/2023 INSC 0004/
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL ORIGINAL/CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO. 113 OF 2016
KAUSHAL KISHOR                                             … PETITIONER(S)
VERSUS
STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS. …RESPONDENT(S)
WITH
SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION @ (DIARY) NO. 34629 OF 2017
J U D G M E N T
V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, J.
PRELUDE
     ததயயனனறற சடறடபணற உளறளனறமற ஆறனதத
 
நனவயனனறற சடறடவட
Said   the   Tamil   Poet­Philosopher   Tiruvalluvar   of   the   Tamil   Sangam
age   (31,   BCE)   in   his   classic   “ Tirukkural ”.   Emphasizing   the
importance  of   sweet  speech,  he   said  that  the  scar  left  behind  by   a
burn   injury   may   heal,   but   not   the   one   left   behind   by   an   offensive
1

speech. The translation of this verse by G.U. Pope in English reads
thus:
“In flesh by fire inflamed, nature may thoroughly heal the sore; 
In soul by tongue inflamed, the ulcer healeth never more.”
A   Sanskrit   Text   contains   a   piece   of   advice   on   what   to   speak   and
how to speak.
सतयय   बबरययतब   पपबपयय   बबरययनन   बबरययतब   सतयमपपबपयमब   ।
           पपबपयय च नयन	नतय बबरययदद ष धम	रर सनयतनर ॥
satyam brūyāt priya  brūyān na brūyāt satyam apriyam	
ṃ   |
priya  ca nān ta  brūyād e a dharma  sanātana	
ṃ ṛ ṃ ṣ ḥ ḥ   ||
The meaning of this verse is:  “Speak what is true; speak what is
pleasing;   Do   not   speak   what   is   unpleasant,   even   if  it   is   true;
And   do   not   say   what   is   pleasing,   but   untrue;   this   is   the
eternal law.”
The “ Book of Proverbs ” (16:24) says:
“ Pleasant   words   are   a   honeycomb,   sweet   to   the   soul   and
healing to the bones ”
Though   religious   texts   of   all   faiths   and   ancient   literature   of   all
languages   and   geographical   locations   are   full   of   such   moral
injunctions emphasising the importance of sweet speech ( more than
2

free   speech ),   history   shows   that   humanity   has   consistently   defied
those   diktats.   The   present   reference   to   the   Constitution   Bench   is
the   outcome   of   such   behaviour   by   two   honourable   men,   who
occupied the position of Ministers in two different States.
I.   Questions formulated for consideration
1. By an order dated 05.10.2017, a Three Member Bench of this
Court directed Writ Petition (Criminal) No.113 of 2016 to be placed
before   the   Constitution   Bench,   after   two   learned   senior   counsel,
appointed as  amicus curiae,  submitted that the questions arising for
consideration in the writ petition were of great importance. Though
the   Bench   recorded,   in   its   order   dated   05.10.2017,   the   questions
that   were   submitted   by   the   learned   amicus   curiae ,   the   Three
Member Bench did not frame any particular question, but directed
the matter to be placed before the Constitution Bench.
2. At   this   juncture,   a   Special   Leave   Petition   (Diary)   No.34629   of
2017   arising   out   a   judgment   of   the   Kerala   High   Court   came   up
before   the   same   Three   Member   Bench.   Finding   that   the   questions
raised in the said SLP were also similar, this Court passed an order
3

on   10.11.2017,   directing   the   said   SLP   also   to   be   tagged   with   Writ
Petition (Criminal) No.113 of 2016.
3. Thereafter,   the   Constitution   Bench,   by   an   order   dated
24.10.2019, formulated the following five questions to be decided by
this Court:­
“…1)   Are   the   grounds   specified   in   Article   19(2)   in
relation   to   which   reasonable   restrictions   on   the   right
to   free   speech   can   be   imposed   by   law,   exhaustive,   or
can restrictions on the right to free speech be imposed
on grounds not found in Article 19(2) by invoking other
fundamental rights? 
2)   Can   a   fundamental   right   under   Article   19   or   21   of
the Constitution of India be claimed other than against
the ‘State’ or its instrumentalities? 
3)   Whether   the   State   is   under   a   duty   to   affirmatively
protect   the   rights   of   a   citizen   under   Article   21   of   the
Constitution   of   India   even   against   a   threat   to   the
liberty of a citizen by the acts or omissions of another
citizen or private agency? 
4)   Can   a   statement   made   by   a   Minister,   traceable   to
any   affairs   of   State   or   for   protecting   the   Government,
be   attributed   vicariously   to   the   Government   itself,
especially   in   view   of   the   principle   of   Collective
Responsibility? 
5)   Whether   a   statement   by   a   Minister,   inconsistent
with   the   rights   of   a   citizen   under   Part   Three   of   the
Constitution,   constitutes   a   violation   of   such
constitutional   rights   and   is   actionable   as
‘Constitutional Tort”? …”
4

II. A brief backdrop
4. Without   a   brief   reference   to   the   factual   matrix,   the   questions
to   be   answered   by   us   may   look   abstract.   Therefore,   we   shall   now
refer to the background facts in both these cases.   
5. Writ  Petition (Criminal) No.113 of 2016 was filed under Article
32   of   the   Constitution   praying   for   several   reliefs   including
monitoring   the   investigation   of   a   criminal   complaint   in   FIR
No.0838/2016   under   Section   154   Cr.P.C.,   for   the   offences   under
Sections   395,   397   and   376­D   read   with   the   relevant   provisions   of
the   Protection   of   Children   from   Sexual   Offences   Act,   2012   (for
short,   ‘POCSO   Act’)   and   for   the   trial   of   the   case   outside   the   State
and   also   for   registering   a   complaint   against   the   then   Minister   for
Urban   Development   of   the   Government   of   U.P.   for   making
statements   outrageous   to   the   modesty   of   the   victims.   The   case   of
the petitioner in Writ Petition (Criminal) No.113 of 2016 in brief was
that   on   29.7.2016   when   he   and   the   members   of   his   family   were
travelling   from   Noida   to   Shahjahanpur   on   National   Highway   91   to
attend   the   death   ceremony   of   a   relative,   they   were   waylaid   by   a
5

gang. According to the writ petitioner, the gang snatched away cash
and   jewelry   in   the   possession   of   the   petitioner   and   his   family
members and they also gang raped the wife and minor daughter of
the   petitioner.   Though   an   FIR   was   registered   on   30.7.2016   for
various   offences   and   newspapers   and   the   television   channels
reported   this   ghastly   incident,   the   then   Minister   for   Urban
Development   of   the   Government   of   U.P.   called   for   a   press
conference   and   termed   the   incident   as   a   political   conspiracy.
Therefore,   the   petitioner   apprehended   that   there   may   not   be   a   fair
investigation. The petitioner claims that he was also offended by the
irresponsible   statement   made   by   the   Minister   and   hence   he   was
compelled to file the said writ petition for the reliefs stated supra.
6. Insofar   as   Special   Leave   Petition   (Diary)   No.34629   of   2017   is
concerned, the same arose out of a judgment of the Division Bench
of   the   Kerala   High   Court   dismissing   two   writ   petitions.   The   writ
petitions   were   filed   in   public   interest   on   the   ground   that   the   then
Minister   for   Electricity   in   the   State   of   Kerala   issued   certain
statements   in   February   2016,   7.4.2017   and   22.4.2017.   These
statements   were   highly   derogatory   of   women.   Though   according   to
6

the petitioners in the public interest litigation, the political party to
which   the   Minister   belonged,   issued   a   public   censure,   no   action
was taken officially against the Minister. Therefore, the petitioner in
one   writ   petition   prayed   among   other   things   for   a   direction   to   the
Chief   Minister   to   frame   a   Code   of   Conduct   for   the   Ministers   who
have   subscribed   to   the   oath   of   office   as   prescribed   by   the
Constitution   with   a   further   direction   to   the   Chief   Minister   to   take
suitable   action   if   any   of   the   Ministers   failed   to   live   upto   the   oath.
The   prayer   in   the   second   writ   petition   was   for   a   direction   to   the
concerned   Authorities   to   take   action   against   the   Minister   for   his
utterances.
7. Both the writ petitions were dismissed by a Division Bench of
the Kerala High Court, on the ground that the prayer of the public
interest writ petitioners were in the realm of moral values and that
the   question   whether   the   Chief   Minister   should   frame   a   code   of
conduct   for   the   Ministers   of   his   cabinet   or   not,   is   not   within   the
domain   of   the   Court   to   decide.   Therefore,   challenging   the   said
common   order,   the   petitioner   in   one   of   those   public   interest   writ
petitions has come up with Special Leave Petition (Diary) No.34629
7

of 2017.  Since the questions raised by the petitioner in the Special
Leave   Petition   overlapped   with   the   questions   raised   in   the   Writ
Petition, they have been tagged together. 
III. Contentions
8. We   have   heard   Shri   R.   Venkataramani,   learned   Attorney
General for India, Ms. Aparajita Singh, learned senior counsel who
assisted   us   as   amicus   curiae,   Shri   Kaleeswaram   Raj,   learned
counsel   for   the   petitioner   in   the   special   leave   petition   and   Shri
Ranjith   B.   Marar,   learned   counsel   appearing   for   the   person   who
sought to intervene/implead.
III.A. Preliminary   note   submitted   by   learned   Attorney   General
for India
9. The   learned   Attorney   General   for   India   submitted   a
preliminary   note   containing   his   submissions   question­wise,   which
can be summed up as follows:­
Question No.1
(i) On   question   No.1   it   is   his   submission   that   as   a   matter   of
constitutional   principle,   any   addition,   alteration   or   change   in
the   norms   or   criteria   for   imposition   of   restrictions   on   any
fundamental   right   has   to   come   up   through   a   legislative
8

process.   The   restrictions   already   enumerated   in   clauses   (2)
and   (6)   of   Article   19   have   to   be   taken   to   be   exhaustive.
Therefore,   the   Court   cannot,   under   the   guise   of   invoking   any
other fundamental right such as the one in Article 21, impose
restrictions   not   found   in   Article   19(2).   Under   the
Constitutional   scheme,   there   can   be   no   conflict   between   two
different fundamental rights or freedoms.
Question No. 2
(ii) The   Constitution   itself   sets   out   the   scheme   of   claims   of
fundamental   rights   against   the   State   or   its   instrumentalities
and it has also enacted in respect of breaches or violations of
fundamental   rights   by   persons   other   than   State   or   its
instrumentalities. Any proposition, to add or insert subjects or
matters   in   respect   of   which   claims   can   be   made   against
persons other than the State, would amount to Constitutional
change.   The   concept   of   State   action   propounded   and   applied
in US Constitutional Law and the enactment of 42 US Code §
1983 have to be seen in the context of peculiar state of affairs
dealing   with   governmental   and   official   immunities   from   legal
proceedings. In view of specific provisions in Articles 15(2), 17,
23 and 24 of the Indian Constitution, there may not be a strict
need to take recourse to the law obtaining in the USA. Claims
against   persons   other   than   the   State,   either   through   enacted
law or  otherwise must be confined to constitutionally  enacted
subjects or matters. 
9

Question No. 3
(iii) There are sufficient Constitutional and legal remedies available
for a citizen whose liberty is threatened by any person. Beyond
the   Constitutional   and   legal   remedy   and   protection   available,
there   may   not   be   any   other   additional   duty   to   affirmatively
protect   the   right   of   a   citizen   under   Article   21.   Cases   of
infringement   of   fundamental   rights   are   taken   care   of   under
Articles 32 and 226. 
Question No. 4
(iv) Conduct of public servants like a Minister, if it is traceable to
the   discharge   of   public   duty   or   the   duties   of   the   office,   is
subject to scrutiny of the law. Sanction for prosecution can be
granted   if   misconduct   is   committed   under   colour   of   office.
Such misconduct including statements that may be made by a
Minister   cannot   be   linked   to   the   principles   of   collective
responsibility. The concept of vicarious liability is incapable of
being   applied   to   situations   and   no   government   can   ever   be
vicariously   liable   for   malfeasance   or   misconduct   of   Minister
not   traceable   to   statutory   duty   or   statutory   violations   for   the
purpose   of   legal   remedies.   Ministerial   misdemeanors,   which
have  nothing  to   do  with  the  discharge of  public  duty   and  not
traceable to the affairs of the State, will have to be treated as
acts of individual violation and individual wrong. To extend in
the   abstract,   the   liability   of   the   State   to   such   situations   or
instances   without   necessary   limitations   can   be   problematic.
10

Post   M/s.   Kasturi   Lal   Ralia   Ram   Jain   vs.   The   State   of
Uttar Pradesh 1
  and following  Rudul Sah  vs.  State of Bihar 2
,
this   Court   has   treated   misconduct   of   public   servants   or
officers   and   consequent   infringement   of   Constitutional   rights
as   ground   for   grant   of   compensation.   However,   there   is   need
for   clarity   and   certainty   as   far   as   the   conceptual   basis   is
concerned. This may be better resorted through enacted law.
Question No. 5
(v) While   the   principle   of   Constitutional   tort   has   been   conceived
in  Nilabati Behera (Smt.) alias Lalita Behera (Through the
Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee)   vs.   State of Orissa 3
,
and   subsequently   applied   to   provide   in   regard   to   the
constitutional   remedies,   the   matter   pre­eminently   deserves   a
proper   legal   framework   in   order   that   the   principles   and
procedures   are   coherently   set   out   without   leaving   the   matter
open­ended or vague.
III.B. Notes of submissions by Amicus
10. Ms. Aparajita Singh, learned senior counsel and  amicus curiae
submitted   a   written   note   question­wise,  which   can   be   summed  up
as follows:­
Question No. 1
1  AIR 1965 SC 1039
2  (1983) 4 SCC 141
3  (1993) 2 SCC 746
11

(i) The   right   to   free   speech   under   Article   19(1)(a)   is   subject   to
clearly   defined  restrictions   under   Article  19(2).   Therefore,  any
law   seeking   to   limit   the   right   under   Article   19(1)(a)   has   to
necessarily   fall   within   the   limitations   provided   under   Article
19(2).   Whenever   two   fundamental   rights   compete,   the   Court
will  balance  the  two   to  allow   the  meaningful  exercise  of  both.
This conundrum is not new, as the rights under Article 21 and
under   Article   19(1)(a)   have   been   interpreted   and   balanced   on
numerous   occasions.   Take   for   instance   the   Right   to
Information   Act,   2005.   The   Act   balances   the   citizen’s   right   to
know under  Article 19(1)(a) with the right to fair  investigation
and   right   to   privacy   under   Article   21.   This   careful   balancing
was   explained   by   this   Court   in   Thalappalam   Service
Cooperative Bank Ltd.  vs .  State of Kerala 4
.   The decision of
this   Court   in   R.   Rajagopal   alias   R.R.   Gopal   vs.   State   of
T.N. 5
  is   another   example   of   reading   down   the   restrictions   (in
the   form   of   defamation)   on   the   right   to   free   speech   under
Article   19(2),   in   its   application   to   public   officials   and   public
figures in larger public interest. Again, in   People’s Union for
Civil   Liberties   (PUCL)   vs .   Union   of   India 6
,   the   right   to
privacy   of   the  spouse   of  the   candidate  contesting  the  election
was   declared   as   subordinate   to   the   citizens’   right   to   know
under   Article   19(1)(a).   In   Jumuna   Prasad   Mukhariya   vs.
4  (2013) 16 SCC 82
5  (1994) 6 SCC 632
6  (2003) 4 SCC 399
12

Lachhi Ram 7
, a challenge to Sections 123(5) and 124(5) of the
Representation   of   the   People   Act,   1951   ( as   they   prevailed   at
that   time )   was   rejected,   on   the   ground   that   false   personal
attacks   against   the   contesting   candidate   was   not   violative   of
the right to free speech. But when it comes to private citizens
who   are   not   public   functionaries,   the   right   to   privacy   under
Article   21   was   held   to   trump   the   right   to   know   under   Article
19(1)(a).   This  was   in  the   case  of   Ram  Jethmalani   vs.   Union
of   India 8
,   which   concerned   the   right   to   privacy   of   account
holders. In   Sahara India Real Estate Corporation Limited
vs.   Securities   and   Exchange   Board   of   India 9
,   this   Court
struck a balance between the right of the media under Article
19(1)(a)   with   the   right   to   fair   trial   under   Article   21.   The
argument that free speech under Article 19(1)(a) was a higher
right than the right to reputation under Article 21 was rejected
by   this   Court   in   Subramanian   Swamy   vs.   Union   of   India,
Ministry   of   Law 10
in   which   Section   499   IPC   was   under
challenge. The right to free speech was balanced with the right
to   pollution   free   life   in   Noise   Pollution   (V.),   in   Re 11
  and   the
right to fair trial of the accused was balanced with the right to
fair trial of the victim in  Asha Ranjan  vs.  State of Bihar 12
. 
7 (1955) 1 SCR 608
8 (2011) 8 SCC 1
9 (2012) 10 SCC 603
10 (2016) 7 SCC 221
11 (2005) 5 SCC 733
12 (2017) 4 SCC 397
13

Question No. 2
(ii) There   are   some   fundamental   rights   which   are   specifically
granted   against   non­State   actors.   Article   15(2)(a)   –   access   to
shops,   public   restaurants,   hotels   and   places   of   public
entertainment, Article 17 – untouchability, Article 23 – forced
labour and Article 24­ prohibition of employment of children in
factories,  mines  etc.,  are rights  which  are  enforceable  against
private   citizens   also.   Some   aspects   of   Article   21   such   as   the
right to clean environment have been enforced against private
parties   as   well.   The  State   is   also   under   a   Constitutional  duty
to ensure that the rights of its citizens are not violated even by
non­State actors and ensure an environment where each right
can   be   exercised   without   fear   of   undue   encroachment.   In
People’s Union for Democratic Rights   vs.   Union of India 13
,
while   rejecting   the   contention   of   the   State   that   it   was   the
obligation of the private party i.e., the contractor to follow the
mandate   of   Article   24   of   the   Constitution   and   the   relevant
laws,   it   was   clarified   that   the   primary   obligation   to   protect
fundamental  rights  was that of  the  State  even  in  the  absence
of   an   effective   legislation.   In   Bodhisattwa   Gautam   vs.
Subhra   Chakraborty   (Ms.) 14
,   interim   compensation   was
awarded holding that fundamental rights under Article 21 can
be enforced even against private bodies and individuals. Public
law remedy has been repeatedly resorted to even against non­
13 (1982) 3 SCC 235
14 (1996) 1 SC 490
14

State   actors   when   their   acts   have   violated   the   fundamental
rights   of   other   citizens.   Award   of   damages   against   non­State
actors   for   violation   of   the   right   to   clean   environment   under
Article   21   was   laid   down   in   M.C.   Mehta   vs.   Kamal   Nath 15
.
Similarly, the majority and concurring opinion in  Justice  K.S.
Puttaswamy   vs.   Union   of   India 16
,   while   elaborating   on   the
duty of the State and non­State actors to protect the rights of
citizens,   pointed   out   that   recognition   and   enforcement   of
claims   qua   non­State   actors   may   require   legislative
intervention.   However,   when   it   comes   to   Article   19,   a
Constitution Bench in  P.D. Shamdasani  vs.  Central Bank of
India   Ltd. 17
,   has   held   it   to   be   inapplicable   against   private
persons.
Question No. 3
(iii) Fundamental   rights   of   citizens   enshrined   in   the   Constitution
are   not   only   negative   rights   against   the   State   but   also
constitute   a   positive   obligation   on   the   State   to   protect   those
rights.   The   Constitution   Bench   in   State   of   West   Bengal   vs.
Committee   for   Protection   of   Democratic   Rights,   West
Bengal 18
,   while   upholding   the   power   of   the   Constitutional
Court   to   transfer   an   investigation   to   the   CBI   without   the
consent   of   the   concerned   State,   emphasized   the   duty   of   the
15 (2000) 6 SCC 213
16 (2017) 10 SCC 1
17 1952 SCR 391
18 (2010) 3 SCC 571
15

State   to   conduct   a   fair   investigation   which   is   a   fundamental
right of the victim under Article 21.  The majority judgment in
Justice   K.S.   Puttaswamy   (supra),   defines   the   positive
obligation of the State to ensure the meaningful exercise of the
right of privacy. In  S. Rangarajan  vs.  P. Jagjivan Ram 19
,  this
Court has categorically laid down that the State cannot plead
its inability to protect the fundamental rights of the citizens. In
Union  of   India   vs.   K.M.   Shankarappa 20
,   Section   6(1)  of  the
Cinematograph   Act,   1952   which   granted   the   Central
Government,   the   power   to   review   the   decision   of   the   quasi­
judicial Tribunal under the Act, was sought to be defended on
the   ground   of   law   and   order.   The   contention   was   rejected
holding that it was the duty of the Government to ensure law
and   order.   In   Indibly   Creative   Private   Limited   vs.
Government   of   West   Bengal 21
,   the   negative   restraint   and
positive   obligation   under   Article   19(1)   (a)   has   been   explained.
In   Pt.   Parmanand   Katara   vs.   Union   of   India 22
,  it  was  held
that even the doctors in Government hospitals are duty bound
to fulfil the constitutional obligation of the State under Article
21. 
Question No. 4
19 (1989) 2 SCC 574
20 (2001) 1 SCC 582
21 (2020) 12 SCC 436
22 (1989) 4 SCC 286
16

(iv)  The   Minister   being   a   functionary   of   the   State,   represents   the
State   when   acting   in   his   official   capacity.   Therefore,   any
violation   of   the   fundamental   rights   of   the   citizens   by   the
Minister   in   his   official   capacity,   would   be   attributable   to   the
State.   The   State   also   has   a   positive   obligation   to   protect   the
rights of citizens under Article 21, whether  the violation is by
its   own   functionaries   or   a   private   person.   It   would   be
preposterous   to   suggest   that   while   the   State   is   under   an
obligation   to   restrict   a   private   citizen   from   violating   the
fundamental   rights   of   other   citizens,   its   own   Minister   can   do
so with impunity. However, the factum of violation would need
to be established on the facts of a given case. It would involve
a   detailed   inquiry   into   questions   such   as   (a)   whether   the
statement by the Minister was made in his personal or official
capacity;   (b)   whether   the   statement   was   made   on   a   public   or
private issue;  (c)  whether the statement was made on a public
or   private   platform.   In   Amish   Devgan   vs.   Union   of   India 23
,
while dealing with hate speech, the impact of the speech of “ a
person   of   influence ”   such   as   a   Government   functionary,   was
explained.   State   of   Maharashtra   vs .   Sarangdharsingh
Shivdassingh   Chavan 24
,   provides   a   clear   instance   of   direct
interference   with   the   investigation   by   a   Chief   Minister.   The
Court   held   the   action   of   the   Chief   Minister   to   be   " wholly
unconstitutional "   and   contrary   to   the   oath   of   allegiance   to   the
Constitution   and   imposed   costs   on   the   State.   The   concurring
opinion   emphasizes   the   responsibility   that   the   oath   of   office
casts   on   the   Minister   under   the   Constitution.   In   Secretary,
Jaipur   Development   Authority,   Jaipur   vs.   Daulat   Mal
23 (2021) 1 SCC 1
24 (2011) 1 SCC 577
17

Jain 25
,   while   dealing   with   a   case   involving   the   misuse   of
public   office   by   a   Minister,   this   Court   elaborated   on   the
responsibility   and   liability   of   the   Ministerial   office   under   the
Constitution.   The   importance   of   the   Oath   of   Office   under   the
Constitution   was   also   emphasized   by   the   Constitution   Bench
in   Manoj   Narula   vs.   Union   of   India 26
.   However,   the
Ministerial code of conduct was held to be not enforceable in a
court   of   law   in   R .   Sai   Bharathi   vs.   J.   Jayalalitha 27
,   as   it
does not have any  statutory force. An argument can be made
that the Minister is personally bound by the oath of his office
to   bear   true   faith   and   allegiance   to   the   Constitution   of   India
under   Articles   75(4)   and   164(3)   of   the   Constitution.   The
Constitution imposes a solemn obligation on the Minister as a
Constitutional functionary to protect the fundamental rights of
the citizens. The code of conduct for Ministers (Both for Union
and States) specifically lays down that the Code is in addition
to the “. . .  observance of the provisions of the Constitution, the
Representation   of   the   People   Act,   1951 ”.   Therefore,   a
Constitutional   functionary   is   duty   bound   to   act   in   a   manner
which   is   in   consonance   with   this   constitutional   obligation   of
the State.
Question No. 5
(v) The   State   acts   through   its   functionaries.   Therefore,   the
official act of a Minister which violates the fundamental rights
of   the   citizens,   would   make   the   State   liable   under
constitutional tort. The principle of sovereign immunity of the
25 (1997) 1 SCC 35
26 (2014) 9 SCC 1
27 (2004) 2 SCC 9
18

State for the tortious acts of its servant, has been held to be
inapplicable   in   the   case   of   violation   of   fundamental   rights.
The   principle   of   State   liability   under   Constitutional   tort   was
expounded   in   Nilabati   Behera   (supra).   In   Common   Cause,
A   Registered   Society   vs.   Union   of   India. 28
,   the   position   in
the case of a public functionary was explained.
III.C.   Written   submissions   of   Shri   Kaleeswaram   Raj,   Advocate
for the SLP petitioner
11. Shri   Kaleeswaram   Raj,   learned   counsel   appearing   for   the
petitioner in the special leave petition submitted an elaborate note.
This   note   is   divided   into   several   chapters   dealing   with   the   nature
and   extent   of   the   freedom   of   speech,   the   restrictions   on   the   same,
the   horizontality   of   fundamental   rights,   constitutional   rights   and
constitutional   values,   statements   made   by   Ministers   and   collective
responsibility,   self­regulation   as   the   best   mode   of   regulation,   hate
speech   not   being   a   protected   speech   and   the   way   forward.   The
contents of this note are summarized as follows:­
(i) The   Constitutional   mandate   of   freedom   of   expression   and
free   speech   is   to   be   preserved   without   imposing
unconstitutional   restrictions.   It   is   a   right   available   to
everyone including political personalities.
28 (1999) 6 SCC 667
19

(ii) But   even   while   upholding   such   a   right,   efforts   should   be
taken   to   frame   a   voluntary   code   of   conduct   for   Ministers
etc., to ensure better accountability and transparency;
(iii) There   is   an   imperative   need   to   evolve   a   device   such   as
Ombudsman to act as a Constitutional check on the misuse
of   the   freedom   of   expression   by   public   functionaries   using
the apparatus of the State;
(iv) The   right   under   Article   19(1)(a)   is   limited   by   restrictions
expressly   indicated   in   Article   19(2),   under   which   the
restrictions should be reasonable and must be provided for
by   law,   by   the   State.     Therefore   this   Court   cannot   provide
for any additional restriction by an interpretative exercise or
otherwise;
(v) It   is   too   remote   to   suggest   that   the   right   of   a   victim   under
Article 21 stands violated if there is a statement by someone
that   the   case   was   born   out   of   political   conspiracy.
Therefore,   there   is   actually   no   conflict   of   any   other   right
with Article 21;
(vi) Unlike Article 25 which makes the right thereunder subject
to   public   order,   morality   and   health,   Article   19(1)(a)   does
not   contain   such   restrictions.   As   held   by   this   Court   in
Sakal Papers (P) Ltd.  vs.  The Union of India 29
, freedom of
speech   can   be   restricted   only   in   the   interest   of   security   of
29 (1962) 3 SCR 842
20

the State, friendly relations with foreign states, public order,
decency   or   morality   or   in   relation   to   contempt   of   court,
defamation   or   incitement   to   an   offence.   It   cannot   be
curtailed, in the interest of the general public, as in the case
of freedom to carry on business;
(vii) Restricting speech by public figures, such as politicians, on
serious   crimes   will   have   great   impact   on   the   freedom   of
speech.     Such   criticism   which   calls   out   true   conspiracies
and true miscarriage of justice, plays an important role in a
democracy;
(viii) In   so   far   as   the   enforcement   of   fundamental   rights   against
non­State   actors   is   concerned,   the   vertical   approach   is
giving   way   to   the   concept   of   horizontal   application.   The
vertical   approach   connotes   a   situation   where   the
enforceability   is   only   against   the   Government   and   not
against   private   actors.   But   with   Nation   States   gradually
moving from  laissez faire  governance to welfare governance,
the   role   of   the   State   is   ever   expanding,   which   justifies   the
shift.
(ix) While   the   South   African   Constitution   has   adopted   a
horizontal application by providing in Section 9(4) of the Bill
of Rights of Final Constitution of 1996 that no person may
unfairly   discriminate   directly   or   indirectly   against   anyone
on   one   or   more   grounds   in   terms   of   sub­Section   (3)   which
21

sets out the grounds that bind the State, the judiciary itself
has adopted a direct horizontal effect, in Ireland as could be
seen   from   the   decisions   in   John   Meskell   vs .   Córas
Iompair  	
É	ireann 30
and   Murtagh   Properties   Limited   vs.
Cleary 31
.  In  John Meskell  (supra), the Irish Supreme Court
granted   damages   against   the   employer   who   dismissed   the
employee   for   not   joining   a   particular   union   after   serving   a
due   notice   to   persuade   him.   In   Murtagh   Properties
Limited   (supra),   the   High   Court   recognized   and   enforced
the   right   to   earn   livelihood   without   any   discrimination
based   on   sex   against   a   private   employer.   Countries   like
Canada   and   Germany   have   developed   indirect   horizontal
application,   meaning   thereby   that   the   rights   regulate   the
laws   and   statutes,   which   in   turn   regulate   the   conduct   of
citizens;
(x) In   the   Indian   context,   direct   horizontal   effect   has   limited
application as can be seen from Articles 15(2), 17 and 24;
(xi) Paradigm   cases   of   horizontality   should   be   distinguished
from ordinary cases. For instance, the U.S. Supreme Court
held   in   Shelly   vs.   Kraemer 32
  a   covenant   contained   in   a
contract  prohibiting  the  sale of  houses  in a  neighbourhood
to   African­Americans,   as   unenforceable,   for   they   have   the
effect   of   denying   equal   protection   under   the   laws.   The
30 1973 IR 121
31 1972 IR 330
32 334 U.S. 1 (1948)
22

Federal Constitutional Court of Germany took a similar view
in   L thϋ 33
  case   (1958)   where   a   call   for   boycott   of   a   film
directed   by   a   person   who   had   worked   on   anti­semitic   Nazi
propaganda   was   challenged.   The   German   Court   held   that
there   was   an   objective   order   of   values   that   must   affect   all
spheres of law;
(xii) It   has   been   repeatedly   held   by   this   Court   that   the   power
under   Article   226   is   available   not   only   against   the
Government and its instrumentalities but also against “ any
person or authority ”. A reference may be made in this regard
to two decisions  namely  Praga Tools Corporation  vs.  Shri
C.A.   Imanual 34
  and   Andi   Mukta   Sadguru   Shree
Muktajee   Vandas   Swami   Suvarna   Jayanti   Mahotasav
Smarak Trust  vs. V.R. Rudani 35
;
(xiii) There   are   several   instances   where   this   Court   has   issued
writs   under   Article   32   against   non­State   actors.   Broadly
those   cases   fall   under   two   categories,   namely,   (i)   private
players   performing   public   duties/functions;   and   (ii)   non­
State actors performing statutory activities that impact the
rights   of   citizens.   Cases   which   fall   under   these   two
categories have been held by this Court to be amenable to
writ   jurisdiction   as   seen   from   several   decisions   including
33 Luth (1958) BVerfGE 7, 198 
34 (1969) 1 SCC 585
35 (1989) 2 SCC 691
23

M.C.   Mehta   vs.   Union   of   India 36
.   Absent   any   of   these
parameters,   the   Court   has   refused   to   exercise   writ
jurisdiction as seen from  Binny Ltd.  vs.  V. Sadasivan . 37
;
(xiv) Even   in   jurisdictions   where   socio   economic   rights   have
been elevated in status to that of constitutional rights, the
enforcement   of   those   rights   were   made   available   only
against the State and not against private actors, as held by
this   Court   in   Society   for   Unaided   Private   Schools   of
Rajasthan  vs.  Union of India 38
;
(xv) On   the   issue   of   potential   conflict   of   rights,   it   is   important
to   bear   in   mind   the   distinction   between   constitutional
rights  and constitutional  values. On  a formal level,  values
are   understood   teleologically   as   things   to   be   promoted   or
maximized.   Rights,   on   the   other   hand,   are   not   to   be
promoted   but   rather   to   be   respected.   It   would   not   show
proper concern for a right to allow the violation of one right
in order to prevent the violation of other rights. This would
promote   the   non­violation   of   rights,   but   it   would   not
respect rights 39
;
(xvi) Instead   of   values   whose   satisfaction   is   to   be   maximized,
rights   act   as   constraints   on   the   actions   of   the   state.   They
confer individuals with a sphere of liberty that is inviolable.
36  AIR 1987 SC 1086
37  (2005) 6 SCC 657
38  (2012) 6 SCC 1
39  Frances Kamm, Morality, Mortality Vol.2, Oxford University Press, 1996
24

Rights   thereby   act   as   restrictions   on   the   government   on
how to pursue values, including constitutional values. It is,
therefore,   crucially   important   that   we   draw   a   distinction
between   the   constitutional   rights   and   constitutional
values.  Not every  increase in  liberty  or   every   improvement
in   leading   a   dignified   life   is   a   constitutional   right.   This
position has been accepted by this Court;
(xvii) As   held   by   this   Court   in   Justice   K.S.   Puttaswamy ,   the
Court will strike a balance, wherever a conflict between two
sets   of   fundamental   rights   is   projected.   Strictly   speaking,
what   is   actually   conceived   by   some   and   noted   in   several
decisions   including   Justice   K.S.   Puttaswamy ,   is   not   the
conflict of rights in abstractum, at a doctrinal level, but the
conflict in the notion/invocation/practice of rights;
(xviii) On   the   issue   of   statements   made   by   Ministers   and
collective   responsibility,   a   reference   has   to   be   made   to
Articles   75(3)   and   164(2).     Both   these   Articles   speak   of
collective responsibility of the Council of Ministers. Though
the language employed in these Articles indicate that such
a   collective   responsibility   is   to   the   House   of   the   People/
Legislative   Assembly,   it   is   actually   a   responsibility   to   the
people   at   large.   Since   every   utterance   by   a   Minister   will
have   a   direct   bearing   on   the   policy   of   the   Government,
there   is   an   imperative   need   for   a   voluntary   code   of
conduct. As pointed out by  this  Court in   Common  Cause
25

(supra), collective responsibility has two meanings, namely,
(i)   that   all   members   of   the   Council   of   Ministers   are
unanimous   in   support   of   its   policies   and   exhibit   such
unanimity   in   public;   and   (ii)   that   they   are   personally   and
morally responsible for its success and failure;
(xix) Individual aberrations on the part of Ministers are serious
threats to constitutional governance and as such the head
of the Council of Ministers has a duty to ensure that such
breaches do not happen;
(xx) A code of conduct to self­regulate the speeches and actions
of   Ministers   is   constitutionally   justifiable   and   this   Court
can   definitely   examine   its   requirement.   Ideally,   a   Minister
is   not   supposed   to   breach   his   collective   responsibility
towards   the   Cabinet   and   the   Legislature   and   hence,   it   is
advisable to have a cogent code of conduct as occurring in
advanced democracies;
(xxi) While it is not possible to impose additional restrictions on
the   freedom   of   speech,   it   is   certainly   desirable   to   have   a
code   of   conduct   for   public   functionaries,   as   followed   in
other   jurisdictions.     The   Court   may  keep   in   mind   the   fact
that   this   Court   in   Sahara   India   Real   Estate
Corporation   Limited   (supra)   cautioned   against   framing
guidelines across the board to restrict the freedom of Press;
26

(xxii) Coming  to hate speeches, there has been a steep increase
in   the   number   of   hate   speeches   since   2014.   From   May­
2014   to   date,   there   have   been   124   reported   instances   of
derogatory   speeches   by   45   politicians.   Social   media
platforms   have   connived   the   proliferation   of   targeted   hate
speech.   Such   speeches   provide   fertile   ground   for
incitement to violence;
(xxiii)  On   the   role   of   the   Court   in   dealing   with   the   question   of
hate speech, the decisions in   Pravasi Bhalai Sangathan
vs.   Union   of   India 40
;   Kodungallur   Film   Society   vs .
Union   of   India 41
and   Amish   Devgan   (supra)   lay   down
broad parameters;
(xxiv)   At the international level, the definition of hate speech was
formulated in the UN Strategy and Plan of Action on Hate
Speech, to mean
“… any kind of communication in speech, writing or
behavior,   that   attacks   or   uses   pejorative   or
discriminatory language with reference to a person
or   a   group   on   the   basis   of   who   they   are,   in   other
words,   based   on   their   religion,   ethnicity,
nationality,   race,   colour,   descent,   gender   or   other
identity factor.”
The   Role   and   Responsibilities   of   Political   Leaders   in
Combating   Hate   Speech   and   Intolerance   (Provisional
version)   dated   12   March   2019,   was   submitted   by   the
40  (2014) 11 SCC 477
41  (2018) 10 SCC 713
27

Committee   on   Equality   and   Non­Discrimination   to   the
Parliamentary   Assembly   of   the   Council   of   Europe.   The
Assembly passed the resolution adopting the text proposed
by rapporteur Ms. Elvira Kovacs, Serbia;
(xxv)   Finally, the way forward is,   (i)  for the legislature to adopt a
voluntary model code of conduct for persons holding public
offices,   which   would   reflect   Constitutional   morality   and
values   of   good   governance;   and   (ii)   the   creation   of   an
appropriate   mechanism   such   as   Ombudsman,   in
accordance with the Venice principles and Paris principles.
Till   such   an   Ombudsman   is   constituted,   the   National   and
State   Human   Rights   Commissions   have   to   take   pro­active
measures,   in   terms   of   the   provisions   of   Protection   of
Human Rights Act, 1993.
IV. Discussion and Analysis
Question No. 1
12. Question   No.1   referred   to   us,   is   as   to   whether   the   grounds
specified in Article 19(2) in relation to which reasonable restrictions
on the right to free speech can be imposed by law are exhaustive, or
can restrictions on the right to free speech be imposed on grounds
not found in Article 19(2) by invoking other fundamental rights?
28

History of evolution of clause (2) of Article 19
13. For   finding   an   answer   to   this   question,   it   may   be   necessary
and   even   relevant   to   take   a   peep   into   history.   Since   Dr.   B.R.
Ambedkar’s original draft in this regard followed Article 40(6) of the
Irish   Constitution,   the   original   draft   of   the   Advisory   Committee
included   restrictions   such   as   public   order,   morality,   sedition,
obscenity,   blasphemy   and   defamation.   Sardar   Vallabhbhai   Patel
suggested the inclusion of libel also.  These restrictions were sought
to be justified by citing the decision in  Gitlow  vs.  New York 42
.
14. Since the country had witnessed large scale communal riots at
that   time,   Sir   Alladi   Krishnaswamy   Iyer   forcefully   argued   for   the
inclusion of security and defence of the State or national security as
one of the restrictions.  Discussion also took place about restricting
speech   that   is   intended   to   spoil   communal   harmony   and   speech
which is seditious in nature. With suggestions, counter suggestions
and   objections   so   articulated,   the   initial   report   of   the   Sub­
Committee on Fundamental Rights underwent a lot of changes. The
evolution of clauses (1) and (2) of Article 19 stage by stage, from the
42  286 US 652 (1925)
29

time   when   the   draft   report   was   submitted   in   April   1947,   upto   the
time   when   the   Constitution   was   adopted,   can   be   presented   in   a
tabular form 43
 as follows:
Draft Provision
Draft   Report   of   the
Subcommittee   on
Fundamental   Rights,   April
1947 (BSR II, 139) 9.   There   shall   be   liberty   for   the   exercise   of
the   following   rights   subject   to   public   order
and morality: 
(a)   The   right   of   every   citizen   to   freedom   of
speech   and   expression.   The   publication   or
utterance   of   seditious,   obscene,   slanderous,
libellous   or   defamatory   matter   shall   be
actionable   or  punishable   in  accordance  with
law.
Final   Report   of   the   Sub­
Committee   on   Fundamental
Rights,   April   1947   (BSR   II,
172) 10.   There   shall   be   liberty   for   the   exercise   of
the   following   rights   subject   to   public   order
and   morality   or   to   the   existence   of   grave
emergency   declared   to   be   such   by   the
Government   of   the   Union   or   the   unit
concerned whereby the security of the Union
or the unit, as the case may be.
Interim   Report   of   the
Advisory   Committee,   April
30, 1947 There   shall   be   liberty   for   the   exercise   of   the
following   rights   subject   to   public   order   and
morality   or   to   the   existence   of   grave
emergency   declared   to   be   such   by   the
Government   of   the   Union   or   the   Unit
concerned whereby the security of the Union
or   the   Unit,   as   the   case   may   be,   is
threatened:
(a) The   right   of   every   citizen   to   freedom   of
speech and expression: 
Provision   may   be   made   by   law   to   make   the
publication   or   utterance   of   seditious,
obscene, blasphemous, slanderous, libellous
or   defamatory   matter   actionable   or
punishable.
Draft   Constitution   prepared 15. (1) There shall be liberty for the exercise
43   Sourced   from   the   article   “Arguments   from   Colonial   Continuity­   the   Constitution   (First
Amendment)   Act,   1951”   (2008)   of   Burra,   Arudra,   Assistant   Professor,   Department   of
Humanities and Social Sciences , IIT (Delhi), 
30

by   B.   N.   Rau,   October   1947
(BSR III, 8­9) of the following rights subject to public order
and morality, namely:
(a)   the   right   of   every   citizen   to   freedom   of
speech and expression; 
… 
(2)   Nothing   in   this   section   shall   restrict   the
power of the State to make any law or to take
any   executive   action   which   under   this
Constitution it has power to make or to take,
during   the   period   when   a   Proclamation   of
Emergency   issued   under   sub­section   (I)   of
section   182   is   in   force,   or,   in   the   case   of   a
unit   during   the   period   of   any   grave
emergency   declared   by   the   Government   of
the   unit   whereby   the   security   of   the   unit   is
threatened.
Draft   Constitution   prepared
by   the   Drafting   Committee
and   submitted   to   the
President   of   the   Constituent
Assembly,   February   1948
(BSR III, 522) 13. (1) Subject to the other provisions of this
Article, all citizens shall have the right – 
(a) to freedom of speech and expression;
 … 
(2)   Nothing   in   sub­clause   (a)   of   clause   (1)   of
this   Article   shall   affect   the   operation   of   any
existing   law,   or   prevent   the   State   from
making   any   law,   relating   to   libel,   slander,
defamation,   sedition   or   any   other   matter
which   offends   against   decency   or
morality   or   undermines   the   authority   or
foundation of the State.
Proposal   introduced   in   the
Constituent   Assembly   in
October 1948 (BSR IV, 39)  13. (1) Subject to the other provisions of this
Article, all citizens shall have the right – 
(a) to freedom of speech and expression; 
… 
(2)   Nothing   in   sub­clause   (a)   of   clause   (1)   of
this   article   shall   affect   the   operation   of   any
existing   law,   or   prevent   the   State   from
making   any   law,   relating   to   libel,   slander,
defamation,   sedition   or   any   other   matter
which offends against decency or morality or
undermines   the   security   of,   or   tends   to
overthrow, the State.
31

Revised   Draft   Constitution,
introduced   and   adopted   in
November   1949   (BSR   IV,
755) 19. (1) All citizens shall have the right ­­­ 
(a) to freedom of speech and expression; 
… 
(2)   Nothing   in   sub­clause   (a)   of   clause   (1)
shall affect  the operation of any existing  law
in so far as it relates to, or prevent the State
from   making   any   law   relating   to,   libel,
slander,   defamation,   contempt   of   Court   or
any matter which offends against decency or
morality   or   which   undermines   the   security
of, or tends to overthrow, the State.
15. Immediately after the adoption of the Constitution, this Court
had an occasion to deal with a challenge to an order passed by the
Government   of   Madras   in   exercise   of   the   powers   conferred   by
Section   9(1­A)   of   the   Madras   Maintenance   of   Public   Order   Act,
1949 44
, banning the entry and circulation of a weekly journal called
‘ Cross Roads ’ printed and published in Bombay. The ban order was
challenged   on   the   ground   that   it   was   violative   of   Article   19(1)(a).
The   validity   of   the   statutory   provision   under   which   the   ban   order
was   issued,   was   also   attacked   on   the   basis   of   Article   13(1)   of   the
Constitution.   A   Seven   Member   Constitution   Bench   of   this   Court,
while   upholding   the   challenge   in   Romesh   Thappar   vs.   State   of
Madras 45
  held as follows: ­
44  1949 Act
45  AIR 1950 SC 124
32

“[12]   We   are   therefore   of   opinion   that   unless   a   law
restricting   freedom   of   speech   and   expression   is
directed solely against the undermining of the security
of the State or the overthrow of it, such law cannot fall
within   the   reservation   under   clause   (2)   of   Art.   19,
although the restrictions which it seeks to impose may
have been conceived generally in the interests of public
order. …”  
16. An argument was advanced in   Romesh Thappar   (supra) that
Section 9(1­A) of the 1949 Act could not be considered wholly void,
as   the   securing   of   public   safety   or   maintenance   of   public   order
would  include the  security  of  the  State  and that  therefore the said
provision,   as   applied   to   the   latter   purpose   was   covered   by   Article
19(2).  However, the said argument was rejected on the ground that
where a law purports to authorise the imposition of restrictions on
a fundamental right, in language wide enough to cover restrictions,
both   within   or   without   the   limits   of   Constitutionally   permissible
legislative action affecting such right, it is not possible to uphold it
even so far as it may be applied within the Constitutional limits, as
it is not severable.
17. On the same date on which the decision in  Romesh Thappar
was   delivered,   the   Constitution   Bench   of   this   Court   also   delivered
another judgment in  Brij Bhushan  vs.  The State of Delhi 46
. It also
46  AIR 1950 SC 129
33

arose   out   of   a   writ   petition   under   Article   32   challenging   an   order
passed by the Chief Commissioner of Delhi in exercise of the powers
conferred   by   Section   7(1)(c)   of   the   East   Punjab   Public   Safety   Act,
1949, requiring the Printer and the Publisher  as well as the Editor
of   an   English   weekly   by   name   ‘ Organizer ’,   to   submit   for   scrutiny,
before   publication,   all   communal   matters   and   news   and   views
about   Pakistan   including   photographs   and   cartoons,   other   than
those   derived   from   the   official   sources.   Following   the   decision   in
Romesh Thappar , the Constitution Bench held that the imposition
of  pre­censorship   on   a   journal   is  a  restriction   on   the  liberty   of  the
Press,   which   is   an   essential   part   of   the   right   to   freedom   of   speech
and   expression.   The   Bench   went   on   to   hold   that   Section   7(1)(c)   of
the   East   Punjab   Public   Safety   Act,   1949   does   not   fall   within   the
reservation of clause (2) of Article 19.
18. After aforesaid two decisions, the Parliament sought to amend
the   Constitution   through   the   Constitution   (First   Amendment)   Bill,
1951.   In   the   Statement   of   Objects   and   Reasons   to   the   First
Amendment,   it   was   indicated   that   the   citizen's   right   to   freedom   of
speech and expression guaranteed by Article 19(1)(a) has been held
34

by   some   Courts   to   be   so  comprehensive   as  not  to   render   a  person
culpable, even if he advocates murder and other crimes of violence.
Incidentally,   the   First   Amendment   also   dealt   with   other   issues,
about which we are not concerned in this discussion.  Clause (2) of
Article 19 was substituted by a new clause under the Constitution
(First   Amendment)   Act,   1951.   For   easy   appreciation   of   the
metamorphosis that clause (2) of Article 19 underwent after the first
amendment, we present in a tabular column, Article 19(2) pre­first
amendment and post­first amendment as under: ­
Pre­First   Amendment   –   Article
19(2) Post­First   Amendment   –   Article
19(2)
(2) Nothing in sub­clause (a) of clause
(1)   shall   affect   the   operation   of   any
existing   law   in   so   far   as   it   relates   to,
or   prevents   the   State   from   making
any   law   relating   to,   libel,   slander,
defamation, contempt of court or any
matter which offends against decency
or   morality   or   which   undermines   the
security of, or tends to overthrow, the
State. (2)   Nothing   in   sub­clause   (a)   of
clause   (1)   shall   affect   the   operation
of   any   existing   law,   or   prevent   the
State from making any law, in so far
as   such   law   imposes   reasonable
restrictions   on   the   exercise   of   the
right   conferred   by   the   said   sub­
clause   in   the   interests   of   the
security   of   the   State,   friendly
relations   with   foreign   States,   public
order,   decency   or   morality,   or   in
relation   to   contempt   of   court,
defamation   or   incitement   to   an
offence.
19. It is significant to note that Section 3(1)(a) of the Constitution
(First Amendment) Act, 1951, declared that the   newly substituted
35

clause   (2)   of   Article   19   shall   be   deemed   always   to   have   been
enacted   in   the   amended   form,   meaning   thereby   that   the
amended clause (2) was given retrospective effect.
20. Another important feature to be noted in the amended clause
(2)   of   Article   19   is   the   inclusion   of   the   words   ‘ reasonable
restrictions ’. Thus, the test of reasonableness was introduced by the
first   amendment   and   the   same   fell   for   jural   exploration   within   no
time, in   State of Madras   vs.   V.G. Row 47
.   The said case arose out
of   a   judgment   of   the   Madras   High   Court   quashing   a   Government
Order   declaring   a   society   known   as   ‘ People’s   Education   Society ’   as
an   unlawful   association   and   also   declaring   as   unconstitutional,
Section 15(2)(b) of the Indian Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1908,
as amended by the Indian Criminal Law Amendment (Madras) Act,
1950. While upholding the judgment of the Madras High Court, this
Court   indicated   as   to   how   the   test   of   reasonableness   has   to   be
expounded.  The relevant portion of the judgment reads as follows: ­
“23. It is important in this context to bear in mind that
the   test   of   reasonableness,   wherever   prescribed,
should be applied to each individual statute impugned,
and   no   abstract   standard,   or   general   pattern   of
47 (1952) 1 SCC 410
36

reasonableness   can   be   laid   down   as   applicable   to   all
cases.   The  nature of  the right alleged  to have  been
infringed,   the   underlying   purpose   of   the
restrictions imposed, the extent and urgency of the
evil   sought   to   be   remedied   thereby,   the
disproportion   of   the   imposition,   the   prevailing
conditions   at   the   time,   should   all   enter   into   the
judicial   verdict.   In   evaluating   such   elusive   factors
and   forming   their   own   conception   of   what   is
reasonable,   in   all   the   circumstances   of   a   given
case, it is inevitable that the social philosophy and
the   scale   of   values   of   the   Judges   participating   in
the decision should play an important part, and the
limit   to   their   interference   with   legislative
judgment   in   such   cases   can   only   be   dictated   by
their   sense   of   responsibility   and   self­restraint   and
the   sobering   reflection   that   the   Constitution   is
meant  not  only  for  people  of their way  of  thinking
but   for   all,   and   that   the   majority   of   the   elected
representatives   of   the   people   have,   in   authorizing
the imposition of the restrictions, considered them
to be reasonable .”
21. After   the   First   Amendment   to   the   Constitution,   the   country
witnessed   cries   for   secession,   with   parochial   tendencies   showing
their   ugly   head,   especially   from   a   southern   State.   Therefore,   a
National   Integration   Conference   was   convened   in   September­
October,   1961   to   find   ways   and   means   to   combat   the   evils   of
communalism,   casteism,   regionalism,   linguism   and   narrow
mindedness.   This   Conference   decided   to   set   up   the   National
Integration   Council.   Accordingly,   it   was   constituted   in   1962.   The
constitution of the Council assumed significance in the wake of the
37

Sino­India   war   in   1962.   This   National   Integration   Council   had   a
Committee on national integration and regionalism. This Committee
recommended two amendments to the Constitution,   namely ,   (i)   the
amendment   of   clause   (2)   of   Article   19   so   as   to   include   the   words
“ the sovereignty and integrity of India ” as one of the restrictions; and
(ii)   the   amendment   of   8   F orms   of   oath   or   affirmation   contained   in
the Third Schedule .  Until 1963, no one taking a constitutional oath
was required to swear that they would “ uphold the sovereignty and
integrity of India ”. But, the Constitution (Sixteenth Amendment) Act,
1963   expanded   the   forms   of   oath   to   ensure   that   “ every   candidate
for   the   membership   of   a   State   Legislature   or   Parliament,   and   every
aspirant to, and incumbent of, public office ” – to quote its Statement
of   Objects   and   Reasons   –   “ pledges   himself   .   .   .   to   preserve   the
integrity   and   sovereignty   of   the   Union   of   India .”   Thus,   by   the
Constitution   (Sixteenth   Amendment)   Act,   1963,   “ the   sovereignty
and   integrity   of   India ”,   was   included   as   an   additional   ground   of
restriction on the right guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a).
22. Having seen the history of evolution of clause (2) of Article 19,
let us now turn to the first question. 
38

Two parts of Question No.1
23. Question No.1 is actually in two parts.   The first part raises a
poser   as   to   whether   reasonable   restrictions   on   the   right   to   free
speech enumerated in Article 19(2) could be said to be exhaustive.
The   second   part   of   the   Question   raises   a   debate   as   to   whether
additional restrictions on the right to free speech can be imposed on
grounds   not   found   in   Article   19(2),   by   invoking   other   fundamental
rights.
First part of Question No.1
24. The judicial history  of  the evolution  of clause (2) of Article 19
which we have captured above shows that lot of deliberations went
into   the   articulation   of   the   restrictions   now   enumerated.   The   draft
Report   of   the   Sub­Committee   on   Fundamental   Rights   itself
underwent   several   changes   until   the   Constitution   was   adopted   in
November, 1949. In the form in which the Constitution was adopted
in   1949,   the   restrictions   related   to   (i)   libel;   (ii)   slander;   (iii)
defamation;   (iv)   contempt   of   court;   (v)   any   matter   which   offends
39

against decency or morality; and   (vi)   any matter which undermines
the security of the State or tends to overthrow the State.
25. After   the   1 st  
and   16 th  
Amendments,   the   emphasis   is   on
reasonable   restrictions   relating   to,   (i)   interests   of   sovereignty   and
integrity of India;  (ii)  the security of the State;  (iii)  friendly relations
with   foreign   states;   (iv)   public   order;   (v)   decency   or   morality;   (vi)
contempt   of   court;   (vii)   defamation;   and   (viii)   incitement   to   an
offence. 
26. A careful look at these eight heads  of restrictions would
show that they save the existing laws and enable the State to
make   laws,   restricting   free   speech   with   a   view   to   afford
protection   to  (i)   individuals   (ii)   groups   of   persons   (iii)   sections
of society (iv) classes of citizens (v) the Court (vi) the State and
(vii) the country . This can be demonstrated by providing in a table,
the provisions of the Indian Penal Code that make some speech or
expression a punishable offence, thereby impeding the right to free
speech,   the   heads   of   restriction   under   which   they   fall   and   the
40

category/class   of   person/persons   sought   to   be   protected   by   the
restriction:
Table of Provisions under IPC restricting freedom of speech and expression
Laws   restricting   free
speech Heads   of   Restriction
traceable to Article 19(2) Person/Class   of   Person
sought   to   be   protected
and   the   nature   of
protection. 
Section   117   of   the   IPC
­Abetting   commission   of
offence   by   the   public   or   by
more   than   ten   persons.
There   is   an   illustration
under   the   section   which
forms   part   of   the   statute.
This   illustration   seeks   to
restrict   freedom   of
expression
Illustration:
A  affixes in  a  public  place a
placard   instigating   a   sect
consisting   of   more   than   ten
members   to   meet   at   a
certain   time   and   place,   for
the  purpose  of  attacking  the
members of an adverse sect,
while   engaged   in   a
procession. A has committed
the   offence   defined   in   this
section. 1. Public Order
2. Incitement to an Offence Individual   Persons   ­
Protection   from
incitement   to   commit
offence. 
Section   124A   of   the   IPC   ­
Sedition 48 1. Public Order
2. Decency and Morality  State – Protection against
disaffection
Section   153A(1)(a)   of   the
IPC   ­   Promoting   enmity
between  different groups  on
ground   of   religion,   race,
place   of   birth,   residence,
language,   etc.,   and   doing
acts   prejudicial   to
maintenance of harmony 1.Public Order
2. Decency and Morality Groups   of   Persons   ­
Protection   from
disrupting   harmony
among   different   sections
of society.
48  Subject matter of challenge pending before this Court.
41

