same.   To   a
similar effect are the following observations of this Court speaking
through   Subba   Rao,   J.   (as   his   Lordship   then   was)   in   Sanwat
Singh   and   Others   v.   State   of   Rajasthan ,   AIR   1961   SC   715   in
para 9 held as under: 
“9. The foregoing discussion yields the following results:
(1)   an   appellate   court   has   full   power   to   review   the
evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded; (2)
the   principles   laid   down   in   Sheo   Swarup’s   case,   61   Ind
App 398 : (AIR 1934 PC 227 (2)) afford a correct guide for
the   appellate   court's   approach   to   a   case   in   disposing   of
such an appeal; and (3) the different phraseology used in

the judgments of this Court, such as, (i) “substantial and
compelling   reasons”,   (ii)   “good   and   sufficiently   cogent
reasons”,   and   (iii)   “strong   reasons”   are   not   intended   to
curtail   the   undoubted   power   of   an   appellate   court   in   an
appeal   against   acquittal   to   review   the   entire   evidence
and   to   come   to   its   own   conclusion;   but   in   doing   so   it
should not only consider every matter on record having a
bearing on the questions of fact and the reasons given by
the   court   below   in   support   of   its   order   of   acquittal   in   its
arriving   at   a   conclusion   on   those   facts,   but   should   also
express   those   reasons   in   its   judgment,   which   lead   it   to
hold that the acquittal was not justified.”
38. The   need   for   the   aforesaid   observations   arose   on   account   of   the
observations   of   the   majority   in   Aher   Raja   Khima   v.   State   of
Saurashtra ,   AIR   1956   SC   217   :   1956   Cri   LJ   426,   which   stated
that   for   the   High   Court   to   take   a   different   view   on   the   evidence
“ there   must   also   be   substantial   and   compelling   reasons   for
holding that the trial court was wrong ”.
39.  M.G.   Agarwal   v.   State   of   Maharashtra ,   AIR   1963   SC   200   :
(1963) 1 Cri LJ 235, is the judgment of the Constitution Bench of
this Court, speaking through Gajendragadkar, J. (as his Lordship
then   was).   This   Court   observed   that   the   approach   of   the   High
Court (appellate court) in dealing with an appeal against acquittal
ought   to   be   cautious   because   the   presumption   of   innocence   in
favour   of   the   accused   “ is   not   certainly   weakened   by   the   fact   that
he has been acquitted at his trial ”.
40.   In   Shivaji   Sahabrao   Bobade   and   Another   v.   State   of

Maharashtra , (1973)  2 SCC   793  :  1973  SCC  (Cri)  1033,  in   para
6, Krishna Iyer, J., observed as follows:
“ 6.   …..In   short,   our   jurisprudential   enthusiasm   for
presumed   innocence   must   be   moderated   by   the
pragmatic   need   to   make   criminal   justice   potent   and
realistic.   A   balance   has   to   be   struck   between   chasing
chance possibilities as good enough to set the delinquent
free and chopping the logic of preponderant probability to
punish marginal innocents…..”
41. This Court in   Ramesh Babulal Doshi   v.   State of Gujarat , (1996)
9   SCC   225   :   1996   SCC   (Cri)   972,   in   para   7   spoke   about   the
approach   of   the   appellate   court   while   considering   an   appeal
against an order acquitting the accused and stated as follows: 
“ 7.   …..While   sitting   in   judgment   over   an   acquittal   the
appellate court is first required to seek an answer to the
question   whether   the   findings   of   the   trial   court   are
palpably   wrong,   manifestly   erroneous   or   demonstrably
unsustainable.   If   the   appellate   court   answers   the   above
question in the negative the order of acquittal is not to be
disturbed.   Conversely,   if   the   appellate   court   holds,   for
reasons to be recorded, that the order of acquittal cannot
at all be sustained in view of any of the above infirmities
it can then — and then only — reappraise the evidence to
arrive at its own conclusions…..”
The object and the purpose of the aforesaid approach is to ensure
that   there   is   no   miscarriage   of   justice.   In   other   words,   there
should   not   be   an   acquittal   of   the   guilty   or   a   conviction   of   an
innocent person.
42.  In   Ajit   Savant   Majagvai   v.   State   of   Karnataka ,  (1997)   7  SCC

110   :   1997   SCC   (Cri)   992,   in   para   16,   this   Court   set   out   the
following principles that would regulate and govern the hearing of
an appeal by the High Court against an order of acquittal passed
by the trial court: 
“16. This Court has thus explicitly and clearly laid down
the   principles   which   would   govern   and   regulate   the
hearing of appeal by the  High Court  against an order of
acquittal passed by the trial court. These principles have
been set out in innumerable cases and may be reiterated
as under:
(1) In an appeal against an order of acquittal, the High
Court possesses all the powers, and nothing less than
the   powers   it   possesses   while   hearing   an   appeal
against an order of conviction.
(2)   The   High   Court   has   the   power   to   reconsider   the
whole   issue,   reappraise   the   evidence   and   come   to   its
own   conclusion   and   findings   in   place   of   the   findings
recorded   by   the   trial   court,   if   the   said   findings   are
against   the   weight   of   the   evidence   on   record,   or   in
other words, perverse.
(3)   Before   reversing   the   finding   of   acquittal,   the   High
Court has to consider each ground on which the order
of   acquittal   was   based   and   to   record   its   own   reasons
for not accepting those grounds and not subscribing to
the view expressed  by the  trial court  that  the  accused
is entitled to acquittal.
(4) In reversing the finding of acquittal, the High Court
has   to   keep   in   view   the   fact   that   the   presumption   of
innocence is still available in favour of the accused and
the   same   stands   fortified   and   strengthened   by   the
order   of   acquittal   passed   in   his   favour   by   the   trial
court.
(5)   If   the   High   Court,   on   a   fresh   scrutiny   and

reappraisal   of   the   evidence   and   other   material   on
record,   is   of   the   opinion   that   there   is   another   view
which   can   be   reasonably   taken,   then   the   view   which
favours the accused should be adopted.
(6)   The   High   Court   has   also   to   keep   in   mind   that   the
trial   court   had   the   advantage   of   looking   at   the
demeanour of witnesses and observing their conduct in
the Court especially in the witness­box.
(7) The High Court has also to keep in mind that even
at   that   stage,   the   accused   was   entitled   to   benefit   of
doubt.   The   doubt   should   be   such   as   a   reasonable
person   would   honestly   and   conscientiously   entertain
as to the guilt of the accused.”
43. This Court in   Chandrappa   (supra)   highlighted that there is one
significant difference in exercising power while hearing an appeal
against   acquittal   by   the   appellate   court.   The   appellate   court
would   not   interfere   where   the   judgment   impugned   is   based   on
evidence and the view taken was reasonable and plausible. This
is because the appellate court will determine the fact that there is
presumption in favour of the accused and the accused is entitled
to get the benefit of doubt but if it decides to interfere it should
assign   reasons   for   differing   with   the   decision   of   acquittal.   After
referring   to   a   catena   of   judgments,   this   Court   culled   out   the
following general principles regarding the powers of the Appellate
Court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal
in the following words: 

“ 42.   From   the   above   decisions,   in   our   considered   view,
the   following   general   principles   regarding   powers   of   the
appellate court while dealing with an appeal against  an
order of acquittal emerge:
(1)   An   appellate   court   has   full   power   to   review,
reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the
order of acquittal is founded.
(2)   The   Code   of   Criminal   Procedure,   1973   puts   no
limitation,   restriction   or   condition   on   exercise   of   such
power   and   an   appellate   court   on   the   evidence   before   it
may   reach   its   own   conclusion,   both   on  questions   of   fact
and of law.
(3)   Various   expressions,   such   as,   “substantial   and
compelling   reasons”,   “good   and   sufficient   grounds”,
“very   strong   circumstances”,   “distorted   conclusions”,
“glaring   mistakes”,   etc.   are   not   intended   to   curtail
extensive   powers   of   an   appellate   court   in   an   appeal
against   acquittal.   Such   phraseologies   are   more   in   the
nature   of   “flourishes   of   language”   to   emphasise   the
reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal
than   to   curtail   the   power   of   the   court   to   review   the
evidence and to come to its own conclusion.
(4)   An   appellate   court,   however,   must   bear   in   mind   that
in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour
of   the   accused.   Firstly,   the   presumption   of   innocence   is
available   to   him   under   the   fundamental   principle   of
criminal   jurisprudence   that   every   person   shall   be
presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a
competent   court   of   law.   Secondly,   the   accused   having
secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is
further   reinforced,   reaffirmed   and   strengthened   by   the
trial court.
(5)   If   two   reasonable   conclusions   are   possible   on   the
basis   of   the   evidence   on   record,   the   appellate   court
should   not   disturb   the   finding   of   acquittal   recorded   by
the trial court.”

44. In   Nepal   Singh   v.   State   of   Haryana ,   (2009)   12   SCC   351,   this
Court reversed the judgment in the   State of Haryana   v.   Nepal
Singh ,   CRA­D   No.   99­DBA   of   1993,   order   dated   21­7­1997
(P&H),   of   the   High   Court   which   had   set   aside   the   judgment   of
acquittal   pronounced   by   the   trial   court   and   restored   the
judgment   of   the   trial   court   acquitting   the   accused   on
reappreciation of the evidence.
45.   The circumstances under which an appeal would be entertained
by this Court from an order of acquittal passed by a High Court
may be summarised as follows:
45.1. Ordinarily,  this  Court  is  cautious  in  interfering  with   an  order  of
acquittal,   especially   when   the   order   of   acquittal   has   been
confirmed up to the High Court. It is only in rarest of rare cases,
where   the   High   Court,   on   an   absolutely   wrong   process   of
reasoning   and   a   legally   erroneous   and   perverse   approach  to   the
facts   of   the   case,   ignoring   some   of   the   most   vital   facts,   has
acquitted   the   accused,   that   the   same   may   be   reversed   by   this
Court,   exercising   jurisdiction   under   Article   136   of   the
Constitution.   [ State   of   Uttar   Pradesh   v.   Sahai   and   Others ,
(1982)   1   SCC   352].   Such   fetters   on   the   right   to   entertain   an
appeal   are   prompted   by   the   reluctance   to   expose   a   person,   who

has been acquitted by a competent court of a criminal charge, to
the anxiety and tension of a further examination of the case, even
though   it   is   held   by   a   superior   court.   [ Arunachalam   v.   P.S.R.
Sadhanantham   and   Another ,   (1979)   2   SCC   297].   An   appeal
cannot   be   entertained   against   an   order   of   acquittal   which   has,
after   recording   valid   and   weighty   reasons,   has   arrived   at   an
unassailable,   logical   conclusion   which   justifies   acquittal.   [ State
of   Haryana   v.   Lakhbir   Singh   and   Another ,   1991   Supp   (1)
SCC 35 : 1990 Cri LJ 2274].
45.2. However, this Court has on certain occasions, set aside the order
of   acquittal   passed   by   a   High   Court.   The   circumstances   under
which   this   Court   may   entertain   an   appeal   against   an   order   of
acquittal and pass an order of conviction, may be summarised as
follows:
45.2.1. Where the approach or reasoning of the High Court is perverse:
( a ) Where incontrovertible evidence has been rejected by the High
Court   based   on   suspicion   and   surmises,   which   are   rather
unrealistic.   [ State   of   Rajasthan   v.   Sukhpal   Singh   and
Others ,   (1983)   1   SCC   393].   For   example,   where   direct,
unanimous   accounts   of   the   eyewitnesses,   were   discounted
without cogent reasoning. [ State of U.P.   v.   Shanker , 1980 Supp

