/2022 INSC 0919/
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1791 OF 2022
(Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl) No.351 of 2021)
MANOJ KUMAR TIWARI                                       … APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
MANISH SISODIA & ORS.                                   …RESPONDENT(S)
With
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1790 OF 2022
(@ Special Leave Petition (Crl) No.658 of 2021)
J U D G M E N T
V. Ramasubramanian, J.
Leave granted.
2. The   order   of   summoning   issued   by   the   Additional   Chief
Metropolitan   Magistrate­I,   Rouse   Avenue   Courts,   New   Delhi,   in   a
criminal   complaint   of   defamation   filed   by   Respondent   No.1   herein
against   six   individuals,   was   challenged   before   the   High   Court
unsuccessfully,   by   persons   arrayed   as   Accused   Nos.1   and   5   and
hence both of them have come up with the above Criminal Appeals.
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3. We have heard Shri R. Venkataramani and Ms. Pinky  Anand,
learned   senior   counsel   appearing   for   the   appellants   and   Dr.
Abhishek   Manu   Singhvi,   learned   senior   counsel,   as   well   as   Shri
Shadan Farasat, learned counsel appearing for Respondent No.1
4. On   19.07.2019,   Respondent   No.1   herein   filed   a   complaint
under   Section   200   of   the   Code   of   Criminal   Procedure,   1973
( hereinafter referred to as ‘Cr.P.C’ ) against six individuals, on the file
of   the   Additional   Chief   Metropolitan   Magistrate­I,   Rouse   Avenue
Courts,   New   Delhi,   alleging   commission   of   the   offences   under
Sections   499   and   500   read   with   Sections   34   and   35   of   the   Indian
Penal Code ( hereinafter referred to as ‘IPC’ ). The case of Respondent
No.1   in   his   complaint   was,   that   he   has   been   the   Deputy   Chief
Minister   of   Delhi   since   February   2015;   that   on   01.07.2019,   Shri
Manoj Tiwari, ( A­1 who is the   appellant in one of these appeals ) held
a   Press   Conference   making   false   and   defamatory   statements   as
though   the   complainant   was   involved   in   corruption   to   the   tune   of
Rs.   2000   crores,   in   the   matter   of   award   of   contracts   for   building
classrooms   in   Delhi   Government   Schools;   that   persons   arrayed   as
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Accused Nos. 2 to 4 in the said complaint, shared   the platform with
the   said   Shri   Manoj   Tiwari,   during   the   Press   Conference   and   they
also   uttered   the   same   defamation   statements;   that   Shri   Vijender
Gupta, arrayed as Accused No.5 in the complaint ( appellant in one
of   these   appeals )   tweeted   defamatory   contents   against   the
complainant; and  that  the person named as Respondent No.6 in the
complaint   also   made   defamatory   statements   in   his   tweets.
According   to   Respondent   No.1   herein   ( the   complainant ),   all   the
accused  persons  acted  with  common   intent  and   in  a  well­thought­
out   and   planned   manner   to   defame   him,   thereby   rendering
themselves liable for prosecution.
5. After   recording   the   statements   of   Respondent   No.1   and   two
independent   witnesses,   in   the   inquiry   under   Section   202(1)   of   the
Cr.P.C   and   after   taking   note   of   the   documents   produced   by
Respondent   No.1,   the   learned   Additional   Chief   Metropolitan
Magistrate   passed   an   Order   on   28­11­2019   directing   the   issue   of
summons   to   all   the   six   accused,   after   holding   that   there   exists
sufficient grounds to proceed against the accused Nos.1 to 4 under
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Section   500   IPC   read   with   Section   34   IPC   and   against   accused
Nos.5 and 6 under Section 500 IPC.
6. The appellants herein ( who were cited as accused Nos.1 and 5
respectively ) challenged the order of summoning by way of petitions
under   Section   482   of   the   Cr.P.C,   before   the   High   Court   of   Delhi.
The   High   Court   dismissed   the   petitions,   forcing   the   appellants   to
come up with the above appeals. 
7. Though the petitions filed by the appellants under Section 482
of the Code were dismissed by the High Court of Delhi by a common
order,   the   cases   of   both   of   them   are   not   exactly   the   same.   Shri
Manoj Kumar Tiwari (A­1), the appellant in one of these appeals, is
accused   along   with   Accused   Nos.   2   to   4   of   committing   the   offence
punishable   under   Section   500   read   with   Section   34   IPC.   But   Shri
Vijender   Gupta   (A­5)   is   accused   of   committing   an   offence
punishable   under   Section   500   IPC   alone.   In   paragraph   14   of   the
summoning   order   dated   28.11.2019,   learned   Additional   Chief
Metropolitan Magistrate has recorded the following opinion:
“Further the exhortation by the respondents as to sharing
of   the  statements   and  holding   a  joint   conference   together
also strengthens the inference of common intention of the
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respondent   no.1,2,3   and   4.   As  far  as   the  tweets   made   by
respondent   no.5   and   6   concerned   that   have   been   made
after   few   hours   of   the   Press   Conference   held   by   the
respondent   no.1   to   4,   hence,   the   act   of   respondent   no.5
and   6   cannot   said   to   be   done   with   common   intention
along   with   other   respondents   rather   they   are   individual
acts of defamation.”
8. Keeping in mind the above distinction between the case of Shri
Manoj   Kumar   Tiwari   and   the   case   of   Shri   Vijender   Gupta,   let   us
now   proceed   to   consider   the   grounds   on   which   the   summoning
order is challenged by these appellants.
9. The   only   ground   on   which   accused   No.1   assails   the   order   of
summoning   is   that   the   Court   ought   not   to   have   entertained   a
private   complaint   under   Section   200   Cr.P.C   especially   from   a
person covered by Section 199(2) of the Code, without following the
procedure prescribed in sub­section (4) of Section 199.
10. Accused No.5 who is appellant in the other appeal assails the
order   of   summoning   on   three   grounds   namely,   (i)   that   the
respondent   No.1   ought   to   have   followed   the   special   procedure
prescribed  in  Section  199(4) of   the  Code  of  Criminal   Procedure,  as
he   happens   to   be   a   Minister   of   a   Union   Territory;   (ii)   that   the
transcript of the tweets attributed to him were not accompanied by
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a   valid   certificate   in   terms   of   Section   65B   of   the   Indian   Evidence
Act; and  (iii)  that in any case the tweets made by him  per se  do not
make   out   a   case   of   defamation   in   terms   of   Section   499   IPC,
punishable under Section 500 IPC. 
11. Reliance   is   placed   by   the   learned   counsel   for   the   appellants
mainly on the decisions of this Court in  P.C Joshi and Another  vs.
State   of   Uttar   Pradesh 1
;   Subramanian   Swamy   vs.   Union   of
India 2
;   and   K.K.   Mishra   vs.   State   of   Madhya   Pradesh   and
Another 3
.   The   contention   of   the   learned   senior   counsel   for   the
appellants   is   that   certain   consequences   are   prescribed   in   Section
237   of   the   Code,   if   it   is   a   case   of   malicious   prosecution   initiated
under   Section   199(2)   and   that   the   attempt   of   Respondent   No.1   to
bypass the special procedure prescribed in Section 199(2) is with a
view to escape the consequences of Section 237 of the Code.
12. Defending   the   summoning   order   passed   by   the   Additional
Chief   Metropolitan   Magistrate   and   the   order   of   the   High   Court
dismissing   the   challenge   to   the   same,   it   is   contended   by   Dr.   A.M.
1   AIR 1961 SC 387
2   (2016) 7 SCC 221
3   (2018) 6 SCC 676
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Singhvi   that   what   is   prescribed   by   Section   199(2)   of   the   Code   is   a
special   procedure,   which   does   not   exclude   the   general   procedure
prescribed   under   Section   199(6)   and   that   the   right   of   a   public
servant,   as   an   individual,   to   prosecute   a   person   for   defamation,   is
guaranteed   by   Section   199(6),   to   which   the   provisions   of   sub­
section (2) of Section 199 have no application. Our attention is also
drawn to the 41 st
  Report of the Law Commission of India which led
to   Section   198B   of   the   Code   of   Criminal   Procedure,   1898
undergoing   sweeping   changes   in   the   Code   of   Criminal   Procedure,
1973.
13. We have carefully considered the rival submissions. In order to
understand   the   scope   and   ambit   of   the   two   different   procedures
prescribed in Section 199 of the Code, it may be necessary to have a
look   at   the   legislative   history   of   these   provisions.   Unfortunately,
there   emerges   two   versions   of   this   history,   one   from   the
amendments made to the Code of 1898 in the years 1943, 1955 and
1964   and   the   Code   of   1973   and   the   other   emerging   from   the   41 st
Report of the Law Commission. We shall take note of both versions
of history. 
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Legislative History of Section 199 (and 198, to be precise)
Milestone ­1 (year 1898)
14. Section   198   of   the   Code   of   Criminal   Procedure,   1898,   as   it
originally   stood   in   the   Code   of   Criminal   Procedure,   1898   read   as
follows:­
“198.   No   Court   shall   take   cognizance   of   an   offence
falling under Chapter XIX or Chapter XXI of the Indian
Penal   Code   or   under   sections   493   to   496   (both
inclusive)   of   the   same   Code,   except   upon   a   complaint
made by some person aggrieved by such offence”   
Milestone­2 (year 1943)
15. By Criminal Procedure (Second Amendment)   Act,   1943,   a
proviso  was added to Section 198, to the following effect:
“Provided   that,   where   the   person   so   aggrieved   is   a
woman who, according to the customs and manners of
the   country,   ought   not   to   be   compelled   to   appear   in
public,   or   where   such   person   is   under   the   age   of
eighteen   years   or   is   an   idiot   or   lunatic,   or   is   from
sickness   or   infirmity   unable   to   make   a   complaint,
some   other   person   may,   with   the   leave   of   the   Court,
make a complaint on his or her behalf.” 
Milestone­3 (Constitution of Law Commission)
16. After  India attained independence, suggestions were made for
the   appointment   of   a   Law   Commission   for   examining   the   Central
Acts. Initially, a Resolution was moved in the Constituent Assembly
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on   December   2,   1947   recommending   the   establishment   of   a
Statutory   Law   Revision   Committee.   However,   the   Resolution   was
withdrawn   upon   an   assurance   given   by   the   then   Law   Minister   Dr.
Ambedkar,   to   constitute   a   permanent   Law   Commission   to   revise
and   codify   the   laws.   Eventually,   the   Lok   Sabha   resolved   on
November 19, 1954, to constitute a Law Commission to recommend
revision   and   modernization   of   laws,   both   substantive   and
procedural   and   in   particular,   the   Civil   and   Criminal   Procedure
Codes.   Pursuant   thereto,   the   Law   Commission   was   constituted   in
August/September   1955   with   M.C.   Setalvad,   Attorney   General   of
India as its Chairman. 
Milestone­4 (year 1955)
17. In   the   meantime,   the   Parliament   enacted   ‘The   Code   of
Criminal   Procedure   (Amendment)   Act,   1955,   (Act   XXVI   of   1955)’
which received the assent of the President on 10 th
 August 1955 and
was   published   in   the   Gazette   of   India   on   12 th
  August   1955.   By
Section 25 of this Amendment Act XXVI of 1955, a new provision in
Section   198­B   was   inserted,   providing   for   a   special   procedure   for
prosecution   for   defamation   against   public   servants   in   respect   of
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their   conduct   in   the   discharge   of   public   functions.   This   Section
198­B read as follows: 
“198B.   (1)   Notwithstanding   anything   contained   in   this
Code,   when   any   offence   falling   under   Chapter   XXI   of   the
Indian Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860) (other than the offence
of   defamation   by   spoken   words)   is   alleged   to   have   been
committed   against   the   President,   or   the   Vice­President,   or
the   Governor   or   Rajpramukh   of   a   State,   or   a   Minister,   or
any   other   public   servant   employed   in   connection   with   the
affairs  of  the  Union  or   of  a   State,   in  respect   of   his  conduct
in the discharge of his public functions, a Court of Session
may take cognizance of of such offence, without the accused
being   committed  to  it   for   trial,  upon  a   complaint   in  writing
made by the Public Prosecutor.
(2) Every   such   complaint   shall   set   forth   the   facts
which   constitute   the   offence   alleged,   the   nature   of   such
offence   and   such   other   particulars   as   are   reasonably
sufficient to give notice to the accused of the offence alleged
to have been committed by him.
(3) No   complaint   under   sub­section   (1)   shall   be
made   by   the   Public   Prosecutor   except   with   the   previous
sanction,­
(a)    in  the  case  of the President  or  the  Vice­President
or the Governor or Rajpramukh of a State, of any Secretary
to the Government authorised by him in this behalf;
(b)   in   the   case   of   a   Minister   of   the   Central
Government   or   of   a   State   Government,   of   the   Secretary   to
the   Council   of   Ministers,   if   any,   or   of   any   Secretary   to   the
Government   authorised   in   this   behalf   by   the   Government
concerned;
(c)     in  the   case   of   any   other   public   servant   employed
in connection with the affairs of the Union or  of a  State,  of
the Government concerned.
(4) No   Court   of   Session   shall   take   cognizance   of   an
offence under sub­section (1), unless the complaint is made
10