Section   153B   of   the   IPC   ­
Imputations,   assertions
prejudicial   to   the   national­
integration  1. Sovereignty   and
Integrity of the State
2. Public Order
3. Decency and Morality  1. Nation 
2.   Group   of   persons
belonging   to   different
religions,   races,
languages, etc,.
Section   171C   of   the   IPC
­Undue   Influence   at
Elections 1. Public Order Candidates   contesting
the Election and Voters –
To   ensure   free   and   fair
election   and   to   keep   the
purity   of   the   democratic
process
Section   228   of   the   IPC   ­
Intentional   insult   or
interruption   to   public
servant   sitting   in   judicial
proceedings  Contempt of Court Court   –To   prevent   people
from   undermining   the
authority of the court. 
Section   228A   of   the   IPC­
Disclosure   of   identity   of   the
victim   of   certain   offences
etc. 1. Public Order
2. Decency and Morality  Individual   persons
(Victims   of   offences   u/s
376)­   Protection   of
identity   of   women   and
minors. 
Section   295A   of   the   IPC   ­
Deliberate   and   malicious
acts,   intended   to   outrage
religious   feelings   of   any
class   by   insulting   its
religion or religious beliefs. 1. Public order, 
2. Decency and morality Sections   of   society
professing   and   practicing
different   religious
beliefs/sentiments. 
Section   298   of   the   IPC­
Uttering   words,   etc.,   with
deliberate   intent   to   wound
religious feelings. 1. Public order, 
2. Decency and morality Sections   of   society
professing   and   practicing
different   religious
beliefs/sentiments.
Section   351   of   the   IPC   –
Assault.   The   definition   of
assault   includes   some
utterances,   as   seen   from
the   Explanation   under   the
Section.
Explanation:
Mere   words   do   not   amount
to an assault. But the words
which   a   person   uses   may
give   to   his   gestures   or
preparation   such   a   meaning 1. Public Order
2. Decency and morality Individual   Persons   –
Protection   from   Criminal
Force.
42

as may make those gestures
or   preparations   amount   to
an assault.
Section   354   of   the   IPC­
Assault   to   woman   with
intent   to   outrage   her
modesty
Note:
The   Definition   of   Assault
includes the use of words. 1. Public Order
2. Decency and morality
3. Defamation Individual   Persons   –
Protection   of   Modesty   of
a Woman.
Section   354A   of   the   IPC   –
Sexual   Harassment   (It
includes   sexually   colored
remarks). 1. Public Order
2. Decency and morality
3. Defamation Individuals   –   Protection
of Modesty of a Woman.
Section   354C   of   the   IPC   –
Voyeurism  1. Public Order
2. Decency and morality
3. Defamation Individuals   –   Protection
of Modesty of a Woman.
Section   354D   of   the   IPC   –
Stalking 1. Decency and Morality
2. Defamation Individuals   –   Protection
of Modesty of a Woman.
Section   354E   of   the   IPC   –
Sextortion 1. Public Order
2. Decency and morality
3. Defamation Individual   Persons   –
Protection   of   Modesty   of
a Woman.
Section   355   of   the   IPC   ­
Assault   or   criminal   force
with   intent   to   dishonour
person,   otherwise   than   on
grave provocation.
Note:
The   Definition   of   Assault
includes use of words. 1. Public Order
2. Decency and morality
3. Defamation Individual   Persons   –
Protection of reputation.
Section   383   of   the   IPC   –
Extortion   (The   illustration
under   the   Section   includes
threat   to   publish
defamatory libel).
Illustration:
A   threatens   to   publish   a
defamatory   libel   concerning
Z unless Z gives him money.
He   thus   induces   Z   to   give 1. Public Order
2. Decency and Morality Individuals   –   Protection
from   fear   of   injury/
Protection of Property.
43

him   money.   A   has
committed extortion.
Section   390   of   the   IPC   –
Robbery
Note:
In   all   robbery   there   is  either
theft or extortion. 1. Public Order
2. Decency and Morality Individuals   –   Protection
from   fear   of   injury/
Protection of Property.
Section   499   of   the   IPC   –
Defamation Defamation Individual   Persons   and
Group   of   People   –
Reputation   sought   to   be
protected.
Section   504     of   the   IPC   –
Intentional   insult   with
intent   to   provoke   breach   of
peace. 1. Incitement to an offense
2. Public Order
3. Decency and morality The public – Protection of
Peace.
Section   505(1)(b)   of   the   IPC
–   Statement   likely   to   cause
fear   or   alarm   to   the   public
whereby any person may be
induced   to   commit   an
offence   against   the   State   or
against   the   public
tranquility. 1. Sovereignty and Integrity
of the State
2. Incitement to an offense
3. Public Order State   –   Protection   from
the   commission   of
offences against the State
and   protection   of   public
tranquility.
Section 505(1)(c) of the IPC­
Statement intended to incite
any   class   or   community   of
persons   to   commit   any
offence   against   any   other
class or community.  Public Order Class/community   of
people.
Protection   from
incitement   to   commit
violence   against   class   or
community. 
Section   509   of   the   IPC   –
Word,   Gesture   or   Act
intended   to   insult   the
modesty of a woman. 1. Defamation
2. Decency or Morality Individual   persons   –
Protection   of   Modesty   of
a Woman.
27. We have taken note of, in the above Table, only the provisions
of   the   Indian   Penal   Code   that   curtail   free   speech.   There   are   also
other   special   enactments   such   as   The   Scheduled   Castes   and   The
44

Scheduled   Tribes   (Prevention   of   Atrocities)   Act,   1989,   The
Prevention of Insults to National Honour Act, 1971 etc., which also
impose   certain   restrictions   on   free   speech.   From   these   it   will   be
clear   that   the   eight   heads   of   restrictions  contained   in   clause   (2)   of
Article 19 are so exhaustive that   the   laws made for  the  purpose of
protection   of   the   individual,   sections   of   society,   classes   of   citizens,
court, the country and the State have been saved. 
28. The   restrictions   under   clause   (2)   of   Article   19   are
comprehensive   enough   to   cover   all   possible   attacks   on   the
individual,   groups/classes   of   people,   the   society,   the   court,   the
country  and  the  State.  This is why   this  Court  repeatedly   held that
any restriction which does not fall within the four corners of Article
19(2)   will   be   unconstitutional.   For   instance,   it   was   held   by   the
Constitution Bench in  Express Newspapers (Private) Ltd.   vs.  The
Union of India 49
,  that a law enacted by the legislature, which does
not   come   squarely   within   Article   19(2)   would   be   struck   down   as
unconstitutional.   Again,   in   Sakal   Papers   (supra) ,   this   Court   held
that   the   State   cannot   make   a   law   which   directly   restricts   one
freedom even for securing the better enjoyment of another freedom.
49 1959 SCR 12
45

29. That the Executive cannot transgress its limits by imposing an
additional   restriction   in   the   form   of   Executive   or   Departmental
instruction   was   emphasised   by   this   Court   in   Bijoe   Emmanuel   vs.
State   of   Kerala 50
.   The   Court   made   it   clear   that   the   reasonable
restrictions sought to be imposed must be through “ a law ” having
statutory   force   and   not   a   mere   Executive   or   Departmental
instruction.   The   restraint   upon   the   Executive   not   to   have   a
back­door   intrusion   applies   equally   to   Courts.   While   Courts
may   be   entitled   to   interpret   the   law   in   such   a   manner   that   the
rights existing in blue print have expansive connotations, the Court
cannot   impose   additional   restrictions   by   using   tools   of
interpretation. What this Court can do and how far it can afford to
go,   was   articulated   by   B.   Sudharshan   Reddy,   J.,   in   Ram
Jethmalani  (supra) as follows:
“ 85 .   An   argument   can   be   made   that   this   Court   can
make   exceptions   under   the   peculiar   circumstances   of
this   case,   wherein   the   State   has   acknowledged   that   it
has not acted with the requisite speed and vigour in the
case   of   large   volumes   of   suspected   unaccounted   for
monies   of   certain   individuals.   There   is   an   inherent
danger   in  making   exceptions   to   fundamental   principles
and rights on the fly. Those exceptions, bit by bit, would
then   eviscerate   the   content   of   the   main   right   itself.
50 ( 1986) 3 SCC 615
46

Undesirable   lapses   in   upholding   of   fundamental   rights
by   the   legislature,   or   the   executive,   can   be   rectified   by
assertion   of   constitutional   principles   by   this   Court.
However,   a   decision   by   this   Court   that   an   exception
could   be   carved   out   remains   permanently   as   a   part   of
judicial canon, and becomes a part of the constitutional
interpretation   itself.   It   can   be   used   in   the   future   in   a
manner   and   form   that   may  far   exceed   what   this   Court
intended or what the constitutional text and values can
bear. We are not proposing that Constitutions cannot be
interpreted   in  a  manner  that  allows  the  nation­State   to
tackle   the   problems   it   faces.   The   principle   is   that
exceptions cannot be carved out willy­nilly, and without
forethought as to the damage they may cause.
86 .One   of   the   chief   dangers   of   making   exceptions   to
principles that have become a part of constitutional law,
through   aeons   of   human   experience,   is   that   the   logic,
and   ease   of   seeing   exceptions,   would   become
entrenched   as   a   part   of   the   constitutional   order.   Such
logic   would   then   lead   to   seeking   exceptions,   from
protective walls of all fundamental rights, on grounds of
expediency   and   claims   that   there   are   no   solutions   to
problems   that   the   society   is   confronting   without   the
evisceration   of   fundamental   rights.   That   same   logic
could   then   be   used   by   the   State   in   demanding
exceptions   to   a   slew   of   other   fundamental   rights,
leading   to   violation   of   human   rights   of   citizens   on   a
massive scale.”
30. Again,   in   Secretary,   Ministry   of   Information   &
Broadcasting,   Govt.   of   India   vs.   Cricket   Association   of
Bengal 51
, t his Court cautioned that the restrictions on free speech
can   be   imposed   only   on   the   basis   of   Article   19(2).   In   Ramlila
Maidan   Incident,   in   re. 52
,   this   Court   developed   a   three­pronged
51 (1995) 2 SCC 161
52  (2012) 5 SCC 1
47

test namely,  (i)  that the restriction can be imposed only by or under
the authority of law and not by exercise of the executive power;   (ii)
that   such   restriction   must   be   reasonable;   and   (iii)   that   the
restriction must be related to the purposes mentioned in clause (2)
of Article 19. 
31. That   the  eight   heads   of   restrictions   contained   in   clause   (2)   of
Article   19   are   exhaustive   can   be   established   from   another
perspective   also.   The   nature   of   the   restrictions   on   free   speech
imposed by law/judicial pronouncements even in countries where a
higher   threshold   is   maintained,   are   almost   similar.   To   drive   home
this   point,   we   are   presenting   in   the   following   table,   a   comparative
note relating to different jurisdictions:
Jurisdiction The   Document
from   which   the
Right   to   Freedom
of   Speech   and
Expression flows The   Document
from   which   the
restrictions   on
the   right   to
freedom   of
Speech   and
Expression flow Nature   of
Restrictions
India Article   19(1)(a)   ­
Constitution   of
India Article   19(2)   ­
Constitution   of
India 1. Sovereignty   and
integrity   of   the
State,
2. Security   of   the
State, 
3. Friendly   relations
48

with   foreign
countries,
4. Public order, 
5. Decency   and
morality,
6. Contempt of court,
7. Defamation, 
8. Incitement   to   an
offense.
UK Article   10(1)   of   the
Human Rights Act,
1998 Article   10(2)   of   the
Human Rights Act,
1998 1. National security,  
2. Territorial   integrity
or public safety, 
3. For   the   prevention
of   disorder   or
crime,   for   the
protection   of
health or morals,
4. For   the   protection
of   the   reputation
or rights of others,
5. For   preventing   the
disclosure   of
information
received   in
confidence, or
6. For   maintaining
the   authority   and
impartiality   of   the
judiciary.
USA First   Amendment
to   the   US
Constitution   No   restriction   is
specifically
provided   in   the
Constitution.   But
Judicial   Review   by
the Supreme Court
has   admitted
certain restrictions Recognised   forms   of
Unprotected Speech:
1.   Obscenity   as   held
in   Roth   v.   United
States,   354   U.S.   476,
483 (1957).
2. Child   Pornography
as   held   in   Ashcroft   v.
Free Speech Coalition,
435 U.S. 234 (2002).
3.   Fighting   Words
49

and   True   Threat   as
held   in   Chaplinsky   v.
New   Hampshire,   315
U.S.   568   (1942)   and
Virginia   v.   Black,   538
U.S.   343,   363   (2003),
respectively.
Australia   Australian
Constitution   does
not   expressly
speak   about
freedom   of
expression.
However,   the   High
Court   has   held
that   an   implied
freedom  of political
communication
exists   as   an
indispensible   part
of   the   system   of
representative   and
responsible
government
created   by   the
Constitution.   It
operates   as   a
freedom   from
government
restraint,   rather
than   a   right
conferred   directly
on   individuals.
Australia is a party
to   seven   core
international
human   rights
treaties.   The   right
to   freedom   of
opinion   and
expression   is
contained   in
Articles   19   and   20
of the  International
Covenant   on   Civil
and   Political
Rights  (ICCPR) and  
Articles   4   and   5   of 1.   Article   19(3),   20
of   the   ICCPR
contains
mandatory
limitations   on
freedom   of
expression,   and
requires   countries,
subject   to
reservation/declar
ation,   to   outlaw
vilification   of
persons   on
national,   racial   or
religious   grounds.
Australia   has
made a declaration
in   relation   to
Article   20   to   the
effect   that   existing
Commonwealth
and   state
legislation   is
regarded   as
adequate, and that
the   right   is
reserved   not   to
introduce   any
further   legislation
imposing   further
restrictions   on
these matters.
2.   Criminal   Code
Act 1995
3.   Racial
Discrimination
Act 1975 Under   International
Treaties:
1. Rights   of
Reputation   of
Others, 
2. National Security, 
3. Public Order, 
4. Public Health, or
5. Public Morality
Under   the   Criminal
Code Act, 1995
1.Offences relating to
urging   by   force   or
violence the overthrow
of   the   Constitution   or
the lawful authority of
the Government; and
2. Offences relating to
the   use   of   a
telecommunications
carriage   service   in   a
way   which   is
intentionally
menacing,   harassing
or   offensive,   and
using   a   carriage
service   to
communicate   content
which   is   menacing,
harassing   or
offensive.
Speech   or
Expression
amounting   to   Racial
50

the   Convention   on
the   Elimination   of
All Forms of Racial
Discrimination
(CERD)   ,   Articles
12   and   13   of   the
Convention   on   the
Rights   of   the   Child
(CRC)   and   Article
21   of   the
Convention   on   the
Rights   of   Persons
with   Disabilities
(CRPD) . Discrimination
under   the   Racial
Discrimination   Act,
1975
European
Union Article   10(1),
European
Convention     on
Human   Rights,
1950 Article   10(2),
European
Convention   on
Human   Rights,
1950 1. In   the   interests   of
national   security,
territorial   integrity
or public safety,  
2. For   the   prevention
of   disorder   or
crime,  
3. For   the   protection
of   health   or
morals,  
4. For   the   protection
of   the   reputation
or rights of others,  
5. For   preventing   the
disclosure   of
information
received   in
confidence, or  
6. For   maintaining
the   authority   and
impartiality   of   the
judiciary.
Republic   of
South Africa Bill   of   Rights,
Article   16(1)   of   the
Constitution   of   the
Republic   of   South
Africa, 1996 Bill   of   Rights,
Article   16(2)   of   the
Constitution of the
Republic   of   South
Africa, 1996 1. Propaganda   for
war,
2. Incitement   of
imminent violence,
3. A dvocacy  of  hatred
that   is   based   on
race,   ethnicity,
gender,   religion,
and   that
51

constitutes
incitement   to
cause harm.
32. Since the eight heads of restrictions contained in clause (2) of
Article 19 seek to protect: 
(i)   the   individual   –   against   the   infringement   of   his   dignity,
reputation, bodily autonomy and property; 
(ii)   different   sections   of   society   professing   and   practicing,   different
religious   beliefs/sentiments   ­   against   offending   their   beliefs   and
sentiments; 
(iii)  classes/groups of citizens belonging to different races, linguistic
identities etc.­ against an attack on their identities; 
(iv)   women   and   children   –   against   the   violation   of   their   special
rights; 
(v)  the State ­ against the breach of its security; 
(vi)   the country ­ against an attack on its sovereignty and integrity;
(vii)  the Court – against an attempt to undermine its authority, 
we   think   that   the   restrictions   contained   in   clause   (2)   of   Article   19
are exhaustive and no further restriction need to be incorporated.
33. In   any   event,   the   law   imposing   any   restriction   in   terms   of
clause   (2)   of   Article   19   can   only   be   made   by   the   State   and   not   by
52

the Court.   The role envisaged in the Constitutional scheme for
the   Court,   is   to   be   a  gate­keeper   (and   a   conscience   keeper)   to
check   strictly   the   entry   of   restrictions,   into   the   temple   of
fundamental   rights.   The   role   of   the   Court   is   to   protect
fundamental   rights   limited   by   lawful   restrictions   and   not   to
protect   restrictions   and   make   the   rights   residual   privileges .
Clause   (2)   of   Article   19   saves   (i)   the   operation   of   any   existing   law;
and   (ii)   the making  of any  law by the State. Therefore, it is not for
us to add one or more restrictions than what is already found.
Second part of Question No.1
34. The   second   part   of  Question   No.1  is   as   to   whether   additional
restrictions on the right to free speech can be imposed on grounds
not found in Article 19(2) by invoking other fundamental rights.
35. This   part   of   Question   No.1   already   stands   partly   answered
while dealing with the first part of Question No.1.   The decisions of
this   Court   in   Express   Newspapers   (Private)   Ltd.   (supra) ,   the
Cricket   Association   of   Bengal   (supra)   and   Ramlila   Maidan
53

Incident, in re.   (supra) ,  provide a complete answer to the question
whether   additional   restrictions   on   the   right   to   free   speech   can   be
imposed on grounds not found in Article 19(2).
36. The   question   whether   additional   restrictions   can   peep   into
Article   19(2),   by   invoking   other   fundamental   rights,   also   stands
answered   by   this   Court   in   Sakal   Papers .   In   Sakal   Papers ,   t he
Central  Government  issued  an  order  called  Daily  Newspaper   (Price
and Page) Order, 1960 in exercise of the power conferred under the
Newspaper (Price and Page) Act, 1956, fixing the maximum number
of  pages  that   might  be  published  by   a  newspaper  according  to  the
price   charged.   Therefore,   the   publisher   of   a   Marathi   Newspaper
challenged the constitutionality of both the Act and the Order.  One
of the arguments raised on behalf of the State in the said case was
that   there   are   two   aspects   of   the   activities   of   newspapers   namely,
(i)   the   dissemination   of   news   and   views;   and   (ii)   the   commercial
aspect.  While the former would fall under Article 19(1)(a), the latter
would fall under Article 19(1)(g).  
37. Since   these   two   rights   are   independent   and   since   the
restrictions on the right under Article 19(1)(g) can be placed in the
54

interest  of  the general public under  Article 19(6), it was contended
by the State in  Sakal Papers  that the Act and the Order are saved
by clause (6) of Article 19. But the   said   argument   of   the   State   was
rejected   by   the   Constitution   Bench   in   Sakal   Papers ,   in   the
following words:
“It may well be within the power of the State to place,
in  the interest  of  the  general public, restrictions upon
the right of a citizen to carry on business but it is not
open to the State to achieve this object by directly and
immediately   curtailing   any   other   freedom   of   that
citizen   guaranteed   by   the   Constitution   and   which   is
not   susceptible   of   abridgement   on   the   same   grounds
as are set out in cl. (6) of Art. 19.     Therefore, the right
of   freedom   of   speech   cannot   be   taken   away   with   the
object of placing restrictions on the business activities
of   a   citizen.   Freedom   of   speech   can   be   restricted   only
in   the   interests   of   the   security   of   the   State,   friendly
relations   with   foreign   State,   public   order,   decency   or
morality   or   in   relation   to   contempt   of   court,
defamation or  incitement  to an offence. It cannot, like
the   freedom   to   carry   on   business,   be   curtailed   in   the
interest   of   the   general   public.   If   a   law   directly
affecting it is challenged it is no answer that the
restrictions enacted by it are justifiable under cls.
(3)   to   (6).   For,   the   scheme   of   Art.   19   is   to
enumerate different freedoms separately and then
to specify  the extent  of  restrictions  to which they
may   be   subjected   and   the   objects   for   securing
which   this   could   be   done.   A   citizen   is   entitled   to
enjoy each and every one of the freedoms together
and cl. (1) does not prefer one freedom to another.
That   is   the   plain   meaning   of   this   clause.   It
follows   from   this   that   the   State   cannot   make   a
law   which   directly   restricts   one   freedom   even   for
securing the better enjoyment of another freedom.
All the greater reason, therefore, for holding that
55

the   State   cannot   directly   restrict   one   freedom   by
placing   an   otherwise   permissible   restriction   on
another freedom. ”
38. We   are   conscious   of   the   fact   that   Sakal   Papers   was   a   case
where the petitioner before the Court had two different fundamental
rights   and   the   law   made   by   the   State   fell   within   the   permitted
restrictions   upon   the   exercise   of   one   of   those   two   fundamental
rights.   However, the restriction traceable to clause (6) of Article 19
was   not   available   in   clause   (2)   of   Article   19.   It   is   in   such
circumstances   that   this   Court   held   that   the   restriction   validly
imposed   upon   the   exercise   of   one   fundamental   right   cannot
automatically become valid while dealing with another fundamental
right   of   the   same   person,   the   restriction   of   which   stands
Constitutionally on different parameters.
39. In   Sakal   Papers   the   conflict   was   neither   between   one
individual’s   fundamental   right   qua   another   individual’s
fundamental   right   nor   one   fundamental   right   qua   another
fundamental   right   of   the   same   individual.   It   was   a   case   where   a
restriction validly made upon a fundamental right was held invalid
qua  another fundamental right of the same individual.  In the cases
56

on hand, what is sought to be projected is a possible conflict arising
out   of   the   exercise   of   a   fundamental   right   by   one   individual,   in   a
manner infringing upon the free exercise of the fundamental right of
another person. But this conflict is age old.
40. The exercise of all fundamental rights by all citizens is possible
only   when   each   individual   respects   the   other   person’s   rights.   As
acknowledged   by   the   learned   Attorney   General   and   Ms.   Aparjita
Singh,   learned   Amicus ,   this   Court   has   always   struck   a   balance
whenever it was found that the exercise of fundamental rights by an
individual, caused inroads into the  space available for  the  exercise
of fundamental rights by another individual. The emphasis even in
the Preamble on “ fraternity ” is an indication that the survival of all
fundamental   rights   and   the   survival   of   democracy   itself   depends
upon mutual respect, accommodation and willingness to co­exist in
peace  and  tranquility   on  the   part  of  the  citizens.   Let  us  now   see  a
few examples. The Fundamental Duty enjoined upon every citizen of
the   country   under   Article   51­A   (e)   to   “promote   harmony   and   the
spirit   of   common   brotherhood   amongst   all   the   people   of   India
transcending religious, linguistic and regional or sectional diversities
57

and   to   renounce   practices   derogatory   to   the   dignity   of   women” ,   is
also an indicator that no one can exercise his fundamental right in
a manner that infringes upon the fundamental right of another. 
41. As articulated by Jeevan Reddy, J. in   Cricket Association of
Bengal,   no  one can exercise his right of speech  in  such  a manner
as to violate another man’s right. In paragraph 152 of the decision
in  Cricket Association of Bengal , Jeevan Reddy, J. said :  “Indeed
it   may   be   the   duty   of   the   State   to   ensure   that   this   right   is
available   to   all   in   equal   measure   and   that   it   is   not   hijacked
by   a   few   to   the   detriment   of   the   rest.   This   obligation   flows
from  the  Preamble  to  our  Constitution,   which  seeks   to  secure
all   its   citizens   liberty   of   thought,   expression,   belief   and
worship………...Under   our   Constitutional   scheme,   the   State   is
not   merely   under   an   obligation   to   respect   the   fundamental
rights guaranteed by Part­III but under an equal obligation to
ensure   conditions   in   which   those   rights   can   be   meaningfully
and effectively enjoyed by one and all.”
58

42.   The   above   passage   from   the   opinion   of   Jeevan   Reddy,   J.,   in
Cricket   Association   of   Bengal ,   was   quoted   with   approval   by   the
Constitution   Bench   in   Sahara   India   Real   Estate   Corporation
Limited  case. 
43. There   are   several   instances   where   this   Court   either   struck   a
balance   or   placed   on   a   slightly   higher   pedestal,   the   fundamental
right   of   one   over   that   of   the   other.   Interestingly,   the   competing
claims arose in many of those cases, in the context of Article 19(1)
(a)   right   of   one   person   qua   Article   21   right   of   another.   Let   us   now
take a look at some of them. 
(i)  In  R. Rajagopal  (supra), the rights pitted against one another
were   the  freedom   of  expression  under   Article   19(1)(a)   and  the
right to privacy of the Officers of the Government under Article
21. This Court propounded: 
“ 26 .   We   may   now   summarise   the   broad   principles
flowing from the above discussion:
(1) The right to privacy is implicit  in the right to life
and   liberty   guaranteed   to   the   citizens   of   this   country
by   Article 21.   It is a "right to be let alone". A citizen has
a right to safeguard the privacy of his own,   his family,
marriage,   procreation,   motherhood,   child­bearing   and
education   among   other   matters.   None   can   publish
anything   concerning   the   above   matters   without   his
consent   — whether   truthful  or  otherwise  and  whether
laudatory   or   critical.   If   he   does   so,   he   would   be
59

violating   the   right   to   privacy   of   the   person   concerned
and would be liable in an action for damages. Position
may,   however,   be   different,   if   a   person   voluntarily
thrusts   himself   into   controversy   or   voluntarily   invites
or raises a controversy.
(2)   The   rule   aforesaid   is  subject   to   the  exception,   that
any   publication   concerning   the   aforesaid   aspects
becomes   unobjectionable   if   such   publication   is   based
upon   public   records   including   court   records.   This   is
for the reason that once a matter becomes a matter of
public   record,   the   right   to   privacy   no   longer   subsists
and   it   becomes   a   legitimate   subject   for   comment   by
press   and   media   among   others.   We   are,   however,   of
the   opinion   that   in   the   interests   of   decency   [ Article
19(2) ]   an   exception   must   be   carved   out   to   this   rule,
viz.,   a   female   who   is   the   victim   of   a   sexual   assault,
kidnap, abduction or  a like offence should not further
be   subjected   to   the   indignity   of   her   name   and   the
incident being publicised in press/media.
(3)   There   is   yet   another   exception   to   the   rule   in   (1)
above   —   indeed,   this   is   not   an   exception   but   an
independent   rule.   In   the   case   of   public   officials,   it   is
obvious,   right   to   privacy,   or   for   that   matter,   the
remedy   of   action   for   damages   is   simply   not   available
with   respect   to   their   acts   and   conduct   relevant   to   the
discharge of their official duties. This is so even where
the   publication   is   based   upon   facts   and   statements
which are not true, unless the official establishes that
the   publication   was   made   (by   the   defendant)   with
reckless   disregard   for   truth.   In   such   a   case,   it   would
be   enough   for   the   defendant   (member   of   the   press   or
media)   to   prove   that   he   acted   after   a   reasonable
verification   of   the   facts;   it   is   not   necessary   for   him   to
prove   that   what   he   has   written   is   true.   Of   course,
where   the   publication   is   proved   to   be   false   and
actuated   by   malice   or   personal   animosity,   the
defendant   would   have   no   defence   and   would   be   liable
for   damages.   It   is   equally   obvious   that   in   matters   not
relevant   to   the   discharge   of   his   duties,   the   public
official enjoys the same protection as any other citizen,
as   explained   in   (1)   and   (2)   above.   It   needs   no
reitera tion   that   judiciary,   which   is   protected   by   the
power to punish for contempt of court and Parliament
60

and   legislatures   protected   as   their   privileges   are   by
Articles 105 and 104 respectively of the Constitution of
India, represent exceptions to this rule.
(4) So far as the Government, local authority and other
organs and institutions exercising governmental power
are   concerned,   they   cannot   maintain   a   suit   for
damages for defaming them.
(5)   Rules   3   and   4   do   not,   however,   mean   that   Official
Secrets   Act ,   1 923,   or   any   similar   enactment   or
provision   having   the   force   of   law   does   not   bind   the
press or media.
(6) There is no law empowering the State or its officials
to   prohibit,   or   to   impose   a   prior   restraint   upon   the
press/media.”
(ii)  In   People’s   Union   for   Civil   Liberties   (PUCL)   (supra) ,   the
rights  that  were  perceived as  competing   with  each other  were
the   right   to   privacy   of   the   spouse   of   a   candidate   contesting
election   qua   the   voter’s   right   to   information.   In   his   separate
but   near   concurring   opinion,   P.   Venkatarama   Reddi,   J.
articulated the position thus :
“121. …
…W hen there is a competition between the right to
privacy   of   an   individual   and   the   right   to
information of the citizen, the former right has to
be subordinated to the latter right as it serves the
larger public interest. …”
(iii)  In   Noise   Pollution   (V.),   in   Re   (supra) ,   the   rights   that
competed   with   one   another,   were   the   rights   enshrined   in
Article   19(1)(a)   and   Article   21.   The   clash   was   between
61

individuals   and   the   persons   in   the   neighborhood.   This   Court
held:
“ 11.   Those   who   make   noise   often   take   shelter
behind   Article 19(1) (a)   pleading freedom of speech and
right   to   expression.   Undoubtedly,   the   freedom   of
speech and right to expression are fundamental rights
but   the   rights   are   not   absolute.   Nobody   can   claim   a
fundamental   right   to   create   noise   by   amplifying   the
sound   of   his   speech   with   the   help   of   loudspeakers.
While one has a right to speech, others have a right to
listen or decline to listen. Nobody can be compelled to
listen   and   nobody   can   claim   that   he   has   a   right   to
make   his   voice   trespass   into   the   ears   or   mind   of
others.   Nobody   can   indulge   into   aural   aggression.   If
anyone   increases   his   volume   of   speech   and   that   too
with   the   assistance   of   artificial   devices   so   as   to
compulsorily expose unwilling persons to hear a noise
raised   to   unpleasant   or   obnoxious   levels,   then   the
person   speaking   is   violating   the   right   of   others   to   a
peaceful,   comfortable   and   pollution­free   life
guaranteed   by   Article   21.   Article   19(1) (a)   cannot   be
pressed   into   service   for   defeating   the   fundamental
right guaranteed by Article 21. …”
(iv) In   Ram   Jethmalani   the   right   to   know,   inhering   in   Article
19(1)(a) and the right to privacy under Article 21, were seen to
be   in   conflict.   Right   to   privacy   was   asserted   by   individuals
holding   bank   accounts   in   other   countries.   The   court   had   to
balance  the  same with  the  citizens’  right   to  know.   This  Court
propounded as follows:
“ 84.   The   rights   of     citizens,   to   effectively   seek   the
protection   of   fundamental   rights,   under   clause   (1)
of   Article   32   have   to   be   balanced   against   the   rights   of
citizens   and   persons   under   Article   21.   The   latter
cannot be sacrificed on the anvil of fervid desire to find
instantaneous solutions to systemic problems such as
unaccounted   for   monies,   for   it   would   lead   to
62

dangerous   circumstances,   in   which   vigilante
investigations,   inquisitions   and   rabble   rousing,   by
masses of other citizens could become the order of the
day.   The   right   of   citizens   to   petition   this   Court   for
upholding   of   fundamental   rights   is   granted   in   order
that   citizens,   interalia,   are   ever   vigilant   about   the
functioning   of   the   State   in   order   to   protect   the
constitutional   project.   That   right   cannot   be   extended
to   being   inquisitors   of   fellow   citizens.   An   inquisitorial
order,   where   citizens’   fundamental   right   to   privacy   is
breached   by   fellow   citizens   is   destructive   of   social
order.   The   notion   of   fundamental   rights,   such   as   a
right   to   privacy   as   part   of   right   to   life,   is   not   merely
that   the   State   is   enjoined   from   derogating   from   them.
It   also   includes   the   responsibility   of   the   State   to
uphold   them   against   the   actions   of   others   in   the
society, even in the context of exercise of fundamental
rights by those others.”
(v) In   Sahara  India  Real  Estate  Corporation  Limited   freedom
of press and the right to fair trial were the competing rights. In
this case, t he Constitution Bench was dealing with a question
whether   an   order   for   postponement   of   publication   of   the
proceedings   pending   before   a   Court,   would   constitute   a
restriction   under   Article   19( 1)(a)   and   as   to   whether   such
restriction   is   saved   under   Article   19(2).     This   question   was
answered by the Constitution Bench in para 42 as follows:
“ 42.   At   the   outset,   we   must   understand   the   nature   of
such   orders   of   postponement.   Publicity   postponement
orders should be seen in the context of Article 19(1)(a)
not being an absolute right. The US   clash model   based
on   collision   between   freedom   of   expression   (including
free press) and the right to a fair trial will not apply to
the   Indian   Constitution.   In   certain   cases,   even   the
accused seeks publicity (not in the pejorative sense) as
openness   and   transparency   is   the   basis   of   a   fair   trial
in   which   all   the   stakeholders   who   are   a   party   to   a
63

litigation including the Judges are under scrutiny and
at   the  same  time  people   get   to  know   what   is  going   on
inside   the   courtrooms.   These   aspects   come   within   the
scope   of   Article   19(1)   and   Article   21.   When   rights   of
equal   weight   clash,   the   Courts   have   to   evolve
balancing   techniques   or   measures   based   on
recalibration   under   which   both   the   rights   are   given
equal   space   in   the   constitutional   scheme   and   this   is
what   the   “postponement   order”   does,   subject   to   the
parameters mentioned hereinafter. But, what happens
when   the   courts   are   required   to   balance   important
public   interests   placed   side   by   side.   For   example,   in
cases   where   presumption   of   open   justice   has   to   be
balanced   with   presumption   of   innocence,   which   as
stated   above,   is   now   recognised   as   a   human   right.
These   presumptions   existed   at   the   time   when   the
Constitution   was   framed   [existing   law   under   Article
19(2)]   and   they   continue   till   date   not   only   as   part   of
rule   of   law   under   Article   14   but   also   as   an   Article   21
right. The constitutional protection in Article 21 which
protects   the   rights   of   the   person   for   a   fair   trial   is,   in
law,   a   valid   restriction   operating   on   the   right   to   free
speech   under   Article   19(1)(a),   by   virtue   of   force   of   it
being   a   constitutional   provision.   Given   that
the   postponement   orders   curtail   the   freedom   of
expression   of   third   parties,   such   orders   have   to   be
passed   only   in   cases   in   which   there   is   real   and
substantial risk   of prejudice to fairness of the trial or to
the proper administration of justice which in the words
of Justice Cardozo is “the end and purpose of all laws”.
However,   such   orders   of   postponement   should   be
ordered   for   a   limited   duration   and   without   disturbing
the content  of  the  publication.  They  should be  passed
only   when   necessary   to   prevent   real   and   substantial
risk   to   the   fairness   of   the   trial   (court   proceedings),   if
reasonable   alternative   methods   or   measures   such   as
change   of   venue   or   postponement   of   trial   will   not
prevent   the   said   risk   and   when   the   salutary   effects   of
such orders   outweigh   the deleterious effects to the free
expression of those affected by the prior restraint. The
order   of   postponement   will   only   be   appropriate   in
cases where the balancing test otherwise favours non­
publication for a limited period. …”
64

(vi) In   Thalapplam   Service   Cooperative   Bank   Ltd.   (supra) ,   the
right   to   know   held   as   part   of   Article   19(1)(a)   and   the   right   to
privacy   being   part   of   Article   21   were   perceived   as   competing
with   each   other,   in   a   matter   between   holders   of   accounts   in
cooperative   banks   and   members   of   the   public   who   wanted
details. This Court in paragraph 64 held:
“64.   Recognising the fact that the right to privacy is a
sacrosanct   facet   of   Article   21   of   the   Constitution,   the
legislation   has   put   a   lot   of   safeguards   to   protect   the
rights   under   Section   8(j),   as   already   indicated.     If   the
information   sought   for   is   personal   and   has   no
relationship   with   any   public   activity   or   interest   or   it
will   not   subserve   larger   public   interest,   the   public
authority or the officer concerned is not legally obliged
to provide those information.   Reference may be made
to   a   recent   judgment   of   this   Court   in   Girish
Ramchandra   Deshpande   v.     Central   Information
Commr.,   (2013)   1   SCC   212 ,   wherein   this   Court   held
that   since   there   is   no   bona   fide   public   interest   in
seeking information, the disclosure of said information
would   cause   unwarranted   invasion   of   privacy   of   the
individual  under   Section  8(1)(j)  of   the   Act.     Further,  if
the authority finds that information sought for can be
made   available   in   the   larger   public   interest,   then   the
officer   should   record   his   reasons   in   writing   before
providing   the   information,   because   the   person   from
whom   information   is   sought   for,   has   also   a   right   to
privacy   guaranteed   under   Article   21   of   the
Constitution.”
(vii)  In   Subramanian   Swamy   (supra),   the   right   to   freedom   of
speech   of   an   individual   guaranteed  under   Article  19(1)(a)   qua
the   right   to   dignity   and   reputation   of   another   individual
guaranteed under Article 21 were the competing rights. In this
case, the Court held as follows: 
65

“98.   Freedom   of   speech   and   expression   in   a   spirited
democracy   is   a   highly   treasured   value.   Authors,
philosophers   and   thinkers   have   considered   it   as   a
prized   asset   to   the   individuality   and   overall
progression   of   a   thinking   society,   as   it   permits
argument,   allows   dissent   to   have   a   respectable   place,
and   honours   contrary   stances.   There   are   proponents
who have set  it on a higher pedestal than life and not
hesitated to barter death for it. Some have condemned
compelled   silence   to   ruthless   treatment.   William
Dougles   has   denounced   regulation   of   free   speech   like
regulating   diseased   cattle   and   impure   butter.   The
Court   has   in   many   an   authority   having   realised   its
precious   nature   and   seemly   glorified   sanctity   has   put
it   in   a   meticulously   structured   pyramid.   Freedom   of
speech is treated as the thought of the freest who has
not mortgaged his ideas, may be wild, to the artificially
cultivated   social   norms;   and   transgression   thereof   is
not   perceived   as   a   folly.   Needless   to   emphasise,
freedom   of   speech   has   to   be   allowed   specious   castle,
but   the   question   is:   should   it   be   so   specious   or
regarded   as   so   righteous   that   it   would   make
reputation   of   another   individual   or   a   group   or   a
collection   of   persons   absolutely   ephemeral,   so   as   to
hold   that   criminal   prosecution   on   account   of
defamation   negates   and   violates   right   to   free   speech
and expression of opinion…”
(viii)  In   Asha  Ranjan   (supra), the right to free trial, of an accused
vis­à­vis   the   victim,   came   up   for   consideration.   The   Court
propounded in paragraph 61:
“ 61.   Be it stated, circumstances may emerge that may
necessitate   for   balancing   between   intra­fundamental
rights.   It   has   been   distinctly   understood   that   the   test
that   has   to   be   applied   while   balancing   the   two
fundamental   rights   or   inter   fundamental   rights,   the
principles   applied   may   be   different   than   the   principle
to   be   applied   in   intra­conflict   between   the   same
fundamental   right.   To   elaborate,   as   in   this   case,   the
accused   has   a   fundamental   right   to   have   a   fair   trial
under   Article   21   of   the   Constitution.   Similarly,   the
66

victims   who   are   directly   affected   and   also   form   a   part
of the constituent of the collective, have a fundamental
right for a fair trial. Thus, there can be two individuals
both having legitimacy to claim or assert the right. The
factum of legitimacy is a primary consideration. It has
to   be   remembered   that   no   fundamental   right   is
absolute   and   it   can   have   limitations   in   certain
circumstances.   Thus,   permissible   limitations   are
imposed   by   the   State.   The   said   limitations   are   to   be
within   the   bounds   of   law.   However,   when   there   is
intra­conflict   of   the   right   conferred   under   the   same
article,   like   fair   trial   in   this   case,   the   test   that   is
required   to   be   applied,   we   are   disposed   to   think,   it
would   be   “paramount   collective   interest”   or
“sustenance   of   public   confidence   in   the   justice
dispensation   system”.   An   example   can   be   cited.   A
group of persons in the name of “class honour”, as has
been   stated   in   Vikas   Yadav   v.   State   of   U.P.,   (2016)   9
SCC   541:   (2016)   3   SCC   (Cri)   621],   cannot   curtail   or
throttle the choice of a woman. It is because choice of
woman   in   choosing   her   partner   in   life   is   a   legitimate
constitutional right. It  is founded on individual choice
that is recognised in the Constitution under Article 19,
and   such   a   right   is   not   expected   to   succumb   to   the
concept   of   “class   honour”   or   “group   thinking”.   It   is
because   the   sense   of   class   honour   has   no   legitimacy
even if it is practised by the collective under some kind
of   a   notion.   Therefore,   if   the   collective   interest   or   the
public   interest   that   serves   the   public   cause   and
further   has   the   legitimacy   to   claim   or   assert   a
fundamental right, then only it can put forth that their
right   should   be   protected.   There   can   be   no   denial   of
the fact  that the rights of the victims for  a  fair  trial is
an inseparable aspect of Article 21 of the Constitution
and when they assert that right by themselves as well
as   the   part   of   the   collective,   the   conception   of   public
interest   gets   galvanised.   The   accentuated   public
interest   in   such   circumstances   has   to   be   given
primacy,   for   it   furthers   and   promotes   “Rule   of   Law”.
…”
67

(ix)  In   Railway   Board   representing   the   Union   of   India   vs .
Niranjan   Singh 53
,   a   trade   union   worker   was   charged   of   the
misconduct   of   addressing   meetings   within   the   railway
premises,   in   contravention   of   the   directions   issued   by   the
employer.   When   he   sought   protection   under   clauses   (a),   (b)
and (c) of Article 19(1), this Court rejected the same by holding
“ that   the  exercise   of  those  freedoms   will  come  to  an  end
as soon as the right of someone else to hold his property
intervenes . ” This Court went on to state that “ the validity of
that  limitation  is  not   to be  judged by the  test  prescribed
in sub­Articles (2) and (3) of Article 19 ”.
(x) In   Life Insurance Corporation of India   vs.   Prof. Manubhai
D.   Shah 54
,   two   fundamental   rights   were   not   competing   or   in
conflict   with   each   other.   But   the   right   to   free   speech   and   the
right   to   propagate   one’s   ideas,   in   the   context   of   censorship
under   the   Cinematograph   Act,   1952   and   in   the   context   of   a
State institution refusing  to publish an Article in an in­house
magazine were in question. In Paragraph 23 of the Report, this
Court said: “ every right has a corresponding duty or obligation
and so is the fundamental right of speech and expression.  The
freedom conferred by Article 19(1((a) is therefore not absolute as
perhaps in the case of the US First Amendment: it carries with it
certain   responsibilities   towards   fellow   citizens   and   society   at
53 (1969) 1 SCC 502
54  (1992) 3 SCC 637
68

large.   A   citizen   who   exercises   this   right   must   remain
conscious  that  his  fellow  citizen too  has  a  similar  right.
Therefore,   the   right   must   be   so  exercised   as   not   to  come
in direct conflict with the right of another citizen .”
44. The   series   of   decisions   discussed   above   shows   that   whenever
two or more fundamental rights appeared either to be on a collision
course or to be seeking preference over one another, this Court has
dealt   with   the   same   by   applying   well­established   legal   tools.
Therefore, we are of the view that under the guise of invoking other
fundamental   rights,   additional   restrictions,   over   and   above   those
prescribed in Article 19(2), cannot be imposed upon the exercise of
one’s fundamental rights.
45. In fine, we answer Question No.1 in the following manner: 
“The   grounds   lined   up   in   Article   19(2)   for   restricting   the
right   to   free   speech   are   exhaustive.   Under   the   guise   of
invoking   other   fundamental   rights   or   under   the   guise   of
two fundamental rights staking a competing claim against
each   other,   additional   restrictions   not   found   in   Article
19(2),   cannot   be   imposed   on   the   exercise   of   the   right
conferred by Article 19(1)(a) upon any individual.”
69

Question No.2
46. The   second   question   referred   to   us   is   as   to   whether   a
fundamental   right   under   Article   19   or   21   can   be   claimed   against
anyone   other   than   the   State   or   its   instrumentalities.   Actually,   the
question is not about “ claim ” but about “ enforceability ”.
47. To   use   the   phraseology   adopted   by   the   philosophers   of   Law,
the   question   on   hand   is   as   to   whether   Part   III   of   the
Constitution   has   a   “vertical”   or   “horizontal”   effect.   Wherever
Constitutional   rights   regulate   and   impact   only   the   conduct   of   the
Government and Governmental actors, in their dealings with private
individuals,   they   are   said   to   have   “ a   vertical   effect ”.   But   wherever
Constitutional   rights   impact   even   the   relations   between   private
individuals, they are said to have “ a horizontal effect ”.
48. In   his   scholarly   article,   “The   ‘ Horizontal   Effect ’   of
Constitutional   Rights”,  published  in  Michigan  Law  Review  (Volume
2.   Issue   3,   2003)   Stephen   Gardbaum,   states   that   the   horizontal
position   has   been   adopted   to   varying   degrees   in   Ireland,   Canada,
Germany,   South   Africa   and   European   Union.   According   to   the
70

learned   author,   this   issue   has   also   been   the   topic   of   sustained
debate   in   the   United   Kingdom   following   the   enactment   of   the
Human Rights Act of 1998 55
.
49. No jurisdiction in the world appears to be adopting, at least as
on date, a purely vertical approach or a wholly horizontal approach.
A   vertical   approach   provides   weightage   to   individual   autonomy,
choice   and   privacy,   while   the   horizontal   approach   seeks   to   imbibe
Constitutional   values   in   all   individuals.   These   approaches   which
appear   to   be   bipolar   opposites,   raise   the   age­old   question   of
‘ individual vs. society ’.
50. Even   in   countries   where   the   individual   reigns   supreme,   as   in
the   United   States,   the   Thirteenth   Amendment   making   slavery   and
involuntary   servitude   a   punishable   offence,   has   actually   made
inroads   into   individual   autonomy.   Therefore,   some   scholars   think
that   the   Thirteenth   Amendment   provided   a   shift   from   the   ‘purely
vertical’   approach   in   a   direct   way.   Subsequently,   an   indirect   effect
of   the   horizontality   was   found   in   certain   decisions   of   the   U.S.
Supreme Court, two of which are of interest.
55 Interestingly The Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993 was enacted in India five years 
before a similar Act came in United Kingdom.
71

51. After  the American Civil War  (1861­1865), the Reconstruction
Era began in the United States. During this period, the Fourteenth
Amendment   came   (1866­1868)   followed   by   the   Civil   Rights   Act,
1875   (also   called   Enforcement   Act   or   Force   Act).   This   Civil   Rights
Act,   1875   entitled   everyone,   to   access   accommodation,   public
transport   and   theaters   regardless   of   race   or   color.   Finding   that
despite   the   Act,   they   were   excluded   from   “ whites   only ”   facilities   in
hotels,   theaters   etc.,   the   victims   of   discrimination   (African­
Americans) filed cases. All those five cases were tagged together and
the U.S. Supreme Court held in (year 1883) what came to be known
as   “Civil   Rights   Cases ” 56
  that   the   Thirteenth   and   Fourteenth
Amendments   did   not   empower   Congress   to   outlaw   racial
discrimination by private individuals. But after nearly 85 years, this
decision   was   overturned   in   Jones   vs.   Alfred   H.   Mayer   Co 57
wherein   it   was   held   that   Congress   could   regulate   sale   of   private
property to prevent racial discrimination. This was done in terms of
42 U.S. Code  § 1 982  which entitled a ll citizens of the United States
to have the same right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by
56 109 US 3 (1883)
57 392  US  409 (1968)
72

white   citizens   thereof   to   inherit,   purchase,   lease,   sell,   hold,   and
convey real and personal property.
52. But a good 20 years before the decision in   Jones   (supra) was
delivered,   the   U.S.   Supreme   Court   had   an   occasion   to   consider   a
clash   between   contractual   rights   and   Constitutional   rights.   It   was
in   Shelly   (supra)   where   an   African­American   family   ( Shellys )   who
purchased a property in a neighbourhood in St. Louis, Missouri was
sought   to   be   restrained   from   taking   possession,   because   of   a
racially   restrictive  covenant  contained   in   an   Agreement   of   the   year
1911 to which a majority of property owners in the neighbourhood
were   parties.   The   covenant   restricted   the   sale   of   any   property   or
part thereof for a term of 50 years to African­Americans and Asian­
Americans.   The   Missouri   Supreme   Court   upheld   the   racially
restricted covenant. But the U.S. Supreme Court reversed it holding
that   the   enforcement   of   such   covenants   violated   the   Equal
Protection   Clause   of   the   Fourteenth   Amendment.     In   other   words
the   contractual   rights   were   trumped   by   the   Constitutional
obligations.
73

53. Then came the decision in   New York Times   vs.   Sullivan 58
.   It
was a case where the City  Commissioner  in Montgomery, Alabama
filed   an   action   for   libel   against   the   New   York   Times   for   publishing
an allegedly defamatory statement in a paid advertisement. The jury
awarded   damages   and   the   judgment   was   affirmed  by   the   Supreme
Court   of   Alabama.   However,   the   U.S.   Supreme   Court   reversed   the
decision   and   held   that   the   First   Amendment   which   prohibited   a
public   official   from   recovering   damages   for   a   defamatory   falsehood
relating to the public official’s official conduct except in the case of
actual malice, bound the plaintiff from exercising his private right.
54. The   above   decisions   of   the   U.S.   Supreme   Court   were   seen   by
scholars as indicating a shift from  a ‘purely vertical approach’ to a
‘horizontal approach’.
55. While   t he   U.S.   Constitution   represented   (to   begin   with)   a
purely vertical approach, the Irish Constitution was found to be on
the  opposite side of  the spectrum, with the rights  provided  therein
having   horizontal   effect.   Article   40   of   the   Irish   Constitution   deals
with Personal Rights under the Chapter “ Fundamental Rights ”. Sub­
58 376 U.S. 254 (1964)
74

Article (3) of Article 40 states that “ The State guarantees in its laws
to   respect,   and,   as   far   as   practicable,   by   its   laws   to   defend   and
vindicate the personal rights of the citizen ”.  In other words, two
rights   are   guaranteed   namely   (i)   respect   for   the   personal   rights   of
the citizen; and  (ii)  to defend and vindicate the personal rights of its
citizen.
56. The   second   clause   of   sub­Article   (3)   of   Article   40   of   the   Irish
Constitution   states   that   “ The   State   shall,   in   particular,   by   its   laws
protect as best it may from unjust attack and, in the case of injustice
done,   vindicate   the   life,   person,   good   name,   and   property   rights   of
every citizen ”.
57. The   above   provisions   have   been   interpreted   by   the   Irish
Supreme Court as imposing a positive obligation on all State actors,
including the Courts to protect and enforce the rights of individuals.
It appears that full horizontal effect was given by the Irish Supreme
Court   to   Constitutional   rights   such   as   freedom   of   association,
freedom from sex discrimination and the right to earn a livelihood.
For instance, the Irish Supreme Court had an occasion to consider
75

in   John   Meskell ,   the   Constitutional   rights   of   citizens   to   form
associations   and   unions   guaranteed   by   Article   40.6.1.   This   case
arose   out   of   an   agreement   reached   between   certain   trade   unions
and   the   employer   to   terminate   the   services   of   all   workers   and   to
reemploy   them   on   condition   that   they   agree   to   be   members   of   the
specified   trade   unions   at   all   times.   One   employee   whose   services
were   terminated   was   not   reemployed,   as   he   refused   to   accept   the
special condition.  Therefore, he sued the company for damages and
claimed   a   declaration   that   his   dismissal   was   a   violation   of   the
Constitutional   rights.   Holding   that   the   Constitutional   right   of
citizens   to   form   associations   and   unions   necessarily
recognized   a   correlative   right   to   abstain   from   joining
associations   and   unions ,   the   Irish   Supreme   Court   awarded
damages on  the  ground that  the non­State  actors actually  violated
the   Constitutional   right   of   the   plaintiff.   In   other   words,   the
Constitutional rights were considered to have horizontal effect.
58. The   Constitution   of   the   Republic   of   South   Africa,   1996   also
provides  horizontal  effect  to  certain   rights.    Section   8.2  of  the  said
Constitution   states:   “ A   provision   of   the   Bill   of   Rights   binds   a
76

natural   or   a   juristic   person   if,   and   to   the   extent   that,   it   is
applicable, taking into account the nature of the right and the nature
of any duty imposed by the right.”
59. The manner in which Section 8.2 has to be applied is spelt out
in Section 8.3.  The same reads thus:
“8.  Application
…..
3. When applying  a provision of the Bill of Rights to a
natural or juristic person in terms of subsection (2), a
court 
a.   in   order   to   give   effect   to   a   right   in   the   Bill,
must apply, or if necessary develop, the common
law   to   the   extent   that   legislation   does   not   give
effect to that right; and
b. may develop rules of the common law to limit
the   right,   provided   that   the   limitation   is   in
accordance with section 36(1).”
60. Section   9   of   the   Constitution   of   the   Republic   of   South   Africa
guarantees equality before law and equal protection and the benefit
of   the   law   to   everyone.   Section   9.3   mandates   the   State   not   to
unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone, on
one   or   more   grounds   including   race,   gender,   sex,   pregnancy,
77

marital   status,   ethnic   or   social   origin,   colour,   sexual
orientation,   age,   disability,   religion,   conscience,   belief,
culture, language, and birth.   If Section 9.3 is a mandate against
the   State,   what   follows   in   Section   9.4   is   a   mandate   against   every
person.  Section 9.4 reads as follows:
“9. Equality
…..
4.  No person may unfairly discriminate directly or
indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds
in   terms   of   sub­section   (3).   National   legislation
must   be   enacted   to   prevent   or   prohibit   unfair
discrimination.”
61. Again,   Section   10   recognises   the   right   to   human   dignity.
While   doing   so,   it   employs   a  language,   which   applies   to  non­
State   actors   also .    Section   10   states  that   “ Everyone   has   inherent
dignity and the right to have their dignity respected and protected ”.
62. During the period from April 1994 to February 1997, when the
Republic   of   South   Africa   had   an   Interim   Constitution,   the
Constitutional Court of South Africa had an occasion to deal with a
defamation   action   in   Du   Plessis   and   Others   vs .   De   Klerk   and
78

Another 59
.   The   defamation   action   was   instituted   by   an   Airline
company, against a newspaper for publishing an article implicating
the Airline in the unlawful supply of arms to UNITA (National Union
for the Total Independence of Angola). After the Interim Constitution
came   into   force,   the   defendant­newspaper   raised   a   defence   that
they   were   insulated   against   the   defamation   action,   under   Section
15   of   the   Constitution   which   protected   the   freedom   of   the   press.
The Transvaal Provincial Division of the Supreme Court referred two
issues   to   the   Constitutional   Court.   One   of   the   issues   was
whether   Chapter   3   (fundamental   rights)   of   the   Constitution
was applicable to legal relationships  between private parties.
The   majority   (11:2)   of   the   Court   held   that   Chapter   3   could   not   be
applied   directly   to   the   common   law   in   actions   between   private
parties.   But   they   left   open   the   question   whether   there   were
particular   provisions   of   the   Chapter   that   could   be   so   applied.
However,   the   Court   held   that   in   terms   of   Section   35(3)   of   the
Interim   Constitution,   Courts   were   obliged   in   the   application   and
development   of   common   law,   to   have   due   regard   to   the   spirit,
purport and objects of Chapter 3. The majority held that it was the
59  1996 ZACC 10
79

task of the Supreme Court to apply and develop the common law as
required by Section 35(3).
63.     Interestingly,   the   dissenting   opinion   given   by   Kriegler,   J.
became the subject matter of lot of academic debate. To begin with,
Kriegler, J. rejected the idea that the debate was one of “ verticality
versus horizontality ”.   He said that Chapter 3 rights do not operate
only   as   against   the   State   but   also   horizontally   as   between
individuals   where   Statutes   are   involved.   Calling   “ direct
horizontality”  as a bogeyman, Kriegler, J. said as follows:
“The   Chapter   has   nothing   to   do   with   the   ordinary
relationships   between   private   persons   or   associations.  
What it does govern, however, is all law, including that
applicable   to   private   relationships.     Unless   and   until
there is a resort to law, private individuals are at liberty
to conduct their private affairs exactly as they please as
far   as   the   fundamental   rights   and   freedoms   are
concerned.   As   far   as   the   Chapter   is   concerned   a
landlord   is   free   to  refuse  to   let   a   flat   to   someone
because of race, gender or whatever; a white bigot
may  refuse   to   sell   property   to   a   person   of   colour;
a   social   club   may   black­ball   Jews,   Catholics   or
Afrikaners   if   it   so   wishes.   An   employer   is   at
liberty   to   discriminate   on   racial   grounds   in   the
engagement of staff; a hotelier may refuse to let a
room   to   a   homosexual;   a   church   may   close   its
doors to mourners of a particular colour or class.  
But none of them can invoke the law to enforce or
protect their bigotry.    One cannot claim rescission
of   a   contract   or   specific   performance   thereof   if
such   claim,   albeit   well­founded   at   common   law,
80

infringes   a   Chapter   3   right .     One   cannot   raise   a
defence   to   a   claim   in   law   if   such   defence   is   in   conflict
with a  protected  right  or freedom.     The  whole  gamut  of
private  relationships  is left undisturbed.     But  the  state,
as the maker of the laws, the administrator of laws and
the interpreter and  applier of the law, is bound  to  stay
within   the   four   corners   of   Chapter   3.   Thus,   if   a   man
claims   to  have  the   right   to   beat   his   wife,   sell   his
daughter   into   bondage   or   abuse   his   son,   he   will
not   be   allowed   to   raise   as   a   defence   to   a   civil
claim   or   a   criminal   charge   that   he   is   entitled   to
do  so  at   common   law,   under  customary  law  or  in
terms of any statute or contract.    That is a far cry
from   the   spectre   of   the   state   placing   its   hand   on
private relationships.   On the contrary, if it were to try
to do so by legislation or administrative action, sections
4,   7(1)   and   the   whole   of   Chapter   3   would   stand   as   a
bastion of personal rights.”
64. After the Final Constitution was adopted and it came into force
on   February   4,   1997,   the   first   case   to   come   up   on   this   issue   was
Khumalo  vs.  Holomisa 60
.   In this case, Bantu Holomisa, the leader
of the South African opposition political party sued a newspaper for
publishing   an   article   alleging   as   though   he   was   under   a   police
investigation   for   his   involvement   with   a   gang   of   bank   robbers.
Heavy   reliance   was   placed   in   this   case   on   the   majority   decision   of
the Constitutional Court of South Africa in   Du Plessis   (supra) .   But
as pointed out earlier,  Du Plessis   was a case which was decided at
a   time   when   South   Africa   had   only   an   Interim   Constitution.
60  (2002) ZACC 12
81