SCC 489 : 1981 SCC (Cri) 428].
( b ) Where the intrinsic merits of the testimony of relatives, living
in the same house as the victim, were discounted on the ground
that   they   were   “interested”   witnesses.   [ State   of   U.P.   v.   Hakim
Singh and Others , (1980) 3 SCC 55].
( c )   Where   testimony   of   witnesses   had   been   disbelieved   by   the
High   Court,   on   an   unrealistic   conjecture   of   personal   motive   on
the part of witnesses to implicate the accused, when in fact, the
witnesses   had   no   axe   to   grind   in   the   said   matter.   [ State   of
Rajasthan   v.   Sukhpal Singh and Others , (1983) 1 SCC 393].
( d )   Where   dying   declaration   of   the   deceased   victim   was   rejected
by   the   High   Court   on   an   irrelevant   ground   that   they   did   not
explain the injury found on one of the persons present at the site
of   occurrence   of   the   crime.   [ Arunachalam   v.   P.S.R.
Sadhanantham and Another , (1979) 2 SCC 297].
( e )   Where   the   High   Court   applied   an   unrealistic   standard   of
“implicit   proof”   rather   than   that   of   “proof   beyond   reasonable
doubt” and therefore evaluated the evidence in a flawed manner.
[ State   of  Uttar   Pradesh   v.   Ranjha   Ram  and   Others , (1986)  4
SCC 99].
( f ) Where the High Court rejected circumstantial evidence, based

on an exaggerated and capricious theory, which were beyond the
plea   of   the   accused;   [ State   of   Maharashtra   v.   Champalal
Punjaji Shah , (1981) 3 SCC 610] or where acquittal rests merely
in exaggerated devotion to the rule of benefit of doubt in favour of
the   accused.   [ Gurbachan   Singh   v.   Satpal   Singh   and   Others ,
(1990) 1 SCC 445].
( g )   Where   the   High   Court   acquitted   the   accused   on   the   ground
that he had no adequate motive to commit the offence, although,
in the said case, there was strong direct evidence establishing the
guilt  of  the  accused,  thereby  making   it  unnecessary  on   the  part
of   the   prosecution   to   establish   “motive”.   [ State   of   Andhra
Pradesh   v.   Bogam   Chandraiah   and   Another ,   (1986)   3   SCC
637].
45.2.2. Where acquittal would result in gross miscarriage of justice:
( a )   Where   the   findings   of   the   High   Court,   disconnecting   the
accused   persons   with   the   crime,   were   based   on   a   perfunctory
consideration   of   evidence,   [ State   of   U.P.   v.   Pheru   Singh   and
Others ,   1989   Supp   (1)   SCC   288]   or   based   on   extenuating
circumstances   which   were   purely   based   in   imagination   and
fantasy   [ State   of   Uttar   Pradesh   v.   Pussu   alias   Ram   Kishore ,
(1983) 3 SCC 502].

( b ) Where the accused had been acquitted on ground of delay in
conducting   trial,   which   delay   was   attributable   not   to   the
tardiness   or   indifference   of   the   prosecuting   agencies,   but   to   the
conduct   of   the   accused   himself;   or   where   accused   had   been
acquitted   on   ground   of   delay   in   conducting   trial   relating   to   an
offence   which   is   not   of   a   trivial   nature.   [ State   of
Maharashtra   v.   Champalal Punjaji Shah , (1981) 3 SCC 610].
46. Having   gone   through   the   entire   impugned   judgment   passed   by
the High Court, we do not find any satisfaction recorded therein
that the findings of the trial court are palpably wrong, manifestly
erroneous   or   demonstrably   unsustainable.   In   the   absence   of
such   satisfaction,   the   High   Court,   in   our   opinion,   should   not
have disturbed a well­reasoned judgment of acquittal, passed by
the   trial   court.   We   shall   assign   reasons   hereafter   why   the   High
Court   should   not   have   disturbed   the   acquittal   recorded   by   the
trial court.
PRINCIPLES   GOVERNING   APPRECIATION   OF   CIRCUMSTANTIAL
EVIDENCE    
47.  A   three­Judge   Bench   of   this   Court   in   Sharad   Birdhichand
Sarda   v.   State   of   Maharashtra ,   (1984)   4   SCC   116,   held   as
under: 

“ 152.   Before   discussing   the   cases   relied   upon   by   the
High   Court   we   would   like   to   cite   a   few  decisions   on  the
nature,   character   and   essential   proof   required   in   a
criminal   case   which   rests   on   circumstantial   evidence
alone.   The   most   fundamental   and   basic   decision   of   this
Court   is   Hanumant   v.   State   of   Madhya   Pradesh   [AIR
1952 SC 343 : 1952 SCR 1091 : 1953 Cri LJ 129] . This
case   has   been   uniformly   followed   and   applied   by   this
Court in a large number of later decisions up­to­date, for
instance,   the   cases   of   Tufail   (Alias)   Simmi   v.   State   of
Uttar   Pradesh   [(1969)   3   SCC   198   :   1970   SCC   (Cri)   55]
and   Ramgopal   v.   State   of   Maharashtra   [(1972)   4   SCC
625 : AIR 1972 SC 656] . It may be useful to extract what
Mahajan, J. has laid down in   Hanumant case   [AIR 1952
SC 343 : 1952 SCR 1091 : 1953 Cri LJ 129] :
It   is   well   to   remember   that   in   cases   where   the
evidence   is   of   a   circumstantial   nature,   the
circumstances   from   which   the   conclusion   of   guilt   is   to
be   drawn   should   in   the   first   instance   be   fully
established, and all the facts so established should be
consistent   only   with   the   hypothesis   of   the   guilt   of   the
accused.   Again,   the   circumstances   should   be   of   a
conclusive   nature   and   tendency   and   they   should   be
such   as   to   exclude   every   hypothesis   but   the   one
proposed to be proved. In other words, there must be a
chain   of   evidence   so   far   complete   as   not   to   leave   any
reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the
innocence   of   the   accused   and   it   must   be   such   as   to
show   that   within   all   human   probability   the   act   must
have been done by the accused.
153.   A   close   analysis   of   this   decision   would   show   that
the   following   conditions   must   be   fulfilled   before   a   case
against an accused can be said to be fully established:
(1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt
is to be drawn should be fully established.
It   may   be   noted   here   that   this   Court   indicated   that   the
circumstances   concerned   ‘must   or   should’   and   not   ‘may

be’   established.   There   is   not   only   a   grammatical   but   a
legal   distinction   between   ‘may   be   proved’   and   “must   be
or should be proved” as was held by this Court in   Shivaji
Sahabrao Bobade   v.   State of Maharashtra   [(1973) 2 SCC
793 : 1973 SCC (Cri) 1033 : 1973 Cri LJ 1783] where the
following observations were made : [SCC para 19, p. 807
: SCC (Cri) p. 1047]
Certainly,   it   is   a   primary   principle   that   the
accused   must   be   and   not   merely   may   be   guilty   before
a   court   can   convict   and   the   mental   distance   between
‘may   be’   and   ‘must   be’   is   long   and   divides   vague
conjectures from sure conclusions.
(2)   the   facts   so   established   should   be   consistent   only
with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to
say,   they   should   not   be   explainable   on   any   other
hypothesis except that the accused is guilty,
(3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature
and tendency,
(4)   they   should   exclude   every   possible   hypothesis
except the one to be proved, and
(5)   there   must   be   a   chain   of   evidence   so   complete   as
not   to   leave   any   reasonable   ground   for   the   conclusion
consistent   with   the   innocence   of   the   accused   and   must
show   that   in   all   human   probability   the   act   must   have
been done by the accused.
154.   These   five   golden   principles,   if   we   may   say   so,
constitute the panchsheel of the proof of a case based on
circumstantial evidence.”
48. In   an   Essay   on   the   Principles   of   Circumstantial   Evidence   by
William Wills       by       T.      and      J.W.      Johnson       and       Co.      1872, it
has been explained   as   under:  
“ In matters of direct testimony, if credence be given to the

relators,   the   act   of   hearing   and   the   act   of   belief,   though
really not so, seem to be contemporaneous. But the case is
very   different   when   we   have   to   determine   upon
circumstantial evidence, the judgment in respect  of which
is   essentially   inferential.   There   is   no   apparent   necessary
connection   between   the   facts   and   the   inference;   the   facts
may be true, and the inference erroneous, and it is only by
comparison   with   the   results   of   observation   in   similar   or
analogous   circumstances,   that   we   acquire   confidence   in
the accuracy of our conclusions. ?∙ 
The   term   PRESUMPTIVE   is   frequently   used   as
synonymous with CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE; but it is
not   so   used   with   strict   accuracy,   The   word"
presumption,"   ex   vi   termini,   imports   an   inference   from
facts;   and   the   adjunct   "presumptive,"   as   applied   to
evidentiary   facts,   implies   the   certainty   of   some   relation
between   the   facts   and   the   inference.   Circumstances
generally,   but   not   necessarily,   lead   to   particular
inferences;   for   the   facts   may   be   indisputable,   and   yet
their relation to the principal fact may be only apparent,
and   not   real;   and   even   when   the   connection   is   real,   the
deduction   may   be   erroneous.   Circumstantial   and
presumptive   evidence   differ,   therefore,   as   genus   and
species.
The   force   and   effect   of   circumstantial   evidence   depend
upon   its   incompatibility   with,   and   incapability   of,
explanation  or  solution  upon  any  other  supposition  than
that of the truth of the fact which it is adduced to prove;
the   mode   of   argument   resembling   the   method   of
demonstration by the reductio ad absurdum.”
49.  Thus,   in   view   of   the   above,   the   Court   must   consider   a   case   of
circumstantial   evidence   in   light   of   the   aforesaid   settled   legal
propositions.   In   a   case   of   circumstantial   evidence,   the   judgment
remains   essentially   inferential.   The   inference   is   drawn   from   the
established   facts   as   the   circumstances   lead   to   particular

inferences.   The   Court   has   to   draw   an   inference   with   respect   to
whether   the   chain   of   circumstances   is   complete,   and   when   the
circumstances   therein   are   collectively   considered,   the   same  must
lead   only   to   the   irresistible   conclusion   that   the   accused   alone   is
the perpetrator of the crime in question. All the circumstances so
established   must   be   of   a   conclusive   nature,   and   consistent   only
with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused.
ANALYSIS OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES RELIED UPON BY THE HIGH
COURT
50. It   is   the   case   of   the   prosecution   that   the   original   accused   No.   3
Seetharam Bhat had made an extra judicial confession before the
PW   7,   H.T.   Yogesh   (son­in­law   of   the   deceased).   PW   7   in   his
examination­in­chief,   recorded   by   the   trial   court   on   21.01.2012
has stated as under: 
“ 1.   I   know   the   accused   persons   who   are   present   before
the   court.   Deceased   Kamalamma   is   my   mother­in­law.
C.W.8 is my wife. P.W.1 is my wife's sister. C.W.12 is the
husband   of   P.W.1.   C.W.5   and   6   are   the   brothers   of   the
deceased.   I   know   other   witnesses.   My   mother­in­law
died   on   23.08.2010   due   to   murder.   The   son   of   A2
Gowramma by name Alok on 24.08.2010 came at about
6.30 a.m. and told that my mother­in­law Kamalamma is
not   found   since   yesterday   night.   A2   is   the   daughter   of
first   wife   of   the   husband   of   deceased   Kamalamma.
Deceased   used   to   reside   Hosamane,   Hirekudige   village.

