/2022 INSC 0970/
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 8261­8262 OF 2022
(Arising out of S.L.P. (Civil) Nos.30849­30850 of 2018)
RAVI NAMBOOTHIRI              ...APPELLANT(S)
                   Versus
K.A. BAIJU & ORS.              ...RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, J.
Leave granted.
2. Aggrieved   by   the   Judgment   passed   by   the   High   Court   of
Kerala, confirming an order passed by the Additional District Judge
setting aside his election as Councilor of Ward No.5 of Annamanada
Gram   Panchayath,   in   the   elections   held   in   November­2015,   the
elected candidate has come up with the above appeals.
3. We have heard the learned counsel for the respective parties.
4. The   brief   facts   essential   for   the   disposal   of   the   above   appeals
are as follows:­
(i) On   5­11­2015,   elections   to   the   Annamanada   Gram
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Panchayath   were   held.   Apart   from   others,   the
appellant and respondent No.1 contested from Ward
No.5.
(ii) On 7.11.2015, the appellant was declared as having
been elected from Ward No.5.
(iii) Respondent   No.1   filed   an   Election   Petition   on   the
file   of   the   District   Munsif   Court,   on   4.12.2015
challenging the election of the appellant.
(iv) By   a   Judgment   dated   19.11.2016,   the   Election
Petition was dismissed by the District Munsif Court,
primarily on the ground that there was no prayer in
the   Election   Petition   to   declare   the   election   of   the
appellant   as   void,   on   the   grounds   stipulated   in
Section 102 of the Kerala Panchayat Raj Act.  There
was actually a prayer for cancelling the election held
on 5.11.2015.  
(v) Aggrieved   by   the   dismissal   of   the   Election   Petition,
respondent No.1 filed an appeal in the Court of the
Additional   District   Judge.   The   appeal   was   allowed
by a Judgment dated 18.06.2018 and the election of
the   appellant   was   declared   as   void   on   the   ground
that   the   appellant   suppressed   in   his   nomination
form,   his   involvement   in   a   criminal   case   and   that
therefore he had committed a corrupt practice.
(vi) Aggrieved   by   the   said   judgment   of   the   District
Court,   the   appellant   filed   a   revision   petition   before
the High Court. The Revision Petition was dismissed
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by an Order dated 30.10.2018. The appellant filed a
petition for review, but the same was also dismissed
by the High Court. Therefore, challenging the order
passed in the Revision Petition and the order passed
in   the   Review   Petition,   the   appellant   has   come   up
with two appeals.
5. The   allegation   that   the   appellant   suppressed   his   involvement
in   a   criminal   case   and   thereby   adopted   a   corrupt   practice,   arose
under very peculiar circumstances, which are as follows:­
(i) On   the   allegation   that   on   20.09.2006,   a   group   of
about   40   persons,   which   included   the   appellant
herein,   formed   themselves   into   an   unlawful
assembly  and  committed  criminal  trespass into the
office   compound   of   the   Annamanada   Gram
Panchayath   and   put   up   a   temporary   shed   for
conducting   a   dharna ,   22   persons   were   prosecuted
before   the   Judicial   First   Class   Magistrate   Court,
Chalakudy, for alleged offences under Sections 143,
283   and   447   read   with   Section   149   of   the   Indian
Penal   Code.   The   appellant   herein   was   cited   as
accused   No.1   and   he   was   also   prosecuted
additionally   for   an   offence   under   Section   38   read
with Section 52 of the Kerala Police Act.
(ii) By   a   Judgment   dated   07.06.2010   passed   in   CC
No.1606 of 2006, the trial Court convicted only A­1
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and   A­2.     The   appellant   herein   who   was   A­1,   was
convicted for the offence under Section 143 IPC and
sentenced   to   simple   imprisonment   for   a   period   of
three months together with a fine of Rs.2000/­.   He
was also convicted for the offence under Section 283
and   sentenced   to   pay   a   fine   of   Rs.200/­.   For   the
offence   under   Section   447,   the   appellant   was
ordered   to   undergo   simple   imprisonment   for   a
period   of   one   month   and   also   to   pay   a   fine   of
Rs.500/­.   Additionally,   the   appellant   was   convicted
for the offence under Section 52 of the Kerala Police
Act and sentenced to pay a fine of Rs.200/­.
(iii) The appellant as well as A­2 filed a statutory appeal
before the Sessions Court, Thrissur. By a Judgment
dated   17.01.2012,   the   appeal   was   partly   allowed
and   the   conviction   of   the   appellant   for   the  offences
under Sections 143, 447 and 283 read with Section
149   IPC   was   set   aside.   However,   the   conviction   of
the   appellant   herein   for   the   offence   under   Section
38 read with Section 52 of the Kerala Police Act and
the   sentence   of   a   fine   of   Rs.200/­   imposed   upon
him, was upheld by the First Appellate Court. 
(iv) Since   the   appellant   is   involved   in   active   electoral
politics   and   his   conviction   by   the   criminal   Court
related to a   dharna   organized by him, the appellant
did   not   pursue   the   matter   further   before   the   High
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Court   against   a   mere   conviction   under   Section   38
read with Section 52 of the Kerala Police Act.
(v) However, while filing his nomination in the elections
to   the   Panchayat   held   in   November­2015,   the
appellant   failed   to   disclose,   in   Form   No.2A,   under
Rule   6   of   the   relevant   Rules,   his   conviction   under
Section 38 read with Section 52 of the Kerala Police
Act, 1961.  Therefore, his election was challenged by
respondent No.1 and the matter has now landed up
before this Court.
6. In the Kerala Panchayat Raj Act, 1994 (hereinafter referred to
as “ the Act ”), an amendment was made in the year 2005, by Act 30
of   2005   with   effect   from   22.08.2005.   One   of   the   amendments
introduced by the said Act, was the insertion of sub­section (1A) in
Section 52. Section 52 (1A) reads as follows:­
“52. Presentation of nomination paper and requirements
for a valid nomination . ­
(1A)   Every   candidate   submitting   nomination   under   sub­
section   (1)   shall  not   be   deemed   to  be   qualified   to  be  elected
to   fill   that   post   unless   he   submits,   along   with   such
nomination,   the   details   regarding   his   educational
qualification,   criminal   cases   in   which   he   is   involved   at
the time of submission of nomination,   property owned by
him   and   other   members   of   his   family,   liabilities   including
arrears   due   from   him   to   any   Public   Sector   Undertaking   or
Government   or   Local   Self   Government   Institutions   and
whether   disqualifies   for   defection   under   the   Kerala   Local
Authorities   (Prohibition   of   Defection)   Act,   1999   in   the   form
and manner as may be prescribed."
7. Though the language employed in sub­section (1A) of Section
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52   mandated   only   the   disclosure   of   the   details   regarding   “ the
criminal   cases   in   which   he   is   involved   at   the   time   of
submission of nomination ”, the High Court invoked Rule 6 of the
Kerala   Panchayat   Raj   (Conduct   of   Election)   Rules,   1995   to   hold
that the suppression of any information relating to past conviction
may   also   amount   to   suppression   of   “ involvement   in   a   criminal
case ”.
8. Rule   6   of   the   Kerala   Panchayat   Raj   (Conduct   of   Election)
Rules, 1995 reads as follows:­
“6. Nomination   of   candidates.­   (1)   A   candidate   shall   be
nominated   by   means   of   a   nomination   paper   in   Form   No.2
and   on   an   application   in   that   behalf   of   an   elector   in   the
electoral   roll   of   any   constituency   of   concerned   Panchayat,
the   Returning   Officer   shall   provide   him   Form   NO.   2   free   of
cost.
(2) Every   candidate shall make and subscribe an oath or
affirmation   before   the   Returning   Officer   or   the   person
authorized   by   the   State   Election   Commission   in   the   Form
specified in the First Schedule of the Act.
(2a) Every candidate shall submit before the Returning 
officer, the details in form No. 2A along with the nomination 
paper.
(3) The   Returning   Officer   shall,   immediately   on   receipt   of
the   nomination   paper,   number   them   serially   in   the   order   of
their   presentation   and   shall   note   the   date   and   time   of   its
presentation   in   each   nomination   paper   and   shall   issue   a
receipt attached to Form No. 2.”
9. The relevant column of Form No. 2A referred to in Rule 6
reads as follows:
“1.   The   following   criminal   cases   are   pending   against   me   for
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trial   before   the   court/I   have   been   convicted   by   the   court   in
criminal cases.
a. XXXX
(b) Those in which punished
(i) Case number 
(ii) Name and place of court
(iii) Description   of   the   offence   for   which   punishment   was
awarded
(iv) Sections   of   the   concerned   Act   under   which
punishment was awarded
(v) Punishment   awarded   (period   of
imprisonment/quantum of fine imposed) etc. 
(vi) Date of sentence
(vii) Details regarding appeal, revision etc. filed against the
sentence.”
10. The   reasoning   of   the   High   Court   was   that   any   failure   to
disclose the correct information regarding the past conviction by a
criminal   court,   would   tantamount   to   suppression   of   information
relating   to   “ involvement   in   a   criminal   case ”.     The   High   Court
reasoned   (i)   that   insofar   as   elections   to   the   State   Assemblies   and
Parliament are concerned, Section 33A of the Representation of the
People   Act,   1951   requires   the   disclosure   of   only   those   convictions
where a sentence of imprisonment for one year and more had been
imposed; and  (ii)  but that the rules framed in Kerala relating to the
elections   to   Panchayats   are   more   stringent,   as   they   require   the
disclosure of any involvement in any criminal case. The High Court
opined   that   the   Court   was   obliged   to   keep   in   mind   the   object   of
such   requirement,   in   the   light   of   the   principles   laid   down   by   this
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Court   in   Union   of   India   vs.   Association   for   Democratic
Reforms and Anr. 1
  and  People’s Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL)
and Anr.  vs.  Union of India and Anr. 2
.  
11. Assailing   the   Judgment   of   the   High   Court,   it   was   argued   by
Shri   Ragenth   Basant,   learned   counsel   appearing   for   the   appellant
that the non­disclosure of the conviction for a petty offence and that
too   relating   to   the  holding   of   a   dharna   on  a  political   issue,   cannot
be termed as “ undue influence ” within the meaning of Section 120(2)
of   the   Act   and   that,   therefore,   the   election   of   the   appellant   ought
not to have been declared void on the ground that it was vitiated by
corrupt   practice   under   Section   102(1)(b)   of   the   Act.   It   was   also
contended   by   the   learned   counsel   that   the   reliance   placed   by   the
First   Appellate   Court   on   the   decision   of   this   Court   in
Krishnamoorthy   vs.   Sivakumar   &   Ors . 3
  was   misplaced.
According   to   the   learned   counsel,   the   non­disclosure   of   criminal
antecedents   pertaining   to   heinous   or   serious   offences   involving
corruption   or   moral   turpitude   alone   would   tantamount   to   corrupt
practice. It is also further contended by the learned counsel for the
appellant   that   the   requirement   of   a   disclosure   in   terms   of   Section
1    (2002) 5 SCC 294
2    (2003) 4 SCC 399
3     (2015) 3 SCC 467
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52(1A) relates only to the involvement in a criminal case at the time
of   submission   of   the   nomination   and   that   therefore,   the
requirement under Rule 6 cannot be read as enlarging the scope of
Section  52(1A).  According  to  the  learned  counsel  for  the  appellant,
even   the   ground   under   Section   102(1)(ca)   of   the   Act   cannot   be
invoked as the same is concerned with a situation where the details
furnished   by   the   elected   candidate   were   shown   to   be   fake.
Therefore,   the   learned   counsel   contended   that   the   First   Appellate
Court and the High Court were completely in error in declaring the
election of the appellant to be void.
12. Supporting   the   judgment   of   the   High   Court   it   was   contended
by   Shri   P.V.   Surendranath,   learned   senior   counsel   for   respondent
No.1   (Election   Petitioner)   that   the   deliberate   suppression   by   the
appellant, in the nomination form filed in Form 2A, of his conviction
for   a   criminal   offence,   squarely   fell   within   the   definition   of   the
expression   “ undue   influence ”   under   Section   120(2)   of   the   Act.
According   to   the   learned   senior   counsel   for   respondent   No.1,   the
Court   is   obliged   to   keep   in   mind   the   fact   that   Section   33B   of   the
Representation   of   the   People   Act,   1951,   was   brought   in   by   the
Parliament   to   nullify   the   effect   of   the   decision   in   Association   for
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Democratic   Reforms   and   Anr   (supra).   But   Section   33B   was
declared   unconstitutional   in   People’s   Union   for   Civil   Liberties
(supra).   Relying   upon   the   decision   in   Resurgence   India   vs.
Election Commission of India and Anr. 4
, it was contended by the
learned   senior   counsel   for   respondent   No.1   that   the   filing   of   an
affidavit with blank particulars has also been held to be a ground to
reject the nomination papers.
13. We   have   carefully   considered   the   rival   contentions.   Before   we
proceed   to   consider   the   rival   contentions,   we   must   point   out   that
the   case   on   hand   relates   to   an   election   to   the   Panchayat   held   in
November­2015. The term of office of the appellant is already over.
But   if   the   Judgment   of   the   High   Court   is   found   to   be   correct,   the
appellant   might   have   incurred   a   disqualification.   Therefore,   a
decision on merits in this case is not a mere academic exercise and
hence we have to deal with the rival contentions.
14. To test the correctness of the decision of the High Court, we may
have to begin our discussion from Section 102 of the Act. Section 102
of the Act reads as follows:­
“ 102.   Grounds   for   declaring   election   to   be   void .   ­   (1)
Subject   to  the   provisions  of  sub­section  (2)   if   the   Court   is   of
opinion – 
4    (2014) 14 SCC 189
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(a) that   on   the   date   of   his   election   a   returned   candidate
was   not   qualified,   or   was   disqualified,   to   be   chosen   to
fill the seat under this Act; or 
(b) that   any   corrupt   practice   has   been   committed   by   a
returned candidate or his election agent or by any other
person with the consent of a returned candidate or his
election agent; or 
(c) that any nomination has been improperly rejected; or
 