within   six   months   from   the   date   on   which   the   offence   is
alleged to have been committed.
(5) When   the   Court   of   Session   takes   cognizance   of   an
offence   under   sub­section   (1),   then,   notwithstanding
anything contained in this Code, the Court of Session shall
try   the   case   without   a   jury   and   in   trying   the   case,   shall
follow   the   procedure   prescribed   for   the   trial  by   Magistrates
of   warrant­cases   instituted   otherwise   than   on   a   police
report and the person against whom the offence is alleged to
have been committed shall, unless the Court of Session, for
reasons to be recorded otherwise directs, be examined as a
witness for the prosecution.
(6)   If in any case instituted under this section, the Court
of Session by which the case is heard discharges or acquits
all   or   any   of   the   accused,   and   is   of   opinion   that   the
accusation against them or any of them was false and either
frivolous   or   vexatious,   the   Court   of   Session   may,   by   its
order   of   discharge   or   acquittal,   direct   the   person   against
whom the offence was alleged to have been committed (other
than   the   President,   Vice­President   or   the   Governor   or
Rajpramukh   of   a   State)   to   show   cause   why   he   should   not
pay compensation to such accused or to each or any of such
accused, when there are more than one.
(7)     The   Court   of   Session   shall   record   and   consider   any
cause which may be shown by the person so directed and if
it   is   satisfied   that   the   accusation   was   false   and   either
frivolous   or   vexatious,   it   may,   for   reasons   to   be   recorded,
direct   that   compensation   to   such   amount,   not   exceeding
one thousand rupees, as it may determine, be paid by such
person to the accused or to each or any of them.
(8)     All   compensation   awarded   under   sub­section   (7)
may be recovered as if it were a fine.
(9)     No   person   who   has   been   directed   to   pay
compensation under sub­section (7) shall, by reason of such
order,   be   exempted   from   any   civil   or   criminal   liability   in
respect of the complaint made under this section:
Provided   that   any   amount   paid   to   an   accused   person
under   this   section   shall   be   taken   into   account   in   awarding
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compensation   to   such   person   in   any   subsequent   civil   suit
relating to the same matter.
(10) The person who has been ordered under sub­section
(7) to pay compensation may appeal from the order, in so far
as the order relates to the payment of the compensation, as
if   he   had   been   convicted   in   a   trial   held   by   the   Court   of
Session.
(11)   When  an order   for  payment   of  compensation to  an
accused person is made in a case which is subject to appeal
under  sub­section (10), the compensation shall not be paid
to him before the period allowed for the presentation of the
appeal has elapsed, or, if an appeal is presented, before the
appeal has been decided.
(12)     For   the   purposes   of   this   section,   the   expression
"Court of Session" includes the High Courts at Calcutta and
Madras in the exercise of their original criminal jurisdiction.
(13) The provisions of this section shall be in addition to,
and not in derogation of, those of section 198.”
Milestone­5 (14    th
     Report of the Law Commission on “Reform of
Judicial Administration” and the Amendment of 1964)
18 . The enactment of the   Amendment Act XXVI of 1955 (by which
Section 198­B was inserted), coincided with the constitution of the
Law Commission in August/September 1955. The Law Commission
submitted   its   14 th
  Report   on   “ Reform   of   Judicial   Administration ”   in
September   1958.   The   Report   was   confined   only   to   indicating   in
broad   outline,   the   changes   that   were   required   to   make   judicial
administration speedy and less expensive as seen from the letter of
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the   Chairman   of   the   Law   Commission   dated   September   26,   1958
addressed to the then Minister of Law. The detailed examination of
the   Codes   of   Criminal   and   Civil   Procedure   was   deferred,   as   they
were likely to consume considerable time.   
19. After   the   Law   Commission   submitted   its   14 th
  Report   on   the
Reform   of   Judicial   Administration,   in   September   1958,   the
Government asked the Commission to undertake an examination of
the   Code   of   Criminal   Procedure.   When   the   Law   Commission   was
carrying   out   this   exercise,   the   Parliament   enacted   ‘The   Anti­
Corruption Laws (Amendment) Act, 1964 (Act 40 of  1964)’. By  this
Act,   four   different   Acts,   namely,   the   Indian   Penal   Code,   1860,   the
Code   of   Criminal   Procedure,   1898,   the   Delhi   Special   Police
Establishment   Act,   1946   and   the   Prevention   of   Corruption   Act,
1947 were amended. 
20. Three   important   changes   were   made   to   Section   198­B   of
the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, by this Act 40 of 1964 .
They were:
13

