REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION  CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1439 OF 2009 BOBY       ...APPELLANT(S) VERSUS STATE OF KERALA    ...RESPONDENT(S) J U D G M E N T B.R. GAVAI, J. 1. This appeal challenges the judgement and order dated 25 th August 2008, passed by the learned Division Bench of the High Court   of   Kerala   at   Ernakulam   (hereinafter   referred   to   as   “the High Court”) in Criminal Appeal Nos. 326, 230 and 847 of 2005 thereby   dismissing   the   appeals   filed   by   Shibu   @   Shibu   Singh (accused   No.   1)   and   Boby   (accused   No.   3/appellant   herein), thereby   upholding   the   judgment   of   conviction   and   sentence dated   18 th   December   2004,   passed   by   the   Additional   Sessions 1 Judge,   Fast   Track   Court–II   (Ad­hoc   Court),   Thrissur (hereinafter referred to as “the trial court”) in Sessions Case No. 208   of   2003   in   respect   of   the   said   accused   persons.   Vide   the same   impugned   judgment,   the   High   Court,   however,   allowed the   appeal   filed   by   Biju   @   Babi   (accused   No.   2)   and   acquitted him from all the offences charged with. 2. Shorn   of   details,   the   facts   leading   to   the   present   appeal are as under: 2.1 On   21 st   November,   2000,   Leela   w/o   Vishwanathan (Complainant/PW­1)   made   a   statement   before   the   Police Station,   Anthikkadu,   Dist.   Thrissur,   wherein   she   alleged   that Shibu   @   Shibu   Singh   (accused   No.   1),   the   younger   brother   of her husband, Vishwanathan (deceased), was a convict who was then   undergoing   imprisonment   as   he   was   involved   in   many theft   cases   wherein   stolen   articles   from   the   said   thefts   were disposed of by her husband.  2.2 It is the case of the complainant that Shibu @ Shibu Singh (accused   No.   1)   had   escaped   from   the   prison   and   was absconding.   Due   to   the   fear   that   Vishwanathan   (deceased) 2 would disclose to the police about his escape from jail, Shibu @ Shibu Singh (accused No. 1) along with other accused persons, namely,  accused  No.  2  to   accused  No.  7  came  in   a  jeep  to   the house of Vishwanathan (deceased) on 20.11.2000 at 08.00 p.m. The   accused   persons   then   held   Vishwanathan   (deceased)   at knife   point,   forcefully   poured   liquor   into   his   mouth   and compelled him to drink till he was left unconscious. When Leela (Complainant/PW­1)   tried   to   interfere,   she   sustained   injuries on   her   palm   due   to   the   knife   carried   by   the   accused   persons with   which   they   attempted   to   inflict   blows   on   her.   Thereafter, Leela   (Complainant/PW­1)   along   with   her   husband   were blindfolded   and   taken   in   a   jeep.   After   covering   a   distance   of about   30   kms.,   the   Complainant/PW­1   was   dropped   at Poomala,   which   was   her   native   place.   When   she   managed   to reach her house with the help of a local named Baiju from the said   village,   she   informed   her   brother   Babu   (P.W.6)   about   the aforesaid   incident,   who   attempted   to   search   for   Vishwanathan (deceased)   during   the   said   night.   Next   day,   i.e.,   on   21 st November   2000,   Leela   (Complainant/PW­1)   along   with   Babu 3 (PW­6)   lodged   her   statement   (Ext.   P­1)   at   the   Police   Station Anthikkadu,   Dist.   Thrissur.   Based   on   the   contents   of   the aforesaid  complaint,   a  First   Information   Report   (Ext.  P­19)  (for short,   “FIR”)   came   to   be   registered   against   the   aforementioned accused   persons   along   with   other   unknown   persons   for offences   punishable   under   Section   395   and   365   of   the   Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as “IPC”).  2.3   Boby (accused No. 3/appellant herein) was arrested by the Police   on   25 th   November   2000.   Based   on   his   disclosure statement   (Ext.   P­23),   the   dead   body   of   Vishwanathan,   which was buried at Pattithara on the banks of river Bharathapuzha, was   recovered.   Additionally,   stolen   goods   were   also   recovered from the house of accused No. 3 and were marked as Ext. P­14. Shibu   @   Shibu   Singh   (accused   No.   1)   and   Biju   @   Babu (accused   No.   2)   were   arrested   on   28 th   November   2000   from   a lodge   at   Guruvayoor   by   the   Guruvayoor   Police.   Subsequently, they   were   handed   over   to   the   Anthikkadu   Police   on   2 nd December 2000. Based on the disclosure statement of Shibu @ Shibu   Singh   (accused   No.   1),   the   spade   with   which   the 4 deceased’s   burial   spot   was   dug   was   recovered   near   the   site where the body was exhumed from, concealed in a plastic bag. 2.4   At   the   conclusion   of   investigation,   a   charge­sheet   came   to be   filed   before   the   Judicial   Magistrate   First   Class,   Court–II, Thrissur,   who   committed   the   case   to   the   Sessions   Court, Thrissur for trial.  2.5   Charges   came   to   be   framed   by   the   trial   court   for   the offences   punishable   under   Sections   395,   364,   365,   380   and 302 read with Section 34 of the IPC. 2.6   All   the   accused   persons   pleaded   not   guilty   and  claimed  to be tried. The prosecution examined 33 witnesses to bring home the   guilt   of   the   accused   persons.   