(ca)   that   the   details   furnished   by   the   elected   candidate
under sub­section (1A) of section 52 were fake; or
(d) that the result of the election, in so far as it concerns a
returned candidate, has been materially affected – 
(i)  by the improper acceptance of any nomination, or 
(ii)   by   any   corrupt   practice   committed   in   the
interests   of   the   returned   candidate   by   an
agent other than his election agent; or 
(iii)  by the improper reception, refusal or rejection
of any vote or the reception of any vote which
is void; or 
(iv)     by   any   non­compliance  with  the  provisions  of
this   Act   or   of   any   rules   or   orders   made
thereunder,   the   Court   shall   declare   that   the
election of the returned candidate to be void. 
(2)   If   in   the   opinion   of   the   Court   a   returned   candidate   has
been guilty by an agent, other than his election agent, of any
corrupt practice but the Court is satisfied. – 
(a) that no such corrupt practice was committed at the
election   by   the   candidate   or   his   election   agent,   and
every   such  corrupt   practice  was  committed  contrary  to
the orders, and without the consent, of the candidate or
his election agent; 
(b)   that   the   candidate   and   his   election   agent   took   all
reasonable   means   for   preventing   the   commission   of
corrupt practices at the election; and 
(c)   that   in   all   other   respects   the   election   was   free   from
any corrupt practice on the part of the candidate or any
of   this   agents,   then   the   Court   may   decide   that   the
election of the returned candidate is not void. 
Explanation .­ In this section the term “agent” has the same
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meaning as in section 120.”
15. As   seen   from   sub­section   (1)   of   Section   102,   the   election   of   a
candidate   can   be   declared   void,   under   five   different   contingencies.
They   are:   (i)   that   the   returned   candidate   was   not   qualified   or   was
disqualified on the date of his election;  (ii)  that any corrupt practice
has been committed by the returned candidate or his election agent
or  by  any  other  person  with the consent of the returned candidate
or his agent;  (iii)  that any nomination had been improperly rejected;
(iv)   that   the   details   furnished   by   the   elected   candidate   under   sub­
section   (1A)   of   Section   52   were   fake;   and   (v)   that   the   result   of   the
election,   insofar   it   concerns   the   returned   candidate,   has   been
materially   affected   either   by   the   improper   acceptance   of   any
nomination or by any corrupt practice committed in the interest of
the returned candidate by an agent other than his election agent or
by   the   improper   reception,   refusal   or   rejection   of   any   vote   or   the
reception  of any   vote which is  void or  by  any   non­compliance with
the   provisions   of   this   Act   or   of   any   Rules   or   orders   made
thereunder.
16. Interestingly,   sub­section   (1)   of   Section   102   places   the   first
four   contingencies   listed   in   the   preceding   paragraph,   { which   are
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relatable   to   clauses   (a),   (b),   (c)   and   (ca)   of   sub­section   (1) }   on   a
different   footing   than   the   fifth   contingency   { relatable   to   clause   (d) }.
The difference between clauses (a), (b), (c) and (ca) on the one hand
and clause (d) of sub­section (1) of Section 102 on the other hand is
this.   For   setting   aside   an   election   under   any   one   or   more   of   the
contingencies   mentioned   in   clauses     (a),   (b),   (c)   and   (ca),   it   is   not
necessary  for   the  Court  to  find  if  the  result  of  the  election,  insofar
as it concerns the returned candidate, has been materially affected
or not.  
17. In contrast, for holding an election to be void on the ground of
improper   acceptance   of   any   nomination   or   the   commission   of   a
corrupt   practice   by   any   other   agent,   but   in   the   interest   of   the
returned candidate or the improper reception, refusal or rejection of
any   vote   or   the   reception   of   any   vote   which   is   void   or   non­
compliance with the provisions of the Act, the Rules or  orders, the
Court   must   be   satisfied   that   the   result   of   the   election   has   been
materially affected.
18. In   other   words   sub­section   (1)   of   Section   102   places,   (i)   non­
qualification/disqualification   of   the   returned   candidate;
(ii)  commission of any corrupt practice by the returned candidate or
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his   election   agent   or   any   other   person   with   the   consent   of   the
returned candidate or his election agent;  (iii)  the improper rejection
of  any  nomination;  and   (iv)   the  furnishing  of  details  under  Section
52(1A) which are fake, on a much higher pedestal. If a challenge is
made   to   the   election   of   a   candidate   on   any   one   of   these   four
grounds, it  is not  necessary   to show  that  the  result  of the  election
has been materially affected. 
19. Sub­section  (1) of Section 102 places,   (i)   improper  acceptance
of   any   nomination;   (ii)   commission   of   any   corrupt   practice   in   the
interest of the returned candidate, but by any agent other than his
own election agent;   (iii)   the improper reception, refusal or rejection
of   any   vote   or   the   reception   of   any   vote   which   is   void;   and   (iv)   the
non­compliance   with   the   provisions   of   the   Act   or   any   Rules   or
orders made thereunder, in one group or class, where the Court is
obliged to  look  into an  additional  factor  namely  whether   the result
of the election was materially affected due to any of these factors.
20. The expression “ corrupt practice ” is defined in Section 120 of the
Act which reads as follows:
“ 120 .   Corrupt   practices .­   The   following   shall  be   deemed   to
be corrupt practices for the purposes of this Act –
(1) “Bribery”, that is to say, ­ 
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(A)   any   gift,   offer   or   promise   by   a   candidate   or   his
agent or by  any other person with the consent of a candidate
or   his   election   agent   of   any   gratification,   to   any   person
whomsoever,   with   the   object,   directly   or   indirectly   of
inducing – 
(a)   a   person   to   stand   or   not   to   stand   as,   or   to
withdraw   or   not   to     withdraw     from being   a     candidate
at  an election, or 
(b) an   elector    to    vote or refrain from voting at  an
election, or as a reward to – 
      (i) a person for having so stood, or not stood, or for
having withdrawn or not having withdrawn his candidature;
or 
          (ii)   an   elector   for   having   voted   or   refrained   from
voting;
  (B)   the   receipt   of,   or   agreement   to   receive,   any
gratification, whether as a motive or a reward – 
       (a) by   a     person       for     standing or   not standing
as,   or       for   withdrawing     or     not   withdrawing   from   being,   a
candidate; or 
        (b)   by     any   person   whomsoever   for   himself   or   any
other person for voting or refraining from voting, or inducing
or   attempting   to   induce   any   elector   to   vote   or   refrain     from
voting, or any   candidate to withdraw or not to withdraw his
candidature. 
Explanation. ­   For   the   purposes   of   this   clause   the
term   ‘gratification’   is   not   restricted   to   pecuniary
gratifications   or   gratifications   estimable   in   money   and   it
includes   all   forms   of   entertainment   and   all   forms   of
employment  for  reward  but  it  does not  include  the payment
of any expenses   bona fide   incurred at, or for the purpose of,
any   election   and   duly   entered   in   the   account   of   election
expenses referred to in Section 85. 
(2)   “Undue   influence”,   that   is   to   say,   any   direct   or
indirect interference or attempt to interfere on the part of the
candidate,   or   his   agent,   or   of   any   other   person   with   the
consent   of  the  candidate   or   his  election  agent;  with  the  free
exercise of any electoral right: 
Provided that –
  (a) without prejudice to the generality of the provisions
of this clause any such person as is referred to therein who –
          (i)   threatens   any   candidate   or   any   elector,   or   any
person in whom a candidate or an elector is interested, with
injury   of   any   kind   including     social     ostracism   and     ex­
communication  or  expulsion   from   any   caste   or
community; or 
15