(a)   The   brackets   and   words   "( other   than   the   offence   of
defamation   by   spoken   words )"   in   sub­section   (1)   of   Section   198­B
were directed to be omitted;
(b) After sub­section (5), a new sub­section (5A) was directed to
be inserted as follows: ­ 
"(5A)   Every   trial   under   this   section   shall   be   held   in
camera if either party thereto so desires or if the Court
of Session so thinks fit to do."; 
(c) After sub­section (13), a new sub­section (14) was directed
to be inserted as follows:­ 
"(14)   Where   a  case   is  instituted   under   this  section  for
the trial of an offence, nothing in sub­section (13) shall
be construed as requiring a complaint to be made also
by the person aggrieved by such offence."
 
The   version   of   history   as   reflected   by   the   Amendments   to   the
Code of 1898
21. The   version   of   history   that   could   be   traced   from   the
Amendments made in the years 1943, 1955 and 1964, to the Code
of 1898, can be summed up as follows:
(i)   The   Code   of   1898   enabled,   under   Section   198,   only   the
aggrieved person to file a complaint.
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(ii)   The Amendment of the year  1943 carved out an exception
in   the   case   of   women   who   could   not   appear   in   public,   minors,
lunatics,   sick   and   infirm   persons   etc.,   by   enabling   them   to   file   a
complaint through some other person.
(iii)   The Amendment of the year 1955 prescribed a detailed special
procedure to be followed in the case of offences under Chapter XXI
of   IPC,   committed   against   the   President,   or   the   Vice­President,   or
the Governor or Rajpramukh of a State, or a Minister, or any other
public servant employed in connection with the affairs of the Union
or of a State, in respect of his conduct in the discharge of his public
functions.  But this procedure was not applicable to the offence
of   defamation   by   spoken   words   as   seen   from   the   words   “ any
offence falling under Chapter XXI of the Indian Penal Code (Act
XLV  of   1860)   (other   than   the   offence   of  defamation   by  spoken
words)”
(iv)   But   the   words   “ other   than   the   offence   of   defamation   by
spoken words” in Section 198­B(1) were omitted by the Amendment
of 1964. 
15

It was from this milestone that the legislation moved to Section 199
of the Code of 1973, which we shall see later.     
Milestone­6 (37    th
    Report of the Law Commission leaves the task
uncompleted)
22. After   the   aforesaid   amendment   of   the   year   1964,   the   Law
Commission   submitted   its   37 th
  Report   in   December,   1967   on   the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, but it covered only Sections 1 to
176.  Paragraph   525  of   this   37 th
  Report  indicated   that   the   Sections
of the Code after Section 176 were proposed to be dealt with in later
Reports.
Milestone­7 (41    st
    Report of the Law Commission)
23. Therefore, the revision of the remaining provisions of the Code
of   Criminal   Procedure   was   undertaken   by   the   subsequent   Law
Commission,   constituted   in   March,   1968.   This   Commission
submitted its Report, which is the 41 st
  Report, in September 1969.
Interestingly,   it   was   recorded   in   the   introductory   Chapter   of   this
41 st
 Report that though the first 14  
Chapters of the Code have been
exhaustively analysed in the previous report (37 th
 Report) of the Law
Commission,   the   Commission   was   compelled   to   revisit   even   those
16

recommendations.   The   reason   for   this,   according   to   the   Law
Commission,   was   that   a   finely   integrated   and   comprehensive   law
like the Code of Criminal Procedure cannot be revised piecemeal, as
the   amendments   suggested   in   one   part   of   the   Code   were   likely   to
naturally   affect,   provisions   of   the   other   parts   of   the   Code   to   a
greater   or   lesser   extent.   Therefore,   the   41 st
  Report   became   a   very
comprehensive report.
24. As   we   have   seen   in   paragraph   14   above,   the   Code   of   1898
contained   a   provision   in   Section   198,   which   mandated   that   the
cognizance   of   offences   relating   to   (i)   breach   of   contract;
(ii)   defamation;   and   (iii)   marriage,   cannot   be   taken   by   any   court
except   upon   a   complaint   made   by   the   aggrieved   person.   The   41 st
Report of the Law Commission recognized (as seen   from paragraph
15.131 )   that   Section   198   of   the   Code   dealt   with   the   issue   of
cognizance   of   three   completely   unconnected   groups   of   offences
namely,   (i)   offence relating  to  breach  of  contract to attend on or   to
supply   demands   to   helpless   persons;   (ii)   offences   relating   to
marriage; and  (iii)  offence relating to defamation. Finding that these
17

groups  of   offences   have  nothing   in   common  and  that  the  grouping
of all of them together was faulty, the 41 st
 Report recommended the
deletion of the reference to Chapter XIX of the Indian Penal Code, in
Section 198.
25. Then the Law Commission took note of the insertion of section
198­B   under   the   Amendment   Act   XXVI   of   1955   and   recorded   in
paragraph 15.138 of the Report, the rationale behind Section 198­B
as follows:   
“15.138.   Section   198B,   which   was   introduced   by   the
Amendment   Act   of   1955,   deals   with   prosecution   for   the
offence   of   defamation   where   such   offence   is   committed
against   certain   high   dignitaries   and   public   servants   in
respect   of   their   conduct   in   the   discharge   of   public
functions.   The   section   lays   down   a   special   procedure   for
such   cases.   The   Court   of   Session   is   empowered   to   take
cognizance   of   such   offence,   without   the   accused   being
committed to it for trial, upon a complaint in writing made
by   the   Public   Prosecutor.   It   is   not   necessary   for   the
aggrieved   person   to   sign   the   complaint   under   this   section,
but   the   complaint   has   to   be   made   with   the   previous
sanction   of  a   specified   authority.  There  are  also  distinctive
features which will be discussed below.”
26. According   to   the   41 st
  Report   of   the   Law   Commission,   Section
198­B   was   inserted   to   provide   a   special   procedure   for   prosecution
for   the   offence   of   defamation   where   such   offence   is   committed
against   certain   high   dignitaries   and   public   servants   in   respect   of
their conduct in the discharge of public functions. The specialties of
18

the   procedure   were,   (i)   that   the   offence   was   made   cognizable;
(ii)   that  the  complaint  could  be  by  the  Public  Prosecutor  and  need
not   even   be   signed   by   the   aggrieved   person;   and   (iii)   that   the   pre­
condition   for   taking   cognizance   is   that   it   was   sanctioned   by   a
specified authority.   
27. It   is   interesting   to   see   that   the   41 st
  Report   of   the   Law
Commission   fails   to   note   how   Section   198­B   inserted   by   the
Amendment   Act   of   1955   was   worded   and   how   it   was   changed   in
1964.   The   Amendment   Act   of   1955   made   section   198­B
applicable   to   offences   other   than   defamation   by   spoken
words. This exception was removed only by the Amendment of
1964 . The 41 st
 Report of the Law Commission makes no mention of
the 1964 Amendment.  
 28. Without reference to  the  Amendment  of  1964, the  41 st
  Report
of the Law Commission records in paragraphs 15.139 to 15.142, a
different version of history starting with the battle that preceded the
1955   Amendment.   It   appears   therefrom   that   there   was   a   huge
opposition to the offence of defamation being made cognizable. The
19

