/2022 INSC 0964/
                                                              REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
     CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO(s). 104 OF 2020
MOHD. ABDULLAH AZAM KHAN         ….APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
NAWAB KAZIM ALI KHAN         ….RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
Rastogi, J.
    
1. Instant  appeal   has  been   filed  under   Section   116A   of   the
Representation of People Act, 1951 assailing the judgment and
order dated 16 th
  December, 2019 passed by the High Court of
Judicature   at   Allahabad,   holding   the   election   of   the   returned
candidate (appellant) from 34, Suar Assembly Constituency of
District   Rampur,   as   void   and   consequently   came   to   be   set
aside.  
Factual background of the case 
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2. The   notification   under   the   Representation   of   the   People
Act,   1951   (hereinafter   referred   to   as   “the   Act   1951”)   was
notified for  holding election of U.P. State Legislative Assembly
from   34,   Suar,   District   Rampur   constituency.   Public   notice
was   issued   by   the   Returning   Officer   fixing   the   election
programme   for   holding   election   for   the   afore­stated
constituency.     According   to   the   schedule   of   programme,   the
appellant and the first respondent along with others filed their
nomination   papers.       The   scrutiny   of   the   nomination   took
place on 28 th
 January, 2017.   
3. After  scrutiny  and  withdrawal  of nomination  papers, the
appellant and six others including the election petitioner were
the  candidates who remained  in  the field for  election.   It may
be   noted   that   before   the   Returning   Officer,   the   respondent
(election   petitioner)   filed   an   objection   against   the   appellant
alleging that he is less than 25 years of age and, therefore, is
not qualified to contest the election in view of Article 173(b) of
the   Constitution.       The   objection   was   overruled   by   the
Returning   Officer   and   accordingly   the   election   took   place   as
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per   the   schedule,   in   which   the   appellant   and   the   respondent
(election   petitioner)   contested  along   with  others.   The  result   of
the election was declared on       11 th
  March, 2017 in which the
appellant secured highest votes and was declared elected.
4. The respondent filed the election petition before the High
Court   of   Judicature   at   Allahabad   on   the   solitary   ground   that
the   appellant   was   not   qualified   to   contest   the   election   for
member of Legislative Assembly in view of Article 173(b) of the
Constitution as he was less than 25 years of age when he filed
his   nomination   papers   and   also   on   the   day   on   which   he
contested the election from 34, Suar Assembly Constituency of
District Rampur.  
5. In   the   election   petition,   the   respondent   (election
petitioner), inter  alia, contended that objection as regards the
age   of   the   appellant   was   raised   by   him   in   the   first   instance
before   the   Returning   Officer,   but   the   same   was   rejected
without appreciating the bare documentary evidence on record
and   despite   the   date   of   birth   of   the   appellant   being   1 st
January,   1993,   which   was   recorded   throughout   in   his
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academic   records,   including   his   Secondary   School
Examination   Certificate   in   2007   from   the   Central   Board   of
Secondary  Education  and    Intermediate  Examination  in  2009
from   St.   Paul’s   School,   Rampur   affiliated   to   Central   Board   of
Secondary   Education,   Delhi,   the   Returning   Officer   failed   to
consider   the   same   and   arbitrarily   overruled   the   objection
raised by him.  
6. In   the   election   petition,   the   following   objections   were
raised and for better appreciation the same are reproduced as
under:
(i) That   the   appellant   was   born   on   01.01.1993   and,   therefore,
as   on   the   date   of   the   nomination   of   scrutiny,   the   appellant
(Mohd. Abdullah Azam Khan) was below 25 years of age. 
(ii) That the appellant (Mohd. Abdullah Azam Khan) appeared in
Secondary School (Class – X) Examination in the year 2007.
When   he   appeared   for   Secondary   School   examination,   his
roll   number   was   5260139.   He   appeared   from   St.   Paul’s
School, Rampur, which was affiliated with the Central Board
of Secondary Education, New Delhi.
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(iii) That the appellant (Mohd. Abdulla Azam Khan) himself filled­
up   the   admission   form   and   examination   form,   and   in   his
own handwriting, mentioned his date of birth as 01.01.1993.
The   record   of   the   appearance   and   examination   of   the
appellant   (Mohd.   Abdullah   Azam   Khan)   are   available   with
the Central Board of Secondary Education, New Delhi.
(iv) That the Central Board for  Secondary Education has issued
the   Secondary   School   Examination   (Class­X)   result   bearing
the   roll   number,   name,   mother’s   name   and   father’s   name
and   date   of   birth   of   the   appellant   (Mohd.   Abdullah   Azam
Khan).   As   per   the   certificate,   the   mother   of   appellant   is
Tazeen Fatima and his father is Mohd. Azam Khan. The date
of   birth   as   recorded   in   the   certificate   of   Secondary   School
Examination (Class­X) results, 2007 of the appellant (Mohd.
Abdullah Azam Khan) is 01.01.1993. A copy of the certificate
of   Secondary   School   Examination   (Class­X)   results   of   the
appellant   (Mohd.   Abdullah   Azam   Khan)   obtained   from   the
Central   Board   of   Secondary   Education   is   enclosed   and
marked as Annexure­4 to this petition.
(v) That the appellant (Mohd. Abdullah Azam Khan) appeared in
Intermediate examination in the year 2009 St. Paul’s School,
Rampur.  The  said  papers  and  records  are available  with St.
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Paul’s   School,   Rampur   and   the   Central   Board   of   Secondary
Education, CBSE. 
(vi) That  the   election   petitioner   has   made   best   efforts   to  get   the
admission   form,   examination   form   as   also   documents
pertaining   to   the   Intermediate   Examination   of   the   appellant
(Mohd.   Abdullah   Azam   Khan),   but   has   not   been   able   to   get
the   same.   The   election   petitioner   has   only   been   able   to   get
the   certificate   of   Secondary   School   Examination   (Class   X)
results of the appellant from the Central Board of Secondary
Education. 
(vii) That   the   appellant   (Mohd.   Abdullah   Azam   Khan)   thereafter
joined   Galgotias   University,   Greater   Noida   for   his   Master’s
Degree   where   he   has   filled­up   form   for   admission   with   the
same date of birth (01.01.1993). The record of the appellant
(Mohd.   Abdullah   Azam   Khan)   in   respect   of   his   Master’s
Degree is available with Galgotias University, Greater Noida. 
7. Thereafter,   in   his   Master’s   degree   which   he   passed   out
from   Galgotias   University,   Greater   Noida,   including   his
passport   and   other   documents   annexed   with   the   nomination
papers   which   are   within   the   public   domain   consistently
indicated that he was born on 1 st
 January, 1993.
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8. In   addition   to   this,   the   contention   of   respondent   no.1
before   the   High   Court   was   that   the   appellant/returned
candidate   belongs   to   a   very   influential   family   and   his   father
was   a   Cabinet   Minister   (Urban   Planning,   Development   and
Local   Bodies)   in   Government   of   Uttar   Pradesh   during   the
period   2012   to   2017   and   because   of   his   local   influence   and
being  the  Minister  in­charge, documentary  evidence  has been
created by him in the year 2015, which was thereafter made to
be the basis and foundation to justify and support the date of
birth   of   the   appellant   herein   which,   as   alleged,   was   wrongly
recorded in the school records and the fact is that the records
maintained   by   Queen   Mary’s   Hospital,   Lucknow,   which
indicates   that   the   appellant   was   born   on   30 th
  September,
1990,   is   a   later   development   and   were   created   in   the   year
2015   to   support   that   the   appellant   was   qualified   to   contest
election in the year 2017 in terms of the requirement of Article
173(b) of the Constitution.   
9. In   counter,   the   appellant   in   the   written   statement   came
with a specific case that the documents on which the election
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petitioner has relied upon regarding the date of birth based on
the   school/academic   records,   although   the   said   documents
belong to the appellant but his date of birth is incorrectly and
inadvertently   registered   as   1 st
  January,   1993,   as   it   was
recorded by one of their family friends, Shahzeb Khan, DW.9,
who   got   the   appellant   admitted   to   St.   Paul’s   School,   Civil
Lines,   Rampur,   where   his   date   of   birth   was   incorrectly   and
inadvertently   registered   as   1 st
  January,   1993   and   that   was
incorrectly   shown   throughout   in   his   academic   records   in
Secondary School Examination/Intermediate Examination and
also in his higher studies including the date of birth reflecting
in the birth certificate issued to him  by Rampur Nagar Palika
on   28 th
  June,   2012,   of   1 st
  January,   1993   which   was   later
cancelled and according to him, the birth certificate issued by
Nagar Nigam, Lucknow, on 21 st
 January, 2015 is based on the
records   maintained   by   Queen   Mary’s   Hospital,   Lucknow,
where   he   was   born,   his   date   of   birth   as   per   the   hospital
records is 30 th
 September, 1990.  
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10. The appellant came with a specific case before this Court
that   his   date   of   birth   reflected   in   his   academic   record   of   1 st
January,   1993   was   incorrect   and   that   being   the   reason,     the
birth   certificate   issued   on   28 th
  June,   2012   by   Nagar   Palika,
Rampur   was   duly   cancelled   on   30 th
  January,   2015   and   a
duplicate certificate of birth dated 21 st
  April, 2015 was issued
by   Queen   Mary’s   Hospital,   Lucknow,   where   he   was   born,
indicating 30 th
 September, 1990, as the correct date of birth of
the appellant and accordingly he was above 25 years of age on
the day when nomination form was filled by him  for  elections
of   U.P.   Legislative   Assembly   from   34,   Suar   Assembly
Constituency of District Rampur in the year 2017 and on that
date   the   appellant   attained   the   age   of   25   years   in   terms   of
Article 173(b) of the Constitution for contesting the election of
34, Suar Assembly Constituency of District Rampur.  
11. Both   the   parties   placed   the  documentary   as   well  as  oral
evidence   in   support   of   their   respective   defences.     The   High
Court   after   due   appreciation   of   the   documentary   as   well   as
oral   evidence   on   record   and   taking   note   of   the   submissions
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made   by   the   parties   returned   the   finding   that   on   the   date   of
filing of nomination papers i.e. 25 th
 January, 2017, on the date
of   scrutiny   of   nomination   papers   i.e.   28 th
  January,   2017   and
on   the   date   of   declaration   of   result   of   34,   Suar   Assembly
Constituency   of     District   Rampur   i.e.   11 th
  March   2017,   the
appellant   was   less   than   25   years   of   age   and   thus,   was   not
qualified to contest the election in terms of Article 173(b) of the
Constitution   and   declared   the   election   of   the   appellant   to   be
void and consequently it came to be set aside by the impugned
judgment dated 16 th
 December, 2019.  
Submissions of the Appellant
12. Mr.   Kapil   Sibal,   Senior   Advocate   appearing   for   the
appellant,   submits   that   there   is   a   statutory   presumption   of
validity of the nomination papers as reflected under para 6 of
Chapter VI of the Handbook of Returning Officers, as held by a
Three­Judge Bench of this Court in   Rakesh Kumar v.   Sunil
Kumar 1
  (para 18) and later considered in   Uttamrao Shivdas
1   (1999) 2 SCC 489 
10

Jankar v. Ranjitsinh Vijaysinh Mohite Patil 2
    (paras 35, 40
and   44)     and   further   submits   that   the   school/academic
records   on   which   reliance   was   placed   by   the   election
petitioner/respondent   and   of   which   cognizance   has   been
taken   by   the   High   Court   under   the   impugned   judgment   was
not disputed by the appellant, but the appellant disputed the
contents   of   the   document   relied   upon   by   the   respondent
throughout   and   that   can   be   reflected   from   the   written
statement filed by the appellant to the election petition and it
was the specific case of the appellant that the date of birth as
recorded   in   his   school   records   i.e.   1 st
  January,   1993   is
incorrect   and     wrongly  recorded,   in   fact,   he   was   born   on   30 th
September,   1990   and   to   support   his   date   of   birth,   sufficient
primary   documentary   evidence   was   placed   on   record   which
pertains to the authenticated record of Queen Mary’s Hospital,
Lucknow,   which   is   a   Government   hospital   and   followed   with
the   birth   certificate   issued   by   the   competent   authority   i.e.
Nagar Nigam, Lucknow dated 21 st
 January, 2015.
2   (2009) 13 SCC 131
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13. To support it further, learned counsel submits that once
the contents of the document pertaining to the appellant were
disputed specifically in his written statement, the burden was
on the election petitioner to prove that the date of birth of the
appellant was 1 st
 January, 1993 to which no efforts were made
and   the   premise   on   which   the   High   Court   has   proceeded   to
shift the burden of proof on the appellant is in disregard to the
principles of  the  Evidence Act and the  fact as alleged is to be
proved by the person who pleads under the Evidence Act and
made further following submissions:­  
(i) The   appellant   has   stated   his   date   of   birth   in   his
nomination   papers   as   30 th
  September,   1990   along   with
supporting   documents.     Therefore,   the   burden   of   proof
lies   on   the   election   petitioner/respondent   to   rebut   the
presumption   by   adducing   admissible   and   reliable
evidence   that   meets   the   standard   of   preponderance   of
probabilities   and   the   election   petitioner/respondent   has
failed   to   produce   any   legally   admissible   evidence   on
record so as to discharge his burden of proof.  
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(ii) The   respondent/election   petitioner   has   failed   to   produce
any   direct   and   admissible   evidence   to   prove   that   the
appellant   was   born   on   1 st
  January,   1993   and   was   not
born   on   30 th
  September,   1990   and   in   support,   the   only
document   produced   by   the   respondent/election
petitioner is the certificate of Class X Exam which is not
a document for proof of age.   
(iii) No   other   document   or   witness   was   produced   by   the
respondent   to   prove   an   alternate   date   of   birth   of   the
appellant, or to prove the fact that he was not of 25 years
of age at the time of scrutiny of nomination papers.
(iv) To   the   contrary,   the   appellant   has   adduced   sufficient,
reliable and cogent oral and unimpeachable documentary
evidence   which   if   considered   in   totality,   establishes   a
preponderance   of   probabilities   that   he   was   above   25
years of age as on 28 th
 January, 2017.   
(v) The   best   evidence   of   the   date   of   birth   is   the   testimonial
evidence   of   the   mother   of   the   appellant   (DW.5)   and   the
doctor  who  delivered the  male  child and  that  is the  only
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direct evidence to support the birth of the appellant on a
specific date.
(vi) The   appellant’s   mother   (DW.5)   in   her   affidavit   in
examination­in­chief   has   categorically   stated   that   she
was   a   lecturer   in   Political   Science   in   Govt.   Girls   PG
College,   Rampur   and   she   gave   birth   four   times.     The
children   from   the   first   two   deliveries   in   1982   and   1984
died   at   the   time   of   birth   and   the   third   child   born   in   the
year 1985 is her elder son Mohd. Adib and thereafter she
again   availed   third   sanctioned   maternity   leave   from   7 th
August,   1990   to   4 th
  November,   1990   which   is   duly
supported   by   service   book,   proved   by   DW.1   and   that
acknowledges that she gave birth to a male child on 30 th
September, 1990 in Queen Mary’s Hospital, Lucknow, in
maternity department of King George Medical University,
Lucknow,   a   Government   Hospital   and   it   is   supported
with   discharge   certificate   dated   24 th
  October,   1990
(Ex.R7),   EOT   register   (Ex.R4)   and   MLR   register   (Ex.R5)
duly supported by Dr. Uma Singh (DW.3) and Dr. Vineeta
14

Das   (DW.4)   who   in   their   oral   testimony   have   supported
the delivery of male child to DW.5 mother of the appellant
on 30 th
 September, 1990. 
(vii) The   appellant   has   further   explained   that   the   incorrect
date of birth in the school record was an error committed
on   the   part   of   the   family   friend   Shahzeb   Khan   (DW.9)
who   got   the   admission   of   the   appellant   in   the   school   in
1995.  
(viii) It was further submitted that in the absence of any cross­
examination   of   either   of   the   defence   witness   or   the
documents   placed   on   record   which   are   public   records
stands proved in terms of Section 35 of the Evidence Act
and   further   corroborated   by   the   testimony   of   DW.5   by
her   service   book,   salary   register,   it   was   established   that
the   appellant   was   born   on   30 th
  September,   1990   in
Queen Mary’s Hospital, Lucknow.     
(ix) The impugned judgment fails to consider the established
evidence though it provides for proof of documents made
in the regular course of business by a person other than
15

the   author   and   fails   to   consider   Section   35   of   the
Evidence   Act   which   states   that   documents   prepared   by
an   official   (public   or   private)   in   performance   of   his   duty
recorded under law are relevant and admissible.  
(x) That   with   respect   to   the   finding   of   manipulation   and
interpolation   as   being   recorded   in   the   impugned
judgment   regarding   the   birth   register   (Ex.R12),   there   is
no   evidence   on   record   to   support   such   a   finding.     No
question   was   put   to   DW.2   as   to   any   manipulation   or
interpolation   in   the   document.     In   the   absence   of   any
evidence, the finding recorded in the impugned judgment
is unsustainable.  
(xi) The   impugned   judgment   incorrectly   record   that   Section
13   of   the   Births   and   Deaths   Registration   Act,   1969   and
Rule   9   of   the   UP   Registration   of   Birth   and   Death   Rule,
2002   have   not   been   followed   while   the   birth   certificate
dated   21 st
  April,   2015   was   issued.     However,   the   fact   is
that   the   birth   of   the   appellant   was   registered
contemporaneously   in   the   year   1990   in   Nagar   Nigam,
16

Lucknow   and   it   was   only   a   duplicate   certificate   of
registration which was issued on 21 st
 January, 2015.
(xii) The   documents   relied   upon   by   the   election
petitioner/respondent are not admissible in evidence and
in   any   case   are   not   a   proof   of   date   of   birth   of   the
appellant on 1 st
 January, 1993.   
(xiii) The school records are not the direct evidence of the fact
of   birth   and   on   a   balance   of   probabilities,   it   cannot   be
given   pre­eminence   over   direct   evidence   of   the   mother,
delivering   doctor   and   contemporaneously   maintained
hospital records. 
(xiv) The error  in school records was sufficiently  explained by
DW.5 and accordingly necessary steps were taken by the
appellant   for   correction   of   the   school   records   by   a   letter
dated 23 rd
 March, 2015 submitted by the appellant to the
Regional Officer, CBSE, as proved by DW.7, Arun Joseph
Dayal, Director of St. Paul’s School, Civil Lines, Rampur.
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(xv) The   reliance   on   the   alleged   Group   Insurance   Scheme
(GIS)   Nomination   form   in   the   service   book   of   DW.5   was
not an admitted document to establish that the appellant
was born in 1993 and this was a serious misappreciation
of the evidence on record committed by the High Court.
(xvi) When confronting a witness as to any previous statement
in a document it is mandatory that the said document be
pointed   out   to   the   witness   under   Section   145   of   the
Indian Evidence Act to which no efforts were made by the
respondent/election petitioner and at the best it is merely
a   piece   of   circumstantial   evidence   which   has   no   legal
backing and cannot establish birth of the appellant on 1 st
January, 1993.   
14. These, according  to  the  appellant, were serious manifest
errors which were committed by the High Court in passing the
judgment   impugned   and   in   support   of   his   submissions,
counsel placed reliance on the judgments of this Court in  Brij
Mohan   Singh   v.   Priya   Brat   Narain   Sinha   and   Others 3
,
3   (1965) 3 SCR 861
18

Birad Mal Singhvi v. Anand Purohit 4
  and  Joshna Gouda v.
Brundaban   Gouda   and   Another 5
  and   taking   assistance   of
the judgments of this Court submits that the finding recorded
by the High Court under the judgment impugned is not legally
sustainable and deserves to be set aside.
Submissions of the Respondent
15. Mr.   Aadil   Singh   Boparai,   learned   counsel   for   the
respondent,   on   the   other   hand,   while   supporting   the   finding
returned   by   the   High   Court   in   the   judgment   impugned,
submits that he was successful in establishing before the High
Court   that   the   date   of   birth   of   the   appellant   is   1 st
  January,
1993 by leading evidence and also as per the admissions made
by   the   appellant/witnesses,   admittedly   the   appellant   was   not
qualified   to   contest   the   election   for   the   Member   of   Legislative
Assembly,   being   less   than   25   years   of   age   in   view   of   Article
173(b)   of   the   Constitution   on   the   date   when   nomination
papers were filled or the date of declaration of result and made
the following submissions:
4   (1988) Supp. SCC 604 
5   (2012) 5 SCC 634
19