By the side of the house of deceased A2 used to reside.
Deceased   alone   used   to   stay   there   and   A2   and   their
children   used   to   stay   by   the   side   of   the   house   of   the
deceased. Husband of A2 is no more. We also came. By
telling   to   all   we   searched   for   my   mother­in­law
Kamalamma.   As   we   could   not   trace   at   about   1   p.m.   I
went to Police Station and filed a missing complaint. I did
not   get   any   information   about   my   mother­in­law   even
after giving the missing complaint.
2.  On 09.12.2010 I had been to Gadikallu. At about 9.30
p.m. at Gadikallu circle A3 Seetharam Bhat met me and
there  he told that about  3 or 3      1/2      months  back   he had
been   called   by   A1   and   told   that   he   had   murdered
Kamalamma   and   in   order   to   bury   the   dead   body   asked
his   help  by providing  two  bottles   of  brandy and   he   also
told   that   if   he   would   not   obey   he   will   also   kill   him   as
done to his brother­in­law Srinivase Gowda. He also told
that   he   helped   him   in   carrying   the   dead   body   to   Dhare
near   the   land   of   Dinamani   and   there   they   have   buried
the body. 
3. Deceased   Kamalamma   used   to   tell   that   A2   is   having
illicit relation and they are not liking her as she is telling
to everybody.
4. Thereafter I went to Police Station on 10.12.2010 and
filed   the   complaint.   Now   I   see   the   said   complaint.   The
same   is   now   marked   as   Ex.P­11.   Ex.P­11(a)   is   my
signature.
5.   Next   day   when   police   and   Assistant   Commissioner
came to the spot I was also called there. C.W.2 to 4 were
also   called.   There   A1   and   A3   showed   the   place   where
they had buried the body of Kamalamma to us and also
to   the   police   and   Assistant   Commissioner.   Thereafter
with   the   help   of   P.W.3   the   dead   body   of   Kamalamma
was   exhumed.   The   dead   body   was   buried   in   survey
No.121,   the   Govt.   land   by   the   side   of   a   channel   at
Horabylu.   When   the   body   was   exhumed   it   was   fully
decomposed.   Over   the   body   one   petticoat,   one   blouse
were   there.   There   the   Assistant   Commissioner   draw   the

body exhumed mahazar. Now I see the same. The same
is   already   marked   as   Ex.P­3.   Ex.P­3(b)   is   my   signature.
At that time photographs were also taken. Now the three
photos   have   been   marked   as   Ex   P­4.   Apart   from   me
C.Ws. 2 to 4 and P.W.3 also signed. 
6. On 14.12.2010 again police called me at about 2 p.m.
to   the   Police   Station.   In   the   said   police   station   A1   was
also   present.   Police   brought   C.W.24   Meeranath   and   he
produced a mobile. The said mobile was of the deceased
Kamalamma.   The   same   was   seized   in   the   presence   of
C.W.22   and   23   by   drawing   a   mahazar.   Now   I   see   the
same. The same is now marked as Ex.P­12. Ex.P­12(a) is
my   signature.   At   that   time   photo   was   also   taken.   Now
the   said   photo   is   marked   as   Ex.P­13.   I   can   identify   the
mobile   if   shown   to   me.   The   same   is   already   marked   as
M.O.4. I do not remember the cell number of my mother­
in law. She has studied upto 4th standard. 
7.   My   mother­in­law   used   to   wear   a   chain   with
Ganapathi   pendant   which   is   already   marked   as   M.O.1,
one pair of ole with blue stone in the middle surrounded
by white stones which is already marked as M.O.2, one
gold   ring   with   red   stone   which   is   already   marked   as
M.O.3. I can identify the blouse and petticoat which were
found   on   the   body   of   the   deceased.   (Now   one   sealed
cover   is   shown   to   the   learned   counsel   for   the   accused.
The   seals   are   found   intact.   He   has   no   objection   to   open
the   same.   The   same   is   now   opened).   It   contains   one
blouse   and   one   petticoat.   Witness   identifies   the   same.
The same are now marked as M.O.11 and 12.”
51. We need not refer to the cross­examination of the PW 7, as we are
of the view that the plain reading of the examination­in­chief itself
is   sufficient   to   arrive   at   the   conclusion   that   the   extra   judicial
confession   could   not   have   been   relied   upon   as   an   incriminating
circumstance. 

52. The   date   of   the   alleged   crime   is   23.08.2010.   The   so   called   extra
judicial   confession,   said   to   have   been   made   by   Seetharam   Bhat
(accused   No.   3)   is   dated   09.12.2010.     We   fail   to   understand   why
all of a sudden Seetharam (accused No. 3) after a period of almost
four   months,   thought   fit   to   make   an   extra   judicial   confession
before   the   PW   7   H.T.   Yogesh   involving   himself   and   the   appellant
herein in the alleged crime.
53. An extra judicial confession, if voluntary and true and made in a
fit state of mind, can be relied upon by the Court. The confession
will   have   to   be   proved   like   any   other   fact.   The   value   of   the
evidence as to  confession, like any   other   evidence, depends  upon
the veracity of the witness to whom it has been made. The value of
the evidence as to the confession depends on the reliability of the
witness who gives the evidence. It is not open to any court to start
with a presumption that extra judicial confession is a weak type of
evidence. It would depend on the nature of the circumstances, the
time   when   the   confession   was   made   and   the   credibility   of   the
witnesses who speak to such a confession. Such a confession can
be   relied   upon   and   conviction   can   be   founded   thereon   if   the
evidence about the confession comes from the mouth of witnesses
who   appear   to   be   unbiased,   not   even   remotely   inimical   to   the
accused,   and   in   respect   of   whom   nothing   is   brought   out   which

may tend to indicate that he may have a motive for attributing an
untruthful statement to  the accused, the words spoken to  by  the
witness are clear, unambiguous and unmistakably convey that the
accused is the perpetrator of the crime and nothing is omitted by
the   witness   which   may   militate   against   it.   After   subjecting   the
evidence   of   the   witness   to   a   rigorous   test   on   the   touchstone   of
credibility,   the   extra   judicial   confession   can   be   accepted   and   can
be the basis of a conviction if it passes the test of credibility.
54.  Extra judicial confession is a weak piece of evidence and the court
must   ensure   that   the   same   inspires   confidence   and   is
corroborated by other prosecution evidence. It is considered to be
a   weak   piece   of   evidence   as   it   can   be   easily   procured   whenever
direct   evidence   is   not   available.   In   order   to   accept   extra   judicial
confession,   it   must   be   voluntary   and   must   inspire   confidence.   If
the   court   is   satisfied   that   the   extra   judicial   confession   is
voluntary, it can be acted upon to base the conviction.  
55.  Considering   the   admissibility   and   evidentiary   value   of   extra
judicial   confession,   after   referring   to   various   judgments,
in   Sahadevan   and   Another   v.   State   of   Tamil   Nadu ,   (2012)   6
SCC 403, this Court held as under:­
“ 15.1.   In   Balwinder Singh   v.   State of Punjab   [1995 Supp
(4)   SCC   259   :   1996   SCC   (Cri)   59]   this   Court   stated   the

principle that: (SCC p. 265, para 10)
“10.   An   extra­judicial   confession   by   its   very   nature   is
rather   a   weak   type   of   evidence   and   requires
appreciation   with   a   great   deal   of   care   and   caution.
Where   an   extra­judicial   confession   is   surrounded   by
suspicious   circumstances,   its   credibility   becomes
doubtful and it loses its importance .”
x x x x
15.4.   While   explaining   the   dimensions   of   the   principles
governing   the   admissibility   and   evidentiary   value   of   an
extra­judicial   confession,   this   Court   in   State   of
Rajasthan   v.   Raja   Ram   [(2003)   8   SCC   180   :   2003   SCC
(Cri)   1965]   stated   the   principle   that:   (SCC   p.   192,   para
19)
“19. An extra­judicial confession, if voluntary and true
and made in a fit state of mind, can be relied upon by
the   court.   The   confession   will   have   to   be   proved   like
any   other   fact.   The   value   of   the   evidence   as   to
confession, like any other evidence, depends upon the
veracity of the witness to whom it has been made.”
The  Court  further expressed  the  view that: (SCC p. 192,
para 19)
“19.   …   Such   a   confession   can   be   relied   upon   and
conviction   can   be   founded   thereon   if   the   evidence
about   the   confession   comes   from   the   mouth   of
witnesses   who   appear   to   be   unbiased,   not   even
remotely   inimical   to   the   accused,   and   in   respect   of
whom   nothing   is   brought   out   which   may   tend   to
indicate   that   he   may   have   a   motive   of   attributing   an
untruthful statement to the accused.…”
x x x
x
15.6.   Accepting   the   admissibility   of   the   extra­judicial
confession,   the   Court   in   Sansar   Chand   v.   State   of