Therefore,   while   dealing   with   Khumalo   (supra),   the   Constitutional
Court of South Africa applied the Final Constitution, as it had come
into force by then. What is relevant for our purpose is the opinion of
the   Constitutional   Court   in   paragraph   33   which   dealt   with   the
enforcement   of   the   rights   against   non­State   actors.   Paragraph   33
reads thus:
“[33]   In   this   case,   the   applicants   are   members   of   the
media   who   are   expressly   identified   as   bearers   of
constitutional   rights   to   freedom   of   expression.     There
can be no doubt that the law of defamation does affect
the right to freedom of expression.   Given the intensity
of   the   constitutional   right   in   question,   coupled
with   the   potential   invasion   of   that   right   which
could   be   occasioned   by   persons   other   than   the
state  or  organs   of   state,   it   is   clear  that   the   right
to   freedom   of   expression   is   of   direct   horizontal
application   in   this   case   as   contemplated   by
section   8(2)   of   the   Constitution .     The   first   question
we need then to determine is whether the common law
of defamation unjustifiably limits that right.  If it does, it
will   be   necessary   to   develop   the   common   law   in   the
manner   contemplated   by   section   8(3)   of   the
Constitution.”
65.     The   horizontal   effect   was   taken   to   another   extreme   by   the
Constitutional   Court   of   South   Africa   in   Governing   Body   of   the
Juma   Musjid   Primary   School   &   Others   vs.   Essay   N.O.   and
Others 61
  wherein it was  held that an eviction order obtained by the
61 (CCT 29/10) [2011] ZACC 13; 2011 (8) BCLR 761 (CC)
82

owner of a private land on which a public school was located, could
not   be   enforced   as   it   would   impact   the   students’   right   to   basic
education   and   the   best   interests   of   the   child   under   the   South
African   Constitution   (Sections   28   and   29).   The   Court   held   that   a
private   landowner   and   non­State   actor   has   a   Constitutional
obligation  not  to impair  the right  to basic education under  Section
29 of the Constitution.  The relevant portion reads thus:
“[57] In order to determine whether the right to a basic
education in terms of section 29(1)(a) binds the Trust,
section 8(2) requires that the nature of the right of the
learners to a basic education and the duty imposed by
that right be taken into account.  From the discussion
in the previous paragraphs of the general nature of the
right   and   the   MEC’s   obligation   in   relation   to   it,   the
form   of   the   duty   that   the   right   to   a   basic   education
imposed   on   the   Trustees   emerges.     It   is   clear   that
there is no primary positive obligation on the Trust  to
provide basic education to the learners.   That primary
positive   obligation   rests   on   the   MEC.     There   was   also
no   obligation   on   the   Trust   to   make   its   property
available   to   the   MEC   for   use   as   a   public   school.     A
private   landowner   may   do   so,   however,   in   accordance
with   section   14(1)   of   the   Act   which   provides   that   a
public school may be provided on private property only
in   terms   of   an   agreement   between   the   MEC   and   the
owner of the property.
[ 58]   This   Court,   in   Ex   Parte   Chairperson   of   the
Constitutional   Assembly:   In   re   Certification   of   the
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, made
it clear that socio­economic rights (like the right to
a   basic   education)   may   be   negatively   protected
from   improper   invasion.   Breach   of   this   obligation
occurs   directly   when   there   is   a   failure   to   respect
the   right,   or   indirectly,   when   there   is   a   failure   to
83

prevent   the   direct   infringement   of   the   right   by
another   or   a   failure   to   respect   the   existing
protection   of   the   right   by   taking   measures   that
diminish   that   protection.   It   needs   to   be   stressed
however   that   the   purpose   of   section   8(2)   of   the
Constitution   is   not   to   obstruct   private   autonomy
or   to   impose   on   a   private   party   the   duties   of   the
state   in   protecting   the   Bill   of   Rights.     It   is   rather
to   require   private   parties   not   to   interfere   with   or
diminish the  enjoyment of  a right.    Its  application
also depends on the intensity of the constitutional
right   in   question,   coupled   with   the   potential
invasion of that right which could be occasioned by
persons other than the State or organs of State.    ”
66. Coming   to   the   United   Kingdom,   they   ratified   the   European
Convention on Human Rights in 1951.  But the rights conferred by
the   Convention   had   to   be   enforced   by   British   citizens   only   in   the
European   Court   of   Human   Rights,   for   a   long   time.   Finding   that   it
took an average of five years to get an action in the European Court
of Human Rights after all domestic remedies are exhausted and also
finding that on an average, the same costed £30,000, a white paper
was submitted in 1997 under the title “ Rights Brought Home” .  This
led   to   the   enactment   of   the   Human   Rights   Act,   1998   by   the
Parliament of the United Kingdom. It came into force on 2.10.2000
(coincidentally  Gandhi Jayanti  Day).  This Act sought to incorporate
into   the   domestic   law,   the   rights   conferred   by   the   European
84

Convention, so that the citizens need not go to the European Court
of Human Rights in Strasbourg.  After the enactment of the Human
Rights   Act,   the   horizontal   effect   of   Convention   Rights   became   the
subject matter of debate in several cases.
67. For instance,   Douglas   vs.   Hello! Ltd. 62
  was a case where the
right to privacy of an individual was pitted against the right of free
speech   and   expression.   In   that   case,   a   magazine   called   OK!   was
given the exclusive right to publish the photographs of the wedding
reception of a celebrity couple that took place at New York. On the
day of the wedding, certain paparazzo had infiltrated the venue and
took   few   unauthorized   photographs   which   were   shared   with
potential   competitor   viz.   Hello!   Ltd.   (another   magazine).   Hello!
published the photographs in the next issue of their magazine even
before Ok! could publish it. The question before the Court of Appeal
(Civil   Division)  was   whether   there   was  violation   of   right   to   privacy,
among   others   and   whether   it   could   be   enforced   against   a   private
person.  The Court said:
“ 49.   It   follows   that   the   ECtHR   has   recognised   an
obligation   on   member   states   to   protect   one
62 [2001] QB 967
85

individual   from   an   unjustified   invasion   of   private
life   by   another   individual   and   an   obligation   on   the
courts   of   a   member   state   to   interpret   legislation   in   a
way which will achieve that result.  
50. Some, such as the late Professor Sir William Wade,
in Wade & Forsyth   Administrative Law   (8 th
  Ed.) p 983,
and   Jonathan   Morgan,   in   Privacy,   Confidence   and
Horizontal   Effect:"   Hello"   Trouble   (2003)   CLJ   443,
contend  that the Human Rights Act should be given
'full, direct, horizontal effect'. The courts have not
been prepared to go this far. …
…
102.   To   summarise   our   conclusion   at   this   stage:
disregarding  the effect of the OK! contract,  we  are
satisfied   that   the   Douglases'   claim   for   invasion   of
their   privacy   falls   to   be   determined   according   to
the   English   law   of   confidence.   That   law,   as
extended   to   cover   private   and   personal
information,   protected   information   about   the
Douglases' wedding.”
68. In   X   vs.   Y 63
,   the   Court   of   Appeals   dealt   with   the   case   of   an
employee X, who was cautioned by the Police for committing a sex
offence   with   another   man   in   a   public   bathroom.   The   offence
occurred   when   X   was   off   duty.   On   finding   about   the   incident,   the
employer   Y   suspended   X   and   dismissed   him   after   a   disciplinary
hearing.   The   dismissal   was   challenged   as   violative   of   Convention
Rights.   An   argument   was   raised   that   these   rights   are   not
enforceable   against   private   parties.   Though   on   facts,   the   claim   of
63 [2004] EWCA Civ 662
86

the   dismissed   employee   was   dismissed,   the   legal   issue   was
articulated by the Court thus:
“55.   The   applicant   invoked   articles   8   and   14   of   the
Convention in relation to his cause of action in private
law.
(1)   As   appears   from   the   authorities   cited   in   section   C
above, article 8 is not confined in its effect to relations
between   individuals   and   the   state   and   public
authorities .   It   has   been   interpreted   by   the
Strasbourg   court   as   imposing   a   positive   obligation
on   the   state   to   secure   the   observance   and
enjoyment of the right between private individuals.
(2)   If   the   facts   of   the   case   fall   within   the   ambit   of
article   8,   the   state   is   also   under   a   positive   obligation
under   article   14   to   secure   to   private   individuals   the
enjoyment   of   the   right   without   discrimination,
including   discrimination   on   the   ground   of   sexual
orientation.
(3)   A   person's   sexual   orientation   and   private   sex   life
fall within the scope of the Convention right to respect
for   private   life   (see   ADT   v.   UK   [2000]   2   FLR   697)   and
the   right   to   non­discrimination   in   respect   that   right.
Interference with the right within article 8.1 has to be
justified under article 8.2.”
69. In  Plattform " Ä rzte Für Das Leben"  vs.   Austria 64
, a question
arose   as   to   the   enforceability   of   the   right   to   freedom   of   assembly
against   non­State   actors,   who   obstructed   the   assembly.   The   case
arose   out   of   these   facts.   On   28   December   1980,   the   anti­
abortion   NGO "	
Ärzte f	ür das Leben" ( Physicians for Life ) organised a
religious   service   and   a   march   to   the   clinic   of   a   doctor   who   carried
64 [1988] ECHR 15
87

out   abortions   in   Stadl­Paura.   A   number   of   counter­demonstrators
disrupted  the   march   to   the   hillside   by   mingling  with   the  marchers
and   shouting   down   their   recitation.   At   the   end   of   the   ceremony,
special riot­control units – which had until then been standing by –
formed   a   cordon   between   the   opposing  groups.   One   person   caught
in   the   act   of   throwing   eggs   was   fined.   The   association   lodged   a
disciplinary   complaint   against   police   for   failing   to   protect   the
demonstration,   which   was   refused.   When   the   matter   was   taken   to
the Constitutional Court, it held that it had no jurisdiction over the
case.   Therefore,   the   association   applied   to   the   European
Commission   on   13   September   1982,   alleging   violation   of
Articles   9   (conscience and religion),   10   (expression),   11   ( association )
and   13   (effective   remedy)   of   the   European   Convention   on   Human
Rights . The European Court on Human Rights held:
“32.     A   demonstration   may   annoy   or   give   offence   to
persons   opposed   to   the   ideas   or   claims   that   it   is
seeking   to   promote.   The   participants   must,   however,
be   able   to   hold   the   demonstration   without   having   to
fear   that   they   will   be   subjected   to   physical   violence
by   their   opponents;   such   a   fear   would   be   liable   to
deter associations or   other groups supporting common
ideas   or   interests   from   openly   expressing   their
opinions   on   highly   controversial   issues   affecting
the   community.   In   a   democracy   the   right   to   counter­
demonstrate cannot   extend to inhibiting the exercise of
the right to demonstrate.
88

Genuine,   effective   freedom   of   peaceful   assembly
cannot,   therefore,   be   reduced   to   a   mere   duty   on
the   part   of   the   State   not   to   interfere:   a   purely
negative   conception   would   not   be   compatible   with
the   object   and   purpose   of   Article   11   (art.   11).   Like
Article   8   (art.   8),   Article   11   (art.   11)   sometimes
requires positive measures to be taken, even in   the
sphere   of   relations   between   individuals,   if   need   be
(see, mutatis   mutandis, the X and Y v. the Netherlands
judgment  of  26  March  1985,   Series  A  no.  91,  p.  11,  §
23)”
70 . In   X   and   Y   vs.   The   Netherlands 65
,   a   privately­run   home   for
children with mental disabilities was sued on the ground that a 16­
year­old   inmate   was   subjected   to   sexual   assault.   When   the   case
was dismissed by the domestic court on a technical plea, the father
of   the   victim   approached   the   European   Court   of   Human   Rights.
ECHR   outlined   the   extent   of   State   obligation   on   the   protection   of
the right to life even against private persons as follows:
“23.   The   Court   recalls   that   although   the   object   of
Article   8   (art.   8)   is   essentially   that   of   protecting   the
individual   against   arbitrary   interference   by   the   public
authorities,   it   does   not   merely   compel   the   State   to
abstain   from   such   interference:   in   addition   to   this
primarily   negative   undertaking,   there   may   be   positive
obligations   inherent   in   an   effective   respect   for   private
or   family   life   (see   the   Airey   judgment   of   9   October
1979,   Series   A   no.   32,   p.   17,   para.   32).   These
obligations   may   involve   the   adoption   of   measures
designed   to   secure   respect   for   private   life   even   in
the   sphere   of   the   relations   of   individuals   between
themselves. ”
65 [1985] ECHR 4
89

71. Having   taken   an   overview   of   the   theoretical   aspect   of
“ verticality   vs   horizontality ”   and   the   approach   of   Constitutional
Courts   in   other   jurisdictions,   let   us   now   come   back   to   the   Indian
context. 
72. Part­III of the Indian Constitution begins with Article 12 which
defines   the   expression   “ the   State ”   to   include   the   Government   and
the Parliament of India and the Government and the Legislature of
each   of   the   States   and   all   local   or   other   authorities   within   the
territory of India or under the control of the Government of India.
73 . After defining the expression “ the State ” in Article 12 and after
declaring   all   laws   inconsistent   with   or   in   derogation   of   the
fundamental   rights   to   be   void   under   Article   13,   Part­III   of   the
Constitution proceeds to deal with rights.  There are some Articles
in   Part­III   where   the   mandate   is   directly   to   the   State   and
there   are   other   Articles   where   without   injuncting   the   State,
certain   rights   are   recognized   to   be   inherent,   either   in   the
citizens  of  the  country or in  persons . In fact, there are two sets
of   dichotomies   that   are   apparent   in   the   Articles   contained   in   Part
90

III. One set of dichotomy is between   (i)   what is directed against the
State;   and   (ii)   what   is   spelt   out   as   inhering   in   every   individual
without   reference   to   the   State.   The   other   dichotomy   is   between
(i)   citizens;   and   (ii)   persons.   This   can   be   illustrated   easily   in   the
form of a table as follows:
Sl.
Nos. Provisions   containing   a
mandate to the State Provisions   declaring
the   rights   of   the
individuals   without
reference   to   “the
State” on whom the
right is
conferred
1. Article  14 mandates the State
not   to   deny   to   any   person
equality   before   law   or   the
equal   protection   of   the   laws
within the territory of India. ­ Any person
2. Article   15(1)   mandates   the
State   not   to   discriminate
against   any   citizen   on
grounds only of religion, race,
caste,   sex,   place   of   birth   or
any of them. ­ Any citizen
3. ­ Article 15(2) mandates
that   no   citizen   shall
be   subject   to   any
disability,   liability,
restriction   or
condition,   with   regard
to—   (i)   access   to
shops,   public
restaurants,   hotels
and   places   of   public
entertainment;   or   (ii)
the   use   of   wells,
tanks,   bathing   ghats,
roads   and   places   of Citizen
91

public   resort
maintained   wholly   or
partly   out   of   State
funds   or   dedicated   to
the   use   of   general
public,
only   on   grounds   of
religion,   race,   caste,
sex,   place   of   birth   or
any of them.
4. Article   16(1)   declares   that
there   shall   be   equality   of
opportunity   for   all   citizens   in
matters   relating   to
employment   or   appointment
to any office under the State. ­ Only citizens
5. Article   16(2)   states   that   no
citizen   shall   on   grounds   of
only   religion,   race,   caste,   sex,
descent,   place   of   birth,
resident   or   any   of   them   be
ineligible   for   or   discriminated
against   in   respect   of   any
employment   or   office   under
the State. ­ Citizen
6. ­ Article   17   abolishes
untouchability   and
forbids   the   practice   of
the   same   in   any   form
and declares it to be a
punishable offence. Neither   the
word   “ citizen ”
nor   the   word
“ person ”   is
mentioned   in
Article   17.   It
means   that
what   is
abolished   is
the   practice
and   any
violation   of
this
injunction   is
punishable.
7. ­ Six   types   of   rights   are
listed   in   Article   19(1),
as   available   to   all Citizens
92

citizens.
8. Article   20   confers   three
different   rights   namely   (i)   not
to   be   convicted   except   by   the
application of a law in force at
the  time  of the commission  of
offence;   (ii)   not   to   be
prosecuted   and   punished   for
the   same   offence   more   than
once;   and   (iii)   right   against
self­incrimination. ­ Persons
9. ­ Article   21   protects   life
and   liberty   of   all
persons. Persons
10. Article   21A   mandates   the
State   to   provide   free   and
compulsory   education   to   all
children   of   the   age   of   six   to
fourteen years. ­ Children
11. Article   22   provides   protection
against   arrest   and   detention
generally and saves preventive
detention   with   certain
limitations. ­ All   persons
except   an
enemy   alien
(Article   22(3)
(a)   makes   the
provision
inapplicable
to   an   enemy
alien).
12. ­ Article   23(1)   prohibits
traffic   in   human
beings   and   begar   and
other   similar   forms   of
forced   labour.     Any
contravention   is   made
a punishable offence. Any person
13. ­ Article   24   prohibits
the   employment   of
children below the age
of   fourteen   years   in
any factory or mine. Children
14. ­ Article   25(1)   declares
the right of all persons
to   freedom   of Persons
93

conscience   and   the
right   freely   to   profess,
practice   and
propagate religion.
15. ­ Article 26 confers four
different   types   of
rights   upon   every
religious
denomination   or   any
section thereof. Religious 
denomination
16. Article   27   confers   right   not   to
be   compelled   to   pay   any
taxes,   for   the   promotion   of
any particular religion. ­ Person
17. ­ Article   28(1)   forbids
religious   instructions
being   provided   in   any
educational
institution   wholly
maintained   out   of
State   funds,   with   the
exception   of   those
established   under   any
endowment or trust. Person
18. ­ A   right   not   to   take
part   in   any   religious
instruction   imparted
in   an   educational
institution   recognised
by   the   State   or
receiving   aid   out   of
State   funds,   is
conferred   by   Article
28(3). Person
19. ­ A right to conserve the
language,   script   or
culture distinct to any
part   of   the   territory   of
India   is   conferred   by
Article 29(1). Citizens
20. A   right   not   to   be   denied
admission   into   any This   applies   to
institutions Citizen
94

educational   institution
maintained   by   the   State   or
receiving   aid   out   of   State
funds,   on   grounds   only   of
religion,   race,   caste,   language
or any of them is conferred by
Article 29(2). maintained   by   the
State   or   even   to
institutions   receiving
aid out of State funds.
21. (i)   A   right   to   establish   and
administer   educational
institutions   of   their   choice   is
conferred   by   Article   30(1)
upon   the   religious   as   well   as
linguistic minorities.
(ii)     The   State   is   mandated
under   Article   30(2)   not   to
discriminate   against   any
educational   institution   while
granting aid. ­ Religious and 
linguistic 
minorities
22. ­ The   right   to   move   the
Supreme Court for the
enforcement   of   the
rights   conferred   by
Part   III   is   guaranteed
under Article 32. The   words
“ State ”,
“ citizen ”   or
“ person ”   are
not mentioned
in   Article   32,
indicating
thereby   that
the   right   is
available   to
one   and   all,
depending
upon   which
right is sought
to   be
enforced.
74 . The above table would show that some of the Articles of Part­
III   are   in   the  form   of   a  directive  to   the   State,   while   others  are  not.
This   is   an   indication   that   some   of   the   rights   conferred   by   Part­III
are to be honored by and also enforceable against, non­State actors.
95

75 . For   instance,   the  rights  conferred   by  Articles  15(2)(a)  and   (b),
17,   20(2),   21,   23,   24,   29(2)   etc.,   are   obviously   enforceable   against
non­State actors also. The owner of a shop, public restaurant, hotel
or   place   of   entertainment,   though   a   non­State   actor   cannot   deny
access to a citizen of India on grounds only of religion, race etc., in
view   of   Article   15(2)(a).   So   is   the   case   with   wells,   tanks,   bathing
ghats, roads and places of public resort maintained wholly or partly
out of State funds or dedicated to the use of general public, in view
of   Article   15(2)(b).   The   right   not   to   be   enforced   with   any   disability
arising   out   of   untouchability   is   available   against   non­State   actors
under   Article   17.   The   right   against   double   jeopardy,   and   the   right
against self­incrimination available under sub­Articles (2) and (3) of
Article   20   may   also   be   available   even   against   non­State   actors   in
the   case   of   prosecution   on   private   complaints.   We   need   not
elaborate   more,   as   the   table   given   above   places   all   rights   in
perspective.
76 . That   takes   us   to   the   question   as   to   how   the   Courts   in   India
have dealt with cases where there were complaints of infringement
by   non­State   actors,   of   fundamental   rights,   other   than   those
96

covered  in   column   2  of   the  Table  in   para  73  above.  To   begin   with,
this Court was weary of extending  the enforcement of fundamental
rights against private individuals. But this reluctance changed over
a period of time. Let us now see how the law evolved:
(i) In   P.D.   Shamdasani   (supra),   a   Five   Member   Bench   of   this
Court   was   dealing   with   a   writ   petition   under   Article   32,   filed
by   a   person   who   lost   a   series   of   proceedings   both   civil   and
otherwise,   against   the   Central   Bank   of   India   Limited,   which
was   at   that   time   a   company   incorporated   under   Companies
Act.   The   grievance   of   the   petitioner   in   that   case   was   that   the
shares  held by  him  in  the  company  were  sold by  the  bank in
exercise of its right of lien for recovery of a debt. Therefore, the
petitioner   pitched   his   claim   under   Article   19(1)(f)   and   Article
31(1)( which   was   available   at   that   time ).   But   while   making   a
comparison between Article 31(1) ( as it stood at that time ) and
Article 21, both of which contained a declaration in  the  same
negative   form,   this   Court   observed   in   P.D.   Shamdasani   as
follows:   “ T here   is   no   express   reference   to   the   State   in
Article 21 .  But could it be suggested on that account that
that Article was intended to afford protection to life and
personal liberty against violation by private individuals?
The   words   “except   by   procedure   established   by   law”
plainly exclude such a suggestion ” .
97

(ii) The aforesaid principle in  P.D. Shamdasani  was reiterated by
another   Five   Member   Bench   of   this   Court   in   Smt.   Vidya
Varma   vs.   Dr.   Shiv   Narain   Varma 66
holding   that   the
language   of   Article   31(1)   and   Article   21   are   similar   and   that
they do not apply to invasions of a right by a private individual
and that consequently no writ will lie in such cases.
(iii) In   Sukhdev   Singh   vs.   Bhagatram   Sardar   Singh
Raghuvanshi 67
  two   questions   arose   before   a   Constitution
Bench   of   this   Court.   One   of   the   questions   was   whether   an
employee of a statutory corporation is entitled to protection of
Articles 14 and 16 against the corporation on the premise that
these   statutory   corporations   are   authorities   within   the
meaning of Article 12. In his separate but concurring opinion,
Mathew,   J.   pointed   out   that   the   concept   of   State   has
undergone   drastic   changes   in   recent   years   and   that   today
State   cannot   be   conceived   of   simply   as   a   coercive   machinery
wielding   the   thunderbolt   of   authority.   The   learned   Judge
quoted   the   decision   of   the   US   Supreme   Court   in   Marsh   vs.
Alabama 68
,  where a person who was a Jehovah’s witness was
arrested   for   trespassing   and   distributing   pamphlets,   in   a
company   town   owned   by   a   corporation.   Though   the   property
in question was private, the Court said that the operation of a
town   was   a   public   function   and   that   therefore,   the   private
66 AIR 1956 SC 108
67 (1975) 1 SCC 421
68 326 US 501 (1946)
98

rights   of   the   corporation   must   be   exercised   within
constitutional limitations. After quoting the decision in  Marsh,
K.K. Mathew, J. went on to hold as follows:
“95.   But   how   far   can   this   expansion   go?   Except   in
very   few   cases,  our   Constitution  does  not,  through  its
own   force,   set   any   limitation   upon   private   action.
Article 13(2) provides that no State shall make any law
which takes away or abridges the rights guaranteed by
Part  III. It  is  the  State action  of a  particular  character
that   is   prohibited.   Individual   invasion   of   individual
right   is   not,   generally   speaking,   covered   by   Article
13(2).   In   other   words,   it   is   against   State   action   that
fundamental   rights   are   guaranteed.   Wrongful
individual   acts   unsupported   by   State   authority   in   the
shape   of   laws,   customs,   or   judicial   or   executive
proceeding   are   not   prohibited.   Articles   17,   23   and   24
postulate   that   fundamental   rights   can   be   violated   by
private   individuals   and   that   the   remedy   under   Article
32   may   be   available   against   them.   But,   by   and   large,
unless an act is sanctioned in some way by the State,
the   action   would   not   be   State   action.   In   other   words,
until   some   law   is   passed   or   some   action   is   taken
through   officers   or   agents   of   the   State,   there   is   no
action by the State…”
(iv) In   People’s   Union for  Democratic  Rights   (supra) this Court
pointed   out   that   the   fundamental   right   guaranteed   under
Article   24   is   enforceable   against   everyone,   including   the
contractors.  The Court went a step further by holding that the
Union   of   India,   the   Delhi   Administration   and   the   Delhi
Development   Authority   have   a   duty   to   ensure   that   this
Constitutional   obligation   is   obeyed   by   the   contractors.   Going
further,   this   Court   held   that   certain   fundamental   rights  such
as   those   found   in   Articles   17,   23   and   24   are   enforceable
against the whole world.
99

(v) S.   Rangarajan   (supra) was a case where a division Bench of
the   Madras   High   Court   revoked   the   ‘U’   certificate   issued   to   a
Tamil   feature   film,   on   the   ground   that   it   offended   the
reservation   policy.   The   Government   of   Tamil   Nadu   supported
the   decision   of   the   High   Court   on   the   ground   that   several
organizations   in   Tamil   Nadu   were   agitating   that   the   film
should   be   banned   as   it   hurt   the   sentiments   of   people
belonging to the reserved categories.   After pointing out that
this   Court   was   amused   and   troubled   by   the   stand   taken
by   the   State   Government,   this   Court   indicated   that   it   is
the duty of the State to protect the freedom of expression
since   it   is   a   liberty   granted   against   the   State   and   that
the State cannot plead its inability to handle the hostile
audience problem.    Holding that the State cannot negate the
rule   of   law   and   surrender   to   blackmail   and   intimidation,   this
Court said that it the obligatory duty of the Court to prevent it
and protect the freedom.
(vi) In   Smt.   Nilabati ,   this   Court   made   a   distinction   between,
(i)  the  decision  in  Kasturi  Lal upholding  the  State’s  plea
of   sovereign   immunity   for   tortious   acts   of   its   servants,
which was confined to the sphere of liability in tort; and
(ii)   the   State’s   liability  for  contravention   of   fundamental
rights   to   which   the   doctrine   of   sovereign   immunity   has
no application in the constitutional scheme . In paragraph
100

34,   which   contains   the   separate   but   concurring   opinion   of
Dr. A.S. Anand, J., the law was summarised as follows:­
“34.   The   public   law   proceedings   serve   a   different
purpose than the private law proceedings. The relief of
monetary   compensation,   as   exemplary   damages,   in
proceedings   under   Article   32   by   this   Court   or   under
Article   226   by   the   High   Courts,   for   established
infringement   of   the   indefeasible   right   guaranteed
under   Article   21   of   the   Constitution   is   a   remedy
available   in   public   law   and   is   based   on   the   strict
liability   for  contravention  of  the  guaranteed  basic  and
indefeasible rights of the citizen. The purpose of public
law   is   not   only   to   civilize   public   power   but   also   to
assure   the   citizen   that   they   live   under   a   legal   system
which aims to protect their interests and preserve their
rights.  Therefore,  when   the   court   moulds   the   relief   by
granting   “compensation”   in   proceedings   under   Article
32   or   226   of   the   Constitution   seeking   enforcement   or
protection of fundamental rights, it  does so under  the
public   law   by   way   of   penalising   the   wrongdoer   and
fixing   the   liability   for   the   public   wrong   on   the   State
which   has   failed   in   its   public   duty   to   protect   the
fundamental   rights   of   the   citizen.   The   payment   of
compensation   in   such   cases   is   not   to   be   understood,
as   it   is   generally   understood   in   a   civil   action   for
damages   under   the   private   law   but   in   the   broader
sense   of   providing   relief   by   an   order   of   making
‘monetary amends’ under the public law for the wrong
done   due   to   breach   of   public   duty,   of   not   protecting
the   fundamental   rights   of   the   citizen.   The
compensation  is in  the  nature  of  ‘exemplary  damages’
awarded   against   the   wrongdoer   for   the   breach   of   its
public   law   duty   and   is   independent   of   the   rights
available to the aggrieved party to claim compensation
under   the   private   law   in   an   action   based   on   tort,
through   a   suit   instituted   in   a   court   of   competent
jurisdiction   or/and   prosecute   the   offender   under   the
penal law.”
(vii) In   Lucknow   Development   Authority   vs.   M.K.   Gupta 69
  this
Court pointed out that the administrative law of accountability
69 (1994) 1 SCC 243
101

of   public   authorities   for   their   arbitrary   and   even   ultra   vires
actions has taken many strides and that it is now accepted by
both by this Court and English Courts that the State is liable
to  compensate  for   the  loss  or   injury  suffered  by  a  citizen  due
to arbitrary actions of its employees.
(viii) The   decision   in   Bodhisattwa   Gautam   (supra),   arose   under
special   circumstances.   A   girl   student   of   a   college   lodged   a
complaint   against   a   Lecturer   for   alleged   offences   under
Sections   312,   420,   493,   496   and   498­A   IPC.     The   Lecturer
moved the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. for quashing
the   complaint.   The   High   Court   dismissed   the   quash   petition.
When the Lecturer filed a special leave petition, this Court not
only dismissed the SLP but also issued notice  suo motu  on the
question as to why  he should not be asked to pay reasonable
monthly maintenance during the pendency of the prosecution.
Finally,   this   Court   ordered   payment   of   a   monthly   interim
compensation   after   holding   that   what   was   violated   was
the fundamental right of the women under Article 21 and
that   therefore   a   remedy   can   be   provided   by   this   Court
under Article 32 even against the non­state actor   ( namely
the   accused ).     This   decision   was   cited   with   approval   in
Chairman,   Railway   Board   &   Ors.   vs.   Chandrima   Das
(Mrs.)  &Ors. 70
.
70 (2000) 2 SCC 465
102

(ix) As   rightly   highlighted   by   the   learned   amicus,   this   Court   has
awarded   damages   against   non­State   actors   under   the
environmental   law   regime,   whenever   they   were   found   to   have
violated the right under Article 21. For instance this Court was
concerned   with   a   case   in   M.C.   Mehta   vs.   Kamal   Nath   71
where   a   company   built   a   club   on   the   banks   of   River   Beas,
partly   taken   on   lease   from   the   Government   and   partly   by
encroaching   into   forest   land   and   virtually   turning   the   course
of   the   River.   Invoking   the   “ polluter   pays   principle ”   and
“ precautionary   principle ”   landscaped   in   Vellore   Citizens’
Welfare   Forum   vs.   Union   of   India 72
and   also   applied   in
Indian   Council   for   Enviro­Legal   Action   vs.   Union   of
India 73
,   this   Court   held   the   owner   of   the   private   motel   to   be
liable   to   pay   compensation   towards   the   cost   of   restoration   of
the   ecology   of   the   area.   Thereafter,   a   show   cause   notice   was
issued to the motel as to why they should not be asked to pay
compensation   to   reverse   the   degraded   environment   and   as   to
why   a   pollution   fine   should   not   be   imposed.   In   response,   the
motel contended before this Court that though in proceedings
under   Article   32   it   was   open   to   this   Court   to   grant
compensation   to   the   victims   whose   fundamental   rights   were
violated   or   who   are   victims   of   arbitrary   Executive   action   or
victims   of   atrocious   behavior   of   public   authorities,   the   Court
cannot impose any fine on those who are guilty of that action.
71 (1997) 1 SCC 388
72 (1996) 5 SCC 647
73 (1996) 3 SCC 212
103

The motel also contended that fine is a component of criminal
jurisprudence   and   hence   the   imposition   of   fine   would   be
violative   of   Articles   20   and   21.   This   Court,   even   while
accepting the said argument in so far as the component of fine
is concerned, directed the issue of fresh notice to the motel to
show   cause   why   exemplary   damages   be   not   awarded,   in
addition   to   the   damages   already   awarded.   Thereafter,   this
Court held in   M.C. Mehta   vs.   Kamal Nath   (supra at footnote
no.15) as follows:­
“ 10.   In   the   matter   of   enforcement   of   fundamental
rights   under   Article   21,   under   public   law  domain,  the
Court, in exercise of its powers under Article 32 of the
Constitution, has awarded damages against those who
have   been   responsible   for   disturbing   the   ecological
balance   either   by   running   the   industries   or   any   other
activity which has the effect of causing pollution in the
environment.   The   Court   while   awarding   damages   also
enforces   the   “ POLLUTER ­ PAYS   PRINCIPLE ”   which   is   widely
accepted as a means of paying for the cost of pollution
and control. To put in other words, the wrongdoer, the
polluter,   is   under   an   obligation   to   make   good   the
damage caused to the environment . ”
(x) In   Consumer   Education   &   Research   Centre   &   Ors.   vs.
Union   of   India   &Ors. 74
,   this   Court   held   that   in   appropriate
cases   the   Court   could   give   appropriate   directions   to   the
employer,   be   it   the   State   or   its   undertaking   or   private
employer ,   to   make   the   right   to   life   meaningful,   to   prevent
pollution   of   work   place,   protection   of   environment,   protection
of   the   health   of   the   workmen   and   to   preserve   free   and
74 (1995) 3 SCC 42
104

unpolluted   water   for   the   safety   and   health   of   the   people.   The
Court   was   dealing   in   that   case   with   the   occupational   health
hazards   and   diseases   afflicting   the   workmen   employed   in
asbestos industries. In paragraph 29 of the Report, this Court
said,   “… It   is   therefore   settled   law   that   in   public   law   claim   for
compensation  is   a   remedy  available   under  Article   32   or   Article
226   for   the   enforcement   and   protection   of   fundamental   and
human   rights.   …   It   is   a   practical   and   inexpensive   mode   of
redress   available   for   the   contravention   made   by   the   State,   its
servants, its instrumentalities ,  a company or a person in the
purported   exercise   of   their   powers   and   enforcement   of
the   rights   claimed   either   under   the   statutes   or   licence
issued   under   the   statute   or   for   the   enforcement   of   any
right or duty under the Constitution or the law .”
(xi) In   Vishaka   vs.   State   of   Rajasthan . 75
,   this   Court   laid   down
guidelines, in the absence of a legislation, for the enforcement
of   the   right   to   gender   equality   of   working   women,   in   a   class
action petition that was filed to enforce fundamental rights of
working   women   and   to   prevent   sexual   harassment   of   women
in workplace. The guidelines imposed an obligation upon both
public   and   private   employers   not   to   violate   the   fundamental
rights   guaranteed   to   working   women   under   Article   14,   15,
19(1)(g) and 21. In   Medha   Kotwal  Lele   &  Ors.   vs.   Union  of
75 ( 1997) 6 SCC 241
105

India 76
,this   Court   noted   that   even   after   15   years   of   the
judgment in   Vishaka   (supra) , many States had not made the
necessary   amendments   or   failed   to   effectively   implement   the
guidelines. This Court issued a direction in Paragraph 44.4 :
“ 44.4     The   State   functionaries   and   private   and
public   sector   undertakings/organisations/bodies/
institutions,   etc.   shall   put   in   place   sufficient
mechanism to ensure full   implementation of   Vishaka
[Vishaka   v.   State   of   Rajasthan,   (1997)   6   SCC   241   :
1997   SCC   (Cri)   932]   guidelines   and   further   provide
that   if   the   alleged   harasser   is   found   guilty,   the
complainant   victim   is   not   forced   to   work   with/under
such harasser and where appropriate and possible the
alleged   harasser   should   be   transferred.   Further
provision   should   be   made   that   harassment   and
intimidation   of   witnesses   and   the   complainants   shall
be met with severe disciplinary action.”
(xii) In  Githa Hariharan (Ms.)  & Anr .  vs .  Reserve Bank of India
&   Anr. 77
,   this   Court   was   dealing   with   a   challenge   to   Section
6(a)   of   the   Hindu   Minority   and   Guardianship   Act,   1956   and
Section   19(b)   of   the   Guardians   and   Wards   Act,   1890   which
declared   the   father   to   be   the   natural   guardian   of   the   person
and   property   of   a   minor   son   and   unmarried   daughter.   The
mother   was   recognised   as   the   natural   guardian   under   these
provisions   “ after   the   father”.   These   provisions   resulted   in
hardship   to   spouses   separated   from   each   other   while   dealing
with   the   wards.   Reading   the   obligations   of   the   State   under
certain International Conventions like CEDAW into the right to
76 (2013) 1 SCC 297
77 (1999) 2 SCC 228
106

dignity   of   women   and   gender   equality,   traceable   to   Article   21
and 14, this Court read down the word “ after ” to mean “ in the
absence   of ”.   By   such   interpretation,   this   Court   invoked
fundamental rights to interpret a word in the sphere of family
law.
(xiii) In   Indian   Medical   Association   vs.   Union   of   India . 78
,   the
policy   of   an   Army   College   of   Medical   Sciences   to   admit   only
those   who   are   wards   of   army   personnel,   based   on   scores
obtained   in   an   entrance   test,   was   under   challenge.   The
question   that   came   up   for   consideration   was   whether   this
discriminatory   practice   by   a   private   entity   would   be   in
violation   of   Article   15   of   the   Constitution.   This   Court   in
Paragraph 187 stated:
“ 187.   Inasmuch  as  education,  pursuant  to T.M.A.  Pai
[(2002) 8 SCC 481], is an occupation under sub­clause
(g) of clause (1) of Article 19, and it is a service that is
offered   for   a   fee   that   takes   care   of   all   the   expenses   of
the   educational   institution   in   rendering   that   service,
plus   a   reasonable   surplus,   and   is   offered   to   all   those
amongst   the   general   public,   who   are   otherwise
qualified,   then   such   educational   institutions   would
also be subject to the discipline of clause (2) of Article
15.   In   this   regard,   the   purport   of   the   above
exposition of clause (2) of Article 15, when read in
the context of egalitarian jurisprudence inherent in
Articles   14,   15,   16   and   Article   38,   and   read   with
our national aspirations of establishing a society in
which   equality   of   status   and   opportunity,   and
justice, social, economic and political, would imply
that   the   private   sector   which   offers   such   facilities
ought   not   to   be   conducting   their   affairs   in   a
manner   which   promote   existing   discriminations
and disadvantages.”
78  ( 2011) 7 SCC 179
107

(xiv) In   Society   for   Unaided   Private   Schools   of   Rajasthan
(supra) ,   the   constitutionality   of   Section   12   of   the   Right   of
Children   to   Free   and   Compulsory   Education   Act,   2009   was
challenged on the ground that it violated Articles 19(1)(g) and
30 of those who had established schools in the private sector.
While   upholding   the   Constitutionality   of   the   provision,   which
required all schools, private and State­funded, to reserve 25%
of its intake for students from disadvantaged background, this
Court held: 
“ 222.   The   provisions   referred   to   above   and   other
provisions   of   international   conventions   indicate   that
the   rights   have   been   guaranteed   to   the   children   and
those   rights   carry   corresponding   State   obligations   to
respect,   protect   and   fulfil   the   realisation   of   children's
rights .       The   obligation   to   protect   implies   the
horizontal  right   which  casts  an  obligation  on  the
State   to   see   that   it   is   not   violated   by   non­State
actors.   For   non­State   actors   to   respect   children's
rights   casts   a   negative   duty   of   non­violation   to
protect   children's   rights   and   a   positive   duty   on
them   to   prevent   the   violation   of   children's   rights
by   others,   and   also   to   fulfil   children's   rights   and
take   measures   for   progressive   improvement.   In
other   words,   in   the   spheres   of   non­State   activity
there shall be no violation of children's rights.”
(xv) In   Jeeja   Ghosh   vs.   Union   of   India 79
,   the   petitioner,   a
disabled   person   suffering   from   cerebral   palsy,   was
unceremoniously   ordered   off   a   SpiceJet   aircraft   by   the   flight
crew   on   account   of   the   disability.   The   petition   was   filed   for
putting in place a system to ensure such a violation of human
79 (2016) 7 SCC 761
108

dignity   and   inequality   is   not   meted   out   to   similarly   placed
persons. This Court observed as follows: 
“ 10.  It is submitted by the petitioner that the Union of
India   (Respondent   1)   has   an   obligation   to  ensure   that
its   citizens   are   not   subject   to   such   arbitrary   and
humiliating   discrimination.   It   is   a   violation   of   their
fundamental rights, including the right to life, right to
equality,   right   to   move   freely   throughout   the   territory
of   India,   and   right   to   practise   their   profession.   The
State   has   an   obligation   to   ensure   that   these
rights are protected  — particularly for those who are
disabled. …”
This Court awarded compensation to the petitioner against the
private Airline on the ground that the airline, though a private
enterprise, ought not to have violated her fundamental right.
(xvi) In   Zee   Telefilms   Ltd.   vs.   Union   of   India 80
,   this   Court   held
that   though   BCCI   does   not   fall   within   the   purview   of   the   term
“ State ”,   it   discharges   public   duties   and   that   therefore   even   if   a
remedy   under   Article   32   is   not   available,   the   aggrieved   party   can
always seek a remedy before the ordinary courts of law or by way of
a   writ   petition   under   Article   226.     This   Court   pointed   out   that   the
violator   of   a   constitutional   right   could   not   go   scot­free   merely
because it is not a State.  The said logic was extended by this Court
to   a   “Deemed   to   be   University”   in   Janet   Jeyapaul   vs.   SRM
80 (2005) 4 SCC 649
109

University 81
, on the ground that though it is a private university, it
was discharging “public functions”, by imparting education.
77. All the above decisions show that on a case­to­case basis, this
Court   applied   horizontal   effect,   considering   the   nature   of   the   right
violated and the extent of obligation on the part of the violator. But
to   enable   the   courts   to   have   certain   basic   guidelines   in   place,   for
dealing with such cases, this Court developed a tool in  Justice K.S.
Puttaswamy.  W hile affirming the right to privacy as a fundamental
right, this Court laid down the landscape as follows:
“ 397.   Once   we   have   arrived   at   this   understanding   of
the  nature   of   fundamental  rights,   we  can   dismantle   a
core assumption of the Union's argument:  that a right
must   either   be   a   common   law   right   or   a
fundamental   right .   The   only   material   distinctions
between   the   two  classes   of  right—of  which  the  nature
and   content   may   be   the   same—lie   in   the   incidence   of
the duty to respect the right and in the forum in which
a   failure   to   do   so   can   be   redressed.   Common   law
rights are horizontal in their operation when they
are violated by one's fellow man, he can be named
and   proceeded   against   in   an   ordinary   court   of
law.   Constitutional   and   fundamental   rights,   on
the   other   hand,   provide   remedy   against   the
violation of a valued interest by the “State”, as an
abstract   entity,   whether   through   legislation   or
otherwise,   as   well   as   by   identifiable   public
officials,   being   individuals   clothed   with   the
powers of the State. It is perfectly possible for an
81 (2015) 16 SCC 530
110

interest   to   simultaneously   be   recognised   as   a
common   law   right   and   a   fundamental   right.
Where the  interference  with  a  recognised   interest
is by the State or any other like entity recognised
by   Article   12,   a   claim   for   the   violation   of   a
fundamental right would lie. Where the author of
an   identical   interference   is   a   non­State   actor,   an
action   at   common   law   would   lie   in   an   ordinary
court .
398.   Privacy   has   the   nature   of   being   both   a   common
law right as well as a fundamental right. Its content, in
both forms, is identical. All that differs is the incidence
of   burden   and   the   forum   for   enforcement   for   each
form.”
78. Thus,   the   answer   to   Question   No.   2   is   partly   found   in   the   9­
Judge Bench decision in   Justice   K.S. Puttaswamy   itself. We have
seen   from   the   line   of   judicial   pronouncements   listed   above   that
a fter   A.K. Gopalan   vs.   State of Madras 82
  lost its hold, this Court
has   expanded   the   width   of   Article   21   in   several   areas   such   as
health,   environment,   transportation,   Education   and   Prisoner’s   life
etc.   As Vivian Bose, J., put it in a poetic language in   S. Krishnan
vs   State   of   Madras 83
“ Brush   aside   for   a   moment   the
pettifogging   of   the   law   and   forget   for   the   nonce   all   the
learned   disputations   about   this   and   that,   and   "and"   or   "or   ",
or   "may"   and   "must   ".   Look   past   the   mere   verbiage   of   the
82 AIR 1950 SC 27
83  AIR 1951 SC 301
111

words   and   penetrate   deep   into   the   heart   and   spirit   of   the
Constitution.”.  The original thinking of this Court that these rights
can   be   enforced   only   against   the   State,   changed   over   a   period   of
time.   The   transformation   was   from   “State”   to   “Authorities”   to
“instrumentalities   of   State”   to   “agency   of   the   Government”   to
“impregnation   with   Governmental   character”   to   “enjoyment   of
monopoly   status   conferred   by   State”   to   “deep   and   pervasive
control” 84
  to   the   “nature   of   the   duties/functions   performed” 85
.
Therefore, we would answer  Question No. 2 as follows: 
“A   fundamental   right   under   Article   19/21   can
be   enforced   even   against   persons   other   than
the State or its instrumentalities ”
Question No. 3
79. “Whether the State is under a duty to affirmatively protect the
rights of a citizen under Article 21 of the Constitution of India even
against a threat to the liberty of a citizen by the acts or omissions of
another citizen or private agency?” is the third question referred to
us.
84  R.D. Shetty vs International Airport Authority (1979) 3 SCC 489 
85  Andi Mukta vs V.R. Rudani (1989) 2 SCC 691 
112

80. Before   we   proceed   further,   it   is   necessary   to   make   a   small
correction. Article 21 right is available not only to citizens but to all
persons.   Therefore,   the   word   ‘ citizen ’   mentioned   in   Question   No.3
has to be read as ‘ person ’.   
81. As   we   have   pointed   out   in   the   Table   under   paragraph   73
above,   the   expression   “ the   State ”   is   not   used   in   Article   21.     This
Article 21 guarantees every person that he shall not be deprived of
his life and liberty except according to the procedure established by
law. Going by the scheme of Part­III which we have outlined both in
the   preceding   paragraphs   and   in   the   Table   in   paragraph   73,   it   is
clear  that the State has two obligations,   (i)   not to deprive a person
of his  life and  liberty  except according  to  procedure established  by
law;   and   (ii)   to   ensure   that   the   life   and   liberty   of   a   person   is   not
deprived even otherwise.  Article 21 does not say “the State shall
not deprive a person of his life and liberty”, but says that “no
person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty” .
82. When the Constitution was adopted, our understanding of the
words “ life ” and “ personal liberty ” was not as it has evolved over the
113

past   seven   decades.   Similarly,   it   was   not   imagined   or   conceived   at
that   time   that   anyone   other   than   the   State   is   capable   of   depriving
the   life   and   personal   liberty   of   a   person,   except   by   committing   a
punishable   offence.   But   with   the   expanding   horizons   of   our
philosophical   understanding   of   law,   life   and   liberty   and   the
advancement   of   science   and   technology,   we   have   come   to   realize
that   “ life   is   not   an   empty   dream ”   and   “ our   hearts   are   not   muffled
drums beating funeral marches to the grave” 86
, nor is “ life a tale told
by an idiot, full of sound and fury signifying nothing ” 87
.
83. Over   a   period   of   time,   this   Court   has   interpreted   ‘ the   right   to
life ’ to include,   (i)   livelihood;   (ii)   all those aspects of life which go to
make   a   man’s   life   meaningful,   complete   and   worth   living;   (iii)
something more than mere survival or animal existence;  (iv)  right to
live   (and   die)   with   human   dignity;   (v)   right   to   food,   water,   decent
environment,   medical   care   and   shelter   etc.;   (vi)   all   that   gives
meaning to a man’s life, such as his tradition, culture, heritage and
protection of that heritage in its full measure; and   (vii)   the right to
Privacy. There are certain jurisdictions which have taken this right
86  From H.W. Longfellow in “A Psalm of life”
87  From Shakespeare in Macbeth
114

to   include   “the   r ight   to   be   forgotten ”   or   the   “r ight   not   to   be
remembered ”.
84. When   the   word   “ life ”   was   understood   to   mean   only   physical
existence, the deprivation of the same was generally conceived to be
possible   only   by   the   State,   except   in   cases   where   someone
committed   an   offence   punishable   under   the   Penal   Code.   But   the
moment   the   right   to   life   under   Article   21   was   developed   into   a
bouquet   of   rights   and   science   and   technology   intruded   into   all
spheres to life, the deprivation of the right by non­State actors also
became possible. Another  development that has taken  place in the
past   3   to   4   decades   is   that   several   of   the   functions   of   the
Government   have   either   been   out­sourced   to   non­State   actors   or
been entrusted to public­private partnerships. This is why, the High
Courts and this Court modulated the tests to be applied for finding
out the maintainability of an action under Article 226 or Article 32.
Once   upon   a   time,   the   maintainability   of   a   petition   under   Article
32/226 depended upon “ who the respondent was ”. Later, the focus
shifted   to   “ the   nature   of   the   duties/functions   performed ”   by   the
115

respondent, for finding out his amenability to the jurisdiction under
Article 226.
85. Life   and   personal   liberty   are   two   different   things,   even   while
being   an   integral   part   of   a   whole   and   they   have   different
connotations. Question No. 3 is so worded that the focus is not on
‘deprivation of life’ but on  (i)  ‘ deprivation of personal liberty ’ and that
too   by   the   acts   or   omissions   of   another   person   or   private   agency;
and  (ii)  the duty of the State to affirmatively protect it. Therefore, we
shall,   in   our   discussion,   focus   more   on   two   aspects,   namely,
(i)   deprivation   of   personal   liberty   by   non­State   actors;   and   (ii)   the
duty   of   the   State.   An   elaborate   exposition   of   the   expression
“ personal liberty ” and its origin in Greek civilization may be found
in the judgment of this Court in   Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre
vs.   State of Maharashtra 88
. Suffice it to say for  our  purpose that
in   this   judgment,   this   Court   identified   in   paragraph   53   of   the
Report that Article 21 guarantees two rights, namely,  (i)  right to life;
and   (ii)   right   to  personal  liberty.  Therefore,  because  of  the  manner
in   which   Question   No.   3   is   framed,   we   shall   try   to   confine   our
88  (2011) 1 SCC 694
116

discussion to personal liberty, though at times both may overlap or
get interchanged.  
86. The   expression   “ personal   liberty ”   appearing   in   Article   21   was
held by  this Court in   A.K.   Gopalan   (supra) to mean freedom  from
physical   restraint   of   a   person   by   incarceration   or   otherwise.
However, the understanding of the expression “ personal liberty ” got
enlarged in  Kharak Singh  vs.  State of U.P. 89
   It was a case where
a  person   who  was  originally  charged  for   the  offence  of  dacoity   and
later   released   for   lack   of   evidence,   was   put   under   surveillance   by
the   Police,   and   his   name   included   in   the   history­sheet   under   the
U.P.   Police   Regulations.   As   a   result,   he   was   required   to   make
frequent   visits   to   the   Police   Station.   Sometimes   the   Police   made
domiciliary   visits   at   night   to   his   house.   They   would   knock   at   the
door, disturb his sleep and ask to report to the Police, whenever he
went   out   of   the   village.   Though   by   a   majority,   the   Constitution
Bench held in  Kharak Singh  (supra)  that the regulation permitting
domiciliary visits is unconstitutional, the majority upheld the Police
surveillance   on   the   ground   that   (at   that   time)   right   to   privacy   had
89 AIR 1963 SC 1295
117

not   become   part   of  the  fundamental   rights.     But  K.  Subba  Rao,   J.
speaking   for   himself   and   J.C.   Shah,   J.   held   that   the   concept   of
personal   liberty   in   Article   21   is   comprehensive   enough   to   include
privacy.   The   thinking   reflected   in   A.K.   Gopalan   that   physical
restraint   was   necessary   to   constitute   infringement   of   personal
liberty, was completely changed by K. Subba Rao, J. in his minority
opinion   in   Kharak   Singh .   Giving   a   completely   new   dimension   to
personal liberty, K. Subba Rao, J. said:
“(31)   …The   expression   is   wide   enough   to   take   in   a
right   to   be   free   from   restrictions   placed   on   his
movements.   The   expression   “coercion”   in   the   modern
age   cannot   be   construed   in   a   narrow   sense.   In   an
uncivilized society where there are no inhibitions,
only   physical   restraints   may   detract   from
personal   liberty,   but   as   civilization   advances   the
psychological   restraints   are   more   effective   than
physical   ones.   The   scientific   methods   used   to
condition   a   man's   mind   are   in   a   real   sense
physical   restraints,   for   they   engender   physical
fear   channelling   one's   actions   through
anticipated   and   expected   grooves.   So   also
creation of conditions which necessarily engender
inhibitions   and   fear   complexes   can   be   described
as   physical   restraints.   Further,   the   right   to
personal   liberty   takes   in   not   only   a   right   to   be
free   from   restrictions   placed   on   his   movements,
but   also   free   from   encroachments   on   his   private
life .   It   is   true   our   Constitution   does   not   expressly
declare   a   right   to   privacy   as  a   fundamental  right,   but
the   said   right   is   an   essential   ingredient   of   personal
liberty.   Every   democratic   country   sanctifies
118

domestic   life;   it   is   expected   to   give   him   rest,
physical happiness, peace of mind and security . In
the   last   resort,   a   person's   house,   where   he   lives   with
his   family,   is   his   “castle”;   it   is   his   rampart   against
encroachment   on   his   personal   liberty.   The   pregnant
words  of   that  famous  Judge,  Frankfurter   J.,  in   ( 1948)
338 US 25 ,   pointing out the importance of the security
of   one's   privacy   against   arbitrary   intrusion   by   the
police,   could   have   no   less   application   to   an   Indian
home as to an American one. If physical restraints on
a   person's   movements   affect   his   personal   liberty,
physical encroachments on his private life would affect
it   in   a   larger   degree.   Indeed,   nothing   is   more
deleterious   to   a   man's   physical   happiness   and   health
than   a   calculated   interference   with   his   privacy.   We
would,   therefore,   define   the   right   of   personal
liberty in Art. 21 as a right of an individual to be
free   from   restrictions   or   encroachments   on   his
person,   whether   those   restrictions   or
encroachments   are   directly   imposed   or   indirectly
brought   about   by   calculated   measures .   It   so
understood,   all   the   acts   of   surveillance   under
Regulation   236   infringe   the   fundamental   right   of   the
petitioner under Art. 21 of the Constitution.”
As   pointed   out   by   Rohinton   Nariman,   J.,   in   Mohd.   Arif   alias
Ashfaq   vs .   Registrar,   Supreme   Court   of   India   &   Ors. 90
  “ The
minority   judgment   of   Subba   Rao   and   Shah,   JJ.   eventually   became
law   in   Rustom   Cavasjee   Cooper   vs.   Union   of   India 91
(Bank
Nationalisation   case),   where   the   11­Judge   Bench   finally   discarded
the   view   expressed   in   A.K.   Gopalan   and   held   that   various
90 (2014) 9 SCC 737
91 (1970) 1 SCC 248
119

fundamental   rights   contained   in   different   articles   are   not   mutually
exclusive … ” .
87. If   U.P.   Police   Regulations   were   challenged   in   Kharak   Singh ,
identical   Regulations   issued   by   the   State   of   Madhya   Pradesh   were
challenged in  Gobind  vs.  State of Madhya Pradesh 92
. Though this
Court   upheld   the   impugned   Regulations,   K.K.   Mathew,   J.   pointed
out:
“ 25.   Rights   and   freedoms   of   citizens   are   set   forth   in
the   Constitution   in   order   to   guarantee   that   the
individual,   his   personality,   and   those   things   stamped
with   his   personality   shall   be   free   from   official
interference   except   where   a   reasonable   basis   for
intrusion   exists.   “Liberty   against   Government”   a
phrase coined by Professor Corwin expresses this idea
forcefully.   In   this   sense,   many   of   the   fundamental
rights   of   citizens   can   be   described   as   contributing   to
the right to privacy.
*** *** ***
27.   There   are   two   possible   theories   for   protecting
privacy of home. The first is that activities in the home
harm others only to the extent that they cause offence
resulting from the mere thought that individuals might
be  engaging  in such  activities and that  such  ‘harm’  is
not   constitutionally   protectible   by   the   State. The
second   is   that   individuals   need   a   place   of
sanctuary   where   they   can   be   free   from   societal
control.   The   importance   of   such   a   sanctuary   is
that   individuals   can   drop   the   mask,   desist   for   a
while from projecting on the world the image they
want to be accepted as themselves, an image that
may   reflect   the   values   of   their   peers   rather   than
92 (1975) 2 SCC 148
120

the   realities   of   their   natures .[See   26   Stanford   Law
Rev. 1161, 1187]”
88. Thus,  the  understanding  of  this  Court  in   A.K.   Gopalan ,  that
deprivation   of   personal   liberty   required   a   physical   restraint,
underwent   a   change   in   Kharak   Singh   and   Gobind   (supra) .   From
there,   the   law   marched   to   the   next   stage   in   Satwant   Singh
Sawhney  vs.  D. Ramarathnam, Assistant Passport Officer, New
Delhi 93
  where   a   Constitution   Bench   of   this   Court   held   by   a
majority, that  the right to personal liberty included the right of
locomotion   and   right   to   travel   abroad .   It   was   held   in   the   said
decision   that   “ liberty"   in   our   Constitution   bears   the   same
comprehensive meaning as is given to the expression "liberty"
by the 5th and 14th Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and
the   expression   "personal   liberty"   in   Article   21   only   excludes
the   ingredients   of   "liberty"   enshrined   in   Article   19   of   the
Constitution .   The   Court   went   on   to   hold   that   “ the   expression
"personal   liberty"   in   Art.   21   takes   in   the   right   of   loco­motion
and   to   travel   abroad,   but   the   right   to   move   throughout   the
93  AIR 1967 SC 1836
121

territories   of   India   is   not   covered   by   it   inasmuch   as   it   is
specially provided in   Art. 19.”
89. Satwant   Singh   (supra)   was   the   case   of   a   businessman,  who
was directed to surrender his passport, with a view to prevent him
from travelling out of India, on account of an investigation pending
against   him   under   the   Export   and   Import   Control   Act.   It   must   be
noted that this case was before the enactment of The Passports Act,
1967.  
90. After   The   Passports   Act   came   into   force,   the   decision   of   the
7­Judge   Bench   in   Maneka   Gandhi   vs.   Union   of   India 94
  came.   It
was held therein that the right to travel abroad is part of the right
to   personal   liberty   and   that   the   same   cannot   be   deprived   except
according to the procedure established by law.
91. Next came the decision in  Bandhua Mukti Morcha  vs .  Union
of   India   &   Ors. 95
.   It   was   a   case   where   a   letter   addressed   by   an
NGO   to   the   Court   exposing   the   plight   of   persons   working   in   stone
quarries   under   inhuman   conditions,   was   treated   as   a   public
94  (1978) 1 SCC 248
95 (1984) 3 SCC 161
122

interest   litigation.   Some   of   those   workers   were   actually   bonded
labourers.   After this Court issued notice to the State Governments
and  the lessees  of the  quarries, a  preliminary  objection  was  raised
as   to   the   maintainability   of   the   writ   petition.   While   rejecting   the
preliminary   objection,   this   Court   broadly   indicated   how   the
fundamental   rights   of   those   bonded   labourers   were   violated   and
what   were   the   duties   of   the   State   and   the   Court   in   cases   of   that
nature. The relevant portion of the decision reads thus:
“ 9.   …   We   should   have   thought   that   if   any   citizen
brings   before   the   Court   a   complaint   that   a   large
number of peasants or workers are bonded serfs or are
being   subjected   to   exploitation   by   a   few   mine   lessees
or   contractors   or   employers   or   are   being   denied   the
benefits   of   social   welfare   laws,   the   State   Government,
which   is,   under   our   constitutional   scheme,   charged
with   the   mission   of   bringing   about   a   new   socio­
economic   order   where   there   will   be   social   and
economic   justice   for   everyone   and   equality   of   status
and opportunity   for  all,  would  welcome  an enquiry  by
the   Court,   so   that   if   it   is   found   that   there   are   in   fact
bonded   labourers   or   even   if   the   workers   are   not
bonded in the strict sense of the term as defined in the
Bonded   Labour   System   (Abolition)   Act,   1976   but   they
are  made  to provide forced  labour  or  are  consigned  to
a   life   of   utter   deprivation   and   degradation,   such   a
situation   can   be   set   right   by   the   State   Government.
Even   if   the   State   Government   is   on   its   own   enquiry
satisfied that the workmen are not bonded and are not
compelled   to   provide   forced   labour   and   are   living   and
working   in   decent   conditions   with   all   the   basic
necessities   of   life   provided   to   them,   the   State
Government should not baulk an enquiry by the Court
when a complaint is brought by a citizen, but it should
be anxious to satisfy the Court and through the Court,
123

the   people   of   the   country,   that   it   is   discharging   its
constitutional obligation fairly and adequately and the
workmen   are   being   ensured   social   and   economic
justice. …”
92 . Therefore,   three   major   breakthroughs   happened,   the   first   in
Kharak   Singh,   the   second   in   Satwant   Singh   and   Maneka
Gandhi   (supra)   and the third in   Bandhua Mukti Morcha   (supra) .
The first breakthrough was the opinion, though of a minority, that
physical   restraint   was   not   a   necessary   sine   qua   non   for   the
deprivation   of   personal   liberty   and   that   even   a   psychological
restraint may amount to deprivation of personal liberty. The second
breakthrough   was   the   opinion   in   Satwant   Singh   and   Maneka
Gandhi  that the right of locomotion and to travel abroad are part of
the   right   to   personal   liberty.   The   third   breakthrough   was   the
opinion   in   Bandhua   Mukti   Morcha   that   the   State   owed   an
obligation to take corrective measures when there was an infraction
of Article 21.
93 . In   National   Human   Rights   Commission   vs.   State   of
Arunachal   Pradesh   &   Anr. 96
,   this   Court   was   confronted   with   a
situation where private citizens, namely, the All Arunachal Pradesh
96 (1996) 1 SCC 742
124