(i) The respondent/election petitioner placed unimpeachable
evidence   on   record   that   includes   the   marksheet   of   the
appellant’s   class   X   certificate,   his   passports   dated   28 th
August, 2006 and original Birth Certificate issued on 28 th
June,   2012   by   Nagar   Palika,   Rampur   and   his   self­filled
passport   application   of   the   year   2006   and   all   these
documents reflect the date of birth of the appellant as 1 st
January, 1993.
(ii) The   documents   relied   upon   by   the   respondent   are
admissible   in   evidence   and   relevant   under   Sections   21
and   35   of   the   Indian   Evidence   Act.     The   evidence
projected   by   the   appellant   was   false   and   fabricated   and
rightly   discarded   by   the   High   Court.     Cancellation
process   was   initiated   by   the   appellant   after   the   birth
certificate   was   issued   by   Nagar   Nigam,   Lucknow   on   21 st
January, 2015 indicating 30 th
 September, 1990 as date of
birth   of  the   appellant.     But,  execution  of   the   documents
relied   upon   by   the   respondent   has   never   been   disputed
and   all   are   public   documents   in   which   consistently   his
20

date of birth recorded is 1 st
  January, 1993 and thus, the
burden was on the appellant to adduce evidence to rebut
the   presumption   as   aforesaid,   that   his   date   of   birth   is
30 th
 September, 1990 and not 1 st
 January, 1993.   
(iii) Both   the   parties   have   adduced   their   evidence   in   the
election petition, that all pertains to the appellant, not to
somebody else.   The record of the election petition which
pertains   to   the   academic   record,   including   passport   and
birth   certificate   of   the   appellant,   until   2015   consistently
indicates his date of birth as 1 st
 January, 1993.   
(iv) That in rebuttal, the appellant placed on record claiming
his date of birth to be 30 th
 September, 1990, which could
not   have   inspired   confidence.     In   support   of   his
submissions,   counsel   for   the   respondent   has   placed
reliance on the judgment of this Court in   Sushil Kumar
v.   Rakesh   Kumar 6
  and   taking   assistance   thereof
submitted   that   the   finding   of   fact   returned   by   the   High
Court   is   based   on   due   appreciation   attached   to   its
6   (2003) 8 SCC 673
21

probative value and only thereafter it has been held that
the   appellant   has   failed   to   establish   his   date   of   birth   as
30 th
  September, 1990 and rightly declared the election of
the   appellant   to   be   null   and   void   and   not   eligible   to
contest   the   election   in   view   of   Article   173(b)   of   the
Constitution.  
16. We   have   heard   learned   counsel   for   the   parties   and   with
their   assistance   perused   the   documentary   and   oral   evidence
on   record,   in   extenso.   Taking   into   consideration   the   settled
principles   as   laid   down   by   this   Court,   it   is   to   be   examined
whether the date of birth of the appellant, as claimed by him,
is 30 th
 September, 1990 or it is 1 st
 January, 1993.  
Purpose of the Evidence Act
17. The   purpose   of   the   Evidence   Act,   1872   is   to   prove   and
disprove   the   existence   of   facts   in   issue   and   to   find   out   the
truth   of   the   facts   which   are   asserted   by   the   parties   as   the
decision of the case lies upon/depends upon the truthfulness
of   those   facts.     The   Act   essentially   does   the   balancing   of
22

interest   between   the   parties   to   the   proceedings   and   such
balancing has to be done by establishing the truth of the facts
asserted.     Ultimately,   the   Indian   Evidence   Act,   1872   is   about
the   quest   towards   truthfulness.     “ Procedure   is   the   handmade
of   justice   and   not   its   mistress”   i.e.   procedure   is   not   to   control
justice   but   procedure   is   the   helping   hand   of   justice   and   it
helps to facilitate justice.   
18. It   is   a   well­established   dictum   of   the   Evidence   Act   that
misplacing   the   burden   of   proof   vitiates   the   judgment.     At   the
same   time,   the   rule   relating   to   the   burden   of   proof   is   based
upon   certain   practical   considerations   of   convenience   and
reasonableness   and   also   of   policy,   but   where   there   is   a
rebuttable   presumption   of   law   in   favour   of   one   party,   the
burden of rebutting it lies upon the later.  
19. At  the  same time, when any  fact is especially   within  the
knowledge   of   a   party,   the   burden   of   proving   it   lies   upon   that
party.     The   term   “especially”   means   facts   which   are   pre­
eminently   or   exceptionally   within   the   knowledge   of   a   person.
It   is   true   that   it   cannot   apply   when   the   fact   is   such   as   to   be
23

capable of being known also by persons other than the party.
This rule is an exception to the rule of burden of proof.  Thus,
when a person acts with some intention other than that which
the   character   and   circumstances   of   the   act   suggest,   the
burden of proving the intention is upon him.   The bottom line
of   the   purpose   of   the   Indian   Evidence   Act   is   to   adopt   a
procedure that helps to facilitate justice and ultimately what is
required is to unearth the truth, to prevail.
20. So  far  as  the  principles of   burden  of  proof  is  concerned,
the principles have been succinctly laid down by this Court in
Sushil Kumar  (supra) paras 28 to 32 :
28.   It is no doubt true that the burden of proof to show that a
candidate   who   was   disqualified   as   on   the   date   of   the
nomination would be on the election petitioner.
29.   It   is   also   true   that   the   initial   burden   of   proof   that
nomination   paper   of   an   elected   candidate   has   wrongly   been
accepted is on the election petitioner.
30.   In   terms   of   Section   103   of   the   Indian   Evidence   Act,
however,  the  burden  of  proof  as  to any  particular  fact   lies  on
that   person   who   wishes   the   court   to   believe   in   its   existence,
unless   it   is   provided   by   any   law   that   the   proof   of   that   fact
shall lie on any particular person. 
31. Furthermore,   in   relation   to   certain   matters,   the   fact
being   within   the   special   knowledge   of   the   respondent,   the
burden to  prove the same would be on him in terms of Section
106   of   the   Indian   Evidence   Act.   However,   the   question   as   to
whether   the   burden   to   prove   a   particular   matter   is   on   the
plaintiff or the defendant would depend upon the nature of the
24

dispute.   (See   Orissa   Mining   Corpn.   v.   Ananda   Chandra
Prusty   [(1996) 11 SCC 600]
32.   The   age   of   a   person   in   an   election   petition   has   to   be
determined   not   only   on   the   basis   of   the   materials   placed   on
record   but   also   upon   taking   into   consideration   the
circumstances   attending   thereto.   The   initial   burden   to   prove
the   allegations   made   in   the   election   petition   although   was
upon   the   election   petitioner   but   for   proving   the   facts   which
were   within   the   special   knowledge   of   the   respondent,   the
burden was upon him in terms of Section 106 of the Evidence
Act.   It   is   also   trite   that   when   both   parties   have   adduced
evidence, the question of the onus of proof becomes academic
[see   Union   of   India   v.   Sugauli   Sugar   Works   (P)   Ltd.   [(1976)   3
SCC 32] and   Cox and Kings (Agents) Ltd.   v.   Workmen   [(1977) 2
SCC 705]. Furthermore, an admission on the part of a party to
the   lis   shall   be   binding   on   him   and   in   any   event   a
presumption   must   be   made   that   the   same   is   taken   to   be
established.
21. As per Section 35 of the Evidence Act, a register of record
maintained in terms of the statute or by statutory authority in
the regular course of business would be a relevant fact and in
the aforementioned backdrop, the evidence brought on record
is   required   to   be   considered.   The   parties   have   led   their
documentary   as   well   as   oral   evidence   and   have   marked
exhibits   in   reference   to   relevant   documents   placed   by   the
election   petitioner   and   the   appellant   in   support   of   their
respective   claims   to   justify   with   regard   to   the   date   of   birth   of
the appellant. The oral and documentary evidence relied upon
25

has   been   noticed   in   paras   8   and   9   of   the   judgment   and   are
reproduced herein :
8.   Both   the   parties   have   led   documentary   and   oral   evidences.   Following
papers have been admitted in evidence and have been marked as Exhibits
as under:­
Petitioner’s evidences:
Ex.
No. Paper
No. Brief particulars
P1 (A­49/1
to   A
53/1)
A   49/1­
4 Pass   port   application   dated   06.07.2012   of   the   respondent
under his signature mentioning his date of birth 01.01.1993,
and place  of birth  Rampur.  Earlier Pass port  No.F­8757022,
was issued on 28.08.2006 which expired on 31.12.2010. The
new   pass   port   No.K7951741   was   issued   by   the   Pass   port
Officer,   Bareilly   on   13.07.2012   for   the   period   till   12.7.2022.
Some papers of Ex.P­1 are mentioned below.
A 50/1 –
A 50/4 Copy   of   Bank   Pass   Book   of   the   respondent   of   his   bank
account in State Bank of India, Nawab Gate, Rampur.
A 51/1 Copy   of   birth   certificate   No.3857   issued   by   Nagar   Palika
Parishad, Rampur mentioning date of birth of the respondent
as 01.01.1993, Place of birth Rampur, Registration No.RNPB
2012   –   03857,   date   of   Registration   28.06.2012   and   date   of
issue 28.06.2012
A 52/2 –
A52/3 Copy   of   respondent’s   pass   port   no.F8757022,   dated
28.08.2006 mentioning date of birth as 01.01.1993
A 53/1 Passport   preview   details   of   passport   No.   K­7951741,   dated
13.07.2012   mentioning   respondent’s   date   of   birth   as
01.01.1993   and   old   pass   port   No.F8757022,   dated
28.08.2006
P­2 (A­60/1
to A­78)
A­60/1   ­
2 Copy   of   the   respondent’s   pass   port   application   dated
10.01.2018   mentioning   his   date   of   birth   as   30.09.1990   and
place of birth Lucknow
A­61/1 “on   line  appointment  receipt”   issued   by  Ministry  of   External
Affairs,   Government   of   India   for   the   aforesaid   Passport
application dated 08.01.2018
A­62/1­
3 Copy   of   the   respondent’s   pass   port   No.K7951741,   dated
13.07.2012   bearing   his   date   of   birth   as   01.01.1993   and
entries   of   departure/arrival   dated   30.04.2013,   05.05.2013,
09.06.2015   and   26.07.2016.   A­62/3   is   respondent’s   Visa
dated 09.07.2014 mentioning his date of birth as 01.01.1993
A­63/1 Birth   certificate   dated   21.1.2015   issued   by   Registrar   Birth
and   Death,   Lucknow,   mentioning   date   of   birth   30.09.1990,
place   of   birth   –   Queen   Mary’s   Hospital,   Lucknow,   U.P.,   and
Registration   No.NNLKO   –   B­2015­292611   and   date   of
26

registration 21.01.2015
A 64/1 Order   of   registrar   birth   and   death,   Nagar   Palika   Parishad,
Rampur,   dated   30.1.2015,   cancelling   the   birth   certificate   of
the respondent dated 28.6.2012, as under:­
A­65/1 Copy of respondent’s U.P. Legislative Assembly Identity Card
dated 14.03.2017
A­66/1 Copy of Adhar Card of the respondent dated 7.3.2015
A­67/1 Copy of respondent’s driving licence
A­68/1 Copy of respondent’s voter I.D. Card dated 18.07.2016.
A­69/1 Copy   acknowledgement   dated   10.1.2018   issued   by   Regional
Passport Officer, Bareilly for application dated 10.1.2018
A­70/1 Copy   of   respondent’s   application   dated   10.1.2018   to   the
Regional Passport Officer Bareilly stating that “I  had applied
for   reissue   of   passport   due   to   change   of   date   of   birth   and
place of birth.”
A­75/2 Letter   of   Regional   Passport   Officer,   Bareilly,   dated
11.01.2018   to   Registrar   birth   and   death,   Municipal
Corporation,   Lucknow   for   verification   of   birth   certificate   of
the respondent
A­76/1 Letter   of   the   Registrar   Birth   and   death,   Nagar   Palika
Parishad,   Rampur,   addressed   to   Regional   Passport   Officer,
Bareilly  confirming issuance  of  letter  dated  30.1.2015   about
cancellation of birth certificate of the respondent.
P3 (A­ A­
80/1
79   to   A­
80/1) Copy   of   birth   certificate   of   Mohd.   Abdulla   Azam   Khan
(Respondent)   dated   28.06.2012   bearing   date   of   registration
RNPB 9012­03857, dated 28.06.2012 issued by Nagar Palika
Parishad,   Rampur   on   the   basis   of   original   record   of   birth.
This birth certificate was got cancelled by the respondent by
order of the Registrar dated 30.01.2015
P4 A­25/1 Copy  of   Secondary  School   examination   Class   X   result   2007,
issued   by   Central   Board   of   Secondary   Education   showing
respondent’s date of birth as 01.01.1993
Oral evidence of Election­petitioner:
P.W. 1­ Kazim Ali Khan (Election­petitioner)
P.W. 2­ Mohd. Naseem, Passport Officer, Bareilly
P.W. 3­ Mohd. Ateer Ansari, Junior Passport Assistant, Bareilly
P.W.   4­   Tej   Pal   Singh   Verma,   Chief   Sanitation   and   Food
Inspector/Deputy   Registrar   Birth   and   Death,   Nagar   Palika   Parishad,
Rampur
Defendant’s/respondent’s Evidences.
Documentary Evidence.
27

Ex.
No. Paper
No. Brief Particular
R1 A 30 List of candidates who filed nomination papers
R2 A 31 Symbol allotment list issued by Returning Officer
R3 A32 Declaration of results by Returning Officer on 11.03.2017
R4 A100/1­
2 Copy   of   page   no.   174   of   EOT   Register   of   Queen   Mary's
Hospital,   Lucknow,   containing   entries   of   admission   of
patients   dated   29.09.1990,   and   thereafter   entries   dated
7 th
  August 1990, 22.09.1990 and 24.09.1990
R5 A101/1­
2 Copy   of   page   No.   225   of   MLR   Register   of   Queen   Mary's
Hospital   bearing   cuttings   and   overwriting   and   no   date   of
admission of Mrs. Tazeen Fatima (mother of the respondent)
R6 A37 Duplicate birth certificate dated 21.04.2015 issued by Queen
Mary's Hospital of K.G. Medical University containing baby's
name “baby of Tazeen Fatima” born on 30.09.1990
R7 A38/1­2 Discharge   ticket   of   indoor   patient   Tazeen   Fatima   in   Queen
Mary's   Hospital   admitted   on   07.08.1990   and   discharge   on
24.10.1990
R8 A41/1­3 Information   dated   12.09.2017   given   by   Professor   Vineeta
Das,   HOD   King   George   Medical   University   to   the   mother   of
the   respondent   under   the   RTI   Act   2005   intimating   that   as
per   rules   of   the   hospital,   record   of   only   10   years   is   kept.
Since   matter   is   of   1990,   therefore,   true   copy   of   admission
register   containing   entries   is   not   possible   to   be   given.
Admission   slip   is   kept   by   the   patient,   discharge   certificate
(paper   No.   A38/1­2)   as   produced   by   Tazeen   Fatima   is
attested.
R9 A42/1­5
Information   given   by   King   George   Hospital   by   letter   dated
19.09.2017   to   the   respondent   under   the   RTI   Act   based   on
the   information   of   Professor   Vineeta   Das,   HOD   King   George
Medical   University   by   letter   dated   12.09.2017   addressed   to
the   Information   Officer   and   mentioning   that:   (paper   No.
A100/2)
R10 A47/1­7 Copy   of   pay   bill   Register   of   Rajkiya   Mahila   PG   College,
Rampur   for   the   month   of   August   1990,   December   1992,
January 1993 and February 1993
R11 A95/1­
34 Copy   of   service   book   of   Tazeen   Fatima,   lecturer,   political
science   who   was   made   permanent   by   Government   Order
dated   11.02.1997   w.e.f.   20.04.1988.   She   submitted   her  GIS
nomination   form   under   his   own   signature   on
26.04.2001(A95/25)   nominated   Mohd.   Azam   Khan
(husband) 53 years­50%, Mohd Adeel Ajam Khan (Bitu) (son)
15   years   ­   25%   and   Mohd.   Abdullah   Azam   Khan   (son)   8
years ­ 25 %
R12 A­96/1­ Application of Dr.  Tazeen Fatima, dated  17.01.2015  (mother
28

5 of the respondent) to Nagar Swastha Adhikari, Nagar Nigam,
Lucknow, requesting him to issue birth certificate of her son
Mohd.   Abdullah   Azam   Khan   as   per   enclosed   affidavit.   Her
son's   birth   may   be   got   verified   from   the   records   of   Queen
Mary's Hospital.
A96/3 Computer   generated   sheet   of   Nagar   Nigam,   Lucknow,
mentioning date of birth registration 21.012015, date of birth
30.09.1990   and  name   Mohd.  Abdullah  Azam  Khan,   place  of
birth ­ Queen Mary's Hospital, dated 21.4.2015
A96/4­5 Photostat   copy   of   birth   register   of   Nagar   Nigam,   Lucknow
containing entry in the name of Abdullah Mohd. Azam Khan
recorded   in   the   register   on   30.09.1990.   Above   it   on   A95/4
are   two   entries   of   birth   recorded   on   07.02.1992   and
25.06.1993 bearing order of some officer to record the birth.
The next page (A95/5) starts with the date 02.10.1990 but at
the bottom of the page dates are 26.09.1990 and 27.09.1990
9.   Oral Evidence of Defendant/respondent:
D.W.­1   ­   Dr.   Shailendra   K.   Tiwari,   Assistant   Director   of   Higher
Education, U.P. Prayagraj.
D.W.­2   ­   Dr.   Archana   Dwivedi,   Additional   Municipal   Commissioner,
Lucknow.
D.W.­3   ­   Dr.   Uma   Singh,   Sr.   Gynecologist   Queen   Mary's   Hospital
(Department of Obst. & Gyno.)
D.W.­4 ­ Dr. Vineeta Das ­ HOD Obst. & Gyno., Queen Mary's Hospital,
Lucknow.
D.W.­5 ­ Dr. Tazeen Fatima, (mother of the respondent)
D.W.­6 ­ Dr. Vandana Sharma ­ Principal Rajkiya Mahila Post Graduate
Degree College, Rampur. 
D.W.­7   ­   Arun   Josheph   Dayal.   Director   Saint   Paul   School,   Civil   Line,
Rampur.
D.W.­8 ­ Dr. Satibir Sing Ken, Radiologist, District Hospital, Rampur.
D.W.­9 ­ Shahzeb Khan, friend of father of the respondent.
D.W.­10 ­ Mohd. Abdullah Azam Khan, respondent.
Analysis of the Evidence  
29

22. Now,   we   shall   advert   to   the   circumstances   appearing   in
the case which support the view taken by us.  The notification
was   issued   notifying   the   schedule   for   election   of   UP   State
Legislative Assembly  from   34, Suar  Assembly  Constituency  of
District Rampur as under:­
(a) Date of filing of nomination  25 th
 January, 2017
(b) Date of scrutiny of nomination  28 th
 January, 2017
(c) Date of withdrawal of nomination  30 th
 January, 2017
(d) Date of allotment of symbols 1 st
 February, 2017
(e) Date of Poll 15 th
 February, 2017
(f) Date of counting  11 th
 March, 2017
23. The   appellant   filled   his   nomination   papers   on   24 th
January, 2017, and was declared elected on 11 th
  March, 2017
by securing the highest number of votes i.e. 1,06,443 votes.
24. In   the   election   petition   filed   by   the   respondent/election
petitioner,   his   solitary   objection   was   that   the   appellant   was
not   qualified   to   contest   the   election   for   Member   of   Legislative
Assembly   in   view   of   Article   173(b)   of   the   Constitution   as   he
was   less   than   25   years   of   age   when   he   filled   his   nomination
30

papers   and   the   date   on   which   he   contested   the   election   and
also   on   the   date   of   declaration   of   the   result   of   34,   Suar
Assembly Constituency of District Rampur.
25.   The   documentary   evidence   placed   by   the
respondent/election   petitioner   on   record   to   substantiate   that
the   date   of   birth   of   the   appellant   is   1 st
  January,   1993   are   all
public   documents   issued   by   the   public   authorities   and   are
admissible   in   evidence   in   terms   of   Section   35   of   the   Indian
Evidence Act, are as follows:  
          Following   documentary   evidences,   record   birth   year   of   the
appellant to be the year 1993 (01.01.1993):—
(i)   Ex.   P4   ­   paper   No.   A­25/1   ­   Copy   of   secondary   school
examination   Class   10 th
  result   2007   issued   by   Central   Board   of
Secondary Education.
(ii)  Ex.  P1  ­  paper   No.  A­52/2­3,  copy  of  appellant's pass  port  no.
F8757022,   dated   28.08.2006   mentioning   his   date   of   birth
01.01.1993.
(iii) Ex. P1 ­ paper No. A­51/1 ­ copy of birth certificate No. 3857 of
the   appellant   issued   by   Nagar   Palika   Parishad,   Rampur,   showing
date   of   birth   of   the   appellant   as   01.01.1993   and   date   of
Registration 28.06.2012.
(iv) Ex. P1 ­ paper No. A­49/1­4, appellant's pass port application
dated 06.07.2012, filed by him under his signature mentioning his
date of birth as 01.01.1993, and place of birth Rampur.
(v)   Ex.   P­1   ­   paper   No.   53/1,   Pass   port   preview   details   of
appellant's pass port No. K­7951741, dated 13.07.2012 and Ex. P­
2   ­   paper   No.   A62/1­3,   copy   of   appellant's   pass   port   No.   K­
7951741,   dated   13.07.2012   bearing   date   of   birth   as   01.01.1993
and   entries   of   departure/arrival   dated   30.04.2013,   05.05.2013,
31

09.06.2015   and   26.07.2016   and   Visa   dated   09.07.2014   all
mentioning date of birth as 01.01.1993.
(vi)   Ex.R­11   (Paper   No.   A95/1­34)   the   copy   of   service   book   of   the
appellant's mother filed by the appellant in evidence and proved by
the   D.W.­1.   It   contains   G.I.S.   Nomination   form   signed   and
submitted   by   the   appellant's   mother   (D.W.­5)   on   26.04.2001
mentioning appellant's age to be 8 years.
(vii)   Ex.   P3   ­   paper   No.   80/1,   copy   of   appellant's   birth   certificate
dated   28.06.2012,   issued   by   Nagar   Palika   Parishad,   Rampur,
issued on the basis of original record of birth. This birth certificate
was subsequently cancelled by the Registrar on 30.01.2015 on the
application of the appellant.
26. The   respondent/election   petitioner   appeared   as   a
witness, PW.1 and while supporting the documentary evidence
established   that   the   date   of   birth   of   the   appellant   as   per   the
school   records   and   other   documentary   evidence   placed   on
record is 1 st
  January, 1993, at the same time made a specific
averment in his examination­in­chief regarding the documents
placed   by   the   appellant/returned   candidate   on   record,   that
these   are   all   fake   and   forged   documents   which   are
manufactured   to   create   false   evidence   regarding   the   age   and
date of birth of the appellant.   Further, the official documents
issued prior to the year 2015 consistently indicate his date of
birth   as   1 st
  January,   1993   and   that   is   also   elicited   from   his
cross­examination.  
32

27. The Court Witnesses, PW.2 Mohd. Naseem, the Passport
Officer,   Bareilly,   PW.3   Mohd.   Ateer   Ansari,   Junior   Passport
Assistant,   Bareilly   and   PW.4   Tej   Pal   Singh   Verma,   Chief
Sanitation   and   Food   Inspector/Deputy   Registrar   Birth   and
Death,   Nagar   Palika,   Rampur   were   examined   and   they
supported   the   public   documents   placed   on   record   which
establishes   that   the   birth   certificate   issued   by   the   Health
Department,  Nagar  Palika,  Rampur  dated 28 th
  June, 2012,  in
addition,   the   online   application   filled   by   the   appellant   for   the
issuance   of   passport,   the   old   Passport   No.F   8757022   issued
on 28 th
 August, 2006 by PW.2 and PW.3 and placed on record
the   relevant   online   application   and   other   documents   which
were   filed   by   the   appellant   in   January   2015   and   all   such
documents   were   duly   supported   by   the   public   officers   P.W.2
and P.W.3 in their deposition.   The Court Witness PW.4 in his
examination­in­chief   deposed   that   all   registers   and   other
records   related   to   birth   certificate   No.3857   dated   28 th
  June,
2012 of the appellant have been destroyed because of the fire
due   to   short   circuit   on   8 th
  May,   2015   in   the   office   of   Nagar
33