Rajasthan   [(2010)   10   SCC   604   :   (2011)   1   SCC   (Cri)   79]
held that: (SCC p. 611, paras 29­30)
“29.   There   is   no   absolute   rule   that   an   extra­judicial
confession   can   never   be   the   basis   of   a   conviction,
although ordinarily an extra­judicial confession should
be corroborated by some other material. [Vide   Thimma
and   Thimma   Raju   v.   State   of   Mysore   [(1970)   2   SCC
105   :   1970   SCC   (Cri)   320]   ,   Mulk   Raj   v.   State   of
U.P.   [AIR   1959   SC   902   :   1959   Cri   LJ
1219]   ,   Sivakumar   v.   State   [(2006)   1   SCC   714   :   (2006)
1 SCC (Cri) 470] (SCC paras 40 and 41 : AIR paras 41
and   42),   Shiva   Karam   Payaswami   Tewari   v.   State   of
Maharashtra   [(2009)   11   SCC   262   :   (2009)   3   SCC   (Cri)
1320]   and   Mohd.  Azad   v.   State   of  W.B.[(2008)  15  SCC
449 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 1082] ]””
                                              [Emphasis supplied]
56.  It   is   well   settled   that   conviction   can   be   based   on   a   voluntarily
confession   but   the   rule   of   prudence   requires   that   wherever
possible   it   should   be   corroborated   by   independent   evidence.
Extra   judicial   confession   of   accused   need   not   in   all   cases   be
corroborated.   In      Madan   Gopal   Kakkad   v.   Naval   Dubey   and
Another ,   (1992)   3   SCC   204,   this   Court   after   referring   to   Piara
Singh  and  Others  v.  State  of  Punjab , (1977) 4 SCC  452, held
that   the   law   does   not   require   that   the   evidence   of   an   extra
judicial confession  should in  all  cases be corroborated. The  rule
of   prudence   does   not   require   that   each   and   every   circumstance
mentioned   in   the   confession   must   be   separately   and
independently corroborated.
57.  The sum and substance of the aforesaid is that an extra judicial

confession   by   its   very   nature   is   rather   a   weak   type   of   evidence
and   requires   appreciation   with   great   deal   of   care   and   caution.
Where   an   extra   judicial   confession   is   surrounded   by   suspicious
circumstances,   its   credibility   becomes   doubtful   and   it   loses   its
importance   like   the   case   in   hand.   The   Courts   generally   look   for
an independent reliable corroboration before placing any reliance
upon an extra judicial confession.
58. This   Court   in   Kashmira   Singh   v.   The   State   of   Madhya
Pradesh  reported in AIR 1952 SC 159, had observed as under: 
“The  confession of an accused  person is  not  evidence  in
the ordinary sense of the term as defined in Section 3. It
cannot   be   made   the   foundation   of   a   conviction   and   can
only   be   used   in   support   of   other   evidence.   The   proper
way   is,   first,   to   marshal   the   evidence   against   the
accused   excluding   the   confession   altogether   from
consideration   and   see   whether,   if   it   is   believed   a
conviction  could   safely  be  based  on it. If  it   is   capable   of
belief independently of the confession, then of course it is
not   necessary   to   call   the   confession   in   aid.   But   cases
may arise where the Judge is not prepared to act on the
other   evidence   as   it   stands   even   though,   if   believed,   it
would   be   sufficient   to   sustain   a   conviction.   In   such   an
event the Judge may call in aid the confession and use it
to   lend   assurance   to   the   other   evidence   and   thus   fortify
himself   in   believing   what   without   the   aid   of   the
confession   he   would   not   be   prepared   to   accept.   [para  8,
10]” 
59. In the case on hand, the High Court committed a serious error in
making   the   confessional   statement   as   the   basis   and   thereafter
going in search for corroboration.  The High Court concluded that

the confessional statement is corroborated in material particulars
without   first   considering   and   marshalling   the   evidence   against
the   appellant   convict   herein   excluding   the   conviction   altogether
from   consideration.   As   held   in   the   decision,   cited   above,   only   if
on  such   consideration   on   the   evidence  available,   other  than  the
confession   a   conviction   can   safely   be   based   then   only   the
confession could be used to support that belief or conclusion. 
60. The trial court has assigned cogent reasons for not accepting the
evidence   of   the   PW   7,   before   whom   the   confession   is   alleged   to
have   been   made,   and   rightly   so,   the   High   Court   has   not   given
any   convincing   reasons   as   to   why   the   PW   7   who   was   discarded
by the trial court should be relied on. 
61. The learned counsel appearing for the State, relied on Section 30
of the Evidence Act to make good his submission that, the extra
judicial   confession   alleged   to   have   been   made   by   the   original
accused   No.   3   Seetharam   Bhat   is   admissible   against   the
appellant   convict   herein.   No   doubt,   the   statement   would   be
admissible but the question is not of mere admissibility or mere
absence   of   bar   under   Section   25   of   the   Evidence   Act,   the   real
question   relates   to   a   proper   interpretation   of   Section   30   of   the
Evidence Act. 

62. Section 30 of the Evidence Act is quoted below in toto:
“ 30.   Consideration   of   proved   confession   affecting
person making it and others jointly under trial   for
the same offence.—
When   more   persons   than   one   are   being   tried   jointly   for
the same offence, and a confession made by one of such
persons affecting himself and some other of such persons
is   proved,   the   Court   may   take   into   consideration   such
confession   as   against   such   other   person   as   well   as
against the person who makes such confession.
[Explanation :—“Offence”, as used in this section includes
the abatement of, or attempt to commit the offence.]”
63. It   was   argued   that   this   confession   of   a   co­accused,   even   if
proved,   cannot   be   the   basis   of   a   conviction   and   although   it   is
evidence in the generic sense, yet it is not evidence in the specific
sense   and   it   could   afford   corroboration   to   other   evidence   and
cannot   be   the   supporting   point   or   the   sole   basis   of   the
conviction. In this respect, reference could be made to a decision
of   this   Court   in   the   case   of   Haricharan   Kurmi   &   Jogia
Hajam   v.   State   of   Bihar ,  as  reported  in  AIR 1964  SC  1184, as
also to another decision of this Court reported in   Ram Chandra
and   Another   v.   State   of   Uttar   Pradesh ,   AIR   1957   SC   381
wherein it was held that confession of a co­accused can only  be
taken   into   consideration   but   it   was   not   in   itself   a   substantive
evidence.   The   Privy   Council   also   held   that   a   confession   of   a   co­
accused   was   obviously   evidence   of   a   very   weak   type   and   it   did

not come within the definition of evidence contained in Section 3.
64. It   is   necessary   to   have   the   facts   behind   these   decisions   of   the
Supreme   Court   and   the   Privy   Council.   We   may   proceed
chronologically.
65. In the case of   Bhuboni Sahu v. The King   reported in AIR 1949
PC 257, the Patna High Court had dismissed an appeal against a
judgment   and   order   of   the   Sessions   Judge   convicting   the
appellant   for   an   offence   of   murder.   The   Privy   Council,   however,
advised His Majesty that the appeal be allowed and the judgment
was   recorded   giving   the   reasons   for   such   advice.   The   evidence
against   the   appellant   consisted   of,   (a)   the   evidence   of   Kholli
Behera   who   had   taken   part   in   the   murder   and   had   become   an
approver,   (b)   the   confession   of   Trinath   recorded   under   Section
164 Cr. P.C. which implicated both himself and the appellant in
the  murder, and  (c) the  recovery   of a  loin  cloth  identified as  the
one which the deceased was wearing when he was assaulted and
an   instrument   for   cutting   grass.   For   the   purpose   of   the   instant
case,   the   evidence   in   point   (b)   is   relevant.   The   Privy   Council
quoted Section 30 of the Evidence Act and held in paragraph 9 of
the judgment (as reported) that Section 30 was introduced for the
first   time   in   the   Indian   Evidence   Act   of   1872   and   it   was   the
departure from the common law of England. It was observed that

this   Section   30   applied   to   confessions   and   not   to   statements
which do not admit the guilt of the confessing party. It was held
that   statement   of   Trinath   was   a   confession.   Their   lordships
further observed that Section 30 seemed to be based on the view
that an admission of an accused person of his own guilt affords
some   sort   of   sanction   in   support   of   the   truth   of   his   confession
against   others   as   well   as   himself.   But   a   confession   of   a   co­
accused,   their   lordships   continued   to   observe,   was   obviously
evidence   of   a   weaker   type.   It   did   not   indeed   come   within   the
definition of ‘evidence’ contained in Section 3 of the Evidence Act.
Such statement was not required to be given on oath nor in the
presence   of   the   accused   and   it   could   not   be   tested   by   cross­
examination.   It   was   a   much   weaker   type   of   evidence   than   the
evidence   of   an   approver   which   was   not   subject   to   any   of   those
infirmities.   Section   30,   however,   provided   that   the   Court   might
take   into   consideration   the   confession   and   thereby   no   doubt
made   it   evidence   on   which   the   Court   could   act,   but   the   section
did not say that the confession was to amount to proof. Clearly,
there   must   be   other   evidence   and   confession   was   only   one
element   in   the   consideration   of   all   the   facts   proved   in   the   case,
which can be put into the scale and weighed with other evidence.
Their   lordships   confirmed   the   view   that   the   confession   of   a   co­

accused could be used only in support of the evidence and could
not be made a foundation of a conviction.
66. The case of  Ram Chandra  (supra) before this Court, as reported
in AIR 1957 SC 381 was also of murder. It was a case in which
corpus   delecti   was   not   traceable   and   proof   of   murder   solely
depended on a retracted confession of an accused. The Court was
of the view that although corpus delecti was not found, yet there
could   be   a   conviction   if   reliable   evidence,   direct   or
circumstantial,   of   the   commission   of   murder   was   available.
However,   a   confession   of   a   co­accused   was   not   in   itself   a
substantive   evidence.   The   courts   below   had   relied   on   a
confession  of   accused   Ram   Chandra   against  a  co­accused,   Ram
Bharosey, for   holding   him  guilty   of the  offences charged  against
him.    This   Court   held,   “It   is   rightly  urged   that   under   Section   30,
Evidence   Act   confession   of   a   co­accused   can   only   be   taken   into
consideration but is not in itself substantive evidence.”  This Court,
however,   was   satisfied   that   even   excluding   the   confession   as
substantive   evidence   there   was   enough   material   against   the
appellant Ram Bharosey to find him guilty of offence of criminal
conspiracy to commit offences charged. To come to the ratio, we
find   that   the   view   was   affirmed   that   confession   of   a   co­accused
could   only   be   considered   but   could   not   be   relied   on   as