opposition came from the Indian Federation of Working Journalists.
The   Press   Commission   reported   that   the   consequences   of   making
the offence of defamation cognizable, are very dangerous, as it may
enable   the   Police   (i)   to   arrest   without   a   warrant;   (ii)   to   take
preventive   action   contemplated   under   Chapter   XIII   of   the   Code   of
1898   (presently   Chapter   XI   of   the   Code   of   1973);     and   (iii)   to
conduct searches.  
29. After   expressing   the   above   apprehensions,   the   Press
Commission   recommended   that   a   procedure   may   be   devised   so   as
to   strike   a   balance   between   those   two   considerations,   viz.,
(i)   frivolous action by the police and the consequent harassment of
the   alleged   offender;   and   (ii)   the   desirability   of   police   investigation
or  magisterial inquiry in some cases where it is necessary that the
public servant should clear himself of the defamatory allegations.
30. According to the 41 st
 Report of the Law Commission, the Joint
Committee   which   considered   the   Bill   of   1954   agreed   that   "the
offence   of   defamation   against   the   President,   Governor   or
Rajpramukh of a State, Minister, or other public servant should not
be made cognizable." The Report says that it was on the basis of the
20

suggestions of the Joint Committee that  Section  198­B  emerged in
the form in which it was inserted under the 1955 Act.
31. Paragraph 15.143 of the 41 st
 Report summed up the rationale,
scope and ambit of Section 198­B as follows:  
“15.143.   Section   198B   thus   emerged   in   its   present   form   after
much deliberation and discussion. It was substantially different
from  the  original clause in the  Bill,  and  also  from  the provision
suggested   by   the   Press   Commission.   It   brings   in   the   Public
Prosecutor,   who   is   expected   to   make   the   complaint   made   with
the   Government's   approval   and   to   conduct   the   trial   before   the
Court of Session.   It puts the whole weight of the Government
against the accused, in what would otherwise have been a
private   litigation   between   the   accused   and   the   public
servant. This intervention of the State can be justified only
on   the   ground   that   the   Government   has   an   interest   in
protecting its reputation when it is likely to be tarnished if
an   attack   on   its   officers   goes   unchallenged,   or   in   other
words,   the   defamation,   besides   causing   harm   to   the
individual, has caused appreciable injury to the State .”  
 
32. In a nutshell,  the 41 st
 Report recognized that the provision
in   Section   198­B   puts   the   whole   weight   of   the   Government
against   the   accused,   in   what   would   otherwise   have   been   a
private litigation between the accused and the public servant .
This   intervention   of   the   State   can   be   justified   only   on   the   ground
that   the   Government   has   an   interest   in   protecting   its   reputation
when   it   is   likely   to   be   tarnished   if   an   attack   on   its   officers   goes
21

unchallenged   or   in   other   words,   the   defamation,   besides   causing
harm to the individual, has caused appreciable injury to the State.
33. The   Law   Commission’s   Report   recorded   in   paragraph   15.144
that   the   primary   object   behind   Section   198B   was   to   provide   a
machinery   enabling   Government   to   step   in   to   maintain   confidence
in   the   purity   of   administration   when   high   dignitaries   and   other
public   servants   are   wrongly   defamed.   Therefore,   the   Commission
recommended that the special provision is needed only for the high
dignitaries who really constitute the Government itself and that it is
unnecessary   to   cover   all   Government   servants   irrespective   of   their
position.   The   Commission   opined   that   Government   servants   in
general   can   seek   permission   of   the   Government   and   approach   the
courts   for   vindicating   their   official   conduct.   In   essence,   the
Commission thought that it should be confined to the President and
the Vice­President of India, the Governors of States, Administrators
of   Union   Territories   and   Ministers,   whether   of   the   Union   or   of   a
State.  
34. In   fact   before   making   the   above   recommendation,   the   Law
Commission   looked   into   the   data   regarding   the   number   of   cases
22

filed   throughout   the   country   and   the   officers/dignitaries   on   whose
behalf they were filed. The Commission recorded as follows:
“Details   as   to   the   number   and   nature   of   the
prosecutions launched under section 198B since 1955
which   were   furnished   to   us   by   the   Courts   of   Session
show that a comparatively large number of cases were
on   behalf   of   the   subordinate   ranks   of   Government
servants. For example, during the period 1955 to 1967
only   twenty­five   cases   were   instituted   under   this
section   in   Punjab,   out   of   which   2   related   to   Class   I
officers,   8  related  to  class   If  officers   and  15   related   to
other   Government   servants   such   sub­Inspectors   of
Police, Registration Clerk, Accountants, Peons etc. The
Total   number   of   prosecutions   in   any   year   was   very
small.
We   are   of   the   view   that   the   provisions   of   the   section,
exceptional as they are, should be confined to the high
dignitaries of the State mentioned above. In the case of
defamation   of   other   public   servants,   the   ordinary
provisions   of   section   198   should   be   enough,   so   far   as
the Code is concerned .”    
 35.  Apart from making the above recommendation, the 41 st
 Report
also   suggested  something,  in  relation   to  sub­sections  (13)  and  (14)
of   Section   198­B.   We   may   recall   that   sub­section   (13)   of   Section
198­B made t he provisions of this section to be in addition to, and
not   in   derogation   of,   those   of   Section   198 .   Sub­section   (14)   was   in
the   nature   of   a   clarification   to   the   effect   that   where   a   case   is
instituted   under   this   section   for   the   trial   of   an   offence,   nothing   in
sub­section   (13)   shall   be   construed   as   requiring   a   complaint   to   be
23

made also by the person aggrieved by such offence. With regard to
these   two   sub­sections,   the   Law   Commission   recommended   as
follows: 
15.153   Sub­section   (13)   states   that   “the   provisions   of
section   198B   shall   be   in   addition   to,   and   not   in
derrogation   of,   those   of   section   198".   The   precise
meaning and effect of this sub­section was a matter of
controversy until it was settled by the Supreme Court.
The   sub­section   is   "enacted   with   a   view   to   state   ex
abundanti   cautela   that   the   right   of   a   party   aggrieved
by   publication   of   a   defamatory   statement   to   proceed
under   section   198   is   not   derogated   by   the   enactment
of   section   198B.   The   expression   ‘in   addition   to’   and
‘not   in   derogation   of’   mean   the   same   thing,   that
section   198B   is   an   additional   provision   and   not
intended to take away the right of a person aggrieved,
even   if   he   belongs   to   the   specified   classes   and   the
offence is in respect of his conduct in the discharge of
his public functions, to file a complaint in the manner
provided   by   section   198".     The   Supreme   Court   thus
negatived   the   contention   that,   in   every   case   falling
under section 198B, besides the complaint filed by the
Public   Prosecutor,   there   must   also   be   a   complaint   by
the aggrieved person.
15.154.   Presumably   with   a   view   to   making   this   position
clear, sub­section (14) was added to section 198B by the
Anti­Corruption  Laws   (Amendment)  Act,  1964.   This   sub­
section states that "where a case is instituted under  this
section for the trial of any offence, nothing in sub­section
(13)   shall   be   construed   as   requiring   a   complaint   to   be
made   also   by   the   person   aggrieved   by   the   said   offence".
The   correct   position   appears   to   be   that   the   remedies
available   to  the   aggrieved   person   under   the   two  sections
are   not   mutually   exclusive   but   are   parallel   to,   and
independent   of,   each   other.   Where   the   aggrieved   person
and   the   Government   concerned   have   decided   to   proceed
under   section   198B,   it   is   clear   that   the   complaint   need
not   comply   with   the   condition   laid   down   in   section   198.
This   idea   could   be   readily   brought   out   by   inserting   the
24

usual   saving   provision   in   section   198,   e.g.,   the   words
"save  as  otherwise provided in section 198B". If this was
done, the only point to make clear in section 198B would
be that the right of the aggrieved person to bring forward
a   complaint   on   his   own   in   the   Court   of   a   Magistrate   in
accordance with section 198 was not in any way affected.
15.155.   We   accordingly   propose   that   in   place   of   the
existing   sub­sections   (13)   and   (14),   the   following   may   be
put in section 198B:­
“(13) Nothing  in  this  section shall affect  the  right  of
the   person   against   whom   the   offence   referred   to   in
sub­section (1) is alleged to have been committed, to
make a complaint in respect of that offence before a
Magistrate   having   jurisdiction   or   the   power   of   such
Magistrate   to   take   cognizance   of   the   offence   upon
such complaint ."
36. In   other   words,   the   41 st
  Report   of   the   Law   Commission
recommended   the   replacement   of   the   then   existing   sub­sections
(13) and (14) of Section 198B with a new sub­section (13). This new
sub­section (13) of Section 198B was intended to make it clear that
the   right   of   an   individual   against   whom   the   offence   of   defamation
was   committed,   to   make   a   complaint   before   a   Magistrate,   was
preserved and that the said right will not stand affected by the other
provisions contained in this Section.
Milestone­8 (Code of 1973)
37. The   41 st
  Report   of   the   Law   Commission   was   submitted   in
September, 1969.  Thereafter, a draft Bill in Bill No.XLI of 1970 was
25