Palika, Rampur  and is unable to  place any  record prior  to  8 th
May,   2015,   but   verified   the   birth   certificate   dated   28 th
  June,
2012 as the record is available in the computer system and a
copy   was   placed   on   record   and   all   these   documents   were
generated either  by the appellant himself or at his instance.   
28. Thus,   from   the   evidence   on   record,   the   respondent   was
able   to   establish   from   the   documentary   evidence   which
belongs to the appellant that consistently from day one he has
shown   his   date   of   birth   as   1 st
  January,   1993   not   only   in   his
academic   record   but   also   in   the   birth   certificate   obtained   by
him   issued  on   28 th
  June,   2012  (Ex.   A­80/1)   by   Nagar   Palika,
Rampur   his   date   of   birth   as   1 st
  January,   1993   which   could
have   been   possible   only   when   the   relevant   documentary
evidence   was   available   with   the   competent   authority/in   the
office   of   Nagar   Palika,   Rampur   and   this   fact   cannot   be   ruled
out. The respondent has established on record that the date of
birth   of   the   appellant   is   1 st
  January,   1993   and   this   fact   was
not disputed by the appellant that the documents placed and
34

relied upon by the respondent on record are public documents
issued by the competent authorities.  
29. At   this   stage,   the   objection   of   the   appellant   was   that
although the documents relied upon by the respondent belong
to him, but the correctness of the documents is in question, in
rebuttal   the   defence   of   the   appellant   throughout   even   in   the
defence   evidence   put   forward   was   that   in   the   year   1995
because   his   father   was   away,   a   friend   of   his   father   DW.9,
Shahzeb   Khan,   took   him   to   the   school   in   1995   and   got
recorded   his   date   of   birth   as   1 st
  January,   1993.     Even   if   this
stand   of   the   appellant   is   taken   on   the   face   value,   the   date   of
birth which is recorded in his Secondary School Examination,
followed with his passport of the year 2006 and his certificate
of   birth   issued   by   Nagar   Palika,   Rampur   with   registration
No.RNPB2012­03857   dated   28 th
  June,   2012   of   which   details
have   been   furnished   at   least   upto   the   year   2015   consistently
in   all   unimpeachable   documentary   evidence   not   only   in   his
academic   records   but   in   all   other   correspondence,   he   has
throughout   reflected   his   date   of   birth   as   1 st
  January,   1993,
35

and since these are all his documents issued from the office of
public authorities by the public officers based on the relevant
data   made   available   by   the   appellant   himself/on   filling
application   online   or   physically,   the   documents   released   to
him in the name of the appellant disclose his date of birth as
1 st
  January,   1993   and   after   evaluation   of   the   documentary
evidence   supported   by   oral   evidence   on   record,   this   Court
certainly can record that it has a sufficient probative value, as
required under Section 35 of the Evidence Act.   
30. At  the  same time, the  appellant,  on  the other  hand, has
not disputed these documents which have been relied upon by
the respondent (election petitioner), of which detailed reference
has   been   made   in   para   8,   said   documents   belong   to   the
appellant   himself   and   are   in   public   domain,   issued   by   the
public   authorities/competent   authorities   and   obviously
information has been extended by the appellant himself and to
make   the   smoke   clear   at   this   stage,   the   defence   of   the
appellant was that at the time when the appellant went to the
school in 1995, the friend of his father DW.9 got recorded his
36

date   of   birth   will   not   have   any   significance,   since   in   the
matriculation   certificate   and   all   applications   which   are   filled
by   the   appellant   himself   and   these   documents   are   generated
which   the   appellant   has   been   failed   to   counter   at   any   given
point of time.   In countering, the appellant has come out with
a   defence   that   his   mother   DW.5   who   was   a   Lecturer   in   a
Postgraduate   College   and   retired   in   2009,   in   her   cross­
examination   deposed   that   her   son   (the   appellant)   after   doing
his   M.Tech   became   active   in   politics   in   the   year   2015   and   at
this time she proceeded for issuance of a birth certificate from
Nagar   Nigam,   Lucknow   and   submitted   application   on   17 th
January, 2015 (Ex.A­96/1­5).   
31. It   is   curious   to   note   that   the   request   made   by   her   was
addressed to the Chief Health Officer, Nagar Nigam, Lucknow
with a statement that her son (the appellant) was born on 30 th
September, 1990 in Queen Mary’s Hospital, Lucknow and the
birth   certificate   is   urgently   needed   for   very   important   and
unavoidable   reasons   and   she   enclosed   her   own   affidavit.     On
such   an   application   being   furnished,   within   three   days,   the
37

birth certificate was issued by Nagar  Nigam, Lucknow on 21 st
January, 2015 (Ex.A­96/3) indicating his date of birth as 30 th
September,   1990,   which   could   not   have   been   ordinarily
possible to obtain by the common man.   
32. It   is   sufficient   to   note   that   there   was   no   documentary
evidence obtained from Queen Mary’s Hospital, Lucknow, prior
to the application dated 17 th
  January, 2015, submitted by her
(mother of appellant) for seeking a birth certificate from Nagar
Nigam, Lucknow and it is not the case of the appellant that his
date   of   birth   recorded   as   1 st
  January,   1993   was   due   to   some
inadvertence, but at later stage, it came across that the correct
date of birth of the appellant is 30 th
 September, 1990 and this
fact revealed in the year 2015, the family proceeded to obtain a
certificate of birth from Nagar Nigam, Lucknow.   
33. It   is   also   to   be   noted   that   on   28 th
  June,   2012,   a   birth
certificate   was   obtained   by   the   appellant   from   Nagar   Palika,
Rampur   and   supporting   documentary   evidence   must   have
been available in the office of Nagar Palika, Rampur, or placed
by the appellant, on the basis of which the birth certificate has
38

been   issued   to   him   on   28 th
  June,   2012,   and   admittedly   it   is
not   possible   that   at   two   different   places   (Rampur/Lucknow)
his   birth   has   taken   place   or   record   is   maintained   and   the
document obtained from Nagar Palika, Rampur, on 28 th
  June,
2012 was completely concealed and the documents were later
generated/obtained   from   Queen   Mary’s   Hospital,   Lucknow,
which were for the first time placed on record in the course of
the election petition.  
34. In   other   words,   the   appellant   was   not   holding   any
documentary   evidence   to   support   his   claim   prior   to   being
placed on record in the course of election petition from Queen
Mary’s   Hospital,   which   was   made   to   be   a   basis   in   the   year
2015   to   seek   a   duplicate   birth   certificate   of   30 th
  September,
1990.   To make it further  clear, the duplicate birth certificate
was   issued   by   Queen   Mary’s   Hospital   on   21 st
  April,   2015
(Ex.A­37)   indicating   the   date   of   birth   of   the   baby   of   DW.5   on
30 th
 September, 1990.  From this document, it is clear that on
17 th
  January,   2015,   on   the   date   when   the   application   was
submitted by his mother (DW.5) addressed to the Chief Health
39

Officer,   Nagar   Nigam,  Lucknow,   to   obtain   the  birth   certificate
of the appellant there was no documentary evidence available
in  the  custody  of  DW.5 to  support that  the  child was  born  in
the hospital on 30 th
 September, 1990.  
35. A   duplicate   birth   certificate   was   obtained   from   Queen
Mary’s   Hospital,   Lucknow   on   21 st
  April,   2015   but   what
happened to the original, if any, has never been placed by the
appellant on record.   Just to make a clarification that even in
the application dated 17 th
  January, 2015, submitted by DW.5
(appellant’s   mother)   there   was   no   mention   of   a   certificate
earlier   issued   and   the   demand   is   to   issue   a   duplicate
certificate of the date of birth of the appellant who is born, as
alleged,   in   the   Queen   Mary’s   Hospital,   Lucknow   on   30 th
September,   1990.       The   very   foundation   on   which   the
appellant   has   proceeded   to   establish   that   his   date   of   birth   is
30 th
 September, 1990 falls on the ground.   
36. It was admitted by DW.5 in her cross­examination that in
all   his   school   records,   Xth,   XIIth,   Undergraduate,
Postgraduate degree, his date of birth recorded is 1 st
  January,
40

1993   and   that   the   question   put   to   her   in   cross­examination
about   the   date   of   birth   of   the   appellant   recorded   in   the
academic record is 1 st
 January, 1993, she made a very curious
statement   that   it   is   the   appellant   who   informed   her   that   his
date   of   birth   is   wrongly   recorded   in   his   school   records,   but
neither   the   appellant   nor   mother­DW.5   ever   proceeded   in
seeking   correction  in   the   date  of   birth   certificate   at  any   given
point of time prior to the year 2015.
37. The appellant himself appeared as DW.10 in the witness
box.     It   was   his   admission   throughout   that   in   the   academic
record,   his   passport,   the   date   of   birth   certificate   issued   from
Nagar   Palika,   Rampur   on   28 th
  June,   2012,   his   date   of   birth
recorded as 1 st
 January, 1993 and curiously, for the first time,
in his examination­in­chief he has stated that his mother told
him that he was born on 30 th
 September, 1990, and not on 1 st
January,   1993,   and   in   reference   to   all   the   documents   which
were put to him in cross­examination, his only statement was
that although these documents belong to him, but his date of
birth   has   been   incorrectly   recorded,   and   later   cancelled,   but
41

while   making   a   statement   of   date   of   birth   being   incorrect,
nothing   in   counter   was   placed   on   record,   except   the
documents   placed   for   the   first   time   in   the   course   of   the
election   petition.       From   where   this   fact   was   gathered,   it   was
not   disclosed   even   in   the   cross­examination   and   a   statement
was   made   in   his   cross­examination   that   his   date   of   birth
either   in   his   birth   certificate   dated   28 th
  June,   2012   or   in
passport   wherever   recorded   of   1 st
  January,   1993   at   a   later
stage   was   cancelled   and   has   made   a   completely   evasive
answer in his cross­examination.   To support in evidence, the
appellant   has   produced   three   basic   documents,   EOT   register
(R­4),   MLR   register   (R­5)   and   discharge   ticket   of   Indoor
Patient.     Dr.   Tazeen   Fatima,   DW.5         (R­7)   and   the   oral
evidence of Prof. Vineeta Das, HoD, Obst. & Gyno. (DW.4), Dr.
Uma   Singh,   Sr.   Gynaecologist   (DW.3)   who   produced   all   the
registers   relating   to   Queen   Mary’s   Hospital,   Lucknow,   of   the
relevant   period   of   the   year   1990,   when   put   to   cross­
examination, reference to the EOT register and particularly to
page   174,   the   question   put   to   her   whether   entry   174   of   EOT
42

register   Annual   No,5097   carry   any   overwriting   on   the
particular   entry,   she   admitted   that   yes,   overwriting   has   been
done and which can be seen in column no.3 of it.  In a further
question   put   to   her   in   the   cross­examination   about   the
description   in   column   no.16   of   the   register   that   whether   it
matches with the information mentioned in rest of the column,
and also that whether the entry of period of pregnancy at page
174   of   EOT   register   is   different   from   entry   of   period   of
pregnancy in page 225 of MLR register, she admitted that yes,
all these entries are different.   The extract of questions put to
Dr.   Uma   Singh   (DW.3)   in   reference   to   the   so­called   official
record of the hospital is as under:
(a) Whether   you   can   say   confidently   that   the   information   of   the
children   born   on   30.09.1990   was   sent   to   Municipal
Corporation, Lucknow?
Ans.:  Yes.
(b) Whether you can tell after seeing the entry of page 174 of EOT
register   Annual   No.5097   carried   along   by   you   that   any
overwriting has been done in this or not?
Ans.   :   Yes,   overwriting   has   been   done   in   it.       Overwriting   is   seen   in
column no.3 of it.
(c) Whether you can tell by seeing the description in column no.16
of   above   register   that   whether   it   matches   with   the   information
mentioned in rest of the column of above register?
Ans.:  No
43

(d) Whether   the   nature   of   period   of   pregnancy   at   page   no.174   of
EOT   register   Annual   No.5097   column   no.10   is   different   from
the entry of period of pregnancy in page no.225 of MLR register
Annual No.1826, Column no.10?
Ans.:  Yes.
(e) Whether   in   the   manner   in   which   the   entries   are   made   at   page
no.225 of MLR register it matches with the entries made on the
above page of other account number?
Ans. :  Do not match totally.
(f) The   EOT   register   and   MLR   register   which   you   have   brought
with you today in the Court and presented before the Court, is
it   attested   or   signatured   by   any   of   the   officer   or   department
head   by   Queen   Mary’s   hospital  or   King   George   Medical?       And
the   entries   therein   or   any   of   the   page   is   signed   or   counter
signed   by   any   of   the   officer   or   doctor   of   the   hospital?   And
whether   both   the   above   mentioned   hospital   registers   are
authenticated by any of the officer or department head?
Ans.:   Above   both   registers   are   not   authenticated   by   the   officer   of
Queen  Mary’s  hospital or   King   George  University.   Above  both
registers   are   also   not   attested.     But   some   of   the   pages   are
signed by consultant of the hospital.
38. To   support   the   documents   placed   on   record   from   the
Queen   Mary’s   Hospital,   Dr.   Vineeta   Das   (DW.4),   the   HoD,
Obstetrics   &   Gynecology   Department,   also   appeared   in   the
witness box.  
39. At   the   same   time,   so   far   as   the   register   of   the   Nagar
Nigam, Lucknow (Ex.R­12) which has been produced by DW.2
Dr.   Archan   Dwivedi,   she   appears   to   have   completely
surrendered in cross­examination in support of the documents
44

placed   by   her.       Few   of   the   questions   put   to   her   in   cross
examination   to   produce   the   register   of   Registration   of   Birth
and   Death   maintained   by   the   Nagar   Nigam,   Lucknow   be
relevant to quote:
(a) Whether   is   it   necessary   to   maintain   the   birth   register   in   the
format given in Registration of Birth & Death Act, 1969?
Ans.:  Yes.
(b) Above   papers   were   shown   again   and   asked   that   can   you   see
this   and   till   that   what   is   date   of   registration   of   birth   of   the
respondent mentioned therein?
Ans.:   In   column   number   3   of   this   paper   date   of   birth   registration   is
21.01.2015.
(c) After   how   many   days the  birth certificate is  being   issued  after
the related entries made in birth register?
Ans.:   When   the   applicant   gives   a   request   letter   thereafter   the   birth
certificate   is   issued.     Birth   registration   is   done   immediately
after receiving of birth list from the hospital.
(d) Whether   the   statement   given   by   you   today   in   front   of   court   is
based on the official record maintained in the office?
Ans.:   Yes, again stated that the above said birth register is not in the
prescribed   format,   and   again   want   to   state   that   the   said
format   only   followed   but   it   has   not   been   used   in   this   case.
Pagination   has   not   been   done   and   neither   register   has   been
attested   nor   pagination   has   been   done   by   any   competent
officer.
 40. The   witness   has   not   even   been   able   to   support   the
documents.     Apart   from   the   said   documents,   we   have   looked
into the  extract  copies of the birth register  maintained by  the
45

Nagar Nigam, Lucknow (Ex.R­12).  Even from the naked eye, it
appears that at page 43, last entry is of 30 th
  September, 1990
and   there   was   no   space   left   on   the   page,   still   it   reveals   that
someone   has   tried   to   insert   a   further   illegal   entry   and   if   it
would have been in continuation on the next page at page 44
after   30 th
  September,   1990,   the   second   entry   comes   on   2nd
October, 1990 and on 1 st
  October, 1990 there is no entry.   At
the   same   time,   all   entries   appear   to   have   been   made   at   the
same   point   of   time   in   continuation   and   this   Court   cannot
attach any credence to the documents on which the appellant
has   heavily   relied   upon   which,   according   to   him,   is   the   basis
for   issuance   of   the   birth   certificate   on   a   mere   application
submitted   by   the   mother   DW.5   dated   17 th
  January,   2015,
issued   by   the   Nagar   Nigam,   Lucknow   on   21 st
  January,   2015.
Rest   of   the   documents   supported   by   the   oral   evidence   placed
by the appellant on record are only to justify that DW.5 was on
maternity   leave   and   a   male   child   was   born   in   the   year   1990
and   the   third   maternity   leave   was   availed   by   her   from   7 th
August, 1990 to 24 th
 October, 1990 and a male child was born
46

on   30 th
  September,   1990,   no   credence   of   any   kind   could   be
attached to it.
41. That  apart from  oral  evidence to support  the documents
placed on record obtained from the Queen Mary’s hospital, we
have looked into the relevant documents and from naked eye it
appears   that   the   EOT   register   where   the   name   of   DW.5,
mother  of  the  appellant   has  been   shown,   entry  appears  to   be
partially   erased   and   rest   of   the   page   other   than   the   entry
relating  to  DW.5,  no  change is being  reflected  from  the  entire
document.  
42. When   the   entire   evidence   is   before   the   Court,   it   is   well
settled   that   the   burden   of   proof   becomes   immaterial   at   the
given point of  time the  document  made   ante  litem motam   can
be   relied   upon   safely   when   such   documents   are   admissible
under   Section   35   of   the   Evidence   Act.   This   Court   in   large
number   of   judgments,   including   Brij   Mohan
Singh   (supra) ,   Updesh  Kumar   and   Others   v.   Prithvi   Singh
and   Others 7
,   State   of   Punjab   v.   Mohinder   Singh 8
,   Vishnu
7   (2001) 2 SCC 524
8   (2005) 3 SCC 702 
47

alias   Undrya   v.   State   of   Maharashtra 9
  and   Satpal
Singh   v.   State   of   Haryana 10
  came   to   the   conclusion   that
while   considering   such   an   issue   and   documents   admissible
under   Section   35   of   the   Evidence   Act,   has   to   examine   the
probative   value   of   the   contents   of   the   document.   The
authenticity of entries may also depend on whose information
such   entry   stood   recorded   and   what   was   his   source   of
information,   meaning   thereby,   that   such   document   may   also
require corroboration in some cases.  
43. In the instant case, the academic record of the appellant
consistently   indicates   the   recorded   date   of   birth   of   the
appellant   is   1 st
  January,   1993   and   to   be   more   specific   before
17 th
  January,   2015,   all   documents   which   were   released   from
various   public   offices   under   the   signatures   of   public
authorities,   the   date   of   birth   of   the   appellant   has   throughout
been   shown   as   1 st
  January,   1993   and   as   stated   by   DW.5
(mother   of   the   appellant)   and   so   also   the   appellant   herein
(DW.10) after doing his post­graduation he wanted to come in
9   (2006) 1 SCC 283
10   (2010) 8 SCC 714
48

active   politics,   application   was   submitted   on   17 th
  January,
2015   for   the   first   time   to   the   office   of   the   Nagar   Nigam,
Lucknow   for   obtaining   the   birth   certificate   of   the   appellant
based on Queen Mary’s Hospital, Lucknow and the fact is that
no   documentary   evidence   was   supported   along   with   the
application,   except   the   affidavit   sworn   by   DW.5   to   the
application dated 17 th
 January, 2015 and it is not possible for
a common man to get the birth certificate in the existing facts
and   circumstances,   but   so   far   as   the   appellant   is   concerned,
birth   certificate   was   issued   with   no   loss   of   time   on   21 st
January,  2015 which was  otherwise not  possible.     It may  be
noticed   that   cancellation   has   taken   place   at   a   later   point   of
time   and   who   is   the   authority   competent   to   cancel,   nothing
has been brought on record but the fact is that the appellant
himself has obtained the certificate of birth from Nagar Palika,
Rampur  on 28 th
  June, 2012 indicating  his date of birth as 1 st
January,   1993  apart  from   other   documentary   evidence   which
the appellant later got cancelled.  This fact cannot be ruled out
that   there   must   be   the   evidence   available   before   the   Nagar
49

Palika,   Rampur,   based   on   which   Birth   Certificate   was   issued
to   him   on   28 th
  January,   2012.     A   very   peculiar   situation   is
created.     Two   birth   certificates   are   issued   by   two   different
authorities (Nagar Palika, Rampur/Nagar Nigam, Lucknow) at
different point of time, the presumption is that there must be
some   documentary   evidence   available   in   the   custody   of
municipality indicating two different dates of birth of the same
person at the same time i.e. the appellant herein. 
44. The judgment relied upon by the appellant in   Birad Mal
Singhvi   (supra)   was   a   case   where   one   of   the   defeated
candidates   filed   an   election   petition   and   his   submission   was
that   there   were   two   other   candidates   whose   nomination
papers were arbitrarily rejected by the election officer but they
neither   came   in   the   witness   box   nor   any   person   appeared   in
the   witness   box   to   support   the   date   of   birth   recorded   in   the
matriculation certificates of those two candidates.  In the given
situation,   those   records   could   not   have   been   relied   upon   and
become inadmissible in view of Section 35 of the Evidence Act.
50

45. So   far   as   the   judgment   relied   upon   by   the   appellant   in
Joshna   Gouda   (supra)   was   a   case   where   the   reliance   was
placed   on   the   school   admission   register   and   admission   form,
including   the   transfer   certificate,   but   no   supporting
evidence/proof   was   available   on   record.     In   that   context,   a
finding   was   recorded   that   conclusive   finding   regarding   the
probative   value   in   reference   to   the   three   documents   Exhs.5,
5A and 7 could not be attached. 
46. It   is   also   trite   law   that   when   both   the   parties   have
adduced   evidence   and   that   too   is   in   reference   to   a   common
question   and   particularly   for   determination   of   age,   which   is
the subject matter of dispute and when both the parties have
adduced   evidence,   the   question   of   onus   of   proof   becomes
academic.   This has been considered by this Court in  Rakesh
Kumar  (supra)  wherein as regards the determination of age of
the   candidate   in   terms   of   Section   36(2)   of   the   Representation
of the People Act, 1951, this Court observed :
“ 27.   In   Sushil   Kumar   v.   Rakesh   Kumar   [(2003)   8   SCC   673]
this Court as regards determination of age of a candidate in
51

terms   of   Section   36(2)   of   the   Representation   of   the   People
Act, 1951 observed: (SCC pp. 684­85, para 32)
“ 32 . The age of a person in an election petition has to be
determined   not   only   on  the  basis   of  the  materials  placed
on   record   but   also   upon   taking   into   consideration   the
circumstances   attending   thereto.   The   initial   burden   to
prove   the   allegations   made   in   the   election   petition
although was upon the election petitioner but for proving
the   facts   which  were   within   the   special  knowledge   of   the
respondent, the burden was upon him in terms of Section
106   of   the   Evidence   Act.   It   is   also   trite   that   when   both
parties   have   adduced   evidence,   the   question   of   the   onus
of   proof   becomes   academic   [see   Union   of   India   v.   Sugauli
Sugar Works (P) Ltd.   [(1976) 3 SCC 32] and   Cox and Kings
(Agents)   Ltd.   v.   Workmen   [(1977)   2   SCC   705   :   1977   SCC
(L&S) 342] ]. Furthermore, an admission on the part of a
party to the lis shall be binding on him and in any event a
presumption must  be made that  the same is  taken  to be
established.”
This   Court   therein   followed,   inter   alia,   Birad   Mal
Singhvi   [1988 Supp SCC 604] and several other decisions.”
47. In   the   instant   case,   the   documents   issued   by   Nagar
Palika, Rampur in the year 2012, clearly indicate the recorded
date of birth as 1 st
 January, 1993 and which is duly supported
by   his   academic   record   from   Class   X   onwards   at   all   stages
which   had   been   generated   only   under   the   appellant’s   own
signatures or under the authority of the appellant and this in
no manner could be disputed.     Merely because the same has
been   later   on   cancelled   by   the   appellant,   it   may   not   lose   its
evidentiary value.  
52

48. In   this   regard,   it   may   be   relevant   to   note   that   Section
13(3) of the Registration of Birth and Death Act, 1969, clearly
postulates   that   delayed   registration   of   birth   and   death   are
permissible provided a procedure prescribed has been followed
after   taking   orders   from   the   Magistrate   and   proving   the
correctness   of   the   date   of   birth.     Although   the   defence   of   the
appellant is that since his name was already registered in the
records   of   Nagar   Nigam,   Lucknow,   Section   13(3)   of   the
Registration of Birth and Death Act, 1969 may not apply, but
this   submission   appears   to   be   misplaced   for   the   reason   that
on   the   basis   of   the   birth   record   maintained   by   the   Nagar
Palika, Rampur, the birth certificate was issued to him under
the orders of the competent authority on 28 th
 June, 2012, and
there cannot be two separate records of birth available in two
different municipalities (Rampur/Lucknow) of the same person
and   in   the   given   situation,   no   credibility   can   be   attached   on
the records maintained by the Nagar Nigam, Lucknow, and in
our   considered   view,   the   procedure   as   prescribed   under
Section   13(3)   of   the   Act,   1969,   in   the   ordinary   course   of
53

business, was supposed to be adopted by the authorities while
a   fresh   certificate   of   date   of   birth   was   issued   to   him   on   21 st
January,   2015,   which   indeed   has   not   been   followed   by   the
competent authority by Nagar Nigam, Lucknow.
49. In   the   instant   case,   the   date   of   birth   of   the   appellant
throughout in his records is 1 st
 January, 1993 and only in the
year 2015 when the appellant became keen to enter into active
politics,   the   mother   of   the   appellant   (DW­5)   submitted   an
application   for   the   first   time   on   17 th
  January,   2015,   claiming
that the appellant was born on 30 th
 September 1990, and birth
certificate may  be immediately  issued to her  and within three
days,   birth   certificate   was   issued   by   the   Nagar   Nigam,
Lucknow   on   21 st
  January,   2015.     In   support   thereof,   the
documentary   evidence   which   the   appellant   has   placed   on
record obtained from the Queen Mary’s Hospital, Lucknow, as
a foundation on which the birth certificate has been issued as
alleged   from   the   Nagar   Nigam,   Lucknow,   in   our   considered
view, no probative value could have been attached to it.
54