substantive evidence.
67. The   case   of   Haricharan   Kurmi   (supra)   was   again   from   the
Patna High Court. Here also a question arose as to the probative
value   of   a   confession  of  one   accused   against  a  co­accused.   This
Court   dealt   with   the   definition   clause   in   Section   3   in   the
Evidence   Act   and   Section   30   thereof,   as   also   some   earlier
decisions   of   this   Court.   It   was   observed,   in   paragraph   15   of   the
judgment, as reported, “It is true that the confession made by Ram
Surat   is   a   detailed   statement   and   it   attributes   to   the   two
appellants a major part in the commission of the offence. It is also
true that the said confession has been found to be voluntary, and
true so far as the part played by Ram Surat himself is concerned,
and so, it is not unlikely that the confessional statement in regard
to the part played by the two appellants may also be true; and in
that sense, the rending of the said confession may raise a serious
suspicion   against   the   accused.   But   it   is   precisely   in   such   cases
that   the   true   legal   approach   must   be   adopted   and   suspicion,
however, grave, must not be allowed to take the place of proof. As
we   have   already   indicated,   it   has   been   a   recognised   principle   of
administration   of   criminal   law   in   this   country   for   over   half   a
century   that   the   confession   of   a   co­accused   person   cannot   be

treated   as   substantive   evidence   and   can   be   pressed   into   service
only when the Court is inclined to accept other evidence and feels
the   necessity   of   seeking   for   an   assurance   in   support   of   its
conclusion deducible from the said evidence. In criminal trial, there
is  no  scope  for applying the  principle  of  moral conviction or grave
suspicion.   In   criminal   cases   where   the   other   evidence   adduced
against   an   accused   person   is   wholly   unsatisfactory   and   the
prosecution seeks to rely on the confession of a co­accused person,
the   presumption   of   innocence   which   is   the   basis   of   criminal
jurisprudence   assists   the   accused   person   and   compels   the   Court
to   render   the   verdict   that   the   charge   is   not   proved   against   him,
and so, he is entitled to the benefit of doubt. That is precisely what
has happened in these appeals .”
68. The   case   in   hand   is   not   one   of   a   confession   recorded   under
Section 15 of the TADA Act. On the language of sub­section (1) of
Section   15,   a   confession   of   an   accused   is   made   admissible
evidence   as   against   all   those   tried   jointly   with   him.   So,   it   is
implicit that  the same can  be considered against  all  those, tried
together.   In   this   view   of   the   matter   also,   Section   30   of   the
Evidence Act need not be invoked for consideration of confession
of   an   accused   against   the   co­accused,   abettor   or   conspirator
charged and tried in the same case along with the accused. The

accepted principle in law is that the confessional statement of an
accused   recorded   under   Section   15   of   the   TADA   Act   is   a
substantive   piece   of   evidence   against   his   co­accused,   provided
the   accused   concerned   are   tried   together.   This   is   the   fine
distinction   between   an   extra   judicial   confession   being   a
corroborative  piece of   evidence  and  a  confession   recorded  under
Section 15 of the TADA Act being  treated as a substantive piece
of evidence. 
DISCOVERY   OF   WEAPON   OF   OFFENCE,   CLOTHES   AND   DEAD
BODY
69. For   the   purpose   of   proving   the   discovery   of   clothes   of   the
appellant herein at his instance by drawing a panchnama under
Section   27  of  the   Evidence  Act,  the  prosecution  has  relied upon
the  evidence  of  the   PW  5 T.  Somaiah.  PW  5 in   his  examination­
in­chief has deposed as under:  
“1. I   know   the   accused   persons   who   are   present
before   the   court.   I   know   C.W.19.   About   one   year   back
myself and C.W.19 were called by the police, at that time
A1   Subramanya   was   also   there.   From   there   A1   led   us
near   the   house   of   Kamalamma.   By   the   side   of   house   of
Kamalamma there is a house of A2. Police told me that A1
is going to give the cloths, we have to be there.  By the side
of   house   of   Kamalamma   from   the   place   where   the
firewood   has   been   stored   A1   removed   one   pant   and   one
shirt   and   produced   before   the   police   and   thereafter   the
same  were  seized  by  drawing  a mahazar. Now I  see  the
said mahazar. The same is now marked as Ex.P­6. Ex.P­
6(a)   is   my   signature.   The   said   mahazar   was   drawn

between   9.30   a.m.   to   10.30   a.m.   (Now   two   covers   are
shown to the learned counsel for the accused. He has no
objection   to   open   the   same.   The   same   are   now   opened.)
They contain red colour shirt and cement colour pant. The
same are now marked as M.O.7 and 8 respectively. At the
time of seizing M.O.7 and 8 photograph is also taken. Now
I see the same. The same is now marked as Ex.P­7.”
70. For the purpose of proving the discovery of the weapon of offence,
the   prosecution   has   relied   upon   the   examination­in­chief   at   the
instance   of   the   appellant   convict   herein.   The   prosecution   has
relied upon the evidence of PW 6 Sridhar Shetty. Sridhar Shetty
in his examination­in­chief has deposed as under: 
“ 1.   I   know   the   accused   persons   who   are   present   before
the   court.   I   know   C.W.21.   On   14.12.2010   myself   and
C.W.21   were   called   by   C.W.42.   At   that   time   A1   and   A3
and   the   president   of   Panchayath   and   many   other
persons   were   also   present .   A1   and   A3   led   us   to   survey
No.121   Government   land   by   the   side   of   the   estate   of
Dinamani   and   there   they   told   that   they   are   going   to
produce the club which has been used for the purpose of
commission   of   offence   and   which   has   been   kept   in   a
bush.   Thereafter   A1   took   out   a   club   from   the   bush   and
produced before the police . Now I see the said club which
is   before   the   court.   The   same   is   now   marked   as   M.O.9.
Thereafter A3 also went by the side of the bush and from
there   he   produced   a   spade.   Now   I   see   the   said   spade.
The   same   is   now   marked   as   M.O.10.   Thereafter   M.O.9
and   10   were   seized   by   drawing   a   mahazar.   Now   I   see
the   said   mahazar.   The   same   is   now   marked   as   Ex.P­8.
Ex.P­8(a) is my signature. The said mahazar was drawn
in between 11 a.m to 11.30 a.m. At the time of drawing
the said proceedings photographs were also taken. Now
the   said   two   photographs   are   marked   as   Ex.P­9   and   P­
10 .”
71. For the purpose of proving the discovery of the dead body of the

deceased   at   the   instance   of   the   appellant   herein   and   the
acquitted   co­accused   (A­2),   the   prosecution   has   relied   upon
evidence   of   PW   7   H.T.   Yogesh.   PW   7   H.T.   Yogesh   in   his
examination­in­chief has deposed as under: 
“5.   Next   day   when   police   and   Assistant   Commissioner
came to the spot I was also called there. C.W.2 to 4 were
also   called.   There   A1   and   A3   showed   the   place   where
they had buried the body of Kamalamma to us and also
to   the   police   and   Assistant   Commissioner.   Thereafter
with   the   help   of   P.W.3   the   dead   body   of   Kamalamma
was   exhumed .   The   dead   body   was   buried   in   survey
No.121,   the   Govt.   land   by   the   side   of   a   channel   at
Horabylu.   When   the   body   was   exhumed   it   was   fully
decomposed.   Over   the   body   one   petticoat,   one   blouse
were   there.   There   the   Assistant   Commissioner   draw   the
body exhumed mahazar. Now I see the same. The same
is   already   marked   as   Ex.P­3.   Ex.P­3(b)   is   my   signature.
At that time photographs were also taken. Now the three
photos   have   been   marked   as   Ex   P­4.   Apart   from   me
C.Ws. 2 to 4 and P.W.3 also signed. 
6. On 14.12.2010 again police called me at about 2 p.m.
to   the   Police   Station.   In   the   said   police   station   A1   was
also   present.   Police   brought   C.W.24   Meeranath   and   he
produced a mobile. The said mobile was of the deceased
Kamalamma.   The   same   was   seized   in   the   presence   of
C.W.22   and   23   by   drawing   a   mahazar.   Now   I   see   the
same. The same is now marked as Ex.P­12. Ex.P­12(a) is
my   signature.   At   that   time   photo   was   also   taken.   Now
the   said   photo   is   marked   as   Ex.P­13.   I   can   identify   the
mobile   if   shown   to   me.   The   same   is   already   marked   as
M.O.4. I do not remember the cell number of my mother­
in law. She has studied upto 4th standard. 
7.   My   mother­in­law   used   to   wear   a   chain   with
Ganapathi   pendant   which   is   already   marked   as   M.O.1,
one pair of ole with blue stone in the middle surrounded
by white stones which is already marked as M.O.2, one

gold   ring   with   red   stone   which   is   already   marked   as
M.O.3. I can identify the blouse and petticoat which were
found   on   the   body   of   the   deceased.   (Now   one   sealed
cover   is   shown   to   the   learned   counsel   for   the   accused.
The   seals   are   found   intact.   He   has   no   objection   to   open
the   same.   The   same   is   now   opened).   It   contains   one
blouse   and   one   petticoat.   Witness   identifies   the   same.
The same are now marked as M.O.11 and 12.”
72. PW   8   H.   M.   Ravikanth   also   as   one   of   the   panch­witnesses   has
deposed in his examination­in­chief as under:  
“2.   On   11.12.2010   at   about   10   a.m.   C.P.I.   called   me,
C.W.2   and   3.   At   that   time   Assistant   Commissioner   was
also   present   and   A1   Subramanya   and   A3   Seetharama
Bhat   were   also   present.   From   Gadikallu   police   officials,
A.C.,   A1   and   A3   alongwith   me   and   C.W.   2   and   3   we
went   to   the   place   where   the   body   has   been   buried.   A1
took   us   to   the   said   place   where   they   had   buried   the
body. After showing the place where they had buried the
body  of  the  deceased   by  A1  with  the  help  of   P.W.3  and
A1 and A3 the body was exhumed and there we noticed
that   it   is   the   dead   body   of   Kamalamma .   The   said   body
was fully decomposed and one blouse and one petticoat
were   found   on   the   dead   body.   For   having   exhumed   the
body   a   mahazar   was   drawn   as   per   Ex.P­3.   Ex.P­3(c)   is
my   signature.   There   the   photographs   were   also   taken
about  the  proceedings. The  said  photographs  have  been
already   marked   as   Ex.P­4.   The   proceedings   was   also
videographed. Now the said C.D. is marked as M.O.13.
3. Thereafter the  inquest mahazar was also  drawn over
the   body   of   the   deceased.   Now   I   see   the   said   mahazar.
The   same   is   now   marked   as   Ex.P­14.   Ex.P­14(a)   is   my
signature.   At   the   time   of   drawing   Ex.P­14   C.W.2   and   3
were also present.
4.   Thereafter   A1   led   us   to   the   house   of   deceased
Kamalamma   and   took  us  to  the  backside  door  and  at   a
distance of 3 to 4 feet he showed the place where he has
murdered   the   deceased   Kamalamma   by   assaulting.