Students’   Union   held   out   threats   to   forcibly   drive   chakmas,   out   of
the State. The National Human Rights Commission itself filed a writ
petition   under   Article   32.   While   allowing   the   writ   petition   and
issuing   directions,  this   Court  indicated  the  role  of   the   State   in   the
following words:
“ 20.   … Thus   the   State   is   bound   to   protect   the   life
and   liberty   of   every   human   being,   be  he   a   citizen
or otherwise,   and it cannot permit any body or group
of  persons, e.g.,  the  AAPSU,  to threaten the  Chakmas
to leave the State, failing which they would be forced to
do   so.   No   State   Government   worth   the   name   can
tolerate   such   threats   by   one   group   of   persons   to
another   group   of   persons;   it   is   duty­bound   to   protect
the threatened group from such assaults and if it fails
to do so, it will fail to perform its constitutional as well
as   statutory   obligations.   Those   giving   such   threats
would   be   liable   to   be   dealt   with   in   accordance   with
law.   The   State   Government   must   act   impartially   and
carry   out   its   legal   obligations   to   safeguard   the   life,
health and well­being of Chakmas residing in the State
without being inhibited by local politics. …”
94 . In  Mr. ‘X’  vs.  Hospital ‘Z’ 97
, the appellant had accompanied a
patient to the hospital for treatment and offered to donate blood, for
the   purpose   of   surgery.   Before   allowing   him   to   donate   blood,
samples   were   taken   from   “X”.   It   was   detected   that   he   was   HIV
positive.   The   fact   that   Mr.   “X”   tested   positive   was   disclosed   by   the
97 (1998) 8 SCC 296
125

hospital   to   the   fiancée   of   Mr.   “X”.   Therefore,   the   proposal   for
marriage   was   called   off   and   Mr.   “X”   was   ostracised   by   the
community.   Mr.   “X”   sued   the   hospital   for   damages,   pitching   his
claim on the right to privacy and the duty of confidentiality that the
hospital   had   in   their   relationship   with   him.   Though   this   Court
partly agreed with Mr. “X” the court found that the disclosure made
by   the   hospital   actually   saved   the   life   of   a   lady.   But   while   dealing
with   a   right   under   Article   21   vis­	
à­vis   the   hospital   (a   private
hospital), this Court held as follows :­
“ 27.   Right   of   privacy   may,   apart   from   contract,
also arise out of a particular specific relationship
which   may   be   commercial,   matrimonial,   or   even
political.   As   already   discussed   above,   doctor­patient
relationship,   though   basically   commercial,   is,
professionally,   a   matter   of   confidence   and,   therefore,
doctors   are   morally   and   ethically   bound   to   maintain
confidentiality. In such a situation, public disclosure of
even   true   private   facts   may   amount   to   an   invasion   of
the   right   of   privacy   which   may   sometimes   lead   to   the
clash   of   one   person's   “right   to   be   let   alone”   with
another person's right to be informed.
28.   Disclosure   of   even   true   private   facts   has   the
tendency   to   disturb   a   person's   tranquillity.   It   may
generate many complexes in him and may even lead to
psychological   problems.   He   may,   thereafter,   have   a
disturbed   life   all   through.   In   the   face   of   these
potentialities,  and   as already   held  by   this  Court   in  its
various decisions referred to above, the right of privacy
is an essential component of the right to life envisaged
by   Article   21.   The   right,   however,   is   not   absolute   and
126

may   be   lawfully   restricted   for   the  prevention   of   crime,
disorder or protection of health or morals or protection
of rights and freedom of others.”
95. In   Pt.   Parmanand   Katara   (supra) ,   a   human   rights   activist
filed a writ petition under Article 32 seeking a direction to the Union
of   India   that   every   injured   person   brought   for   treatment   to   a
hospital should instantaneously be given medical aid to preserve life
and that the procedural Criminal Law should be allowed to operate
thereafter. The  basis  of the  said writ  petition  was a  report about  a
scooterist   who   got   injured   in   a   road   traffic   accident,   being   turned
away   by   the   nearby   hospital   on   the   ground   that   they   were   not
authorized to handle medico­legal cases.  Before the victim could be
taken   to   an   authorized   hospital   located   20   kilometers   away,   he
died,   which   prompted   the   writ   petition.   While   issuing   directions,
this Court expressed an opinion about the affirmative duty of court
in paragraph 8 as follows:­
“ 8.   Article   21   of   the   Constitution   casts   the
obligation   on   the   State   to   preserve   life .   The
provision   as   explained   by   this   Court   in   scores   of
decisions   has   emphasized   and   reiterated   with
gradually   increasing   emphasis   that   position.   A   doctor
at   the   government   hospital   positioned   to   meet   this
State   obligation   is,   therefore,   duty   bound   to   extend
medical   assistance   for   preserving   life.   Every   doctor
127

whether   at   a   government   hospital   or   otherwise
has   the   professional   obligation   to   extend   his
services  with  due expertise for  protecting  life .   No
law   or   State   action   can   intervene   to   avoid/delay   the
discharge   of   the   paramount   obligation   cast   upon
members   of   the   medical   profession.   The   obligation
being   total,   absolute   and   paramount,   laws   of
procedure whether in statutes or otherwise which
would   interfere   with   the   discharge   of   this
obligation   cannot   be   sustained   and   must,
therefore, give way . …”
That   the   State   has   an   obligation   to   help   preserve   life,   guaranteed
under   Article   21   was   spelt   out   clearly   in   Pt.   Parmanand   Katara .
What   applies   to   life   applies   equally   to   personal   liberty.   This   is
because   there   may   be  cases   involving   both   the   right   to   life   as  well
as liberty. 
96. For   instance,   in   Suchita   Srivastava   &   Anr.     vs.
Chandigarh   Administration 98
, this   Court   had   an   occasion   to
consider   the   reproductive   rights   of   a   mentally­challenged   woman.
This   right   was   read   as   part   of   the   right   to   life   and   liberty   under
Article   21.   In   Devika   Biswas   vs.   Union   of   India . 99
,   this   Court
considered   certain   issues   concerning   the   entire   range   of   conduct
and   management,   under   the   auspices   of   State   Governments,   of
98 (2009) 9 SCC 1
99 (2016) 10 SCC 726
128

sterilization   procedures,   either   in   camps   or   in   accredited   centres
and held that the right to health and reproductive rights of a person
are   part   of   the   right   under   Article   21.   While   doing   so,   this   Court
quoted   with   approval   the   decision   in   Bandhua   Mukti   Morcha
where   the   obligation   of   the   State   to   ensure   that   the   fundamental
rights   of   weaker   sections   of   society   are   not   exploited,   was
underlined.
97. Tapping   of   telephones   in   exercise   of   the   power   conferred   by
Section   5(2)   of   the   Indian   Telegraph   Act,   1885   became   the   subject
matter   of   challenge   in   People’s   Union   for   Civil   Liberties   (PUCL)
vs.   Union   of   India 100
.   This   Court   held   that   conversation   on
telephone   is   an   important   facet   of   a   man’s   private   life   and   that
tapping   of   telephone   would   infringe   Article   21.   Technological
eavesdropping except in accordance with the procedure established
by   law   was   frowned   upon   by   the   Court.   This   was   at   a   time   when
mobile   phones   had   not   become   the  order  of   the   day   and  the   State
monopoly   was   yet   to   be   replaced   by   private   players   such   as
intermediaries/service   providers.   Today,   the   infringement   of   the
100 (1997) 1 SCC 301
129

right   to   privacy   is   mostly   by   private   players   and   if   fundamental
rights cannot be enforced against non­State actors, this right will go
for a toss.
98. In  District Registrar and Collector, Hyderabad  & Anr.    vs.
Canara   Bank   &   Ors. 101
,   what   was   under   challenge   was   an
amendment   made   to   The   Indian   Stamp   Act,   1899   by   the   State   of
Andhra   Pradesh,   empowering   a   public   officer   to   inspect   the
registers,   books,   papers   and   documents   kept   in   any   premises,
including a private place where such registers, books etc., are kept.
Taking   cue   from   the   decision   in   R.   Rajagopal   and   Maneka
Gandhi , this Court held in paragraphs 55 and 56 of the decision as
follows:­
“ 55.   The   A.P.   Amendment   permits   inspection   being
carried   out   by   the   Collector   by   having   access   to   the
documents   which   are   in   private   custody   i.e.   custody
other   than   that   of   a   public   officer.   It   is   clear   that   this
provision  empowers  invasion  of   the   home  of   the   person
in   whose   possession   the   documents   “tending”   to   or
leading   to   the   various   facts   stated   in   Section   73   are   in
existence   and   Section   73   being   one   without   any
safeguards   as   to   probable   or   reasonable   cause   or
reasonable   basis   or   materials   violates   the   right   to
privacy   both   of   the   house   and   of   the   person.   We   have
already referred to   R. Rajagopal case   [(1994) 6 SCC 632]
101 (2005) 1 SCC 496
130

wherein   the   learned   Judges   have   held   that   the   right   to
personal liberty also means life free from encroachments
unsustainable   in   law,   and   such   right   flowing   from
Article 21 of the Constitution.
56.   In   Maneka   Gandhi   v.   Union   of   India   [(1978)   1   SCC
248]   a   seven­Judge   Bench   decision,   P.N.   Bhagwati,   J.
(as   His   Lordship   then   was)   held   that   the   expression
“personal liberty” in Article 21 is of the widest amplitude
and   it   covers   a   variety   of   rights   which   go   to   constitute
the personal liberty of man and some of them have been
raised   to   the   status   of   distinct   fundamental   rights   and
given   additional   protection   under   Article   19   (emphasis
supplied).   Any   law   interfering   with   personal  liberty   of   a
person   must   satisfy   a   triple   test:   ( i )   it   must   prescribe   a
procedure; ( ii ) the procedure must withstand the test of
one   or   more   of   the   fundamental   rights   conferred   under
Article 19 which may be applicable in a given situation;
and ( iii ) it must also be liable to be tested with reference
to   Article   14.   As   the   test   propounded   by   Article   14
pervades   Article   21   as   well,   the   law   and   procedure
authorising   interference   with   personal   liberty   and   right
of   privacy   must   also   be   right   and   just   and  fair   and   not
arbitrary,   fanciful   or   oppressive.   If   the   procedure
prescribed does not satisfy the requirement of Article 14
it   would   be   no   procedure   at   all   within   the   meaning   of
Article 21.”
99. In   Indian   Woman   says   Gang­raped   on   orders   of   village
Court   published   in   Business   and   Financial   News   dated
23­1­2014,   in   Re 102
,   this   Court   was   dealing   with   a   suo   motu   writ
petition   relating   to   the   gang­rape   of   a   women   under   orders   of   a
community  panchayat  as punishment for having a relationship with
a man belonging to a different community. After taking note of two
102 (2014) 4 SCC 786
131

earlier   decisions,   one   in   Lata   Singh   vs.   State   of   U.P. 103
  which
dealt   with   honour   killings   of   youngsters   involved   in   inter­caste,
inter­religious   marriages   and   the   other   in   Arumugam   Servai   vs.
State   of   Tamil   Nadu 104
,   which   dealt   with   khap   panchayats ,   this
Court opined in paragraph 16 as follows:­
“16.   Ultimately,  the  question  which  ought  to  consider
and   assess   by   this   Court   is   whether   the   State   police
machinery   could   have   possibly   prevented   the   said
occurrence.   The  response   is   certainly  a   “yes”.   The
State   is   duty­bound   to   protect   the   fundamental
rights   of   its   citizens;   and   an   inherent   aspect   of
Article   21   of   the   Constitution   would   be   the
freedom   of   choice   in   marriage .   Such   offences   are
resultant   of   the   State's   incapacity   or   inability   to
protect the fundamental rights of its citizens.”
In   fact,   this   Court   observed   in   the   aforesaid   decision   that   the
obligation   of   the   State   does   not   get   extinguished   upon   payment   of
compensation   and   that   the   rehabilitation   of   the   victims   of   such
nature was a must.
100.     In   Shakti   Vahini   vs.   Union   of   India   &   Ors. 105
,   while
dealing   with   a   writ   petition   seeking   a   direction   to   the   State
Governments and Central Government to take preventive measures
103 (2006) 5 SCC 475
104 (2011) 6 SCC 405
105 (2018) 7 SCC 192
132

to   combat   honour   crimes   and   to   submit   a   National/State   plan   of
action,   this   Court   issued   a   slew   of   directions   directing   the   State
Governments to take both punitive and remedial measures, on the
ground   that   the   State   has   a   positive   obligation   to   protect   the   life
and   liberty   of   persons.     In   paragraph   49   this   Court   said,   “ We   are
disposed   to   think   so,   as   it   is   the   obligation   of   the   State   to   have   an
atmosphere   where   the   citizens   are   in   a   position   to   enjoy   their
fundamental   rights.”   After   quoting   the   previous   decision   in   S.
Rangarajan   (supra) ,   which   arose   out   of   the   infringement   of   the
freedom of expression in respect of a cinematograph film, this Court
said in  Shakti Vahini  (supra)  as follows:­
“ 49. …
We   are   absolutely   conscious   that   the   aforesaid
passage   has   been   stated   in   respect   of   a   different
fundamental   right,   but   the   said   principle   applies
with   more   vigour   when   the   life   and   liberty   of
individuals   is   involved.   We   say   so   reminding   the
States   of   their   constitutional   obligations   to
comfort,   nurture   the   sustenance   of   fundamental
rights of the citizens and not to allow any hostile
group to create any kind of trench in them .”
101.   At   last,   while   dealing   with   the   right   to   privacy,   in   Justice
K.S.   Puttaswamy ,   this   Court   made   it   clear   that,   “ it   is   a   right
133

which   protects   the   inner   sphere   of   the   individuals   from
interference by both the State and non­State actors ”.
102.   Before we conclude this chapter, we must point out that some
academics   feel   that   the   same   level   of   justification   for   infringement
by   the   State,   for   all   rights   recognized   by   the   Court,   end   up   being
problematic 106
  and   that   the   idea   of   a   hierarchy   of   rights,   as
articulated  by   Das,  J.  in   A.K.   Gopalan   may   have   to  be  examined.
In fact,   Rohinton Nariman ,   J.   articulated this idea in   Mohd.  Arif
(supra)  where  the  question  was  as  to  whether  a  petition  for   review
in   the   Supreme   Court   should   be   heard   in   open   Court   at   least   in
death penalty cases. The learned Judge said:
“ 36.   If  a  pyramidical   structure  is   to  be  imagined,
with   life   on   top,   personal   liberty   (and   all   the
rights   it   encompasses   under   the   new   doctrine)
immediately   below   it   and   other   fundamental
rights   below   personal   liberty   it   is   obvious   that
this   judgment   will   apply   only   to   death   sentence
cases.   In   most   other   cases,   the   factors   mentioned   by
Krishna   Iyer,   J.   in   particular   the   Supreme   Court’s
overcrowded   docket,   and   the   fact   that   a   full   oral
hearing has preceded judgment of a criminal appeal on
merits, may tilt the balance the other way.”
106 Anup Surendranath in his Article “ Life and Personal Liberty ” in The Oxford Handbook of 
the Indian Constitution (South Asia Edition), 2016
134

Therefore,   the   importance   of   the   right   to   personal   liberty   over   and
above all the other rights guaranteed under Articles 19 and 14 need
hardly to be over­emphasized.
103.   Therefore, our answer to Question No.3 would be that the
State   is   under   a   duty   to   affirmatively   protect   the   rights   of   a
person under Article 21, whenever there is a threat to personal
liberty, even by a non­State actor .
Question No.4 
104 .   Question   No.4  referred  to  us  is  this:  “Can  a  statement  made
by a Minister, traceable to any affairs of the State or for protecting
the Government, be attributed vicariously to the Government itself,
especially in view of the principle of Collective Responsibility?”
105 .   The   above   question   revolves   around   the   role   and
responsibility of a Minister and the vicarious liability/responsibility
of a Government to any statement made by him. For answering the
said   question,   we   may   need   to   understand   the   role   of   a   Minister
under our Constitutional scheme.
135

106 .   Part   V   of   the   Constitution   providing   for   matters   connected
with   “ T he   Union ”   contains   five   chapters,   dealing   respectively   with,
(i)   the   Executive;   (ii)   Parliament;   (iii)   Legislative   powers   of   the
President;   (iv)   the Union Judiciary; and   (v)   Comptroller and Auditor
General   of   India.   Part   VI   of   the   Constitution   dealing   with   “ The
States ”   contains   six   chapters,   dealing   respectively   with,   (i)   general
provision containing the definitions;  (ii)  the Executive;  (iii)  the State
Legislature;   (iv)   Legislative   power   of   the   Governor;   (v)   the   High
Courts in the States; and  (vi)  Subordinate Courts.
107 .   While Articles 74 and 75 provide for,   (i)   ‘Council of Ministers
to   aid   and   advise   the   President’;   and   (ii)   ‘Other   provisions   as   to
Ministers’, insofar as the Union is concerned, Articles 163 and 164
provide for,  (i)  ‘Council of Ministers to aid and advise the Governor’;
and   (ii)   ‘Other provisions as to Ministers’, insofar as the States are
concerned. Similarly, Article 77 provides for the conduct of business
of the Government of India and Article 166 provides for the conduct
of   business   of   the   Government   of   a   State.   The   duties   of   the   Prime
136

Minister   are   dealt   with   in   Article   78   and   the   duties   of   Chief
Ministers are dealt with in Article 167.
108 .   Article   75(3)   states  that   “ the   Council   of   Ministers   shall   be
collectively   responsible   to   the   House   of   the   People .”     Similarly,
Article   164(2)   states   “ the   Council   of   Ministers   shall   be   collectively
responsible to the Legislative Assembly of the State” .
109 .   Generally,   all   executive   action   of   the   Government   of   India
shall  be  expressed  to  be  taken in  the  name of  the  President  under
Article   77(1).   However,   for   more   convenient   transaction   of   the
business   of   the   Government   of   India,   the   President   shall   make
Rules.   These   Rules   shall   also   provide   for   the   allocation   of   the
business   among   Ministers.   This   is   under   Article   77(3).   Similar
provisions are found in sub­Articles (1) and (3) of Article 166.
110 .   There   are   special   duties   assigned   to   the   Prime   Minister   and
the Chief Ministers, under Articles 78 and 167 respectively.  
111 .   While   dealing   with   the   scheme   of   Article   166(3),   the
Constitution Bench of this Court pointed out in  A. Sanjeevi Naidu
137

vs .   State of Madras 107
,   that under our Constitution, the Governor
is   essentially   a   constitutional   head   and   the   administration   of   the
State is run by the Council of Ministers.   Since it is impossible for
the   Council   of   Ministers   to   deal   with   each   and   every   matter   that
comes   before   the   Government,   the   Governor   is   authorized   under
Article 166(3) to make Rules for the more convenient transaction of
the   business   of   the   Government   of   the   State   and   for   allocation
amongst   its   Ministers   the   business   of   the   Government.   In
paragraph   10   of   the   said   decision,   the   Constitution   Bench
spoke   about   “joint   responsibility”   and   not   about   collective
responsibility .   The   relevant   portion   of   paragraph   10   reads   as
follows:
“ 10. The   cabinet   is   responsible   to   the   Legislature
for   every   action   taken   in   any   of   the   Ministries.
That   is   the   essence   of   joint   responsibility .   That
does   not   mean   that   each   and   every   decision   must   be
taken by the cabinet. The political responsibility of the
Council of Ministers does not and cannot predicate the
personal   responsibility   of   the   Council   of   Ministers   to
discharge   all   or   any   of   the   Governmental   functions.
Similarly   an   individual   Minister   is   responsible   to   the
Legislature   for   every   action   taken   or   omitted   to   be
taken   in   his   ministry.   This   again   is   a   political
107  (1970) 1 SCC 443
138

responsibility   and   not   personal   responsibility.   …”
112. The expression “ collective responsibility”  can be traced to some
extent,   to   Article   75(3)   insofar   as   the   Union   is   concerned   and   to
Article   164(2)   insofar   as   the   States   are   concerned.   But   in   both   the
Articles,   it   is   the   Council   of   Ministers   who   are   stated   to   be
collectively   responsible   to   the   House   of   the   People/Legislative
Assembly   of   the   State.   Generally   collective   responsibility   of   the
Council of Ministers either to the House of the People or to the
Assembly   should   be   understood   to   correlate   to   the   decisions
and   actions   of   the   Council   of   Ministers   and   not   to   every
statement made by every individual Minister.
113 . In   State   of   Karnataka   vs .   Union   of   India. 108
,   a   Seven
Member   Constitution   Bench   of   this   Court,   while   dealing   with   a
challenge made by the State of Karnataka in the form of a civil suit
under Article 131, to the appointment by the Central Government, of
a   commission   of   enquiry   against   the   Chief   Minister   of   Karnataka,
had   an   occasion   to   consider   the   exposition   of   the   words   “c ollective
108  (1977) 4 SCC 608
139

responsibility ”   appearing   in   Article   164(2).   After   indicating   that
collective   responsibility   is   basically   political   in   origin   and
mode of operation , Beg, C.J. opined in the said case as follows:
“ 46.   The   object   of   collective   responsibility   is   to
make   the   whole   body   of   persons   holding
Ministerial   office   collectively,   or,   if   one   may   so
put   it,   “vicariously”   responsible   for   such   acts   of
the   others   as   are   referable   to   their   collective
volition   so  that,   even   if  an   individual   may  not   be
personally   responsible   for   it,   yet,   he   will   be
deemed to share the responsibility with those who
may have actually committed some wrong. …
47.   Each Minister can be and is separately responsible
for   his   own   decisions   and   acts   and   omissions   also.
But,   inasmuch   as   the   Council   of   Ministers   is   able   to
stay in office only so long as it commands the support
and   confidence   of   a   majority   of   members   of   the
Legislature of the State, the whole Council of Ministers
must   be   held   to   be   politically   responsible   for   the
decisions   and   policies   of   each   of   the   Ministers   and   of
his   department   which   could   be   presumed   to  have   the
support   of   the   whole   Ministry.   Hence,   the   whole
Ministry   will,   at   least   on   issues   involving   matters   of
policy,   have   to   be   treated   as   one   entity   so   far   as   its
answerability   to   the  Legislative  Assembly   representing
the   electors   is   concerned.   This   is   the   meaning   of   the
principle underlying Article 164(2) of the Constitution.
The purpose of this provision is not to find out facts or
to   establish   the   actual   responsibility   of   a   Chief
Minister   or   any   other   Minister   or   Ministers   for
particular decisions or Governmental acts. That can be
more   suitably   done,   when   wrongful   acts   or   decisions
are   complained   of,   by   means   of   inquiries   under   the
Act.   As   already   indicated   above,   the   procedure   of
Parliamentary Committees to inquire into every legally
or   ethically   wrong   act   was   found   to   be   unsatisfactory
and   unsound.   The   principle   of   individual   as   well   as
140

collective   ministerial   responsibility   can   work   most
efficiently only when cases requiring proper sifting and
evaluation   of   evidence   and   discussion   of   questions
involved   have   taken   place,   where   this   is   required,   in
proceedings   before   a   Commission   appointed   under
Section 3 of the Act.
48.   Text­book   writers   on   Constitutional   Law   have
indicated   how   collective   ministerial   responsibility   to
Parliament,   which   has   essentially   a   political   purpose
and   effects,   developed   later   than   individual
responsibility   of   Ministers   to   Parliament   which   was
also political in origin and operation. It is true that an
individual   Minister   could,   in   England,   where   the
principle   of   individual   and   collective   responsibility   of
Ministers   was   evolved,   be   responsible   either   for
wrongful acts done by him without the authority of the
whole   cabinet   or   of   the   monarch   to   support   them,   or
under orders of the King who could, in the eye of law,
do no wrong. But, apart from an impeachment, which
has  become  obsolete,   or   punishment  for   contempts   of
a   House,   which   constitute   only   a   limited   kind   of
offences, the Parliament does not punish the offender.
For establishing his legal liability recourse to ordinary
courts of law is indispensable.”
114 . Quoting   from   Wade   and   Phillips   on   Constitutional   Law,   this
Court   pointed   out   in   the   State   of   Karnataka   (supra)   that
“ responsibility to Parliament only means that the Minster may
be compelled by convention to resign. ”
115 . The extent to which the enforcement of collective responsibility
can be taken was also indicated in the above decision as follows:
“ 50. The   whole   question   of   responsibility   is
related   to   the   continuance   of   a   Minister   or   a
141

Government   in   office.   A   Minister's   own   acts   or
omissions or those of others in the department in
his   charge,   for   which   he   may   feel   morally
responsible,   or,   for   which   others   may   hold   him
morally responsible, may compel him to resign.  By
an   extension   of   this   logic,   applied   to   individual
Ministers   at   first,   emerged   the   principle   of   “collective
responsibility”   which   we  find  enacted   in  Articles   75(2)
and   164(2)   of   our   Constitution.   The   only   sanction   for
its   enforcement   is   the   pressure   of   public   opinion
expressed   particularly   in   terms   of   withdrawal   of
political   support   by   members   of   Parliament   or   the
State Legislature as the case may be.”
116 .   In other words, this Court indicated that while a Minister may
be   compelled   to   resign   for   his   individual   acts   of   omission   or
commission, the   only sanction  for the  enforcement of collective
responsibility is the  “ pressure of public opinion ”.
117 .   In  R.K. Jain  vs.  Union of India 109
, this Court was concerned
with   a   public   interest   litigation   relating   to   the   functioning   of   the
Customs, Excise and Gold Control Appellate Tribunal. At that time
the office of the President of the Tribunal was lying vacant for over
six months. But after   rule nisi   was issued in the first writ petition,
the   Government   appointed   someone   as   the   President   of   the
Tribunal.  Immediately,   a   second   writ   petition   was   filed   challenging
the appointment and also some of the recruitment rules relating to
109 (1993) 4 SCC 119
142

the appointment.The file relating to the appointment was produced
in a sealed cover and the Government claimed privilege in terms of
Section   123   of   the   Indian   Evidence   Act,   1872   and   Article   74(2)   of
the   Constitution.   While   dealing   with   the   executive   power   of   the
President and the role of the Council of Ministers, K.Ramasamy, J.,
said   “ The   principle   of   ministerial   responsibility   has   a   variety
of   meanings   precise   and   imprecise,   authentic   and   vague ”.
Paragraphs   29   and   30   of   the   report   in   R.K.   Jain   (supra)   may   be
usefully extracted as follows:
“ 29.   It  would thus be  held  that the  Cabinet  known  as
Council   of   Ministers   headed   by   Prime   Minister   under
Article   75(3)   is   the   driving   and   steering   body
responsible   for   the   governance   of   the   country.   They
enjoy   the   confidence   of   the   Parliament   and   remain   in
office   so   long   as   they   maintain   the   confidence   of   the
majority.   They   are   answerable   to   the   Parliament   and
accountable   to   the   people.   They   bear   collective
responsibility and shall be bound to maintain secrecy.
Their   executive   function   comprises   of   both   the
determination   of   the   policy   as   well   as   carrying   it   into
execution, the initiation of legislation, the maintenance
of order, the promotion of social and economic welfare,
direction   of   foreign   policy.   In   short   the   carrying   on   or
supervision of the general administration of the affairs
of   Union   of   India   which   includes   political   activity   and
carrying   on   all   trading   activities,   the   acquisition,
holding   and   disposal   of   property   and   the   making   of
contracts   for   any   purpose.   In   short   the   primary
function   of   the   Cabinet   is   to   formulate   the   policies   of
the   Government   in   conformity   with   the   directive
principles of the Constitution for the governance of the
nation;   place   the   same   before   the   Parliament   for
143

acceptance   and   to   carry   on   the   executive   function   of
the State as per the provisions of the Constitution and
the laws.
30.   Collective   responsibility   under   Article   75(3)   of
the   Constitution   inheres   maintenance   of
confidentiality as enjoined in oaths of office and of
secrecy   set   forth   in   Schedule   III   of   the
Constitution   that   the   Minister   will   not   directly   or
indirectly   communicate   or   reveal   to   any   person   or
persons   any   matter   which   shall   be   brought   under
his/her   consideration   or   shall   become   known   to
him/her as Minister except as may be required for the
“due  discharge  of  his/her   duty  as  Minister”. The  base
and   basic   postulate   of   its   significance   is
unexceptionable.   But   the   need   for   and   effect   of
confidentiality   has   to   be   nurtured   not   merely   from
political   imperatives   of   collective   responsibility
envisaged   by   Article   75(3)   but   also   from   its
pragmatism.”
118 .     In   paragraph   33   of   the   report   in   R.K.   Jain ,   this   Court
indicated that the Cabinet as a whole is collectively responsible for
the advice tendered to the President and for the conduct of business
of   each   of   his/her   department.   The   question   as   to   what   happens
when   an   individual   Minister   is   in   total   disagreement   with   the
collective decision of the Cabinet was also spelt out in  R.K. Jain  in
the following words:
“ 33.   ...Each   member   of   the   Cabinet   has   personal
responsibility to his conscience and also responsibility
to   the   Government.   Discussion   and   persuasion   may
diminish   disagreement,   reach   unanimity,   or   leave
it   unaltered.   Despite   persistence   of   disagreement,
144

it   is   a   decision,   though   some   members   like   it   less
than   others.   Both   practical   politics   and   good
government   require   that   those   who   like   it   less
must still publicly support it. If such support is too
great   a   strain   on   a   Minister's   conscience   or
incompatible   to   his/her   perceptions   of
commitment   and   he/she   finds   it   difficult   to
support   the   decision,   it  would   be   open   to  him/her
to   resign .   So   the   price   of   the   acceptance   of   Cabinet
office   is   the   assumption   of   the   responsibility   to
support   Cabinet   decisions.   The   burden   of   that
responsibility is shared by all.”
119 .     In   Secretary,   Jaipur   Development   Authority,   Jaipur
(supra) ,   the   abuse   of   official   position   by   the   Minister   of   Urban
Development   and   Housing   Department   and   the   officers   working   in
the   Jaipur   Development   Authority   in   the   matter   of   allotment   of
plots became the subject matter. While dealing with the question of
individual   and   collective   accountability   and   responsibility   of
Ministers, this Court said in paragraph 10 as follows:
“ 10.   ...The   Governor   runs   the   Executive   Government
of a State with the aid and advice of the Chief Minister
and   the   Council   of   Ministers   which   exercise   the
powers   and   performs   its   duties   by   the   individual
Ministers   as   public   officers   with   the   assistance   of   the
bureaucracy   working   in   various   departments   and
corporate   sectors   etc.   Though   they   are   expressed   in
the name of the Governor, each Minister  is personally
and   collectively   responsible   for   the   actions,   acts   and
policies.   They   are   accountable   and   answerable   to   the
people.   Their   powers   and   duties   are   regulated   by   the
law   and   the   rules.   The   legal   and   moral   responsibility
145

or   liability   for   the   acts   done   or   omissions,   duties
performed   and   policy   laid   down   rest   solely   on   the
Minister   of   the   Department.   Therefore,   they   are
indictable for their conduct or omission, or misconduct
or   misappropriation.   The   Council   of   Ministers   are
jointly   and   severally   responsible   to   the
Legislature.   He/they   is/are   also   publicly
accountable   for   the   acts   or   conducts   in   the
performance of duties. ”
120 .   Again, in paragraph 11, this Court outlined the responsibility
of the Ministers as follows:
“11.   The   Minister   holds   public   office   though   he   gets
constitutional   status   and   performs   functions   under
the   Constitution,   law   or   executive   policy.   The   acts
done and duties performed are public acts or duties as
the   holder   of   public   office.   Therefore,   he   owes   certain
accountability   for   the   acts   done   or   duties   performed.
In a democratic society governed by rule of law, power
is   conferred   on   the   holder   of   the   public   office   or   the
authority   concerned   by   the   Constitution   by   virtue   of
appointment.   The   holder   of   the   office,   therefore,   gets
opportunity   to   abuse   or   misuse   the   office.   The
politician who holds public office must perform public
duties   with   the   sense   of   purpose,   and   a   sense   of
direction,   under   rules   or   sense   of   priorities.   The
purpose  must   be   genuine   in  a   free   democratic   society
governed   by   the   rule   of   law   to   further   socio­economic
democracy.   The   Executive   Government   should   frame
its   policies   to   maintain   the   social   order,   stability,
progress   and   morality.   All   actions   of   the   Government
are   performed   through/by   individual   persons   in
collective   or   joint   or   individual   capacity.   Therefore,
they should morally be responsible for their actions .”
121 .     In   Vineet   Narain   vs.   Union   of   India. 110
,   this   Court   was
concerned   with   a   public   interest   litigation   under   Article   32
110 (1998) 1 SCC 226
146

complaining about the inaction on the part of the Central Bureau of
Investigation   in   a   matter   relating   to   the   disclosures   contained   in
what   came   to   be   known   as   “Jain   Diaries”.   After   taking   note   of   the
Report   of   Lord   Nolan   on   “Standards   in   Public   Life” ,   this   Court
issued   certain   directions,   though   confined   only   to   the   Central
Bureau   of   Investigation,   Enforcement   Directorate   and   Prosecution
Agency.   But   Lord   Nolan’s   Report   dealt   mainly   with   principles   of
public life and code of conduct.
122 .     The   decision   in   Common   Cause   was   little   peculiar   and
riddled with some problems. The allotment of petroleum outlets by
the   then   Minister   of   State   for   Petroleum   and   Natural   Gas,   under
what was claimed to be a discretionary quota, was first set aside by
this   Court   by   a   judgment   reported   in   (1996)   6   SCC   530.
Simultaneously,   a   show­cause   notice   was   issued   to   the   then
Minister   Capt.   Satish   Sharma   as   to   why   a   criminal   complaint
should   not   be   lodged   against   him   and   why   he   should   not   be
directed   to   pay   damages   for   his   malafide   action   in   wrongfully
allotting   the   petrol   outlets.   After   the   Minister   responded   to   the
show­cause notice, an order was passed, reported in (1996) 6 SCC
147

593,   directing   the   Minister   to   pay   exemplary   damages   and   also
directing   the   initiation   of   prosecution.   Later,   a   petition   for   review
was   filed   by   the   Minister   for   recalling   the   order   which   directed
payment   of   exemplary   damages   and   also   the   registration   of   a   case
by the Central Bureau of Investigation. The decision in the petition
for review, reported in (1999) 6 SCC 667, dealt with the question of
collective   responsibility   in   the   context   of   the   contention   raised.   It
was argued by  the delinquent Minister  in the said case that under
the   business   rules   of   the   Cabinet,   the   act   of   a   Minister   is   to   be
treated as the act of the President or the Governor as the case may
be and that therefore the allotment made by him should be treated
to have been made while acting only on behalf of the President.  As
an   extension   of   this   argument,   it   was   also   contended   that   the
Minister having acted as a part of the Council of Ministers, his act
should be treated to be the act of the entire Cabinet on the principle
of collective responsibility. While rejecting  the said contention, this
Court   held   in   Common   Cause   that   the   immunity   available   to   the
President under Article 361 of the Constitution cannot be extended
to   the   orders   passed   in   the   name   of   the   President   under   Article
148

77(1) or  77(2). Dealing  with  the concept of collective responsibility,
this Court held in paragraph 31 as follows:
“ 31.   The   concept   of   “collective   responsibility”   is
essentially   a   political   concept .   The   country   is
governed   by   the   party   in   power   on   the   basis   of   the
policies   adopted   and   laid   down   by   it   in   the   Cabinet
meeting.   “Collective   responsibility”   has   two   meanings:
the first meaning which can legitimately be ascribed to
it is that all members of a Government are unanimous
in   support   of   its   policies   and   would   exhibit   that
unanimity   on   public   occasions   although   while
formulating   the   policies,   they   might   have   expressed   a
different view in the meeting of the Cabinet. The other
meaning  is that  Ministers, who had an opportunity  to
speak   for   or   against   the   policies   in   the   Cabinet   are
thereby   personally   and   morally   responsible   for   its
success and failure.”
123 .     After   having   dealt   with   the   concept   of   collective
responsibility,   this   Court   carved   out   an   exception   in   paragraph   34
as follows:
 “ 34.   From the above, it will be seen that in spite of the
fact   that   the   Council   of   Ministers   is   collectively
responsible   to   the   House   of   the   People,   there   may   be
an   occasion   where   the   conduct   of   a   Minister   may   be
censured if he or his subordinates have blundered and
have acted contrary to law.”
124 .    Again in paragraph 36 this Court held as follows:
“ 36.   Even in England, all Ministers and servants of the
Crown are accountable to the courts for the legality of
their   actions,   and   may   be   held   civilly   and   criminally
liable,   in   their   individual   capacities,   for   tortious   or
criminal   acts.   This   liability   may   be   enforced   either   by
149

means   of   ordinary   criminal   or   civil   proceedings   or   by
means   of   impeachment,   a   remedy   which   is   probably
obsolete.   They   are   also   subject   to   the   judicial   review
jurisdiction   of   the   courts.   [See:   Halsbury's   Laws   of
England , Fourth Edn., (Re­issue), Vol. 8(2), para 422.]”
125 .     In   State   (NCT   of   Delhi)   vs.   Union   of   India 111
,   the
Constitution   Bench   of   this   Court   was   concerned   with   the
interpretation   of   Article   239AA   of   the   Constitution.   The   concept   of
collective   responsibility   was   dealt   with   extensively   by   Dipak   Misra,
C.J., as he then was, from paragraphs 82 to 85. In his independent
but   concurring   opinion   Dr.   D.Y.   Chandrachud,   J.   also   dealt   with
the   question   of   collective   responsibility   from   paragraphs   318
onwards.
126.     What   follows   from   the   above   discussion   is,   (i)   that   the
concept of collective responsibility is essentially a political concept;
(ii)   that   the   collective   responsibility   is   that   of   the   Council   of
Ministers; and  (iii)  that such collective responsibility is to the House
of   the   People/Legislative   Assembly   of   the   State.   Generally,   such
responsibility   correlates   to   (i)   the  decisions   taken;   and   (ii)   the  acts
of omission  and  commission  done.  It is not possible to  extend  this
111 (2018) 8 SCC 501
150

concept of collective responsibility to any and every statement orally
made   by   a   Minister   outside   the   House   of   the   People/Legislative
Assembly.
127.     Shri   Kaleeswaram   Raj,   learned   counsel   appearing   for   the
special leave petitioner drew our attention to the code of conduct for
Ministers   of   the   Government   of   Australia,   code   of   conduct   for
Ministers of the Government of India and the Ministerial Code of the
United   Kingdom.  However,  attractive  such   prescriptions   may   be,  it
is   not   possible   to   enforce   such   code   of   conduct   in   a   court   of   law.
Government   servants   stand   on   a   different   footing,   as   any
misconduct   on   their   part   with   reference   to   the   Government
Servants (Conduct) Rules, may attract disciplinary action under the
Civil   Services   (Discipline   and   Appeal)   Rules.   Even   in   the   case   of
Government   servants,   it   may   not   be   possible   to   justify   a
dismissal/removal from service on the basis of a statement uttered
by   a   Government   servant,   as   it   may   not   pass   the   proportionality
test,  viz­a­viz  the gravity of the misconduct. 
128.     The   suggestion   made   by   Shri   Kaleeswaram   Raj   that   the
Prime Minister, in the case of a Minister  of the Union of India and
151

the Chief Minister, in the case of a Minister of the State should be
allowed   to   take   appropriate   action,   against   the   erring   Minister,   is
just fanciful. The Prime Minister or the Chief Minister does not have
disciplinary control over the members of the Council of Ministers. It
is   true   that   in   practice,   a   strong   Prime   Minister   or   Chief   Minister
will   be   able   to   drop   any   Minister   out   of   the   Cabinet.   But   in   a
country   like   ours   where   there   is   a   multi­party   system   and   where
coalition   Governments   are   often   formed,   it   is   not   possible   at   all
times   for   a   Prime   Minister/Chief   Minister   to   take   the   whip,
whenever   a   statement   is   made   by   someone   in   the   Council   of
Ministers.
129 .    Governments which survive on wafer­thin majority ( of which
we have seen quite a bit ), sometimes have individual Ministers who
are strong enough to decide the very survival of such Governments.
This problem is not unique to our country.
130.     We   have   followed   the   Westminster   Model   but   the
Westminster   Model   itself   became   shaky   after   the   United   Kingdom
saw   the   first   coalition   Government   in   2010,   since   the   Churchill
Caretaker Ministry of 1945. It is interesting to note that in a Report
152

submitted   by   the   Constitution   Committee   (UK)   in   the   year   2014,
under the title, “ Constitutional Implications of Coalition Government ”
it was pointed out that “ collective ministerial responsibility has
been   the   convention   most   affected   by   coalition   Government ”.
The Report proceeds to state that the coalition Government formed
in   2010   (in   UK)   set   out   five   specific   issues   on   which   the   parties
would   agree   to   differ.   But,   in   reality   the   number   of   areas   of
disagreement   has   been   greater   resulting   on   one   occasion,   in
Ministers being whipped to vote in opposite lobbies and on another,
in MPs on the Treasury Benches attempting to amend the Address
on the Queen’s speech.
131 .    In the “ Briefing Paper ” (Number 7755, 14 November 2016) on
“ Collective  responsibility ” by  Michael Everett available in the House
of   Commons   Library,   (i)   the   early   origins   and   development   of   the
concept   of   collective   responsibility;   (ii)   what   is   collective
responsibility;   (iii)   the   conventions   of   collective   responsibility;   and
(iv)   departures   from   collective   responsibility   are   dealt   with.   This
Paper   traces   early   beginnings   of   the   doctrine   of   collective
responsibility   to   the   reign   of   George   III   (1760­1820).   According   to
153

the  Briefing   Paper, the  development  of today’s  concept of  collective
responsibility   arose   during   the   Victorian   golden   age   of
Parliamentary Government. In fact, the Briefing Paper quotes some
commentators   who   have   questioned   whether   the   convention   of
collective  responsibility   remains  appropriate  for   the   Government  of
today.   The   Briefing   Paper   quotes   Barry   Winetrobe,   a   Research
Fellow   at   the   Constitution   Unit   who   said   that   the   doctrine   of
collective responsibility was developed at a time when a sense
of coherence was  required  to be maintained among disparate
ministerial forces in the face of the Monarch and that it is not
necessarily  appropriate  in an  age,  not   just  of  democracy,  but
of greater and more direct participative democracy .
132 .     It will be useful to quote a portion of Chapter 2.3 under the
heading   “ Enforcing   collective   responsibility ”   from   the   Briefing   Paper
as follows:
“…Dr Felicity Matthews, Senior Lecturer in Governance
and Public Policy at the University of Sheffield, has also
argued   that   the   respect   accorded   to   the   doctrine   of
collective   responsibility   “has   varied”,   with   its
maintenance   and   disregard   “owing   as   much   to   politics
as to propriety”.
154

An interesting example of this occurred in 2003 during
the build­up to the Iraq war. Robin Cook, the Leader of
the   House   of   Commons,   resigned   in   protest   in   March
2003 over the then Labour Government’s policy toward
Iraq,  being   unable   to  maintain   the  official   Government
position. His actions were therefore consistent with the
doctrine   of   collective   responsibility.   However,   Clare
Short,   the   Secretary   of   State   for   International
Development,   was   allowed   to   stay   in   the   Cabinet
despite   her   own   vocal   opposition   to   military
intervention   and   despite   publicly   denouncing   the   then
Prime Minister as “deeply reckless” in March 2003.
According   to   Felicity   Matthews,   despite   her
“extraordinary breach” of collective responsibility, Clare
Short   was   persuaded   and   allowed   to   retain   her
ministerial portfolio. She then remained in the Cabinet
for a further two months, until she decided to resign on
12   May   2003,   following   perceived   mistakes   in   the
US/UK   coalition   after   the   invasion.   This   example,
according to Matthews, “underlines the extent to which
Prime   Ministers   have   proven   unwilling   or   unable   to
enforce   a   strict   interpretation   of   collective
responsibility,  even  when  their  personal  credibility  has
been besmirched”.
133.     Thus,   the   convention   developed   in   the   United   Kingdom   for
Ministers, itself appears to have gone for a toss and hence, it is not
possible to draw any inspiration from the UK Model.
134.     We   are   not   suggesting   for   a   moment   that   any   public   official
including a Minister can make a statement which is irresponsible or
in bad taste or bordering on hate speech and get away with it.   We
are   only   on   the   question   of   collective   responsibility   and   the
vicarious liability of the Government.
155

135 .     As   all   the   literature   on   the   issue   shows,   collective
responsibility   is   that   of   the   Council   of   Ministers.   Each   individual
Minister   is   responsible   for   the   decisions   taken   collectively   by   the
Council of Ministers.  In other words, the flow of stream in collective
responsibility   is   from   the   Council   of   Ministers   to   the   individual
Ministers.   The   flow   is   not   on   the   reverse,   namely,   from   the
individual Ministers to the Council of Ministers.
136 .    Our attention was also drawn to the decision of this Court in
Amish   Devgan .   Though   the   said   decision   considered   extensively
the   impact   of   the   speech   of   “ a   person   of   influence ”,   we   are   not,   in
this reference dealing with the same. This is for the reason that the
said   decision   concerned   “ hate   speech ”.     None   of   the   questions
referred to us, including Question No.4 with which we are presently
concerned, relates to hate speech, and understandably so. The writ
petition   as   well   as   the   special   leave   petition   out   of   which   this
reference   arose,   concerned   speeches   made   by   the   Ministers   of   the
State of Uttar Pradesh and the State of Kerala. The speech made by
the Minister of the State of Uttar Pradesh attempted to paint a case
of   robbery   and   gang­rape   as   a   political   conspiracy.   The   speech   of
156

the   Minister   of   the   State   of   Kerala   portrayed   women   in   a
disrespectful way. Since the statements concerned in both the cases
were   attributed   to   the   Ministers,   Question   No.4   referred   to   us,
specifically   relates   to   “ statement   made   by   a   Minister ”.   Amish
Devgan   did   not   deal   with   the   statement   of   a   Minister   traceable   to
any   affairs   of   the   State,   though   a   Minister   would   fall   under   the
category   of   “ person   of   influence ”.   Moreover,   the   statements
attributed   to   the   Ministers   in   the   cases   on   hand   may   not   come
under   the   category   of   hate   speech.   Therefore,   we   do   not   wish   to
enlarge   the   scope   of   this   reference   by   going   into   the   questions
which were answered in  Amish Devgan .
137 .     Therefore,   our   answer   to   Question   No.4   would   be   that   a
statement made by a Minister even if traceable to any affairs
of   the   State   or   for   protecting   the   Government,   cannot   be
attributed   vicariously   to   the   Government   by   invoking   the
principle of collective responsibility.
Question No.5
157

138 .    Question No.5 referred to us for consideration is “ whether a
statement   by   a   Minister,   inconsistent   with   the   rights   of   a   citizen
under   Part­III   of   the   Constitution,   constitutes   a   violation   of   such
constitutional rights and is actionable as ‘Constitutional Tort’?” 
139 .     To   begin   with,   we   have   some   difficulty   with   the   words
“ a   statement   by   a   Minister ”,   appearing   in   Question   No.5.
A statement may be made by a Minister either inside or outside the
House of People/Legislative Assembly of the State. A statement may
also   be   made   by   a   Minister   in   writing   or   by   words   spoken.   A
statement   may   be   made   in   private   or   in   public.   A   statement   may
also   be   made  by   a   Minister   either   touching   upon   the   affairs   of  the
Ministry/ department of which he is in control or touching generally
upon   the   policies   of   the   Government   of   which   he   is   a   part.   A
Minister  may  also   make  a  statement,  in  the  form   of  an  opinion  on
matters about which he or his department is not concerned or over
which he has no control.   All such statements need not necessarily
give rise to an action in tort or in constitutional tort.
140 .    Take for instance a case where a Minister makes a statement
that   women   are   unfit   to   be   employed   in   a   particular   avocation.   It
158

may reflect his insensitivity to gender equality and also may expose
his low constitutional morality. The fact that due to his insensitivity
or lack of understanding or low constitutional morality, he speaks a
language that has the potential to demean the constitutional rights
of   women,   cannot   be   a   ground   for   action   in   Constitutional   tort.
Needless   to   say   that   no   one   can   either   be   taxed   or   penalised   for
holding   an   opinion   which   is   not   in   conformity   with   the
constitutional   values.   It   is   only   when   his   opinion   gets   translated
into action and such action results in injury or harm or loss that an
action in tort will lie. With this caveat, let us now get into the core
of the issue. 
141.   A tort is a civil wrong, that causes a claimant to suffer loss or
harm   resulting   in   legal   liability   for   the   person   who   commits   the
tortious act. Halsbury’s Law of England states:  “Those civil rights of
action which are available for the recovery of unliquidated damages
by persons who have sustained injury or loss from acts, statements
or   omissions   of   others   in   breach   of   duty   or   contravention   of   right
imposed  or conferred by law rather than by agreement are  rights of
action in tort.”
159