50. The   High   Court,   in   our   considered   view,   has   examined
the  documentary  and the  oral  evidence available on record in
extenso, we find that no manifest error was committed by the
High Court in passing the impugned judgment, which may call
for our interference. 
51. Consequently,   the   appeal   fails   and   is   accordingly
dismissed.   No costs.
52. Pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of.
….
…………………………J.
(AJAY RASTOGI)
…………………………….J.
(B.V. NAGARATHNA)
NEW DELHI
NOVEMBER 07, 2022.
55

1
REPORTABLE
IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 104 OF 2020
MOHD. ABDULLAH AZAM KHAN      APPELLANT
VERSUS
NAWAB KAZIM ALI KHAN  RESPONDENT
J U D G M E N T
NAGARATHNA J.
I have had the benefit  of reading  the judgment  proposed  by  His Lordship
Ajay   Rastogi,   J.   While   I   concur   with   the   reasoning   as   well   as   the   conclusion
arrived at by His Lordship, I, however, wish to elaborate on the reasoning and
also assign additional reasons for dismissing the appeal.
2. This   appeal   assails   the   judgment   of   the   High   Court   of   Judicature   at
Allahabad,   dated   16.12.2019   in   Election   Petition   No.08   of   2017   by   which   the
petition filed by the election petitioner herein against the successful candidate
herein has been allowed and the election of the successful candidate herein, to

2
the Uttar Pradesh Legislative Assembly from the 34­Suar Constituency, District
Rampur held in the year 2017 has been set aside. 
For   the   sake   of   convenience,   the   rank   of   the   parties   herein   shall   be
referred to as per their rank and status in the Election Petition filed before the
High Court. In other  words, they shall be referred  to as the election petitioner
and the successful candidate, respectively.
3. Succinctly stated, the facts giving rise to the instant appeal are as under:
3.1. A notification was published  under  Section 15 of the Representation of
People   Act,   1951(hereinafter   referred   to   as   R.P.   Act),   notifying   the
election of Uttar Pradesh State Legislative Assembly,  inter­alia,  from 34­
Suar   Constituency,   District   Rampur,   Uttar   Pradesh.   As   per   the   said
notification,   the   last   date   for   filing   the   nomination   for   contesting   the
election   was   25.01.2017   and   the   poll   was   scheduled   to   be   held   on
15.02.2017.   The   appellant   was   the   successful   candidate   while   the
election petitioner was the unsuccessful candidate who filed the election
petition.
3.2. The successful candidate filed his nomination on 24.01.2017, to contest
the   elections,   from   34­Suar   Constituency,   District   Rampur,   Uttar
Pradesh.   Subsequently,   the   election   petitioner,   namely,   Nawab   Kazim
Ali Khan, filed an objection before the Returning Officer, challenging the
successful   candidate’s   nomination   on   the   ground   that   he   had   not

3
attained the age of twenty­five years at the time of filing his nomination
and   was   therefore,   ineligible   to   contest   the   election   in   view   of   Article
173(b) of the Constitution of India. The election  petitioner  had filed his
objection on the basis of a newspaper article published in a local daily,
Dainik Jagran Amar Ujala  on 28.01.2017. 
3.3. By order dated 30.01.2017, the Returning Officer rejected the objection
filed   by   the   election   petitioner   herein   by   observing   that   the   successful
candidate herein had stated in Column B of Section 3 of the nomination
form,   as   also   in   Form   26,   that   his   age   was   twenty­six   years.   That   in
support of such claim, the successful candidate had attached his Birth
Certificate   (No.229428)   which   was   issued   to   him   by   the   Nagar   Nigam,
Lucknow, on 21.05.2015 and in the said document, the date of birth of
the   successful   candidate   was   recorded   as   30.09.1990.   It   was   further
noted   that   as   per   the   successful   candidate’s   Aadhar   card   and   the
electoral   roll,   his   age   at   the   relevant   time   was   twenty­six   years.
Consequent   to   the   rejection   of   the   objections   raised   by   the   election
petitioner   and   on   the   basis   of   the   documents   submitted   and   details
furnished   by   the   successful   candidate   in   the   nomination   form,   his
nomination was accepted by the Returning Officer.
3.4. The election was held as scheduled  on 15.02.2017 and on 11.03.2017,
the appellant was declared as the successful candidate in the election to
the Uttar Pradesh Legislative Assembly from the 34­Suar Constituency,

4
District   Rampur.   The   election   petitioner   herein   stood   third   in   the   said
election. 
4. In   the   above   background,   the   election   petitioner   filed   Election   Petition
No.08   of   2017   before   the   High   Court   of   Judicature   at   Allahabad,   seeking   a
declaration   that   the   election   of   the   successful   candidate   to   the   Uttar   Pradesh
Legislative   Assembly   be   declared   as   null   and   void,   for   non­compliance   of   the
requirements of Article 173(b) of the Constitution of India. The said prayer was
allowed by the High Court and the election of the successful candidate was set
aside.  Hence, this appeal.
Pleadings:
5. The averments made by the election petitioner in his Election Petition do
not call for a reiteration except to the following extent:
i) That the successful candidate had not completed twenty­five years of age,
both, as on the date of scrutiny of the nomination papers as well as on the
date of the election and therefore, his candidature seeking  election to the
Uttar   Pradesh   Legislative   Assembly   ought   not   to   have   been   accepted   in
light of Article 173(b) of the Constitution of India read with Section 36(2) of
the R.P. Act. 
ii) That the birth certificates produced by the successful candidate before the
Returning   Officer   were   duplicate   certificates   issued   by   the   Queen   Mary’s
Hospital,   Lucknow,   and   the   Nagar   Nigam,   Lucknow,   on   21.04.2015   and

5
21.01.2015, respectively, and not on 30.09.1990, being the date on which
the   successful   candidate   was   stated   to   have   been   born.   Therefore,   such
documents   did   not   reflect   the   correct   date   of   birth   of   the   successful
candidate.
iii) That   the   Returning   Officer   rejected   the   objection   filed   by   the   election
petitioner without verifying the date of birth of the successful candidate in
the   original   birth   certificates   issued   by   the   Queen   Mary’s   Hospital,
Lucknow and the Nagar Nigam, Lucknow. The birth certificates issued by
the Queen Mary’s Hospital, Lucknow and the Nagar Nigam, Lucknow were
fabricated   documents   and   the   successful   candidate’s   actual   birth
certificate   was   issued   by   the   Registrar   (Birth   and   Death),   Nagar   Palika
Parishad, Rampur, Uttar Pradesh and as per the said document, his date
of   birth   was   01.01.1993   and   not   30.09.1990   as   contended   by   the
successful candidate. 
On   the   above   pleadings,   the   election   petitioner   sought   setting   aside   the
election of the successful candidate.
6. In   response   to   the   Election   Petition,   the   successful   candidate   in   the
election,   filed   his  written   statement   before   the   High  Court,   inter alia ,   with  the
following averments:
i) That he was born on 30.09.1990 at Queen Mary’s Hospital, Lucknow, and
not on 01.01.1993 as alleged by the election petitioner. Therefore, he was

6
above   the   age   of   twenty­five   years   as   on   the   last   date   of   filing   the
nomination, i.e., on 25.01.2017, on the date of scrutiny of his nomination,
i.e., 28.01.2017 and on the date on which he was declared as the elected
candidate, i.e., on 11.03.2017. Hence, he was duly qualified to contest the
election   and   hold   the   office   of   a   Member   of   Legislative   Assembly,   under
Article 173(b) of the Constitution of India and provisions of the R.P. Act. 
ii) That   the   Returning   Officer   rightly   rejected   the   objections   raised   by   the
election   petitioner   in   view   of   the   fact   that   there   was   no   defect   of   a
substantial   nature   in   the   successful   candidate’s   nomination   paper   and
accompanying documents. 
With the aforesaid averments it was prayed that the Election Petition filed
by   the   election   petitioner   be   dismissed   by   the   High   Court   as   being   devoid   of
merit. 
6.1.   The election petitioner filed his replication to the written statement which
is summarised as under:
(A) While   denying   the   contents   of   the   written   statement   to   be   true   and
the   documents   attached   to   the   written   statement   being   fabricated,
forged  and misleading,  the election   petitioner  reiterated  the contents
of his election petition. 
(B) The election petitioner has taken an additional plea to the effect that
on   14.08.2017,   the   Election   Officer   Rampur,   had   forwarded   a
representation   which   was   moved   by   one,   Mr.   Akash   Kumar   Saxena,

7
Chairman   of   the   Indian  Industries   Association,   to   the   Chief   Election
Officer,   disclosing   discrepancies   with   respect   to   the   Pan   Card   of   the
successful   candidate.   That   the   successful   candidate   had
clandestinely   procured   a   new   Pan   Card   bearing   No.   DWAPK7513R
which was issued to him on 24.03.2015, showing his date of birth as
30.09.1990   by   deliberately   concealing   the   fact   that   he   had   already
been issued Pan Card No. DFOPK6164K on 30.08.2013 in which his
date   of   birth   was   recorded   as   01.01.1993.   As   per   the   original   pan
card, the successful candidate was less than twenty­five years of age,
whereas,   according   to   his   new   pan   card   he   was   twenty­six   years   of
age. 
(C) Further,   the   successful   candidate   had   opened   a   bank   account   no.
34341386006 in State Bank of India with Pan Card No. DFOPK6164K
wherein   his   date   of   birth   in   the   bank   account   was   recorded   as
01.01.1993.   That   the   successful   candidate   had   two   pan   cards   and
had   not   disclosed   his   correct   income   while   contesting   the   legislative
assembly elections.
Evidence:
7. The   parties   let   in   oral   as   well   as   documentary   evidence   in   the   Election
Petition:

8
7.1.     The   election   petitioner   let   in   oral   evidence   through   PW­1   ­   PW­4
witnesses.   The   election   petitioner   got   marked   Exhibit   P­1   to   P­4
documents.
7.2.       The   successful   candidate   let   in   oral   evidence   through   DW­1   ­   DW­10
witnesses.   The   successful   candidate   got   marked   Exb.   No.­   R1­R12
documents. 
7.3.       On   the   basis   of   oral   and   documentary   evidence   on   record,   High   Court
allowed   the   Election   Petition   filed   by   the   election   petitioner   herein   and
set   aside   the   election   of   the   successful   candidate/appellant   herein   in
respect   of   34­Suar   Constituency,   District   Rampur,   held   in   the   year
2017. Being aggrieved successful candidate has preferred this appeal.
Submissions:
We   have   heard   Shri   Kapil   Sibal,   learned   senior   counsel   instructed   by
learned counsel on behalf of the successful candidate whose election has been
set aside by the High Court and Shri Aadil Singh Boparai, learned counsel for
the respondent instructed by learned counsel.
8.           The  submissions  on  behalf  of the appellant­successful  candidate  do not
call for reiteration and are epitomised as under:  
8.1. Learned   senior   counsel,   Shri   Kapil   Sibal,   appearing   on   behalf   of   the
successful   candidate   submitted   that   the   impugned   judgment   of   the
High   Court   had   been   rendered   based   on   an   erroneous   appreciation   of

9
law   and   facts   relating   to   the   controversy   at   hand,   and   also   on   an
incorrect   understanding   of   the   fact   in   issue.   That   the   appellant­
successful candidate, at the time of filing his nomination as well on the
date   of   polling,   had   completed   the   age   of   twenty­five   years   and   was
therefore   competent   in   all   respects   to   hold   the   office   of   Member   of
Legislative Assembly. 
8.2.  It   was   contented   that   the   fact   in   issue   in   the   present   case   is   not
whether   the   successful   candidate   entered   his   date   of   birth   as
01.01.1993   in   his   official   documents,   but   whether   the   successful
candidate was actually born on 01.01.1993; or whether despite the fact
that certain documents had recorded the successful candidate’s date of
birth   to   be   01.01.1993,   he   was   actually   born   on   another   date,   i.e.,
30.09.1990. 
8.3. It   was   submitted   that   the   best   evidence   as   regards   the   actual   date   of
birth   of   the   successful   candidate,   was   the   testimonial   evidence   of   the
successful   candidate’s   mother   (DW­5)   and   the   doctor   (DW­3)   who
delivered   the   successful   candidate.   That   the   law   of   evidence   requires
that direct and primary evidence, if available, must be given for proof of
a fact and such evidence would be the best  evidence of such fact. This
foundational   rule   is   reflected,   inter­alia,   in   Sections   59   to   65   and
Section   91   of   the   Indian   Evidence   Act,   1872   (hereinafter   referred   to   as
“Evidence Act” for the sake of brevity). In the instant case, the evidence

10
of the successful candidate’s  mother  and the delivering  doctor  is direct
oral evidence of the fact of birth of the successful candidate on a given
date. 
8.4.     It   was   vehemently   contended   that   DW­5’s   testimony   was   fully
corroborated   by   the   recitals   in   her   service   book   and   salary   register,   as
also   by   the   hospital   records.   That   the   hospital   records   such   as   the
Emergency O.T. (E.O.T) register and the Maternity Labour room Register
(MLR),   were   not   only   primary   and   direct   evidences   that   were
contemporaneous to the event of birth, but were also public documents
which were produced from proper custody and therefore, they would be
both relevant and admissible under Section 35 read with Section 74 of
the Evidence Act. 
8.5. Further,   referring   to   the   testimony   of   DW­3,   namely,   Dr.   Uma   Singh,
who is stated to be the doctor who enabled the delivery of the successful
candidate,   it   was  submitted   that   the   statements   made   by   DW­3,   when
considered   together   with   the   hospital   records,   conclusively   establish
that the successful candidate was born on 30.09.1990. That DW­3 was
one   such   witness,   who   was   connected   with   the   successful   candidate’s
birth in a manner as would enable her to vouchsafe the truth as to the
date   of   birth   of   the   successful   candidate.   That   the   High   Court
committed   a   grave   error   in   disregarding   the   evidence   of   DW­3   on   the
sole   ground   that   she   stated   that   she   was   unable   to   say   with   certainty

11
that the baby born to DW­5 on 30.09.1990, was in fact, the successful
candidate.   That   to   expect   DW­3   to   make   such   an   assertion,   was   an
absurd requirement, which was not contemplated under law. 
8.6. Shri   Kapil   Sibal,   learned   senior   counsel   sought   to   explain   the
discrepancy   in   the   period   of   pregnancy   of   the   successful   candidate’s
mother, as recorded in Column 10 of the relevant entry in the maternity
labour   room   register   by   stating   that   the   age   of   the   successful
candidate’s   mother   at   the   time,   i.e.,   38   years,   had   been   incorrectly
entered in the column dedicated for ‘period of pregnancy.’ That this was
in   the   nature   of   a   clerical   error   and   ought   not   to   be   held   to   have   a
material bearing on the authenticity of the record itself, more so, when
all other details recorded in the said register were correct. 
8.7. As   regards   the   allegations   of   forgery   and   fabrication   of   the   hospital
records,   it   was   averred   that   by   making   entries   as   to   the   successful
candidate’s   birth   on   a   later   date,   it   would   require   a   single   horizontal
space   in   the   registers   ought   to   have   been   kept   blank   since   1990,   till
whenever the successful candidate is alleged to have created the forged
records. Such an assumption is wholly improbable and therefore, there
is   no   possibility   of   forgery   and   fabrication   of   the   hospital   records.
Further, no such absurd presumption could be made particularly when
the   hospital   records   stood   corroborated   by   the   testimonial   evidence   of
DW­4, namely, Dr. Vineeta Das, Head of the Department of Gynaecology

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and   Obstetrics   as   well   as   by   the   birth   certificate   dated   21.04.2015
issued by DW­3 and DW 4 and proved by them. 
8.8.    It was next contended that the High Court’s reliance on school records of
the   successful   candidate,   wherein   his   date   of   birth   was   incorrectly
recorded   as   01.01.1993,   was   misplaced.   That   school   records   are   not
direct   evidence   of   the   fact   of   birth   and   cannot,   on   a   balance   of
probabilities, be given pre­eminence over direct evidence of the mother,
delivering   doctor   and   contemporaneously   created   hospital   records.   In
order   to   buttress   such   averments,   reliance   was   placed   on   Birad   Mal
Singhvi vs. Anand Purohit   A.I.R. 1988 SC 1796 ;   Sushil Kumar vs.
Rakesh   Kumar   (2003)   8   SCC   673 ;   Joshna   Gouda   vs.   Brundaban
Gouda   (2012) 5 SCC 634 .
    8.9.    It  was further  submitted  that  the error  in the school  records   had  been
sufficiently explained by DW­5, as well as DW­9, who is the person who
is   stated   to   have   accompanied   the   successful   candidate   to   get   him
admitted   in   school.   That   it   is   a   common   practice   in   India   to   give   a
belated date of birth at the time of admission in school so as to secure
benefit of enhanced years of public service, and such practice has been
acknowledged   by   this   Court   in   Brij   Mohan   Singh   vs.   Priya   Brat
Narain Sinha and Ors .  A.I.R. 1965 SC 282.  

13
8.10.   As regards the election petitioner’s reliance on the GIS nomination form
of   the   successful   candidate’s   mother,   wherein   she   had   stated   that   the
successful   candidate   was   eight   years   old   as   on   26.04.2001,   it   was
submitted   that   the   said   document   was   neither   direct   nor
contemporaneous  proof of birth on a certain date. The  GIS nomination
form was at best a piece of circumstantial evidence which had no weight
and   could   not   establish   that   the   successful   candidate’s   date   of   birth
was 01.01.1993. 
8.11.     On   the   basis   of   the   aforesaid   submissions,   it   was   asserted   that   the
election   petitioner   had   not   produced   sufficient   evidence   so   as   to
discharge   the   burden   of   proof   to   prove   his   positive   case,   as   required
under law,  vide   Birad Mal Singhvi (supra)  and  Sushil  Kumar (supra) .
That the entire case of the election petitioner was based on conjectures
and   farfetched   presumptions   as   to   exertion   of   pressure   by   the
successful   candidate’s   father,   for   issuance   of   forged   certificates   and
therefore,   the   Election   Petition   ought   not   to   have   been   entertained   by
the High Court. 
With   the   aforesaid   averments,   it   was   prayed   that   the   impugned
judgment be set aside and the instant appeal be allowed by dismissing
the election petition. 

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9.  The submissions on behalf of the learned counsel for respondent­election
petitioner Sri Boparai, are summarised as under:
9.1.   Learned   counsel   for   the   election   petitioner   supported   the   impugned
judgment and contended that there was no infirmity in the findings and
decision   of   the   High   Court   which   would   call   for   interference   by   this
Court.   Hence,   it   was  prayed   that   the   instant   appeal   may   be   dismissed
and the judgment of the High Court dated 16.12.2019 be confirmed. 
9.2.  Learned   counsel   elaborated   his   submissions   by   contending   that   the
nomination of the successful candidate herein to be a candidate for the
Uttar   Pradesh   Legislative   Assembly   Elections   from   the   Suar   District
Constituency,   District   Rampur,   was   erroneously   accepted   as   the
successful candidate was underaged and had not completed twenty­five
years   of   age   which   is   a   qualification   and   an   eligibility   criterion   under
Article 173 (b) of the Constitution of India. That since the nomination of
the   successful   candidate   was   improperly   accepted   and   he   was
ultimately   declared   the   successful   candidate   in   the   said   election,   the
result   was   liable   to   be   set   aside   which   was   rightly   done   by   the   High
Court.  
9.3. Learned   counsel   for   the   election   petitioner   contended   that   the   correct
date   of   birth   of   the   successful   candidate   is   01.01.1993   as   recorded   in
the   Class­X   mark­sheet   of   the   successful   candidate;   the   passports
issued   to   him   dated   28.08.2006   and   13.07.2012,   the   successful

15
candidate’s   original   birth   certificate   dated   28.06.2012   issued   by   the
Nagar   Palika   Parishad,   Rampur,   the   passport   applications   of   the
successful candidate pertaining to the year 2012 and the visa issued to
the   successful   candidate   dated   09.07.2014.   It   was   further   contended
that the aforesaid documents are public documents and the same were
not   denied   by   the   successful   candidate,   hence,   they   were   admissible
and   relevant   under   Section   21   and   35   of   the   Evidence   Act   and   a
presumption would arise as to the validity of such documents. 
9.4. It   was   next   contended   that   the   defence   taken   by   the   successful
candidate   that   he   came   to   know   about   the   incorrect   date   of   birth
mentioned   in   the   aforesaid   documents   only   in   the   year   2015   and   the
passport   and   other   documents   were   eventually   cancelled,   did   not
inspire confidence as the successful candidate in his cross­examination
had   stated   that   the   process   of   cancellation   was   initiated   in   the   year
2018, much after the election petitioner filed the Election Petition before
the   High   Court.   That   such   a   conduct   of   the   successful   candidate   was
demonstrative   of   the   fact   that   attempts   were   made   to   fabricate   an
earlier   date   of   birth   in   the   records   pertaining   to   the   successful
candidate, only when his election was challenged, and not prior to that. 
9.5. Learned   counsel   for   the   election   petitioner   averred   that   he   had
discharged   the   initial   burden   of   proof   by   adducing   the   aforesaid
documents   as   evidence   wherein   the   date   of   birth   of   the   successful

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candidate   was   recorded   as   01.01.1993.   That   the   existence   of   such
documents   as   well   as   the   contents   thereof   stood   admitted   by   the
successful   candidate;   so   also,   the   fact   that   the   said   documents   were
signed  and submitted  by him  before  the competent  authorities.  In that
context,   reliance   was   placed   on   the   judgment   of   the   Privy   Council   in
Rani   Chandra   Kunwar   vs.   Chaudhari   Narpat   Singh   and   Ors.
(1906)   SCC   OnLine   PC   26   to   contend   that   once   the   successful
candidate   had   admitted   the   execution   of   the   aforesaid   public
documents,   the   onus   of   proof   shifted   on   the   successful   candidate   to
adduce evidence to rebut the presumption and further demonstrate that
his date of birth is 30.09.1990 and not 01.01.1993. 
9.6. The election petitioner also relied on  Sushil Kumar vs. Rakesh Kumar
(2003) 8 SCC 673,   to assert that, when both the parties have adduced
evidence   in   an   election   petition,   the   question   of   onus   of   proof   would
become   academic   and   therefore,   it   was   for   the   Court   to   appreciate   the
contrary oral and documentary evidence and arrive at a conclusion,   de
hors   considerations   as   to   who   was   to   discharge   whole   or   part   of   the
burden of proof. 
9.7. Learned   counsel   for   the   election   petitioner   referred   to   the   GIS   (Group
Insurance Scheme) Nomination form in the service book (Ex. R­11 Paper
No. A­95/25) of the successful candidate’s mother, which was proved in