Thereafter A1 took us to a cattleshed at a distance of 5 to
6 feet and from there he produced a club. Now I see the
said   club.   The   club   is   marked   as   M.O.14.   Thereafter
accused   told   that   he   has   kept   the   umbrella   of   deceased
in   Theerthahalli   Kuppalli   bus   stand   above   the   bus
shelter. Thereafter A1 led  us  in a police  jeep to Kuppalli
and there after going near the bus stop A1 asked to stop
the  jeep. After alighting  from  the   jeep A1  went  and  took
out   the   umbrella   kept   on   the   roof   of   the   shelter   and
produced   the   same.   Now   I   see   the   said   umbrella.   The
said   umbrella   is   now   marked   as   M.O.15.   Now   the   spot
cum seizure mahazar of club and umbrella is confronted
to the witness. He admits his signature. The same is now
marked as Ex.P­15. Ex.P­15(a) is my signature. The said
mahazar   has   been   drawn   from   2  p.m.   to   4   p.m.   At   that
time   A3 was  also   present.  A1  who   is  present   before   the
court   is   the   same   person   who   led   us   and   produced
M.O.14 and 15 and A1 and A3 showed the place where
the  dead  body has  been buried. At  the  time  of mahazar
photographs  have  been also  taken. The  said  five  photos
are marked as Ex.P­16.”
73. PW   9   Somashekhara   (Jeweller)   in   his   examination­in­chief   has
deposed as under: 
“1.  I know A1 when he came to my shop to sell the gold.
I am having a jewellery works at Rippanpet on the road
which   leads   to   Theerthahalli.   Police   came   alongwith   A1
on   13.12.2010   at   about   7   p.m.   Alongwith   police   A1,
C.W.15/Gururaj were also there. I told the police that A1
had   come   and   sold   the   gold   in   my   shop.  I  took   the   gold
from   A1   three   and   1/2   months   prior   to   police   coming   to
my   shop   alongwith   A1.   A1   sold   one   gold   chain   with
Ganapathi pendant, one  pair of ole having blue  stone  in
the middle surrounded by white stones and one gold ring
with   red   stone.   A1   while   selling   told   that   the   said   gold
articles   belong   to   him,   as   he   is   having   financial
difficulties   in   the   family   and   he   is   also   constructing   a
house,   for   that   reason   he   is   selling   the   same.   I   paid
Rs.27,500/­ to the accused  for having purchased. Police
asked   me   to   return   the   said   articles.   Accordingly   I

returned and the same were seized by the police . C.W.15
appraised the gold articles and thereafter certified them.
At   the   time   when   the   gold   articles   were   seized   it   was
valuing   Rs.47,000/­.   Now   I   see   the   said   mahazar.   The
same   is   already   marked   as   Ex.P­1.   Ex.P­1(b)   is   my
signature.   Myself,   C.W.l3,   C.W.15   and   P.W.2   have
signed Ex.P­1. The said mahazar has been drawn from 7
p.m.   to   8.30   p.m.   I   can   identify   the   said   gold   articles
which   have   been   seized   under   Ex.P­1.   They   have   been
already   marked   as   M.Os.   1   to   3.   At   the   time   of   seizing
M.Os. 1 to 3 police also took photographs. The same are
already marked as Ex.P­2.”
74. PW 10 Ravi Shetty (one of the panch­witnesses) to the recovery of
mobile, in his examination­in­chief has deposed as under: 
“2 . On 14.12.2010 myself, C.W.23 and 24 were called to
the   Police   Station   at   about   1.30   p.m.   P.W.7   was   also
present.   C.W.24   produced   the   mobile   which   had   been
sold   by   A1   to   him.   The   said   mobile   has   been   seized   by
drawing   a   mahazar   as   per   Ex.P­12.   Ex.P­12(b)   is   my
signature . M.O.4 is the same mobile which was produced
on   that   day.   When   the   said   proceedings   took   place
photographs   were   also   taken.   Now   I   see   the   said
photographs.   They   have   been   already   marked   as   Ex.P­
13.”
75. PW   19   T.   Sanjeeva   Naik   is   the   Investigating   Officer.   In   his
examination­in­chief, he has deposed as under: 
“ 2. On 10.12.2010 at about 1.30 p.m. I received the case
file   and   took   the   further   investigation   of   this   case   from
P.W.17   and   perused   the   investigation   done   by   him.
Immediately   I   deployed   P.S.I.   and   other   staff   to   trace
about   the   accused.   C.W.   36,   37   brought   A1   and
produced before me at about 9 p.m. with a report. Now I
see the said report. The same is now marked as Ex.P­26.
Ex.P­26(a) is my signature, C.w.34 and 35 also informed
that   they   have   apprehended   A2   and   secured   and
produced before me with a report at about 9 p.m. Now I

see the said report. The same is now marked as Ex.P­27.
Ex.P­27(a)   is   my   signature.   P.W.17   and   C.W.38
apprehended A3 and produced before me at about 9 p.m.
on   the   same   day   with   a   report.   The   report   has   been
already   marked   as   Ex.P­23.   Ex.P­23(b)   is   my   signature.
Immediately   I   interrogated   the   accused   persons   and
recorded   their   voluntary   statement.   A1   volunteered   that
he   had   committed   the   murder   of   deceased   Kamalamma
and   to   produce   the   club,   mobile,   spade,   another   club
which   had   been   used   for   transportation   of   dead   body
and the ornaments which were taken over from the dead
body .   Now   the   relevant   portion   the   voluntary   statement
of   A1   is   marked   as   Ex.P­28.  Ex.P­28(a)  is   my  signature.
A2   and   A3   also   volunteered   to   show   the   place   where
they   had   buried   the   dead   body.   The   said   voluntary
statements have been recorded in the presence of C.W.2,
3   and   P.W.8.   I   also   sent   immediately   a   requisition   to
P.w.15 to come as a Sub­Divisional Magistrate to exhume
the body of deceased Kamalamma.
3.   On   11.12.2010   P.W.   15   in   the   presence   of   panch
witnesses as shown by A1 and A3 he exhumed the body
of   deceased   in   the   presence   of   P.W.7,   P.W.8,   P.W.3,
C.W.2   and   3.   For   having   exhumed   the   body   a   mahazar
was   also   drawn   as   per   Ex.P­3.   Ex.   P­3(e)   is   my
signature.   There   the   photographs   were   taken   as   per
Ex.P­4. In the presence of above  said  panch witnesses  I
also   drew   the   inquest   mahazar   as   per   Ex.P­14.   Ex.P­
14(b)   is   my   signature.   At   the   time   of   inquest   I   recorded
the statement of C.W.5, 6, P.W.1, C.W.8, P.W.2, C.W.10,
P.W.3 and C.W.12. Thereafter through C.W.39 I sent the
body   to   Govt.   Hospital,   Koppa   for   post­mortem   with   a
requisition. I also requested to collect the material to send
for   D.N.A.   test   from   the   body.   Subsequently   A1   led   us
and   showed   the   place   where   he   has   committed   the
offence and there in the presence of C.W. 2, 3 and P.W.8
I   drew   the   spot   cum   seizure   mahazar   as   per   Ex.P­15.
ExP­15(b) is my signature. At the time of drawing Ex.P­15
he   also   produced   M.O.14.   Thereafter   he   led   us   to
Kuppalli   bus   stop   and   there   he   produced   the   umbrella
from   the   shelter   of   the   said   bus   stand.   The   umbrella   is
already marked as M.O.15. I seized M.O.15 under Ex.P­

15.   I  also   took  the   photographs   of∙  the   proceedings.   The
said   five   photographs   have   been   marked   as   Ex.P­16.
Thereafter   I   came   back   alongwith   accused   and   seized
articles   and   subjected   the   seized   articles   to
P.F.No.73/2010.   I   also   produced   A1   and   A3   before   the
court   and   took   them   to   police   custody.   I   produced   A2
before the court with remand application. 
4.  On  13.12.2010  I secured   P.W.2,  C.W.13  and  C.W.15.
Thereafter   A1   led   us   to   Rippanpet   to   the   Someshwara
Jewellery   works   shop   i.e.,   the   shop   of   P.W.9.   A1   asked
P.W.9 to produce M.Os. 1 to 3. As per the request of the
accused   he   produced   M.Os.   1   to   3   which   has   been
pledged with him. He produced M.Os. 1 to 3 and I seized
them   by   drawing   a   mahazar   as   per   Ex.P­1.   Ex.P­1(c)   is
my signature. I also took the photographs as per Ex.P­2. I
have   also   videographed   the   said   proceedings.   I   came
back   to   the   Police   Station   with   seized   property   and
subjected   the   seized   articles   to   P.F.No.74/2010.   I   also
recorded the statement of P.W.9 and C.W.15. I also kept
A1 in police custody. 
5.   On   14.12.2010   I   secured   P.W.4   and   C.w.17   and
thereafter A3 led us to his house at Kiranakere and there
he produced the M.O. 5 and 6 and there I seized them by
drawing   a   mahazar   as   per   Ex.P­5.   Ex.P­5(b)   is   my
signature.   I   also   took   the   photographs.   Now   I   see   the
said   two   photographs.   The   same   are   now   marked   as
Ex.P­29.   There   I   secured   P.W.5   and   C.W.19   and
thereafter   A1   led   us   to   the   house   of   A2   and   from   the
firestag   he   produced   M.O.7   and   8   and   there   I   seized
them   by   drawing   a   mahazar   as   per   Ex.P­6.   Ex.P­6(b)   is
my signature. I also took the photographs as per Ex.P­7.
Thereafter   A1   and   A3   led   us   to   the   place   where   they
have hidden M.O.9 and 10 and they went near the side
of bush at Government land Survey No.121 at Hirekodige
village and by going inside the bush A1 produced M.O.9
and   A3   produced   M.O.10.   The   same   were   seized   by
drawing   a   mahazar   as   per   Ex.P­8.   Ex.P­8(b)   is   my
signature. There I also took the photographs as per Ex.P­
9 and  P­10. Thereafter I came  back  to  the  Police  Station
alongwith   A1   and   A3   and   seized   articles   and   subjected

the seized articles to P.F.No.75/2010 to 77/2010. On the
same   day,   as   per   my   direction   my   constable   C.W.36
secured   P.W.16   to   the   Police   Station.   I   secured   P.W.10
and   C.W.23   and   P.W.16   produced   the   mobile   M.O.4
which   is   said   to   have   been   sold   by   A1   to   him   and   the
same was seized by drawing a mahazar as per Ex.P­12.
Ex.P­12(d)   is   my   signature.   PW.16   also   identified   A1   by
saying   that   he   is   the   person   who   sold   M.O.4   to   him.   At
the   time   of   proceedings   P.W.7   was   also   present.   I   also
took   the   photographs   as   per   Ex.P­13.   Thereafter   I
subjected   M.O.4   to   P.F.No.78/2010.   I   also   recorded   the
statement   of   P.W.16,   further   statement   of   C.W.5,   C.W.6,
P.W.1,   C.W.8   and   C.W.25.   I   also   produced   A1   and   A3
before the court with remand application.”
76. Keeping   in   mind   the   aforesaid   evidence,   we   proceed   to   consider
whether the prosecution has been able to prove and establish the
discoveries in accordance with law.  Section 27 of the Evidence Act
reads thus:
“ 27.   How   much   of   information   received   from
accused may be proved.—
Provided that, when any fact is deposed to as discovered
in   consequence   of   information   received   from   a   person
accused of any offence, in the custody of a police officer,
so   much   of   such   information,   whether   it   amounts   to   a
confession or not, as relates distinctly to the fact thereby
discovered, may be proved.”
77. The first and the basic infirmity in the evidence of all the aforesaid
prosecution witnesses is that none of them have deposed the exact
statement  said  to  have  been  made by   the  appellant  herein  which
ultimately led to the discovery of a fact relevant under Section 27