       (ii) induces or attempts to induce a candidate or an
elector   to   believe   that   he,   or   any   person   in   whom   he   is
interested, will become or will be rendered an object of divine
displeasure or spiritual censure, shall be deemed to interfere
with the free exercise of the electoral right of such candidate
or elector within the meaning of this clause; 
(b) a declaration of public policy; or a promise of public
action, or the mere exercise of a legal right without intent to
interfere   with   an   electoral   right   shall   not   be   deemed   to   be
interference within the meaning of this clause. 
                (3)   The   appeal   by   a   candidate   or   his   agent   or   by   any
other  person with the consent  of a candidate or his election
agent to  vote or refrain from voting for any person on the
ground of his  religion,   race,   caste,   community   or
language or the use of, or appeal to religious symbols or the
use   of,   or   appeal   to   national   symbols   such   as   the   national
flag   or   the   national   emblem   for   the   furtherance   of   the
prospects of the election of that candidate or for prejudicially
affecting the election of any candidate: 
Provided that no symbol allotted under any rules made
under   this   Act   to   a   candidate   shall   be   deemed   to   be   a
religious   symbol   or   a   national   symbol   for   the   purposes   of
this clause. 
               (4) The promotion of, or attempt to promote, feelings of
enmity   or   hatred   between   different   classes   of   the   citizens   of
India   on   grounds   of   religion,   race,   caste,   community,   or
language,   by   a   candidate   or   his   agent   or   any   other   person
with the consent of a candidate or his election agent for  the
furtherance of the prospects of the election of that candidate
or for prejudicially affecting the election of any candidate. 
              (5)   The   publication   by   a   candidate   or   his   agent   or   by
other person, with the consent of a candidate or his election
agent, of  any   statement   of   fact   which   is   false,   and   which
he either believes to be false or does not believe to be true, in
relation   to   the   personal   character   or   conduct   of   any
candidate,   or   in   relation   to   the   candidature,   or   withdrawal,
of any candidate being a statement reasonably calculated to
prejudice the prospects of that candidate’s election. 
              (6)   The   hiring   or   procuring,   whether   on   payment   or
otherwise,  of   any   vehicle   or   vessel   by   a   candidate   or   his
agent or by any other person with the consent of a candidate
or his election agent, or the use of such vehicle or vessel for
the free conveyance of any elector (other than the candidate
himself,  the   members   of   his   family   or   his   agent)   to   or
16