17
evidence by DW­1­ S. K. Tiwari, Assistant Director of Higher Education,
Uttar Pradesh, to contend that the said form was signed by the mother
of the successful candidate on 26.04.2001 and in the said form she had
admitted   that   the   successful   candidate   was   eight   years   old   as   on
26.04.2001. Such an admission was conclusive proof of the fact that he
was   born   in   the   year   1993   and   was   therefore   eight   years   old   in   April,
2001.   The   said   GIS   Form   was   adduced   as   a   piece   of   evidence   by   the
successful   candidate   and   was   also   adverted   to   by   DW­5   –   Dr.   Tazeen
Fatima   in   her   cross­examination.   However,   she   did   not   offer   any
explanation as to the successful candidate’s age in the said form. In this
regard,   reliance   was   placed   on   the   judgment   of   this   Court   in   P.C.
Purushothama   Reddiar   vs.   S.   Perumal   (1972)   1   SCC   9   wherein   it
was  observed   that   once   a  document   is  properly   admitted,   the  contents
of that document are also admitted in evidence and no further evidence
would   have   to   be   let   in   by   the   party   relying   on   such   an   admission   to
establish the fact so admitted. 
9.8. It was submitted that the E.O.T Register (Ex. R­4 Paper No. A­100/1­2)
and   the   M.L.R.   Register   (Ex.   R­5   Paper   No.   A­101/1­2)   adduced   as
evidence   by   the   successful   candidate,   were   neither   authenticated   nor
certified   by   the   competent   authority   of   Queen   Mary’s   Hospital.   There
were   irregularities   including   entry   of   wrong   name,   discrepancy   in   the
records pertaining to period of pregnancy, etc., which were admitted by

18
DW­3, Dr. Uma Singh, in her cross­examination and more importantly,
D.W.3   also   stated   that   she   could   not   confirm   that   the   successful
candidate was born on 30.09.1990. 
9.9.       It   was   next   contended   that   the   Birth   Certificate   issued   by   the   Nagar
Nigam, Lucknow,  wherein the date of  birth  of the successful  candidate
was shown as 30.09.1990, was based on a purported entry in the birth
register (Ex. R­12 A 96/4­5) which was tendered as evidence  by DW­2,
Dr.   Archana   Dwivedi,   Additional   Municipal   Commissioner,   Nagar
Nigam, Lucknow  and the said entry was as a result of manipulation of
the public records.   That DW­2 in her cross­examination had stated that
the   birth   register   was   maintained   by   a   clerk   and   was   not   in   the
prescribed format as per  the mandate of the Registration of Births Act,
1969,   (hereinafter   referred   to  as  the   “Act”,   for   the  sake   of  brevity),   and
the same had not been authenticated or verified by a competent official.
Further, the birth register was not paginated and the entry of the name
of   the   successful   candidate’s   mother   was   not   made   in   a   chronological
order.   Also,   DW­2   testified   that   the   Birth   List   maintained   by   the
hospital,   on   the   basis   of   which   birth   entry   of   successful   candidate’s
name   was   made   in   the   birth   register   maintained   by   the   municipality,
was not available. Therefore, the substratum or the basis of making the
entry   in   the   birth   register   maintained   by   the   municipality   was   not

19
available and hence, the corresponding entry was a result of extraneous
factors.
9.10.   Further,   it   was   submitted   that   reliance   placed   by   the   successful
candidate on the result of the ossification test did not prove that he was
born   on   30.09.1990.   In   order   to   buttress   such   contention,   learned
counsel   for   the   election   petitioner   placed   reliance   on   Mukarrab   and
others vs. State of U.P. (2017) 2 SCC 210  wherein it was observed by
this Court that Ossification Test cannot be solely relied upon and is not
a conclusive proof of age. In furtherance of such an argument, learned
counsel for the election petitioner referred to the testimony of DW­8, Dr.
Satbir   Singh   Ken,   who,   in   his   cross­examination   had   admitted   that
ossification   test   is   not   a   definitive   proof   of   age   as   the   result   of   such   a
test could vary from the actual age, to a certain degree. 
With   the   aforesaid   averments,   it   was   prayed   that   the   present   appeal   be
dismissed as being devoid of merit and the impugned judgment be confirmed. 
Points for consideration:
10. Article   173(b)   of  the  Constitution  of  India  states   that  a  person   shall not
be qualified to be chosen to fill a seat in the legislature of the state unless he is,
in the case of seat in the legislative assembly, not less than twenty­five years of
age and in the case of a seat in the legislative council not less than thirty years
of age.

20
Having   heard   learned   senior   counsel   and   learned   counsel   for   the
respective parties and on perusal of the material on record, the following points
would arise for consideration: 
(i)  Whether   the   High   Court   was   correct   and   justified   in
allowing   Election   Petition   No.08   of   2017   filed   by   the   election
petitioner   against   the   successful   candidate   and   thereby
setting   aside   the   election   of   the   successful   candidate   to   the
office   of   Member   of   Legislative   Assembly,   from   34­Suar
Constituency,   District   Rampur,   Uttar   Pradesh,   on   the   ground
that there was improper acceptance of successful candidate’s
nomination paper and  there was a breach of Article 173(b)  of
the Constitution of India? 
(ii)  What order?
11. The   narration   of   facts   and   contentions   would   not   call   for   reiteration
except stating that the successful candidate is aggrieved by his election to the
Legislative   Assembly   vis­à­vis   34­   Suar   Constituency,   District   Rampur,   Uttar
Pradesh,   being   set   aside   at   the   instance   of   the   election   petitioner   by   the
impugned judgment of the High Court. 
12. Before proceeding to consider the evidence let in by the respective parties
in order  to ascertain whether, the conclusions arrived at by the High Court in
allowing   the   Election   Petition   filed   by   the   election   petitioner   herein,   are   just

21
and proper, it is necessary to discuss and delineate on the relevant judgments
of   this   Court   cited   at   the   Bar   with   regard   to   burden   of   proof   in   light   of   the
relevant provisions of the Evidence Act.
12.1.       The   legal  scheme   governing   various   aspects   of   ‘burden   of   proof’   in   the
Indian   context,   is   contained   in   Sections   101   to   106   of   the   Indian
Evidence Act.
12.2.   As per Section 101 of the Indian Evidence Act, when a person is bound
to prove the existence of any fact, it is said that the burden of proof lies
on   that   person.   This   section   is   based   on   the   rule,   ei   incumbit   probatio
qui dicit, non  qui  negat , which means that the burden  of proving  a fact
rests on the party who substantially asserts the affirmative of the issue
and   not   upon   the   party   who   denies   it,   because   a   negative   is   usually
incapable   of   proof.   The   burden   of   proving   a   fact   always   lies   upon   the
person   who   asserts   and   until   such   burden   is   discharged,   the   other
party is not required to be called upon to prove his case. The court has
to   examine   as   to   whether   the   person   upon   whom   the   burden   lies   has
been able to discharge his burden. However, the above rule is subject to
the general principle that things admitted need not be proved.
12.3.   The   question   as   to   whether   burden   of   proof   has   been   discharged   by   a
party to the   lis   or not, would depend upon the facts and circumstances
of the case. If the facts are admitted or, if otherwise, sufficient materials

22
have   been   brought   on   record   so   as   to   enable   a   Court   to   arrive   at   a
definite   conclusion,   it   is   idle   to   contend   that   the   party   on   whom   the
burden of proof lies would still be liable to produce direct evidence,  vide
National Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Rattani  (2009) 2 SCC 75: AIR 2009
SC 1499 . 
12.4.  Burden   to  prove   documents   lie   on   plaintiff   alone   as   onus   is   always   on
the person asserting a proposition or fact which is not self­evident. This
position   is   summarised   in   the   observation   to   the   effect   that,   an
assertion that a man who is alive was born requires no proof; the onus,
is not on the person making the assertion, because it is self­evident that
he   had   been   born.   But   to   assert   that   he   had   been   born   on   a   certain
date,   if   the   date   is   material,   requires   proof;   the   onus   is   on   the   person
making the assertion,  vide  Robins vs. National Trust & Co. Ltd.  1927
AC 515: 101 IC 903 . 
12.5.  It   is   also   to   be   noted   at   this   juncture   that   there   is   an   essential
distinction between burden of proof and onus of proof. Burden of proof
lies upon a person who has to prove the fact and it never shifts, onus of
proof on the other hand, shifts.  Such a shifting of onus is a continuous
process   in   the   evaluation   of   evidence.   For   instance,   In   a   suit   for
possession   based   on   title,   once   the   plaintiff   has   been   able   to   create   a
high degree of probability so as to shift the onus on the defendant, it is

23
for the defendant to discharge his onus and in the absence thereof, the
burden   of   proof   lying   on   the   plaintiff   shall   be   held   to   have   been
discharged   so   as   to   amount   to   proof   of   the   plaintiffs   title,   vide   RVE
Venkatachala   Gounder   vs.   Arulmigu   Viswesaraswami   and   VP
Temple  AIR 2003 SC 4548 (4558­59): (2003) 8 SCC 752 .
12.6.  In terms of section 102 of the Evidence Act, the initial burden to prove
its claim is always on the plaintiff and if he discharges that burden and
makes   out   a   case   which   entitles   him   to   a   relief,   the   onus   shifts   to   the
defendant   to  prove   those   circumstances,   if   any,  which   would  disentitle
the plaintiff of the same. 
12.7.  Where,   however,   evidence   has   been   led   by   the   contesting   parties,
abstract considerations of onus are out of place and truth or otherwise
must   always   be   adjudged   on   the   evidence   led   by   the   parties   [Kalwa
Devadattam vs. Union A.I.R. 1964 SC 880]
12.8.  As per Section 103,   the burden of proof as to any particular fact lies on
that person who wishes the Court to believe in its existence, unless it is
provided by any law that the proof of that fact shall lie on any particular
person.    This  section  amplifies  the general rule in section  101 that  the
burden   of   proof   lies   on   the   person   who   asserts   the   affirmative   of   the
issue.   It   lays   down   that   if   a   person   wishes   the   court   to   believe   in   the
existence   of   a   particular   fact,   the  onus   of   proving   that   fact,   is  on   him,

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unless   the   burden   of   proving   it   is   cast   by   any   law   on   any   particular
person. 
12.9. Section 105 is an application of the rule in section 103. When parties to
a   dispute   adduce   evidence   to   substantiate   their   claim,   onus   becomes
academic   and   divided,   entailing   each   party   to   prove   their   respective
plea. 
12.10. Section 106 is an exception to the general rule laid down in Section 101,
that   the   burden   of   proving   a   fact   rest   on   the   party   who   substantially
asserts   the   affirmative   of   the   issue.   Section   106   is   not   intended   to
relieve any person of that duty or burden but states that when a fact to
be proved  is peculiarly within the knowledge of a party, it is for him to
prove it. It applies to cases where the fact is especially  within a party’s
knowledge and to none else. The expression ‘especially’ used in Section
106   means   facts   that   are   eminently   or   exceptionally   within   one’s
knowledge.   This   means   a   party   having   personal   knowledge   of   certain
facts   has   a   duty   to   appear   as   a   witness   and   if   he   does   not   go   to   the
witness box, there is a strong presumption against him. In an Election
Petition,   the   initial   burden   to   prove   determination   of   age   of   returned
candidate lies on the petitioner, however, burden lies on the respondent
to prove facts within his special knowledge.  (Sushil Kumar vs. Rakesh
Kumar (supra))

25
12.11.   The   provisions   of   Section   106   are   unambiguous   and   categorical   in
laying  down that  when  any  fact  is especially  within the knowledge  of a
person,   the   burden   of   proving   that   fact   is   upon   him.   If   he   does   so,   he
must   be   held   to   have   discharged   his   burden   but   if   he   fails   to   offer   an
explanation on  the  basis  of  facts  within  his  special  knowledge,   he  fails
to discharge the burden cast upon him by Section 106 .
[Source: Sarkar on Law of Evidence, 20 th
 Edition, Volume 2.]
12.12. In  Sushil Kumar vs. Rakesh Kumar (supra) , the controversy was with
regard   to   the   improper   acceptance   of   the   nomination   of   the   sole
respondent   therein   on   the   premise   that   he   was   under   qualified   to
contest   the   Bihar   Legislative   Assemble   election   from   181,   Parbatta
Constituency.   In   the   said   case,   inter   alia,   the   horoscope   of   the
respondent   therein   and   admission   register   of   New   St.   Xaviers   School,
Boring   Road,   Patna   and   transfer   certificate   issued   by   Swami
Vivekananda Vidyalaya, Mithapur, Patna, were produced as documents
to prove that the successful candidate therein was not eligible to contest
the   said   Assembly   election.   In   the   said   case,   Section   35   of   the   Indian
Evidence   Act   was   referred   to   and   it   was   observed   that   the   register
maintained  in  terms  of  a  statute  or   by  a  statutory   authority   in regular
course   of   business   would   be   a   relevant   fact   and   if   such   vital   evidence
had been produced, it would clinch the issue. It was observed that there

26
is   no   reliable   evidence   on   record   to   show   that   the   date   of   birth   was
recorded   in   the   school   register   on   the   basis   of   the   statement   of   any
responsible   person   and   that   the   admission   register   or   a   transfer
certificate issued by a primary school do not satisfy the requirements of
Section 35 of the Evidence Act. 
Further,   reference   was   made   to   Brij   Mohan   (supra)   as   well   as
Birad Mal Singhvi   ( supra )   and it was observed that in the absence of
primary   material   on   the   basis   whereof   the   age   was   recorded,   it   would
not   be   possible   to   accept   the   evidence   produced   therein.   While
examining   the   admission   register   of   the   school   relied   upon   by   the
successful   candidate   therein,   it   was   observed   that   entries   in   the   said
register   had   been   made   by   one   person   with   two   different   pens   in   one
sitting. Also, there were other alterations in the said register and hence,
no credence could be given to the same. It was observed that forgery in
the   register   had   been   done   in   a   crude   form   and   the   High   Court   had
noticed   the   same   but   still   proceeded   to   rely   upon   the   said   documents
which   amounted   to   a   misdirection   in  law.   It   was   further   observed   that
the respondent  therein had special knowledge as to in which school he
had   studied   and   should   have   disclosed   the   same   instead   of   disclosing
the details of his education. He had taken recourse  to   suppression veri
and   suggestion   falsi   and   had   produced   documents   which   were
apparently   forged   and   fabricated.   The   respondent   therein   could   not

27
have   been   admitted   in   New   St.   Xaviers   Junior   School,   being   overaged
and   the   evidence   of   father   of   the   respondent   was   not   trustworthy.
Further, the horoscope filed by the respondent in the said case did not
inspire confidence. Further, DW­2 who let in evidence on the horoscope
was   a   bystander   who   had   nothing   to   do   either   with   the   preparation   of
the   horoscope   or   with   the   writing   thereof   and   his   evidence   was   not
trustworthy and the horoscope could not have been looked into for any
purpose   whatsoever.   Also,   an   application   was   filed   on   behalf   of   the
respondent   therein   in   respect   to   the   occurrence   which   took   place   in
April,   1995,   and   the   date   of   birth   of   the   appellant   was   said   to   be
fourteen   years   as   on   that   date,   and,   thus,   sixteen   years   in   the   year
1996 and was below twenty­five years of age on the date of filing of the
nomination. 
With   reference   to   the   averments   made   in   the   bail   application   on
behalf   of   the   respondent   therein   and   the   same   being   an   admission,
reliance   was   placed   on   Thiru   John   vs.   Returning   Officer   (1977)   3
SCC 540   to observe that a party’s admission as defined in Sections 17
to   20,   fulfilling   the   requirements   of   Section   21   of   the   Evidence   Act,   is
substantive   evidence   proprio   vigore .   An   admission,   if   clearly   and
unequivocally   made,   is   the   best   evidence   against   the   party   making   it
and   even   though   conclusive,   shifts   the   onus   on   to   the   maker   on   the
principle that ‘what a party himself admits to be true may reasonably be

28
presumed   to   be   so   and   until   the   presumption   was   rebutted,   the   fact
admitted must be taken to be established.’
It was further observed in para 65 of the said judgment that :
“ 65.   Furthermore,   a   person   should   not   be   permitted   to
take advantage of his own wrong. He should either stand
by   his   statement   made   before   a   court   of   law   or   should
explain   the   same   sufficiently.   In   the   absence   of   any
satisfactory   explanation,   the   court   will   presume   that   the
statement   before   a   court   is   correct   and   binding   on   the
party on whose behalf the same has been made.”
Under Section 58 of the Indian Evidence Act, a fact admitted need
not be proved.
12.13.   In   Narender   Singh   vs.   Mala   Ram   and   Ors.   (1999)   8   SCC   198,   the
controversy   was   with   regard   to   the   improper   rejection   of   nomination
papers   and   the   filing   of   an   Election   Petition   by   the   candidate   whose
nomination papers were improperly rejected and improper acceptance of
the   nomination   papers   of   the   returned   candidate.   This   Court   speaking
through   Rajendra   Babu,   J.,   discussed   about   consideration   and
appreciation   of   evidence   in   an   election   dispute.   In   para   15   of   the
judgment,   it   was   observed   that   the   general   principle   in   the   matter   of
appreciation of evidence in an election dispute is that the onus to prove
the   essential   facts   which   constitute   the   cause   of   action   in   such   a
dispute   is   upon   the   person   making   it,   namely,   the   election   petitioner.
What   evidence   would   be   sufficient   to   prove   a   particular   fact   depends

29
upon   the   circumstances   of   each   case.   When   the   evidence   adduced   is
capable of drawing  an inference  either  way, the view  that is favourable
to the returned candidate will have to be preferred. Reference was made
to  Ram Singh vs. Col. Ram Singh 1985 (Supp.) SCC 611 , wherein, it
was observed that “in borderline cases the courts have to undertake the
onerous  task  of,   ‘disengaging  the  truth  from   falsehood,  to separate  the
chaff from the grain’.”
Analysis:
  I shall now analyse the oral and documentary evidence on record in order
to assess the correctness of the findings of the High Court.
i)  Re: Passports and Visas of the appellant­successful candidate:
13.  The election petitioner adduced Ex. P­1 and P­3 wherein the date of birth
of   the   successful   candidate   was   shown   as   01.01.1993,   to   contend   that   the
successful   candidate   was   less   than   25   years   of   age   at   the   time   of   filing   his
nomination   and   the   fact   that   the   aforesaid   documents   indicated   the   date   of
birth as 01.01.1993 was not disputed by the successful candidate although the
said date was not accepted as his date of birth. 
    13.1.     It   is  noted   that   the  successful   candidate  had   made   applications  under
his   own   signature   to   obtain   the   passports   in   the   year   2006   and   2012
(Ex.   P­1  –   Paper   No.   A­   49/1­4)   wherein   he   had  mentioned   his   date  of
birth as 01.01.1993. Therefore, the High Court held that the successful

30
candidate   had   always   been   aware   of   the   fact   that   in   the   educational
certificate   and   passports,   his   date   of   birth   was   shown   as   01.01.1993
and had accepted the same till the year 2015. 
13.2.       PW­2,   Shri.   Mohd.   Naseem,   Passport   Officer,   Bareilly,   deposed   that   he
had brought photocopies of the documents referred to by the successful
candidate   at   the   time   of   making   an   application   for   the   issuance   of   his
Passport   No.  K­7951741   which  was  issued   to  him   on  13.07.2012   from
Bareilly   Passport   Office.   PW­2   deposed   that   the   successful   candidate
had   annexed   a   copy   of   his   birth   certificate   issued   by   the   Health
Department/Municipal   Corporation,   Rampur,   on   28.06.2012,   along
with   a   copy   of   his   online   application   form,   a   copy   of   a   pass   book
pertaining to his bank account held with State Bank and a copy of his
old   Passport   No.   F­8757022   issued   on   28.08.2006   which   was   valid   till
31.12.2010.     To   a   question   whether   self­attested   copies   of   documents
submitted by an applicant are maintained in the records, PW­2 deposed
that original copies are returned and self­attested copies are scanned. 
13.3.     When   a   question   was   posed   as   to   whether   by   modifying   the   particular
entry  of  date of  birth  in the  successful   candidate’s  old  Passport   No. K­
7951741,   a   new   Passport   No.   Z­4307442   after   mentioning   his   date   of
birth   as   30.09.1990   was   issued   to   him   on   10.01.2018,   PW­2   deposed
that he was not in a position to answer the question as each application
was   available   separately   in   the   P.S.P.   system.   He   deposed   that   in

31
compliance   of   the   Court’s   order,   he   had   brought   only   the   available
record  of Passport  No. K­7951741   and  if after  that  a new  Passport  No.
Z­4307442   was   issued,   he   would   have   to  check   from   the   system.   That
he   would   be   able   to   present   records   pertaining   to   Passport   No.   Z­
4307442   on   the   next   date   fixed   by   the   Court,   if   the   same   had   in   fact
been issued.
13.4.   Further, on perusal of Ex. P­1, paper No. A­49/1­4, which is the Passport
application dated 06.07.2012 made by the successful candidate, I am of
the opinion that the same is made under his own signature and records
his  date  of  birth  as 01.01.1993,  and  place  of  birth as  Rampur.  In  that
background, it is necessary to examine whether the information entered
in   the   passport   application   dated   06.07.2012,   would   amount   to   proof,
as  to  the   contents   of   such   application,  including  the   date  and   place   of
birth entered therein. 
13.5.       I   am   of   the   view   that   great   evidentiary   value   has   to   be   attached   to   an
application submitted to a government establishment or Office, such as
a   Passport   Office   and   the   details   entered   in   such   application,   together
with   the   documents   submitted   therewith,   must   be   understood   to   be
tendered   by   the   applicant   who   signs   the   application   form   thereby
accepting   that   the   information   submitted   therein   is   true   and   correct
and   to   the   best   of   his   knowledge.   I   find   that   the   successful   candidate
herein, having signed the application form dated 06.07.2012 wherein it

32
has   been   expressly   entered   that   his   date   of   birth   was   01.01.1993   and
place   of   birth   was   Rampur,   cannot,   at   a   later   juncture   claim   that   he
was   unaware,   till   the   year   2015   that   his   date   of   birth   as   per   various
documents   was   01.01.1993   and   his   place   of   birth   was   Lucknow.   The
fact   that   the   successful   candidate   self­attested   the   birth   certificate
issued by the Municipal Corporation, Rampur, wherein his date of birth
has   been   recorded   as   01.01.1993,   would   establish   that   the   successful
candidate   acknowledged,   accepted   and   sought   to   rely   on   such   fact   in
order   to   secure   a   passport   on   the   basis   of   such   information.   It   is
therefore   not   open   to   the   successful   candidate   to   subsequently   resile
from   the   aforesaid   clear   admission   and   contend   that   he   was   unaware
that   an   ‘incorrect’   date   of   birth   was   recorded   in   certain   documents.
Having   admitted   the   fact   that   his   date   of   birth   was   01.01.1993   and
place   of   birth   was   Rampur,   in   the   application   form   dated   06.07.2012
which   was   at   an   undisputed   point   of   time,   the   successful   candidate
cannot resile from the same. 
13.6.   I also take note of the fact that the successful candidate had travelled to
many   foreign   countries   on   his   passports   which   were   obtained   in   the
year   2006   and   2012   and   the   visa   which   was  granted   in  the   year   2014
and   in   these   documents   his   date   of   birth   was   shown   as   01.01.1993.   I
am unable to accept  that the successful candidate, who regularly used
the   passports   obtained   in   the   years   2006   and   2012   for   international