142.   If Crown Proceedings Act, 1947 changed the course of the law
relating   to   tort   in   England,   the   Federal   Tort   Claims   Act,   1946
changed in America, the course of law relating to the liability of the
State   for   the   tortious   acts   of   its   servants.   Nevertheless,   the   claims
for damages continued to be resisted for a long time both here and
elsewhere on the principle of sovereign immunity. It is interesting to
note that on the initiative of the President of India, the Law Ministry
took   up   for   consideration   the   question   whether   legislation   on   the
lines of the Crown Proceedings Act, 1947 of the United Kingdom is
needed and if so, to what extent.   After the constitution of the Law
Commission,   the   Law   Ministry   referred   the   matter   to   the
Commission   for   consideration   and   report.   In   its   First   Report
submitted   on   11.5.1956   on   “Liability   of   the   State   in   Tort” ,   the   Law
Commission   took   note   of   (i)   the   existing   law   in   India;   (ii)   law   in
England;  (iii)  law in America;  (iv)  law in Australia;  (v)  law in France;
(vi)   rule   of   statutory   construction;   and   (vii)   conclusions   and
proposals.
143.   In Chapter VIII containing the conclusions and proposals, the
First   Report   of   the   Law   Commission   suggested:   (i)   that   in   the
160

context of a welfare State, it is necessary to establish a just relation
between   the   rights   of   the   individual   and   the   responsibilities   of   the
State;   (ii)   that   when   the   Constitution   was   framed,   the   question   to
what extent, if any, the Union and the States should be made liable
for   the   tortious   acts   of   their   servants   or   agents   was   left   for   future
legislation;   (iii)   that   the   question   of   demarcating   the   line   up   to
which the State should be made liable for the tortious acts, involves
a nice balancing of considerations, so as not to unduly restrict the
sphere  of  the  activities  of  the  State  and  at  the   same  time  to   afford
sufficient  protection to  the citizen;   (iv)   that it is necessary  that the
law should, as far as possible, be made certain and definite, instead
of   leaving   it   to   courts   to   develop   the   law   according   to   the   views   of
the   judges;   and   (v)   that   the   old   distinction   between   sovereign   and
the   non­sovereign   functions   or   Governmental   and   the   non­
Governmental   functions   should   no   longer   be   invoked   to   determine
the liability of the State.
144.     Paragraph   66   of   the   First   Report   of   the   Law   Commission
contained   the   principles   on   which   appropriate   legislation   should
proceed.  It will be useful to extract paragraph 66 of the First Report
161

of  the  Law  Commission,   to  understand  the  sweep  of  constitutional
tort,   as   it   was   conceived   within   a   few   years   of   the   adoption   of   the
Constitution.   In   fact,   it   has   laid   down   the   road   map   very   clearly
with lot of foresight. Paragraph 66 reads thus:
“66.   The   following   shall   be   the   principles   on   which
legislation should proceed:—
I.  Under the general law :
Under   the   general   law   of   torts   i.e.,   the   English
Common   Law   as   imported   into   India   on   the   principle
of   justice,   equity   and   good   conscience,   with   statutory
modifications of that law now in force in India ( vide  the
Principles of General Law, Appendix VI)—
(i)   The   State   as   employer   should   be   liable
for   the   torts   committed   by   its   employees   and
agents   while   acting   within   the   scope   of   their
office or, employment.
(ii) The State as employer  should be liable
in   respect   of   breach   of   those   duties   which   a
person   owes   to   his   employees   or   agents   under
the   general   law   by   reason   of   being   their
employer.
(iii)   The   State   should   be   liable   for   torts
committed by an independent contractor only in
cases referred to in Appendix VI.
(iv) The State also should be liable for torts
where   a   corporation   owned   or   controlled   by   the
State would be liable.
(v) The State should be liable in respect of
breach of duties attached under the general law
to   the   ownership,   occupation,   possession   or
control of immoveable properly from the moment
162

the   State   occupies   or   takes   possession   or
assumes control of the property.
(vi)   The   State   should   be   subject   to   the
general   law   liability   for   injury   caused   by
dangerous things (chattels).
In   respect   of   (i)   to   (vi)   the   State   should   be   entitled   to
raise   the   same   defences,   which   a   citizen   would   be
entitled to raise under general law.
II.  In respect of duties of care imposed by statute :
(i)   If   a   statute   authorises   the   doing   of   an
act  which is in itself injurious, the State should
not be liable.
(ii)   The   State   should   be   liable,   without
proof   of   negligence,   for   breach   of   a   statutory
duty   imposed   on   it   or   its   employees   which
causes damage.
(iii)   The   State   should   be   liable   if   in   the
discharge of statutory duties imposed upon it or
its   employees,   the   employees   act   negligently   or
maliciously, whether or not discretion is involved
in the exercise of such duty.
(iv)   The   State   should   be   liable   if   in   the
exercise   of   the   powers   conferred   upon   it   or   its
employees the power is so exercised as to cause
nuisance   or   trespass   or   the   power   is   exercised
negligently or maliciously causing damage.
N.B .—Appendix  V  shows  some  of  the  Acts
which contain protection clauses. But under the
General   Clauses   Act   a   thing   is   deemed   to   be
done   in   good   faith  even   if   it   is   done   negligently.
Therefore,   by   suitable   legislation   the   protection
should   be   made   not   to   extend   to   negligent   acts
however  honestly  done  and  for  this  purpose  the
relevant   clauses   in   such   enactments   should   be
examined.
(v)   The   State   should   be   subject   to   the
same duties and should have the same rights as
163

a private employer under a statute, whether it is
specifically binding on the State or not.
(vi)   If   an   Act   negatives   or   limits   the
compensation   payable   to   a   citizen   who   suffered
damage, coming within the scope of the Act, the
liability   of   the   State   should   be   the   same   as
under that Act and the injured person should be
entitled   only   to   the   remedy,   if   any,   provided
under the Act.
III.  Miscellaneous :
Patents ,   Designs  and  Copyrights:   The  provisions
of   Sec.   3   of   the   Crown   Proceedings   Act   may   be
adopted.
IV.  General Provisions:
(i)   Indemnity   and   contribution :   To   enable
the   State   to   claim   indemnity   or   contribution,   a
provision   on   the   lines   of   Sec.   4   of   the   Crown
Proceedings Act may be adopted.
(ii)   Contributory   negligence:   In   England,
the   Law   Reform   (Contributory   Negligence)
Act,1945 was enacted amending the law relating
to   contributory   negligence   and   in   view   of   the
provisions of the Crown Proceedings Act the said
Act   also  binds  the  Crown.  In  India, the  trend  of
judicial   opinion   is   in   favour   of   holding   that   the
rule  in   Merryweather  v. Nixan   [ (1799)   8   T.R.   186 ]
does   not   apply   and   that   there   is   no   legal
impediment   to   one   tortfeasor   recovering
compensation   from   another.
But   the   law   should   not   be   left   in   an   uncertain
state and there should be legislation on the lines
of the English Act.
(iii)  Appropriate  provision  should  be   made
while revising   the Civil  Procedure  Code  to make
it   obligatory   to   implead   as   party   to   a   suit   in
which   a   claim   for   damages   against   the   State   is
made,   the   employee,   agent   or   independent
contractor   for   whose   act   the   State   is   sought   to
164

be   made   liable.     Any   claim   based
on   indemnity   or   contribution   by   the   State   may
also   be   settled   in   such   proceeding   as   all   the
parties will be before the court.
V.  Exceptions :
(i) Acts   of   State :   The   defence   of   “Act   of
State” should be made available to the State for
any   act,   neglect   or   default   of   its   servants   or
agents.     “Act   of   State”   means   an   act   of   the
sovereign   power   directed   against   another
sovereign   power   or   the   subjects   of   another
sovereign   power   not   owning   temporary
allegiance, in pursuance of sovereign rights.
(ii)   Judicial   acts   and   execution   of   judicial
process :The   State   shall   not   be   liable   for   acts
done   by   judicial   officers   and   persons   executing
warrants   and   orders   of   judicial   officers   in   all
cases   where   protection   is   given   to   such   officers
and   persons   by   Sec.   1   of   the   Judicial   Officers
Protection Act, 1850.
(iii)   Acts   done   in   the   exercise   of   political
functions of the State such as acts relating to :
(a) Foreign   Affairs   (entry   10,   List
I, Seventh Schedule of the Constitution);
(b)   Diplomatic,   Consular   and   trade
representation (entry 11);
(c)     United   Nations
Organisation(entry 12);
(d)Participation   in   international
conferences, associations and other bodies
and   implementing   of   decisions   made
thereat (entry 13);
(e) entering   into   treaties   and
agreements   with   foreign   countries   and
implementing   of   treaties,   agreements   and
conventions   with   foreign   countries   (entry
14);
(f)   war and peace (entry 15);
165

(g) foreign jurisdiction (entry 16);
(h) anything   done   by   the
President, Governor or Rajpramukh in the
exercise of the following functions:
Power   of   summoning,   proroguing
and   dissolving   the   Legislature,   vetoing   of
laws   and   anything   done   by   the   President
in   the   exercise   of   the   powers   to   issue
Proclamations under the Constitution;
(i) Acts done under the Trading with
the Enemy Act, 1947;
(j)   Acts   done   or   omitted   to   be   done
under   a   Proclamation   of   Emergency   when
the security of the State is threatened.
(iv) Acts done in relation to the Defence Forces:
(a) Combatant   activities   of   the
Armed Forces during the time of war;
(b)  Acts   done   in   the   exercise   of
the   powers   vested   in   the   Union   for   the
purpose   of   training   or   maintaining   the
efficiency of the Defence Forces;
The   statutes   relating   to   these
already   provide   for   payment   of
compensation   and   the   machinery   for
determining   the   compensation:   See
Manoeuvres,   Field   Firing   and   Artillery
Practice   Act,   1948;   Seaward   Artillery
Practice Act, 1949;
(c)   The   liability   of   the   State   for
personal   injury   or   death   caused   by   a
member   of   the   Armed   Forces   to   another
member   while   on   duty   shall   be   restricted
in   the   same   manner   as   in   England   (Sec.
10 of the Crown Proceedings Act)
(v) Miscellaneous:
166

(a)   any   claim   arising   out   of
defamation,   malicious   prosecution   and
malicious arrest,
(b)   any   claim   arising   out   of   the
operation of quarantine law,
(c)   existing   immunity   under   the
Indian   Telegraph   Act,   1885   and   Indian
Post Offices Act, 1898,
(d)   foreign   torts.   (The   English
provision may be adopted.)”
145.     It   appears   that   based   on   the   First   Report   of   the   Law
Commission, a Bill known as   the Government (Liability in Torts) Bill
was introduced in 1967, but the same did not become the law. As a
consequence, a huge burden was cast on the Courts to develop the
law through judicial precedents, some of which we shall see now.
146.     The judicial  journey  actually  started off  on  a right note  with
the   decision   in   The   State   of   Bihar   vs.   Abdul   Majid 112
,   where   a
Government servant who was dismissed but later reinstated, filed a
suit   for   recovery   of   arrears   of   salary.   Though   the   State   raised   a
defence on the basis of the doctrine of pleasure, this Court rejected
the   same   on   the   ground   that   said   doctrine   based   on   the   Latin
112   AIR 1954 SC 245
167

phrase   “ durante   bene   placito ”   (during   pleasure)   has   no   application
in India. This decision was followed in  State of Rajasthan  vs.  Mst.
Vidhyawati 113
,   which   involved   a   claim   for   compensation   by   the
widow  of  a  person  who  was  fatally   knocked down  by  a  jeep  owned
and   maintained   by   the   State.   When   sovereign   immunity   was
pleaded,   this   Court   observed   in   Vidhyawati   (supra) :   “ when   the
rule   of   immunity   in   favour   of   the   Crown,   based   on   common
law in the United Kingdom has disappeared from the land of
its birth, there is no legal warrant for holding that it has any
validity in this country, particularly after the Constitution . ”
147.     On   the   question   of   the   liability   of   the   State,   for   the   tortious
acts of its servants, this Court opined in  Vidhyawati , as follows:
“(10) This   case   also   meets   the   second   branch   of   the
argument   that   the   State   cannot   be   liable   for   the
tortious   acts   of   its   servants,   when   such   servants   are
engaged on an activity connected with the affairs of the
State. In this connection it has to be remembered that
under   the   Constitution   we   have   established   a   welfare
state,   whose   functions   are   not   confined   only   to
maintaining   law   and   order,   but   extend   to   engaging   in
all activities including industry, public transport, state
trading, to name only a few of them. …”
113  AIR 1962 SC 933
168

148.     But   despite   the   decisions   in   Abdul   Majid   (supra)   and
Vidhyawati , this Court fell into a slippery slope in   Kasturi Lal . It
was a case where the partner of a firm dealing in bullion and other
goods was arrested and detained in police custody and the gold and
silver   that  he   was   carrying   was  seized  by   the  police.   When   he   was
released later, the silver was returned but the Head Constable who
effected   the   arrest   misappropriated   the   gold   and   fled   away   to
Pakistan   in   October,   1947.   The   suit   filed   by   Kasturi   Lal   for
recovery   of   the   value   of   the   gold,   was   resisted   on   the   ground   that
this   was   not   a   case   of   negligence   of   the   servants   of   the   State   and
that   even   if   negligence   was   held   proved   against   the   police   officers
the State could not be held liable. While upholding the contention of
the State, this Court said “ if a tortious act is committed by a public
servant and it gives rise to a claim for damages, the question to ask
is: was the tortious act committed by the public servant in discharge
of   statutory   functions   which   are   referable   to,   and   ultimately   based
on, the delegation of the sovereign powers of the State to such public
servant?   If   the   answer   is   in   the   affirmative,   the   action   for   damages
for loss caused by such tortious act will not lie.  On the other hand, if
169

the tortious act has been committed by a public servant in discharge
of   duties   assigned   to   him   not   by   virtue   of   the   delegation   of   any
sovereign   power,   an   action   for   damages   would   lie .   The   act   of   the
public servant committed by him during the course of his employment
is in this category of cases, an act of a servant who might have been
employed by a private individual for the same purpose .”
149.     In   fact,   it   was   suggested   by   this   Court   in   Kasturi   Lal   that
the   Legislatures   in   India   should   seriously   consider   making
legislative   enactments   to   regulate   and   control   their   claim   for
immunity.   Before   proceeding   further   with   the   journey   in   the
chronological   sequence,   it   must   be   mentioned   that   the   decision   in
Kasturi Lal  was diluted to some extent after nearly 30 years which
we shall take note of at the appropriate stage.
150.     In   Khatri   (II)   vs.   State   of   Bihar. 114
,   which   came   to   be
popularly known as  Bhagalpur blinding case,  this Court was dealing
with   a   brutal   incident   of   Police   atrocity   which   resulted   in   twenty­
four   prisoners   being   blinded.   Though   an   opportunity   was  provided
114  (1981) 1 SCC 627
170

to  this Court  to  signal  the  arrival of  Constitutional  tort  in  the said
case   and   though   the   petitioners   sought   compensation   for   the
violation   of   their   Article   21   right,   this   Court   simply   postponed   the
decision   to   a   future   date   by   holding   that   they   are   issues   of   the
gravest Constitutional importance, involving the exploration of new
dimension of the right to life and personal liberty.
151.     But   within   a   couple   of   years,   another   opportunity   arose   in
Rudul   Sah   (supra) ,   which   related   to   the   unlawful   detention   of   a
prisoner  for  fourteen years even  after  his acquittal.  This  shook the
conscience   of   this   Court.   Therefore,   this   Court   awarded
compensation   in   an   arbitrary   sum   of   money,   even   while   reserving
the right of the petitioner to bring a suit for recovery of appropriate
damages. This Court said that the order of compensation passed by
this   Court   was  in   the   nature  of   palliative.  When   it  is  suggested  by
the State that the appropriate remedy would be only to file a suit for
damages,   this   Court   said   that   by   refusing   to   order   anything
(towards compensation), this Court would be doing mere lip­service
to the fundamental right to liberty and that one of the telling ways
171

in   which   the   violation   of   the   right   by   the   State   can   be   reasonably
prevented, is to mulct its violators with monetary compensation.
152.     After   Rudul   Sah ,   there   was   no   looking   back.     Instead   of
providing   elaborate   details,   we   think   it   is   sufficient   to   provide   in   a
tabular   form,   details   of   the   cases   where   this   Court   awarded
compensation in public law, invoking the principle of constitutional
tort, either expressly or impliedly. 
Sr. 
No. Case Laws Decision
1.
Sebastian   M.Hongray   vs.
Union of India 
(1984) 3 SCC 82  Two men who were taken for questioning
by   21st   Sikh   Regiment   never   returned
home.
 When   a   writ   of   habeas   corpus   was   filed
by   a   JNU   student,   this   Court   directed
that the missing men be produced before
the   Court.   This   order   could   not   be
complied with.
 Court   awarded   compensation   of   Rs.1lac
to   the   wives   of   the   missing   men   on
account   of   mental   agony   suffered   by
them.
2.
Bhim   Singh,   MLA   vs.   State
of J&K.
(1985) 4 SCC 677  An   MLA   was   illegally   arrested   and
detained to prevent him from attending a
session   of   the   Jammu   &   Kashmir   State
Legislative Assembly.
 FIR   was   registered   u/s   153A,   IPC   and
order   of   remand   was   obtained   from   the
Magistrate   without   producing   the   MLA
before Court.
 In   a   writ   for   habeas   corpus   filed   by   his
wife,   this   Court   observed   that   there   had
been a violation of his fundamental rights
under   Articles   21   and   22(2)   of   the
Constitution and accordingly directed the
State   of   Jammu   and   Kashmir   to   pay
172

Bhim   Singh   a   sum   of   Rs.50,000/­   as
compensation. 
3.
Peoples’   Union   for
Democratic   Rights   vs.   State
of Bihar &Ors.
(1987) 1 SCC 265  A   public   interest   litigation   was   filed
against   the   illegal   shooting   by   police
officers   against   members   of   a   peaceful
assembly. 
 Several   were   injured   and   21   died
(including children) due to this incident.
 While the State had paid a compensation
of   Rs.10,000   each   to   heirs   of   the
deceased,   this   Court  found  it   insufficient
and   directed   payment   of   Rs.20,000   to
dependants   of   each   deceased   and
Rs.5,000 to each injured person.
4.
Saheli, a Women’s Resources
Centre   through   Ms.   Nalini
Bhanot   &   Ors.   vs.
Commissioner of Police, 
Delhi   Police   Headquarters   &
Ors.
(1990) 1 SCC 422  Two   women   were   forcefully   evicted   from
their   homes.   The   landlord   was   aided   by
the SHO and SI in the assault that led to
demise   of  the   nine­year­old   son  of  one  of
the women.
 This   Court   awarded   compensation   of
Rs.75,000   to   the   mother   of   the   deceased
child.
5.
Supreme   Court   Legal   Aid
Committee   through   its
Hony.   Secretary   vs.   State   of
Bihar & Ors.
(1991) 3 SCC 482  A   person   injured   in   a   train   robbery,   was
taken   to   the   nearest   hospital   by   the
Police   by   tying   him   to   the   footboard   of   a
vehicle. This led to his death.
 This Court observed that had timely care
been   given   to   the   victim   he   might   have
been saved.
 The   State   of   Bihar   was   directed   to   pay
Rs.20,000   to   the   legal   heirs   of   the
deceased.
6.
Nilabati   Behera   (Smt.)   alias
Lalita   Behera   (Through   the
Supreme   Court   Legal   Aid
Committee)   vs.   State   of
Orissa & Ors.
(1993) 2 SCC 746  Petitioner   was   a   mother   whose   son   had
died in police custody.
 This   Court   directed   the   State   to   pay
compensation of Rs.1.5 lacs.
7.
Arvinder   Singh   Bagga   vs.
State of U.P. & Ors.
(1994) 6 SCC 565  A   married   woman   was   detained   and
physically   assaulted   in   a   police   station
with a view to coerce her to implicate her
husband   and   his   family   in   a   case   of
abduction and forcible marriage.
 After   taking   her   statement,   her   husband
173

and his family were also harassed by the
police. 
 This   Court   observed   that   the   police   had
exhibited   high­handedness   and
uncivilized   behaviour   and   awarded   the
woman a compensation of Rs.10,000 and
members of her family Rs.5,000 each.
8.
N.   Nagendra   Rao   &   Co.   vs.
State of A.P. 
(1994) 6 SCC 205  Appellant   was   in   the   business   of   food
grains and fertiliser. On an inspection by
the   concerned   authorities,   his   stocks
were seized. 
 As   was   the   practice,   the   food   grains   in
custody   were   sold   and   the   proceeds
deposited   in   the   Treasury,   but   the
fertilisers were not dealt with in the same
manner   causing   great   loss   to   the
Petitioner. 
 In   a   suit   for   negligence   and   misfeasance
of   public   authorities,   this   Court   further
developed   the   concept   of   Constitutional
Tort   and   limited   the   scope   of   sovereign
immunity   laid   down   in   Kasturilal .   The
State   was   held   vicariously   liable   for   the
actions of the authorities. 
9.
Inder   Singh   vs.   State   of
Punjab & Ors.
(1995) 3 SCC 702  A   Deputy   Superintendent   of   Police   along
with   his   subordinates   abducted   and
killed   seven   persons   due   to   personal
vengeance.
 This   Court   ordered   an   inquiry   by   the
CBI.After   CBI   filed   a   report,   this   court
directed   the   State   to   pay   Rs.1.5   lacs   to
the legal heirs (to be recovered from guilty
policemen   later)   and   State   to   pay   costs
quantified at Rs.25,000.
10.
Paschim   Banga   Khet
Mazdoor   Samity   &   Ors.   vs.
State of  W.B. & Anr.
 (1996) 4 SCC 37  The   callous   attitude   on   the   part   of   the
medical   authorities   at   various
Government­run   hospitals   in   Calcutta   in
providing   treatment   to   a   train   accident
victim was highlighted in this case.
 This   Court   directed   the   State   to   pay
Rs.25,000   for   the   denial   of   its
constitutional obligations of care.
174

11.
D.K. Basu  vs.  State of W.B.
(1997) 1 SCC 416  In   a   public   interest   litigation   involving
incidents   of   custodial   violence   in   West
Bengal,   this   Court   issued   guidelines   for
law   enforcement   agencies   to   follow   when
arresting and detaining any person.
 This   Court   also   discussed   the   award   of
compensation as a remedy for violation of
fundamental   rights   as   a   punitive
measure against State action.
12.
People’s Union for Civil 
Liberties  vs.  Union of India 
& Anr.
(1997) 3 SCC 433  Two  persons  alleged  to be  terrorists  were
killed by the police in a false encounter.
 This  Court   directed   the   State   of  Manipur
to   pay   Rs.1   lac   to   the   family   of   the
deceased   and   Rs.10,000   to   PUCL   for
pursuing the case for many years.
13.
Municipal   Corporation   of
Delhi,   Delhi   vs.   Uphaar
Tragedy   Victims   Association
& Ors.
(2011) 14 SCC 481  A   fire   in   a   cinema   hall   resulted   in   injury
to   over   100   persons   and   death   of   59
cinemagoers.

 The   fire   was   caused   by   a   transformer
installed by Delhi Vidyut Board (DVB).
 HC had found the Municipal Corporation,
Delhi Police, and the DVB responsible for
the accident.
 This   Court   held   only   DVB   and   theatre
owner   liable   to   pay   compensation   in   the
ratio of 15:85.
 While   doing   so,   this   Court   dealt
extensively   with   the   concept   of
Constitutional Tort.
153.     It   will   be   clear   from   the   decisions   listed   in   the   Table   above
that   this   Court   and   the   High   Courts   have   been   consistent   in
invoking   Constitutional   tort   whenever   an   act   of   omission   and
commission   on   the   part   of   a   public   functionary,   including   a
Minister,   caused   harm   or   loss.   But   as   rightly   pointed   out   by   the
learned   Attorney   General   in   his   note,   the   matter   pre­eminently
175

deserves   a   proper   legal   framework   so   that   the   principles   and
procedure   are   coherently   set   out   without   leaving   the   matter   open
ended   or   vague.   In   fact,   the   First   Report   of   the   Law   Commission
submitted a draft bill way back in 1956. This Court recommended a
legislative   measure   in   Kasturi   Lal   in   1965   and   a   bill   called
Government   (Liability   in   Torts)   Bill   was   introduced   in   1967.   But
nothing   happened   in   the   past   55   years.   In   such   circumstances,
courts   cannot   turn   a   blind   eye   but   may   have   to   imaginatively
fashion   the   remedy   to   be   provided   to   persons   who   suffer   injury   or
loss,   without   turning   them   away   on   the   ground   that   there   is   no
proper legal frame work.
   
154.   Therefore, our answer to Question No. 5 is as follows:
“A   mere   statement   made   by   a   Minister,   inconsistent   with   the
rights   of  a   citizen   under   Part­III   of  the   Constitution,   may   not
constitute a violation of the constitutional rights and become
actionable   as   Constitutional   tort.   But   if   as   a   consequence   of
such  a  statement,   any  act   of  omission   or  commission   is   done
176

by   the   officers   resulting   in   harm   or   loss   to   a   person/citizen,
then the same may be actionable as a constitutional tort”.
SUMMING UP
155.    To sum up, our answers to the five questions referred to the
Bench, are as follows:
QUESTIONS ANSWERS
1. Are   the   grounds   specified   in
Article   19(2)   in   relation   to
which   reasonable   restrictions
on the right to free speech can
be imposed by law, exhaustive,
or can restrictions on the right
to   free   speech   be   imposed   on
grounds   not   found   in   Article
19(2)   by   invoking   other
fundamental rights? The   grounds   lined   up   in
Article   19(2)   for   restricting
the   right   to   free   speech   are
exhaustive.   Under   the   guise
of   invoking   other
fundamental   rights   or   under
the   guise   of   two   fundamental
rights   staking   a   competing
claim   against   each   other,
additional   restrictions   not
found in Article 19(2), cannot
be imposed on the exercise of
the   right   conferred   by   Article
19(1)(a) upon any individual.
2. Can a fundamental right under
Article   19   or   21   of   the
Constitution   of   India   be
claimed  other   than   against   the
‘State’ or its instrumentalities? A   fundamental   right   under
Article 19/21 can be enforced
even   against   persons   other
than   the   State   or   its
instrumentalities.
3. Whether   the   State   is   under   a
duty to affirmatively protect the
rights of a citizen under Article
21   of   the   Constitution   of   India The   State   is   under   a   duty   to
affirmatively   protect   the   rights
of   a   person   under   Article   21,
177

even   against   a   threat   to   the
liberty   of   a   citizen   by   the   acts
or   omissions   of   another   citizen
or private agency? whenever   there   is   a   threat   to
personal   liberty,   even   by   a
non­State actor.
4. Can   a   statement   made   by   a
Minister,   traceable   to   any
affairs of State or for protecting
the   Government,   be   attributed
vicariously   to   the   Government
itself,   especially   in   view   of   the
principle   of   Collective
Responsibility?  A   statement   made   by   a
Minister   even   if   traceable   to
any   affairs   of   the   State   or   for
protecting   the   Government,
cannot   be   attributed
vicariously to the Government
by   invoking   the   principle   of
collective responsibility.
5. Whether   a   statement   by   a
Minister,   inconsistent   with   the
rights   of   a   citizen   under   Part
Three   of   the   Constitution,
constitutes   a   violation   of   such
constitutional   rights   and   is
actionable   as   ‘Constitutional
Tort”? A   mere   statement   made   by   a
Minister, inconsistent with the
rights   of   a   citizen   under   Part­
III   of   the   Constitution,   may
not   constitute   a   violation   of
the   constitutional   rights   and
become   actionable   as
Constitutional tort. But if as a
consequence   of   such   a
statement, any act of omission
or   commission   is   done   by   the
officers   resulting   in   harm   or
loss   to   a   person/citizen,   then
the   same   may   be   actionable
as a constitutional tort.
178

156.     Now   that   we   have   answered   the   questions,   the   writ   petition
and   the   special   leave   petition   are   directed   to   be   listed   before   the
appropriate   bench   after   getting   orders   from   Hon’ble   the   Chief
Justice of India.
… ..…………....................J.
    (S. Abdul Nazeer)
… ..…………....................J.
    (B.R. Gavai)
… ..…………....................J.
    (A.S. Bopanna)
.…..………......................J.
(V. Ramasubramanian)
New Delhi;
January 03, 2023
179

REPORTABLE	  	
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA	 	
CRIMINAL ORIGINAL	/CIVIL	 APPELLATE 	JURISDICTION	 	
WRIT PETITION (CRL.) NO. 113 OF 2016	 	
 	
Kaushal Kishor 	  	 	 	 	 	             	…..Petitioner(s)	 	
Versus	 	
State of Uttar Pradesh	 & Ors.	 	 	 	       	  ….. 	Respondent(s)	 	
With	 	
SLP (C) 	@	 Diary No.34629 of 2017	 	
 	
Sl.No.	 	Particulars	 	Page Nos.	 	
1. 	Introduction	 	2-10	 	
2. 	Submissions	 	10	-17 	
3. 	Preface	 	17	-18	 	
4. 	Article 19(1)(a) and 19 (2) 	– An Overview	 	18	-26 	
5. 	Wesley Hohfeld’s analysis of the form of 
rights	  	
26	-30	 	
6. 	The content of Article 19 (1)(a)	 	30	-40	 	
7. 	‘Hate speech’	 	40	-54	 	
8. 	Human dignity as a value as well as a 
right under the Constitution of India	 	
54	-63	 	
9. 	The preambular goals of ‘Equality’ and 
‘Fraternity’	 	
63	-72	 	
10	. 	Re: Question No.2	 	72	-101	 	
11.	 	Re: Question No.3	 	101	-106	 	
12.	 	Re: Question No.4	 	106	-107	 	
13.	 	Re: Question No.5	 	107	-120	 	
14.	 	Conclusions	 	120	-121

2 	
 	
J U D G M E N T	 	
NAGARATHNA, J.	 	
  	I  have  had  the  benefit  of  reading 	the 	erudite 	judgment  proposed 	
by 	His  Lordship 	V. 	Ramasubramanian,  J	.  While  I  agree  with  the 	
reasoning  and  conclusions  arrived  at  by 	his  Lordship	 on  certain 	
questions referred to this Constitution Bench	, I wish to 	lend a different 	
perspective to some of the issues by way	 of	 my separate opinion	.  	
2.	 	In the	 words of one of the Indian philosophers, Basaveshwara: 	 	
“NuDidare muttina haaradantirabeku,	 	
NuDidare maanikyada deeptiyantirabeku,	 	
NuDidare spatikada shalaakeyantirabeku,	 	
NuDidare Lingamecchi ahudenabeku.	” 	
 
One should speak only when the words uttered are as pure as 
pearls strung on a thread; 	 	
Like the lustre shed by a ruby; 	 	
Like a crystal’s flash that cleaves the blue; 	 	
And such that the Lord, on listening to such speech, must say 
“yes, yes, that is true!” 	 	
 
Introduction:	 	
3.	 	The concern of the petitioner	s in the	se	 case	s is 	the 	misuse of the 	
right  to  free	dom  of	 speech	 and  expression	 under  Article  19(1)(a)  of  the 	
Constitution,  particularly,  by  those  persons  holding  political  offices, 
public  servants,  public  functionaries  or  other	s holding  responsible 	
positions in Indian polity and society. The concern of the petitioner	s is 	
with  regard	 	to  the  manner  in  which  public  functionaries  make 	
disparaging  and  insulting  remarks  against  certain  sections  of  the

3 	
 
society,  against  countrymen  and  against  certain  individuals  such  as 
women who may be victims of crime. Such indiscreet speech is a cause 
of 	concern  in  recent  times  as  it  is  thought  to  be  hurtful  and  insulting. 	
The  question	s raised  in  these  matters 	are	 with  regard  to  remedies 	
available  in  law  so  as  to  counter  such  kind  of  hurtful  or  disparaging 
speech made, particularly, by public functionaries	. 	
4.	 	The facts giving rise to the present petitions may be encapsulated 	
as	 under	:  	
4.1	. 	Writ Petition (Crl.) No. 113 of 2016, relates to the unsavory public 
comments made by a former  Uttar Pradesh Cabinet  Minister, in 
the  context  of  an  alleged  gang 	rape  of  a  woman  and  her  minor 	
daughter  that  took  place  on  29	th July,  2016	 on  the  Noida	-	
Shahjahanpur  National  Highway  (NH  91).  Relying  on  certain 
news articles, the petitioner in Writ Petition (Crl.) No. 113 of 2016 
has brought to the notice of this Court t	he remarks made by the 	
said  public  functionary,  terming  the  alleged  incident  as  an 
“opposition  conspiracy	,”  which  was  proliferated  merely  because 	
“elections  were 	near,	 and  the  desperate  opposition  could  stoop  to 	
any level to defame the government.”	 	
4.2	.  	In relation to such statements, a First Information Report, being 
FIR No. 0838 of 2016 was registered against the said Minister on 
30	th 	July,  2016	 	by  the  Kotwali  Police  Station,  Dehat,

4 	
 	
Bulandshahr,  Uttar  Pradesh,  for  offences  under  Sections  395, 
397,  376	-D	,  342  of  the  Indian  Penal  Code,  1860	 (hereinafter 	
referred to as ‘IPC’ for the sake of 	convenience	).  	
4.3	. 	In  th	e  above	 background,  the  Writ  Petition  has  been  preferred, 	
praying as follows: 	 	
“P R A Y E R	 : - 	
In view of the above stated submissions, it is therefore, 
most  humbly  prayed  that  this  Hon’ble  Court	; may  in 	
the interests of justice, be pleased to :	- 	
a.	 	Issue  a  w	rit  of  mandamus  and  /  or  any  other 	
appropriate  w	rit  and  /  or  direction  against  the 	
respondents directing them to stop the infringement of 
the fundamental rights of the petitioner to live a 	lawful 	
life; in addition to passing other appropriate directions 
to the respondents.	 	
b.	 	Direct the state to pay the appropriate compensation to 
the petitioner, other victims and the family members as 
per Law. 	 	
c.	 	Direct the state to provide and ensure respectabl	e and 	
appropriate  free  of  cost  and  safe  education 
arrangements till the attainments of the highest degree 
in the interest of justice.	 	
d.	 	Direct  the  state  to  provide  and  ensure  sufficient  life 
security and appropriate job security to the petitioner, 
other vict	ims and family members.	 	
e.	 	Summon  the  status  report  from  the  investigation 
agency in the interests of justice.	 	
f. 	Monitor  the  investigation  of  FIR  No.0838/2016  under 
Section 154 Cr. P.C. 395, 397, 376	-D and POCSO Act, 	
342.	 	
g.	 	Transfer  the  trial  of  the  FIR  No.0838/2	016  to  Delhi 	
from Bulandshahar in the interest of justice.	 	
h.	 	Pass  directions  to  Respondent  No.1  to  register  F.I.R. 
against  Sh.  Azam  Khan,  Minister 	for  Urban 	
Development, G	ovt.	 of	 UP; for making statements being 	
outrageous  to  the  modesty  of  the  petitioner  in 	the 	
matters of the present case.	 	
i. 	Direct to the Respondent No.1 for registration of F.I.R. 
No.0838/2016  against  erring  police  officials  for 
disobeying the directions of law in the present case.

5 	
 	
j. 	Pass any other or further orders as this Hon’ble Court 
may  deem	 fit  and  proper  in  the  light  of  the  facts  and 	
circumstances  of  the 	present  case  in  favour  of  the 	
petitioners and against the respondents.”	 	
4.4	. 	Special Leave Petition bearing Diary No. 34629 of 2017 has been 
filed impugning the common order dated 	31	st May, 	2017	 passed 	
by  the  High  Court  of  Kerala,  at  Ernakulam  dismissing  Writ 
Petition  (C)  No.  15869  and  Writ  Petition  (C)  No.  14712  of  2017	. 	
The  said 	Writ  Petitions  were  filed  before  the  High  Court  alleging 	
inaction on the part of Government of Kerala in connection with 
the  derogatory  statements  made  on  separate  occasions,  by  the 
then  Minister  of  Electricity,  Government  of  Kerala,  against  a 
woman 	Princi	pal of a polytechnic college in Kerala, the mother of 	
a  student  who  allegedly  committed  suicide  due  to  the  alleged 
harassment  by  the  college  authorities  and  against  women 
labourers  of  a  tea  plantation.  Aggrieved  by  the  dismissal  of  the 
said Writ Petition, 	SLP bearing Diary No. 34629 of 2017 came to 	
be  filed  before  this  Court,  which  was  directed  to  be  tagged  with 
Writ Petition (Crl.) No. 113 of 2016. 	 	
5.	 	The  questions  raised  for  the  consideration  of  this  Constitution 	
Bench are enumerated as under:	 	
“1	)  Are	 the  grounds  specified  in  Article  19(2)  in 	
relation  to  which  reasonable  restrictions  on  the 
right  to  free  speech  can  be  imposed  by  law, 
exhaustive, or can restrictions on the right to free 
speech  be  imposed  on  grounds  not  found  in

6 	
 	
Article  19(2)  by  invoking	 	other  fundamental 	
rights?	 	
 
2) 	  Can a fundamental right under Article 19 or 21 of 
the  Constitution  of  India  be  claimed  other  than 
against the ‘State’ or its instrumentalities? 	 	
 
3) 	  Whether the State is under a duty to affirmatively 
protect  the  rights  of	 a  citizen  under  Article  21  of 	
the Constitution of India even against a threat to 
the liberty of a citizen by the acts or omissions of 
another citizen or private agency? 	 	
 
4) 	   Can a statement made by a Minister, traceable to 
any  affairs  of  State  or  for  protecting  the 
Government,  be  attributed  vicariously  to  the 
Government  itself,  especially  in  view  of  the 
principle of Collective Responsibility? 	 	
 
5) 	  	Whether  a  statement  by  a  Mi	nister,  inconsistent 	
with the rights of a citizen under Part Three of the 
Constitution,  constitutes  a  violation  of  such 
constitutional  rights  and  is  actionable  as 
‘Constitutional Tort’?”	 	
6.	 	His  Lordship,  Ramsubramanian,  J.  has  answered  the  questions 	
referr	ed to this Constitution Bench in the scholarly judgment proposed 	
by him. My view on each of such questions, as contrasted with those of 
His  Lordship’s  have  been  expressed  in  a  tabular  form  hereinunder,  for 
easy reference. 	 	
Question	s 	His Lordship’s views 	 	My views	 	
1)	  Are  the  grounds 	
specified in Article 19(2) 
in  relation  to  which 
reasonable  restrictions 
on  the  right  to  free 
speech  can  be  imposed 
by  law,  exhaustive,  or 
can  restrictions  on  the 	
The  grounds  lined  up 
in  Article  19(2)  for 
restricting  the  right  to 
free  speech  are 
exhaustive.  Under  the 
guise of invoking other 
fundamental  rights  or 
under  the  guise  of  two 	
I  respectfully  agree  with 
the  reasoning  and 
conclusion  of	 	His 	
Lordship,  in  so  far  as 
Question  No.  1  is 
concerned.

7 	
 
Question	s 	His Lordship’s views 	 	My views	 	
right  to  free  speech  be 
imposed on grounds	 not 	
found in Article 19(2) by 
invoking  other 
fundamental rights?	 	
fundamental  righ	ts 	
taking  a  competing 
claim  against  each 
other,  additional 
restrictions  not  found 
in Article 19(2), cannot 
be  imposed  on  the 
exercise  of  the  right 
conferred  by  Article 
19(1)(a)  upon  any 
individual. 	 	
2)	  Can  a  fundamental 	
right under Article 19 or 
21 of the Constitution of 
India  be  claimed  other 
than  against  the  ‘State’ 
or its instrumentalities?	 	
A  fundamental  right 
under  Article  19/21 
can be 	enforced even 	
against persons other 
than  the  State  or  its 
instrumentalities.	 	
The  rights  in  the  realm 
of  common  law,  which 
may  be  similar  in  their 
content  to  the 
Fundamental  Rights 
under  Article  19/21, 
operate  horizontally;	 	
However,  the 
Fundamental  Rights 
under  Articles  19  and 
21, do not	 except those 	
rights  which  have  also 
been  statutorily 
recognised.	 Therefore, a 	
fundamental  right 
under  Article  19/21 
cannot  be  enforced 
against  persons  other 
than  the  State  or  its 
instrumentalities.	 	
However,  they  may  be 
the  b	asis  for  seeking 	
common law remedies.	 	
But  a  remedy  in  the 
form  of  writ  of  Habeas 
Corpus,  if  sought 
against a private person 
on  the  basis  of  Article 
21  of  the  Constitution

8 	
 
Question	s 	His Lordship’s views 	 	My views	 	
can  be  before  a 
Constitutional  Court 
i.e.,  by  way  of  Article 
226  before  the  High 
Cour	t or Article 32 read 	
with  Article  142  before 
the Supreme Court.	 	
As  far  as  non	-State 	
entities  or  those  entities 
which  do  not  fall  within 
the  scope  of  Article  12  of 
the  Constitution  are 
concerned, a writ petition 
to  enforce  fundamental 
rights  would  not  be 
en	tertained  as  against 	
them.  This  is  primarily 
because  such  matters 
would  involve  disputed 
questions of fact. 	 	
3)  Whether  the  State  is 
under  a  duty  to 
affirmatively protect the 
rights of a citizen under 
Article  21  of  the 
Constitution  of  India 
even 	against  a threat to 	
the liberty of a citizen by 
the acts or omissions of 
another  citizen  or 
private agency?	  	
The  State  is  under  a 
duty  to  affirmatively 
protect  the  rights  of 
a  person  under 
Article  21,  whenever 
there  is  a  threat  to 
personal  liberty  even 
by 	a private actor. 	 	
The  duty  cast  upon  the 
State under Article 21 	is 	
a  negative  duty  not  to 
deprive  a  person  of  his 
life and personal liberty 
except  in  accordance 
with law. 	 	
The State however has an 
affirmative  duty  to  carry 
out obligations cast upon 
it  unde	r  constitutional 	
and  statutory  law.  Such 
obligations  may  require 
interference  by  the  State 
where  acts  of  a  private 
party  may  threaten  the 
life  or  liberty  of  another 
individual. 	Hence,	 	
failure  to  carry  out  the 
duties  enjoined  upon

9 	
 
Question	s 	His Lordship’s views 	 	My views	 	
the  State  under 
constituti	onal  and	 	
statutory law to protect 
the  rights  of  a  citizen, 
could have the effect of 
depriving  a  citizen  of 
his  right  to  life  and 
personal liberty. When a 
citizen is so deprived of 
his  right  to  life  and 
personal  libert	y,  the 	
State  would  have 
breached  the  negative 
duty cast upon it under 
Article 21.	 	
4)	 Can  a  statement 	
made  by  a  Minister, 
traceable  to  any  affairs 
of State or for protecting 
the  Government,  be 
attributed vicariously to 
the  Government  itself, 
especially  in  view  of  the 
principle  of	 	Collective 	
Responsibility?	  	
A statement made by 
a  Minister  even  if 
traceable  to  any 
affairs of the State or 
for  protecting  the 
Government,  cannot 
be  attributed 
vicariously  to  the 
Government  by 
invoking  the 
principle  of 
collective 
responsibility. 	 	
A  statem	ent  made  by  a 	
Minister  if  traceable  to 
any  affairs  of  the  State 
or  for  protecting  the 
Government,  can  be 
attributed  vicariously 
to  the  Government  by 
invoking  the  principle 
of  collective 
responsibility,  so  long 
as  such  statement 
represents  the  view  of 
the G	overnment also. If 	
such a statement is not 
consistent  with  the 
view  of  the 
Government,  then  it  is 
attributable  to  the 
Minister personally. 	 	
5)  Whether  a  statement 
by  a  Minister, 
inconsistent  with  the 
rights of a citizen under 
Part  Three  of  the 
Constitution, 
constitutes  a  violation 	
A  mere  statement 
made  by  a  Minister, 
inconsistent with the 
rights  of  a  citizen 
under  Part	-III  of  the 	
Constitution,  may 
not  constitute  a 	
A  proper  legal  framework 
is	 necessary to define the 	
acts  or  omissions  which 
would  amo	unt  to 	
constitutional  torts,  and 
the  manner  in  which  the 
same  would  be  redressed

10	 	
 
Question	s 	His Lordship’s views 	 	My views	 	
of  such  constitutional 
rights  and  is  actionable 
as ‘Constitutional Tort’	 	
 	
violation  of 
constitutional  rights 
and  become 
actionable  as  a 
Constitutional  tort. 
But  if  as  a 
consequence  of  such 
a  sta	tement,  any  act 	
of  omission  or 
commission  is  done 
by  the  officers 
resulting  in  harm  or 
loss  to  a 
person/citizen,  then 
the  same  may  be 
actionable  as  a 
constitutional tort.	 	
or  remedied	 on  the  basis 	
of judicial precedent.	 	
It  is  not  prudent  to  treat 
all  cases  where  a 
statement  made  by  a 
public  functionary 
resulting  in  harm  or  loss 
to  a  person/citiz	en,  as 	 	
constitutional tort	s.  	
 
Public  functionaries 
could  be  proceeded 
against personally if their 
statement  is  inconsistent 
with  the  views  of  the 
Government.  If,  however, 
such views are consistent 
with  the  views  of  the 
Government,  or  are 
endorsed  by  the 
Government,  then  the 
same  may  be  vicariously 
attributed to the State on 
the  basis  of  the  principle 
of collective responsibility	 	
and appropriate remedies 
may  be  sought  before  a 
court of law	.  	
 
 
Submissions	:  	
 
7.	 	We  have  heard  learned  Senior  Counsel	, Sri  Kaleeswaram  Raj	, for 	
the Petitioners and learned Attorney  General for the Respondents, and 
learned Senior Counsel Ms	. Aparajita Singh, 	amicus 	curiae.

11	 	
 
Arguments on behalf of the petitioners: 	 	
8.	 	The 	submissions of learned Senior Counsel	, Sri Kaleeswaram Raj	, 	
appearing on behalf of the Petitioners may be epitomized as under: 	 	
8.1	. 	That  while 	upholding  the  constitutional  right 	to	 freedom 	of	 	
speech  and	 expression  of 	M	inisters,  efforts  should  be  made  to 	
frame  a  voluntary  code  of  conduct  for 	M	inisters  and  public 	
officials,  which  would  ensure  better  accountability  and 
transparency in their political activities and also place a check on 
the  misuse  of  freedom  of  speech  and 	expression  exercised  by 	
public functionaries using the apparatus of the State.	 	
8.2	. 	That while the state’s duty to protect life and liberty broadly falls 
within the right under Article 21, it is difficult to chain the State 
with  responsibility  in  every  ins	tance  where  speech  by  a  public 	
functionary  strikes  at  the  dignity  of  another  person.  That  in  the 
absence of such a provision to vicariously attribute responsibility 
to the State	, every instance of such speech cannot be actionable 	
and  remediable  through  the	 	judiciary.  That  no 	duty 	
corresponding  to  Article  21 	is  imposed  on  individual 	M	inisters 	
nor  such  duty  is  imposed  o	n any  government  machinery  to 	
regulate  the  conduct  of  individual 	M	inisters  warranting  judicial 	
intervention.  Therefore,  even  though  no  actionable  breach  of 
public duty can be said to have taken place when statements are

12	 	
 	
made by people in power, this in turn, postulates the desirability 
to  have  a  voluntary  code  of  conduct	 in  the  better  interest  of  the 	
government as well as the governed.	 	
8.3	. 	Reliance  was  placed  on 	Article  75  (3)  of  the  Constitution  to 	
contend  that 	M	inisters  have  a  collective  responsibility  towards 	
the  legislature  and  thus,  a  code  of  conduct  to  self	-regulat	e  the 	
speech  and  actions  of  Ministers  is  constitutionally  justifiable. 
That  a 	M	inister  is  not  supposed  to  breach 	her/his 	collective 	
responsibility towards the Cabinet and the Legislature, hence, it 
is  advisable  to  have  a  cogent  code  of 	conduct	 as 	available 	in 	
advanced democracies.	 	
8.4	. 	Learned	 Senior  Counsel  lastly  submitted  that  the  instant  cases 	
do  not  involve  a  question  as  to  conflict  of  any  other  right  with 
Article  19.  That  the  question  herein,  in  sum  and  substance,  is	, 	
whether	, any restraint j	ustifiable under the Constitution, can be 	
placed	 on 	M	inisters  and  public  functionaries,  to  regulate  their 	
speech. 	 	
Arguments on behalf of the	 Respondent	-Union of India	:  	
9.	 	Submissions  of  L	earne	d  Attorney  General  for  India,  Sri  R. 	
Venkataramani  and  L	earned	 Solicitor  General  of  India,  Sri  Tushar 	
Mehta,  appearing  on  behalf  of  the  Respondent	-Union  of  India,  may  be 	
summarized as under:

13	 	
 
9.1	. 	At  the  outset,  Sri  R.  Venkataramani	, Learned  Attorney  General	 	
fairly 	submitted  that  restrictions 	on  the	 freedom  of  speech 	
enumerated under Article 19 (2) have to be taken to be exhaustive 
and thus,  the court cannot invoke any other fundamental right, 
namely,  Article  21  to  impose  restrictions  on  grounds  which  are 
not enumera	ted under Article 19(2). Further, that as a matter of 	
constitutional principle, any addition, alteration or change in the 
norms  or  criteria  for  imposition  of  restrictions,  on  any 
fundamental right has to come through a legislative process.	 That 	
the  balanci	ng  of  fundamental  rights,  either  to  avoid  overlapping 	
or  to  ensure  mutual  enjoyment,  is  different  from  treating  one 
right as a restriction on another right. 	 	
9.2	. 	It was next submitted that the Constitution of India sets out the 
scheme  of  claims  of  fundame	ntal  rights  against  the  State  or  its 	
instrumentalities  and  such  scheme  also  addresses  breaches  or 
violations of fundamental rights by persons other than the State 
or  its  instrumentalities.  Thus,  any  proposition  to  add  or  insert 
subjects  or  matters  in  respe	ct  of  which  claims  can  be  made 	
against  persons  other  than  the  State,  would  amount  to  a 
constitutional  change.  That  any  enlargement  of  such 
constitutional principles would have the consequence of opening 
a flood gate of constitutional litigation.

14	 	
 
9.3.	 	It  was  further  contended  that  there  are  sufficient  constitutional 
and  legal  remedies  available  to  a  citizen  whose  liberty  is 
threatened by any person and beyond the constitutional and legal 
remedies,  there  may  not  be  any  other  additional  duty  to 
affirmativ	ely protect the right of a citizen under Article 21. 	 	
9.4	. 	Learned  Attorney  General	 urged  that 	M	inisterial  misdemeanors, 	
which  have  nothing  to  do  with  the  discharge  of  public  duty  and 
are not traceable to the affairs of the State 	w	ill have to be treated 	
as	 acts  of  individual  violation  and  individual  wrongs.  Thus,  the 	
state 	can	not be vicariously liable	 for the same	. That the conduct 	
of  a  public  servant  like  a 	M	inister  in  the  government,  if  was 	
traceable to the discharge of a public duty or duties of the offi	ce, 	
was  subject  to  the  scrutiny  of  law.  However,  such  misconduct 
including statements that may be made by a 	M	inister, cannot be 	
linked to the principles of collective responsibility.	 	
Submissions of 	learned 	amicus 	curiae, Ms	. Aparajita Singh	, Senior 	
Advocate	:  	
10.	 	The  submissions  of 	learned 	amicus 	curiae	,  Ms	. Aparajita  Singh, 	
may be summarized as under: 	 	
10.1	. 	At 	the  outset 	she 	submitted  that  the  right  to  freedom  of  speech 	
and expression under Article 19(1)(a) is subject to clearly defined 
restrictions  under  Article  19(2).  Therefore,  any  law  seeking  to

15	 	
 	
limit  the  right  under  Article  19(1)(a)  has  to  fall  within  the 
limitation provi	ded under Article 19(2). 	 	
10.	2.  That	 the  right  to  freedom  of  speech  and  expression  of  a  public 	
functionary  who  represents  the  state  has  to  be  balanced  with  a 
citizen	’s  right  to  fair  investigation  under  Article  21  and  if  the 	
exercise  of  a 	M	inister	’s  right  under  Article  19(1)(a)  violates  a 	
cit	izen’s  right  under  Article  21  then  the  same  would  have  to  be 	
read  down  to  protect  the  right  of  the  citizen.  Thus,  a 	M	inister 	
cannot claim the protection of Article 19(1)(a) to violate Article 21 
rights of citizens. 	 	
10.3.	 	Ms	. Aparajita  Singh  next  contended	 that 	a 	M	inister	,  being  a 	
functionary  of  the  State  represents  the  State  when  acting  in  his 
official  capacity.  Therefore,  any  violation  of  the  fundamental 
rights of citizens by the 	M	inister	 in his official capacity, would be 	
attributable  to  the  State.  Thus,	 it  would  be  preposterous  to 	
suggest  that  while  the  State  is  under  an  obligation  to  restrict  a 
private  citizen  from  violating  the  fundamental  rights  of  other 
citizens,  its  own 	M	inister	 can  do  so  with  impunity.	 However, 	
learne	d 	amicus 	curiae 	qualified such submission by stating that 	
the factum of violation would need to be established on the facts 
of a given case	 and hence the law has to evolve from case to case	. 	
It  would  involve  a  detailed  inquiry  into  questions  such  as 	i) 	
whether the stateme	nt by the 	M	inister	 was made in his personal

16	 	
 	
or  official  capacity	; ii)  whether  the  statement  was  made  on  a 	
public or private issue	; iii	) whether the statement was made on a 	
public or private platform.	 	
10.	4.	 It was submitted that a 	M	inister	 is personally bound by the oath 	
of  office  to  bear  true  faith  and  allegiance  to  the  Constitution  of 
India  under  Articles  75(4)  and  164(3)  of  the  Constitution.  That 
the  code  of  conduct  for 	M	inister	s  (both  for 	U	nion  and 	States) 	
specifically  lays  down  that  th	e  Code  is  in  addition  to  the 	
“…observance  of  the  provisions  of  the  Constitution,  the 
Representation  of  the  People  Act,  1951”. 	Therefore,  a 	
constitutional  functionary  is  duty  bound  to  act  in  a  manner 
which is in consonance with the constitutional obligation	s. 	 	
10.	5.	 	It 	was  lastly  submitted  that 	the  State  acts  through  its 	
functionaries.  Therefore,  an  official  act  of  a 	M	inister	 which 	
violates  the  fundamental  rights  of  the  citizens,  would  make  the 
State  liable 	by  treating  the  said  act  of  the 	M	inister	 as  a	 	
constitutional tort	. However, the principle of sovereign immunity 	
of the state for the tortious acts of its servants, has 	been held to 	
be inapplicable in the case of violation of fundamental rights.	 	
Question No. 1 referred to this Constitution Bench reads as under: 	 	
“Are  the  grounds  specified  in  Article  19(2)  in  relation	 to	 which 	
reasonable restrictions on the right to 	free s	peech can be imposed

17	 	
 
by law, exhaustive, or can restrictions on the right to free speech 
be  imposed  on  grounds  not  found  in  Article  19(2)  by  invoking 
fundamental rights?”	 	
Pref	ace	: 	
11.	 	In my view	, these 	case	s call for 	an analysis 	of the 	content 	of Article 	
19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India 	which grants to all citizens of India 	
the 	right  to 	freedom  of 	speech  and 	expression.  Before  proceeding  to 	
analyse the relevant 	constitutional 	provisions,	 it may be appropriate to 	
preface  the  discussion  with 	the  thought  that 	freedom  of  speech	 is  not 	
contingent  only  upon  the  laws  of  a  nation	. The  compulsion  of  social 	
relations  and  the  informal  pressures  of  conformity,  exerted  in  a 
pervasive manner, determine to a great extent, the content and limits of 
permissible speech in society. It is the laws, however, through their own 
unique  methods,  whic	h  reinforce  social  sanctions. 	Therefore,  the 	
Constitution,  which  is  the  fundamental  law  of  the  land,  as  well  as  the 
other  laws  which  are  measured  on  the  touchstone  of  the  Constitution, 
are  to  be  interpret	ed	,  having  regard	, 	inter	-alia	, to  the 	content  and 	
pe	rmissible limits of free speech in a peaceful society. 	 	
It  is 	necessary  to  observe 	that 	freedom  of  speech  and  expression 	
has  always  been  closely  linked  with  certain  socio	-political  idea	ls  that 	
constitute  the  foundation  of  democrac	y:  respect  for  individual  dignity 	
and  equality; 	fraternity; 	ideals  of  tolerance; 	cultural  and  religious 	
sensitivity.  Many  of  these  idea	ls  are  written  into  the  text  of 	our

18	 	
 
Constitution  and  permeate  its  structure	 through  the  very  Preamble  to 	
the Constitution	. These idea	ls form the philosophical foundations of the 	
discourse on free speech and therefore, 	any	 analysis of the same should 	
be compatible with these idea	ls. It is in that background that 	one must 	
set  out  to  examine  whether 	additional  accountability  an	d  thus,  a  legal 	
obligation  can  be  cast  upon  public  functionaries  with  respect  to  the 
permissible  extent  of  free  speech. 	Further,  it  is  also  necessary  to 	
examine the difference between 	restraints	 on the exercise	 of	 freedom of 	
speech  and  expression,  vis	-à-vis 	restrictions	 thereon	, 	and 	in  that 	
background  examine  the  degree  of 	self	-restraint	 that  needs  to  be 	
exercised  by  every  citizen,  whether  a  public  functionary  or  not,  in 
exercising 	his/her	 right  to  freedom  of  speec	h  and  expression	 in  a 	
Country  like  ours  which  is	 so	 unique  because  of  its  diversity  and 	
pluralism	. 	
Article 19(1)(a) and Article 19(2): An overview	 	
12.	 	At  this  stage	, it  would  be  useful  to  dilate  on  Article  19(1)(a)  and 	
Article 19(2) as under: 	 	
12.1. 	Article  19(1)	(a)  to  (f) 	of  the  Constitution  guarantees  certain 	
fundamental  rights  to  the  citizens  of  India.  These  fundamental 
rights  are  however,  subject  to  reasonable  res	trictions  as 	
enumerated  in  Articles  19(2)  to  (6)  thereof  which  could  be 
imposed by the State. These fundamental rights are in the nature 
of inalienable rights of man or basic human rights which inhere

19	 	
 	
in  a	ll citizen	s of  a  free  country.  Yet,  these  rights  are  not 	
unrestricted or absolute, and are regulated by restrictions	, which 	
may be imposed by the State, 	which have to be reasonable. The 	
object of prescribing restraints or reasonable restrictions on the 
fundamental fr	eedoms is to avoid anarchy or disorder in society. 	
Hence,  the  founding  fathers  of  our  Constitution  while 
enumerating  the  fundamental  rights,  have  alongside  prescribed 
reasonable restrictions in clauses (2) to (6) of Article 19 and the 
laws 	enacted  within  t	he  strict  limits  of  such  restrictions  are 	
constitutionally permissible.	 	
12.	2. 	  Since	, these cases involve the freedom of speech and expression, 	
it is unnecessary to analyse the nature of the other fundamental 
rights  in  Article  19(1)  of  the 	Constitution.	 Articles  19(1)  (a)  and 	
19(2) of the Constitution read as under:	 	
“19.  Protection  of  certain  rights  regarding 
freedom of speech, etc	.- 	
(1)	 	All citizens shall have the right 	–  	
(a)	 to freedom of speech and expression; 	 	
 	
xxx	 	 	xxx	 	 	xxx	 	
(2)	 	Nothing  in  sub	-clause  (a)  of  clause  (a) 	
shall affect the operation of any existing 
law,  or  prevent  the  State  from  making 
any  law,  in  so  far  as  such  law  imposes 
reasonable restrictions on the exercise of 
the  right  conferred  by  the  said  sub	-	
clause in the interests of the sovereignty 
and integrity of India, the security of the 
State,  friendly  relations  with  Foreign 
States, public order, decency or morality 
or  in  relation  to  contempt  of  court, 
defamation or i	ncitement to an offence	.”