from any polling  station provided under section 45: 
              Provided   that   the   hiring   of   a   vehicle   or   vessel   by   an
elector   or   by   several   electors   as   their   joint   cost   for   the
purpose   of   conveying   him   or   them   to   and   from   any   such
polling station or place fixed for the poll shall not be deemed
to   be   a   corrupt   practice   under   this   clause   if   the   vehicle   or
vessel   so   hired   is   a   vehicle   or   vessel   not   propelled   by
mechanical power: 
              Provided   further   that   the   use   of   any   public   transport,
vehicle   or   vessel   or   any   tramcar   or   railway   carriage   by   any
elector at his own cost for the purpose of going to or coming
from any such polling station or place fixed for the poll shall
not be deemed to be a corrupt practice under this clause. 
       Explanation. –In this clause, expression ‘vehicle’ means
any vehicle used or capable of being used for the purpose of
road   transport,   whether   propelled   by   mechanical   power   or
otherwise   and   whether   used   for   drawing   other   vehicles   or
otherwise. 
      (7)   The   incurring   or   authorising   of   expenditure   in
contravention of section 85. 
        (8) The obtaining or procuring or abetting or attempting
to   obtain   or   procure   by   a   candidate   or   his   agent   or,   by   any
other  person   with   the   consent   of   a   candidate   or   his
election agent, any assistance (other than the giving of vote)
for   the   furtherance   of   the   prospects   of   that   candidate’s
election, from any person in the service of a Panchayat or of
Government,   and   belonging   to   any   of   the   following   classes,
namely: ­
(a) gazetted officers; 
(b) members of police forces; 
(c) excise officers; 
(d) revenue officers; and 
(e) such other class of persons in the service of the
Government as may be prescribed; 
              Provided   that   where   any   person,   in   the   service   of   the
Government and belonging to any of the classes aforesaid, in
the   discharge   or   purported   discharge   of   his   official   duty,
makes   any   arrangements   or   provides   any   facilities   or   does
any other act or thing, for, to, or in relation to, any candidate
or   his   election   agent   or   any   other   person   acting   with   the
consent   of   the   candidate   or   his   election   agent,   (whether   by
reason   of   the   office   held   by   the   candidate   or   for   any   other
reason),   such   arrangements,   facilities   or   act   or   thing   shall
17

not   be   deemed   to   be   assistance   for   the   furtherance   of   the
prospects of that candidates election.
          (9) Booth capturing by a candidate or his agent or other
person   acting   with   the   consent   of   the   candidate   or   his
election agent. 
              Explanation   1 .–   In   this   section   the   any   expression
“agent”   includes   an   election   agent,   a   polling   agent   and   any
person  who is  held  to have  acted as an  agent  in connection
with the election with the consent of the candidate. 
              Explanation   2. –   For   the   purposes   of   clause   (8),   a
person   shall   be   deemed   to   assist   in   the   furtherance   of   the
prospects   of   a   candidate’s   election   if   he   acts   as   an   election
agent of that candidate. 
              Explanation   3 .–   For   the   purposes   of   clause   (8),
notwithstanding   anything   contained   in   any   other   law,   the
publication   in   the   Gazette   of   the   appointment,   resignation,
termination of service, dismissal or removal from service of a
person   in   the   service   of   the   Government   or   of   a   Panchayat
shall be conclusive proof – 
      (i)   of   such   appointment,   resignation,   termination   of
service,   dismissal   or   removal   from   service,   as   the   case   may
be, and 
  (ii)   where   the   date   of   taking   effect   of   such
appointment,   resignation,   termination   of   service,   dismissal
or removal from service as the case may be, is stated in such
publication; also of the fact that such person was appointed
with   effect   from   the  said   date,   or  in   the   case   of   resignation,
termination   of   service,   dismissal   or   removal   from   service,
such person ceased to be in such service with effect from the
said date. 
           Explanation 4 .– For the purposes of clause (9), “booth
capturing” shall have the same meaning as in section 137.”
21. The   argument   of   respondent   No.1   is   that   the   case   would   fall
squarely  under  Section  102(1)(ca),  which   deals  with   the  furnishing
of details under Section 52(1A), but which are fake. Alternatively, it
is suggested that the case would fall under Section 102(1)(b) which
deals with  the  commission  of  any  corrupt practice by  the  returned
18

candidate.     Since   the   expression   “ corrupt   practice ”   is   defined   in
Section   120(2)   to   include   ‘ undue   influence   with   the   free   exercise   of
any   electoral   right ’,   it   is   argued   by   the   respondent   No.1   that   the
case   may   fall   under   Section   102(1)(b)   also,   in   view   of   the   law   laid
down in  Krishnamoorthy  (supra)
22. We   have   our   own   doubts   about   the   second   limb   of   the
argument   of   the   learned   senior   counsel   for   respondent   No.1.   The
second   limb   of   his   argument   is   that   the   failure   to   disclose   correct
information   in   Form   2A   would   tantamount   to   ‘ undue   influence   on
the   free   exercise   of   the   electoral   right ’,   which   comes   within   the
definition   of   the   expression   “ corrupt   practice”   under   section   120   of
the   Act.   Inspiration   for   this   argument   arises   from   the   decision   of
this Court in  Krishnamoorthy  (supra).
23. Interestingly,   the   decision   of   this   Court   in   Krishnamoorthy
arose out of a judgment of the Madras High Court, authored by one
of   us  (VRS,J.) 5
.  It   was  a   case   where   the  elected  candidate   failed   to
disclose   in   the   affidavit   and   declaration   form   accompanying   the
nomination,   details   regarding   the   criminal   cases   pending   against
him.   Such   details   were   required   to   be   furnished   in   terms   of   the
5  The judgment of the Madras High Court dated 15­6­2009 was affirmed  by this court.
19

Notification  issued by   the  State   Election  Commission  in   exercise  of
the   powers   conferred   by   Articles   243­K   and   243­ZA   of   the
Constitution,   read   with   the   relevant   provisions   of   the   various
Tamilnadu State enactments dealing with local bodies.   The election
of   the   returned   candidate   was   challenged   in   that   case   under   the
provisions of Section 259 read with Section 260 of the Tamil Nadu
Panchayats   Act,   1994.   While   section   259   of   the   Tamil   Nadu   Act
dealt   with   the   grounds   on   which   an   election   can   be   declared   as
void,   Section   260   of   the   Act   defined   what   are   corrupt   practices.
Section   259   of   the   Tamil   Nadu   Act   is   similar,   though   not   in   pari
materia   to   Section   102   of   the   Kerala   Act   and   Section   260   of   the
Tamil Nadu Act is similar to Section 120 of the Kerala Act. Section
259(1)   of   the   Tamil   Nadu   Act   and   Section   102(1)   of   the   Kerala   Act
are   presented   in   a   tabular   column   so   that   the   difference   between
them can be appreciated:
Section 259 of Tamil Nadu Act Section 102 of Kerala Act
259.   Grounds   for   declaring   elec ­
tions to be void  
(1) Subject  to the provisions of sub­
section (2), if the District Judge is of
opinion –
(a) that on the date of his election a
returned   candidate   was   not   quali ­
fied   or   was   disqualified,   to   be   cho ­
sen as a member under this Act, or,
(b)   that   any   corrupt   practice   has 102.   Grounds   for   declaring   election   to
be void . – 
(1)   Subject   to   the   provisions   of   sub­
section (2) if the Court is of opinion – 
(a)   that   on   the   date   of   his   election   a
returned candidate was not qualified, or
was disqualified, to be chosen to fill the
seat under this Act; or 
(b)   that   any   corrupt   practice   has   been
committed   by   a   returned   candidate   or
20