33
travel,   failed   all   along,   to   notice   that   the   date   of   birth   recorded   in   the
passports was incorrect. I refuse to believe that an educated individual
such   as   the   successful   candidate   herein,   had   not,   in   over   nine   years
(2006   to   2015)   looked   at   the   first   page   of   his   passport   and   only   later
grasped that the date of birth entered therein was ‘incorrect’ only while
he was on the verge of entering politics and contesting an election to the
Legislative Assembly. 
13.7.   Further, I also take note of the deposition of P.W.4. who deposed that all
the   papers   related   to   Birth   Certificate   No.   3857,   Register   No.   R.N.P.B.
2012­03857,   dated   28.06.2012   had   been   destroyed   in   a   fire   due   to   a
short   circuit   on   08.05.2015   in   the   office   of   Nagar   Palika   Parishad,
Rampur   and   that   no   papers   pertaining   to   a   period   prior   to   such   date
were   available   in   the   Office   of   Nagar   Palika   Parishad,   Rampur.   That
such documents were available only in a computer­generated form and
a copy of Birth Certificate No. 3857, Register No. R.N.P.B. 2012­03857,
dated   28.06.2012   was   produced   wherein   the   successful   candidate’s
date of birth was recorded as 01.01.1993. 
13.8.     The   stand   taken   by   the   successful   candidate   that   all   documents
pertaining to the Birth Certificate dated 28.06.2012 were burnt due to a
short   circuit   on   08.05.2015   in   the   office   of   Nagar   Palika   Parishad,
Rampur, would suggest that the said birth certificate, wherein the date
of birth of the successful candidate was recorded as 01.01.1993 came to

34
be  later   cancelled  under  suspicious   circumstances.   It   is rather  strange
that a birth certificate pertaining to the year 1993, was destroyed in the
year 2015 under peculiar circumstances, at a time when the successful
candidate was making several efforts to get his date of birth changed in
various records. It is rather  unbelievable  that just when the successful
candidate   began   assuming   an   active   role   in   politics   and   undertook
various   efforts   towards   correcting   his   date   of   birth   in   several   records,
i.e.,   in   the   year   2015,   the   birth   certificate   and   relevant   documents
pertaining   to   the   said   certificate,   wherein   the   date   of   birth   of   the
successful candidate was recorded as 01.01.1993 came to be destroyed
in a fire and was accordingly cancelled. 
13.9.   It   is   further   noted   that   an   application   seeking   a   birth   certificate   was
made on 28.06.2012 bearing No. RNPP 2012­03857 to the Nagar Palika
Parishad, Rampur and on the same date, birth certificate was issued to
the   successful   candidate   showing   the   date   of   birth   as   “01­Jan­1993”.
The place of birth was shown as “ घघ र   ममर   बबज   खब ,  जघ ल   ररड ,  रबमपप र ” . The said
address is shown to be the address of his parents at the time of birth of
the   child   i.e.,   the   successful   candidate   as   well   as   the   permanent
address  of  parents. The  inference   to be  drawn from   the  said document
is   that   in   the   year   2012,   the   petitioner   consciously   applied   to   Nagar
Palika   Parishad,   Rampur   for   obtaining   the   birth   certificate   in   order   to
append   the   same   for   obtaining   a   new   passport.   The   further   inference

35
that I draw from the said document is that the successful candidate has
sought his birth certificate from  the Nagar Palika Parishad, Rampur as
he   was   born   at   Rampur   and   the   birth   certificate   clearly   indicates   that
he was born on 01.01.1993. Subsequently, the said birth certificate was
cancelled.   PW­4   has   deposed   that   all   the   documents   relating   to   the
issuance of birth certificate to the successful  candidate were destroyed
in   fire   on   08.05.2015   which   is   indeed   strange   and   mysterious   as   by
then   the   successful   candidate   had   already   obtained   “duplicate”   birth
certificate from the Municipal Corporation, Lucknow.
ii) Re: Educational Certificates of the successful candidate: 
14.  As per the Secondary School examination Class X certificate (Exhibit P4,
paper   no.   A­25/1)   issued   in   the   year   2007   by   the   C.B.S.E.,   the   successful
candidate’s date of birth has been recorded as 01.01.1993. The High Court has
observed that the stand taken by the successful candidate in this regard is that
he   came   to   know   that   his   date   of   birth   was   ‘incorrectly’   mentioned   as
01.01.1993   in   the   Certificate   of   Secondary   School   Examination   (Class   X)   only
in   the   year   2015   when   he   was   scrutinising   his   educational   records,   was
unbelievable and untrue. 
14.1.  As regards the successful candidate’s educational records, which record
his   date   of   birth   to   be   01.01.1993,   his   version   is   that   due   his   father’s
busy   social   and   political   life,   his   father’s   friend   Shahzeb   Khan   (DW­9)
got him admitted in the Nursery Class of St. Paul School, Rampur. It is

36
the   successful   candidate’s   case   that   his   date   of   birth   was   incorrectly
recorded as 01.01.1993 instead of 30.09.1990 and the same continued
in all his educational records. That he made an application to C.B.S.E.
through   the   Principal   of   St.   Paul   School   to   change   the   date   of   birth
mentioned   in   his   records   and   also   sent   many   reminders   to   the   school
and   the   same   were   forwarded   to   the   office   of   C.B.S.E.   in   Allahabad,
however, till date no information had been given to him by C.B.S.E.
14.2.   In this regard, D.W.­5 mother of the successful candidate deposed that
her family friend Shahzeb Khan (DW­9) took the successful candidate to
St. Paul School, Rampur, for his admission in Nursery Class in the year
1995   and   wrongly   entered   the   date   of   birth   as   01.01.1993   instead   of
30.09.1990   in   the   admission   form.   That   the   successful   candidate   was
born on 30.09.1990 and the date of birth mentioned in his educational
record   was   incorrect.   DW­5   was   asked   if   she   knew   that   her   son­the
successful candidate had mentioned his date of birth in Class X, Class
XII,   under   graduate   degree   and   post   graduate   degree   as   01.01.1993.
DW­5   deposed   that   when   her   son   was   in   the   final   year   of   his
graduation,   he   informed   her   that   the   date   of   birth   in   his   educational
record   was   wrongly   mentioned   and   that   the   date   of   birth   in   other
educational records could not be corrected without changing the date of
birth   mentioned   in   the   Class­X   Certificate.   Therefore,   an   application

37
was made to the Principal, St. Paul School Rampur, to correct the date
of birth as per the school records.
14.3.  DW­9, who is stated to be the person  who accompanied  the successful
candidate   to   St.   Paul  School   to   get   him   admitted   in  nursery   class   was
also   examined.   DW­9   deposed   that   in   the   year   1995,   he   took   the
successful   candidate   to   St.   Paul’s   School,   Civil   Lines,   Rampur,   to   get
him admitted into the said school. That after completing the admission
process,   the   master   who   was   in   charge   of   giving   admission,   got   the
successful candidate enrolled in Nursery class and put his date of birth
as   01.01.1993   in   the   admission   form   and   asked   DW­9   to   sign   it   and
DW­9 signed the same.
14.4.  I am of the view that the version narrated by the successful candidate to
explain   the   ‘error’   in   his   date   of   birth,   as   recorded   in   all   educational
records, would not aid the successful candidate’s case.  
Further,   it   is   to   be   noted   that   DW­5­Tazeen   Fatima   in   Paragraph
12   of   her   Examination­in­Chief   and   the   successful   candidate   in
Paragraph  53   of  his  written  statement  had  stated  that   DW­9­  Shahzeb
Khan,   the   successful   candidate’s   father’s   friend,   had   got   him   admitted
in the nursery class of St. Paul School, Rampur, in the year 1995, and
had   inadvertently   mentioned   the   date   of   birth   of   the   successful
candidate as 01.01.1993. However, DW­9­ Shahzeb Khan, in Paragraph
5 of his Examination­in­Chief has deposed that the master had written

38
the   date   of   birth   of   the   successful   candidate   in   the   admission   form.
Therefore, I am not inclined to attach much weight to the statements of
either  DW­5  or  DW­7 in this regard as they  are  inconsistent  with each
other. 
14.5.   It is further noted that the successful candidate has emphatically stated
that   his   date   of   birth   is   30.09.1990   and   not   01.01.1993   and   that   an
erroneous date was given at the time of his admission to nursery class
in   the   year   1995.   This   would   mean   that   the   successful   candidate   was
sought to be admitted in nursery class when he was about 5 ½	 years of
age which is not believable as he would be over­aged for that class.  On
the other hand, if he was born on 01.01.1993, it is possible that at 2 	
½
years  he would have been   admitted  to nursery  class  which is  the  right
age to get admission in nursery.  Further, the successful candidate has
completed   his   10 th
  standard   in  the   year   2007   and  his   12 th
  standard   in
the   year   2009   which   would   mean   that   the   successful   candidate   was
about 14 	
½	 years when he completed his 10 th
 standard and 16 	½	 years
when he completed his 12 th
  standard which is the normal age to do so.
If   according   to   the   successful   candidate   his   actual   date   of   birth   is
30.09.1990, the inference is that he would have been about 17 	
½	 years
when   he   completed   his   10 th
  standard   and   19  	
½	  years   when   he
completed   his   12 th
  standard   which   is   improbable.   Also,   there   is   no

39
explanation on record as to why at a belated age he has completed  his
10 th
 standard and intermediate examination in the year 2009. 
14.6.     D.W.­7   who   is   the   Director   of   St.   Paul   School,   Rampur,   was   also
examined to prove the version narrated by the successful candidate. He
deposed   that   the   successful   candidate   addressed   a   letter   dated
23.03.2015 to the school stating therein that in the year 2015 he came
to know that his date of birth was incorrectly entered in his educational
certificates   as   01.01.1993   whereas   his   actual   date   of   birth   was
30.09.1990 and he requested DW­7 to make the necessary changes. He
in   turn   forwarded   the   letter   dated   23.03.2015   to   the   Regional   Office,
C.B.S.E,   Allahabad,   along   with   a   letter   issued   by   him   to   the   Regional
Office,   C.B.S.E.,   dated   15.04.2015   wherein   he   had   requested   C.B.S.E.
to correct the successful candidate’s date of birth. Also, he had sent two
reminders   to   the   Regional   Office,   C.B.S.E.,   Allahabad,   on   19.05.2015
and  21.09.2015   stating   that   in  the  register   of   birth  and   death  and  the
Birth   Certificate   provided   by   the   Hospital,   the   date   of   birth   of   the
successful candidate was shown as 30.09.1990 and therefore, it should
be changed from 01.01.1993 to 30.09.1990. Further, in the reminders,
DW­7   stated   that   in   the   register   of   birth   and   death   and   the   Birth
Certificate   provided   by   the  Hospital,   the   date   of  birth  of  the   successful
candidate was shown as 30.09.1990 and therefore,  the date of birth in

40
the   educational   records   should   also   be   changed   from   01.01.1993   to
30.09.1990. 
14.7.   It is further noted that on the request made on behalf of the successful
candidate,   several   letters   were   addressed   by   the   Principal   of   St.   Paul
School,   Rampur   to   the   Regional   Officer,   Central   Board   of   Secondary
Education,   Allahabad   requesting   for   permission   to   correct   the   date   of
birth of the successful candidate. Further, the said permission was not
granted and on 30.10.2017, a letter was addressed to the mother of the
successful  candidate – DW­5  stating  that  the  matter  was twenty  years’
old and it  was not  possible  for   the  school  to  trace the  required  details.
This   would  imply   that   the   school   records  continue   to   show   the   date   of
birth   of   the   successful   candidate   as   01.01.1993   and   on   that   basis   the
other   educational   records   of   the   successful   candidate   also   indicate   his
date   of   birth   as   01.01.1993.   On   perusal   of   the   application   seeking
passport   application   form   submitted   by   the   successful   candidate,   it   is
noted that his date of birth and place of birth have been mentioned as
01.01.1993   and   at   Rampur.   Further,   two   references   given   by   him   are
Rafi   Raja   Khan   and   Rizwan   Mohammad   Khan   also   residing   at   Ghair
Meer   Baaz   Khan,   Jail   Road,   Rampur.   The   permanent   residential
address   details   of   the   successful   candidate   were   also   shown   as   Ghair
Meer   Baaz   Khan,  Jail  Road,   Rampur,  Ganj,   Uttar   Pradesh.   This   would

41
imply   that   in   the   school   records,   the   date   of   birth   of   the   appellant
continues to be 01.01.1993 and his place of birth as Rampur.
14.8.   But since DW­7 in his request made to the C.B.S.E. relied on the entry
made   in   the   register   of   birth   and   death   and   the   Birth   Certificate
provided   by   the   Hospital,   it   is   necessary   to   examine   whether   the   said
register and the hospital records were genuine and can be relied upon.
Accordingly, such questions are examined in the following section of the
analysis.
iii)     Re: Whether the Birth Certificate bearing Registration No. NNLKO­B­
2015­292611   issued   on   21.01.2015   by   the   Nagar   Nigam,   Lucknow,
was a valid piece of evidence?     
15.       To   ascertain   the   validity   of   the   birth   certificate   bearing   Registration   No.
NNLKO­B­2015­292611   issued   on   21.01.2015   by   the   Nagar   Nigam,   Lucknow,
the   High   Court   placed   reliance   on   the   following   documents:   a)   (Ex.   R­12   A­
96/1­5), b) (Ex. R­12 A­96/3), c) (Ex. 12 Paper No. A­96/4­5)
15.1.  On   perusal   of   the   aforesaid   documents   and   the   original   hospital   file
relating   to  the issuance   of  birth certificate  of  the  successful  candidate,
produced   by   DW­2,   it   is   observed   that   the   file   merely   contained   an
application and an affidavit (Ex. R­12 A­96/1­5) dated 17.01.2015 made
by   the   successful   candidate’s   mother   to   the   City   Health   Officer,   Nagar
Nigam, Lucknow, for the issuance of a birth certificate and a computer

42
generated   sheet   (Ex.   R­12   A­96/3)   which   contained   particulars   of
registration of birth of the successful candidate.
15.2.   The High Court further noted that the birth register (Ex. 12 Paper No. A­
96/4­5)   adduced   by   DW­2   was   neither   authenticated   nor   certified   by
any   competent   officer   and   was   not   even   paginated.   That   DW­2   in   her
cross­examination had admitted that the Birth Register was maintained
by a clerk  and was not in the prescribed  format as per the mandate of
the 1969 Act, and the same had not been authenticated or verified by a
competent   official.   Further,   the   Birth   Register   was   not   paginated   and
the   entry   of   the   name   of   the   successful   candidate’s   mother   was   not
made in a chronological order. DW­2 further testified that the Birth List
maintained by the hospital, on the basis of which birth entry is made in
the birth register maintained by the municipality, was not available. On
the   basis   of   the   afore­stated   oral   and   documentary   evidence,   the   High
Court   held   that   the   Birth   Register   (Ex.   12   Paper   No.   A­96/4­5)   was   a
clear   case   of   manipulation   and   interpolation,   as   the   entry   of   the
successful candidate’s date of birth and name was inserted in the small
space   at   the   bottom   of   the   page   showing   it   to   have   been   made   on
30.09.1990.   It   was   also   noted   that   the   successful   candidate’s   entry   in
the   Birth   Register   did   not   bear   any   signature   or   an   order   of   any
authority   of   the   Nagar   Nigam,   Lucknow,   or   the   Sub­Divisional
Magistrate;   the   High   Court,   therefore   held   that   the   entry   of   the

43
successful candidate’s name was not made on 30.09.1990 and that the
said entry was an interpolation.
15.3.   The   High   Court,   on   perusal   of   the   affidavit   (Ex.   R­12   A­96/1­5)   dated
17.01.2015   made   by   Dr.   Tazeen   Fatima   (DW­5),   mother   of   the
successful   candidate   while   seeking   issuance   of   the   duplicate   birth
certificate,   held   that   the   successful   candidate’s   mother   in   the   said
affidavit   had   concealed   the   fact   that   another   Birth   Certificate   (Ex.   P­3
Paper   No.   A­80/1)   issued   by   the   Nagar   Palika   Parishad,   Rampur,
existed and was subsequently cancelled on 30.01.2015. 
15.4.  It is further observed that the mother of the successful candidate made
an application to the City Health Officer, Nagar Nigam, Lucknow, for the
issuance   of   the   birth   certificate   on   17.01.2015,   after   twenty­five   (25)
years   of   the   birth   of   the   successful   candidate   and   the   same   was
endorsed   by   an   officer   of   the   Nagar   Nigam,   Lucknow,   on   19.01.2015
and immediately thereafter i.e. two days later, a certificate was issued to
the   successful   candidate   on   21.01.2015.   That   the   birth   certificate   was
issued  without   following  the  mandatory  provisions   of  Section  13  of  the
1969   Act.     Also   Rule   9   of   the   U.P.   Registration   of   the   Birth   and   Death
Rules, 2002 and Section 13(3) of the 1969 Act, provided that any birth
or   death   which   had   not   been   registered   within   one   year   of   its
occurrence, shall be registered only on an order made by a Magistrate of
First Class or a Presidency  Magistrate after verifying  the correctness of

44
the birth or death and upon payment of the prescribed fee. Rule 9(3) of
the U.P. Registration of the Birth and Death Rules, 2002, provided that
any birth or death which had not been registered within one year of its
occurrence,   shall   be   registered   only   on   an  order   of   the   Sub­  Divisional
Magistrate and after payment of a late fee of Rs. 10/­.  I am therefore of
the view that, the Nagar Nigam, Lucknow, had no jurisdiction to register
the   birth   of   the   successful   candidate   after   twenty­five   years   from   the
date   on   which   he   was   stated   to   be   born   by   the   issuance   of   the   Birth
Certificate   on   21.01.2015   (Ex.   P­2   Paper   No.   A­63/1)  without   an   order
of the Sub­Divisional Magistrate as required under  Section 13(3)  of the
1969   Act,  read  with  Rule  9(3)   of  the  U.P.   Registration  of   the   Birth  and
Death   Rules,   2002.   In  fine,   it   is   held   that   the   birth   certificate   (Ex.   P­2
Paper No. A­63/1) issued by the Nagar Nigam, Lucknow, on 21.01.2015
was null and void. 
15.5.   From   the   impugned   judgment,   it   is   further   noted   that   the   entry   with
respect to the successful candidate’s date of birth in the Birth Register,
showing it to be 30.09.1990,  was inserted in all probability in the year
2015. The High Court took note of the fact that the birth certificate was
issued to the successful candidate on 21.01.2015  by the Nagar Nigam,
Lucknow, and at that time, the father of the successful candidate was a
Cabinet   Minister   of   the   Department   of   Urban   Development   and   Local
Bodies   and   the   Nagar   Nigam,   Lucknow,   came   under   his   Ministry.   The

45
High Court was therefore of the view that the entry in the birth register
was a result of undue pressure on authorities by the interested parties
and   was   clearly   manipulated.   The   High   Court   therefore,   held   that   the
evidence   adduced   by   Dr.   Tazeen   Fatima   (DW­5),   mother   of   the
successful   candidate   and   by   DW­10­   the   successful   candidate,   was
false and wholly untrustworthy. 
15.6.     In   order   to   ascertain   the   validity   of   the   Birth   Certificate   bearing
Registration   No.   NNLKO­B­2015­292611   issued   on   21.01.2015   by   the
Nagar   Nigam,   Lucknow,   regard   must   be   had   to   the   request   letter
addressed   by   the   mother   of   the   successful   candidate   ­   DW­5   –   Tazeen
Fatima   dated   19.01.2015   to   the   City   Health   Officer,   Nagar   Nigam,
Lucknow,   for   the   issuance   of   a   birth   certificate   to   the   successful
candidate   and   the   copy   of   the   Birth   Register   maintained   by   the   Nagar
Nigam,   Lucknow,   in   which   entry   in   the   name   of   the   successful
candidate was made on 30.09.1990. 
  15.7.   DW­2   Dr.   Archana   Dwivedi,   Additional   Principal   Commissioner,
Lucknow,  deposed  that as per the Court’s order dated 27.05.2019, she
had   brought   the   original   birth   certificate   of   the   successful   candidate
issued   on   21.01.2015   and   the   Birth   Record   of   Queen   Mary’s   Hospital
from   01.01.1990   to   31.12.1990.   She   admitted   that   the
register/hospital’s birth record did not contain page numbers nor had it
been   certified   by   any   competent   officer   or   been   attested.   DW­2   placed

46
before   the   Court   the   relevant   entry   in   the   hospital   birth   record   which
pertained   to   Tazeen   Fatima’s   delivery   on   30.09.1990.   In   the   course   of
cross­examination,   on   being   asked   whether   it   was   necessary   to
maintain  the   birth  register   in  the   format   laid   down   in   1969   Act,   DW­2
answered in the affirmative; however, in response to the question as to
whether   the   birth   register   produced   by   her   in   Court   was   in   the
prescribed   format,   she  answered   in  the   negative.   When  asked   on   what
basis   the   entry   was   made   in   the   birth   register   on   30.09.1990   and
whether   she   had   brought   any   papers   related   to   it,   DW­2   deposed   that
the   entries   in   the   birth   register   were   made   according   to   the   birth   list
provided   by  the hospital,  however,  the said list  was  not  available  to be
produced before the Court. 
15.8.    Answering a question as to, after how many days of making the related
entries   in   the   birth   Register,   the   birth   certificate   is   issued,   DW­2
deposed that the birth certificate is issued when an applicant addresses
a request letter and the birth is registered immediately after receiving a
birth list from the hospital. 
15.9.     It   is   noted   that   the   birth   certificate   dated   21.01.2015,   is   said   to   have
been issued by the Nagar Nigam, Lucknow, on the strength of the entry
made   in   the   birth   register   maintained   by   the   Queen   Mary’s   Hospital,
Lucknow,   wherein   it   was   recorded   that   the   successful   candidate’s
mother   delivered   a   male   child   on   30.09.1990.   As   per   the   testimony   of

47
DW­2,   entries   in   birth   register   are   made   according   to   the   birth   list
provided by the hospital. Therefore, in order to give any finding as to the
validity   of   the   birth   certificate   dated   21.01.2015,   issued   by   the   Nagar
Nigam, Lucknow, the validity of the antecedent documents, such as the
birth register and birth list maintained by the hospital, on the strength
of which the birth certificate dated 21.01.2015 was issued, needs to be
examined. 
15.10.   As   is   evident   from   the   relevant   portion   of   DW­2’s   cross   examination,
although   the   birth   register   was   to   be   maintained   in   the   format
prescribed in this regard in the 1969 Act, such format was not followed
in   the   present   case,   while   recording   the   entry   pertaining   to   the
successful   candidate’s   birth   on   30.09.1990.   Further,   while   it   is   stated
that such entry was recorded in the birth register on the basis of a birth
list   maintained   by   the   hospital,   it   is   admitted   that   the   birth   list
pertaining   to   the   successful   candidate’s   birth   is   not   available.   This
means, the basis of making the entry in the birth register maintained by
the municipality was not available. 
15.11.   These   facts   are   to   be   further   considered   in   light   of   the   finding   of   the
High   Court   to   the   effect   that   the   entry   pertaining   to   the   successful
candidate   was   inserted   in   a   small   space   at   the   bottom   of   the   page,   in
the birth register, showing it to have been made on 30.09.1990. 