introduced   in   the   Rajya   Sabha   in   December,   1970.   The   Bill   was
referred   to   a   Joint   Select   Committee   of   both   the   Houses   of
Parliament   and   what   finally   emerged,   was   passed   by   both   the
Houses and this became the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Act
No.2 of 1974).  
38. It   is   Section   199   of   this   Code   of   1973,   which   we   are   called
upon   to   interpret   in   this   case.   Section   199   of   the   Code   of   1973
reads as follows:
  “ 199.   Prosecution   for   defamation .­ (1)   No   Court   shall
take   cognizance   of   an   offence   punishable   under   Chapter
XXI of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860 ) except upon a
complaint made by some person aggrieved by the offence: 
Provided   that   where   such   person   is   under   the   age
of   eighteen   years,   or   is   an   idiot   or   a   lunatic,   or   is   from
sickness or infirmity unable to make a complaint, or is a
woman   who,   according   to   the   local   customs   and
manners,  ought   not   to  be   compelled   to  appear   in  public,
some other person may, with the leave of the Court, make
a complaint on his or her behalf.
(2)   Notwithstanding   anything   contained   in   this
Code,  when   any   offence   falling  under   Chapter   XXI   of   the
Indian   Penal   Code   (45   of   1860   )   is   alleged   to   have   been
committed   against   a   person   who,   at   the   time   of   such
commission, is the President of India, the Vice­ President
of   India,   the   Governor   of   a   State,   the   Administrator   of   a
Union territory or a Minister of the Union or of a State or
of a Union territory, or any other public servant employed
in connection with the affairs of the Union or of a State in
respect   of   his   conduct   in   the   discharge   of   his   public
functions a Court of Session may take cognizance of such
offence,   without   the   case   being   committed   to   it,   upon   a
complaint in writing made by the Public Prosecutor.
26

(3)   Every   complaint   referred   to   in   sub­   section   (2)
shall   set   forth   the   facts   which   constitute   the   offence
alleged,   the   nature   of   such   offence   and   such   other
particulars   as   are   reasonably   sufficient   to   give   notice   to
the accused of the offence alleged to have been committed
by him.
(4)   No   complaint   under   sub­section   (2)   shall   be
made   by   the   Public   Prosecutor   except   with   the   previous
sanction­
(a)   of   the   State   Government,   in   the   case   of   a
person   who   is   or   has   been   the   Governor   of
that State or a Minister of that Government;
(b)   of the State Government, in the case of any
other public servant employed in connection
with the affairs of the State;
(c)   of   the   Central   Government,   in   any   other
case.
(5)   No Court of Session shall take cognizance of an
offence   under   sub­section   (2)   unless   the   complaint   is
made   within   six   months   from   the   date   on   which   the
offence is alleged to have been committed.
(6)   Nothing   in   this   section   shall   affect   the   right   of
the   person   against   whom   the   offence   is   alleged   to   have
been   committed,   to   make   a   complaint   in   respect   of   that
offence   before   a   Magistrate   having   jurisdiction   or   the
power of such Magistrate to take cognizance of the offence
upon such complaint.”
39. Before   proceeding   further,   it   is   necessary   to   take   note   of   the
fact   that   what   was   recommended   by   the   41 st
  Report   of   the   Law
Commission to be sub­section (13) of Section 198B, in replacement
of   the   then   existing   sub­sections   (13)   and   (14),   which   we   have
extracted in paragraph 35 above, has now become sub­section (6) of
Section   199.   Keeping   this   in   mind,   let   us   now   go   back   to   the
27

grounds   raised   by   the   appellants,   for   assailing   the   order   of
summoning issued by the Magistrate.  
Back to the cases on hand
40. To  recapitulate,   the   appellant   in   one   of   these   appeals   (who  is
A­1)   is   assailing   the   order   of   summoning,   only   on   one   ground
namely, that a person covered by sub­section (2) cannot bypass the
special procedure prescribed in sub­section (4) of Section 199. The
appellant   in   the   other   appeal   (A­5)   has   raised   two   additional
grounds namely,  (i)  that the contents of the tweets sent by him were
not   per   se   defamatory;   and   (ii)   that   the   transcript   of   the   tweets
cannot   be   relied   upon   without   complying   with   the   mandate   of
Section   65B   of   the   Indian   Evidence   Act.   Let   us   first   deal   with   the
common   ground   on   which   both   the   appellants   assail   the   order   of
summoning. 
Whether special procedure eclipses the general procedure?
41. In   support   of   the   contention   that   a   person   covered   by   sub­
section (2) of Section 199 has to necessarily go through the special
procedure prescribed by sub­section (4) of Section 199, the learned
counsel   for   the   appellants   has   relied   upon   the   decisions   of   this
28

Court   in   P.C   Joshi,   Subramanian   Swamy   and   K.K.   Mishra
(supra).  Therefore, let us see the  ratio decidendi  of these decisions.
42. In   P.C   Joshi   (supra),   the   Public   Prosecutor,   Kanpur   filed   a
complaint   in   the   Court   of   Sessions,   against   the   Editor   and   the
Printer   and   the   Publisher   of   an   English   Weekly,   claiming   that   a
news item published therein was defamatory of the Chief Minister of
the State. The Order of the Home Secretary sanctioning prosecution
under Section 198B(3) of the Code of 1898 was filed along with the
complaint.   After   examining   witnesses,   the   learned   Sessions   Judge
framed   the   charge.   The   order   framing   charge   was   unsuccessfully
challenged   by   the   Editor   and   Publisher   before   the   High   Court   and
the matter landed up on the file of this Court. The object behind the
special   procedure   prescribed   under   Section   198B   of   the   Code   of
1898   was   elaborated   in   detail   by   this   Court   in   P.C.   Joshi   (supra).
In   paragraph   7   of   the   Report   in   P.C.   Joshi   (supra),   this   Court
indicated that Section 198B has made a departure from the normal
rule,   in   larger  public   interest.  After   holding   so,   this  Court   clarified
that   the   expression   “ not   in   derogation   of ”   appearing   in   sub­section
(13) of Section 198B clearly indicated that the provisions of Section
29

198B   did   not   impair   the   remedy   provided   by   Section   198.   This
Court   said:   “ it   means   that   by   Section   198B,   the   right   which   an
aggrieved   person   has   to   file   a   complaint   before   a   Magistrate   under
Section   198   for   the   offence   of   defamation,   even   if   the   aggrieved
person   belongs   to   the   specified   classes   and   the   defamation   is   in
respect of his conduct in the discharge of his public functions, is not
taken away or impaired. If sub­section (13) be construed as meaning
that the provisions of Section 198B are to be read as supplementary
to   those   of   Section   198,   the   non­obstante   clause   with   which   sub­
section   (1)   of   Section   198B   commences   is   rendered   wholly   sterile
…….. ”
43. An   argument   was   advanced   in   P.C.   Joshi   (supra)   that   sub­
sections (6) to (11) of Section 198B of the Code of 1898 provided for
the award of compensation in the case of vexatious prosecution and
that   if   the   aggrieved   person   was   not   the   complainant,   it   was   not
possible to direct compensation to be paid to the accused who was
made to face a vexatious complaint. The said argument was rejected
in  P.C. Joshi  (supra) on the basis of sub­section (5) of Section 198B
30

which   required   the   person   against   whom   the   offence   was
committed,   to   be   examined   as   a   witness   for   prosecution.   In
paragraph 8 of the Report in   P.C. Joshi   (supra), this Court held as
follows:
“8.   Reliance   was   placed   on   behalf   of   the   appellants
upon   sub­ss.   (6)   to   (11)   of   S.198B   which   provide   for
the   award   of   compensation   to   the   person   accused   if
the court is satisfied that the accusation is false and
either   frivolous   or   vexatious,   and   it   was   submitted
that   the   Legislature   could   not   have   intended   that   a
person   who   was   not   the   complainant   and   who   was
not directly concerned with the proceedings may still
be   required   if   so   ordered   by   the   court   to   pay
compensation.   But   sub­s.   (5)   which   provides   that   a
person   against   whom   the   offence   is   alleged   to   have
been committed shall, unless the court for reasons to
be   recorded   otherwise   directs,   be   examined   as   a
witness for the prosecution, clearly indicates that the
question whether the complaint was false and either
frivolous or vexatious may fall to be determined only
if   the   person   complaining   to   be   defamed   actively
supports   the   complaint.   It   cannot   therefore   be   said
that   S.   198B   provides   for   compensation   being
awarded against a person who is not concerned with
the complaint . ”
44. In  Subramanian Swamy  (supra), this Court was dealing with
a   batch   of   writ   petitions   under   Article   32   of   the   Constitution
challenging  the constitutional validity of Sections 499 and 500 IPC
and   Sections   199(1)   to   199(4)   of   the   Code   of   1973.   The   impact   of
sub­section (6) on other sub­sections of Section 199 of the Code of
31