been   committed   by   a   returned   can ­
didate   or   his   agent   or   by   any   other
person   with   the   consent   of   a   re ­
turned candidate or his agent, or
(c)   that   any   nomination   paper   has
been improperly rejected, or
(d) that the result of the election in ­
sofar as it concerns a returned can ­
didate has been materially affected ­
(i)   by   the   improper   acceptance   of
any nomination, or
(ii)   by   any   corrupt   practice   commit ­
ted   in   the   interests   of   the   returned
candidate   by   a   person   other   than
that candidate or his agent or a per ­
son acting with the consent of such
candidate or agent, or
(iii)   by   the   improper   acceptance   or
refusal   of   any   vote   or   reception   of
any vote which is void; or
(iv)   by   the   non­compliance   with   the
provisions of this Act or of any rules
or   orders   made   thereunder,   the
Court   shall   declare   the   election   of
the returned candidate to be void. his election agent or by any other person
with the consent of a returned candidate
or his election agent; or 
(c)   that   any   nomination   has   been
improperly rejected; or 
(ca) that the details furnished by the
elected   candidate   under   sub­section
(1A) of section 52 were fake;  or
(d)   that   the   result   of   the   election,   in   so
far   as   it   concerns   a   returned   candidate,
has been materially affected – 
(i)  by   the   improper   acceptance   of
any nomination, or 
(ii)   by   any   corrupt   practice   committed
in   the   interests   of   the   returned
candidate   by   an   agent   other   than   his
election agent; or 
(iii)  by the improper reception, refusal
or rejection of any vote or the reception
of any vote which is void; or 
(iv)     by   any   non­compliance   with   the
provisions of this Act  or of any rules or
orders   made   thereunder,   the   Court
shall   declare   that   the   election   of   the
returned candidate to be void. 
24. The   crucial   difference   between   the   Tamil   Nadu   Act   and   the
Kerala   Act,   is   the   insertion   of   clause   (ca)   in   sub­section   (1)   of
Section 102. Sub­section (1A) of Section 52 and clause (ca) of sub­
section   (1)   of   Section   102   were   inserted   by   Kerala   Panchayat   Raj
(Amendment)   Act,   30   of   2005.   The   decision   in   Krishnamoorthy
arose   at   a   time,   place   and   circumstance   (i)   when   the   disclosure
regarding   criminal   antecedents   was   made   mandatory   only   under
the Notifications of the State Election Commission; and  (ii)  the non­
21

disclosure was not yet made a ground in the Statute, for declaring
the   election   as   void.   Therefore,   the   Court   found   (pro­actively),   a
provision   already   available   in   the   Statute   at   that   time,   namely
‘ undue  influence  in the  free  exercise  of  electoral  right ’ and held that
the   non­disclosure   had   an   undue   influence   on   the   free   exercise   of
choice of the voter.      
25. The   decision   of   the   Madras   High   Court   in   Krishnamoorthy,
traces   the   historical   perspective   of   the   election   law   relating   to
disclosure of criminal antecedents, as follows: 
(i)   In the year 1999, the Association for Democratic Reforms filed a
Writ Petition on the file of the Delhi High Court, seeking a direction
to   the   Union   of   India   to   implement   the   recommendations   made   by
the   Law   Commission   in   its   170th   Report   and   to   make   necessary
changes   under   Rule   4   of   Conduct   of   Election   Rules,   1961.   One   of
the   recommendations   made   by   the   Law   Commission   was   for
debarring   a   candidate   from   contesting   an   election,   if   charges   have
been   framed   against   him   by   a   Court   in   respect   of   certain   offences
and   the   necessity   for   the   candidates   to   furnish   details   of   the
criminal   cases   pending   against   them.   Apart   from   the
recommendations   of   the   Law   Commission,   the   Association   for
22

Democratic Reforms (hereinafter referred to as "ADR" for the sake of
brevity)  also  relied  upon   the  Report  of  the  Vohra  Committee  of  the
Government of     India, Ministry of Home Affairs, which pointed out
the   nexus   between   politicians   and   those   accused   of   criminal
offences. In the light of the Reports of the Law Commission and the
Vohra  Committee,  ADR sought,   in  the  writ  petition   filed  before  the
Delhi High Court, a direction to the Election Commission, to make
it   mandatory   for   every   candidate   to   provide   information,   by
amending   Forms   2­A   to   2­E   prescribed   under   the   Conduct   of
Election Rules, 1961.
(ii)   Though   the   Delhi   High   Court   held,   by   its   judgment   dated
02.11.2000, that it is the function of the Parliament and not that of
the Court, to make necessary amendments in the   Representation of
the   People   Act ,   1951,   the   Delhi   High   Court   nevertheless   issued   a
direction   to   the   Election   Commission   to   secure   to   the   voters,   the
following information, from the contesting candidates:­
“(a)   Whether   the   candidate   is   accused   of   any   offence
punishable with imprisonment and if so, the details;
(b)   The   assets   possessed   by   a   candidate,   his   or   her   spouse
and dependent relations;
(c)   Facts   giving   insight   into   the   candidate's   competence,
capacity   and   suitability   for   acting   as   an   elected   member,
including details of the educational qualifications;
23

(d)   Information   considered   necessary   by   the   Election
Commission   for   judging   the   capacity   and   capability   of     the
political party fielding the candidate for election.”
(iii)  The above directions issued by the Delhi High Court was on the
basis that a citizen of the country, whether an elector or not, has a
fundamental   right   to   receive   information   regarding   the   criminal
activities   of   a   candidate.   The   High   Court   took   the   view   that   for
making a right choice, it is essential not to keep the antecedents of
the   candidate   in   the   dark,   as   it   will   not   be   in   the   interest   of
democracy and the well being of the country.
(iv)   The   judgment   of   the   Delhi   High   Court   was   taken   on   appeal   to
this  Court by  the Union of India and it was taken  up along  with a
Writ Petition filed by the People's Union of Civil Liberties (referred to
as   "PUCL"   in   short),   under   Article   32   seeking   certain   similar
directions.
(v)   After   hearing   elaborate   arguments,   this   Court   framed   two
questions, as arising for consideration in the matter and they are as
follows:­
“(a) Whether the Election Commission is empowered to issue
directions, as ordered by the High Court?
(b) Whether a voter­a citizen of the country has a right to get
relevant   information,   such   as   the   assets,   qualifications   and
involvement   in   offences,   of   candidates,   for   being   educated
and   informed   for   judging   the   suitability   of   a   candidate
contesting the election as MP or MLA?”
24

(vi)   After   referring   to   various  decisions,   this   Court   summed   up   the
legal   position   in   paragraph­46   of   its   decision.   The   contents   of
paragraph­46   of   the   decision   can   be   summarised   in   brief   as
follows:­
“(a)   The   jurisdiction   of   the   Election   Commission   is   wide
enough   to   include   all   powers   necessary   for   the   smooth
conduct   of   the   elections,   including   the   entire   process   of
election   consisting   of   several   stages   and   embracing   many
steps;
(b) The limitation on the plenary character of power is when
Parliament or State Legislature has made a valid law. In case
the   law   is   silent,   Article   324   is   a   reservoir   of   power.   It   is   a
residuary   power  and  the  phrase  "superintendence,  direction
and control" appearing in   Article 324 (1)   should be construed
liberally   empowering   the   Election   Commission   to   issue
orders;
(c) Fair  election contemplates disclosure by  the candidate of
his   past,   so   as   to   give   a   proper   choice   to   the   candidate
according   to   his   thinking   and   opinion.   Even   if   this
stipulation   is   not   very   much   effective   for   breaking   a   vicious
circle,   it   will   be   a   step­in­aid   for   the   voters   not   to   elect   law
breakers as law makers;
(d)   To   maintain   the   purity   of   elections   and   to   bring   about
transparency,   the   Commission   can   ask   details   of   the
expenditure incurred by political parties;
(e)   The   right   to   get   information   in   democracy   is   recognised
throughout   as   a   natural   right   flowing   from   the   concept   of
democracy;
(f)   If   the   field   meant   for   Legislature   and   Executive   is   left
unoccupied,   detrimental   to   public   interest,   the   Supreme
Court   would   have   ample   jurisdiction   under   Article   32   read
with 141 and 142 of the Constitution;
(g)   Voters'   right   to   know   the   antecedents   including   the
criminal   past   of   the   candidate   contesting   in   the   election,   is
much more fundamental and basic for the survival of democ ­
racy.”
25