of the Evidence Act. 
78. If,   it   is   say   of   the   investigating   officer   that   the   accused   appellant
while   in   custody   on   his   own   free   will   and   volition   made   a
statement   that   he   would   lead   to   the   place   where   he   had   hidden
the weapon of offence, the site of burial of the dead body, clothes
etc., then the first thing that the investigating officer should have
done   was   to   call   for   two   independent   witnesses   at   the   police
station itself. Once the two independent witnesses would arrive at
the police station thereafter in their presence the accused should
be   asked   to   make   an   appropriate   statement   as   he   may   desire   in
regard   to   pointing   out   the   place   where   he   is   said   to   have   hidden
the   weapon   of   offence   etc.   When   the   accused   while   in   custody
makes   such   statement   before   the   two   independent   witnesses
(panch­witnesses)   the   exact   statement   or   rather   the   exact   words
uttered by the accused should be incorporated in the first part of
the   panchnama   that   the   investigating   officer   may   draw   in
accordance   with   law.   This   first   part   of   the   panchnama   for   the
purpose of Section 27 of the Evidence Act is always drawn at the
police  station  in  the  presence  of the independent  witnesses so  as
to   lend   credence   that   a   particular   statement   was   made   by   the
accused   expressing   his   willingness   on   his   own   free   will   and
volition to point out the place where the weapon of offence or any

other   article   used   in   the   commission   of   the   offence   had   been
hidden.   Once   the   first   part   of   the   panchnama   is   completed
thereafter   the   police   party   along   with   the   accused   and   the   two
independent   witnesses   (panch­witnesses)   would   proceed   to   the
particular   place   as   may   be   led   by   the   accused.   If   from   that
particular   place   anything   like   the   weapon   of   offence   or   blood
stained clothes or any other article is discovered then that part of
the entire process would form the second part of the panchnama.
This   is   how   the   law   expects   the   investigating   officer   to   draw   the
discovery   panchnama   as   contemplated   under   Section   27   of   the
Evidence   Act.   If   we   read   the   entire   oral   evidence   of   the
investigating officer then it is clear that the same is deficient in all
the aforesaid relevant aspects of the matter.
79. In   the   aforesaid   context,   we   may   refer   to   and   rely   upon   the
decision of this Court in the case of   Murli and Another v. State
of Rajasthan  reported in (2009) 9 SCC 417, held as under:
“ 34.     The   contents   of   the   panchnama   are   not   the
substantive   evidence.   The   law   is   settled   on   that   issue.
What is substantive evidence is what has been stated by
the panchas or the person concerned in the witness box.
…… ”          [ Emphasis supplied]
80.  One   another   serious   infirmity   which   has   surfaced   is   in   regard   to
the authorship of concealment by  the person who is said to have

discovered the weapon.
81.  The   conditions  necessary   for   the   applicability   of   Section   27   of   the
Act are   broadly   as   under: ­
(1) Discovery   of   fact   in   consequence   of   an   information   received
from accused; 
(2) Discovery of such fact to be deposed to;
(3)  The   accused   must   be   in   police   custody   when   he   gave
      information; and
(4)   So   much   of   information   as   relates   distinctly   to   the   fact   thereby
discovered is admissible –  Mohmed Inayatullah v. The State
of Maharashtra : AIR (1976) SC 483 
Two conditions for application: –  
(1) information   must   be   such   as   has   caused   discovery   of   the   fact;
and  
(2) information   must   relate   distinctly   to   the   fact   discovered   ­
Earabhadrappa  v. State of Karnataka : AIR (1983) SC 446.
82.  We   may   refer   to   and   rely   upon   a   Constitution   Bench   decision   of
this   Court   in   the   case   of   State   of   Uttar   Pradesh   v.   Deoman
Upadhyaya   reported in AIR (1960) SC 1125, wherein, Paragraph
71   explains   the   position   of   law   as   regards   the   Section   27   of   the
Evidence Act:
“71.   The   law   has   thus   made   a   classification   of   accused
persons into two: (1) those who have the danger brought
home   to   them   by   detention   on   a   charge;   and   (2)   those
who   are   yet   free.   In   the   former   category   are   also   those
persons   who   surrender   to   the   custody   by   words   or
action.   The   protection   given   to   these   two   classes   is
different.   In   the   case   of   persons   belonging   to   the   first
category the law has ruled that their statements are not
admissible, and in the case of the second category, only
that   portion,   of   the   statement   is   admissible   as   is
guaranteed by the discovery of a relevant fact unknown

before   the   statement   to   the   investigating   authority.   That
statement  may even be confessional in nature, as  when
the   person   in   custody   says:   “I   pushed   him   down   such
and such mineshaft”, and the body of the victim is found
as a result, and it can be proved that his death was due
to injuries received by a fall down the mineshaft .”
  [Emphasis supplied]
83.  The   scope   and   ambit   of   Section   27   of   the   Evidence   Act   were
illuminatingly   stated   in   Pulukuri   Kottaya   and   Others   v.
Emperor ,   AIR  1947  PC  67,  which  have  become   locus   classicus ,
in the following words:
" 10.   ….It   is   fallacious   to   treat   the   “fact   discovered”
within   the   section   as   equivalent   to   the   object   produced;
the   fact   discovered   embraces   the   place   from   which   the
object is produced and the knowledge of the accused as
to this, and the information given must relate distinctly to
this fact. Information as to past user, or the past history,
of   the   object   produced   is   not   related   to   its   discovery   in
the setting in which it is discovered. Information supplied
by   a   person   in   custody   that   “I   will   produce   a   knife
concealed   in   the   roof   of   my   house”   does   not   lead   to   the
discovery of a knife; knives were discovered many years
ago.   It   leads   to   the   discovery   of   the   fact   that   a   knife   is
concealed   in   the   house   of   the   informant   to   his
knowledge, and if the knife is proved to have been used
in   the   commission   of   the   offence,   the   fact   discovered   is
very relevant. But if to the statement the words be added
“with   which   I   stabbed   A"   these   words   are   inadmissible
since   they   do   not   relate   to   the   discovery   of   the   knife   in
the house of the informant." 
84.  What   emerges   from   the   evidence   of   the   investigating   officer   is
that   the   accused   appellant   stated   before   him   while   he   was   in
custody,   “ I   may   get   discovered   the   murder   weapon   used   in   the

incident ”.   This   statement   does   not   indicate   or   suggest   that   the
accused   appellant   indicated   anything   about   his   involvement   in
the   concealment   of   the   weapon.   It   is   a   vague   statement.   Mere
discovery   cannot   be   interpreted   as   sufficient   to   infer   authorship
of   concealment   by   the   person   who   discovered   the   weapon.   He
could have derived knowledge of the existence of that weapon at
the   place   through   some   other   source   also.   He   might   have   even
seen  somebody   concealing   the weapon, and,  therefore,  it cannot
be   presumed   or   inferred   that   because   a   person   discovered   the
weapon, he was the person who had concealed it, least it can be
presumed   that   he   used   it.   Therefore,   even   if   discovery   by   the
appellant   is   accepted,   what   emerges   from   the   substantive
evidence as regards the discovery of weapon is that the appellant
disclosed   that   he   would   show   the   weapon   used   in   the
commission of offence. 
85.  In  Dudh Nath Pandey v. State of U.P.,  AIR (1981) SC 911 ,  this
Court   observed   that   the   evidence   of   discovery   of   pistol   at   the
instance   of   the   appellant   cannot,   by   itself,   prove   that   he   who
pointed out the weapon wielded it in the offence. The statement
accompanying   the   discovery   was   found   to   be   vague   to   identify
the authorship of concealment and it was held that pointing out
of the weapon may, at the best, prove the appellant’s knowledge

as to where the weapon was kept. 
86.  Thus,   in   the   absence   of   exact   words,   attributed   to   an   accused
person,   as   statement   made   by   him   being   deposed   by   the
investigating officer in his evidence, and also without proving the
contents of the panchnama, the High Court was not justified in
placing reliance upon the circumstance of discovery of weapon. 
87.  In   the   aforesaid   context,   we   may   also   refer   to   a   decision   of   this
Court in the  case of   Bodhraj  alias   Bodha  and  Others  v.  State
of Jammu and Kashmir  reported in (2002) 8 SCC 45, as under:
“ 18.   …..It   would   appear   that   under   Section   27   as   it
stands   in   order   to   render   the   evidence   leading   to
discovery   of   any   fact   admissible,   the   information   must
come   from   any   accused   in   custody   of   the   police.   The
requirement   of   police   custody   is   productive   of   extremely
anomalous   results   and   may   lead   to   the   exclusion   of
much valuable evidence in cases where a person, who is
subsequently   taken   into   custody   and   becomes   an
accused,   after   committing   a   crime   meets   a   police   officer
or   voluntarily   goes   to   him   or   to   the   police   station   and
states   the   circumstances   of   the   crime   which   lead   to   the
discovery   of   the   dead   body,   weapon   or   any   other
material   fact,   in   consequence   of   the   information   thus
received   from   him.   This   information   which   is   otherwise
admissible becomes inadmissible under Section 27 if the
information did not come from a person in the custody of
a   police   officer   or   did   come   from   a   person   not   in   the
custody   of   a   police   officer.   The   statement   which   is
admissible   under   Section   27   is   the   one   which   is   the
information   leading   to   discovery.   Thus,   what   is
admissible   being   the   information,   the   same   has   to   be
proved   and   not   the   opinion   formed   on   it   by   the   police
officer. In other words, the exact information given by the
accused   while   in   custody   which   led   to   recovery   of   the