1973   was   indicated   in   paragraph   203   of   the   Report   in
Subramanian Swamy  as follows:­
“203. Sub­section (6) gives to a public servant what every
citizen has as he cannot be deprived of a right of a citizen.
There   can   be   cases   where   sanction   may   not   be   given   by
the   State   Government   in   favour   of   a   public   servant   to
protect   his   right   and,   in   that   event,   he   can   file   a   case
before   the   Magistrate.   The   provision   relating   to
engagement  of the public prosecutor in defamation cases
in respect of the said authorities is seriously criticized on
the   ground   that   it   allows   unnecessary   room   to   the
authorities   mentioned   therein   and   the   public   servants   to
utilize   the   Public   Prosecutor   to   espouse   their   cause   for
vengeance.   Once   it   is   held   that   the   public   servants
constitute   a   different   class   in   respect   of   the   conduct
pertaining  to their discharge of duties and functions, the
engagement   of   Public   Prosecutor   cannot   be   found   fault
with.   It   is   ordinarily   expected   that   the   Public   Prosecutor
has a duty to scan the materials on the basis of which a
complaint   for   defamation   is   to   be   filed.   He   has   a   duty
towards   the   Court.   This   Court   in   Bairam   Muralidhar   v.
State   of   A.P   while   deliberating   on   Section   321   CrPC   has
opined   that   the   Public   Prosecutor   cannot   act   like   a   post
office on behalf of the State Government. He is required to
act in good faith, peruse the materials on record and form
an   independent   opinion.   It   further   observed   that   he
cannot   remain   oblivious   to   his   lawful   obligations
under   the   Code   and   is   required   to   constantly   remember
his duty to the court as well as his duty to the collective.
While   filing   cases   under   Sections   499   and   500   IPC,   he   is
expected to maintain that independence and not   act as a
machine.”  
45. The above passage is relied upon by the learned senior counsel
for the appellants to contend that it is only in cases where the State
Government   refuses   to   give   sanction   for   prosecution,   that   the
individual   right   under   sub­section   (6)   of   Section   199   can   be
32

invoked.  But we are afraid that such an inference does not flow out
of   what   is   observed   in   paragraph   203   of   the   decision   in
Subramanian Swamy   (supra) .   To say that the provisions of sub­
section   (6)   of   Section   199   can   be   invoked   by   the   individual   public
servant,   only   in   cases   where   the   State   Government   does   not   go   to
his rescue, could violate the plain language of sub­section (6).  Sub­
section   (6)   of   Section   199   begins   with   the   words   “ nothing   in   this
section shall affect the right of the person against whom the offence
is alleged to have been committed ”. Sub­section (6) does not contain
any   conditions   subject   to   which   the   right   thereunder   can   be
exercised.
46. The non­obstante clause in sub­section (2) of Section 199 will
also  not  go to  the rescue of the appellants, as the said clause also
stands   eclipsed   by   the   words   “ nothing   in   this   section ”   appearing   in
sub­section (6). The word “ nothing ” appearing in sub­section (6) will
include the non­obstante clause in sub­section (1) also.
47. In   K.K.   Mishra   (supra)   this   Court   was   concerned   with   a
challenge to the maintainability of the prosecution instituted under
33

Section   199(2).   After   referring   to   the   decisions   in   P.C.   Joshi   and
Subramanian   Swamy   (supra),   this   Court   held   the   prosecution   to
be   not   maintainable,   primarily   on   two   grounds   namely   (i)   that   the
alleged   defamatory   statements   cannot   be   said   to   have   any
reasonable   connection   with   the   discharge   of   public   duties   by   the
office   of   the   Chief   Minister   and   that   therefore   the   Chief   Minister
should have resorted only to provisions of sub­section (6) of Section
199;   and   (ii)   that   in   any   case   the   Public   Prosecutor   had   failed   to
apply   his   mind   to   the   materials   placed   before   him,   vitiating   the
complaint presented by him.
48. We do not know how the decision in   K.K. Mishra   (supra) will
be   of   any   assistance   to   the   appellants.   The   question   whether   the
Public Prosecutor applied his mind or not cannot arise in this case,
as Respondent No.1 has filed the complaint on his own in terms of
Section   199(6).   The   question   whether   the   alleged   defamatory
statements   relate   to   the   official   discharge   of   duties   of   Respondent
No.1,  hinges on  facts.
34

49. Merely because it was stated in  K.K. Mishra   (supra) that what
is   envisaged   in   sub­sections   (2)   and   (4)   of   Section   199   is   a
departure from  the normal rule, it does not mean that sub­section
(6)   stands   nullified.   In   fact   more   than   helping   the   appellants,   the
ratio   propounded   in   paragraph   7   of   K.K.   Mishra   (supra)   supports
the stand of Respondent No.1. Paragraphs 7 and 8 of   K.K. Mishra
(supra) read thus:
“ 7.   Section   199(2)   CrPC   provides   for   a   special   procedure
with regard to initiation of a prosecution for the offence of
defamation   committed   against   the   constitutional
functionaries   and   public   servants   mentioned   therein.
However,   the   offence   alleged   to   have   been   committed
must   be   in   respect   of   acts/conduct   in   the   discharge   of
public   functions   of   the   functionary   or   public   servant
concerned,   as   may   be.   The   prosecution   under   Section
199(2)   CrPC   is   required   to   be   initiated   by   the   Public
Prosecutor   on   receipt   of   a   previous   sanction   of   the
competent   authority   in   the   State/Central   Government
under   Section   199(4)   of   the   Code.   Such   a   complaint   is
required   to   be   filed   in   a   Court   of   Session   that   is   alone
vested   with   the   jurisdiction   to   hear   and   try   the   alleged
offence and even without the case being committed to the
said   court   by   a   subordinate   court.   Section   199(2)   CrPC
read   with   Section   199(4)   CrPC,   therefore,   envisages   a
departure   from   the   normal   rule   of   initiation   of   a
complaint   before   a   Magistrate   by   the   affected   persons
alleging   the   offence   of   defamation.   The   said   right,
however, is saved even in cases of the category of persons
mentioned in sub­section (2) of Section 199 CrPC by sub­
section (6) thereof.
8.   The   rationale   for   the   departure   from   the   normal   rule
has   been   elaborately   dealt   with   by   this   Court   in   a
35

judgment   of   considerable   vintage   in   P.C.   Joshi   v.   State   of
U.P.   (AIR  pp.  391­92,  para  9)  The  core reason which  this
Court   held   to   be   the   rationale   for   the   special   procedure
engrafted   by   Section   199(2)   CrPC   is   that   the   offence   of
defamation   committed   against   the   functionaries
mentioned  therein   is  really   an offence   committed  against
the   State   as   the   same   relate   to   the   discharge   of   public
functions   by   such   functionaries.   The   State,   therefore,
would   be   rightly   interested   in   pursuing   the   prosecution;
hence the special provision and the special procedure.”
50. As   seen   from   the   portion   of   K.K.   Mishra   (supra)   extracted
above,   the   right   of   an   individual   is   saved,   under   sub­section   (6),
even   if   he   falls   under   the   category   of   persons   mentioned   in   sub­
section (2).
51. The   long   history   of   the   evolution   of   the   legislation   relating   to
prosecution   for   the   offence  of  defamation   of   public   servants   shows
that   the   special   procedure   introduced   in   1955   and   fine­tuned   in
1964   and   overhauled   in   1973   was   in   addition   to   and   not   in
derogation   of   the   right   that   a   public   servant   always   had   as   an
individual.   He   never   lost   his   right   merely   because   he   became   a
public servant   and   merely because the allegations related to official
discharge   of   his   duties.   Sub­section   (6)   of   Section   199   which   is   a
reproduction   of   what   was   recommended   in   the   41 st
  Report   of   the
Law   Commission   to   be   made   sub­section   (13)   of   Section   198B,
36