(vii)   After   summarising   the law  in  paragraph­46, this  Court  issued
certain directions in paragraph­48, which read as follows:­
"48.   The   Election   Commission   is   directed   to   call   for
information   on   affidavit   by   issuing   necessary   order   in
exercise of its power under   Article 324   of the Constitution of
India from each candidate seeking election to Parliament or a
State   Legislature   as   a   necessary   part   of   his   nomination
paper,   furnishing   therein,   information   on   the   following   as ­
pects in relation to his/her candidature:
(1) Whether the candidate is convicted/acquitted/discharged
of   any   criminal   offence   in   the   past   if   any,   whether   he   is
punished with imprisonment or fine.
(2)   Prior   to   six   months   of   filing   of   nomination,   whether   the
candidate   is   accused   in   any   pending   case,   of   any   offence
punishable with imprisonment for two years or more, and in
which charge is framed or  cognizance is taken by  the Court
of law. If so, the details thereof.
(3) The assets (immovable, movable, bank balance, etc.) of a
candidate and of his/her spouse and that of dependants.
(4) Liabilities, if any, particularly whether there are any over
dues of any public financial institution or government dues.
(5) The educational qualifications of the candidate."
(viii)  Following the above decision, the Election Commission of India
decided   to   amend   Forms   2­A   to   2­E   appended   to   the   Conduct   of
Election   Rules,   1961   and   approached   the   Government   of   India
seeking   suitable   Amendments.   But   the   ECI   was   informed   by   the
Government   that   steps   were   being   taken   in   consultation   with   all
political   parties.   Therefore,   finding   that   the   time   limit   fixed   by   the
Supreme Court in the above case was running out, the ECI issued
26

an   order   bearing   No.3/ER/2002/JS­II/Vol­III   dated   28.6.2002
under   Article 324   of the Constitution. 
(ix)   However,   almost   simultaneously   with   the   issue   of   the   above
order  of the ECI, the  President  of India  promulgated an  Ordinance
known   as   "Representation   of   the   People   (Amendment)   Ordinance
2002". The validity of the Ordinance was challenged by the People's
Union   of   Civil   Liberties   and   a   few   others   under   Article   32.   During
the   pendency   of   the   proceedings,   the   Ordinance   was   repealed   and
the   Representation of the People (Third Amendment) Act , 2002 was
notified   with   retrospective   effect.   By   the   Amendment,   Sections   33­
A   and   33­B   were inserted to the Act and they read as follows:­
"33­A.   Right   to   information.   ­­   (1)   A   candidate   shall,   apart
from any information which he is required to furnish, under
this   Act   or   the   rules   made   thereunder,   in   his   nomination
paper   delivered   under   sub­section   (1)   of   Section   33 ,   also
furnish the information as to whether ­­
(i)   he   is   accused   of   any   offence   punishable   with
imprisonment   for   two   years   or   more   in   a   pending   case   in
which   a  charge  has  been   framed  by   the  Court   of   competent
jurisdiction;
(ii)   he   has   been   convicted   of   an   offence   other   than   any
offence   referred   to   in   sub­section   (1)   or   sub­section   (2),   or
covered   in   sub­section   (3),   of   Section   8   and   sentenced   to
imprisonment for one year or more.
(2) The candidate or his proposer, as the case may be, shall,
at   the   time   of   delivering   to   the   Returning   Officer   the
nomination   paper   under   sub­section   (1)   of   Section   33 ,   also
deliver   to   him   an   affidavit   sworn   by   the   candidate   in   a
27

prescribed   form   verifying   the   information   specified   in
sub­section (1).
(3)   The   Returning  Officer   shall,  as  soon  as  may   be  after   the
furnishing   of   information   to   him   under   sub­section   (1),
display   the   aforesaid   information   by   affixing   a   copy   of   the
affidavit,   delivered   under   sub­section   (2),   at   a   conspicuous
place at his Office for the information of the electors relating
to   a   constituency   for   which   the   nomination   paper   is
delivered.
33­B.   Candidate   to   furnish   information   only   under   the   Act
and the rules .­­ Notwithstanding anything contained in any
judgment,   decree   or   order   of   any   Court   or   any   direction,
order   or   any   other   instruction   issued   by   the   Election
Commission,   no   candidate   shall   be   liable   to   disclose   or
furnish   any   such   information,   in   respect   of   his   election,
which is not required to be disclosed or furnished under this
Act or the rules made thereunder."
Since   the   ordnance   under   challenge   was   replaced   by   the
Act,during   the   pendency   of   the   proceedings,   the   pleadings
and   the   prayer   in   the   writ   petitions   were   amended   so   as   to
confine the challenge to   Section 33­B .”
(x)   Ultimately,   a   three   Member   Bench   of   this   Court,   in   Peoples
Union   of   Civil   Liberties,   held   Section   33­B   of   the   Representation
of the People Act, 1951, brought forth by the   Third Amendment Act ,
2002, to be unconstitutional. 
(xi)   After   this   court   declared   Section   33­B   to   be   unconstitutional,
the   Election   Commission   of   India   issued   revised   orders   dated
27.03.2003   requiring   e very   candidate,   at   the   time   of   filing   his
nomination paper for any election to the Council of States, House of
the People, Legislative Assembly of a State or the Legislative Council
of   a   State   having   such   a   Council,   to   furnish   full   and   complete
28

information   in  regard   to   the  matters   specified   by   this   Court,  in   an
affidavit,   the   format   whereof   was   annexed   as   Annexure­I   to   the
order.  
26. Despite the judgment of this Court in  PUCL , Section 100 of the
Representation   of   the   People   Act,1951   was   not   amended   so   as   the
make the non­disclosure or false disclosure, as one of the grounds
for   declaring   an   election   as   void.   Section   100   (1)   continues   to
contain only four grounds for declaring an election void. These four
grounds are comparable to clauses (a), (b), (c) and (d) of Section 102
of   the   Kerala   Panchayat   Raj   Act,   1994.   The   special   feature   of   the
Kerala   Act   is   the   insertion   of   clause   (1­A)   in   Section   52   and   the
insertion of clause (ca) in sub­section (1) of Section 102. 
27. In   the   Representation   of   the   People   Act,   1951   as   well   as   the
Tamil   Nadu   Panchayats   Act   (out   of   which   the   decision   in
Krishnamoorthy   arose)   the   candidate   challenging   an   election   had
to   rely   upon   subordinate   legislation   to   seek   a   declaration   that   the
election   was   void.   Non­disclosure/false   disclosure   was   not   made
available   in   those   Statutes   themselves   as   one   of   the   grounds   for
declaring   an   election   void.   Therefore,   the   Court   had   to   fall   back
upon   the   Rules   and   the   Orders   of   the   Election   Commission   and
29

bring those violations within the scope of “ undue influence ” leading
to “ corrupt practice ” which is available as one of the grounds.
28. In so far as the Kerala Panchayat Raj Act is concerned, there is
no necessity, after  the  amendment under  Act 30 of  2005 to take a
circuitous   route.   Non­disclosure   and   false   disclosure   can   straight
away be traced to Section 52(1A) and 102(1)(ca) of the Act.   
29. Coming   back   to   Section   102(1)(ca),   it   enables   a   Court   to
declare the election of a returned candidate to be void, if the details
furnished   by   him   under   Section   52(1A)   are   found   to   be   “ fake ”.
Interestingly   the   Statute   uses   the   expression   “ fake ”   and   not
expressions   such   as   “ false ”,   “suppression ”   etc.   The   word   “ fake ”   is
not   defined   in   the   Act.   Black’s   Law   Dictionary   defines   the   word
“ fake " to mean “ to make or construct ”. The Oxford Dictionary defines
“ fake ” as follows:
“ fake   –   ► adj.   not   genuine,   ► n.   a   person   or   thing   this   is   not
genuine,  ►   v. 1.  forge or counterfeit (something). ­ ■ pretend to
feel or suffer from (an emotion or illness).
2. ( fake   someone   out )   N.   Amer,   informal   trick   or   deceive
someone.
­DERIVATIVES  faker  n.  fakery  n.” 
30. In P. Ramanatha Aiyar’s  Advanced Law Lexicon , (Volume 2, 5 th
Edition,   2017),   the  entry   relating  to   the   word  “ fake ”   simply   directs
the reader to the entry relating to the word “ forgery ”. Therefore, one
30