20	 	
 
12.	3. 	  The	 freedom of speech and expression	 as envisaged under Article 	
19(1)(a) of the Constitution	 means the right to free speech and to 	
express  opinions  through  various 	media 	such  as  by  word  of 	
mouth,  through  the  print  or  electronic  media,  through 
pictographs, writings	, graphics	 or any other manner that can be 	
discerned	 by the mind.  The right includes	 the freedom of press. 	
The  content  of  this  right  also  includes  propagation  of  ideas 
through  publication  and  circulation,  the  right  to  seek 
information and to acquire or impart ideas. In short, the right to 
free speech would include every nature of right th	at would come 	
within the scope and ambit of free speech. Hence, Article 19(1)(a) 
in very broad and 	in 	wide terms states that all citizens shall have 	
the right to freedom of speech and expression. The said right can 
be  curtailed  only  by  reasonable  restricti	ons  which  are 	
enumerated in Article 19(2) thereof which can be imposed by the 
State under the authority of law but not by exercise of executive 
power  in  the  absence  of  any  law.  Further,  the  nature  of 
restrictions  on  right  to  free  speech  must  be  reasonable	, and	 in 	
the  interest  of  the  sovereignty  and  integrity  of  India,  security  of 
the  State,  friendly  relations  with  foreign  States,  public  order, 
decency  or  morality  or  in  relation  to  contempt  of  court, 
defamation or incitement to	 an offence.	 (Article 19(2))	. 	
12.4. 	 For	 a  country  like  ours  which 	is	 a 	Parliamentary 	D	emocracy, 	
freedom of speech and expression is a necessary right 	as well as

21	 	
 	
a  concomitant 	for  the  purpose  of  not  only  ensuring  a  healthy 	
democracy  but 	also  to  ensure	 that  the  citizens  could  be  well 	
in	formed  and  educated	 on  governance	.  The  dissemination  of 	
information  through  various  media	, 	including  print  and 	
electronic  media  or  audio  visual  form	, is  to  ensure  that  the 	
citizens  are  enlightened  about  their  rights  and  duties,  the 
manner in which they sho	uld conduct themselves in a democracy	 	
and 	for  en	abling	 a  debate  on  the  policies  and  actions  of  the 	
Gover	nments	 and  ultimately  for  the  development  of  the  Indian 	
society in an egalitarian way.	 	
12.5. 	 The right to freedom of speech and expression in Article 19(1)(a) 
of  the  Constitution  has  its  genesis  in  the  Preamble  of  the 
Constitution  which	, inter  alia	, speaks  of  liberty  of  thought, 	
expression, belief. Since, India is a sovereign democratic republic 
and  we  follow  a  parliamentary  system  of  democracy,  liberty  of 
thought and expression is a significant freedom and right under 
our constitutional setup.	 	
12.6.	  This Court has, since the enforcement of the Constitution, been 
zealously  upholding  the  right  to  freedom  of  speech  and 
expression in 	in	numerable judgments which may be highlighted 	
with reference to a 	few 	of them. 	 	
i) 	In 	Romesh  Thappar  vs.  State  of  Madras,  AIR	 1950  SC 	
124,  1950  SCC  436	, 	(“Romesh  Thappar	”) 	while 	
highlighting that the freedom of speech is the foundation of

22	 	
 	
all  democratic  organisations,  held  that  said  freedom  would 
also include the right to freedom of the press. 	This judgment 	
highlighted  that 	the  free  flow  of  opinion  and  ideas 	is 	
necessary  to  sustain  collective  life  of  the  well  informed 
citizenry 	which 	is a 	sine qua non	 for 	effective governance. 	 	
ii)	 	In 	S.  Khushboo  vs.  Kanniammal,  (2010)  5  SCC  600, 	
(“Khushboo	”) this Court held that the freedom 	under Article 	
19(1)(a) 	envisaged  dissemination  of  all  kinds  of  views	, both 	
popular as well as unpopular.	 	
iii)	 	Recently  in 	Shreya  Singhal  vs.  Union  of  India	, (2015)  5 	
SCC  1	, 	(“Shreya  Singhal	”) this  Court  speaking  through 	
Nariman,  J.  highlighted  on  the  differences  between  the  US 
First Amendment and Article 19(1)(a) read with Artic	le 19(2) 	
in the following words:	 	
“15.	 It  is  significant  to  notice  first  the  differences 	
between  the  US  First  Amendment  and  Article 
19(1)(a)  read  with  Article  19(2).  The  first  important 
difference  is  the  absoluteness  of  the  US  First 
Amendment	—	Congress  shall  make	 no  law	 which 	
abridges  the  freedom  of  speech.  Second,  whereas 
the  US  First  Amendment  speaks  of  freedom  of 
speech  and  of  the  press,  without  any  reference  to 
“expression”,  Article  19(1)(a)  speaks  of  freedom  of 
speech and expressi	on without any reference to “the 	
press”.  Third,  under  the  US  Constitution,  speech 
may  be  abridged,  whereas  under  our  Constitution, 
reasonable  restrictions  may  be  imposed.  Fourth, 
under our Constitution such restrictions have to be 
in the interest of eight 	designated subject	-matters	—	
that  is,  any  law  seeking  to  impose  a  restriction  on 
the freedom of speech  can only pass  muster  if it is 
proximately  related  to  any  of  the  eight  subject	-	
matters set out in Article 19(2).	”

23	 	
 	
 
It was further observed that insofar as t	he first apparent 	
difference  is  concerned,  the  U	nited 	States	 Supreme  Court 	
has never given	 effect to the declaration that Congress shall	, 	
under  some  circumstances, 	make  any  law  abridging  the 	
freedom of speech. Insofar as the second apparent difference 
is  c	oncerned,  para  17  of 	Shreya  Singhal 	is 	extracted 	as 	
under:	 
“17.	 So far as the second apparent difference is 	
concerned,  the  American  Supreme  Court  has 
included  “expression”  as  part  of  freedom  of 
speech  and  this  Court  has  included  “the  press” 
as being 	covered  under Article 19(1)(a), so that, 	
as  a  matter  of  judicial  interpretation,  both  the 
US and India protect the freedom of speech and 
expression  as  well  as  press  freedom.  Insofar  as 
abridgement  and  reasonable  restrictions  are 
concerned, both the US Supr	eme Court and this 	
Court have held that a restriction in order to be 
reasonable  must  be  narrowly  tailored  or 
narrowly interpreted so as to abridge or restrict 
only  what  is  absolutely  necessary.  It  is  only 
when it comes to the eight subject	-matters that 	
the	re is a vast difference. In the US, if there is a 	
compelling  necessity  to  achieve  an  important 
governmental  or  societal  goal,  a  law  abridging 
freedom  of  speech  may  pass  muster.  But  in 
India, such law cannot pass muster if it is in the 
interest  of  the  gener	al  public.  Such  law  has  to 	
be  covered  by  one  of  the  eight  subject	-matters 	
set out under Article 19(2). If it does not, and is 
outside  the  pale  of  Article  19(2),  Indian  courts 
will strike down such law.	” 	
 	
In 	Shreya  Singhal	,  there  was  a  challenge  to  Section  66	-A 	
of the Information Technology Act, 2000, which was struck down 
as  being  violative  of  Article  19(1)(a)  and  was  not  saved  under

24	 	
 	
Article  19(2)  on  the  ground  of  vagueness  and  not  providing 
manageable  standards  and  clear 	guidance  for  citizens, 	
authorities  and  courts  for  drawing  a  precise  line  between 
allowable  and  forbidden  speech,  expression  or  information. 
When a law uses vague expressions capable of misuse or abuse 
without  providing  notice  to  persons  of  common  intellige	nce  to 	
guess  their  meaning,  it  leaves  them  in  a  boundless  sea  of 
uncertainty, conferring wide, unfettered powers on authorities to 
curtail freedom of speech and expression arbitrarily.	 	
12.7	. 	The	 present 	cases,  however,  are  not 	really 	concerned  with 	
restrictions  on  the  right  to  freedom  of  speech  being  imposed  by 
the State. These cases are concerned with the content of Article 
19(1)(a)  of  the  Constitution,  inasmuch  as  the  grievance  sought 
to be ventilated by the petitioner	s is	, whether	, there could be 	an 	
inherent  constitutional  restriction  on  freedom  of  speech  and 
expression  on  the  citizens 	vis	-à-vis	 other  citizens.  These  cases 	
are  not  with  regard  to  reasonable  restrictions  that  could  be 
imposed by the State on the freedom of speech and expression	, 	
rath	er	, what would be the content of free speech that 	should not	 	
be exercised as a right by an individual citizen which would	 not	 	
in any way give	 rise	 to 	a cause of action to another citizen to seek 	
a remedy.

25	 	
 
13. 	The  content  of  a  free  speech  right,  as  described  hereinabove,  is 	
to  be  understood 	in  terms  of	 the  structural  elements  or  components 	
of a free speech right. Only when a free speech right is understood as 
such,  deductions  can  be  made  as  to  the  precise  boundaries  thereof 
and  the  basis  on  which  such  right  can  be  limited  or  restrained. 
Stephen Gradbaum	, in his essay titled 	“The Structure of a Free Speech 	
Right,” 	in  the  Oxford  Handbook  of  Freedom  of  Speech  has  discussed 	
six components of a free speech right, in the following words: 	 	
“The  first  is  the 	'force'	 of  a  free  speech  right.  This 	
includes  what  typ	e  of  legal  right  to  free  speech  is 	
formally  recognized  or  at  issue:  for  example,  common 
law,  statutory,  or  constitutional.  This  in  turn  helps  to 
determine  whether  and  how  easily  a  free  speech  right 
can  be  legally  superseded.  Another  aspect  of  force  is 
whet	her and how the right is judicially enforceable. The 	
second component is the 	'subject'	 of free speech rights, 	
or  who  are  the  rights	-holders:  for  example,  all  persons 	
within  a  jurisdiction  or  only  citizens;  legal  persons 
including  corporations  or  only  natur	al  persons?  The 	
third is the 	‘scope’	 of a free speech right: a right to say 	
or  do  what  exactly?  Does  it  include  falsehoods,  hate 
speech,  or  baking  a  cake?  The  fourth,  as  a  distinct 
structural  element  concerning  content,  addresses 
whether  the  right  includes	 	not  only  negative 	
prohibitions  on  relevant  others  but  also  positive 
obligations	,  such  as  a  duty  to  affirmatively  protect  the 	
free	 speech  of  rights	-holders  from  third	-party  threats? 	
The fifth component is the 	'object'	 of a free speech right: 	
who  are  these 	'relevant  others'  that  are  bound  by  the 	
holder's  rights?  Against  whom  can  the  right  be  validly 
asserted?  Finally,  there  is  the  '	limitation	’  of  a  free 	
speech  right.  If  the  prior  questions  have  all  been 
answered  to  the  effect  that  a  free  speech  right  is 
impl	icated and infringed in a particular situation, when, 	
if ever, might there be a legally justified limitation of that 
right?  Is  the  right  an  absolute  bar  or  ‘trump’  against 
inconsistent action and, if not, what presumptive weight 
attaches to it? How, when, 	and why can the presumption 	
be rebutted? Collectively, by constituting and expressing

26	 	
 	
the underlying structure of the right to free speech, the 
answers to these six questions help to define the nature 
and  extent  of  any  particular  such  right  in  a  given  lega	l 	
system.”	 	
(Emphasis by me)	 	
 
 Referring  to  the  aspect  of  limitation  of  a  free  speech  right,  the 	
learned author has observed that the teleology of a Constitutional order, 
can  also  play  a  role  in  fashioning  the  contours  of  free  speech 
protections. That is to	 say, a free speech right may be fashioned to serve 	
Constitutional commitments. 	 	
 	
14. 	According to Wesley Hohfeld’s analysis of the form of rights, every 	
right has a complex internal structure, and such structure determines 
what the 	rights 	mean	 for those who hold them	. Such rights are ordered 	
arrangements  of  basic  components.  One  of  the  com	ponents  of  a  right, 	
is  a  cor	relative  duty.  That  is  to  say	, if  X  has  a  right,  he  is  legally 	
protected  from  interference  in  respect  of  such  right  and  such  right 
carries with it the  duty of the State, not  to interfere  with such right. If 
the  State  (or  any  oth	er  person)  is  under  no  corelative  duty  to  abstain 	
from  interfering  with  the  exercise  of  a  right,  then  such  a  right  is  not  a 
‘right’ 	in  the  strict  Hohfeldian  sense.  The  boundaries  of  the  protective 	
perimeter  within  which  a  person  can  exercise  their  rights, 	depend  on 	
the degree to which the State is duty bound to protect the right. 	 	
 
14.1. 	 What  emerges  from  the  Hohfeldian  conception  of  rights  and 
corelative  duties, 	qua	 the  right  to  freedom  of  speech  and 	
expression may be summed up as follows:

27	 	
 	
a)	 	The 	Constitution of India confers under Article 19(1)(a), the 	
right to freedom of speech and expression to all its citizens. 
The State has a corelative duty to abstain from interference 
with  such  right  except  as  provided  in  Article  19(2)  of  the 
Consitution  whi	ch  are  reasonable  restrictions  on  the  right 	
conferred  under  Article  19(1)(a).  The  extent  of  such  duty 
depends upon the content of speech. For instance, in respect 
of  speech  that  is  likely  to  be  adverse  to  the  interests  of 
sovereignty  and  integrity  of  India	,  the  security  of  the  State, 	
friendly  relations  with  foreign  States,  public  order,  decency 
or  morality;  or  speech  that  constitutes  contempt  of  court, 
defamation  or  is  of  such  nature  as  would  be  likely  to  incite 
the commission of an offence, the duty of the	 State to abstain 	
from  interference,  is  nil.  This  principle  is  Constitutionally 
reflected under Article 19(2) which enables the State to enact 
law  which  would  impose  reasonable  restrictions  on  such 
speech  as  described  under  the  eight  grounds  listed 
hereina	bove which are the basis for reasonable restrictions.	 	
b)	 	Per  contra	,  in  respect  of  speech  and  expression  which 	
constitutes  an  exchange  of  ideas,  including  dissent  or 
disagreement,  and  such  ideas  are  expressed  in  a  manner 
compatible  with  the  ethos  cultivated  i	n  a  civilised  society, 	
the duty of the State to abstain from interference, is high.

28	 	
 	
c)	 	Similarly,  in  respect  of  commercial  speech,  the  State  is 
completely free to recall 	or curb 	commercial speech which is 	
false,  misleading,  unfair  or  deceptive.  Therefore,  th	e 	
threshold  of  tolerance  towards  commercial  speech  or 
advertisements depends on the content of such speech and 
the  object  of  the  material  sought  to  be 
propagated/circulated. The duty of the State to abstain from 
interference  would  also  depend  upon  the  natu	re  and  effect 	
of the commercial speech. 	 	
d)	 	As  is  evident  from  the  above  illustrations,  the  extent  of 
protection of speech would depend on whether, such speech 
would constitute a ‘propagation of ideas’ or would have any 
social  value.  If  the  answer  to  the  said	 question  is  in  the 	
affirmative,  such  speech  would  be  protected  under  Article 
19(1)(a); if the answer is in the negative, such speech would 
not be protected under Article 19(1)(a). In respect of speech 
that  does  not  form  the  content  of  Article  19(1)(a),  th	e  State 	
has  no  duty  to  abstain  from  interference	 having  regard  to 	
Article  19(2)  of  the  Constitution  and  only  the  grounds 
mentioned therein	.  	
e)	 	Having  noted  that  the  protective  perimeter  within  which  a 
person can exercise 	his/her	 rights depends on the degree 	to 	
which  the  State  is  duty  bound  to  protect  the  right,  it  may 
also be said as a corollary that in respect of speech that does

29	 	
 	
not form the content of Article 19(1)(a), the State has no duty 
to  abstain  from  interference  and  therefore,  speech	 such  as 	
hate  sp	eech,  defamatory  speech,  etc.	 would  lie  outside  the 	
protective perimeter within which a person can exercise his 
right to freedom of speech. Such speech can be subjected to 
restrictions  or  restraints.  While 	restrictions	 on  the  right  to 	
freedom  of  speech  and	 expression  are  required  to  be  made 	
only  under  the  grounds  listed  under  Article  19(2),  by  the 
State	, restraints	 on  the  said  right,  do  not  gather  their 	
strength  from  Article  19(2).  Restraints  on  the  right  to 
freedom  of  speech  and  expression  are  governed  by 	the 	
content  of  Article  19(1)(a)	 itself;  i.e.,  any  kind  of  speech, 	
which  does  not  conform  to  the  content  of  the  right  under 
Article  19(1)(a),  may  be  restrained.  Questions  pertaining  to 
the voluntary or binding nature of such restraint, the force 
behind the 	same, the persons on whom such restraints are 	
to  be  imposed,  the  manner  in  which  compliance  thereof 
could  be  achieved,  etc.,  are  aspects  left  to  be  deliberated 
upon and answered by the Parliament. However, the finding 
made hereinabove is only to the extent	 of clarifying that any 	
kind  of  speech,  which  does  not  form  the  content  of  Article 
19(1)(a),  may  be 	restrained	 	as  such  speech  does  not 	
constitute  an  exchange  of  ideas,  in  a  manner  compatible 
with  the  ethos  cultivated  in  a  civilised  society.  Such

30	 	
 	
restraints	 need not	 be traceable only to Article 19(2), which 	
exhaustively	 lists eight grounds on which restrictions may 	
be imposed on the right to freedom of speech and expression 
by the state.	 	
 	
The Content of Article 19(1)(a): 	 	
15. 	The  freedom  of  speech  and  expression  under  Article  19(1)(a)  is  a 	
right with diverse facets, both with regard to the content of speech and 
expression, and the medium through which communication takes place. 
It is also a dynamic concept that has evolved with	 time and advances in 	
technology. In short, Article 19(1)(a) covers the right to express oneself 
by  word  of  mouth,  through  writing,  pictorial  form, 	graphics	,  or  in  any 	
other manner. It  includes the freedom of communication and the right 
to  propagate  or  pub	lish  one's  views  and  opinions.  The  communication 	
of  ideas  may  be  through  any  medium 	such  as  a  book, 	newspaper, 	
magazine or movie, including electronic and audio	-visual media.	 	
15.1.	 Right to Circulate: 	 	
Freedom of the press takes within its fold a number of rights 	
and one such right is the freedom of publication. Publication also 
means  dissemination  and  circulation; 	indeed,	 	without 	
circulation,  publication  would  be  of  little  value, 	vide 	Romesh 	
Thap	par;  Sa	kal  Papers  (P)  Ltd.  vs.  Union  of  India	, 	A.I.R. 	
1962 SC 305	 (“Sakal Papers (P) Ltd.	”).

31	 	
 	
 In 	Life 	Insurance 	Corporation	 vs.	 Prof.	 Manubhai	 D. 	
Shah	, (1992)  3  SCC  637	 (“Prof. 	Manubhai	 D.  Shah	”) this 	
Court reiterated that the freedom of speech and 	expression under 	
Article  19(1)(a)  must  be  understood  to  take  within  its  ambit  the 
freedom  to  circulate  one’s  view.  That  such  circulation  could  be 
by word of mouth, in writing or through audio	-visual media. The 	
freedom  to  ‘air  one’s  view’  was  declared  as  a 	“lifeline  of  any 	
democratic institution” and the Court expressed strong criticism 
at  any  attempt  aimed  at  stifling  or  suffocating  the  right  to 
circulation.  In  the  said  case,  t	he	 appeals 	concerned 	separate 	
instances  of  state	-controlled  entities  (LIC  and 	Doordarshan) 	
refus	ing	 	to  publish  or  broadcast  work  that  criticized  the 	
government.  The  Court  reasoned  that  government	-controlled 	
means  of  publication  have  a  greater  burden  to  recognize  an 
individual’s  right  to  defend  themselves  and  if  a 	state	 censors 	
conte	nt, then it is obligated to provide reasons valid in law. That 	
when  a  state	-controlled  entity  refuses  to  circulate  through  its 	
magazine or other platform, one’s views, including one’s defence, 
the right to circulate is violated. 	 	
This  Court  has 	therefore	, 	on  several  occasions  recognised 	
the  right  to  circulation,  as  a  facet  of  the  right  to  freedom  of 
speech.  The  right  to  circulation  includes,  the  right  to 
optimise/maximise  the  volume  of  such  circulation  and  also 
determine the content and reach thereof.

32	 	
 
15.2. 	Right to dissent: 	 	
 Article  19(1)(a)  serves  as  a  vehicle  through  which  dissent 	
can  be  expressed. 	 The  right  to  dissent,  disagree  and  adopt 	
varying  and  individualistic  points  of  view  inhere	s in  every 	
citizen  of  th	is	 Country.  In  fact,  the  right  to  dissen	t  is  the 	
essence  of  a  vibrant  democracy	, for  it  is  only  when  there  is 	
dissent that different ideas would emerge which may be of help 
or  assist  the  Government  to  improve  or  innovate  upon  its 
policies  so  that  its  governance  would  have  a  positive  effect  on 
the  people  of  the  country  which  would  ulti	mately  lead  to 	
stability,  peace  and  development  which  are  concomitants  of 
good governance.  	 	
15.3. 	 The  following  judgments  of  this  Court  on  the  right  to  dissent 
are noteworthy: 	 	
(i)	 	In 	Romesh 	Thap	par	,  this  Court  recognised  that  criticism 	
or	 dissent directed against the Government, was not to be 	
curtailed and any attempt to do so could not be justified as 
a  reasonable  restriction  under  Article  19  (2)  of  the 
Constitution.  This  declaration  by  th	is	 Court 	cemented  the 	
idea that the freedom of speech and expression covers the 
right  to  dissent  or  criticise,  even  when  such  right  is 
employed  with  respect  to  criticism  of  governmental  policy 
or action or inaction. It is now recognised that the right to

33	 	
 	
dissent is	 an essential pre	-requisite of a healthy democracy	 	
and a facet of free speech	.  	
(ii)	 	In 	Kedar	 Nath Singh vs. State of Bihar	, A.I.R. 1962 SC 	
955	 	(“Kedar	 	Nath  Singh	”) 	this  Court  considered  a 	
challenge  to  Sections  124	-A  and  505  of  the  IPC,  which 	
criminalise	d 	attempts  targeted  at  exciting  disaffection 	
towards the Government, by words, or through writing and 
publications  which  may  disturb  public  tranquillity. 
Although thi	s Court dismissed the challenge to the 	vires	 of 	
the aforestated provisions, it was clarified that criticism of 
measures adopted by the government, would be within the 
limits  of,  and  consistent  with  the  freedom  of  speech  and 
expression.	 	
(iii)	 Subsequently,	 in	 Directorate  General  of  Doordarshan 	
vs.  Anand  Patwardhan	, (2006)  8  SCC  433	 (“Anand 	
Patwardhan	”) this  Court  observed  that  the  State  cannot 	
prevent  open  discission,  even  when  such  discussion  was 
highly critical of governmental policy. 	 	
(iv)	 The  right  of  an  individual  to  hold  unpopular  or 
unconventional views was once again upheld in 	K	hushboo 	
wherein  this  Court  quashed 	First  Information  Reports 	
(FIRs	) registered pertaining to offences under Sections 292, 	
499,  500,  504,  505,  509  of  the  IPC,  bas	ed  on  complaints 	
regarding the unpopular comments made by the appellant

34	 	
 	
therein, an actor,	 in a news magazine on the subject of pre	-	
marital 	sex 	wherein she had urged women and girls to take 	
necessary  precautions  to  avoid  the  transmission  of 
venereal  diseas	es.  In  doing  so,  this  Court  observed  that 	
criminal  law  could  not  be  set  into  motion  in  a  manner  as 
would interfere with the domain of personal autonomy. The 
Court  upheld  the  appellant’s  freedom  of  speech  and 
expression and quashed the FIRs,  expressing the 	need  for 	
tolerance even 	qua 	unpopular views. 	 	
 
15.4.	 Right	 to advertise (commercial speech): 	 	
As  per  the  dictionary  meaning,  the  expression  "advertise" 	
means, to draw attention to, or describe goods for sale, services 
offered	, 	etc.,  through  any  medium,  such  as  newspaper, 	
television 	or other electronic media, 	etc., in order to encourage 	
people to buy or use them. In other words, it is to draw attention 
to  any  product  or  service.  "Advertisement"  is  a  public  notice, 
announcement, 	picture in a newspaper or on a wall or hoarding 	
in the street etc., which advertises something. In short, it is to 
advert attention to something and in the  commercial sense, to 
draw  attention  to  goods  for  sale  or  services  offered.  In  that 
sense, an adverti	sement is commercial speech. 	 	
    	A glimpse of the following cases would be useful:

35	 	
 	
(i)	  	In 	Hamdard  Dawakhana	 (Wakf)  Lal  Kuan	 vs.  Union  of 	
India	, A.I.R  1960  SC  554	 (“Hamdard  Dawakhana	”) this 	
Court  held  that  an  advertisement  is  a  form  of  speech,  but  its 
true  character  is  reflected  by  the  object  for  the  promotion  of 
which  it  is  employed.  However,  this  Court  qualified  its 
observations with the caveat that when advertisement takes the 
form  of  commercial  advertisement  which  has  an  element  of 
trade  or  commerce	,  it  no  longer  falls  within  the  concept  of 	
freedom  of  speech	, for	, the  object  is  not  propagation  of  ideas 	- 	
social,  political  or  economic  or  furtherance  of  literature  or 
human  thought;  but  the  commendation  of  the  efficacy,  value 
and importance of the produ	ct it seeks to advertise. In the said 	
case,  this  Court  did  not  recognize  commercial  speech  on  par 
with  other  forms  of  speech  by  holding  that  it  did  not  have  the 
same value as political or creative expression. That broadly, the 
right  to  publish  and  distribu	te  commercial  advertisements 	
advertising  an  individual's  personal  business  is  a  part  of 
freedom  of  speech  guaranteed  by  the  Constitution,  but  not 
every  advertisement  is  a  matter  which  comes  within  the  scope 
of freedom of speech, nor can it be said that it 	is an expression 	
of  ideas.  In  every  case,  one  has  to  see  what  is  the  nature  of 
advertisement  and  what  is  the  business/commercial  activity 
falling under Article 19(1)(g) it seeks to further.

36	 	
 	
In th	e aforesaid	 case,  what  was  challenged  was the  Drugs 	
and Magic Remedies (Objectionable Advertisements)	 Act, 1954. 	
It was held that the object of the Act was the prevention of self	-	
medication  and  self	-treatment  by  prohibiting  advertisements, 	
which  may  be  used  to  advoca	te  the  same  or  which  tended  to 	
spread  the  evil.  It  was  further  held  that  the  advertisements  of 
Hamdard Dawakhana	, appellant in the said case, 	were relating 	
to  commerce  or  trade  and  not  propagation  of  ideas	.  Such	 	
advertising of prohibited drugs or commoditi	es the sale	 of which	 	
wa	s not in the interest of the general public	, cannot be "speech" 	
within  the  meaning  of  freedom  of  speech  and  would  not  fall 
within Article 19(1)(a). 	 	
It is therefore evident that this Court in the said case placed 	
weight  on  the  aspect  as  to  whether,  the  advertisement  sought 
to be protected, did in fact constitute ‘propagation of ideas.’ The 
true  content  and  object  of  the  material  sought  to  be 
propagated	/circulated  was  to  be  assessed,  in  order  to  declare 	
whether  such  content  would  enjoy  the  protection  of  Article 
19(1)(a). 	 	
 	
(ii)	 	Subsequently,  in 	Indian  Express  Newspaper  (Bombay) 	
Pvt.  Ltd.  vs.  Union  of  India	, (1985	) 1  SCC  641	 (“Indian 	
Express 	Newspaper  (Bombay)  Pvt.  Ltd.	”),  this  Court 	
considered  the  decision  in 	Hamdard  Dawakhana	 	and

37	 	
 	
observed  that  the  main  plank  of 	said	 decision  was  the  type  of 	
advertisement  or  the  content  thereof  and  that  particular 
advertisement  did  not  carry  with  it  the  protection  of  Article 
19(1)(a).  It  was  further  clarified  that  the  observations  made  in 
Hamdard  Dawakhana	 	are  too  broadly  stated.  That	 	all 	
commercial  advertisements  cannot  be  denied  the  protection  of 
Article  19(1)(a)  of  the  Constitution  merely  because  they  are 
issued by businessmen. 	 	
 
(iii)	 Subsequently,  in 	Tata  Press  Limited  vs.  Mahanagar 	
Telephone  Nigam  Limited	, (1995)  5  SCC  139	 (“Tata  Press 	
Limited	”),  this  Court  clarified  that  commercial  speech,  which 	
is  entitled  to  protection  under  the  First  Amendment 	in 	U	SA 	is 	
also protected under Article 19(1)(a) of the Indian Constitution. 
However, 	in  the  USA, 	the  State  was  completely  free  to  recall 	
commercial speech which is false, misleading, unfair, deceptive 
and which proposes illegal transactions	 in USA	. But, under the	 	
Indian  Constitution,  commercial  speech  which  is  deceptive, 
unfair, misleading and untruthful, would be hit by Article 19(2) 
of  the  Constitution  and  can  be  regulated/prohibited  by  the 
State.	 	
 	
15.5.	 Compelled	 Speech: 	 	
 Compelled  or  forced  speech  is  speech  which  compels  a 	
person  to  state  a  thing.  It  is  in  the  form  of  a  "must  carry"

38	 	
 	
provision  in  a  statute.  An  example  of  compelled  speech  is  a 
provision  mandating  printing  of  the  ingredients,  its  measure 
and  such  other  detail	s  on  a  food  product  or  pharmaceutical 	
item.  The  object  is  to  inform 	and,  in  some  cases,	 warn  a 	
potential  consumer  about  the  nature  of  the  product.  Such 
compelled speech cannot be a violation of the freedom of speech 
and  expression.  But  if  the  State  compels	 a  citizen  to  carry  out 	
propaganda or a point of view contrary to his wish then it may 
be a rest	riction	 on his freedom of speech and expression	, which 	
must  be  justified  as  per  Article  19(2)  of  the  Constitution	.  But,	 	
if the “must carry” provision furthers informed decision making, 
which is the essence of free speech and expression	, then it will 	
not  amount  to  a  violation  of  Article  19(1)(a). 	The  following 	
judgments could be cited in the aforesaid context: 	 	
(i)	 	In 	Union  of  India  vs.  Motion  Picture  Association	, A.I.R. 	
1999 SC 2334	 (“Motion Picture Association	”), this Court 	
held that whether compelled speech will or will not amount 
to a violation of the freedom of speech and expression, would 
depend  upon  the 	nature  of  a  "must  carry"  provision.  It 	
observed  that	, if  a  "must  carry"  provision  further  informed 	
decision	-making,  which  is  the  essence  of  the  right  to  free 	
speech and expression, it will not amount to any violation of 
the  fundamental  freedom  of  speech  an	d  expression. 	
However,  if  such  a  provision  compels  a  person  to  carry  out

39	 	
 	
propaganda  or project a partisan or distorted point of view, 
contrary  to  his  wish,  it  may  amount  to  a  restraint  on  his 
freedom of speech and expression. 	It  may also violate other 	
fund	amental rights such as Article 19 (1) (g) or right against 	
self	-incrimination which is protected under  Article 20 (3) of 	
the Constitution. 	 	
(ii)	 	Therefore, this Court, in the said case, once again laid stress 
on  the  ideas  and  information  sought  to  be  commu	nicated, 	
by  way  of  compelling  the  transmission  of  such  ideas.  The 
content of the information which  is compelled to be carried 
was found to be highly relevant. 	 	
Thus,  t	he  right  under  Article  19(1)(a)  is  a  multi	-faceted 	
freedom 	and includes within its 	expanse	, inter	-alia	, the right to 	
gender  identity	 as  a  facet  of  freedom  of  expression	, 	vide 	
National  Legal  Services  Authority  vs.  Union  of  India	, 	
(2014) 5 SCC 438	 (“National Legal Services Authority	”); the 	
right  of  the  press  to  conduct  interviews, 	vide 	Prabha  Dutt  vs. 	
Union of India	, (1982) 1 SCC 1	 (“Prabha Dutt	”); the right to 	
attend proceedings in Court and report the same, 	vide 	Swapnil 	
Tripathi  vs.  Supreme  Court  of  India	, (2018)  10  SCC  639	 	
(“Swapnil	 Tripathi	”); 	the  right  to  fly  the  national  flag 	vide 	
Union  of  India  vs.  Naveen  Jindal	, 	(2004)  2  SCC  510	 	
(“Naveen  Jindal	”). The  right  to  s	ilence,  often  regarded  as  the 	
very  converse  of  ‘speech,’  is  also  implicit  in  the  freedom  of

40	 	
 	
speech  under  Article  19(1)(a),  as  recognised  in 	Bijoe 	
Emmanuel  vs.  State  of  Kerala	, (1986)  3  SCC  615	 (“Bijoe 	
Emmanuel	”).  	
 	
16.	 	‘Hate Speech	’: 	
16.1.	 	The  various  nuances  of  what  has  come  to  be  termed  as  ‘hate 
speech’  could  be  discussed  with  reference  to  judgments  of  this 
Court as under: 	 	
Learned	 	counsel  appearing  for  the  petitioner	, 	Sri 	
Kaleeswaram  Raj  submitted  that	, 	the  con	tention	 	of  the 	
petitioner	s in these cases is that the right to free speech which is 	
a right against the State would also bring within its fold, a duty 
vis	-à-vis	 not  only  the  State  but  other  citizens  also  in  the  matter 	
of exercising the said freedom. In other word	s, what is sought to 	
be  addressed  in  these  cases  is  what  are  the  components  or 
elements  of  the  fundamental  right  of  free  speech  and  whether 
there  could  be  limits  on  the  right  to  free  speech 	de  hors	 Article 	
19(2)  of  the  Constitution,  with  a  view  to  check,  w	hat  has 	
ubiquitously 	come  to  be  known  as  ‘hate  speech’	 or  ‘disparaging 	
speech’	. By this I do not restrict 	the scope of consideration in the 	
instant  cases  only 	to  speech  made  by  public  functionaries	, but 	
the  same  shall  also  extend  to  speech 	by  ordinary  citi	zens	, 	
especially on social media.

41	 	
 
16.2.	 	This Court, in 	Pravasi Bhalai Sangathan vs. Union of India	, 	
(2014)  11  SC  477	 (“Pravasi  Bhalai  Sangathan	”) speaking 	
through  Dr.  B.S.  Chauhan,  J., 	has 	dealt  with 	‘hate  speech’  as 	
having  an  innate  relationship  with  the  idea  of  discrimination. 
That the impact of such speech  is  not 	measured  by  its  abusive 	
value alone, but rather by how successfully and systematically 
it  marginalises  people.  The  definition  of  ‘hate  spee	ch’  as 	
propounded  by  this  Court  in	 the  aforesaid  case	,  is  extracted 	
hereinunder: 	 	
“Hate  speech  is  an  effort  to  marginalise  individuals 
based  on  their  membership  in  a  group.	 Using 	
expression  that  exposes  the  group  to  hatred,  hate 
speech seeks to delegitimis	e group members in the 	
eyes of the majority, reducing their social standing 
and  acceptance  within  society. 	Hate  speech, 	
therefore  rises  beyond  causing  distress  to  individual 
group  members.  It  can  have  a  societal  impact.  Hate 
speech lays the groundwork for 	later, broad attacks on 	
[the] vulnerable that can range from discrimination, to 
ostracism,  segregation,  deportation,  violence  and,  in 
the most extreme cases, to genocide. Hate speech also 
impacts  a  protected  group’s  ability  to  respond  to  the 
substantive  id	eas  under  debate,  thereby  placing  a 	
serious  barrier  to  their  full  participation  in  our 
democracy.”	 	
(Emphasis by me) 	 	
 
 	
This Court referred 	to 	the judgment of the Supreme Court of 	
Canada  in 	Saskatchewan  Human  Rights  Commission  vs.	 	
William 	Whatcott	, 2013 SCC 11	 (“Saskatchewan	”) (Canada)	 	
wherein it was held that human rights obligations form the basis 
for  the  control  of  publication  of  "hate  speeches."  The  Canadian

42	 	
 	
Supreme Court further declared that the repugnancy of the ideas 
being  expressed  is  not  sufficient  to  justify  restricting  the 
ex	pression,  and  whether  or  not  the  author  of  the  expression 	
intended  to  incite  hatred  or  discriminatory  treatment,  is 
irrelevant.  That  the  key  is  to  determine  the  likely  effect  of  the 
expression  on  its  audience,  keeping  in  mind  the  legislative 
objectives to 	reduce or eliminate discrimination. Placing reliance 	
on the observations of the Canadian Supreme Court, this Court 
in 	Pravasi Bhalai Sangathan 	observed that the offence of hate 	
speech  is  not  limited  to  causing  individual  distress  but  would 
target persons w	ho are members of certain groups or sections of 	
society which breeds discrimination and consequently, hostility.	 	
  	
16.3. 	 In  India,  human  dignity  is  not  only  a  value  but  a  right  that  is 
enforceable. 	In  a  human	-dignity	-based  democracy,  freedom  of 	
speech and expression must be exercised in a manner that would 
protect  and  promote  the  rights  of  fellow	-citizens. 	But  h	ate 	
speech,  w	hatever  its  content  may  be, 	denies  human  beings  the 	
right  to  dignity.  In  this  regard,  it  may  be  apposite  to  refer  to 	a 	
recent	 decision  of  this  Court  in 	Amish  Devgan  vs.  Union  of 	
India	, (2021)  1  SCC  1	 (“Amish  Devgan	”) wherein  this  Court 	
speaking 	through 	Sanjeev  Khanna,  J. 	undertook  an  analysis  of 	
‘hate speech’ as being antithetical to, and incompatible with the 
foundations  of  human  dignity. 	Protection  of  ‘Dignity’  as  a

43	 	
 	
justification for 	criminalization of ‘hate speech’ was discussed as 	
follows: 	 	
“46.  […] 	Dignity,  in  the  context  of  criminalisation  of 	
speech with which we are concerned, refers to a person's 
basic  entitlement  as  a  member  of  a  society  in  good 
standing,  his  status  as  a  social  equal  and  as  bearer  of 
human  rights  and  constitutional  entitl	ements.  It  gives 	
assurance  of  participatory  equality  in  inter	-personal 	
relationships  between  the  citizens,  and  between  the 
State  and  the  citizens,  and  thereby  fosters  self	-worth. 	
Dignity in this sense does not refer to any particular level 
of  honour  or  est	eem  as  an  individual,  as  in  the  case  of 	
defamation which is individualistic.	 	
47.  Preamble  to  the  Constitution  consciously  puts 
together fraternity assuring dignity of the individual and 
the  unity  and  integrity  of  the  nation.  Dignity  of 
individual  and  unity  and  integrity  of  the  nation  are 
linked, one in the form of rights of individ	uals and other 	
in the form of individual's obligation to others to ensure 
unity and integrity of the nation. The unity and integrity 
of the nation cannot be overlooked and slighted, as the 
acts  that  'promote'  or  are  'likely'  to  'promote' 
divisiveness, alie	nation and schematism do directly and 	
indirectly  impinge  on  the  diversity  and  pluralism,  and 
when  they  are  with  the  objective  and  intent  to  cause 
public  disorder  or  to  demean  dignity  of  the  targeted 
groups,  they  have  to  be  dealt  with  as  per  law.  The 
purpos	e is not to curtail right to expression and speech, 	
albeit not gloss over specific egregious threats to public 
disorder and in particular the unity and integrity of the 
nation. Such threats not only insidiously weaken virtue 
and  superiority  of  diversity,  b	ut  cut	-back  and  lead  to 	
demands  depending  on  the  context  and  occasion,  for 
suppression  of  freedom  to  express  and  speak  on  the 
ground of reasonableness. 	Freedom and rights cannot 	
extend to create public disorder or armour those who 
challenge  integrity  and  u	nity  of  the  country  or 	
promote  and  incite  violence.  Without  acceptable 
public  order,  freedom  to  speak  and  express  is 
challenged and would get restricted for the common 
masses  and  law	-abiding  citizens.  This  invariably 	
leads  to  State  response  and,  therefore,	 those  who 	
indulge  in  promotion  and  incitement  of  violence  to 
challenge unity and integrity of the nation or public

44	 	
 	
disorder tend to trample upon liberty and freedom of 
others	.” 	
(Emphasis 	by me)	 	
 Further, referring to the views of Alice E. Marwick and Ross	 	
Millers in the report titled “Online Harassment, defamation, and 
Hateful Speech: A Primer of the Legal Landscape,” this Court in 
Amish Devgan	 elucidated as follows on three distinct elements 	
that legislatures and courts can use to define and identify ‘hat	e 	
speech’: 	 	
“72.1. 	 The content	-based element involves open use of 	
words  and  phrases  generally  considered  to  be  offensive 
to  a  particular  community  and  objectively  offensive  to 
the  society.  It  can  include  use  of  certain  symbols  and 
iconography.  By  applying	 	objective  standards,  one 	
knows  or  has  reasonable  grounds  to  know  that  the 
content  would  allow  anger,  alarm  or  resentment  in 
others  on  the  basis  of  race,  colour,  creed,  religion  or 
gender. 	 	
72.2.	 	 The  intent	-based  element  of  'hate  speech' 	
requires  the  spea	ker's  message  to  intend  only  to 	
promote  hatred,  violence  or  resentment  against  a 
particular  class  or  group  without  communicating  any 
legitimate  message.  This  requires  subjective  intent  on 
the  part  of  the  speaker  to  target  the  group  or  person 
associated wit	h the class/group. 	 	
72.3. 	 	The harm or impact	-based element refers to the 	
consequences  of  the  ‘hate  speech’,  that  is,  harm  to  the 
victim  which  can  be  violent  or  such  as  loss  of  self	-	
esteem, economic or social subordination, physical and 
mental 	stress,  silencing  of  the  victim  and  effective 	
exclusion from the political arena.	 	
72.4. 	 	Nevertheless,  the  three  elements  are  not 	
watertight  silos  and  do  overlap  and  are  interconnected 
and  linked.  Only  when  they  are  present  that  they

45	 	
 	
produce  structural  con	tinuity  to  constitute  'hate 	
speech'.”	 	
It  was 	further 	clarified  that  the  effect  of  the  words  must  be 	
judged  from  the  standard  of  “reasonable,  strong	-minded,  firm 	
and courageous men and not those who are weak and ones with 
vacillating  minds,  nor  those  who  scent  danger  in  every  hostile 
point  of  view.”  That  in  o	rder  to  ensure  maximisation  of  free 	
speech,  the  assessment  should  be  from  the  perspective  of  a 
reasonable member of the public. 	 	
16.4. 	  Further, i	n a landmark Judgment of the U	nited State	s’ Supreme 	
Court  in  the  matter  of 	Chaplinsky  vs. 	State  of 	New 	
Hampshire	, 315 U.S. 568 (194	2) (“Chaplinsky	”) “hate speech” 	
was defined by Murphy J. to mean 	“fighting words, which by their 	
very utterance  inflict  injury or  tend  to  incite  an  immediate breach 
of  peace.  It  has  been  observed  that  such  utterances  are  no 
esse	ntial  part  of  any  exposition  of  ideas,  and  are  of  slight  social 	
value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from 
them  is  clearly  outweighed  by  the  social  interest  in  order  and 
morality.” 	 	
16.5. 	 The  term  ‘hate  speech’  does  not  find 	a  specific 	place  in 	Article 	
19(2) of the Constitution and 	it appears that it 	does not constitute 	
a  specific  exception  to  the  freedom  of  speech  and  expression 
under  Article  19(1)(a). 	Possibly  the  framers  of  the  Constitut	ion

46	 	
 	
did  not  find  the  same  to  be 	of 	relevance  in	 the	 Indian  social 	
m	osaic  considering  that  the  other  cherished  values  of  our 	
Constitution  such  as  fraternity  and  dignity  of  the  individual 
would  be  strong  factors  which  would  negate  any  form  of  hate 
speech to 	be uttered in ou	r Country. This may be having regard 	
to  our  social  and  cultural  values. 	However,  with  the  passage  of 	
time,  a	 wide  range  of  Indian  statutes  have  been  enacted  with  a 	
view to control  hate	 speech	. It  may be useful to refer to a few of 	
such  provisions,  with  a  view  to  examine 	the  sufficiency  of  the 	
existing  framework  in  checking  ‘hate  speech	’  a	lthough,  the  said 	
term h	as not yet been precisely defined till date by the Parliament.	  	
i) 	The 	Indian  Penal  Code	 (“IPC”) 	contains  provisions  which 	
prohibit hate 	speech	. Section 153	-A penalises the promotion 	
of  class  hatred.  Section  153	-B  penalises  “imputations, 	
assertions  prejudicia	l  to  national  integration".  Section	 295	-	
A penalises  insults  to  religion  and  to  religious  beliefs. 	
Section 298 	makes it a penal offence to	 utter words, makes 	
sounds or gestures with the deliberate intention of wounding 
the  religious  feelings  of  another.  Section  505  makes  it  a 
penal  offence  to  incite  any  class  or  community  against 
another. Chapter XXII, IPC punishes criminal intimidation.	 	
ii)	 	Sec	tion  95  of  the 	Code  of  Criminal  Procedure	, 	1973	 	
(“CrPC”) 	empowers  the  State  Government  to  forfeit

47	 	
 	
publications  that  are  punishable  under  Sections  124	-A, 	
153	-A,  153	-B,  292,  293  or  295	-A  of  the  IPC.  Section  107 	
empowers the Executive Magistrate to prevent a 	person from 	
committing  a  breach  of  peace  or  disturbing  public 
tranquillity or doing any wrongful act that may cause breach 
of  peace  or  disturb  public  tranquillity.  Section  144 
empowers  the  District  Magistrate,  a  Sub	-divisional 	
Magistrate  or  any  other  Execu	tive  Magistrate  specially 	
empowered by the State Government in this behalf to issue 
orders in urgent  cases of nuisance or apprehended danger. 
The above offences are cognizable.	 	
iii)	 	Section	 7 of  the	 Protection  of  Civil  Rights  Act,  1955	 	
penalises  incitement  to, 	and  encouragement  of 	
untouchability  through  words,  either  spoken  or  written,  or 
by signs or by visible representations or otherwise.	 	
iv)	 	Section	 3(g)	 of  the	 Religious  Institutions  (Prevention  of 	
Misuse)  Act,  1988 	prohibits  religious  institutions  to  allow 	
the u	se of any premises belonging to, or under their control 	
for promoting or attempting to promote disharmony, feelings 
of  enmity,  hatred,  ill	-will  between  different  religious,  racial, 	
linguistic	 or regional groups or castes or communities.	 	
v)	 	Section	 3(	1)(x)	 of the	 Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled 	
Tribes  (Prevention  of  Atrocities)  Act,  1989	 punishes  an 	
intentional  insult or intimidation  with intent to humiliate a

48	 	
 	
member  of  a  Scheduled  Caste  or  Tri	be  in  any  place  within 	
public view.	  	
vi)	 	Section	 8 of  the	 Representation  of  the  People  Act,  195	1 	
disqualifies  a  person  from  contesting  elections  if  he  is 
convicted for indulging in acts amounting to illegitimate use 
of freedom of speech and expression. Section	 123(3	-A) of the 	
same 	Act 	declares "the promotion of, or attempt to promote, 	
feelings of enmity or hatred between different classes of the 
citizens  of  India  on  grounds  of  religion,  race,  caste, 
community, or language, by a candidate or his agent or any 
oth	er person with the consent of a candidate or his election 	
agent  for  the  furtherance  of  the  prospects  of  the  election  of 
that  candidate  or  for  prejudicially  affecting  the  election  of 
any candidate", a "corrupt practice".	 	
vii)	 The 	Cable	 Television  Networks  (Regul	ation)  Act,  1995	 	
requires that all programmes and advertisements telecast on 
television  conform  to  the 	Programme 	Code  and  the 	
Advertisement 	Code.  Rule  6, 	Cable  Television  Networks 	
Rules, 1994	 lays down the 	Programme 	Code and prohibits 	
the carrying of any programme on the cable service which: 	 	
(a)	 	contains  an  attack  on  religion  or  communities  or 
contains 	visuals  or  words  contemptuous  of  religious 	
groups or which promotes communal attitudes;

49	 	
 	
(b)	 	is  likely  to  encourage  or  incite 	violence  or  contains 	
anything against maintenance of law and order or which 
promotes anti	-national attitudes;	 	
(c)	 	criticises, maligns or slanders any individual in person 
or certain groups, segments of social, public and moral 
life of the country;	 	
(d)	 	contains  visuals  or  words  which  reflect  a  slandering, 
ironical and snobbish attitude in the portrayal of certain 
ethnic, linguistic and regional groups.	  	
Similarly,  the 	Advertising 	Code  under  Rule  7	 of  the	 	
Cable  Television  Networks  Rules,  1994	 prohibits  th	e 	
carriage  of  advertisements  on  the  cable  service  which  hurt 
the  religious  susceptibilities  of  subscribers,  which  derides 
any  race,  caste,  colour,  creed  or  nationality,  or  incite 
violence or disorder or breach of law.	  	
The 	Cable  Television  Networks  (Regula	tion)  Act, 	
1995	 empowers the authorised officer appointed under the 	
Act to prohibit the transmission of a programme or channel, 
if  it  is  not  in  conformity  with  the 	Programme 	Code  or  the 	
Advertisement 	Code; or if it is likely to promote disharmony 	
or  feelin	gs  of  enmity,  hatred  or  ill	-will  between  different 	
religious,  racial, linguistic or regional groups;  or is likely to 
disturb public tranquillity. Further, the Central Government 
is  empowered  to  prohibit  the  transmission  or

50	 	
 	
re	-transmission of any channel or programme in the interest 	
of  the  sovereignty,  integrity  or  security  of  India  or  of  public 
order.	 	
viii)	 Under the 	Cinematograph Act, 1952	, a film can be denied 	
certification  on  various  grounds,  including  on  the  ground 
that it is 	likely to incite the commission of an offence or that 	
it is against the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of 
India or public order.	 	
ix)	 	The 	Information Technology Act, 2000	 (IT Act) allows the 	
interception of information by the authorities in the inte	rest 	
of  public  order,  or the  sovereignty  and  integrity  of  India,  or 
for the purpose of preventing incitement to the commission 
of a cognizable offence. Section 66	-A of the same Act which 	
sought  to  penalise  information  that  is	 "grossly  offensive"  or 	
of "men	acing character" or despite knowledge that it is false, 	
is  sent  to  cause  annoyance,  inconvenience,  danger, 
obstruction, insult, criminal intimidation, enmity, hatred or 
ill	-will, was struck down in 	Shreya Singhal 	on the ground 	
of, 	inter alia	, vagueness. 	 	
x)	 	Norms of Journalistic Conduct, 2010	 issued by the Press 	
Council  of  India  (constituted  under  the  Press  Council  Act, 
1978)  contain  extensive  guidelines  on  the  reporting  of 
communal incidents.

51	 	
 	
The content of speech is sought to be controlled in all the 	
aforesa	id  statutes  when  the  same  is  made  not  only  by  public 	
functionaries  but  any  ordinary  citizen  also  through  whatever 
medium of dissemination. 	 	
16.6.	 	One  of  the  recommendations  of  the  267	th Law  Commission  was 	
to  insert  Sections 	153C  and  505A  and  associated  provisions  in 	
the CrPC to deal with 	‘Hate Speech	’. As per the Law Commission 	
report, the proposed provisions would read as under: 	 	
“153	-C- Whoever on grounds of religion, race, caste or 	
community,  sex,  gender  identity, 	sexual  orientation, 	
place  of  birth,  residence,  language,  disability  or  tribe	– 	
(a)  uses  gravely  threatening  words  either  spoken  or 
written,  signs,  visible  representations  within  the 
hearing or sight of a person with the intention to cause, 
fear or alarm; or	 	
(b) advocates hatred by words either spoken or written, 
signs,  visible  representations,  that  causes  incitement 
to  violence  shall  be  punishable  with  imprisonment  of 
either  description  for  a  term  which  may  extend  to  two 
years, and fine up to Rs 5000, or wit	h both.”	 	
“505	-A- Causing fear, alarm, or provocation of violence 	
in  certain  cases:  Whoever  in  public  intentionally  on 
grounds  of  religion,  race,  caste  or  community,  sex, 
gender,  sexual  orientation,  place  of  birth,  residence, 
language, disability or 	tribe uses words, or displays any 	
writing,  sign,  or  other  visible  representation  which	 is	 	
gravely threatening, or derogatory;	 	
(i)within  the  hearing  or  sight  of  a  person,	 causing  fear 	
or alarm	, or;	 	
(ii) 	 with  the  intent  to  provoke  the  use  of  unlawful 	
violen	ce,  against  that  person  or  another,	 shall  be

52	 	
 	
punished  with  imprisonment  for  a  term  which  may 
extend to one year and/or fine up to Rs 5000, or both”.	 	
 The  proposed 	provision	 under  Section 	505	-A,  seeks  to 	
control  not  only 	speech  that  could  potentially 	incite  violence  or 	
hurt  the  feelings  of  a  community  or  dampen  national  integrity, 
but also seeks to check threatening or derogatory remarks, made 
on  grounds	 of  religion,  race,  caste  or  community,  sex,  gender, 	
sexual orientatio	n, place of birth, residence, language, disability 	
or  tribe,  and  which  cause 	fear  or  alarm.  While  speech  of 	the 	
former category has been traditionally regarded as 	‘hate speech,	’ 	
generally vitriolic or 	‘derogatory’ statements, which are made on 	
the  grounds 	of 	religion,  race,  caste  or  community,  sex,  gender, 	
sexual orientation, place of birth, residence, language, disability 
or tribe, have	 traditionally	 not been considered to qualify as ‘hate 	
speech,’  no  matter  how  unwarranted  or 	disparaging  such 	
statements may be.	 	
16.	7.  Traditionally,  ‘hate  speech’  is  the  term  used  to  describe 	speech 	
that  can  potentially  cause	 actual  material  harm	 	through 	
potential 	social,  economic  and  political  marginalisation  of  a 	
community  as  declared  by  this  Court  in 	Pravasi  Bhalai 	
Sangathan	. However, in the present case,	 in my opinion,	 we are 	
concerned  with  a  more  overarching  area  of  derogatory,  vitriolic 
and  disparagi	ng  speech,  which 	is  actually  not	 ‘hate  speech’ 	
simplicitor 	as  has  been  traditionally 	sought  to  be 	defined

53	 	
 	
and  understood	. I  am	 concerned  with 	speech  that  may  not  be	 	
linked  to  systematic  discrimination  and  eventual  political 
marginalisation  of  a  community,  but 	which  may	 nonetheless 	
have  insidious  effects  on  the  societal  perception  of  human 
dignity	,  values  of  social  cohesion,  fraternity  and  equality	 	
cherished by “We the	 people” of India	.  	
16.	8.  Andrew F. Sellars, in his essay published by Harvard University, 
titled 	'Defining  Hate  Speech,’	 has  examined  the  concept  of 	‘hate 	
speech	’ in  different  democratic  jurisdictions	. The  author  has 	
identified that certain 	remarks, which, although may not be ‘hate 	
speech’  in  the  strict  sense  of  the  term, 	border  on  the  said  term	. 	
That even 	tacit	 elements of intent of the speaker to cause harm, 	
may 	constitute  some  species  of  hate  speech.  Intent  may  refer  to 	
non	-physical  aspects  like  to  demean,  vilify,  humiliate,  or  being 	
persecutorial,  disregarding  or  hateful.  The  author  has  also 
recognised  that  in  some 	contexts, 	“at  home  speeches	” may 	
themselves amo	unt to hate speeches 	as such speech 	can	 now 	be 	
uploaded and circulated in the virtual world through internet etc.	 	
The  only  pre	-requisite  is  that  the  speech  should  have  no 	
redeeming  purpose,  which  means  that 	“the  speech  primarily 	
carries no meaning other th	an hatred	, hostility and ill	-will.	”

54	 	
 
Beyond ‘hate speech’: 	 	
17.	 	The  expansive 	scope 	of  ‘hate  speech’  as  set  out  above,  would 	
include  within  its  sweep  not  only 	‘hate 	speech	’ simplicitor 	which 	is 	
defined  as  speech 	aimed  at  systematic 	discrimination  and  eventual 	
political  marginalisation  of  a  community	,  but  also  other  species  of 	
derogatory, vitriolic and disparaging speech. 	 	
 
18.	 	A  philosophical  justification  to  control  and  restrain  derogatory, 	
vitriolic and disparaging speech has  been 	very poignantly conveyed by 	
Lau Tzu, a celebrated Chinese philosopher and writer, in the following 
words: 	 	
"Watch your thoughts; they become	 words. 	 	
Watch your words; they become	 actions. 	 	
Watch your actions; they	 become habit. 	 	
Watch your habits; they	 become character. 	 	
Watch your	 character; it becomes your destiny.”	 	
 	
19.	 	Theoretical	 and  doctrinal  underpinnings 	justifying	 restraint	s on 	
derogatory	 and  disparaging  speech,  may  be  traced  to  t	wo	 primary 	
factors: 	human  dignity  as  a  value  as  well  as  a 	right;	 the 	Preambular 	
goals of ‘equality’ and ‘fraternity.’ 	 	
Human dignity as a value as well as a right	 under the Constitution 	
of India	:  	
20.	 	As discussed supra, human dignity is not only a value but a right 	
that  is  enforceable  under 	Article  21  of 	the  Constitution  of  India.  In  a 	
human	-dignity	-based  democracy,  freedom  of  speech  and  expression

55	 	
 
must  be  exercised  in  a  manner  that  would  protect  and  p	romote  the 	
rights of fellow	-citizens. 	 	
 