cannot   be   made   a   dead   letter   by   holding   that   persons   covered   by
sub­section (2) of Section 199 may have to invariably follow only the
procedure prescribed by  sub­section (4) of Section 199.   Therefore,
the   common   ground   raised   by   both   the   appellants   is   liable   to   be
rejected.  A  person   falling  under  the  category  of  persons  mentioned
in sub­section (2) of Section 199 can either take the route specified
in   sub­section   (4)   or   take   the   route   specified   in   sub­Section   (6)   of
Section 199.
52. An   ancillary   argument   arising   out   of   Section   199(4)   is   that
Section   237   of   the   Code   provides   a   safety   valve   against   malicious
prosecution or prosecution without reasonable cause.   Section 237
reads as follows:
“237.   Procedure   in   cases   instituted   under   section
199(2) .—(1)   A   Court   of   Session   taking   cognizance   of   an
offence  under  sub­section  (2)  of  section 199  shall  try  the
case   in   accordance   with   the   procedure   for   the   trial   of
warrant­cases instituted otherwise than on a police report
before a Court of Magistrate: 
Provided  that  the  person  against  whom  the  offence
is alleged to have been committed shall, unless the Court
of   Session,   for   reasons   to   be   recorded,   otherwise   directs,
be examined as a witness for the prosecution.
(2) Every trial under this section shall be held  in camera  if
either party thereto so desires or if the Court thinks fit so
to do. 
37

(3)   If,   in   any   such   case,   the   Court   discharges   or   acquits
all or any of the accused and is of opinion that there was
no   reasonable   cause   for   making   the   accusation   against
them  or any of them, it may, by  its order  of discharge or
acquittal, direct the person against whom the offence was
alleged to have been committed (other than the President,
Vice­President   or   the   Governor   of   a   State   or   the
Administrator of a Union territory) to show cause why he
should not pay compensation to such accused or to each
or any of such accused, when there are more than one. 
(4) The Court shall record and consider any cause which
may   be   shown   by   the   person   so   directed,   and   if   it   is
satisfied   that   there   was   no   reasonable   cause   for   making
the  accusation,   it   may,   for   reasons  to  be  recorded,   make
an   order   that   compensation   to   such   amount   not
exceeding   one   thousand   rupees,   as   it   may   determine,   be
paid   by   such   person   to   the  accused   or  to   each   or   any   of
them. 
(5) Compensation awarded under sub­section (4) shall be
recovered as if it were a fine imposed by a Magistrate. 
(6) No person who has been directed to pay compensation
under   sub­section   (4)   shall,   by   reason   of   such   order,   be
exempted   from   any   civil  or   criminal  liability   in  respect   of
the complaint made under this section: 
Provided   that   any   amount   paid   to   an   accused
person   under   this   section   shall   be   taken   into  account   in
awarding   compensation   to   such   person   in   any
subsequent civil suit relating to the same matter. 
(7)   The   person   who   has   been   ordered   under   sub­section
(4) to pay compensation may appeal from the order, in so
far   as   it   relates   to   the   payment   of   compensation,   to   the
High Court. 
(8)   When   an   order   for   payment   of   compensation   to   an
accused   person   is   made,   the   compensation   shall   not   be
paid to him before the period allowed for the presentation
of   the   appeal   has   elapsed,   or,   if   an   appeal   is   presented,
before the appeal has been decided.”
38

The   contention   of   the   appellants   is   that   the   protection   available
under   Section   237   of   the   Code   to   the   accused,   will   be   lost   if   the
public servant avoids the special procedure and lodges a complaint
individually.
53. It is true that under sub­section (3) of Section 237, the Court
is empowered to direct the public servant (other than the President,
Vice­President or  the Governor  of a State or the Administrator of a
Union   Territory)   to   show   cause   why   he   should   not   pay
compensation   to   a   person   accused   of   committing   the   offence   of
defamation, in cases where the Court not only discharges or acquits
the accused, but is also of the opinion that there was no reasonable
cause for making the accusation against him.
54. But Section 237(3) is not a new invention. What was contained
in  sub­sections  (6) to  (11) of Section 198B  of the  old  Code of 1898
has taken a new shape in Section 237. Moreover, it is not as though
there   is   no   such   safety   valve   against   prosecution   by   an   individual
without   reasonable   cause,   when   he   invokes   sub­section   (6)   of
Section   199.  Whenever  a  person   is   prosecuted   by   a   public   servant
in   his   individual   capacity   before   a   Magistrate   by   virtue   of   Section
39

199(6),   the   accused   can   always   fall   back   upon   Section   250,   for
claiming   compensation   on   the   ground   that   the   accusation   was
made   without   reasonable   cause.   Section   250   of   the   Code   reads
thus:
“250.  Compensation for accusation without reasonable
cause .—(1)   If,   in   any   case   instituted   upon   complaint   or
upon   information   given   to   a   police   officer   or   to   a
Magistrate, one or more persons is or are accused before
a   Magistrate   of   any   offence   triable   by   a   Magistrate,   and
the   Magistrate   by   whom   the   case   is   heard   discharges   or
acquits   all   or   any   of   the   accused,   and   is   of   opinion   that
there   was   no   reasonable   ground   for   making   the
accusation   against   them   or   any   of   them,   the   Magistrate
may, by  his  order  of  discharge  or  acquittal,  if  the  person
upon whose complaint or information the accusation was
made   is   present,   call   upon   him   forthwith   to   show   cause
why he should not pay compensation to such accused or
to each or any of such accused when there are more than
one; or, if such person is not present, direct the issue of a
summons to him to appear and show cause as aforesaid.
(2)   The   Magistrate   shall   record   and   consider   any   cause
which   such   complainant   or   informant   may   show,   and   if
he   is   satisfied   that   there   was   no   reasonable   ground   for
making   the   accusation,   may,   for   reasons   to   be   recorded,
make   an   order   that   compensation   to   such   amount,   not
exceeding the amount of fine he is empowered to impose,
as   he   may   determine,   be   paid   by   such   complainant   or
informant to the accused or to each or any of them. 
(3) The Magistrate may, by the order directing payment of
the   compensation   under   sub­section   (2),   further   order
that,   in   default   of   payment,   the   person   ordered   to   pay
such   compensation   shall   undergo   simple   imprisonment
for a period not exceeding thirty days. 
(4) When any person is imprisoned under sub­section (3),
the   provisions   of   sections   68   and   69   of   the   Indian   Penal
Code (45 of 1860) shall, so far as may be, apply. 
40

(5) No person who has been directed to pay compensation
under   this   section   shall,   by   reason   of   such   order,   be
exempted   from   any   civil  or   criminal  liability   in  respect   of
the complaint made or information given by him: 
Provided   that   any   amount   paid   to   an   accused
person   under   this   section   shall   be   taken   into  account   in
awarding   compensation   to   such   person   in   any
subsequent civil suit relating to the same matter.
(6)   A   complainant   or   informant   who   has   been   ordered
under sub­section (2) by a Magistrate of the second class
to pay compensation exceeding one hundred rupees, may
appeal   from   the   order,   as   if   such   complainant   or
informant   had   been   convicted   on   a   trial   held   by   such
Magistrate.
(7)   When   an   order   for   payment   of   compensation   to   an
accused   person   is   made   in   a   case   which   is   subject   to
appeal under sub­section (6), the compensation shall not
be   paid   to   him   before   the   period   allowed   for   the
presentation of the appeal has elapsed, or, if an appeal is
presented, before the appeal has been decided; and where
such   order   is   made   in   a   case   which   is   not   so   subject   to
appeal   the   compensation   shall   not   be   paid   before   the
expiration of one month from the date of the order. 
(8) The provisions of this section apply to summons­cases
as well as to warrant­cases.”
55. Therefore,   nothing   turns   on   Section   237   of   the   Code.   Section
237 cannot be used as a crutch to support the argument revolving
around Sections 199(2) and 199(4).
56. Since   we   are   rejecting   the   argument   revolving   around   sub­
sections   (2)   and   (4)   of   Section   199   and   also   since   this   is   the   only
argument   on   which   Shri   Manoj   Kumar   Tiwari   (A­1)   has   come   up
41