has   to   go  to   the   entry   relating   to   the   word  “ forgery ”  to   understand
the   meaning   of   the   word   “ fake ”.   The   entry   relating   to   the   word
“ forgery”   is quite long and it begins with a reference first to Section
463 of the IPC, 1860 which defines “ forgery ”. The entire Entry reads
as follows:­
  “ Forgery .   “Forgery”   whoever   makes   any   false   document   or
false  electronic  record,  or   part   of  a  document   or  electronic
record, with intent to cause damage or injury, to the public
or   to   any   person,   or   to   support   any   claim   or   title,   or   to
cause any person to part with property, or to enter into any
express or implied contract, or with intent to commit fraud
or   that   fraud   may   be   committed   commits   forgery.   [IPC   (45
of 1860), S. 463]
“A man’s signature of his own name may amount to forgery.”
[IPC (45 of 1860), S. 464,  Expln . 1]
“While it is true that there is a distinction between fraud and
forgery,   and   forgery   contains   some   elements   that   are   not
included   in   fraud,   forgeries   are   a   species   of   fraud.   In
essence, the crime of forgery involves the making, altering,
or completing of an instrument by someone other than the
ostensible   maker   or   drawer   or   an   agent   of   the   ostensible
maker or drawer.” 37 CJS  Forgery  S. 2, at 66 (1997).
The fraudulent making or altering of an instrument that ap ­
parently creates or alters a legal liability of another.
The   offence   of   making   a   false   instrument   so   that   it   can   be
accepted as genuine.
The fraudulent imitation of a document or the writing or sig ­
nature   of   a   signatory   in   order   to   pass   it   off   as   written   by
another.
The   fraudulent   making   or   alteration   of   any   record,   deed,
writing, instrument, register, Stamp,  etc . to the prejudice of
another man’s right. (4 Comm. 247.) A false making of any
written   instrument   for   the   purpose   of   fraud   or   deceit;   in ­
cluding every alteration of or addition to a true instrument.
(2 East’s P.Cc. 19, C. 1. 49.  Tomlin )
31

Forgery has its origin in the French word ‘forger’ which signi ­
fies:
“….to   frame   or   fashion   a   thing   as   the   smith   doth   his   work
upon  the  anvil. And it  is used  in  our  law for  the  fradulent
making and publishing of false writings to the prejudice of
another man’s right. ( Termes de la Ley ).
In   WEBSTER’S   Comprehensive   Dictionary,   International
Edn., ‘forgery’ is defined as :
“The  act  of  falsely  making   or  materially  altering,  with  intent
to defraud; any writing which, if genuine, might be of legal
efficacy or the foundation of a legal liability.”
This   definition   as   adopted   in   Rembert   v.   State ,   25   AM   Rep.
639.   In   another   case,   namely   State   v.   Phelps ,   34   AM   Dec
672,   it   was   laid   down   that   forgery   is   the   false   making   of
any written instrument, for the purpose of fraud or deceit.
This   decision   appears   to   be   based   on   the   meaning   of
forgery   as   set   out   in   Tomlin’s.   Indian   Bank   v.   Satyam   Fi ­
bres (India) (P) Ltd ., AIR 1996 SC 2592.
Forgery is the false making or materially altering with intent
to   defraud,   of   any   writing   which,   if   genuine,   might   appar ­
ently be of legal efficacy, or the foundation of a legal liabil ­
ity.   (2   Bishop   Cr.   L.   sect.   523;   Rembert   v.   State ,   25   Am.
Rep. 639).
OTHER  DEFINITIONS.   “The   false   making   of   any   written,   in ­
strument,   for   the   purpose   of   fraud   or   deceit.”   ( State   v.
Phelps ,   34   Am.   Dec.   672.)   “The   fraudulent   making   or
alteration   of   a   written   instrument   to   the   prejudice   of   the
rights   of   another.”   “The   fraudulent   making   of   a   false
writing, which, genuine, would apparently be of some legal
efficacy.”
FORGERY,   UTTERING   FORGED   INSTRUMENT,   FALSE
PRETENCES   DISTINGUISHED.   Where   the   false   pretence
made   use   of   to   obtain   money   or   property   is   a   written
instrument, the resulting crime is sometimes forgery or the
uttering   of   a   forged   instrument,   and   sometimes   obtaining
property   by   false   pretence.   If   the   instrument   used   is   false
in   itself   and   is   one   which   if   genuine   would   create   some
right   or   liability,   obtaining   property   on   the   faith   of   it   is
forgery   or  the                 uttering   of  a   forged   instrument   as  the
case may be. [ People v. Peacock , 6 Con. (NY) 72]
Forgery   constitutes   fraud,   and   no   legal   title   passes   to   the
transferee.   [ Thorappa   Devanappa   v.   Umedmalji ,   AIR   1924
Bom 205, 87 IC 226, 25 Bom LR 604;  Brij Basi v. Moti Ram ,
AIR 1982 All 323;  Banku Behari Sikdar v. Secretary of State
32

for India in Council , (1909) ILR 36 Cal 239;  Karachi Bank v.
Kodumal   Kalumal ,   AIR   1923   Sind   54;   Firm   Kalka   Pd   Ram
Charan   v.   L   Kunwar   Lal   Thapper ,   AIR   1957   All   104;
Kodumal Kalumal v. Karachi Bank Ltd ., AIR 1921 Sind 172;
Mahabir   Prasad   Bubna   v.   Union   Bank   of   India ,   AIR   1992
Cal 270]
Bankers   are   specially   protected   under   special   conditions
against   claims   based   on   forged   documents   [See   the
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, S. 85]
Since   forging   prejudices   the   person   whose   signature   has
been   forged,   no   action   is   maintainable   on   the   promissory
note   even   against   the   real   executant   of   the   note.   [ Satya
Narayan Tewari v. Sital Missir , AIR 1934 Rang 345, 153 IC
631]”
31. A reading of the above entry in the Law Lexicon shows that the
word “ forgery ” has its origin in French, signifying “ the framing or
fashioning   of   a   thing   as   the   smith   doth   his   work   upon   the
anvil . ” Essentially  “ forgery ” appears to include the false making of
any writing.
32. Thus,   it   appears   from   the   above   that   the   elements   of   forgery
are also identified as the ingredients of faking something.
33. If the false making of an instrument is a common ingredient of
“ faking ”   and   " forgery ”,   the   non­disclosure   in   Form   No.2A   of   the
conviction suffered by the appellant in the past, may certainly come
within   Section   102(1)(ca).   The   reason   for   this   is   that   a   person
having   criminal   antecedents,   poses   himself   to   be   one   without   any
such antecedent, when he fails to make a true disclosure. In law, he
33

passes   off   or   comes   out   as   a   person   without   any   criminal
antecedent. Therefore, the failure to make a true disclosure in Form
2A,   regarding   the   past   conviction,   will   certainly   come   within   the
meaning of the word ‘ fake’ , mentioned in clause (ca) of sub­section
(1) of Section 102.
34. It may be true, as contended by Shri Ragenth Basant, learned
counsel for the appellant that Rule 6, in terms of which Form No.2A
has   been   drafted,   is   a   subordinate   legislation,   which   cannot   go
beyond   the   scope   of   Section   52(1A).   But   unfortunately   for   the
appellant,   Rule   6   is   not   under   challenge   on   the   ground   that   it   is
ultra vires  the Act.  Therefore, the appellant cannot now be heard to
contend   that   Rule   6   cannot   travel   beyond   or   enlarge   the   scope   of
Section 52(1A). 
35. If   not   for   Rule   6   and   Form   No.2A,   it   is   possible   to   accept   the
argument   that   the   requirement   under   Section   52(1A)   is   limited   to
“ the disclosure of involvement in a criminal case at the time of filing
of   the   nomination ”.   At   the   time   of   filing   of   the   nomination,   the
appellant was not involved in any criminal case. 
36. We do not agree with the argument of Shri P.V. Surendranath,
learned   senior   counsel   for   respondent   No.1   that   the   phrase
34