International practice: 	 	
21.	 	In attempting to justify restraints on free speech, on the argument 	
founded  on  considerations  of  autonomy,  dignity  and  self	-worth  of  the 	
person(s) against whom 	derogatory 	statements 	are made, reference may 	
be made to international practice in this regard. 	 	
i) 	Canada:	 Canadian 	jurisprudence	 on  the  subject  proceeds  on  the 	
basis of inviolability of human dignity as its paramount value and 
specifically  limits  the  freedom  of  expression  when  necessary  to 
protect  the  right  to  personal  honour. 	The 	Canadian  approach 	
em	phasises  on  multiculturalism  and  group  equality,  as  it  places 	
greater emphasis on cultural diversity and promotes the idea of 	an 	
ethnic mosaic. Interestingly, the Canadian position, as discernible 
from  the  Canadian  Supreme  Court’s  verdict  in 	R vs.  James 	
Keegstra	, (1990) 3 SCR 697	 (“Keegstra	”) (Canada)	 considers the 	
likely impact of hate speech on both the targeted groups and non	-	
targeted  groups.  The  former  are  likely  to  be  degraded  and 
humiliated 	and	 experience injuries to their sense of self	-w	orth and 	
acceptance  in  the  larger  society  and  may  well,  as  a  consequence, 
avoid  contact  with  members  of  the  other  group  within  the  polity. 
The  non	-targeted  members  of  the  group,  sometimes  representing 	
society  at  large,  on  the  other  hand,  may  gradually  beco	me  de	-

56	 	
 	
sensitised  and  may  in  the  long  run  start  accepting  and  believing 
the messages of hate directed towards racial and religious groups. 
These  insidious  effects  pose  serious  threats  to  social  cohesion 	in 	
the  long  run 	rather  than  merely 	projecting  immediate  threats  to 	
violence.	 	
Further, 	Dixon	 C.J. 	of  the  Canadian  Supreme  Court  in 	
Canada  Human  Rights  Commission  vs.  Taylor,  (1990)  3  SCR 
892	 (“Taylor	”) (Canada)	 has  observed  as  follows,  as  regards  the 	
interrelationship  between  messages  of  hat	e  propaganda  and  the 	
values of dignity and equality: 	 	
“...messages  of  hate  propaganda  undermine  the 
dignity  and  self	-worth  of  targeted  group  members 	
and,  more  generally,  contribute  to  disharmonious 
relations among various racial, cultural and 	religious 	
groups,  as  a  result  eroding  the  tolerance  and  open 
mindedness  that  must  flourish  in  a  multicultural 
society which is committed to the idea of equality.”	 	
ii)	 	Australia	: The position of law	 in Australia	 is substantially aligned 	
with  that  in  Canada.  The  Australian  Federal  Court,  in  the  case  of 
Pat  Eatock  vs.  Andrew  Bolt	, 	(2011)  FCA  1103	 (“Pat  Eatock	”) 	
(Australia)	 followed  the  dictum  in 	Keegstra 	in  holding  that  the 	
right  to  freedom  of  expression  could  be  restricted 	vide 	legislation 	
which  made  racial  hatred  a  criminal  offence.  The 	Australian 	
Federal Court	 stated that	 the	 rationale for a legislation restraining 	
free speech was as follows:

57	 	
 	
“(a)  The 	justification  from  pursuit  of  truth  does  not 	
support the protection of hate propaganda, and may even 
detriment  our  search  for  truth.  The  more  erroneous  or 
mendacious a statement, the less its value in the quest of 
truth.  We  must  not  overemphasise  that  rati	onality  will 	
overcome all falsehoods. 	 	
(b)  Self	-fulfilment  and  autonomy,  in  a  large  part,  come 	
from  one's  ability  to  articulate  and  nurture  an  identity 
based  on  membership  in  a  cultural  or  religious  group. 
The extent to which this value furthers free speec	h should 	
be  modulated  insofar  as  it  advocates  an  intolerant  and 
prejudicial  disregard  for  the  process  of  individual  self	-	
development and human flourishing. 	 	
(c)  The  justification  from  participation  in  democracy 
shows  a  shortcoming  when  expression  is  employ	ed  to 	
propagate  ideas  repugnant  to  democratic  values,  thus 
undermining  the  commitment  to  democracy.  Hate 
propaganda  argues  for  a  society  with  subversion  of 
democracy  and  denial  of  respect  and  dignity  to 
individuals based on group identities.	”  	
iii)	 	South Africa	: The position	 which	 regards dignity as a paramount 	
constitutional  value	 has  been  recognised  in  South  Africa.  The	 	
Constitutional 	Court	 	ha	s 	expressed  willingness  to  subjugate 	
freedom  of  expression  when  the 	same	 sufficiently  undermines 	
dignity	.  The  constitutional  provision,  therefore,  enjoins  the 	
legislature and the court to limit 	free 	speech rights and the exercise 	
of those rights which depri	ve others of dignity. 	 	
iv)	 	Germany	: The  German 	law  on  the  subject  posits 	that  freedom  of 	
expression 	is  one  amongst  several  rights  which  is  limited  by 	
principles of equality, dignity and multiculturalism. Further, value 
of personal honour always triumphs over t	he right to utter untrue 	
statements or facts made with the knowledge of their falsity.	 Also,

58	 	
 	
if true statements of fact invade the intimate personal sphere of an 
individual, the right to personal honour triumphs over the freedom 
of  speech.  If  the  expressio	n  of  opinion  as  opposed  to  a  fact 	
constitutes a serious affront to the dignity of a person, the value of 
dignity	 triumphs  over  the  speech.  Therefore,  German  application 	
strikes a balance between rights and duties, between the individual 
and  the  community	 on  the  one  hand	 and  between  the  self	-	
expression needs of the speaker and the self	-respect and dignity of 	
the  listeners	 on  the  other	.  It  recognises  the  content	-based  speech 	
regulation  and  also  recognises  the  difference  between  fact  and 
opinion. 	 	
 	
The 	inali	enability	 of  ‘human  dignity’  under  the  Constitution  of 	
India vis	-à-vis the right to freedom of speech and expression: 	 	
 
22.	 	In 	Charu  Khurana  v	s.  Union  of  India	, (2015)  1  SCC  192	 	
(“Charu  Khurana	”),  this  Court  declared  that  dignity  is  the 	
quintessential  quality  of  personality  and  a  basic  constituent  of  the 
rights  guaranteed  and  protected 	under  Article  21.  Dignity  is  a  part  of 	
the  individual  rights  that  form  the  fundamental  fulcrum  of  collective 
harm	ony  and  interest  of  a  society.  That  while	 the	 right  to  speech  and 	
expression is absolutely sacrosanct,  dignity as a part of Article 21 has 
its own significance. 	That dignity of an individual cannot be overridden 	
and blotched 	by	 malice	 and	 vile and venal at	tack	s to tarnish and destroy

59	 	
 
the  reputation  of  another  by  stating  that  the  same  curbs  and  puts 
unreasonable restriction on the freedom of speech and expression.	 	
Further,  in	 In 	Re.	 Noise  Pollution	 (V)	,  (2005)  5  SCC  733	 it  was 	
observed  that  Article  19(1)(a)  cannot  be 	cited  as  a  justification 	for 	
defeating the fundamental right guaranteed by Article 21	. That a person 	
speaking  cannot  violate  the  rights  of  others 	to  enjoy  a 	peaceful, 	
comfortable  and 	(noise) 	pollution  free 	environment	, guaranteed  by 	
Article 21.	  	
Having  regard  to	 the  unequivocal  declaration  of  this  Court,	 to  the 	
effect that Article 21 could not be sacrificed 	at the altar 	of securing the 	
widest  amplitude  of  free  speech  rights, 	this  premise  can  s	erve  as  a 	
theoretical  justification  for  prescribing  restraints  on  derogatory  and 
disparaging speech. Human dignity, being a 	primary element under the 	
protective  umbrella 	of  Article  21,  cannot  be  negatively  altered  on 	
account 	of 	derogatory speech, which mar	ks out persons as unequal	 and	 	
vilifies 	them	 leading to indignity	.  	
 	
23.	 	Rule  of  Law,  includes  certain  minimum  requirements  without 	
which a legal system cannot exist. Professor Lon 	L. 	Fuller	, a renowned 	
American  legal  philosopher, 	has  described  these  requirements 	
collectively as the 'inner morality of law'. Such an understandin	g of the 	
concept  of  Rule  of  Law  places  much  emphasis  on  the  centrality  of 
individual  dignity  in  a  society  governed  by  the  Rule  of  Law.  Justice

60	 	
 
Aharon Barak, former Chief Justice of Israel, has lucidly explained this 
facet of Rule of law in the following ma	nner: 	 	
“The Rule of law is not merely public order, the Rule of law 
is  social  justice  based  on  public  order.  The  law  exists  to 
ensure proper social life. Social life, however, is not a goal 
in  itself  but  a  means  to  allow  the  individual  to  live  in 
dignity a	nd develop himself. The human being and human 	
rights  underlie  this  substantive  perception  of  the  Rule  of 
law, with a proper balance among the different rights and 
between  human  rights  and  the  proper  needs  of  society. 
The substantive Rule of law "is the Rul	e of proper law, 	
which  balances  the  needs  of  society  and  the 
individual".  This  is  the  Rule  of  law  that  strikes  a 
balance  between  society's  need  for  political 
independence, social equality, economic development, 
and internal order, on the one hand, and the 	needs of 	
the  individual,  his  personal  liberty,  and  his  human 
dignity on the other. The Judge must protect this rich 
concept of the Rule of law.” 	 	
(Emphasis 	by me)	 	
 	
24.	 	As  recognised  by  this  Court  in 	K.S.  Puttaswamy 	(Retd.) 	vs. 	
Union of India	, (2019) 1 SCC 1	 (“Puttaswamy”)	, a substantive aspect 	
of the Rule of Law is the balance between the individual and society. In 
that  background,  this  Court  discussed  the  scope  of  Constitutional 
rights  under  our  Constitutional  scheme  and  the  extent  of 	their 	
protection. While emphasising that there are no absolute constitutional 
rights, this Court	 laid down, in the following words that one of the only 	
rights which 	is	 treated as "absolute" is the right to human dignity: 	 	
“62. 	It  is  now  almost  accepted  tha	t  there  are  no 	
absolute  constitutional  rights  [Though,  debate  on 
this  vexed  issue  still  continues  and  some

61	 	
 	
constitutional  experts  claim  that  there  are  certain 
rights,  albeit  very  few,  which  can  still  be  treated  as 
"absolute".  Examples  given  are:(a)  Right  t	o  human 	
dignity which is inviolable	,(b) Right not to be subjected 	
to  torture  or  to  inhuman  or  degrading  treatment  or 
punishment.  Even  in  respect  of  such  rights,  there  is  a 
thinking that in larger public interest, the extent of their 
protection  can  be  dimin	ished.  However,  so  far  such 	
attempts  of  the  States  have  been  thwarted  by  the 
judiciary.]  and  all  such  rights  are  related.  As  per  the 
analysis  of  Aharon  Barak  [Aharon 
Barak,Proportionality:  Constitutional  Rights  and  Their 
Limitation (Cambridge University Pr	ess 2012).], two key 	
elements in developing the modern constitutional theory 
of  recognising  positive  constitutional  rights  along  with 
its limitations are the notions of democracy and the Rule 
of law. Thus, the requirement of proportional limitations 
of  con	stitutional  rights  by  a  sub	-constitutional  law  i.e. 	
the  statute,  is  derived  from  an  interpretation  of  the 
notion  of  democracy  itself.  Insofar  as  the  Indian 
Constitution  is  concerned,  democracy  is  treated  as  the 
basic  feature  of  the  Constitution  and  is  spec	ifically 	
accorded a constitutional status that is recognised in the 
Preamble of the Constitution itself. It is also unerringly 
accepted that this notion of democracy includes human 
rights  which  is  the  cornerstone  of  Indian  democracy. 
Once  we  accept  the  afo	resaid  theory  (and  there  cannot 	
be  any  denial  thereof),  as  a  fortiori,  it  has  also  to  be 
accepted that democracy is based on a balance between 
constitutional  rights  and  the  public  interests.  In  fact, 
such  a  provision  in  Article  19  itself  on  the  one  hand 
gu	arantees some certain freedoms in Clause (1) of Article 	
19 and at the same time empowers the State to impose 
reasonable  restrictions  on  those  freedoms  in  public 
interest.  This  notion  accepts  the  modern  constitutional 
theory  that  the  constitutional  rights  a	re  related.  This 	
relativity  means  that  a  constitutional  licence  to  limit 
those  rights  is  granted  where  such  a  limitation  will  be 
justified to protect public interest or the rights of others. 
This phenomenon	--	of both the right and its limitation in 	
the  Cons	titution	--	exemplifies  the  inherent  tension 	
between democracy's two fundamental elements. On the 
one  hand  is  the  right's  element,  which  constitutes  a 
fundamental  component  of  substantive  democracy;  on 
the other hand is the people element, limiting those ver	y 	
rights  through  their  representatives.  These  two 
constitute  a  fundamental  component  of  the  notion  of

62	 	
 	
democracy,  though  this  time  in  its  formal  aspect.  How 
can  this  tension  be  resolved?  The  answer  is  that  this 
tension  is  not  resolved  by  eliminating  the  "lo	sing"  facet 	
from the Constitution. Rather, the tension is resolved by 
way  of  a  proper  balancing  of  the  competing  principles. 
This is one of the expressions of the multi	-faceted nature 	
of  democracy.  Indeed,  the  inherent  tension  between 
democracy's  different	 facets  is  a  "constructive  tension". 	
It  enables  each  facet  to  develop  while  harmoniously 
coexisting with the others. The best way to achieve this 
peaceful  coexistence  is  through  balancing  between  the 
competing interests. Such balancing enables each facet 
to develop alongside the other facets, not in their place. 
This tension between the two fundamental aspects	--	
rights  on  the  one  hand  and  its  limitation  on  the 
other hand	--is to be resolved by balancing the two so 	
that  they  harmoniously  coexist  with  each  othe	r. 	
This  balancing  is  to  be  done  keeping  in  mind  the 
relative  social  values  of  each  competitive  aspects 
when considered in proper context.” 	 	
[Emphasis	 by me]	 	
 	
25.	 	It is 	clarified	 that 	at this juncture 	that 	it is not necessary to engage 	
in  the  exercise  of 	balancing  our  concern  for  the  free  flow  of  ideas  and 	
the democratic process, with our desire to further equality and human 
dignity. 	This is because n	o question would arise as to the conflict of two 	
seemingly	 competing  rights,  being  the  right  to  freedom  of  speech  and 	
expression, 	vis	-à-vis	 the  right  to  human  dignity  and  equality. 	The 	
reason for the same i	s because, the 	restraint	 that is called for, is only in 	
relation to 	unguided, derogatory, vitriolic speech, 	which in no way can 	
be considered as an essential part of exposition of ideas	, which has little 	
social value. This discourse, in no way seeks to pose a potential danger 
to peaceful dissenters, who exercise their right to freedom of speech and 
expression in	 a critical, but measured fashion.

63	 	
 	
 The	 present 	cases  pertain  specifically  to  derogatory,  disparaging 	
speech, which closely resembles hate speech. Such speech does not fall 
within  the  protective  perimeter  of  Article  19(1)(a)  and  does  not 
constitute  the  content  of  the  free  speech  right.  Therefore,  when  such 
speech has the  effect of infringing the fundamental right under  Article 
21 of another individual, it would not constitute a case which requires 
balancing  of  conflicting  rights,  but  one  w	herein  abuse  of  the  right  to 	
freedom of speech  by a person has attacked the fundamental rights of 
another.	 	
The Preambular goals of ‘equality’ and ‘fraternity	’:  	
26.	 	Equality,  liberty  and  fraternity  are  the  foundational  values 	
embedded  in  the  Preamble  of  our  Constitution. 	‘Hate  speech	’,  in  the 	
sense 	discussed	 hereinabove,  strikes  at  each  of  these  foundational 	
values,  by  marking  out  a  society  as  being  unequal	. 	It  also  violates 	
fraternity  of  citizens  from  diverse  backgrounds,  the 	sine	-qua	-non	 of	 a 	
cohesive  society  based  on  plurality  and  multi	-culturalism	 such  as	 in 	
India	 that is, Bharat	.  	
 
27.	 	Fraternity  is  based  on  the  idea  that  citizens  have  reciprocal 	
responsibilities  towards  one  another. 	The  term	 takes	 within  its  sweep	, 	
inter	-alia	, the ideals of tolerance, 	co	-operation,	 and mutual aid. 	 	
 
27.1. 	 The  meaning  of  the  term  fraternity,  in  the  context  of 	criminal 	
defamation	 	and  restraints  on  the  freedom  of  speech  and

64	 	
 	
expression	 has  been  examined  by  this  Court  in 	Subramanian 	
Swamy vs. Union of India	, (2016) 7 SCC 2	21 (“Subramanian 	
Swamy	”) 	wherein  it 	was  observed  that  fraternity  under  the 	
Constitution  expects  every  citizen  to  respect  the  dignity  of  the 
other.  Mutual  respect  is  the  fulcrum  of  fraternity  that  assures 
dignity. This Court qualified its observations with the caveat that 
‘fraternity’  does  no	t  mean  that  there  cannot  be  dissent  or 	
difference	, more so because 	all citizens have the right to freedom 	
of speech and expression. However, it was unequivocally declared 
that  a  constitutional  value  which  is  embedded  in  the  idea  of 
fraternity  is  dignity  of	 the  individual,  which  is  required  to  be 	
respected  by  fellow  citizens.	 That  the  Preamble  consciously 	
chooses to assure the dignity of the individual, in the context of 
fraternity  and  therefore,  rights  enshrined  in  Part  III  have  to  be 
exercised  by  individua	ls  against  the	 backdrop  of  the  ideal  of 	
fraternity. Th	is	 Court observed that the fraternal ideal 	also 	finds 	
resonance 	in  Part  IVA  of  the  Constitution. 	In  u	pholding  the 	
permissibility  of  the  law  on  criminal  defamation, 	on  the 	
touchstone of the concept of co	nstitutional fraternity, this Court 	
speaking  through  Dipak  Misra,  J.	 (as  his  Lordship  then  was)	 	
observed 	in paragraphs 155 and 163, 	as follows: 	 	
“155	.  It  is  a  constitutional  value  which  is  to  be 	
cultivated  by  the  people  themselves  as  a  part  of 
their 	social  behavior.	 There  are  two  schools  of 	
thought; one canvassing individual liberalization and 
the other advocating for protection of an individual as

65	 	
 	
a member of the collective. The individual should have 
all  the  rights  under  the  Constitution  but 
simulta	neously  he  has  the  responsibility  to  live  upto 	
the  constitutional  values  like  essential  brotherhood	-	
the  fraternity	-that  strengthens  the  societal  interest. 	
Fraternity  means  brotherhood  and  common  interest. 
Right  to  censure  and  criticize  does  not  conflict  wi	th 	
the  constitutional  objective  to  promote  fraternity. 
Brotherliness  does  not  abrogate  and  rescind  the 
concept of criticism. In fact, brothers can and should 
be critical. Fault finding and disagreement is required 
even when  it leads to an individual disqui	et or group 	
disquietude. Enemies Enigmas Oneginese on the part 
of some does not create a dent in the idea of fraternity 
but, a significant one, liberty to have a discordant note 
does not confer a right to defame the others.”	 	
 
“163.  We  have  referred  to  two 	concepts,  namely, 	
constitutional fraternity and the fundamental duty, as 
they constitute core constitutional values. Respect for 
the  dignity  of  another  is  a  constitutional  norm. 	It 	
would not amount to an overstatement if it is said 
that  constitutional  frat	ernity  and  the  intrinsic 	
value  inhered  in  fundamental  duty  proclaim  the 
constitutional  assurance  of  mutual  respect  and 
concern  for  each  other's  dignity.  The  individual 
interest  of  each  individual  serves  the  collective 
interest  and  correspondingly  the  colle	ctive 	
interest  enhances  the  individual  excellence. 
Action against the State is different than an action 
taken  by  one  citizen  against  the  other.  The 
constitutional  value  helps  in  structuring  the 
individual  as  well  as  the  community  interest. 
Individual  inter	est  is  strongly  established  when 	
constitutional values are respected. The Preamble 
balances different and divergent rights. Keeping in 
view  the  constitutional  value,  the  legislature  has 
not repealed Section 499 and kept the same alive 
as  a  criminal  offence	. 	The  studied  analysis  from 	
various  spectrums,  it  is  difficult  to  come  to  a 
conclusion  that  the  existence  of  criminal  defamation 
is  absolutely  obnoxious  to  freedom  of  speech  and 
expression.  As  a  prescription,  it  neither  invites  the 
frown of any of the Arti	cles of the Constitution nor its 	
very  existence  can  be  regarded  as  an  unreasonable 
restriction.”	 	
(Emphasis 	by me)

66	 	
 	
 	
27.2. 	 The decision of this Court in 	Subramanian Swamy 	establishes 	
precedent of justifying a restraint on free speech, on	 the	 ground 	
of  promotion  of  fraternity.  It  has  been  recognized  that 	the 	
constitutional  value  of  fraternity  imputes  an  obligation  on  all 
citizens to subserve collective interest and respect the dignity and 
equality of fellow citizen	. Restraints on free speech prescribed to 	
secure these ends, have been held to be justified, as being aimed 
at  preserving  the  Preambular  ideal  of  fraternity. 	It  is  also  to  be 	
noted that this Court in the said case recognized that fraternity 
as a value is to	 be cultivated by citizens themselves as a part of 	
their  social  behavior	 by  refraining  from  uttering  defamatory 	
statements	.  This  chord  of  the  said  judgment,  acknowledges  the 	
idea of self	-restraint or inherent restraints as being read into the 	
right to free	dom of speech and expression. 	 	
27.	3. 	 Democracy	, being  one  of  the  basic  features  of  our  Constitution, 	
it is implicit that in a rule by majority there would be 	a sense of 	
security  and  inclusiveness.  Further,  the  Preamble  of  the 
Constitution which envisages	, inter alia	, fraternity	, assures	 that 	
the 	dignity  of  individual	s 	cannot  be  dented  by  means  of 	
unwarranted  speech  being  made  by	 fellow  citizens,  including 	
public functionaries	. Thus, the Preamble of the Constitution and 	
the  values  thereof  assuring  the  people  of  India  not  only  justice,

67	 	
 	
liberty, equa	lity but also fraternity and unity and integrity of the 	
nation, must remind every citizen of this 	Country irrespective of 	
the office or position or power that is held	, of the sublime ideals 	
of  the  Constitution	 and  to  respect  them  in 	their 	true  letter  and 	
spirit	. There is an inbuilt constitutional check 	to ensure that the 	
values  of  the  Constitution  are  not  in  any  way  undermined  or 
violated.  It  is  high  time  that  we	, as  a  society  in  general  and  as 	
individuals  in  particular	, re	-dedicate	 ourselves 	to  the 	sacred 	
values  of  the  Constitution  and  promote  them  not  only  at  our 
individual level but at the macro level. Any kind of speech which 
undermine	s the values for which our Constitution 	stands	 would 	
cause	 a dent on our social and political values.	  	
Employing  t	he  Fundamental  Duties  under  Part  IV	-A  of  the 	
Constitution  as  a  means  to  check  disparaging,  unwarranted 
speech: 	 	
28.	 	Every	 right 	engulfs  and  incorporates  a  duty  to  respect  another’s 	
right and secure mutual compatibility and conviviality of the individuals 
based  on  collective  harmony,  resulting  in  social  order. 	 The  concept  of 	
fraternity  under  the  Constitution  expects  every  citizen  t	o  respect  the 	
dignity  of  the  other.  Mutual  respect  is  the  fulcrum  of  fraternity  that 
assures dignity. In the context of constitutional fraternity, fundamental 
duties engrafted under Article 51	-A of the Constitution gain significance.

68	 	
 
Sub	-clause  (c),	 (e)  an	d  (j)  of  Article  51	-A  of  the  Constitution 	which  are 	
relevant to these cases 	read as follows: 	 	
“Article  51	-A.  Fundamental  Duties	- .—	It  shall  be  the 	
duty of every citizen of  India	—	  	
(a)	 	xxx	 	
(b)	 	xxx	 	
(c)	 	to uphold and protect the sovereignty, unity 
and integrity of India	;  	
(d)	 	xxx	 	
(e)	 	to  promote  harmony  and  the  spirit  of 
common brotherhood amongst all the people 
of  India  transcending  religious,  linguistic 
and  regional  or  sectional  diversities;  to 
renounce practices derogatory to the dignity 
of women; 	 	
(f)	 	xxx	 	
(g)	 	xxx	 	
(h)	 	xxx	 	
(i)	 	xxx	 	
(j)	 	to strive to	wards excellence in all spheres of 	
individual  and  collective  activity  so  that  the 
nation  constantly  rises  to  higher  levels  of 
endeavour and achievement;”	 	
Fundamental  duties  also  constitute  core  Constitutional  values  for 	
good  citizenship  in  a  democracy  such	 as ours.  The  duties  enumerated 	
above,  enjoin  all  citizens  with  the  obligations  of  promoting  fraternity, 
harmony, unity, collective welfare etc. Fundamental duties have a keen 
bond  of  sorority  with  the  Constitutional  goals  and  must  therefore  be 
recognised 	not  merely  as  Constitutional  norms  or  precepts  but  as 	
obligations, corelative to rights. In short, the permissible content of the 
right  to  freedom  of  speech  and  expression,  ought  to  be  tested  on  the 
touchstone of fraternity and fundamental duties as envisa	ged under our 	
Constitution.

69	 	
 	
 	
29.	 	Although  the  question	s for  consideration  before  the  Constitution 	
bench,  w	ere	 	with  specific  regard  to  the  possible  restraints  on 	
unwarranted  and  disparaging  speech  by  public  functionaries,  the 
observations  made  hereinabove, 	will	 apply  with  equal  force  to  public 	
functionaries,  celebrities/influencers  as  well  as 	all 	citizens  of  India	, 	
more  so  because  technology  is  being  used  as  a  medium  of 
communication	 which has a wide spectrum of impact across the globe	.  	
30.	 	The  internet  represents  a  communication  revolution  and  has 	
enabled us to communicate with millions of people 	worldwide, with no 	
more  difficulty  than  communicating  with  a  single  person	,  at  a  click  or 	
by  touch  on  a  screen	.  Ironically,  the  very  qualities  of  the  internet  that 	
have  revolutionised  communication  are  amenable  to  misuse.  The 
internet,  through  various  soci	al  media  platforms  ha	s accelerated  the 	
pace as well as the reach of messages, comments and posts to such an 
extent that the difference between a celebrity and a common man, has 
been  practically  negated,  in  so  far  as  the  reach  of  their  speech  is 
concerned. 	 	
31.	 	However,  given  the  specific  submission  of  the  petitioners  herein 	
that  disparaging  and  vitriolic  speech  expressed  at 	various 	levels  of 	
political authority have exacerbated a climate 	bordering 	on intolerance	 	
and tension in the society, 	which 	perhaps 	may	 lead to insecurity, 	it may 	
be appropriate to sound a strong word of warning in this regard.

70	 	
 
32.	 	It  may  be  appropriate  at  this  juncture  to  refer  to  the  writings  of 	
Michael Rosenfeld, on the key variables which determine the impact of 
hate speech. One of th	e key variables highlighted by the 	learned a	uthor 	
in  his  paper  titled  “	Hate  Speech  in  Constitutional  Jurisprudence:  A 	
Comparative  Analysis,”	 published  in  Cardozo  Law  Review,  is  the 	
question  as  to  “	who	”  the  speaker  is.  The	 learned	 author  notes  that 	
speech  made  by  a  person  of  influence,  such  as  a  top  government  or 
executive  functionary,  opposition  leader,  political  or  social  leader  of 
following, or a credible anchor on a TV show carries far more credibility 
and impact than a statement	 made by a common person. 	 	
Public functionaries and other persons of influence and celebrities	, 	
having regard to 	their reach, real or 	apparent 	authority and 	the 	impact 	
they  wield  on  the  public  or  on  a 	certain  section	 thereof,  owe  a  duty  to 	
the  citizenry  at	 large  to  be  more  responsible	 and  restrained  in  their 	
speech	.  They  are  required  to  understand  and  measure  their  words, 	
having  regard  to  the  likely  consequences  thereof  on  public  sentiment 
and  behaviour	,  and  also  be  aware  of  the  example  they  are  setting  for	 	
fellow citizens to follow	.  	
33.	 	While  there  are  no  infallible  rules  that  can  be  formulated	 by  the 	
Court	 to  define  the 	precise 	threshold  of  acceptable  speech,  every 	
citizen’s conscious attempt to abide by the Constitutional values, and to 
preserve  in  letter  and  spirit  the  culture  contemplated  under  the 
Constitution  will  significantly  contribute  in  eliminating  instances  of

71	 	
 
societal	 discord,  friction  and  disharmony,  on  account  of  disparaging, 	
vitriolic  and  derogatory  speec	h,  particularly  when  made  by  public 	
functionaries and/or public 	figures. This does not in any way imply that 	
ordinary citizens who form the great mass of the citize	nry of this Country 	
can  shun  responsibility  for  vitriolic,  unnecessarily  critical,  diabolical 
speech,  bordering  on  all  those  aspects  mentioned  under  Article  19  (2)	 	
either against public functionaries / figures or against other citizens in 
general or agains	t particular individuals	.  	
34.	 	Every  citizen 	of  India  must  consciously  be  restrained  in  speech, 	
and exercise the right to freedom of speech and expression under Article 
19(1)(a)  only  in  the  sense  that  it  was  intended  by  the  framers  of  the 
Constitution, to 	be exercised. This is the true content of Article 19(1)(a) 	
which does not  vest with citizens unbridled liberty to utter  statements 
which  are  vitriolic,  derogatory,  unwarranted,  have  no  redeeming 
purpose  and  which,  in  no  way  amount  to  a  communication  of  ide	as. 	
Article  19(1)(a)  vests  a  multi	-faceted  right,  which  protects  several 	
species  of  speech  and  expression  from  interference  by  the  State. 
However,  it  is  a  no  brainer  that  the  right  to  freedom  speech  and 
expression,  in  a  human	-rights  based  democracy  does  no	t  protect 	
statements  made  by  a  citizen,  which  strike  at  the  dignity	 of  a  fellow 	
citizen.  Fraternity  and  equality  which  lie  at  the  very  base  of  our 
Constitutional culture and upon which the superstructure of rights are

72	 	
 
built,  do  not  permit  such  rights  to  be	 employed  in  a  manner  so  as  to 	
attack the rights of another. 	 	
Verse  15  of  Chapter  17  of  the 	Srimad  Bhagavad  Gita	 describes 	
what constitutes discipline of speech or	 ‘vā	ṅ-maya tapas:’ 	 	
 	
अन
ु द्वेगकरं वाक्यं  सत्यं प्रियहितं  च यत
्  	| 	
स्वाध्यायाभ्यसनं चैव वाङ्मयं तप उच्यते 	|| 	 	
Anudvega	-kara	ṁ	 vākya	ṁ	 satya	ṁ	 priya	-hita	ṁ	 cha yat	 	
Svādhyāyābhyasana	ṁ	 chaiva vā	ṅ-maya	ṁ	 tapa uchyate	 	
Words  that  do  not  cause  distress,  are  truthful,  inoffensive, 	
pleasing  and  beneficial,  are  said  to  be  included  within  the 
discipline  of  speech,  and  are  likened  to  regular  recitation  of  the 
Vedic scriptures. 	 	
35.	 	The discussion presented hereinabove was with	 a view to rekindle 	
some ideas on the content of Article 19 (1) (a) of the Constitution and on 
other 	pertinent 	issues surrounding the right to free speech guaranteed 	
under the aforesaid Article. However, as far as the substantial analysis 
of Question  No.  1	 is  concerned,  I  respectfully  agree  with  the  reasoning 	
and conclusions proposed by His Lordship, Ramasubramanian, J. 	 	
Re:  Question  No.  2:	 Can  a  fundamental  right  under  Article  19  or 	
21  of  the  Constitution  be  claimed  other  than  against  the  ‘State’ 
or its 	instrumentalities?	  	
36.	 	All  human  beings  are  endowed  at  birth,  with  certain  inalienable 	
rights  and  among  such  rights  are  right  to  life  and  liberty,  including 
liberty of thought and expression. These rights have been recognized as

73	 	
 
inalienable  rights,  having	 regard  to  the  supreme  value  of  human 	
personality.  Incidentally,  some  of  such  rights  have  come  to  be 
Constitutionally  recognized  under  Part  III  of  the  Constitution  of  India. 
Fundamental  Rights  were  selected  from  what  were  previously  natural 
rights and were	 later 	termed as	 common law rights.	 However, it is to be 	
noted that Part III of the Constitution, is not the sole repository of such 
rights.  Even  after  some  of  such  inalienable  rights  have  come  to  be 
Constitutionally  recognised  as  Fundamental  Rights  under 	the 	
Constitution  of  India,  the  congruent  rights  under  common  law  or 
natural  law  have  not  been  obliterated.  It  also  follows,  that  the 
corresponding  remedies  available  in  common  law,  are  also  not 
obliterated.  The  object  of  elevating  certain  natural  and  commo	n  law 	
rights,  as  Fundamental  Rights  under  the  Constitution  was  to  make 
them specifically enforceable against the State and its agencies through 
a Courts of law. These observations gain legitimacy from the judgment 
of Mathew, J. in 	His Holiness	 Kesavanada 	Bharati	 Sripadagalvaru	 	
vs.  State  of  Kerala	, 	(1973)  4  SCC  225	 (Kesavanada  Bharati)	 	
wherein  His Lordship recognized the  object of Constitutions to 	declare 	
recognised  natural  rights  as  applicable 	qua	 the  state.  Adopting  the 	
picturesque language of Roscoe Poun	d, the following observations were 	
made: 	 	
“1514.  While  dealing  with  natural  rights,  Roscoe 
Pound  states  on  page  500  of  Vol.  I  of  his 
Jurisprudence:

74	 	
 	
“Perhaps  nothing  contributed  so  much  to 
create  and  foster  hostility  to  courts  and  law 
and  Constitutions  as  t	his  conception  of  the 	
courts  as  guardians  of  individual  natural 
rights  against  the  state  and  against  society; 
this  conceiving  of  the  law  as  a  final  and 
absolute  body  of  doctrine  declaring  these 
individual  natural  rights; 	this  theory  of	 	
Constitutions  as  dec	laratory  of  common	-	
law  principles,  which  are  also  natural	-law 	
principles,  anterior  to  the  state  and  of 
superior  validity  to  enactments  by  the 
authority  of  the  state;  this  theory  of 
Constitutions  as  having  for  their  purpose 
to  guarantee  and  maintain  the  nat	ural 	
rights  of  individuals  against  the 
government  and  all  its  agencies.	 In  effect, 	
it  set  up  the  received  traditional  social, 
political,  and  economic  ideals  of  the  legal 
profession  as  a  super	-Constitution,  beyond 	
the reach of any agency but judicial decisi	on. 	 	
1515. I may also in this connection refer to a passage 
on the inherent and inalienable rights in A History of 
American  Political  Theories  by  C.  Marriam:  By  the 
later thinkers the idea that men possess inherent and 
inalienable  rights  of  a  political  or 	quasi	-political 	
character  which  are  independent  of  the  state,  has 
been  generally  given  up.  It  is  held  that  these  natural 
rights  can  have  no  other  than  an  ethical  value,  and 
have no proper place in politics. There never was, and 
there  never  can  be,'  says  Bu	rgess,  'any  liberty  upon 	
this earth and among human beings, outside of state 
organization'. In speaking of natural rights, therefore, 
it  is  essential  to  remember  that  these  alleged  rights 
have  no  political  force  whatever,  unless  recognized 
and enforced by 	the state. It is asserted by Willoughby 	
that 'natural rights' could not have even a moral value 
in the supposed 'state of nature'; they would really be 
equivalent  to  force  and  hence  have  no  ethical 
significance. (see p. 310).” 	 	
x x xx x x x 	 	
“1522. I am al	so of the view that the power to amend 	
the  provisions  of  the  Constitution  relating  to  the 
fundamental  rights  cannot  be  denied  by  describing

75	 	
 	
the  fundamental  rights  as  natural  rights  or  human 
rights. 	The  basic  dignity  of  man  does  not  depend 	
upon  the  codifica	tion  of  the  fundamental  rights 	
nor  is  such  codification  a  prerequisite  for  a 
dignified  way  of  living.  There  was  no 
Constitutional  provision  for  fundamental  rights 
before January 26, 1950 and yet can it be said that 
there did not exist conditions for dignif	ied way of 	
living  for  Indians  during  the  period  between 
August  15,  1947  and  January  26,.  1950.	 The  plea 	
that provisions of the Constitution, including those of 
Part III, should be given retrospective effect has been 
rejected  by  this  Court.	 Article  19	 which  makes 	
provision  for  fundamental  rights,  is  not  applicable  to 
persons  who  are  not  citizens  of  India.  Can  it,  in  view 
of  that,  be  said  that  the  non	-citizens  cannot  while 	
staying  in  India  lead  a  dignified 	life?	 It  would,  in  my 	
opinion,  be  not  a  correct 	approach  to  say  that 	
amendment  of  the  Constitution  relating  to 
abridgement or taking away of the fundamental rights 
would  have  the  effect  of  denuding  human  beings  of 
basic dignity and would result in the extinguishment 
of essential values of life.”	 	
[Emphas	is by me]	 
 	
37.	 	This  proposition  was  further  highlighted  in  the  enlightened 	
minority  opinion  of 	His  Lordship	, H.R.  Khanna,  J,  in 	Additional 	
District  Magistrate,  Jabalpur  vs.  Shiv	akant  Shukla	, 	A.I.R.  1976 	
SC 1207	 (“ADM Jabalpur	”)  wherein while refusing to subscribe to the 	
view that when the right to enforce Fundamental Right under 	Article 21 	
is  suspended,  the  result  would  be  that  there  would  be  no  remedy 
against deprivation of a person's life or liberty by the State even though 
su	ch deprivation is without the authority of law, observed, 	that	 Article 	
21  was  not  the  sole  repository  of  the  right  to  life  and  personal  liberty. 
That  such  rights  inhered  in  men  even  prior  to  the  enactment  of

76	 	
 
the Constitution, and were not cre	ated for the first time by enacting the 	
Constitution.  It  was  also  recognised  that  though  the  Constitutionally 
recognised remedy under Article 32, for infringement of the Right under 
Article 21 may not be available as the said rights remained suspended 
or  n	otionally  surrendered  on  account  of  declaration  of  an  Emergency, 	
remedies  under  the  law	s which 	were	 in  force  prior  to  the  coming  into 	
effect  of  the  Constitution  would  still  operate  to  ensure  that  no  person 
could be deprived of his life or liberty except in	 accordance with law. In 	
that  context,  it  was  held  that  the  rights  Constitutionally  recognised 
under Article 21, represented ‘higher values’ which were elementary to 
any civilised State and therefore the sanctity of life and liberty was not 
traceable  only 	to  the  Constitution.  The  relevant  portions  of  His 	
Lordship’s judgment can be usefully extracted hereinunder: 	 	
“152. The effect of the suspension of the right to move 
any court for the enforcement of the right conferred by 
Article  21,  in  my  opinion,  is  that  when  a  petition  is 
filed in a court, the court would have to proceed upon 
the  basis  that  no  reliance  can  be  p	laced  upon  that 	
Article  for  obtaining  relief  from  the  court  daring  the 
period  of  emergency.  Question  then  arises  as  to 
whether  the  rule  that  no  one  shall  be  deprived  of  ins 
life or personal liberty without the authority of law stiff 
survives  during  the  per	iod:  of  emergency  despite  the 	
Presidential  order  suspending  the  right  to  move  any 
court  for  the  enforcement  of  the	-right  contained  in 	
Article 21. The answer to this question is linked with 
the answer to the question as to whether Article 21 is, 
the  sole  re	pository  of  the  right  to  life  and  personal 	
liberty. 	After  giving  the  matter  my  earnest 	
consideration, I am of the opinion that Article 21 
cannot be considered" to be the sole repository of 
the right to life and; personal liberty. The right to 
life,  and  per	sonal:  liberty  is  the  most  precious

77	 	
 	
right  of  human  beings  in  civilised  societies 
governed  by  the  rule  of  law.  Many  modern 
constitutions  incorporate  certain  fundamental 
rights,  including  the  one  relating  to  personal 
freedom.”	 	
xxx	 	
“155. 	Sanctity of life and 	liberty was not something 	
new  when  the  Constitution  was  drafted.  It 
represented a fact of higher values which mankind 
began  to  cherish  in  its  evolution  from  a  state  of 
tooth  and  claw  to  a  civilized  existence.  Likewise, 
the  principle  that  no  one  shall  be  de	prived  of  ins 	
life  and  liberty  without  the  authority  of  law  was 
not the gift of the Constitution.	 It was a necessary 	
corollary of the concept relating to the sanctity of life 
and  liberty;  it  existed  and  was  in  force  before  the 
coming into force, of the Con	stitution. The idea about 	
the sanctity of life and liberty as well as the principle 
that  no  one  shall  be  deprived  of  his  life  and  liberty 
without the authority of law are essentially two facets 
of the same concept. This concept grew and acquired 
dimensions	 in response to the inner urges and nobler 	
impulses with the march of civilisation. Great writers 
and  teachers,  philosophers  and  political  thinkers 
nourished  and  helped  in  the  efflorescence  of  the 
concept by rousing the conscience of mankind and by 
making 	it conscious of the necessity of the concept as 	
necessary  social  discipline  in  self	-interest  and  for 	
orderly  existence.  According  even  to  the  theory  of 
social compact many aspects of which have now been 
discredited,  individuals  have  surrendered  a  part  of 
their  theoretically  unlimited  freedom  in  return  or  the 
blessings of the government. Those blessings include 
governance  in  accordance  with  certain  norms  in  the 
matter  of  life  and  liberty  of  the  citizens.  Such  norms 
take the shape of the rule of law. Respect 	for law, we 	
must  bear  in  mind,  has  a  mutual  relationship  with 
respect for government. Erosion of the respect for law, 
it has accordingly been said, affects the respect for the 
government.  Government  under  the  law  means,  as 
observed by Macdonald, that the p	ower to govern shall 	
be  exercised  only,  under  conditions  laid  down  in 
constitutions and laws approved by either the people 
or their representatives. Law thus emerges as a norm 
limiting  the  application  of  power  by  the  government

78	 	
 	
over  the  citizen  or  by  citiz	ens  over  their  fellows. 	
Theoretically all men are equal before the law and are 
equally  bound  by  it  regardless  of  their  status,  class, 
office  or  authority.  At  the  same  time  that  the  law 
enforces duties it also protects rights, even against the 
sovereign.”	 	
x x x 	
158. 	I am unable to subscribe to the view that when 	
right  to  enforce  the  right  under  Article  21  is 
suspended, the result would be that there would be 
no remedy against deprivation of a person's life or 
liberty by the State even though such deprivation	 	
is without the authority of law or even in flagrant 
violation of the provisions of law. The right not to 
be  deprived  of  one's  life  or  liberty  without  the 
authority  of  law  was  not  the  creation  of  the 
Constitution.  Such  right  existed  before  the 
Constitution	 came  into  force.  The  fact  that  the 	
framers  of  the  Constitution  made  an  aspect  of 
such right a part of the fundamental rights did not 
have  the  effect  of  exterminating  the  independent 
identity of such right and of making Article 21 to 
be  the  sole  repository	 of  that  right. 	Its  real  effect 	
was to ensure that a law under which a person can be 
deprived of ins life or personal liberty should prescribe 
a procedure for such deprivation or, according to the 
dictum laid down by Mukherjea, J. in Gopalan's case, 
such  l	aw  should  be  a  valid  law  not  violative  of 	
fundamental  rights  guaranteed  by  Part  III  of  the 
Constitution. 	Recognition  as  fundamental  right  of 	
one  aspect  of  the  pre	-Constitutional  right  cannot 	
have the effect of making things less favourable so 
far  as  the  sa	nctity  of  life  and  personal  liberty  is 	
concerned compared to the position if an aspect of 
such right had not been recognised as fundamental 
right because, of the vulnerability of fundamental 
rights  accruing  from  Article  359. 	I  am  also  unable 	
to  agree  that 	in  view  of  the  Presidential  Order  in  the 	
matter  of  sanctity  of  life  and  liberty,  things  would  be 
worse  off  compared  to  the  state  of  law  as  it  existed 
before the coining into force of the Constitution.”	 	
x x x

79	 	
 	
“162.  It  has  been  pointed  out  above  that  even  be	fore 	
the coming into force of the Constitution, the position 
under  the common law both in England and in India 
was  that  the  State  could  not  deprive  a  person  of  ins 
life and liberty without the authority of law. The same 
was the position under the penal law	s of India. It was 	
an  offence  under  the  Indian  Penal  Code,  as  already 
mentioned,  to  deprive  a  person  of  ins  life  or  liberty 
unless  such  a  course  was  sanctioned  by  the  laws  of 
the  land.  An  action  was  also  maintainable  under  the 
law  of  torts  for  wrongful  con	finement  in  case  any 	
person  was  deprived  of  ins  personal  liberty  without 
the  authority  of  law.  In  addition  to  that,  we  had 
Section 491 of the CrPC which provided the remedy of 
habeas  corpus  against  detention  without  the 
authority  of  law.  Such  laws  continue	d  to  remain  in 	
force in view of Article 372 after the coming into force 
of  the  Constitution.  According  to  that  article, 
notwithstanding the repeal by this Constitution of the 
enactments  referred  to  in  Article  395  but  subject  to 
the other provisions of this	 Constitution, all the law in 	
force  in  the  territory  of  India  immediately  before  the 
commencement of this Constitution shall continue in 
force therein until altered  or repealed or amended by 
a competent legislature or other competent authority. 
The  law  in 	force,  as  observed  by  the  majority  of 	the 	
Constitution  Bench  in  the  case  of  Director  of 
Rationing  and  Distribution  v.  The  Corporation  of 
Calcutta and Ors. 1960 CriLJ 	1684,	 include not only 	
the statutory law but also custom or usage haying the 
force of law 	as also the common law of England which, 	
was  adopted  as  the  law  of  the  country  before  the 
coming  into  force  of  the  Constitution.  The  position 
thus  seems  to  be  firmly  established  that  at  the  time, 
the  Constitution  came  into  force,  the  legal  position 
was tha	t no one could be deprived of ins life or liberty 	
without the	- authority of law. 	 	
163. 	It is difficult to accede to the contention that 	
because  of  Article  21  of  the  Constitution,  the  law 
which  was  already  in  force  that  no  one  could  be 
deprived of ins life 	or liberty without the authority 	
of  law  was  obliterated  and  ceased  to  remain  in 
force.  No  rule  of  construction  interpretation 
warrants  such  an  inference.  Section  491  of  the 
CrPC continued to remain an integral part of that 
Code  despite  the  fact  that  the  Hi	gh  Courts  were

80	 	
 	
vested  with  the  power  of  issuing  writs  of  habeas 
corpus  under  Article  226. 	No  submission  was  ever 	
advanced  on  the  score  that  the  said  provision  had 
become a dead letter of enforceable because of the fact 
that Article 226 was made a part of t	he Constitution, 	
indeed	,  in  the  case  of  Makhan  Singh  (supra) 	
Gajendragadkar  J.  speaking  for  the  majority  stated 
that after the coming into force of the Constitution, a 
party  could  avail  of  either  the  remedy  of  Section  491 
of the CrPC or that of Article 226	 of the Constitution. 	
The  above  observations  clearly  go  to  show  that 
constitutional  recognition  of  the  remedy  of  writ  of 
habeas  corpus  did  not  obliterate  or  abrogate  the 
statutory  remedy  of  writ  of  habeas  corpus.  Section 
491 of the CrPC continued to be par	t of that Code till 	
that Code was replaced by the new Code. Although the 
remedy  of  writ  of  habeas  corpus  is  not  now  available 
under  the  new  CrPC,  1973,  the  same  remedy  is  still 
available under Article 226 of the Constitution.”	 	
[Emphasis by me] 	 	
In 	holding  thus,  H.R.	 Khanna,  J.  refused  to  subscribe  to  the 	
majority  view 	in  the  said  case	 that  once  a  right  is  recognised  and 	
embodied 	in the Constitution and forms part of it, it could not have any 	
separate  existence  apart  from  the  Constitution,  unless  it 	were  also 	
enacted  as  a  statutory  principle  by  some  positive  law  of  the  State.  His 
Lordship rejected the proposition that the intention of the Constitution 
was  not  to  preserve  something  concurrently  in  the  field  of  natural  law 
or  common  law;  it  was  to  exclu	de  all  other  control  or  to  make  the 	
Constitution  the  sole  repository  of  ultimate  control  over  those  aspects 
of human freedom which were guaranteed therein. 	 	
38.	 	The  strength  of  H.R.  Khanna,  J’s  minority  opinion  was 	
subsequently  acknowledged  and  affirmed  by  this  Court  in

81	 	
 
Puttaswamy	, wherein  it  was  held  that  the  rights  to  life  and  personal 	
liberty  were  ‘primordial  rights’  and  were  not  bounties  which  were 
conferred 	by  the  State  and  created  by  the  Constitution.  That  the  right 	
to  life  existed  even  before  the  advent  of  the  Constitution  and  in 
recognising  such  right,  the  Constitution  did  not  become  the  sole 
repository of such rights. That every constitutional democracy i	ncluding 	
our  country,  is  rooted  in  an  undiluted  assurance  that  the  Rule  of  law 
will protect their rights and liberties  against any  invasion by the  State 
and that  judicial remedies would be  available when a citizen has been 
deprived of most precious inalien	able rights. Dr.	 D.Y.	 Chandrachud.	 J. 	
(as  His  Lordship  then  was)  enunciated  the  aforesaid  principles  in  the 
following words:	 	
“119.  The  judgments  rendered  by  all  the  four  judges 
constituting  the  majority  in 	ADM  Jabalpur 	are 	
seriously  flawed.  Life  and  person	al  liberty  are 	
inalienable  to  human  existence.  These  rights  are,  as 
recognised  in 	Kesavananda  Bharati	,  primordial 	
rights.  They  constitute  rights  under  natural  law.  The 
human  element  in  the  life  of  the  individual  is 
integrally  founded  on  the  sanctity  of  life.  Dignity  is 
associated with liberty and freedom. No civilized state 
can  contemplate  an  encroachment	 upon  life  and 	
personal  liberty  without  the  authority  of  law.  Neither 
life nor liberty are bounties conferred by the state nor 
does the Constitution create these rights. The right to 
life  has  existed  even  before  the  advent  of  the 
Constitution.  In  recognisi	ng  the  right,  the 	
Constitution  does  not  become  the  sole  repository  of 
the  right.  It  would  be  preposterous  to  suggest  that  a 
democratic Constitution without a Bill of Rights would 
leave individuals governed by the state without either 
the  existence  of  the  r	ight  to  live  or  the  means  of 	
enforcement  of  the  right. 	The  right  to  life  being 	
inalienable  to  each  individual,  it  existed  prior  to

82	 	
 	
the  Constitution  and  continued  in  force  Under 
Article  372  of  the  Constitution.  Justice  Khanna 
was clearly right in holding th	at the recognition of 	
the  right  to  life  and  personal  liberty  under  the 
Constitution does not denude the existence of that 
right,  apart  from  it  nor  can  there  be  a  fatuous 
assumption that in adopting the Constitution the 
people  of  India  surrendered  the  most 	precious 	
aspect of the human persona, namely, life, liberty 
and  freedom  to  the  state  on  whose  mercy  these 
rights would depend. Such a construct is contrary 
to  the  basic  foundation  of  the  Rule  of  law  which 
imposes  restraints  upon  the  powers  vested  in  the 
mo	dern state when it deals with the liberties of the 	
individual.	 The power of the Court to issue a Writ of 	
Habeas  Corpus  is  a  precious  and  undeniable  feature 
of the Rule of law. 	 	
120.  A  constitutional  democracy  can  survive  when 
citizens have an undiluted ass	urance that the Rule of 	
law  will  protect  their  rights  and  liberties  against  any 
invasion by the state and that judicial remedies would 
be  available  to  ask  searching  questions  and  expect 
answers  when  a  citizen  has  been  deprived  of  these, 
most  precious  right	s.  The  view  taken  by  Justice 	
Khanna must be accepted, and accepted in reverence 
for the strength of its thoughts and the courage of its 
convictions.”	 	
[Emphasis by me]	 	
39.	 	What emerges from the aforesaid decisions of this Court, may be 	
culled out as follows	:  	
i) 	That some natural/primordial rights of man have been accorded a 
secure position under the Constitution so as to protect such rights 
against  undue  encroachments  by  organs  of  State.  The  object  of 
elevation  of  such  common  law  rights/natural  rights  to  the 
Constitutional  plane  was  to 	make  them  specifically  enforceable 	
against the State and its agencies through Courts of Law.