The   prosecution   also   placed on record 14 Material Objects which were marked as M.O. 1 to M.O.   14.   During   the   cross­examination   from   the   defence   side, Sekharan   (DW­1),   father   of   the   deceased   was   examined.   The accused   persons   were   questioned   under   Section   313   of   the Criminal   Procedure   Code,   1973   (for   short,   “the   Cr.P.C.”) wherein   they   denied   the   circumstances   that   appeared   against them in evidence which were put to them. At the conclusion of 5 trial,   the   learned   trial   court   found   Shibu   @   Shibu   Singh (accused   No.   1),   Biju   @   Babu   (accused   No.   2)   and   Boby (accused No. 3/appellant herein) guilty of the offences charged with   and   accordingly   sentenced   them   to   undergo   life imprisonment   for   the   offence   punishable   under   Section   302 read with  Section  34  IPC.   It further  directed them   to  undergo rigorous   imprisonment   for   different   periods   for   the   offences punishable under Sections 364, 395, and 201 read with Section 34 of the IPC. The sentences were directed to run concurrently.  2.7  Being aggrieved thereby, accused Nos. 1 to 3 preferred their respective   appeals   before   the   High   Court.   The   High   Court,   by the   impugned   judgement,   dismissed   the   appeals   preferred   by Shibu   @   Shibu   Singh   (accused   No.   1)   and   Boby   (accused   No. 3/appellant   herein),   but   was   pleased   to   allow   the   appeal preferred by Biju @ Babu (accused No. 2), thereby setting aside the   judgment   of   conviction   and   sentence   of   the   trial   court insofar as Biju @ Babu (accused No. 2) was concerned.  3. Being aggrieved thereby, the present appeal. 6 4. We   have   heard   Shri   R.   Basant,   learned   Senior   Counsel appearing   on   behalf   of   the   appellant–Boby   and   Shri   K.N. Balgopal,   learned   Senior   Counsel   appearing   on   behalf   of   the respondent–State of Kerala. 5. Shri   Basant,   learned   Senior   Counsel   would   submit   that both the trial court and the High Court have erred in convicting and sentencing the appellant–Boby for the offences punishable under Sections 395, 365, 364, 201, 380, 302 and 302 read with Section   34   of   the   IPC.   He   submitted   that   the   prosecution   has failed   to   prove   its   case   against   the   appellant–Boby   beyond reasonable doubt and that there are glaring lacunae in the case of   the   prosecution.   It   is   submitted   that   even   the   High   Court found   that   there   were   discrepancies   in   the   statements   of   the prosecution witnesses who were examined during the trial. It is further submitted that the High Court also observed the glaring discrepancies   in   the   statement   of   the   Complainant/PW­1   with regard   to   Biju   @   Babu   (accused   No.   2)   on   the   basis   of   which, the   High   Court   acquitted   the   said   accused   Biju   @   Babu (accused No. 2) of all the charges levelled against him. 7 6. Shri Basant submitted that a Memorandum under Section 27 of  the  Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (hereinafter  referred to  as “the  Evidence  Act”) is required  in  cases of  recovery   initiated  at the   instance   of   an   accused   person,   based   on   the   statements made   before   the   Police.   It   is   submitted   that,   on   perusal   of evidence   on   record   in   the   instant   matter,   neither   such Memorandum   under   Section   27   of   the   Evidence   Act   was prepared   at   the   time   of   the   recovery   of   the   body   of   deceased Vishwanathan,   nor   were   signatures   of   independent   or   panch witnesses   taken   at   the   time   of   said   recovery.   It   is   further submitted   that   it   was   the   duty   of   the   Investigating   Officer   (for short, ‘IO’) to have prepared the said Memorandum while acting on   the   information   obtained   from   Boby   (appellant   herein)   and that   such   inaction   on   part   of   the   IO   would   vitiate   the prosecution case, at least insofar as proving the recovery of the dead body of the deceased is concerned.   7. Shri Basant submitted that the trial court solely relied on the   last  seen  theory  and  held  that  the  prosecution   had  proved the   same   with   regard   to   the   chain   of   circumstances   in   this 8 case.   It   is   further   submitted   that   conviction   of   an   accused person cannot be sustained only on the basis of proving the last seen   theory   as   the   same   was   required   to   be   corroborated   with the statements of the witnesses that are examined during  trial along with other evidence placed on record. While pointing out the   discrepancies   in   the   statements   of   prosecution   witnesses, which   were   relied   upon   by   the   courts   below,   it   was   submitted that   the   conviction   of   the   appellant   herein   could   not   be sustained on the said ground alone. 8. Shri   Balgopal,   on   the   contrary,   submits   that   the   courts below   have   concurrently   found   the   accused   persons   guilty   of the   offences   charged   with.   The   prosecution   has   proved   the incriminating   circumstances   beyond   reasonable   doubt.     It   has also proved the chain of circumstances which leads to no other conclusion   than   the   guilt   of   the   accused.   