“ involvement in a criminal case ” would include past conviction also,
especially when Section 52(1A) uses the rider “ at the time of filing of
the nomination ”.
37. In   our   considered   view,   the   words   “ involvement   in   a   criminal
case at the time of filing of the nomination ” would only mean  (i)  cases
where a criminal complaint is pending investigation/trial;   (ii)   cases
where the conviction and/or sentence is current at the time of filing
of   the   nomination;   and   (iii)   cases   where   the   conviction   is   the
subject matter of any appeal or revision pending at the time of the
nomination.
38. Therefore, in the absence of Rule 6 and Form No.2A we could
have   easily   concluded   that   the   case   of   the   appellant   will   not   be
covered   by   Section   52(1A)   as   he   was   not   involved   in   any   criminal
case   on   the   date   of   the   nomination.   But   Rule   6   and   Form   No.2A
taken together with what the law means to be “ fake ”, makes things
difficult for the appellant.
39. We  have  extracted  in  paragraph  9  above, the  relevant  portion
of   Form   No.2A.     Column   No.1   in   Form   2A   requires   the   details   not
only   of   the   criminal   cases   pending   trial   before   the   Court   but   also
the   criminal   cases   in   which   the   contestant   was   convicted.   The
35

contestant   is   required   to   furnish   in   Form   No.2A,   details   regarding
the cases in which he is punished, the case number, the Court, the
offences   for   which   punishment   was   awarded,   the   nature   of   the
punishment   and   the   details   regarding   appeal   or   revision   etc.
Therefore,   Form   No.2A   goes   far   beyond   the   requirement   of   Section
52(1A). The appellant admittedly failed to furnish details of his past
conviction   in   Form   No.2A.   Therefore,   the   ground   on   which   his
election   was   sought   to   be   declared   void,   falls   squarely   within
Section 102(1)(ca) of the Act.  
40. But   that   is   not   all.   The   offences   for   which   the   appellant   was
eventually convicted, were under Section 38 read with Section 52 of
the Kerala Police Act, 1960 (Act 5 of 1961).
41. Section 38 of the Kerala Police Act, 1960 reads as follows:
“ 38.   Persons   bound   to   conform   to   reasonable   directions
of police .— (1) All persons shall be bound to conform to the
reasonable   direction   of   a   police   officer   given   in   fulfilment   of
any   of   the   duties   enjoined   on,   or   in   exercise   of   any   of   the
powers vested in him under this Act.
(2)   A   police   officer   may   restrain   or   remove   any   person
resisting   or   refusing   or   omitting   to   conform   to   any   such
direction as aforesaid.”
42. Section 52 of the Kerala Police Act,1960 reads as follows:
“ 52.   Penalty   for   failure   to   conform   to   lawful   and
reasonable   directions   of   police   officers .—   Every   person
who   disobeys   any   direction   given   by   a   police   officer   under
this   Act   or   rules   made   thereunder   shall   on   conviction   be
36

liable to fine not exceeding two hundred rupees.”
43. It   could   be   seen   from   both   the   above   provisions   that   the
conviction of the appellant was actually for the disobedience of the
directions   issued   by   a   police   officer.   This   was   admittedly   in
connection with a  dharna  which the appellant staged in front of the
Panchayat   office,   along   with   a   group   of   his   supporters.   Therefore,
the   question   that   we   are   obliged   to   consider   is   as   to   whether   the
non­disclosure of the conviction for such offences would also come
within the purview of Section 102(1)(ca) of the Act.
44. As we have seen from the way in which the law developed from
the   decision   in   Association   for   Democratic   Reforms   (supra) ,   the
primary object of compelling the disclosure of criminal antecedents
of   candidates   contesting   the   elections,   is   to   decriminalize   politics
and to make the voters aware of the choice that they have. This is
why this Court was very careful in formulating the principles of law,
in   paragraph   94   of   the   decision   in   Krishnamoorthy   (supra).
Paragraph   94   of   the   decision   in   Krishnamoorthy   (supra)   may   be
usefully extracted as follows:­
“ 94.   In   view   of   the   above,   we   would   like   to   sum   up   our
conclusions:
94.1.   Disclosure   of   criminal   antecedents   of   a
candidate,   especially,   pertaining   to   heinous   or   serious
37

offence  or   offences  relating   to  corruption or   moral  turpitude
at the time of filing of nomination paper as mandated by law
is a categorical imperative.
94.2.   When   there   is   non­disclosure   of   the   offences
pertaining to the areas mentioned in the preceding clause, it
creates an impediment in the free exercise of electoral right.
94.3.   Concealment   or   suppression   of   this   nature
deprives the voters to make an informed and advised choice
as   a   consequence   of   which   it   would   come   within   the
compartment   of   direct   or   indirect   interference   or   attempt   to
interfere   with   the   free   exercise   of   the   right   to   vote   by   the
electorate, on the part of the candidate.
94.4.   As   the   candidate   has   the   special   knowledge   of
the   pending   cases   where   cognizance   has   been   taken   or
charges   have   been   framed   and   there   is   a   non­disclosure   on
his part, it would amount to undue influence and, therefore,
the   election   is   to   be   declared   null   and   void   by   the   Election
Tribunal under Section 100(1)( b ) of the 1951 Act.
94.5.   The   question   whether   it   materially   affects   the
election or not will not arise in a case of this nature.”
45.  While   offences   under   the   Indian   Penal   Code   or   under   special
enactments such as Prevention of Corruption Act, Arms Act and so
on and so  forth  are substantive offences, the  commission  of  which
may make a person a criminal, an offence under certain enactments
such   as   Kerala   Police   Act   are   not   substantive   offences.   Just   as
strike   is   a   weapon   in   the   hands   of   the   workmen   and   lock­out   is   a
weapon   in   the   hands   of   the   employer   under   Labour   Welfare
legislations,   protest   is   a   tool   in   the   hands   of   the   civil   society   and
police   action   is  a   tool   in   the  hands  of   the   Establishment.   All  State
enactments   such   as   Kerala   Police   Act,   Madras   Police   Act   etc.,   are
aimed at better regulation of the police force and they do not create
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substantive   offences.   This   is   why   these   Acts   themselves   empower
the police to issue necessary  directions for the maintenance of law
and   order   and   the   violation   of   any   of   those   directions   is   made   a
punishable offence under these Acts.
46. Once the object behind the provisions of the Kerala Police Act
are   understood,   it   would   be   clear   that   neither   Section   52(1A)   read
with Rule 6 and Form 2A nor Section 102(1)(ca) of the Act nor  the
decisions   in   Association   for   Democratic   Reforms ,   People’s
Union   for   Civil   Liberties   (PUCL)   or   Krishnamoorthy   can   be
stretched   to   such   an   extent   that   the   failure   of   the   appellant   to
disclose his conviction for an offence under the Kerala Police Act for
holding   a   dharna   in   front   of   the   Panchayat   office,   is   taken   as   a
ground for declaring an election void.
47. It   may   be   of   interest   to   note   that   the   Kerala   Police   Act,   1960
repealed   (i)   the   Travancore­Cochin   Police   Act,   1951;   and   (ii)   the
Madras District Police Act, 1859 as applied to the Malabar District
referred to in Section 5(2) of the States Reorganisation Act, 1956. It
also   repealed   the   provisions   of   (i)   the  Police   Act,   1861;   and   (ii)   the
Madras   City   Police   Act,   1888,   which   were   earlier   extended   to   the
Malabar   District.   Thus   Kerala   Police   Act,   1960   is   actually   the
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successor   legislation   of   certain   police   enactments   of   the   colonial
era,   whose   object   was   to   scuttle   the   democratic   aspirations   of   the
indigenous   population.   This   aspect   should   be   kept   in   mind   before
applying   blindfold,   the   principle   ‘ what   is   sauce   for   the   goose   is
sauce for the gander ’.
48. Therefore, we are of the considered view that the District Court
and   the   High   Court   were   wrong   in   declaring   the   election   of   the
appellant to be void on the ground that the failure of the appellant
to   disclose   in   Form   2A,   his   conviction   under   the   Kerala   Police   Act
amounted   to   ‘ undue   influence   on   the   free   exercise   of   the   electoral
right ’ and also a violation of Section 52(1A) read with Section 102(1)
(ca)   of   the   Kerala   Panchayat   Raj   Act.   Hence,   the   appeals   are
allowed, the impugned orders are set aside and the Election Petition
filed by respondent No.1 is dismissed.  No costs.
……………......................J.
[S.ABDUL NAZEER]          
…………….......................J.
 [V.RAMASUBRAMANIAN]   
New Delhi;
November 09, 2022.  
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