48
15.12.     It   is   also   noted   that   in   the   relevant   column   of   the   birth   register,   the
successful   candidate   was   recorded   as   a   ‘Hindu’.   This   would   further
strengthen   the   case   of   the   election   petitioner   that   the   successful
candidate’s  details were  subsequently  added  in a  space  in the register,
which originally pertained to some other birth. 
15.13.  In light of the aforesaid discussion, I am of the view that no weight can
be placed on the birth certificate dated 21.01.2015, issued by the Nagar
Nigam,   Lucknow,   which   is   stated   to   be   issued   on   the   strength   of   an
entry   made   in   the   birth   register   maintained   by   the   hospital   and   is
created   by   manipulation   and   interpolation   in   the   relevant   hospital
records. It is therefore held that in the absence of any explanation as to
why   the   relevant   birth   list,   forming   the   basis   of   the   entry   in   the   birth
register,   was   not   available   to   be   produced   before   the   Court,   no
evidentiary   value   can   be   attached   to   the   birth   register.   It   is
consequently held that the birth certificate dated 21.01.2015, issued by
the Nagar Nigam, Lucknow on the strength of such documents, cannot
be held to be a valid document.
15.14.     It is also to be noticed that Birth Certificate showing the date of birth
of the successful candidate as 01.01.1993 was still holding the field and
valid and thus till the same was cancelled subsequently, the successful
candidate   had   two   Birth   Certificates   showing   his   date   of   birth   at   two
different  places  and on two different  dates,  namely, one on 01.01.1993

49
at   Rampur   and   another   on   30.09.1990   at   Lucknow   which   clearly
indicates that only one Birth Certificate was valid and correct as far as
successful   candidate’s   date   of   birth   is   concerned.   In   my   view,   the
certificate   showing   the   date   of   birth   of   the   successful   candidate   as
01.01.1993   at   Rampur   is   the   correct   certificate   and   not   the   one
subsequently obtained in the year 2015.  
15.15. In light of the above discussion, the finding of the High Court as to the
invalidity of the birth certificate dated 21.01.2015, issued by the Nagar
Nigam, Lucknow, is affirmed.
iv) Re:   Proof   of   Birth   on   30.09.1990   on   the   basis   of   entries   in
Hospital records and Oral Evidence:
16.  DW­3­Dr.   Uma   Singh,   Senior   Gynaecologist,   Queen   Mary’s   Hospital
stated   that   she   had   brought   with   her,   the   relevant   labour   room   register   and
operation   theatre   register   (O.T.   Register).   Referring   to   page   no.   225   of   the
Labour   register   (M.L.R.)   annual   no.   1826   monthly   no.   257,   she   deposed   that
the entry pertained to Dr. Tazeen Fatima, successful candidate’s mother and as
per the said entry she delivered a male child on 30.09.1990 at 3:43 a.m.   She
also stated that she had signed and issued the duplicate birth certificate dated
21.04.2015   (A­37).     In   answer   to   a   question   as   to   the   authority   which   issues
birth   certificates   in   Queen   Mary’s   Hospital,   DW­3   stated   that   duplicate   birth
certificates   are   issued   by   the   person   nominated   by   the   Department   Head.   As
regards   the   procedure   for   issuance   of   duplicate   birth   certificates,   DW­3

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deposed that an application requesting for a duplicate birth certificate is to be
made to the Chief Medical Superintendent of King George University who would
thereafter   forward   the   same   to   the   Department   Head   who   would   issue   the
duplicate   certificate.   DW­3   answered   in  the   negative   when   asked   whether   she
had   brought   to   the   Court   the   application   forwarded   by   the   Chief   Medical
Superintendent  for   the issuance   of  the duplicate  birth  certificate.  While  DW­3
stated   that   it   was   the   responsibility   of   the   Chief   Medical   Superintendent   to
inform   the   Municipal   Corporation   about   the   birth   of   a   child,   she   stated   that
she was unable to confidently say whether the information of the children born
on 30.09.1990 was sent to the Municipal Corporation. 
16.1. Referring to the relevant entry in page No. 174 of emergency O.T. register
Annual No. 5097 and monthly no. 512, DW­3 was asked whether there
was any overwriting on it and she answered in the affirmative. On being
questioned whether the entries made in page no. 225 of M.L.R. register
matched the entries made in the pages of other annual numbers; DW­3
answered that they  ‘do not match totally’ . 
16.2.     Replying   to   a   question   as   to   whether,   as   per   the   hospital   record
presented  before the Court it could be said that a male child was born
in   the   hospital   on   30.09.1990,   DW­3   stated   that   the   register   affirms
that   ‘related lady’   gave birth to a male child on 30.09.1990. However,
DW­3   answered   in   the   ‘negative’   when   questioned   as   to   whether   she

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could definitely  say  that  the male  child  born on  30.09.1990   as  per  the
register brought by her was the successful candidate. 
16.3.   A question was put to DW­3 by the High Court as to whether, the E.O.T.
and   M.L.R.   registers   which   DW­3   brought   with   her   were   attested   or
signed by any Officer  or Department Head of Queen Mary’s Hospital or
King George University  and whether the entries in the said registers or
any   page   was   signed   or   counter­signed   by   any   Officer   or   Department
Head   of   the   Hospital   and   whether   the   registers   were   authenticated   by
any Officer  or Department Head. DW­3 deposed that both the registers
were not authenticated by any Officer of Queen Mary’s Hospital or King
George   University   and   were   not   attested.   DW­3   deposed   that   she   had
neither   made   the   relevant   entries   in   the   register   nor   had   she   signed
them. On being asked as to on what basis she could say that the entries
in the register were genuine given that the same were neither made nor
signed by her, DW­3 stated that she had stated that they were genuine
on an understanding of the working procedure of the hospital. 
16.4.  On a consideration of the aforesaid documentary evidence in light of the
depositions of DW­3, the High Court observed that Page No. 174 of the
E.O.T. Register  of Queen Mary’s Hospital, Lucknow, (Ex. R­4 Paper No.
A­100/1­2)   containing   entries   of   the   admission   of   patients   on
29.09.1990, which showed that the mother of the successful candidate,
Tazeen   Fatima,   was   admitted   in   the   hospital   and   gave   birth   to   a   male

52
child,   was   not   trustworthy   as   contents   had   been   struck   out   and   there
was overwriting on the name of “Tazeen Fatima” on the relevant page of
the   E.O.T.   Register.   That   the   entries   made   in   Column   13   and   Column
16 did not contain material particulars as shown in entries on the same
page pertaining to other patients. The High Court also noticed  that the
entry  in  the  relevant  page of  the  E.O.T  register   did not  match  with the
entries   in   Page   No.   225   of   the   M.L.R.   Register   (Ex.   R­5   Paper   No.   A­
101/1­2).   That   there   was   overwriting   on   the   name   of   “Mrs.   Tazeen
Fatima”   on   the   relevant   page   of   the   M.L.R.   Register   and   that   the
relevant   page   of   the   M.L.R.   Register   did   not   contain   the   date   of
admission and registration number. The High Court also observed that
the   period   of   pregnancy   was   recorded   in   the   M.L.R.   as   38   weeks   as
against the period of 32 weeks recorded in the E.O.T  register. That the
entry   in   the   E.O.T.   register   was   made   in   the   name   of   one   “Tazeen
Fatima”   while   in   the   M.L.R.   register   it   was   made   in   the   name   of   “Mrs.
Tazeen   Fatima”   and   the   same   was   in   a   different   hand   writing   and   a
different pen was used as compared to other particulars.
16.5.   It was further noted that the fact that the contents were scored out and
overwritten in the above­mentioned registers was admitted by DW­3­Dr.
Uma   Singh,   Sr.   Gynaecologist,   Queen   Mary’s   Hospital,   (Department   of
Obst. & Gyno.) in her oral evidence dated 31.07.2019. 

53
16.6.     From   the   deposition   of   DW­3­Dr.   Uma   Singh,   it   is   noted   that   she   had
stated   that   the   aforesaid   two   registers   were   neither   authenticated   nor
signed   by   any   officer   or   doctor   of   the   hospital   and   that   the   entry
pertaining to the birth on 30.09.1990 was not signed by her. DW­3 had
further   deposed   that   she   could   not   say   whether   the   child   born   on
30.09.1990   as   mentioned   in   the   above   registers   was   the   appellant
herein. DW­3 further deposed that it was the responsibility of the Chief
Medical   Superintendent   to   give   information   pertaining   to   the   births   to
the   Nagar   Nigam,   Lucknow,   and   that   she   was   never   given   this
responsibility   and   that   there   was   no   post   of   Chief   Medical
Superintendent   in   the   hospital.   Further,   DW­3   stated   that   the   above­
mentioned   registers   were   maintained   by   a   clerk,   and   the   concerned
clerk was not produced by the successful candidate to prove the alleged
entries made in the above­mentioned registers. Further, DW­3­Dr. Uma
Singh   could   not   produce   the   application   made   by   the   mother   of   the
successful   candidate,   to   her,   for   the   issuance   of   a   duplicate   birth
certificate.
16.7.   More   significantly,   DW­3   who   is   said   to   have   delivered   the   successful
candidate on 30.09.1990 could not categorically say that the male child
that   she   delivered   was   indeed   the   successful   candidate.   Thus,   there   is
no clinching evidence in this regard despite the documents sought to be
produced, which in any case have not been rightly believed by the High

54
Court  owing  to  overwriting,  interpolation  etc.  and  DW­3  not   being  able
to categorically state that successful candidate was delivered by her on
30.09.1990.   Therefore,   in   my   view   the   evidence   of   DW­3   does   not,   in
any way further the case of the successful candidate. 
16.8.   DW­4,   Dr.   Vineeta   Das   is   stated   to   be   the   doctor   who   issued   the
Duplicate Birth Certificate on 21.04.2015.  Referring  to Document  A­37
(Duplicate   Birth   Certificate   issued   on   21.04.2015)   DW­4   was   asked
whether   the   same   had   been   signed   by   her,   she   answered   in   the
affirmative. As to the contents of Document A­37, DW­4 deposed that it
was a duplicate birth certificate which was issued on 21.04.2015 by the
Gynaecology   Department   of   the   hospital   she   worked   at.     DW­4   further
deposed   that   in   the   first   column,   it   had   been   recorded   that   the   birth
certificate pertained to the baby of Tazeen Fatima, the sex and caste of
the   child   i.e.,   Male   and   Muslim,   were   also   recorded;   in   the   second
column the name of the mother, Smt. Tazeen Fatima was written and in
the   third   column;   father’s   name   i.e.,   Mohd.   Azam   Khan   was   written;
and   in   the   fourth   column,   the   grandfather’s   name   was   written.   DW­4
deposed   that   in   the   next   line,   the   date   and   time   of   delivery   i.e.,
30.09.1990 at 3:43 a.m. were mentioned. 
16.9.     On   being   questioned   as   to   the   procedure   that   is   followed   for   issuing   a
duplicate   birth   certificate,   DW­4   stated   that   the   Chief   Medical
Superintendent,   King   George   Medical   University   sends   a   letter   to   the

55
Head of Department who in turn appoints a Medical Consultant for the
issuance   of   duplicate   birth   certificates   and   after   that   the   clerk   makes
the   duplicate   birth   certificate   which   has   to   be   signed   by   the   Head   of
Department. 
16.10.   On   being   questioned   whether   the   entries   made   in   Page   no.   174   of
Manual No. 5097 were made by her, DW­4 answered in the negative.
16.11. On appreciating the above statements in light of the documents referred
to   above,   it   is   noted   that   DW­4   in   her   cross­examination   had   deposed
that   birth   certificate   was   issued   in   the   instant   case   on   an   application
received   by   the   Chief   Medical   Superintendent   but   she   could   not   name
the   medical   consultant   nominated   to   prepare   the   duplicate   birth
certificate nor could she produce any document relating thereto. 
16.12. The High Court observed that the entries in the E.O.T. register (Ex. R­4
Paper   No.   A100/1­2)   and   in   the   M.L.R.   register   (Ex.   R­5   Paper   No.
A101/1­2)   could   not   be   proved   to   be   genuine   by   the   successful
candidate and that he failed to establish that he was the child born on
30.09.1990, as recorded in the aforesaid registers. 
16.13.   The   High   Court   therefore   rightly   held   that   the   successful   candidate
could   not   prove   that   he   was   born   on   30.09.1990   at   Lucknow   and   the
evidence   adduced   by   the   mother   of   the   successful   candidate   (DW­5)
regarding   the   alleged   birth   on   30.09.1990   could   not   be   relied   upon   in
the absence of other corroborative evidence. 

56
16.14.   In   furtherance   of   the   RTI   application   dated   31.08.2017,   filed   by   the
successful   candidate   (during   the   pendency   of   the   Election   Petition
before the High Court) seeking information as to his date of birth, DW­
4­   Dr.   Vineeta   Das   issued   a   letter   (Ex.   R­9   Paper   No.   A42/3)   dated
12.09.2017,   to   the   Public   Information   Officer/Chief   Medical
Superintendent   of   King   George   Medical   University,   Lucknow,   wherein
she  had  stated  that  the  successful  candidate was  born on 30.09.1990.
Upon   perusal   of   the   letter   dated   12.09.2017,   it   is   observed   that   the
correctness of the contents of the said letter was completely lost in view
of the fact that in the relevant page of the E.O.T. Register (Ex. R­4 Paper
No. A100/1­2) and in the relevant  page of the M.L.R.  Register  (Ex.  R­5
Paper   No.   A101/1­2),   there   was   no   mention   of   the   name   of   the
successful candidate. Thus, the birth of the successful candidate (dated
30.09.1990)   could   not   be   related   to   those   entries.   The   High   Court
further   observed   that   DW­4   in   her   cross­examination   had   stated   that
she   was   neither   related   to  the   delivery   of   the   successful   candidate   nor
had   she   made   the   entries   in   the   E.O.T.   Register.   The   High   Court
therefore   observed   that,   without   there   being   any   record   present   with
DW­4, it was wrong on her part to certify that the successful candidate
was born on 30.09.1990 in Queen Mary’s Hospital, Lucknow.
16.15.   Based   on   the   above   reasoning,   the   High   Court   was   rightly   of   the   view
that   the   evidence   given   by   DW­3­   Dr.   Uma   Singh   and   DW­10­   the

57
successful   candidate   could   not   establish   that   he   was   born   on
30.09.1990 in Queen Mary’s Hospital, Lucknow.
16.16.   It   is   obvious   on   a   perusal   of   the   E.O.T.   and   M.L.R.   registers   that   the
same   are   riddled   with   discrepancies,   over­writing   and   factual
inaccuracies.   A   glaring   discrepancy,   which   would   have   a   material
bearing   on   the   successful   candidate’s   case   is   that   the   period   of
pregnancy recorded in the M.L.R. register was recorded as 38 weeks as
against the period of 32 weeks recorded in the E.O.T register. It is also
noted that in the M.L.R. register, Mrs. Tazeen Fatima’s name alone has
been written in a different handwriting and different ink as compared to
the rest of the particulars pertaining to such entry. This would indicate
that   the   name   of   the   successful   candidate’s   mother   was   entered   and
adjusted   into   the   available   space,   and   corresponding   to   particulars,
which pertained to some other patient in the Registers. 
16.17. While DW­3 has deposed that the duplicate birth certificate was issued
after the application was made by the successful candidate’s mother to
the Chief Medical Superintendent of King George University, requesting
for   it   which   was   forwarded   to   the   department   head   of   the   concerned
hospital,   but   D.W.3   could   not   produce   the   forwarding   letter.   No   effort
was   made   by   the   successful   candidate   to   produce   the   same   by
procuring it by way of making an R.T.I. application. Therefore, I am not
convinced   that   the   due   procedure   was   followed   before   issuing   the

58
duplicate   birth   certificate   dated   21.04.2015.   In   fact,   when   enquired
about   the   original   birth   certificate   of   the   duplicate   certificate   of   the
successful candidate, there was no answer given.
16.18.   Having   already   noted   that   the   entries   pertaining   to   the   birth   of   the
successful   candidate,   in   the   E.O.T.   and   M.L.R.   registers   were   mired
with   discrepancies,   over­writing   and   factual   inaccuracies,   I   am   unable
to   ignore   the   same,   especially   since   both   such   registers   were   not
authenticated   by   any   Officer   of   Queen   Mary’s   Hospital   or   King   George
University   and   were   not   attested.   By   DW­3’s   own   admission,   the   only
basis on which she was stating that the relevant entries in the registers
were   genuine   was   on   her   understanding   of   the   working   procedures   of
the   hospital.   This   does   not   inspire   much   confidence   as   to   the
genuineness of the entries made in the registers, which   ex facie   appear
to be manipulated. 
16.19.  Further, it is noted from the Labour Room Register that the doctor who
attended   DW­5­the   mother   of   the   successful   candidate   at   the   Queen
Mary’s Hospital was Prof. (Dr.) A. Harish and not Dr. Uma Singh. Dr. A.
Harish has not been examined in the matter.
16.20.   I,  therefore,   am   not   inclined   to  place   much   weight   on   the   testimony   of
DW­4,   as   she   had   not   made   the   entries   in   the   E.O.T.   Register.
Therefore, her statements are not persuasive. 

59
I, therefore, affirm the findings and decision of the High Court   qua
this issue also. 
v) Re: Medical Examination Report of the successful candidate: 
17.       The   High   Court   did   not   accept   the   report   of   the   ossification   test,   as
conclusive   proof   of   the   successful   candidate’s   age   as   the   same   could   not   be
proved by DW­8, Dr. Satbir Singh Ken, Radiologist, District Hospital, Rampur,
who was a part of the Medical Board that determined the age of the successful
candidate   to   be   26   years.   The   High   Court   based   its   decision   on   the   fact   that
DW­8   could   not   produce   the   original   medical   report   or   the   records   pertaining
thereto. It was also observed that a bone ossification test would always have to
be considered having regard to the fact that the results thereof could differ, by
up to two years from the actual age of the person tested,   vide   Mukarrab and
others vs. State of U.P. (2017) 2 SCC 210. 
17.1.       In this background, it may also be noted that DW­8 deposed that in his
opinion, there could be a difference  of one year between the actual age
of   the   successful   candidate   and   the   age   suggested   in   the   report   of   the
bone ossification test. That on being asked whether it was correct to say
that bone ossification tests could not tell the correct age, DW­8 refused
to make any comment and stated that he was only a radiologist and had
given only the X­Ray report. 

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17.2.   The aforesaid statements would have to be considered in light of the law
relating   to   the   evidentiary   value   of   a   bone   ossification   test.   This   Court
has,   in   Mukarrab   (supra) ,   declared   that   an   ossification   test   could   not
be  solely  relied   upon  as conclusive  proof   of  age  and  the  said  test  is  by
no means an infallible or accurate test to determine the correct number
of   years   of   a   person’s   life.   The   general   rule   for   determining   the   age   is
that it can vary plus or minus two years and that the date of birth of a
person is to be determined on the basis of the material on record and on
appreciation   of   evidence   adduced   by   parties.   It   has   therefore   been
authoritatively laid down by this Court that the report of an ossification
test can, at most, be used to corroborate other relevant evidences, oral
or documentary. Even so, relying on the aforesaid case, the High Court
had   rightly   observed   that   if   the   margin   factor   of   (plus   or   minus)   two
years   is   applied   to   the   case   of   the   successful   candidate,   it   could   also
mean that in the year 2017 the age of the successful candidate was 24
years which would indicate that he was born in the year 1993.
17.3.  In that background, I am of the view that the medical examination report
of   the   successful   candidate   dated   27.01.2017   based   on   an   ossification
test conducted, wherein his age was recorded  to be twenty­six years at
the relevant time, cannot be accepted as conclusive proof of his age and
the   same   would   not   hold   any   water.   This   is   especially   so   when   other
documents   such   as   matriculation   certificate,   date   of   birth   certificate

61
issued   by   the   Nagar   Palika   Parishad,   Rampur   and   passports,   which
have been acknowledged by this Court on various occasions to serve as
proof   of   date   of   birth   are   in   fact   available   in   the   instant   case   but   the
date of birth recorded in the said documents is contrary to the result of
the   ossification   test.   While   I   may   have   been   inclined   to   place   some
weight   on   the   result   of   the   ossification   test,   in   case   other   documents
which   would   serve   as   proof   of   age   were   not   available,   I   am   unable   to
accept   the   same   in   the   instant   case.   This   is   because   other   documents
which   would   serve   as   proof   of   age   are   available   and   the   date   of   birth
recorded in such documents is contrary to the result of the ossification
test. Therefore, I affirm the findings and decision of the High Court   qua
this issue also. 
vi) Re:   Declaration   of   the   successful   candidate’s   mother   while
submitting the G.I.S. Nomination Form :
18.     This   issue   pertains   to   the   evidentiary   value   of   the   contents   of   the   G.I.S.
(Group Insurance Scheme) nomination form which formed a part of the Service
Book   (Ex.   R­11   Paper   No.   A95/1­34)   of   the   successful   candidate’s   mother,
which   is  relied   upon  by   the  successful   candidate.   In  Paper   No.  A95/25   of   the
said   Service   Book   is   the   G.I.S.   Nomination   Form   of   the   mother   of   the
successful   candidate,   which   records,   inter­alia ,   that   on   26.04.2001,   she   had
nominated   the   appellant­successful   candidate   and   two   other   family   members
under   the   Group   Insurance   Scheme   by   stating   their   respective   age   as   on   the

62
aforesaid date. In the said form, the age of the successful candidate is stated as
eight years as on 26.04.2001. 
18.1.  The High Court observed that DW­1­ Dr. Shailendra K. Tiwari, Assistant
Director   of   Higher   Education,   Prayagraj,   U.P.,   brought   the   successful
candidate’s mother’s Service Book (Ex. R­11 A95/1­34) which contained
the   G.I.S.   (Group   Insurance   Scheme)   Nomination   Form   (Ex.   R­11
A95/25) which was signed by the mother of the successful candidate on
26.04.2001.   The   High   Court   concluded   that   the   successful   candidate
was born in the year 1993.
18.2.   The   High   Court   further   observed   that   the   election   petitioner   had
specifically   raised   this   argument   in   paragraph   12   (iii)   of   the   Election
Petition and yet, the successful candidate did not make any averment in
this   regard   so   as   to   explain   the   detail   entered   as   such   in   the   G.I.S.
nomination form.
18.3.     The   G.I.S.   Nomination   Form   (Ex.   R­11   Paper   No.   A95/25)   showed   that
the   successful   candidate   was   only   eight   years   old   in   the   year   2001,
which   would   imply   that   he   was   born   in   the   year   1993.   Further,   such
admission on the part of DW­5­Tazeen Fatima at an undisputed point of
time would have to be considered as conclusive proof of the fact that the
successful candidate was born in the year 1993 and was therefore eight
years old in April, 2001 in the absence of any explanation to resile from
the   said   admission.   The   said   G.I.S   Form   was   adduced   as   evidence   by

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none   other   than   the   successful   candidate   and   was   also   referred   to   by
DW­5–Tazeen   Fatima   in   her   cross­examination.   However,   she   did   not
offer   any   explanation   about   the   entry   as   to   the   successful   candidate’s
age   in   the   said   form   and   had   not   disputed   the  said   G.I.S.   Form   which
was a part of her Service Book. The successful candidate, having relied
on DW­5’s Service Book, of which the G.I.S. form is a part, cannot now
seek to rely on the same selectively, i.e., on only those details entered in
the  Service  Book/G.I.S.   form   which   would   potentially  support   his   case
while   resiling   or   disregarding   as   irrelevant   any   entry   or   detail   therein
which would have an adverse impact on his case. 
18.4.     This   Court   has   held   in   P.C.   Purushothama   Reddiar   vs.   S.   Perumal
(1972) 1 SCC 9  that once a document is properly admitted by the party
producing   the   said   document,   the   contents   of   that   document   are   also
admitted in evidence and no further evidence would have to be let in by
the   party   relying   on   such   admission   to   establish   the   fact   so   admitted
aliunde . 
18.5.     The   said   G.I.S.   Form   was   adduced   as   evidence   at   the   behest   of   the
successful candidate and the contents of the same were proved by DW­
1­Dr.   Shailendra   K.   Tiwari   and   were   not   disputed   by   DW­5­Tazeen
Fatima.   Therefore,   the   successful   candidate   cannot   now   be   allowed   to
selectively admit the contents of the same. No attempt was made by the
successful   candidate   to   resile   from   the   said   admission   by   offering   any