articles   has   to   be   proved.   It   is,   therefore,   necessary   for
the benefit  of both the  accused  and  the  prosecution that
information   given   should   be   recorded   and   proved   and   if
not   so   recorded,  the  exact   information  must  be   adduced
through   evidence.   The   basic   idea   embedded   in   Section
27 of the Evidence Act is the doctrine of confirmation by
subsequent   events.   The   doctrine   is   founded   on   the
principle that if any fact is discovered as a search made
on   the   strength   of   any   information   obtained   from   a
prisoner,   such   a   discovery   is   a   guarantee   that   the
information   supplied   by   the   prisoner   is   true .   The
information   might   be   confessional   or   non­inculpatory   in
nature but if it results in discovery of a fact, it becomes a
reliable   information.   It   is   now   well   settled   that   recovery
of   an   object   is   not   discovery   of   fact   envisaged   in   the
section.   Decision   of   the   Privy   Council   in   Pulukuri
Kottaya   v.   Emperor   [AIR 1947 PC 67 : 48 Cri LJ 533 : 74
IA   65]   is   the   most­quoted   authority   for   supporting   the
interpretation that the “fact discovered” envisaged in the
section   embraces   the   place   from   which   the   object   was
produced, the knowledge of the accused as to it, but the
information   given   must   relate   distinctly   to   that   effect.
(See   State   of   Maharashtra   v.   Damu   Gopinath
Shinde   [(2000) 6 SCC 269 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 1088 : 2000
Cri LJ 2301] .) No doubt, the information permitted to be
admitted   in   evidence   is   confined   to   that   portion   of   the
information   which   “distinctly   relates   to   the   fact   thereby
discovered”. But the information to get admissibility need
not   be   so   truncated   as   to   make   it   insensible   or
incomprehensible.   The   extent   of   information   admitted
should   be   consistent   with   understandability.   Mere
statement   that   the   accused   led   the   police   and   the
witnesses   to   the   place   where   he   had   concealed   the
articles is not indicative of the information given .”
                 [Emphasis supplied]
88.  Mr.   V.N.   Raghupathy,   the   learned   counsel   for   the   State   would
submit   that   even   while   discarding   the   evidence   in   the   form   of
various discovery panchnamas the conduct of the appellant herein

would   be   relevant   under   Section   8   of   the   Evidence   Act.   The
evidence   of   discovery   would   be   admissible   as   conduct   under
Section 8 of the Evidence Act quite apart from the admissibility of
the disclosure statement under Section 27 of the said Act, as this
Court   observed   in   A.N.   Venkatesh   and   Another   v.   State   of
Karnataka , (2005) 7 SCC 714:
“ 9.   By virtue of Section 8 of the Evidence Act, the conduct
of   the   accused   person   is   relevant,   if   such   conduct
influences or is influenced by any fact in issue or relevant
fact.   The   evidence   of   the   circumstance,   simpliciter,   that
the   accused   pointed   out   to   the   police   officer,   the   place
where   the   dead   body   of   the   kidnapped   boy   was   found
and  on their pointing out  the body was  exhumed, would
be   admissible  as  conduct  under  Section  8 irrespective   of
the   fact   whether   the   statement   made   by   the   accused
contemporaneously   with   or   antecedent   to   such   conduct
falls   within   the   purview   of   Section   27   or   not   as   held   by
this   Court   in        Prakash   Chand        v.        State   (Delhi
Admn.)        [(1979) 3 SCC 90 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 656 : AIR 1979
SC   400]   .   Even   if   we   hold   that   the   disclosure   statement
made by the accused­appellants (Exts. P­15 and P­16) is
not admissible under Section 27 of the Evidence Act, still
it is relevant under Section 8…..”   
[Emphasis supplied]
89.  In   the   aforesaid   context,   we   would   like   to   sound   a   note   of
caution.   Although   the   conduct   of   an   accused   may   be   a   relevant
fact under   Section 8   of the Evidence Act, yet the same, by itself,
cannot   be   a   ground   to   convict   him   or   hold   him   guilty   and   that
too,   for   a   serious   offence   like   murder.   Like   any   other   piece   of

evidence,   the   conduct   of   an   accused   is   also   one   of   the
circumstances which the   court may take into consideration along
with the other evidence on record, direct or indirect. What we are
trying to convey is that the conduct of the accused alone, though
may be relevant under   Section 8   of the Evidence Act, cannot form
the basis of conviction.  
MOTIVE
90. The   High   Court   has   relied   upon   the   strong   motive   for   the
appellant convict to commit the crime as one of the incriminating
circumstances. 
91. In   the   case   of   Sampath   Kumar   v.   Inspector   of   Police,
Krishnagiri ,   (2012)   4   SCC   124,   decided   on   02.03.2012,   this
Court held as under:
“ 29.   In   N.J.   Suraj   v.   State   [(2004)   11   SCC   346   :   2004
SCC   (Cri)   Supp   85]   the   prosecution   case   was   based
entirely   upon   circumstantial   evidence   and   a   motive.
Having   discussed   the   circumstances   relied   upon   by   the
prosecution, this Court rejected the motive which was the
only   remaining   circumstance   relied   upon   by   the
prosecution stating that the presence of a motive was not
enough   for   supporting   a   conviction,   for   it   is   well   settled
that the chain of circumstances should be such as to lead
to an irresistible conclusion, that is incompatible with the
innocence of the accused.

30.   To   the   same   effect   is   the   decision   of   this   Court
in   Santosh   Kumar   Singh   v.   State   [(2010)   9   SCC   747   :
(2010)   3   SCC   (Cri)   1469]   and   Rukia   Begum   v.   State   of
Karnataka   [(2011)  4 SCC  779  : (2011)  2  SCC  (Cri)  488  :
AIR   2011   SC   1585]   where   this   Court   held   that   motive
alone in the absence of any other circumstantial evidence
would   not   be   sufficient   to   convict   the   appellant .
Reference may also be made to the decision of this Court
in   Sunil   Rai   v.   UT,   Chandigarh   [(2011)   12   SCC   258   :
(2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 543 : AIR 2011 SC 2545] . This Court
explained   the   legal   position   as   follows:   (Sunil   Rai
case   [(2011)   12   SCC   258   :   (2012)   1   SCC   (Cri)   543   :   AIR
2011 SC 2545] , SCC p. 266, paras 31­32)
“31.   …   In   any   event,   motive   alone   can   hardly   be   a
ground for conviction.
32.   On   the   materials   on   record,   there   may   be   some
suspicion   against   the   accused,   but   as   is   often   said,
suspicion,   howsoever   strong,   cannot   take   the   place   of
proof.”
31.   Suffice it to say although, according to the appellants
the   question   of   the   appellant   Velu   having   the   motive   to
harm   the   deceased   Senthil   for   falling   in   love   with   his
sister, Usha did not survive once the family had decided
to   offer   Usha   in   matrimony   to   the   deceased   Senthil.   Yet
even   assuming   that   the   appellant   Velu   had   not
reconciled   to   the   idea   of   Usha   getting   married   to   the
deceased   Senthil,   all   that   can   be   said   was   that   the
appellant   Velu   had   a   motive   for   physically   harming   the
deceased.   That   may   be   an   important   circumstance   in   a
case   based   on   circumstantial   evidence   but   cannot   take
the   place   of   conclusive   proof   that   the   person   concerned
was the author of the crime. One could even say that the
presence of motive in the facts and circumstances of the
case creates a strong suspicion against the appellant but
suspicion, howsoever strong, also cannot be a substitute
for   proof   of   the   guilt   of   the   accused   beyond   reasonable
doubt .”

       [Emphasis supplied]
92.  Thus,   even   if   it   is   believed   that   the   accused   appellant   had   a
motive   to   commit   the   crime,   the   same   may   be   an   important
circumstance   in   a   case   based   on   circumstantial   evidence   but
cannot   take   the   place   as   a   conclusive   proof   that   the   person
concerned was the author of the crime. One could even say that
the presence of motive in the facts and circumstances of the case
creates   a   strong   suspicion   against   the   accused   appellant   but
suspicion,  howsoever   strong,  cannot   be  a  substitute   for   proof  of
the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The trial court
rightly disbelieved motive to commit the crime as the evidence in
this regard is absolutely hearsay in nature.
 
93.  The fact that we have ruled out the circumstances relating to the
making   of   an   extra   judicial   confession   and   the   discovery   of   the
weapon of offence etc. as not having been established, the chain
of   circumstantial   evidence   snaps   so   badly   that   to   consider   any
other circumstance, even like motive, would not be necessary.
94. Thus, in view of the aforesaid discussion, we have reached to the
conclusion that the evidence of discovery of the weapon, clothes
and   dead   body   of   the   deceased   at   the   instance   of   the   appellant
convict   herein   can   hardly   be   treated   as   legal   evidence,   more

particularly, considering the various legal infirmities in the same.
95. For all the foregoing reasons, we have reached to the conclusion
that   the   High   Court   committed   error   in   holding   the   appellant
convict herein guilty of the offence of murder. 
96. In   the   result,   this   appeal   succeeds   and   is   hereby   allowed.   The
impugned   judgment   and   order   of   conviction   passed   by   the   High
Court is hereby set aside. 
97. The   appellant   convict   shall   be   set   at   liberty   forthwith,   if   not
required in any other case. 
98. Pending application, if any, also stands disposed of.
..…….……………… CJI.
(UDAY UMESH LALIT) 
………………..……….J.
(J.B. PARDIWALA)
New Delhi;
Date: October 13, 2022.

ITEM NO.1504               COURT NO.9               SECTION II-C
(For Judgment)
               S U P R E M E  C O U R T  O F  I N D I A
                       RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
Criminal Appeal No. 242/2022
SUBRAMANYA                                         Appellant(s)
                                VERSUS
THE STATE OF KARNATAKA                             Respondent(s)
(IA No.17205/2022-CONDONATION OF DELAY IN FILING and IA 
No.17206/2022-EXEMPTION FROM FILING C/C OF THE IMPUGNED JUDGMENT 
and IA No.17207/2022-GRANT OF BAIL )
 
Date : 13-10-2022 This appeal was called on for pronouncement of 
    judgment today.
For Appellant(s) Mr. Krishna Pal Singh, AOR
Mr. Seemab Qayyum, Adv.
Ms. Anvita Aprajita, Adv.
Mr. Madhavendra Singh, Adv.
Mr. Mohan Singh Bais, Adv.
                   
For Respondent(s) Mr. V. N. Raghupathy, AOR
  Mr. Md. Apzal Ansari, Adv.
Mr. Parikshit P. Angadi, Adv.   
          
Hon’ble  Mr. Justice  J. B.  Pardiwala,    pronounced the  judgment
of the Bench comprising Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India and His
Lordship.
T his   appeal   succeeds   and   is   hereby   allowed   in   terms   of   the
signed reportable judgment.
The   impugned   judgment   and   order   of   conviction   passed   by   the
High Court is hereby set aside. 
The   appellant   convict   shall   be   set   at   liberty   forthwith,   if
not required in any other case. 
Pending application, if any, also stands disposed of.
(SNEHA DAS)                                (RANJANA SHAILEY)
SENIOR PERSONAL ASSISTANT                       COURT MASTER (NSH)
(Signed reportable judgment is placed on the file)