83	 	
 
ii)	 	Notwithstanding that such rights have been placed in Part III of the 
Constitution of India, the rights are concurrently preserved 	in the	 	
field of natural law or common law. Remedies available in common 
law  for  actualising  such  rights  are  also  preserved.  There  are 
therefore two spheres of rights, and corresponding remedies: 	first	, 	
relatable  to  the  Fundamental  Rights  enshrined  under  Part  III	 the 	
Constitution  of  India,  which  correspond  to  the  remedies  under 
Article  32  and  Article  226  of  the  Constitution  of  India; 	second	, 	
inalienable/natural/common  law  rights,  which  are  pre	-	
constitutional  rights,  and  may  be  protected  by  having  recourse  to 
commo	n law remedies. 	 	
iii)	 	While the content of a certain common law right, may be identical 
to  a  Fundamental  Right,  the  two  rights  would  be  distinct  in  two 
respects: 	first	,  incidence  of  the  duty  to  respect  such  right;  and 	
second	, the forum which would be called upo	n to adjudicate on the 	
failure to respect such right. While the content of the right violated 
may be identical, the status of the violator, is what is relevant.	 	
With  that  primer,  I  shall  proceed  to  consider  whether  the 	
Fundamental Rights under Article 19 o	r 21 of the Constitution of India 	
can  be  claimed 	against 	any  person 	other	 than  the  State  or  its 	
instrumentalities. 	 	
40.	 	With historical and political changes and the advent of democracy 	
and  of  Constitutional  government,  the 	“State	” was 	created  under  and

84	 	
 
by  a 	constitution	 and  placed  at  a  position  which  renders  it  capable  of 	
interfering with natural and common law rights. On the other hand, as 
is evident from the text of the Preamble of the Constitution of India, the 
“W	e  the  People  of  Indi	a  created  the  State  as  an  entity  to  serve  their 	
interests.  In  order  to  reconcile  the  competing  effects  of  creation  of  the 
State, 	certain	 common  law  rights  were  elevated  to  the  constitutional 	
plane by accommodating them in Part III of the Constitution of In	dia to 	
make  them  specifically  enforceable  against  the  State  and  its  agencies 
through  the  Courts.  Part  III  of  the  Constitution  was  therefore  enacted 
to  dictate  the  relationship  between  citizens  and  the  State	- this  is  the 	
true 	character and utility of Part I	II. This idea has also found resonance 	
in	 Puttaswamy	, wherein it was observed as follows: 	 	
“251.  Constitutions  address  the  rise  of  the  new 
political  hegemon  that  they  create  by  providing  for  a 
means  by  which  to  guard  against  its  capacity  for 
invading  the  liberties  available  and  guaranteed  to  all 
civilized  peoples.  Under  our  constitutional  scheme, 
these  means 	- declared  to  be  fundamental  rights 	- 	
reside in Part III, and are made effective by the power 
of  this  Court  and  the  High  Courts  Under  Art	icles  32 	
and 226 respectively. This narrative of the progressive 
expansion  of  the  types  of  rights  available  to 
individuals  seeking  to  defend  their  liberties  from 
invasion 	- from  natural  rights  to  common  law  rights 	
and finally to fundamental rights 	- is con	sistent with 	
the  account  of  the  development  of  rights  that 
important strands in constitutional theory present.”	 	
Therefore,  the primary object of Part III of the Constitution was to 	
forge a new relationship between the citizens and the State, which was 
the 	new  site  of  Governmental  power.  The  realm  of  interaction  between

85	 	
 
citizens 	inter	-se	,  was  governed  by  common  law  prior  to  the  enactment 	
of  the  Constitution  and  continued  to  be  so  governed  even  after  the 
commencement of the Constitution because as recognised 	hereinabove, 	
the  common  rights  and  remedies  were  not  obliterated  even  after  the 
Constitution  was  enacted.  These  inalienable  rights,  although 
subsequently  placed  in  Part  III  of  the  Constitution,  retained  their 
identity  in  the  arena  of 	common 	law  and  continu	ed  to  regulate 	
relationships  between  citizens  and  entities,  other  than  the  State  or  its 
instrumentalities. It is therefore observed that the incidence of the duty 
to respect Constitutional and Fundamental Rights of citizens is on the 
State  and  the  Constitu	tion  provides  remedies  against  violation  of 	
Fundamental Rights by the State. These observations are in consonance 
with the recognition by this Court in 	People’s Union for Civil Liberties 	
vs.  Union  of  India	, 	(2005)  2  SCC  436	 (“	People’s  Union  for  Civil 	
Liber	ties”	)  that  the  objective  of  Part  III  is  to  place  citizens  at  centre 	
stage and make the state accountable to them. 	 	
41.	 	On the other hand, common law rights, regulate the relationship 	
between  citizens 	inter	-se	.  Although  the  content  of  a  common  law  right 	
ma	y be similar to a Fundamental Right, the two rights are distinct in so 	
far as, the incidence of duty to respect a common law right is on citizens 
or entities other than State or its instrumentalities; while the incidence 
of  duty  to  respect  a  Fundamental  Ri	ght,  except  where  expressly 	
otherwise  provided,  is  on  the  State.  Remedies  against  violation  of

86	 	
 
Fundamental Rights by the State are Constitutionally prescribed under 
Articles  32  and  226;  while  common  law  remedies,  some  of  which  are 
statutorily  recognised,  a	re  available  against  violation  of  common  law 	
rights.  Such  remedies  are  available  even  as  against  fellow  citizens  or 
entities  other  than  State  or  its  instrumentalities.  To  this  extent, 
horizontality  is  recognised  in  common  law. 	Further  to  some  exten	t 	
certai	n Fundamental Rights are recognised statutorily and 	some others 	
are  expressly  recognised  in  the  Constitution  as  being 	applicable  as 	
horizontal rights between citizens 	inter se	 such as Articles 15(2), 17, 23, 	
24. 	A similar declaration as regards the right to privacy is found in the 	
decision  of  this  Court  in 	Puttaswamy	.  The  relevant  excerpts  from  the 	
said decision have been reproduced hereinunder: 	 	
“253. Once we have arrived at this understanding of the 
nature  of  fundamental  rights,  we  can  dismantle  a  core 
assumption of the Union's argument: that a right must 
either  be  a  common  law  right  or  a  fundamental  right. 
The  only  material  distinctions  between 	the  two  classes 	
of  right 	- of  which  the  nature  and  content  may  be  the 	
same 	- lie in the incidence of the duty to respect the right 	
and  in  the  forum  in  which  a  failure  to  do  so  can  be 
redressed. 	Common law rights are horizontal in their 	
operation  when  they 	are  violated  by  one's  fellow 	
man,  he  can  be  named  and  proceeded  against  in  an 
ordinary  court  of  law.  Constitutional  and 
fundamental  rights,  on  the  other  hand,  provide 
remedy against the violation of a valued interest by 
the  'state',  as  an  abstract  entity, 	whether  through 	
legislation  or  otherwise,  as  well  as  by  identifiable 
public  officials,  being  individuals  clothed  with  the 
powers  of  the  state.  It  is  perfectly  possible  for  an 
interest  to  simultaneously  be  recognized  as  a 
common  law  right  and  a  fundamental 	right.  Where 	
the interference with a recognized interest is by the 
state  or  any  other  like  entity  recognized  by  Article

87	 	
 	
12,  a  claim  for  the  violation  of  a  fundamental  right 
would  lie.  Where  the  author  of  an  identical 
interference  is  a  non	-state  actor,  an  a	ction  at 	
common law would lie in an ordinary court. 	 	
254.  Privacy  has  the  nature  of  being 	both 	a  common 	
law  right  as  well  as  a  fundamental  right.  Its  content, 
in  both  forms,  is  identical.  All  that  differs  is  the 
incidence of burden and the forum for enforc	ement for 	
each form.”	 	
[Emphasis by me]	 	
It  has  therefore  been  unequivocally  declared  by  this  Court  that 	
while the content of a right recognised under Part III of the Constitution 
may coincide or overlap with a common law right, the remedies available 
agains	t  violation  of  the  respective  form  of  right,  operate  in  different 	
spheres  of  law.    That  is,  although  the  content  of  a  common  law  right 
and  a  fundamental  right  may  be  almost  identical,  the  remedy  against 
violation  of  a  common  law  right,  shall  lie  under  comm	on  law  and  not 	
under  the  Constitution;  similarly,  the  remedy  against  violation  of  a 
Fundamental  Right  is  provided  for  under  the  Constitution  itself	 	
expressly against the State under Article 19(2) thereof	. 	
42.	 	The  status  of  the  violator  of  the  right,  is 	also  an  essential 	
parameter  for  distinction  between  the  two  rights  and  corresponding 
remedies. Where the interference with a recognized right is by the State 
or any other entity recognized under Article 12, a claim for the violation 
of  a  fundamental  right 	would  lie  under  Articles  32  and  226  of  the 	
Constitution  before  this  Court  or  before  the  High  Court	 respectively	.  	
Where  interference  is  by  an  entity  other  than  State  or  its

88	 	
 
instrumentalities,  an  action  would  lie  under  common  law  and  to  such 
extent, the leg	al scheme recognises horizontal operation of such rights. 	 	
43.	 	Though  the  content  of  the 	Fundamental  R	ight  may  be  identical 	
under	 the  Constitution 	with 	the  common  law	 right	,  it  is  only  the 	
common  law  right  that  operates  horizontally	 	except  when  those 	
Funda	mental Rights have been transformed into statutory rights under 	
specific  enactments	 or  where  horizontal  operation  has  been  expressly 	
recognised  under  the  Constitution	.  This  is  because,  the  following 	
difficulties  would  surface  if  the  Fundamental  Rights  ensh	rined  under 	
Article 19 and 21 are permitted to operate horizontally	 so as to seek the 	
remedy by 	way 	of a writ petition before a Constitutional Court	:  	
i) 	No  recognition  that  Fundamental  Rights  enshrined  under  Article 
19 and 21 are permitted to operate horizon	tally can be made except 	
by  ignoring  the  elementary  differences  between  a  Fundamental 
Right  and  the  congruent  common  law  right.  Such  a  recognition 
could  proceed  only  by  ignoring  the  fact  that  the  incidence  of  the 
duty  to  respect  a  Fundamental  Right  is  on  t	he  State  and  its 	
instrumentalities.  Recognition  of  horizontal  enforceability  of 
Fundamental Rights would also ignore the status of the violator of 
the right	 except when a Fundamental Right is also recognised as a 	
statutory right against another person or c	itizen.	 Therefore, such a 	
recognition  is  misplaced  as  it  proceeds  with  total  disregard  to  the 
elementary  differences  in  status  of  the  two  forms  of  rights, 
incidence  of  duty  to  respect  each  of  such  forms  of  rights,  and  the

89	 	
 	
forum  which  would  be  called  upon  t	o  adjudicate  on  the  failure  to 	
respect each of such rights. 	 	
ii)	 	The  following  decisions  of  this  Court  are  demonstrative  of  its 
disinclination  or  reluctance  in  recognising  that  Fundamental 
Rights enshrined under Article 19 and 21 are permitted to operate 
horizontally: 	 	
a)	 	In 	P.D. Shamdasani vs. Central Bank of India	 Ltd.	, A.I.R. 	
1952  SC  59	,  a  Constitution  Bench  of  this  Court  refused  to 	
entertain  a  Writ  Petition  filed  under  Article  32  of  the 
Constitution,  wherein  a  prayer  was  made  to  enforce  the  right 
under  Article  19(1)(f)  and  Article  31(1),  as 	they	 then  stood, 	
against  a  pr	ivate  entity.  In  that  context,  it  was  held  that  the 	
language and structure of	 Article 19	 and its setting in Part III 	
of the Constitution clearly show that the 	Article was intended 	
to  protect  those  freedoms  against  State  action	.  This  Court 	
declared  that  vio	lation  of  rights  of 	property  by	 individuals  or 	
entities other than the State and its instrumentalities, was not 
within the purview of Article 19(1)(f).	 	
Further,  this  Court  made  a  comparison  between  Article 	
31(1),  as  it  then  stood,  and  Article  21  as  both  Articles  cast  a 
negative  duty  on  the  State.  In  that  context  it  was  held  that 
although  there  is  no  express  reference  to  the  State  in  Article 
21, it could n	ot be suggested that the Article  was intended to

90	 	
 	
afford protection to life and liberty against violation by private 
individuals.  That  the  words  “except  by  procedure  established 
by law” exclude such suggestion that Article 21 would operate 
horizontally. 	 	
Th	e  aforesaid  decision 	is 	illustrative  of  this  Court’s 	
reluctance to hold that the Fundamental Rights under Articles 
19  or  21  of  the  Constitution,  would  operate  horizontally.  It  is 
also  to  be  noted  that  in  the  aforesaid  case,  this  Court  has 
acknowledged  that	 a  suitable  remedy  exists  under  statutory 	
law  to  redress  the  infraction  complained  of.  Therefore,  while 
this Court was mindful that the rights in the realm of common 
law, some of which have gained statutory recognition, operate 
horizontally,  the  Fundamenta	l  Rights  under  Articles  19  and 	
21, do not	, except 	in	 the case of seeking a writ in the nature of 	
habeas corpus	.  	
(b) 	 In	 Zoroastrian  Cooperative  Housing  Society  Limited  vs. 	
District Registrar, Cooperative Societies	 (Urban)	, (2005) 5 	
SCC  632	,  the  Petitioner 	society  was  a 	registered  society  with 	
its  own  bye	-laws,  under  its  parent  legislation,  the  Bombay 	
Cooperative  Societies  Act.	 As  per  bye	-law  7,  only  members  of 	
the  Parsi  community  were  eligible  to  become  members  of  the 
Society. The effect of	 this was that since housing shares could 	
be  transferred  only  to  members,  effectively,  only  Parsis  could

91	 	
 	
buy  plots  under  the  aegis  of  the  Cooperative  Society.	 This 	
restrictive covenant in the bye	-laws became the subject matter 	
of challenge before this Cour	t, 	inter	-alia	, on the ground that it 	
violated  the  right  to  equality  enshrined  in  the  Constitution. 
This  Court  refused  to  accept  such  a  challenge  and  held  that 
the  Society’s  bye	-laws  were  in  the  nature  of  Articles  of 	
Association of a company	 and were not li	ke a statute. The bye	-	
laws were only 	“binding	 between	 the	 persons	 affected	 by	 them.”	 	
That	 a private	 contractual agreement is not subject to general 	
scrutiny under Part III of the Constitution. This Court further 
distinguished  between  a  discriminatory  legis	lation  passed  by 	
the  State  and  a  discriminatory  bye	-laws  of  a  society  or 	
association, which is not ‘State’. Accordingly, it held that while 
a  legislation  may  be  subject  to  a  challenge  on  the  touchstone 
of  Part  III  of  the  Constitution,  bye	-laws  of  a  society	 or 	
association, could not. 	 	
  	This  decision  is  also  demonstrative  of  this  Court’s 	
disapproval  of  horizontal  operation  of  fundamental  rights, 
making  them  directly  applicable  to  interactions,  whether 
contractual or otherwise, between private parties. 	 	
iii)	 	I  am  however  mindful  of  the  fact  tha	t  over  the  years,  the 	
conception  of  “State”  as  defined  under  Article  12  of  the 
Constitution  has  undergone  significant  metamorphosis.

92	 	
 	
Through  its  jurisprudential  labour,  this  Court  has  devised 
several  principles  and  doctrines,  so  as  to  enable  citizens  to 
en	force  their  fundamental  rights  not  only  against  “State”  as 	
defined in the strict sense to mean “agency of the Government,” 
but  also  against  entities  imbued  with  public  character,  or 
entitles  which  perform  functions  which  closely  resemble 
governmental  funct	ions.  [See: 	Pradeep  Kumar  Biswas  vs. 	
Indian  Institute  of  Chemical  Biology,  (2002)  5  SCC  111; 
Zee  Telefilms  Ltd.  vs.  Union  of  India,  (2005)  4  SCC  649; 
Janet Jeyapaul vs. S.R.M. University, (2015) 16 SCC 530] 	 	
This Court has progressively expanded the scope 	of Article 	
12  of  the  Constitution  so  as  to  ensure  that  a  private  entity, 
which  performs a public duty/function and therefore informs 
our  national  life,  does  not  get  away  scott	-free  merely  because 	
it  is  not  “	State” 	stricto  sensu	.    Such  entitles  are  imbued  w	ith 	
constitutional obligations on account of the public or statutory 
functions performed by them. At this juncture, it is necessary 
to reflect on the difference between holding that Fundamental 
Rights may be enforced against a private entity on account of 
the public nature of its functions, as contrasted with universal 
operation  of  fundamental  rights  claims  against  all  persons.  A 
private  body,  acting  in  private  capacity,  fulfilling  a  private

93	 	
 	
function,  cannot  be  axiomatically  amenable  to  the  claims  of 
fundam	ental rights violations. 	 	
The  decision  of  this  Court  in 	Ramakrishna  Mission  vs. 	
Kago Kunya	, (2019) 16 SCC 303	 is also highly instructive on 	
the issue of amenability of actions of private entities, to judicial 
review  under  Article  226  of  the  Constitution  of  India.  In  the 
said case, the issue before this Court was whether the Hospital 
run by the Petitioner Mission 	performed a public function that 	
made	 it  amenable  to  writ  jurisdiction  under  Article  226.  This 	
Court  found  that  the  Hospital  and  the  Mission  were  not 
amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 since running 
a  hospital  would  not  constitute  a  public  fun	ction.  This  Court 	
further highlighted that even when a private entity performs a 
public function,  the Court would be required to enquire  as to 
whether  the  grant  in  aid  received  by  the  said  entity  covers  a 
significant  portion  of  its  expenditure.  This  Court 	went  on  to 	
declare that regulation of a private body by a 	statute does not 	
give  it  the  colour  of  a  public  function.  A  public  function  was 
held to be one which is “closely related to functions which are 
performed  by  the  State  in  its 	sovereign  capacity.	” 	
Acc	ordingly	, it was held that the Hospital was not  performing 	
a  public  function  since  the  functions  it  performed  were  not 
“akin  to  those  solely  performed  by  State  authorities.”  It  was

94	 	
 	
held that medical services were provided by private as well as 
State entiti	es and therefore, the nature of medical services was 	
not  such  that  they  could  be  carried  out  solely  by  State 
authorities. 	 	
Thus,  according  to  the  decision  of  this  Court  in 	
Ramakrishna Mission	, regulation by the State either through 	
a statute or 	otherwise	; receipt of a meagre amount of aid from 	
the  State;  receipt  of  concessions  by  the  State	; do  not  make  a 	
private entity amenable to the writ jurisdiction of Courts under 
Article 226 of the Constitution. 	 	
Thus,  r	ecognising  a  horizontal  approach	 of  Fu	ndamental 	
Rights between citizens 	inter se	 would set at naught and render 	
redundant, all the  tests and doctrines forged by this Court to 
identify  “State”  for  the  purpose  of  entertaining  claims  of 
fundamental rights violations. Had the intention of this Cou	rt 	
been to allow Fundamental Rights, including the rights under 
Article	s 19  and  21,  to  operate  horizontally,  this  Court  would 	
not 	have 	engaged  in  evolving  and  refining  tests  to  determine 	
the true meaning and scope of “State” as defined under Article 
12.  This  Court  would  have  simply  entertained  claims  of 
fundamental rights violations against all persons and entities, 
without  deliberating  o	n  fundamental  questions  as  to 	
maintainability  of  the  writ  petitions.  Although  this  Court  has

95	 	
 	
significantly  expanded  the  scope  of  “State”  as  defined  under 
Article 12, such expansion is based on considerations such as 
the nature of functions performed by the	 entity in question and 	
the  degree  of  control  exercised  over  it  by  the  State  as  such.  
This  is  significantly  different  from  recognising  horizontality  of 
the fundamental rights under Article	s 19 and 21	, except while 	
seeking  a  writ  in  the  nature  of  habeas  co	rpus	.  Such  a 	
recognition  would  amount  to  disregarding  the  jurisprudence 
evolved  by  this  Court  as  to  the  scope  of  Article  12  of  the 
Constitution. 	 	
iv)	 	Another aspect that needs consideration is that a Writ Court, 
does  not  ordinarily  adjudicate  to  issue  Writs  in	 cases  where 	
alternate and efficacious remedies exist under common law or 
statutory law particularly against private persons.  Therefore, 
even if horizontal operation of the Fundamental Rights  under 
Article  19/21  is  recognised,  such  recognition  would  be  of	 no 	
avail  because  the  claim  before  a  Writ  Court  of  fundamental 
rights  violations  would  fail  on  the  ground  that  the  congruent 
common  law  right  which  is  identical  in  content  to  the 
Fundamental  Right,  may  be  enforced  by  having  recourse  to 
common  law  remedies.	 Therefore,  on  the  ground  that 	there 	
exists an alternate and efficacious remedy in common law, the

96	 	
 	
horizontal  claim  for  fundamental  rights  violations  would  fail 
before a 	W	rit 	Court. 	 	
This  may  be  better  understood  by  way  of  an  illustration. 	
Let  me  assume  fo	r  the  purpose  of  argument  that  the 	
Fundamental Right under Article 19(1)(a) read with Article 21 
is  allowed  to  operate  horizontally.  A  person  would  then  be 
eligible to file a writ petition, against another private individual 
or  entity  for  violation  of  such	 right.  The  violation  may  for 	
instance be a verbal attack at the aggrieved person, which may 
have  the  effect  of  undermining  such  person’s  dignity  or 
reputation.  Dignity  and  reputation  are  essential  facets  of  the 
right  to  life  under  Article  21;  at  the  same 	time,	 they  are  also 	
recognised  as  common  law  rights  as  they  are  fundamental 
attributes  of  human  personality  which  is  regarded  as  a 
supreme  value  in  common  law.  Common  law  remedies, 
including declarations, injunctions and damages, are available 
to redress a	ny injury to common law rights, including the right 	
to  dignity  and  reputation.  Such  remedies  are  also  statutorily 
recognised under  the Specific Relief Act,  1963  and the I	ndian 	
Penal  Code	.    Therefore,  on  account  of  availability  of  an 	
alternate  remedy  under 	common  law,  the  Courts  would  be 	
reluctant 	to 	entertain a writ petition under Article	s 226 or 32, 	
as the case may be.

97	 	
 	
v)	 	Further,  it  is  trite  that  Writ  Courts  do  not  enter  into 
adjudication  of  disputed  questions  of  fact.    But,  questions 
regarding infringement	 of the fundamental rights under Article 	
19/21,  by  a  private  entity,  would  invariably  involve  disputed 
questions of fact. Therefore, this is another difficulty that must 
be borne in mind while determining the horizontal operation of 
such rights in a writ p	roceeding. 	 	
However, there is  another  aspect of the matter  that requires to be 	
discussed. 	A writ of habeas corpus is an order directing the person who 	
has detained another to produce the detainee before the court in order 
for  the  court 	to  ascertain  on  what  ground  or  for  what  reason  he  has 	
been confined, and to release him if there is no legal justification for the 
detention.  A writ of habeas  corpus is granted 	ex debito justiae	 and the 	
applicant  must  only  demonstrate 	prima	-facie,	 unlawful 	detention  of 	
himself or any other person. If there is no justification for the detention 
and  the  same  is  unlawful,  a  writ  is  issued  as  of  right 	vide	 Union  of 	
India vs. Paul Manickam	, (2003) 8 SCC 342	. The importance of a writ 	
of  habeas  corpus  is  the  duty  b	eing  cast  on 	a Constitutional  Court  to 	
issue  the  writ  to  safeguard  the  freedom  of  a  citizen  against  illegal  and 
arbitrary  detention.  In  my  humble  view,  an  illegal  detention  is  a 
violation  of  Article  21  of  the  Constitution,  irrespective  of  whether  the 
deten	tion is by the State or by a private person.

98	 	
 	
A petition under Article 226 of the Constitution would therefore lie 	
before the High Court, not only when the person has been detained by 
the State but also when he/she is detained by a private individual 	vide 	
Mohd.  Ikram  Hussain  vs.  State  of  Uttar  Pradesh	, 	A.I.R.  1964  SC 	
1625  at  1630	. In  my  view,  such  a  petition  under  Article  32 	of	 the 	
Constitution would 	also 	lie before this Court for seeking a writ of habeas 	
corpus  in  terms  of  Article  32  (2).  Such  a  writ 	could  be  issued  not  just 	
against the State which may have illegally detained a person, but even 
as  against  a  private  person.  Hence,  in  the  context  of  illegal  detention, 
Article 21 would operate horizontally against private persons also. Such 
a departure ha	s to be made although Fundamental Rights are normally 	
enforced  against  the  State  under  Article  32  of  the  Constitution. 
Otherwise,  the  remedy  by  way  of  a  writ  of  habeas  corpus  would  be 
rendered incomplete if the said remedy is not available against a privat	e 	
person	 under  Article  32  of  the  Constitution	.  Hence  in  the  context  of 	
illegal detention, even by a private person, I would opine that Article 21 
would  operate  horizontally  and  the  writ  of  habeas  corpus  could  be 
issued  against  a  private  person 	just  as 	unde	r  Article  226  of  the 	
Constitution, the High Court can issue such a writ against any person 
or authority. But even in the context of Article 32(2) of the Constitution, 
it may not be proper to restrict the said remedy only as against the State 
but the same m	ay be made available even as against private persons, in 	
which  event the  power exercised  by this  Court could  be in 	accordance

99	 	
 
with	 Article  142  (1)  of  the  Constitution  to  do  complete  justice  in  the 	
matter. For ease of reference Article 142(1) may be extract	ed as under: 	 	
vi)	 	“142. Enforcement of decrees and orders of Supreme 
Court  and  unless  as  to  discovery,  etc. 	- (  1  )  The 	
Supreme  Court  in  the  exercise  of  its  jurisdiction  may 
pass such decree or make such order as is necessary for 
doing  complete  justice  in  any 	cause  or  matter  pending 	
before  it,  and  any  decree  so  passed  or  orders  so  made 
shall be enforceable throughout the territory of India in 
such manner as may be prescribed by or under any law 
made by Parliament and, until provision in that behalf is 
so made, 	in such manner as the President may by order 	
prescribe	.” 	 	
 
 	
Therefore, 	a writ  of  habeas  corpus  could  be  issued  by  this  Court 	
under  Article  32  of  the  Constitution,  not  only  against  the  ‘State’  as 
defined  under  Article  12  of  the  Constitution  but  also  against	 a  private 	
individual. This is because illegal detention by a private person is a tort 
and of a nature similar to a constitutional tort. The reason for saying so 
is  because  an  illegal  detention  whether  by  a  State  or  a  private  person 
has a direct and identi	cal effect on the detainee. The detainee loses his 	
liberty and there may be a threat to his life. 	 	
Directions in the nature of writs of habeas corpus have been issued 	
by  this  Court  on  previous  occasions	,  against  private  individuals, 	
particularly in cases o	f kidnapping, child custody etc. [See for instance: 	
Nirmaljit  Kaur  (2)  vs.  State  of  Punjab,	 (2006)  9  SCC  3	64]  In  such 	
cases,  resorting  to  the  process  of  instituting  a  criminal  case  before  a 
police  station,  may  prove  to  be  futile  because  the  need  of  the  hour  in 
such cases is swift action. The writ of habeas corpus under Article 226

100	 	
 
as  well  as  Article  32  of  the  Co	nstitution,  is 	festium  remidium	,  i.e.,  a 	
speedy  remedy,  and  such  remedy  needs  to  be  made  available  even  as 
against a private individual. 	 	
It  is  appropriate  that  the  High  Court  concerned  under  whose 	
jurisdiction  the  illegal  detention  has  occurred  should  be 	approached 	
first. In order to invoke jurisdiction of this Court under Article 32 of the 
Constitution by approaching this Court directly, it has to be shown by 
the  Petitioner  as  to  why  the  concerned  High  Court  has  not  been 
approached.  In  cases  where 	it  woul	d  be  futile  to  approach  the  High 	
Court,  and  where  satisfactory  reasons  are  indicated  in  this  regard,  a 
petition  seeking  issuance  of  a  writ  of  habeas  corpus,  may  be 
entertained.  However,  in  the  absence  of  such  circumstances,  filing  a 
petition  under  Article 	32  of  the  Constitution  is  not  to  be  encouraged, 	
vide 	Union of India vs. Paul Manickam	, (2003) 8 SCC 342	.  	
The  judicial  precedent  referred  to  above  are  aligned  with  the 	
aforesaid discussion. 	 	
In light of the aforesaid discussion, Question No. 2 is answered as 	
follows: 	 	
“The  rights  in  the  realm  of  common  law,  which  may  be 	
similar or identical in their content to the Fundamental Rights 
under  Article  19/21,  operate  horizontally:  However,  the 
Fundamental  Rights  under  Articles  19  and  21,  may  not  be 
justiciable  horizontally  be	fore  the  Constitutional  Courts  except 	
those  rights  which  have  been  statutorily  recognised  and  in 
accordance  with  the  applicable  law.  However,  they  may  be  the

101	 	
 
basis  for  seeking  common  law  remedies.  But  a  remedy  in  the 
form of writ of Habeas Corpus, if sough	t against a private person 	
on  the  basis  of  Article  21  of  the  Constitution  can  be  before  a 
Constitutional  Court  i.e.,  by  way  of  Article  226  before  the  High 
Court  or  Article  32  read  with  Article 	142  before	 the  Supreme 	
Court.”	 	
Re:  Question  No.  3: 	Whether  the 	State  is  under  a  duty  to 	
affirmatively protect the rights of a citizen under Article 21 of the 
Constitution  of  India  even  against  a  threat  to  the  liberty  of  a 
citizen  by  the  acts  or  omissions  of  another  citizen  or  private 
agency? 	 	
44.	 	In  order  to  answer  th	is  question,  it  may  be  prudent  to  consider 	
the circumstances under which this Court has previously observed that 
the State is bound to protect the life and liberty of every human being	, 	
from the following judgments:	 	
i) 	In 	Pt.  Parmana	nd  Katara  vs.  Union  of 	India	, 	A.I.R.  1989  SC 	
2039	, this Court was confronted with the question as to whether a 	
doctor  has  the  professional  obligation  to  instantaneously  extend 
his services to a person brought for medical treatment, without any 
delay  on  the  pretext  of  compliance 	with  procedural  criminal  law. 	
This  court  declared  that  the  obligation  of  a  doctor  to  extend  his 
services with due expertise, for protecting life was paramount and 
absolute and any laws of procedure which would interfere with the 
discharge  of  this  obligatio	n,  would  be  antithetical  to  Article  21  of 	
the Constitution. It was further observed that where there is delay

102	 	
 	
on  the  part  of  medical  professionals  to  administer  treatment  in 
emergencies, state action can intervene.	 	
ii)	 	In 	National Human Rights Commission vs. S	tate of Arunachal 	
Pradesh	, (1996) 1 SCC 742	, this Court considered a writ petition 	
filed under Article 32 of the Constitution, pertaining to the threats 
held  out  by  the  All  Arunachal  Pradesh  Students’  Union,  to  force 
Chakmas	 out of the State of Arunachal P	radesh. It was the case of 	
the  Petitioner  therein  that  a 	large  number  of 	Chakmas	 from 	
erstwhile  East  Pakistan  (now  Bangladesh)  were  displaced  by  the 
Kaptai  Hydel  Power  Project  in  1964.  They  had  taken  shelter  in 
Assam and Tripura. Most of them were settled in these States and 
became Indian citizens in due course of time. Since a large 	number 	
of refugees had taken shelter in Assam, the State Government had 
expressed  its  inability  to  rehabilitate  all  of  them  and  requested 
assistance  in  this  regard  from  certain  other  States.	 As  a  result  of 	
such  consultations  between  the  North  Eastern  State	s,  some 	
population  of 	Chakmas 	began  residing  in  Arunachal  Pradesh.  It 	
was  also  stated  that  many  of  such  persons  had  made 
representations for the grant of citizenship 	under	 Section	 5(1)(a)	 of 	
the Citizenship Act, 1955, however, no decision was communicated 
in this regard. In the interim, relations between citizens residing in 
Arunachal  Pradesh  and  the 	Chakmas	 deteriorated  and  the  latter 	
were  being  subjected  to 	repressive  measures  with  a  view  to 	
forcibly	 expel  them  from  the  State.  In  that  background,  a  writ

103	 	
 	
petition  came  to  be  filed,  alleging	, inter	-alia	,  unwillingness  on  the 	
part  of  the  State  to  contain  the  hostile  situation.  In  that 
background,  this  Court  issued  a  writ  of  mandamus, 	inter	-alia	, 	
directing the State of Arunachal Pradesh to ensure that the life and 
liberty of every 	Chakma 	residing in the St	ate is protected, and any 	
attempt by organised groups to evict or drive them out of the State 
is  repelled,  if 	necessary,	 by  requisitioning  the  service  of  para	-	
military  or  police  force.  It  was  also  directed  that  the  application 
made  by 	Chakmas 	for  the  grant	 of  citizenship 	under	 Section	 	
5(1)(a)	 of  the  Citizenship  Act,  1955  be  considered,  and  pending 	
such consideration, no 	Chakma	 shall be evicted from the State.	 	
It  is  to  be  noted  that  in  the  said  case,  this  Court  cited  the 	
Fundamental  Rights  of  persons  under  Article  21  in  directing  the 
State  to  protect  the  rights  of 	Chakmas	 from  threats  by  private 	
actors.  The  said  directions  were  issued  in  the  backdrop  of  the 
Stat	e’s inaction to mobilise the available machinery to contain the 	
hostile situation and such inaction had or could have had the effect 
of depriving 	Chakmas	 of their right to life and personal liberties. It 	
was in that context that this Court declared that th	e State is bound 	
to protect the life and liberty of every human being, be he a citizen 
or otherwise.	 	
iii)	 	In 	Gaurav Kumar Bansal vs. Union of India	, (2015) 2 SCC 130	, 	
this Court, in directing the respondents therein 	to provide 	ex gratia

104	 	
 	
monetary  compensation  to	 the  families  of  the  deceased  who  have 	
succumbed  to  the  pandemic  of  Covid	-19,  in  view  of	 Section  12	 of 	
the  Disaster  Management  Act,  2005,  relied  on  Article  21  of  the 
Constitution. 	 	
iv)	 	Similarly,  in 	Swaraj  Abhiyan  vs.  Union  of  India	, (2016)  7  SCC 	
498	, this Court relied on Article 21 of the Constitution, in issuing 	
a writ of mandamus to the Union of India, to effectively implement 
the  National  Food  Security,  2013  in  certain  parts  of  the  country 
which had been affected due to drought.  	 	
     	The aforesai	d cases illustrate that this Court has observed that 	
the State is bound to protect the life and liberty of every human being, 
in the following contexts: 	 	
a)	 	Where  inaction  on  the  part  of  the  State,  to  contain  a  hostile 
situation  between  private  actors,  could  have  had  the  effect  of 
depriving persons of their right to life and liberty; 	 	
b)	 	Where  the  State  had  failed  to  carry  out  its  obligations  under  a 
statute or a	 policy or scheme, and such failure could have had the 	
effect of depriving persons of their right to life and liberty.	   	
c)	 	It  is therefore clear that the acknowledgement of this Court of the 
duty of the State under Article 21, only pertains to a negative dut	y 	
not  to  deprive  a  person  of  his  right  to  life  and  personal  liberty, 
except  in  accordance  with  law.  This  Court  has  not  recognised  an 
affirmative  duty  on  the  part  of  the  State  under  Article  21  of  the

105	 	
 	
Constitution  to  protect  the  rights  of  a  citizen,  against 	a  threat  to 	
the liberty of a citizen by the acts or omissions of another citizen or 
private agency. Of course, there exist a plethora of statutes which 
cast an obligation on the State and its machinery to contain hostile 
situations  between  private  actors; 	to  repel  any  action  by  private 	
actors which would undermine the life and liberty of other persons 
etc.  This  Court  has,  on  several  occasions,  issued  writs  of 
mandamus  directing  State  authorities  to  carry  out  such  statutory 
obligations.  In  directing  so,  this	 Court  may  have  referred  to  the 	
right to life and personal liberties under Article 21. However, such 
reference  to  Article  21  is  not  to  be  construed  as  an 
acknowledgement  by  the  Court  of  an  affirmative  duty  on  the  part 
of the State under Article 21 of the C	onstitution to protect the rights 	
of a citizen, against a threat to the liberty of a citizen by the acts or 
omissions  of  another  citizen  or  private  agency.	 Given  that  Article 	
21  only  imposes  a  negative  duty,  a  violation  of  the  same  would 
occur only when th	e State undertakes an obligation by enacting a 	
statute  or  a  scheme,  but 	does  not  fulfil  it. 	Thus,	 the  violation  will 	
only  occur  when  a  scheme  has  been  initiated  but  is  not  being 
appropriately implemented, as was noted in the aforecited cases. 	 	
 	
      	In  light  of  the  aforesaid  discussion,  Question  No.  3  is  answered 	
as follows:

106	 	
 
“The duty cast upon the State under Article 21 is a negative duty 
not  to  deprive  a  person  of  his  life  and  personal  liberty  except  in 
accordance with law. 	The State has an a	ffirmative duty to carry 	
out  obligations  cast  upon  it  under  statutory 	and  constitutional 	
law	, which are based on the Fundamental Right guaranteed under 	
Article  21  of  the  Constitution	.  Such  obligations  may  require 	
interference  by  the  State  where  acts  of  a  p	rivate  actor  may 	
threaten the life	 or	 liberty of another individual. 	Failure to carry 	
out  the  duties  enjoined  upon  the  State  under  statutory  law  to 
protect the rights of a citizen, could have the effect of depriving a 
citizen of his right to life and perso	nal liberty. When a citizen is 	
so  deprived  of  his  right  to  life  and  personal  liberties,  the  State 
would have breached the negative duty cast upon it under Article 
21.” 	 	
Re: Question No. 4: 	Can a statement made by a Minister, traceable 	
to  any  affairs  of 	State  or  for  protecting  the  Government,  be 	
attributed vicariously to the Government itself, especially in view 
of the principle of Collective Responsibility?	  	
45. 	A  Minster  may  make  statements  in  two  capacities: 	first	,  in  his 	
personal  capacity; 	second	,  in 	his  official  capacity  and  as  a  delegate  of 	
the Government. It is a no brainer that in respect of the former category 
of statements, no vicarious liability may be attributed to the Government 
itself. The latter category of statements may be traceable to any	 affair of 	
the State or may be made with a view to protect the Government. If such 
statements  are  disparaging  or  derogatory  and  represent  not  only  the 
personal views of the individual Minister making them, but also embod	y 	
the  views  of  the  Government,  then,  such  statements 	can	 	be

107	 	
 
attributed vicariously to the Government itself, especially in view of the 
principle  of  Collective  Responsibility. 	In  other  words,  i	f  such  views  are 	
endorsed not only in the statements made 	by an individual Minister, but 	
are also reflective of the Government’s stance, 	such statements may be 	
attributed  vicariously  to  the  Government.  However,  if  such  statements 
are stray opinions of an individual Minister and are not consistent with 
the  views  o	f  the  Government,  then  they  shall  be  attributable  to  the 	
Minister personally	 and not to the Government	.  	
Therefore, Question No. 4 is answered as follows: 	 	
“A statement made by a Minister if traceable to any affairs of the 
State  or  for  protecting  the 	Government,  can  be  attributed 	
vicariously  to  the  Government  by  invoking  the  principle  of 
collective responsibility, so long as such statement represents the 
view of the Government also. If such a statement is not consistent 
with  the  view  of  the  Government,	 then  it  is  attributable  to  the 	
Minister personally.”	 	
Re:  Question  No.  5: 	Whether  a  statement  by  a  Minister, 	
inconsistent  with  the  rights  of  a  citizen  under  Part  Three  of  the 
Constitution, constitutes a violation of such constitutional rights 
and is action	able as ‘Constitutional Tort’?	 	
 
46. While  public  law  and  private  law  are  in  theory,  treated  as 	
analytically different, in practice, the divide between the two spheres is 
often blurred. As a result, ideas, concepts and devices from one sphere, 
influence the other. Such an intermingling has gi	ven rise to the doctrine 	
of horizontal effects as discussed hereinabove, wherein a constitutional

108	 	
 
directive or norm	 (Fundamental Right)	 is interpreted by Courts to apply 	
between individuals. 	 	
 
47. 	Another  concept  which  can  be  traced  to  the  interaction  betw	een 	
public  law  and  private  law  is  that  of  a  Constitutional  tort,  which  in 
essence attributes vicarious liability on the State for acts and omissions 
of  its  agents  which  result  in  violation  of  fundamental  rights  of  an 
individual  or  group. 	 A  constitutional 	tort  is  a  violation  of  one’s 	
constitutional  rights,  particularly  fundamental  rights,  by  an  agent  of 
the  government,  acting  in 	his/her 	official  capacity.  The  alleged 	
constitutional  violation  creates  a  cause  of  action  that  is  distinct  from 
any  other  availabl	e  state	 tort	 remedy.  It  however,  carries  with  it,  the 	
essential  element  of  tort  law,  which  seeks  to  redress  a  harm  or  injury 
by awarding monetary compensation by a competent court of law.	 	
 
Writ Petition: Principles of Procedure	  	
48. 	Normally 	the 	filing	 of  a  writ  petition  invoking  Article  32  of  the 	
Constitution  before  the  Supreme  Court  or  Article  226  before  the  High 
Court is 	resort	ed	 to 	seeking 	an extraordinary remedy.  The prerogative 	
powers  of  the  High  Court  are  not  exercised  for  enforcement  of  private 
rights  of  the  parties  but  are  for  the  purpose  of  ensuring  that  public 
authorities act within the limits of law. Writ remedy is 	thus 	not 	a 	privat	e 	
law remedy	 except w	rit of habeas corpus	. Thus, writ petition would lie 	
against  the  State  including  local  authorities  and  other  authorities  as 
defined  under  Article  12  of  the  Constitution  which  is  an  inclusive

109	 	
 
definition  which  takes  within  its  scope  and  a	mbit  all  statutory  bodies 	
instrumentalities and authorities or persons charged with, or expected 
to exercise, public functions or discharge public duties.  A writ petition 
may  be  instituted  for  the  enforcement  of  any  fundamental  rights 
guaranteed  by  Part  I	II  of  the  Constitution  under  Article  32  before  the 	
Supreme  Court  but  under  Article  226  of  the  Constitution,  the 
jurisdiction  of  the  High  Courts  is  wider  than  the  jurisdiction  of  the 
Supreme  Court  inasmuch  as  the  said  Article  may  be  invoked  for 
enforcement 	of fundamental rights as also “	for any other purpose	”.  	 	
 
Tortious liability:	  	
49	. 	 In India, th	e government can be held liable for tortious acts of its 	
servants  and  can  be  ordered  to  be  paid  compensation  to  the  persons 
suffering 	as a result of the 	legal wrong. Article 294(b) of the Constitution 	
declares  that  the  liability  of  the  Union  Government  or 	the  State 	
Government  may  arise 	“out  of  any  contract  or  other	wise	”.    The  word 	
otherwise	 implies  that  the  said  liability  may  arise  for  tortious  acts  as 	
well.   Article 300 enables institution of appropriate proceedings against 
the government for enforcing su	ch liability. 	 	
 
50. 	Even prior to the commencement of the Constitution, the liability 	
of  the  Government  for  tortious  acts  of  its  servants  or  agents  were 
recognised 	vide	 Peninsular  &  Oriental  Steam  Navigation  Co.  vs. 	
Secy. Of State, (1868	-69) 5 Bom HCR APP 	1. After the commencement 	
of  the  Constitution,  there  have  been  several  cases  in  which  the  Union

110	 	
 
of India and State Governments were held liable for tortious acts of their 
employees, servants and agents. All those cases were not necessarily by 
invoking  the  writ  jurisdiction  of  the  Supreme  Court  and  the  High 
Courts.  Though, the Government is liable fo	r tortious acts of its officers, 	
servants or employees, 	normally	, such liability cannot be enforced by a 	
Writ Court	.  An aggrieved party has the right to approach the competent 	
court or authority to seek damages or compensation in accordance with 
the law o	f the land. 	 	
 
51.  But  i	f  fundamental  rights  have  been  violated,  and  if  the  court  is 	
satisfied that the grievance of the petitioner is well founded, it may grant 
the relief by enforcing a person’s fundamental right. Such relief may be 
in  the  form  of  moneta	ry  compensation/damages.  Instances  of  such 	
cases  are 	Rudul    Sah  vs.  State  of  Bihar,  (1983)  4  SCC  141; 	
Sebastian M. Hongray vs. Union of India, (1984) 3   SCC 82; Bhim 
Singh  vs.  State  of  J&K,  (1985)  4  SCC  677;  People’s  Union  for 
Democratic  Rights  vs.  Police 	Commissioner,  (1989)  4  SCC  730; 	
Saheli  v	s.  Commissioner  of  Police,  (1990)  1  SCC  422;  State  of 	
Maharashtra vs. Ravikant S. Patil, (1991) 2 SCC 373; Kumari v	s. 	
State of Tamil Nadu, (1992) 2 SCC 223; Shakuntala Devi vs. Delhi 
Electric  Supply  Undertaking,  (1995)  2  SCC  369;  Tamil  Nadu 
Electricity Board vs. Sumanth, (2000) 4 SCC 543; Railway Board 
vs. Chandrima Das, (2000) 2 SCC 465.

111	 	
 
52.  	Article  21  has  played  a 	significant  role  in  shaping  the  law  on 	
tortious  liability  of  the  Government.  This  Court  has  asserted  that  the 
concept of sovereign function, which acts as an exception to attracting 
tortious liability, ends where Article 21 begins. Therefore, this Court ha	s 	
been  willing  to  defend  life  and  liberty  of  persons  against  state 
lawlessness  by  holding  that  where  Article  21  is  violated,  the  State  has 
to  pay  compensation  and  the  concept  of  sovereign  function  does  not 
prevail in this area.	  	
         	 	
53. 	This  proposition  may  be  specifically  traced  to  early  PILs,  which 	
began  in  India  in  the  1980s, 	primarily  in  cases  where  officials  of  the 	
State,  such  as  prison  officials  had  mistreated  prisoners. 	The  focus  of 	
the  first  phase  of  PIL  in  India  was  on  exposure  o	f 	repression  by  the 	
agencies  of  the  state,  notably  the  police,  prison,  and  other  custodial 
authorities. These early PILs were essentially Constitutional tort actions 
which  concerned  allegations  of  violation  of  protected  fundamental 
rights,  as  a  result  of  a	cts  or  omissions  on  the  part  of  officials  of  the 	
State. Therefore, Constitutional law and tort law came to be merged by 
this  Court  under  the  rubric  of  PIL,  and  this  Court  began  allowing 
successful  petitioners  to  recover  monetary  damages  from  the  State  for 
infraction  of  their  fundamental  rights. 	 In  such  cases,  there  may  have 	
been  statutory  rights  of  persons  also  which  would  then  be  an 
enunciation  of  an  aspect  of  Fundamental  Rights  particularly  under 
Article 21 of the Constitution.

112	 	
 
54. 	In 	Rudul  Sah  vs.  State	 of  Bihar	, 	(1983)  4  SCC  141	,  Y.V. 	
Chandrachud,  CJ.,  gave  further  momentum  to  fundamental  rights  to 
combat state lawlessness 	by granting cash compensation to a victim of 	
unlawful  incarceration  for  fourteen  years.  It  is  to  be  noticed  that  His 
Lordship, in th	e said case, took note of the dilemma in allowing a litigant 	
to  seek  damages  in  a  writ  petition/PIL  action  against  the  State.  His 
Lordship  noted  that  this  could  have  the  effect  of  ordinary  civil  action 
being circumvented on a routine basis, by invoking wri	t jurisdiction of 	
the  High  Courts  and  the  Supreme  Court  as  an  alternative  to  ordinary 
civil  action.  However,  it  was  recognized  that  granting  such  remedies 
would enhance the legitimacy of the vehicle of PIL. Therefore, this Court 
in 	Rudul Sah	 ultimately chose to grant monetary damages, in order to 	
‘mulct’  the  violators,  as  well  as  to  offer  a 	‘palliative’  for  victims. 	
Subsequent to the decision in 	Rudul Sah	, compensatory relief has been 	
granted 	as  a  means  to  ‘civilize  public  power’	 in  several  c	ases  involving 	
abrogation  of  Fundamental  Rights,  [	See  for  instance, 	Sabastian  M. 	
Hongray vs. Union of India	, A.I.R. 1984 SC 1026	; Bhim Singh, MLA 	
vs. State of Jammu and Kashmir	, A.I.R. 1986 SC 494	.] 	 	
 
55. 	In	 Nilabati Behera vs. State of Orissa, (1993) 2 SCC 746, 	this 	
Court observed that the award of compensation in a proceeding under 
Article  32  or  Article  226  of  the  Constitution  is  a  remedy  available  in 
public  law  based  on  strict  liability  for  contravention  o	f  fundamental 	
rights.  In  respect  of  such  actions,  the  doctrine  of  sovereign  immunity

113	 	
 
does not apply, though it may be available as a defence in a private law 
in an action based on tort. Drawing a distinction between proceedings 
under  the  private  and  public	 law,  it  was  observed  that  a  public  law 	
proceeding may serve a different purpose than a private law proceeding. 
Public  law  proceedings  are  based  on  the  concept  of  strict  liability  for 
contravention of guarantee basic and indivisible rights of the citizens 	by 	
the State. The purpose of public law is not only to civilise governmental 
power  and  but  also  to  assure  the  citizens  that  they  live  under  a  legal 
system  which  gains  to  protect  their  interest  and  preserve  their  rights. 
Therefore, when the court moulds the	 relief by granting compensation, 	
in  proceedings  under  Article  32  and  Article  226  of  the  Constitution 
seeking  enforcement  or  protection  of  fundamental  rights,  it  does  so 
under public law by way of employing elements of the law of torts and 
fixing the liabi	lity on the State which has	 been negligent and has 	failed 	
in its public duty to protect the fundamental rights of the citizens. The 
payment of compensation under such cases is not to be understood as 
it  is  generally  understood  in  a  civil  action  for  damages	 under  private 	
law,  but  in  the  broader  sense  of  providing  relief  by  ordering  monetary 
amounts  to  be  paid  for  the  wrong  done  due  to  breach  of  public  duty 
which  would  have  the  effect  of  violation  of  fundamental  rights  of 
citizens.  Such grant of damages in e	xercise of a writ jurisdiction by the 	
constitutional  courts  is  independent  of  the  rights  available  to  the 
aggrieved  party  to  claim  compensation  under  private  law  in  an  action 
based on tort. Therefore, a suit may be instituted in a competent court

114	 	
 
of law or	 proceedings may be initiated to prosecute the offender under 	
the penal law. 	 	
 
56. 	Though,  in 	D.K.Basu  v	s.  State  of  West  Bengal,  (1997)  1  SCC 	
416 	monetary  compensation  was  granted,  in 	Hindustan  Paper 	
Corporation Ltd. v	s. Ananta Bhattacharjee, (2004) 6 	SCC 213	 this 	
Court cautioned that 	a direction to pay compensation under Article 226 	
of the Constitution is permissible as a public law remedy and resorted 
to  only  when  there  is  a  violation  by  the  State  or  its  agents  acting  in 
official capacity of the funda	mental right guaranteed by Article 21 of the 	
Constitution,  and not  otherwise.   It was further observed that it is not 
every  violation of the provisions of the Constitution or a statute which 
would  enable  the  court  to  direct  grant  of  compensation.  The  power	 of 	
the  court  to  grant  compensation  in  public  law  is  limited.    Therefore, 
normally  in  case  of  tortious  liability,  the  person  aggrieved  has  to 
approach  a  civil  court  for  ventilating  his  grievances  and  he  cannot 
invoke  the  writ  jurisdiction  of  the  Supreme  Co	urt  or  a  High  Court.  	
However, if the duty breached is of a public nature or there is violation 
or breach or infringement of a fundamental right by an act or omission 
on the part of the authority, it is open to the party who has suffered  a 
“legal wrong” to	 invoke the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court or a High 	
Court by instituting the writ petition. In that case, the court, in exercise 
of  its  extraordinary  jurisdiction 	and  discretion  judiciously 	may  grant 	
relief  to  the  person  wronged  without  relegating  him 	to  avail  a  remedy,

115	 	
 
otherwise available to him under private law having regard to the facts 
and circumstances of the	 particular	 case.	 	
 
57. 	In 	Chairman,  Railway  Board  vs.  Chandrima  Das	, 	(2000)  2 	
SCC 465	, this Court was presented with an appeal against an 	order of 	
the  Calcutta  High  Court  in  a  writ  petition  filed  by  a  civil  rights  lawyer 
on  behalf  of  a  foreign  national	-victim  of  rape,  allegedly  committed  by 	
railway  employees  at  a  government	-owned  railway  station.  The  events 	
in  question  happened  when  the  empl	oyees  were  off  duty,  but  were 	
present  at  the  premises  owned  and  operated  by  the  Government	 	
(Railways) 	. The writ petition was filed against the employer, in addition 	
to  initiating  criminal  proceedings  against  the  individuals.  A  specific 
prayer was made in 	the writ petition for monetary compensation for the 	
victim,  payable  by  the  Government,  alleging  that  its  failure  to  protect 
the victim and prevent the crime, had violated the victim’s fundamental 
right. The High Court awarded a sum of Rs. 10 Lakhs as compe	nsation 	
to  the  victim  of  rape,  as  it  was  of  the  opinion  that 	the 	offence  was 	
committed  at  the  building  (Rail  Yatri  Niwas)  belonging  to  the  Railways 
and  was  perpetrated  by  the  Railway  employees.  An  appeal  against  the 
said judgment was preferred before this 	Court. 	 	
 
58.  	This  Court  dismissed  the  appeal  holding  that  where  public 	
functionaries  are  involved  and  the  matter  relates  to  violation  of 
Fundamental  Rights,  or  the  enforcement  of  public  duties,  the  remedy 
would be available under public law, notwithstanding that a suit	 could

116	 	
 
be  filed  under  private  law,  for  damages.  Since  the  crime  of  rape 
amounted  to  a  violation  of  the  victim’s  right  to  life  under  Article  21  of 
the  Constitution,  this  Court  concluded  that  a  public  law  remedy  was 
wholly appropriate. 	 	
 
59	.  	The decisions i	n 	Rudul Sah	 and 	Chandrima Das	 establish that 	
a  public  law  action  seeking  monetary  compensation  for  violation  of 
fundamental  rights  was  no  longer  an  action  in  lieu  of  a  private  law 
claim,  but  was  to  serve  an  independent  and  more  important  purpose. 
However,  it  cannot  be  ignored  that  the	 decisions  of  Courts  to  award 	
compensation in such cases, proceed on the basis of lower evidentiary 
standards, as noted by this Court in 	Kumari vs. State of Tamil Nadu	, 	
(1992) 2 SCC 223	.  	
 
60.  	In 	Tamil  Nadu  Electricity  Board  vs.  Sumathi  Das	, 	(2000)  4 	
SCC 	543	,  this  Court  held  that  exercise  of  writ  jurisdiction  would  be 	
inappropriate where there were disputed questions of fact that required 
proof through substantial evidence. However, it has been clarified that 
the  restriction  applied  only  to  the  higher  judi	ciary’s  writ  jurisdiction 	
under  Articles  32  and  226,  and  that  it  did  not  restrain  this  Court’s 
power to address the matter under Article 142, which allows this Court 
to pass any order ‘necessary for doing complete justice in any cause or 
matter.’ 	 	
Therefor	e,  this  Court  has  recognised  that  factual  disputes  could 	
operate  as  a  limit  on  the  Courts’  ability  to  treat  a  matter  as  being

117	 	
 
actionable  as  a  Constitutional  tort	 but  has  nevertheless  awarded 	
monetary  compensation  in  certain  cases 	possibly	 having  regard  to 	the 	
glaring facts of those cases by exercising power under Article 142 of the 
Constitution	.  	
 	
61.   	Scholarly  views  suggest  that  the  concept  of 	Constitutional  tort 	
challenges  the  ability  of  law  to  deter  socially  harmful  behaviour  of 
different kinds, by forcing the perpetrator to internalise the costs of their 
actions.  However,  in  case  of  a  Constitutional  tort  action,  the  entity 
saddled with the cos	t, is not the same as the entity who is to be deterred. 	
This absurdity is stated to be threatening to the corrective justice idea 
that tort law embodies. In other words, 	an	 actor’s direct ability to alter 	
the  injury	-causing  behaviour  is  critical  to  the  fou	ndation  of  tort  law. 	
However, given that an action of Constitutional tort imposes the burden 
of  damages  on  an  entity,  other  than  the  violator  of  the  right,  a  doubt 
has  been  cast  on  its  effectiveness  in  serving  as  a  vehicle  of  corrective 
justice. 	 	
 
62.  	In 	light  of  the  aforesaid  discussion,  it  is  observed  that  it  is  not 	
prudent  to  treat  all  cases  where  a  statement  made  by  a  public 
functionary  resulting  in  harm  or  loss  to  a  person/citizen,  as  a 
constitutional  tort.  Regard  must  be  had  in  every  case  to  the  natu	re  of 	
resultant  harm  or  loss.  Further,  it  is  to  be  noted  that  even  the  cases 
cited  hereinabove  have  permitted  treating  an  act  or  omission  as  a 
constitutional  tort  only  where  there  has  been  an  infraction  of

118	 	
 
fundamental right as a direct result of such act o	r omission. Therefore 	
the  causal  connection  between  the  act  or  omission  and  the  resultant 
infraction  of  fundamental  rights,  is  central  to  any  determination  of  an 
action of constitutional tort. 	 	
 
63.  	In 	Delhi  Jal  Board  v	s.  National  Campaign  for  Dignity  & 	
Rights of Sewerage & Allied Workers	, (2011) 8 SCC 568	, this Court 	
refused  to  entertain 	a    matter 	 against  an  interim  order  passed  by  the 	
Delhi  High  Court  in  a  writ  petition,  whereby  the  Petitioner  Board  had 
been  directed  to  deposit  compensation  in  favour  of  the  family  of  a 
sewerage worker who had died while performing his duties. Dismissing 
the 	case	, 	this  Court  held  that  since  the  deceased  had  died  due  to 	
insensitivity on the part of the State apparatus, to the safety and well	-	
being of its employees, the State would be liable to pay compensation to 
the  family  of  the  deceased.  This  Court  invoked  Article	 142  of  the 	
Constitution to enhance the amount of compensation payable. 	 	
 
64.  	At this juncture, it may be apposite to sound a word of caution 	
as  regards  the  approach  of  the  Courts  in  granting  monetary 
compensation as a means for vindication of fundamental rights. It is to 
be noted that in the absence of a 	clear, cogent and comprehen	sive legal 	
framework 	based on judicial precedent, 	which would clarify what harm 	
or  injury  is  actionable  as  a  constitutional  tort,  such  a  device  is  to  be 
resorted  to  only  in  cases  where  there  are  brutal  violations  of 
fundamental rights, such as the violations that were involved in 	Rudul

119	 	
 
Sah	 and 	Chandrima  D	as	.  This  Court  has  acknowledged  such  a  view 	
in 	Sebastian  M.  Hongray	,  by  noting  that  compensation  was  being 	
awarded in the said case having regard to “	torture, the agony  and the  	
mental oppression” which the family of the victim therein had to endure 
due  h	is  death  by  an  encounter.  Similarly,  this  Court,  in 	Bhim  Singh	 	
stated that the compensation was awarded by taking note of the “bizzare 
acts”  of  police  lawlessness.  As  already  highlighted,  compensation  was 
awarded  in 	Delhi  Jal  Board	,  by  exercising  power  und	er  Article  142. 	
Thus, the remedy provided is on a case to case basis on an evolution of 
the concept of constitutional tort through judicial dicta. 	 	
 
65.  	While  it  is  true  that  the  Courts  must  mould  their  tools  to  deal 	
with particularly 	extreme	 and threatening situations, and the device of 	
a ‘constitutional tort’ has evolved through such an exercise, it must be 
borne in mind that the tool of treating an acti	on as a constitutional tort 	
must  not  be	 wielded  only  in 	instances  wherein  state  lawlessness  and 	
indifference  to  the  right  to  life  and  personal  liberties  have  caused 
immense  suffering.	  	The  law  would  have  to  evolve 	in  this  regard, 	in 	
respect of violation of	 other Fundamental 	Rights	 apart from issuance of 	
the prerogative writs	.  	
 
66. 	Therefore,  it  is  observed  that 	presently 	invocation 	of 	writ 	
jurisdiction  to  grant  damages,  by  treating  acts  and  omissions  of 
agencies  of  the  State  as  Constitutional  torts,  must  be  an  exception

120	 	
 
rather  than  a  rule. 	The  remedy  before  a  competent  court  or  under 	
criminal law is, in any case available as per the exi	sting legal framework.	 	
 	In light of the aforesaid discussion, Question No. 5 is answered as 	
follows: 	 	
“A  proper  legal  framework  is  necessary  to  define  the  acts  or 
omissions  which  would  amount  to  constitutional  tort  and  the 
manner  in  which  the  same  would  be	 redressed  or  remedied  on 	
the basis of judicial precedent. Particularly, it is not prudent to 
treat all cases where a statement made by a public functionary 
resulting in harm or loss to a person/citizen, as a constitutional 
tort, except in the context of t	he answer given to Question No. 4 	
above.” 	 	
67.  	In light of the above discussion	 as well as the answers given to the 	
questions referred	, the following other conclusions are drawn	: 	
a)	 	It  is for the Parliament in its wisdom to enact a legislation or code 
to 	restrain	, 	citizens  in  general  and  public  functionaries	, 	in 	
particular	, from  making  disparaging	 or  vitriolic 	remarks  against 	
fellow citizens	, having regard to	 the strict parameters of 	Article 19(2) 	
and  bearing  in  mind  the  freedom  under  Article  19(1)  (a) 	of 	the 	
Constitution  of  India	.  Hence, 	I  am 	not  inclined  to  issue  any 	
guideline  in  this  regard, 	but  the  observations  made 	herein	above 	
may be borne in mind	.  	
b)	 	It  is 	also 	for the respective political parties to regulate and control 	
the actions and speech of its 	functionaries	 and members	. This could 	
be through enactment of 	a 	Code of 	Conduct which would prescribe

121	 	
 	
the  limits  of  permissible  speech  by 	functionaries  and 	members  of 	
the respective political parties.	 	
c)	 	Any citizen, who is prejudiced by any 	form of 	attack	, as a result of 	
spe	ech/expression	 through any medium,	 targeted against her/him	 	
or by speech which constitutes ‘hate speech’ or any species thereof, 
whether  such  attack 	or  speech 	is  by 	a  public  functionary  or 	
otherwise, may approach the Court of Law 	under Criminal and Civil 	
statutes and seek appropriate remedies. Whenever permissible, 	civil 	
remedies in the nature of declaratory remedies, injunctions as well 
as  pecuniary  damages 	may	 be  awarded  as  prescribed  under  the 	
relevant statutes.	  	
 	
However,  answers  given  to  Question  Nos.  4  and  5  may  have  a 	
bearing  in  the  context  of 	collective  responsibility  of  government  and 	
Constitutional tort. 	 	
Writ Petition (Crl.) No.113 of 2016 	and Special Leave Petition	 (Civil)	 	
bearing  Diary  No.34629  of  2017  are	 directed  to  be 	listed 	before  an 	
appropriate  Bench  after  seeking  orders  of  Hon’ble  the  Chief  Justice  of 
India. 	 	
     	
                                                                             	
…………..….………J. 	 	
B.V. NAGARATHNA 	 	
 
NEW DELHI,	 	
03	 JANUARY, 2023.