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explanation   as   to   why   reliance   could   not   be   placed   on   the   said
document when the successful candidate himself was relying on it.
18.6.     I,   therefore,   affirm   the   findings   of   the   High   Court   that   the   G.I.S.
Nomination   Form   (Ex.   R­11   Paper   No.   A95/25)   came   into   existence   at
an undisputed point of time and is a piece of evidence which proves that
the successful candidate was born in the year 1993.
vii) Re: Aadhar Card, Voter I.D. Card and Driving License:
19.       This   issue   pertains   to   the   effect   of   the   following   documents   of   identity,
wherein   the   successful   candidate’s   date   of   birth   has   been   recorded   as
30.09.1990, namely, copy of Aadhar Card, driving licence and Voter ID Card of
the   appellant­successful   candidate.   Strong   reliance   has   been   placed   on   the
above­listed   documents   to   contend   that   the   date   of   birth   recorded   therein   is
30.09.1990,   which   is   in   accordance   with   the   date   of   birth   reflected   in   the
duplicate birth certificates issued by the Queen Mary’s Hospital, Lucknow, and
the Nagar Nigam, Lucknow, on 21.04.2015 and 21.01.2015, respectively. 
19.1.     The   High   Court,   on   perusal   of   the   successful   candidate’s   Aadhar   Card
(Ex. P­2 Paper  No. A­66/1), Driving License (Ex. P­2 Paper No. A­67/1)
and   Voter   I.D.   Card   (Ex.   P­2   Paper   No.   A­68/1)   held   that   the   above­
mentioned documents are not evidence of date of birth of the successful
candidate. It was of the view that the date of birth in the Driving License
was   corrected   subsequently   and   that   the   Aadhar   Card   dated
07.03.2015   and   the   Voter   I.D.   Card   dated   18.07.2016   were   issued   on

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the   basis   of   the   date   of   birth   mentioned   in   the   birth   certificate   dated
21.01.2015 issued by the Nagar Nigam, Lucknow, which had been held
to be null and void.  Reliance  was placed on a judgment of its Court in
Smt.   Parvati   Kumari   and   Ors.   vs.   State   of   U.P.   Thru.   Principal
Secretary   Home   &   Ors.   (Misc.   Bench   No.   13419   of   2018)   to   hold
that Aadhar card is a means of identity and not a proof of date of birth.
The High Court therefore, held that the above­mentioned documents did
not   conclusively   establish   that   the   successful   candidate   was   above
twenty­five years of age on the date of filing his nomination papers or on
the   date   of   declaration   of   result   of   the   legislative   assembly   election   in
question.
19.2.  I am inclined to affirm the findings of the High Court  qua  this issue also.
It is observed so,   in light of the fact that the Aadhar card was issued on
07.03.2015,   on   the   basis   of   the   duplicate   birth   certificate   dated
21.01.2015.   Having   held   that   the   duplicate   birth   certificate   dated
21.01.2015 does not establish the date of birth of successful candidate
as   30.09.1990   and   that   the   same   was   issued   under   circumstances
which   are   suggestive   of   manipulation   and   interpolation   of   the   hospital
records, I am of the opinion that the Aadhar card which was issued on
07.03.2015   would   also   not   have   any   evidentiary   value   in   so   far   as
successful   candidates’   date   of   birth   is   concerned.   Further,   the   driver’s
licence and voter ID of the successful candidate herein, which were also

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issued on the strength of the duplicate certificates issued by the Queen
Mary’s   Hospital,   Lucknow,   and   the   Nagar   Nigam,   Lucknow,   on
21.04.2015   and   21.01.2015,   respectively,   would   not   serve   as   proof   of
the   successful   candidate’s   date   of   birth,   having   regard   to   the
observations   in   the   preceding   paragraphs   of   the   discussion   as   to   the
proof of the date of birth of the successful candidate being 30.09.1990.
19.3.       It   is   observed   that   all   these   documents   were   secured   post   2015,   at
which   time   the   successful   candidate   started   taking   active   part   in
politics.   I,   therefore,   am   inclined   to   observe   that   the   said   documents
were obtained, merely as a means to corroborate the false claims of the
successful candidate as to his date of birth and hence are not worthy of
consideration   as   corroborative   evidence   for   the   purpose   of   proving   the
date of birth of the successful candidate. 
20.      I shall now discuss the judgments cited on behalf of the appellant:
a) In   Brij   Mohan   Singh   vs.   Priya   Brat   Narain   Sinha   (supra) ,   on   an
examination of the entire oral and documentary evidence, this Court held
that   the   election   petitioner   therein   had   not   been   able   to   prove   that   the
successful   candidate   therein   was   below   twenty­five   years   of   age   on   the
date   of   filing   of   his   nomination   while   the   appellant   himself   also   was   not
able to show that he was at least twenty­five years of age on that date. It
was   observed   that   the   burden   of   proving   the   age   was   on   the   election

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petitioner   and   when   the   said   burden   was   not   discharged,   the   election
petition must fail.
The   aforesaid   dictum   is   of   no   assistance   to   the   appellant   herein   as
the position with respect to the factual matrix is at variance. Although, the
election   petitioner   herein   contended   that   the   successful   candidate   was
less   than   twenty­five   years   of   age   and   therefore,   was   ineligible   to   contest
the   Assembly   election   and   the   election   petitioner   had   the   burden   of
proving   the   said   fact   but   the   successful   candidate   took   up   on   himself   to
prove   another   fact,   namely,   that   he   was   born   on   30.09.1990   and   not   on
01.01.1993   and   therefore,   was   above   twenty­five   years   of   age.   Thus,   the
burden   was   on   the   respective   parties   to   prove   their   respective   cases.   On
going through the oral and documentary evidence in this case, I find that
the appellant herein has failed to prove that he was born on 30.09.1990 in
spite   of   letting   in   voluminous   oral   and   documentary   evidence   in   view   of
the   discussion   and   findings   arrived   at   by   us.   On   the   other   hand,   the
evidence   let   in   by   the   respondent­election   petitioner,   when   juxtaposed   to
the   pertinent   admissions   let   in   by   the   appellant   herein,   has,   in   my   view,
enabled   the   respondent   herein   to   prove   his   case   before   the   High   Court.
The   reasoning   and  conclusion   of  the  High  Court   in  my   view   is  thus,   just
and   proper   on   the   appreciation   of   the   evidence   on   record   in   the   instant
case.

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b) In  Birad Mal Singhvi Singh vs. Anand Purohit (supra) , the question as
regards   the   age   of   two   candidates,   namely,   Hukmi   Chand   and   Suraj
Prakash   Joshi   was   under   consideration.   The   election   petitioner   therein
had   examined,   inter   alia,   PW­3   and   PW­5,   being   the   Principal,   New
Government   High   Secondary   School,   Jodhpur,   since   1984   and   Deputy
Director   (Examination)   Board   of   Secondary   Education,   Rajasthan,
respectively. They  produced the scholar’s register (Ex.­P8) and counterfoil
of   the   Certificate   of   Board   of   Secondary   Education   (Ex.­P9)   of   Hukmi
Chand,   respectively,   and   tabulation   record   of   the   Secondary   School
Examination,   1974,   (Ex.­P10).   In  the   documents   at   Ex.­   P9   and   P10,   the
date   of   birth   of   Hukmi   Chand   was   recorded   as   13.06.1956.   Similarly,
insofar as Suraj Prakash Joshi is concerned, Ex.­P11 being the tabulation
record   of   Secondary   School   Examination   of   1977   indicated   his   date   of
birth  as  11.03.1959   and   the  counterfoil   of  certificates   and  the  tabulation
form recording the same date of birth on the basis of what was mentioned
by the candidate in the examination form were produced. 
In my view, the aforesaid case would have no relevance insofar as the
appellant herein is concerned. No doubt, in the present case also, the fact
in   issue   is   with   regard   to   the   date   of   birth   of   the   appellant­successful
candidate. While the election petitioner in the instant case stated that it is
01.01.1993   and   he   has   produced   documents   and   let   in   oral   evidence   in
support   of   the   same,   the   appellant­successful   candidate   has   stated   that

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his date of birth is 30.09.1990 and in support of this fact, has tried to let
in   both   oral   and   documentary   evidence.   While   considering   the   oral   and
documentary   evidence   on   record,   I   find   that   the   appellant   has   failed   to
prove   his   case   that   he   was   born   on   30.09.1990.   On   the   other   hand,   the
evidence   on   record   in   the   form   of   oral   and   documentary   admissions
produced   by   the   appellant   herein   when   juxtaposed   and   appreciated   with
the   oral   and   documentary   evidence   of   the   respondent­election   petitioner
herein indicates that the appellant has failed to prove that he was born on
30.09.1990   while   the   election   petitioner   has   proved   that   the   appellant
herein was born on 01.01.1993. This is because the appellant has not let
in evidence to show as to on what basis the birth certificate was issued by
the Queen Mary’s Hospital in which the appellant was born, as well as the
basis   on   which   the   other   birth   certificate   had   been   issued   by   the   Nagar
Nigam, Lucknow. This is because the entries made in the EOT register and
MLR have no evidentiary value in the absence of the birth list sent by the
hospital to  the  Municipal Corporation which is  the  basis for   registering  a
birth   in   the   birth   register   maintained   by   it.   Unless   the   hospital   wherein
the  child   was  born   sends   the   birth   list  to  the  Municipal   Corporation,   the
issuance   of   birth   certificate   by   it   would   have   no   probative   value.   The
duplicate birth certificates issued by Queen Mary’s Hospital and the Nagar
Nigam,   Lucknow,   are   de   hors   any   basis   in   the   instant   case.   I   infer   the
same   on   perusal   of   the   documentary   and   oral   evidence   discussed   above.

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Therefore,   the   appellant   herein   has   failed   to   prove   that   he   was   born   on
30.09.1990. 
On   the   other   hand,   the   respondent­election   petitioner   has   produced
the   relevant   evidence   of   an   undisputed   point   of   time   to   prove   that   the
appellant   herein   was   born   on   01.01.1993.   Such   inference   can   be   made
from Ex. P­1 to P­4 in which the date of birth of the successful candidate
was   shown   as   01.01.1993.     Although,   voluminous   documents   were
produced   by   the   appellant   to   contradict   the   same,   the   fact   remains   that
Ex   R­11   being   the   copy   of   the   service   book   of   Tazeen   Fatima   Lecturer
Political   Science,   mother   of   the   appellant­successful   candidate   it   was
categorically stated that the appellant herein was eight years of age in the
year   2001   as   per   GIS   nomination   form   submitted   by   her   under   her   own
signature on 26.04.2001.  This critical admission made in the service book
stating   that   the   appellant   herein   was   eight   years   of   age   in   2001   has   not
been explained nor any attempt has been made to contradict or resile from
the same.  
The factual matrix in the aforesaid case would not apply   vis­à­vis  the
case   at   hand   as   the   respondent   herein   produced   certain   documents   in
order to prove that the appellant herein was born on 01.01.1993  and the
said fact has been proved by producing the relevant oral and documentary
evidence. When the said evidence is appreciated in light of the admissions
by  the   appellant   herein,  I   find   that  the   appellant   has   failed  to   prove   that

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he was born on 30.09.1990. In the circumstances, I am of the opinion that
the documentary evidence produced by the respondent­election petitioner
has   cogent   and   probative   value.   This   is   because   the   said   documents   are
consistent   with   the   admitted   documents   of   the   appellant   as   well   as   with
the   admissions   made   by   the   appellant   himself   to   the   effect   that,   it   was
only in the year 2015 that he found out that the date of birth   mentioned
in   his   records   was   shown   to   be   01.01.1993   and   that   he   was   born   in
Rampur   and   based   on   the   Birth   Certificate   issued   by   Nagar   Palika
Parishad,   Rampur,   he   had   continued   his   affairs   including   travelling
overseas   on   passports   and   visas   issued   on   the   basis   of   the   Birth
Certificate   issued   by   Nagar   Palika   Parishad,   Rampur,   which   showed   that
he was born on 01.01.1993. 
Further,   it   was   only   after   the   commencement   of   the   proceedings   in
the election  petition and the challenge raised to his date of birth that the
appellant made attempts to establish that he was born on 30.09.1990 and
hence,   took   steps   to   get   his   educational   record,   passport   and   other
documents   of   identity   “rectified”   so   as   to   make   them   consistent   with   his
stand as against the election petition. The subsequent alterations made in
the   documents   pertaining   to   the   appellant   herein   cannot   have   a   bearing
on the case since even according to the appellant it was on the basis of the
following   documents,   namely,   his   Class   X   Marksheet,   his   Passport   and
Visa   that   the   appellant   herein   was   continuing   with   his   activities   and

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identified himself with this date of birth as 01.01.1993 till the year 2015.
Therefore,   I   am   convinced   that   it   was   only   for   the   purpose   of   contesting
the   assembly   elections   which   were   held   in   the   year   2017   and   being
conscious   of   the   fact   that   he   could   not   do   so   as   he   was   disqualified   on
account   of   being   under   aged,   he   took   steps   to   alter   his   date   of   birth   to
30.09.1990  and  made   attempts to  seek   “duplicate”  birth  certificates  from
the   Nagar   Nigam,   Lucknow   and   Queen   Mary’s   Hospital,   Lucknow.   Till
then, the appellant herein was conscious of the fact that his date of birth
in   his   educational   and   other   records   was   01.01.1993   and   he   used   those
documents   for   the   relevant   purposes   that   necessitated   the   usage   of   the
said documents. 
Another significant point is that until the document at Ex. P­3 Paper
No.   A­80/1   was   cancelled,   the   appellant   had   possessed   documents
showing two dates of births, one, being 01.01.1993 as having been born in
Rampur and the other being 30.09.1990 as having been born in Lucknow.
In   the   circumstances,   I   am   of   the   opinion   that   since   the   basis   on   which
the birth certificate was issued by the Nagar Nigam, Lucknow  and Queen
Mary’s Hospital, Lucknow, is not brought on record in the form of tenable
and   probative   oral   and   documentary   evidence,   the   case   of   the   appellant
cannot be accepted at all. 
By   this,   it   does   not   mean   that   respondent   herein­election   petitioner
must   fail.  I   say   so  for   the  reason  that   the  appellant   herein   has  produced

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material   to   show   that   he   was   eight   years   of   age   in   the   year   2001   (G.I.S.
Nomination   Form)   which   is   consistent   with   the   case   of   the   election
petitioner who has produced documents indicating the date of birth of the
appellant­successful   candidate   as   01.01.1993   and   therefore,   was   not
eligible   to   contest   for   the   election   to   the   legislative   assembly   in   the   year
2017.
c) The judgment of this Court in  Narender Singh (supra)  is of no assistance
to   the   appellant   herein   as   evidence   on   record   does   not   give   rise   to
inferences in favour of the appellant herein. 
d) The   judgment   of   this   Court   in   Joshna   Gouda   (supra)   is   also
distinguishable.   In   the   said   case,   the   controversy   was   with   regard   to   the
eligibility   to   contest   for   the   post   of   Sarpanch   under   the   Orissa   Gram
Panchayat Act, 1964, it was contended by the first respondent therein that
the appellant therein was not eligible to contest as he had not attained the
age   of   21   years.   Therefore,   the   Election   Petition   was   filed   to   seek   setting
aside   of   the   election   of   the   respondent   therein.   The   appellant   therein
contested the Election Petition. In the said case, the question was whether
the  appellant   therein  was  born  on   07.07.1985   and  not   on  20.06.1986   as
contended   by   the   first   respondent­election   petitioner   therein.   The
successful candidate therein had produced Exbs. A to H in support of the
fact that she was born on 07.07.1985. The High Court found that Exbs. A
and H are voters’ list of the years 2007 and 2008 respectively which were

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prepared   later   in   point   of   time   to   the   filing   of   the   nomination   papers   in
election   in   question   and   they   do   not   reflect   the   date   of   birth   of   the
appellant therein. Ex. D being horoscope  was rightly not relied upon. Ex.
E   being   a   certificate   of   date   of   birth   issued   under   the   provisions   of   the
Registration   of   Births   and   Deaths   Act   showing   the   date   of   birth   of   the
appellant   therein   as   07.07.1985   but   such   an   entry   came   to   be   made
pursuant   to   an   application   made   by   the   appellant   therein   subsequent   to
the   nominations   in   the   election   in   question.   Therefore,   the   High   Court
refused  to place any reliance on the said document  also.  This Court held
that   the   High   Court   had   rightly   refused   to   believe   those   documents   and
the appellant­successful candidate therein had failed to prove her date of
birth   as   07.07.1985.   But   that   does   not   automatically   lead   to   the
conclusion   that  the  assertion  of  respondent  No.  1  therein   that  the  actual
date   of   birth   of   the   appellant   therein   is   20.06.1986   was   proved.   It   was
observed by this Court that the burden to prove the fact that the appellant
therein was born on 20.06.1986 rested squarely on the election petitioner.
In that regard, reliance was placed on Section 101 of the Evidence Act. It
was   further   observed   by   placing   reliance   on   Robins   vs.   National   Trust
Company 1927 AC 515  which is to the following effect: 
            “   …   To   assert   that   a   man   who   is   alive   was   born
requires no proof. The onus is not on the person making
the assertion, because it is self­evident  that he had been
born.  But  to assert  that  he  [had  been]  born  on a certain

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date, if the date is material, requires proof; the onus is on
the person making the assertion.”
This   Court   held   that   since   the   first   respondent   therein   had   failed   to
discharge   the   burden   cast   upon   him,   the   Election   Petition   had   to   fail   on
the oral and documentary evidence let in that case. It was held that there
was   an   inconsistency   regarding   the   age   of   the   appellant   therein   and
particularly   with  reference  to  her  admission   in the  Upper  Primary   School
and   hence,   the   appeal   was   allowed   and   the   Election   Petition   was
dismissed. The aforesaid judgment is not applicable to the present case as
in   the   present   case   there   is   a   clear   and   unambiguous   admission   on   the
part   of   the   appellant   through   the   nomination   form   being   part   of   the
Service   Book   ­   (Ex).   R­11   paper   No.   A­95/1­34   and   the   document
produced   by   the   respondent/election   petitioner   herein.   Those   documents
relate   to   the   appellant   herein   and   the   appellant   herein   had   acted   upon
those documents until his date of birth was changed to 30.09.1990 in the
year   2015.   Thus,   the   judgment   in   Joshna   Gouda   is   of   no   assistance   to
the appellant herein.
Summary of Conclusions:
a) I am of the view  that the appellant­successful candidate was not born on
30.09.1990   and   was   not   twenty­five   years   old   at   the   time   of   filing   the
nomination as the appellant has been unable to prove the said fact despite
the   voluminous   oral   and   documentary   evidence   provided   on   record.   In
fact,  G.I.S.   Nomination   Form   submitted  by   DW­5  at  an  undisputed   point

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of   time   and   which   is   part   of   her   Service   Book   which   is   adduced   as
evidence  at  the behest  of the appellant­successful candidate goes against
the   case   of   the   appellant.   The   G.I.S.   Nomination   Form   is   in   consonance
with the passports  and visa   issued  by  the concerned  authorities  showing
the date of birth of the appellant as 01.01.1993 which have been produced
by the election petitioner in support of his case. The issuance of the fresh
passport during the pendency of the Election Petition showing the date of
birth as 30.09.1990 is of no consequence and cannot be of any assistance
to the appellant herein.
Similarly,   Class   X   Secondary   School   Examination   Certificate   and
Class   XII   Secondary   School   Examination   Certificate   which   indicate   the
date   of   birth   of   the   appellant   as   01.01.1993   even   till   date,   are   also   in
consonance   with   the   earlier   passports   and   visa   documents   produced   by
the respondent­election petitioner herein. In fact, the appellant­successful
candidate  had relied   upon  the  educational  certificates  indicating   his  date
of birth as 01.01.1993 and his place of birth as Rampur for the purpose of
securing his earlier passports and visa.
b) Moreover, the stand taken by the successful candidate that all documents
pertaining to the Birth Certificate dated 28.06.2012 issued by the office of
Nagar   Palika   Parishad,   Rampur,   were   burnt   due   to   a   short   circuit   on
08.05.2015 would suggest that the said birth certificate, wherein the date
of   birth  of   the   successful   candidate   was  recorded   as  01.01.1993   came   to
be destroyed and later cancelled were under suspicious circumstances.

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c) Further,   on   a   perusal   of   the   E.O.T.   and   M.L.R.   registers,   I   hold   that   the
same  are   mired   with  discrepancies,   over­writing   and   factual   inaccuracies
and   the   same   cannot   be   ignored.   I   am,   therefore,   of   the   view   that   no
weight can be placed on the birth certificate dated 21.01.2015,  issued by
the Nagar Nigam, Lucknow, which is stated to be issued on the strength of
an entry made in the birth register maintained by the hospital, which itself
is   not   authentic   in   the   absence   of   production   of   the   birth   list   indicating
the birth of the appellant  on 30.09.1990,  and is created by  manipulation
and interpolation in the hospital records.
d) I am not inclined to place any weight on the result of the ossification test
as   other   documents   such   as   the   matriculation   certificate,   date   of   birth
certificate   issued   by   the   Nagar   Palika   Parishad,   Rampur   and   passports
prove   that   the   age   and   the   date   of   birth   recorded   in   such   documents   is
contrary to the result of the ossification test.
e) It is further held that the Aadhar card,  driver’s licence and voter ID of the
appellant­successful candidate herein, which were issued on the strength
of   the   duplicate   certificates   issued   by   the   Queen   Mary’s   Hospital,
Lucknow,   and   the   Nagar   Nigam,   Lucknow,   on   21.04.2015   and
21.01.2015,   respectively,   are   not   proof   of   the  successful   candidate’s   date
of birth as 30.09.1990.
It   would   be   apposite   to   refer   to   para   79   of   Sushil   Kumar   vs.   Rakesh
Kumar (supra)  which reads as under:
“ 79.   The   Election   Tribunal  while   determining   an  issue   of
this nature has to bear in mind that Article 173(b) of the

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Constitution   of   India   provides   for   a   disqualification.   A
person cannot be permitted to occupy an office for which
he is disqualified  under  the Constitution. The  endeavour
of the court therefore should be to see that a disqualified
person   should   not   hold   the   office   but   should   not   at   the
same   time   unseat   a   person   qualified   therefor.   The   court
is required to proceed cautiously in the matter and, thus,
while   seeing   that   an   election   of   the   representative   of   the
people  is not set aside on flimsy  grounds but would also
have   a   duty   to   see   that   the   constitutional   mandate   is
fulfilled.”
In view of the aforesaid discussion which has been made after taking into
consideration   all   the   material   on   record,   I   find   that   the   acceptance   of   the
nomination   of   the   appellant­successful   candidate   was   improper.   The   findings
of   the   High   Court   in   this   regard   do   not   require   any   interference.   Hence,   the
judgment impugned is affirmed and consequently, the appeal is dismissed. The
election   of   the   appellant­successful   candidate   herein   to   the   Uttar   Pradesh
Legislative   Assembly   from   34­Suar   Constituency,   District   Rampur,   Uttar
Pradesh,   is   set   aside.   A   certified   copy   of   this   decision   be   sent   to   Election
Commission forthwith.
Parties to bear their respective costs.
…………… ..…………………J.
    (B.V. NAGARATHNA)
NEW DELHI
07 th
 NOVEMBER, 2022.