with the above appeal, his appeal in Criminal Appeal arising out of
S.L.P. (Crl.) No.351 of 2021, is liable to be dismissed.   Accordingly,
it is dismissed.
ADDITIONAL   GROUNDS   IN   THE   CASE   OF   SHRI   VIJENDER
GUPTA (A­5)
57. In   the   first   portion   of   this   judgment   where   we   have   provided
the background facts, we have indicated that the learned Additional
Chief   Metropolitan   Magistrate   has   held   Shri   Vijender   Gupta   (A­5)
not   liable   to   be   prosecuted   for   the   offence   under   Section   34   of   the
IPC.  We have extracted elsewhere, paragraph 14 of the summoning
order dated 28.11.2019 passed by the Additional Chief Metropolitan
Magistrate, which became the subject matter of challenge before the
High Court in the order impugned in these appeals.
58. In   the   light   of   the   fact   that   learned   Additional   Chief
Metropolitan   Magistrate   has   taken   cognizance   only   of   the   offence
under Section 500 IPC against Shri Vijender Gupta, it is enough for
us   to   test   whether   the   tweets   attributed   to   him   can   be   said   to   be
per   se   defamatory.     It   is   a   fundamental   rule   of   criminal
jurisprudence   that   if   the   allegations   contained   in   the   complaint,
42

even   if   taken   to  be   true,   do  not   constitute   the   offence   complained,
the person accused should not be allowed to undergo the ordeal of a
trial.   Therefore, let us have a look at the tweets attributed to Shri
Vijender Gupta (A­5).   These tweets are extracted in paragraphs 44
and   45   of   the   impugned   judgment   of   the   High   Court   of   Delhi   and
they are extracted  as follows:
“44. The   alleged   culpable   tweet   of   the   petitioner   of
Crl.M.C. 2355/2020 reads as under:­
“Vijender Gupta @ Gupta, vijend…01 Jul
Chief   Minister   of   Delhi   @   Arvind   Kejriwal   and   Deputy
Chief   Minister   @mssodia,   kindly   give   answer   to   24
questions of mine
I am sure that your answer will disclose your scam in the
construction   of   these   rooms   but   you   are   avoiding   to   give
answer but I will obtain the reply.
45. Though   the   tweet   itself   is   requirement   of   the
complainant   to   respond   to   24   questions   of   the   said
alleged Twitter which questions are to t he effect:
“1. How   many   rooms   and   what   total   cost   was
sanctioned under Priority in Directorate of Education?
2. What   is   the   cost   of   construction   per   square   meter
and   what   is   the   cost   of   construction   per   room   under
Priority?
3. What were AA and ES for same were given by DOE
and with what conditions?
4. What   components   were   included   in   the   cost
estimates   including   horticulture,   landscaping,   rain   water
harvesting   etc.?   List   different   components   as   the
estimated expenditure?
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5. What was the time of completion under Priority?
6. How   many   rooms   are   actually   constructed   till   now
under Priority and at what different time building wise?
7. What   was   the   time   over   run   in   handling   over   of
these rooms?
8. How   many   rooms   are   still   to   be   constructed   under
Priority, both building/school wise?
9. What   remaining   work   including   horticulture,
landscaping   etc.   is   left   under   Priority,   both
building/school wise?
10. Is there any cost escalation by PWD in construction
of rooms under Priority?
11. If   yes,   please   give   details   –   PWD   zone   wise   and
school/building wise ?
12. What was the reasons for cost escalation?
13. Are   these   reasons   approved   by   DOE   before   it   was
implemented by PWD?
14. Is  there  any precondition in AA & ES  given  by DOE
regarding   how   much   cost   escalation   is   allowed   without
prior approval as when the approval is required?
15. Were   such   approvals   of   the   competent   authority
taken?
16. If   no,   what   action   is   taken   against   concerned
officials of PWD?
17. What penalties are imposed on contractor of PWD for
time overrun?
18. Whether   the   work   done   by   PWD   is   as   per
specifications?
19. Is   the   water   drainage   system   built   by   PWD   using
pipes   on   the   face   of   the   building   on   all   floors,   as   per
specification of PWD?
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20. What   are   the   EORs   sanctioned   by   DOE   to   PWD   for
civil   workers   during   2016­17,   2017­18,   2018­19   scheme
wise?
21. What   steps   are   taken   by   DOE   to   avoid   any
duplication  of  work  under  EORs   and  under  works   carried
in Priority I?
22. How   many   rooms   and   at   what   total   cost   were
sanctioned under priority II under DOE?
23. What   is   the   cost   of   construction   per   square   metre
and   what   is   the   cost   of   construction   per   room   under
Priority­II?
24. What   extra   components   are   included   in   the   cost
estimates   under   Priority   II   vis­à­vis   under   Priority   I?   Give
list of new components and expenditure on same.”
59. Admittedly   and   obviously   the   twenty­four   questions   posed   by
Shri Vijender  Gupta  (A­5) to  respondent  No.1 cannot  be said to  be
defamatory as these questions seek answers to certain facts relating
to   the   construction   of   some   buildings.   What   is   sought   to   be
projected   as   defamatory,   is   only   one   statement   namely   “ I   am   sure
that your answer will disclose your scam in the construction of these
rooms but you are avoiding to give answer but I will obtain the reply ”.
60. We do not know how a statement in a tweet that the answers
of   respondent   No.1   to   the   questions   posed   by   the   appellant   will
disclose his scam, can be said to be defamatory.  We are afraid that
even   if   a   person   belonging   to   a   political   party   had   challenged   a
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person holding public office by stating “ I will expose your scam” , the
same may not amount to defamation. Defamatory statement should
be specific and not very vague and general. The essential ingredient
of  Section 499 is that the imputation made by  the accused should
have   the   potential   to   harm   the   reputation   of   the   person   against
whom the imputation is made. Therefore, we are of the view that the
statement   made   by   Shri   Vijender   Gupta   (A­5)   to   the   effect   “ your
answer   will   disclose   your   scam ”   cannot   be   considered   to   be   an
imputation   intending   to   harm   or   knowing   or   having   reason   to
believe that it will harm the reputation of respondent No.1.
61. Unfortunately the summoning Order dated 28.11.2019 passed
by the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, did not go into the
contents of the tweets made by Shri Vijender Gupta.  To that extent,
there was no application of mind on the part of the Additional Chief
Metropolitan Magistrate.
62. Though   the   High   Court   prima   facie   examined   the   tweets,   it
upheld the summoning order passed by the Magistrate, after simply
extracting   Section   499.   The   claim   made   by   a   person   involved   in
politics that the answers provided by his rival in public office to the
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questions   posed   by   him,   will   expose   his   scam,   cannot   be   per   se
stated to be intended to harm the reputation of the person holding
office.   The   statements   such   as   “ I   will   expose   you ”,   “ I   will   expose
your corrupt practices ” and “ I will expose the scam in which you are
involved,   etc .”   are   not   by   themselves   defamatory   unless   there   is
something more.
63. In   view   of   the   above,   the   appeal   filed   by   Shri   Vijender   Gupta
(A­5)   is   liable   to   succeed   on   the   sole   ground   that   the   statements
contained in his tweets cannot be said to be defamatory within the
meaning of Section 499 of the IPC.
64. In light of the above finding, we do not think that we need to
go into other argument raised by Shri Vijender Gupta (A­5), on the
basis of Section 65B of the Indian Evidence Act.
CONCLUSION
65. In the result, the appeal arising out of S.L.P. (Criminal) No.658
of  2021, is  allowed and  the  order  of  summoning  dated 28.11.2019
passed   by   the   Additional   Chief   Metropolitan   Magistrate­I,   Rouse
Avenue Court Complex, New Delhi in Ct. Case 51/2019, insofar as
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Shri Vijender  Gupta  (A­5) is concerned, is set  aside.    However,  the
complaint   may   proceed   in   respect   of   other   accused.   The   appeal
arising   out   of   S.L.P.  (Criminal)   No.351  of   2021   filed  by   Shri   Manoj
Kumar Tiwari shall stand dismissed.
Pending application(s), if any, stands disposed of accordingly.
…………………………….J.
(S. Abdul Nazeer)
…………………………….J.
(V. Ramasubramanian)
New Delhi
October 17,  2022
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