He   relies   on   the judgment  of this Court in the case of   Suresh  Chandra  Bahri v. State of Bihar 1 . 1 1995 Supp. (1) SCC 80 9 9. Undisputedly,   the   present   case   rests   entirely   on circumstantial evidence.  A three­Judges Bench of this Court in the   case   of   Sharad   Birdhichand   Sarda   v.   State   of Maharashtra 2 , has laid down the golden principles with regard to   conviction   in   a   case   which   rests   entirely   on   circumstantial evidence.   We  may  gainfully  refer   to  the  following  observations of this Court in the said case: “ 153.   A   close   analysis   of   this   decision   would   show that the following conditions must be fulfilled before a   case   against   an   accused   can   be   said   to   be   fully established: ( 1 )   the   circumstances   from   which   the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. It may be noted here that this Court indicated that the circumstances concerned “must or should” and not   “may   be”   established.   There   is   not   only   a grammatical but a legal distinction between “may be proved”   and   “must   be   or   should   be   proved”   as   was held   by   this   Court   in   Shivaji   Sahabrao Bobade   v.   State of Maharashtra   [(1973) 2 SCC 793 : 1973 SCC (Cri) 1033 : 1973 Crl LJ 1783] where the observations were made: [SCC para 19, p. 807: SCC (Cri) p. 1047] “Certainly,   it   is   a   primary   principle   that the   accused   must   be   and   not merely   may   be   guilty   before   a   court   can convict   and   the   mental   distance   between ‘may be’ and ‘must be’ is long and divides 2 (1984) 4 SCC 116 10 vague   conjectures   from   sure conclusions.” ( 2 )   the   facts   so   established   should   be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt   of   the   accused,   that   is   to   say,   they should   not   be   explainable   on   any   other hypothesis   except   that   the   accused   is guilty, ( 3 )   the   circumstances   should   be   of   a conclusive nature and tendency, ( 4 )   they   should   exclude   every   possible hypothesis   except   the   one   to   be   proved, and ( 5 )   there   must   be   a   chain   of   evidence   so complete   as   not   to   leave   any   reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the   innocence   of   the   accused   and   must show   that   in   all   human   probability   the act   must   have   been   done   by   the accused.” 10. It   can   thus   clearly   be   seen   that   it   is   necessary   for   the prosecution   that  the   circumstances   from   which  the   conclusion of   the   guilt   is   to   be   drawn   should   be   fully   established.     The Court holds that it is a primary principle that the accused ‘must be’ and not merely ‘may be’ guilty before a court can convict the accused.   It has been held that there is not only a grammatical but a legal distinction between ‘may be proved’ and “must be or should   be   proved”.     It   has   been   held   that   the   facts   so 11 established   should   be   consistent   only   with   the   guilt   of   the accused,  that   is  to   say,  they  should  not   be   explainable   on   any other   hypothesis   except   that   the   accused   is   guilty.     It   has further   been   held   that   the   circumstances   should   be   such   that they   exclude   every   possible   hypothesis   except   the   one   to   be proved.  It has been held that there must be a chain of evidence so   complete   as   not   to   leave   any   reasonable   ground   for   the conclusion   consistent   with   the   innocence   of   the   accused   and must   show   that   in   all   human   probabilities   the   act   must   have been done by the accused. 11. In the light of these guiding principles, we have to examine the present case.   12. The trial court has relied on the following circumstances: (i) Last seen together with the deceased; (ii) Recovery of the stolen material including jewellery from accused No.3­Boby; (iii) Recovery   of   spade   from   accused   No.   1­Shibu   @   Shibu Singh; (iv) Recovery   of   the   dead   body   at   the   instance   of   accused No. 3­Boby; 12 13. The   trial   court   had   convicted   accused   Nos.   1   to   3   upon finding   that   the   prosecution   had   proved   the   aforesaid circumstances   against   them.     In   appeal,   the   High   Court   found that the prosecution had failed to prove the case against Biju @ Babi (accused No. 2) and accordingly acquitted him. 14. The   learned   Division   Bench   of   the   High   Court,   though found that the prosecution had failed to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt insofar as accused No.2 was concerned, held that,   insofar   as   accused   Nos.   1   and   3   were   concerned,   the prosecution had proved the case beyond reasonable doubt.  15. It   could   thus   be   seen   that   the   trial   court   as   well   as   the High   Court   found   the   circumstance   of   the   accused   persons having   been   last   seen   in   the   company   of   the   deceased   on   the basis   of   the   evidence   of   PW­1,   as   the   main   incriminating circumstance.   The   High   Court   further   found   that,   insofar   as Boby (accused No.3/appellant herein) was concerned, there was an   additional   evidence   with   regard   to   the   recovery   of   the   dead body and ornaments.  Insofar as Shibu @ Shibu Singh (accused 13 No. 1) was concerned, the High Court found that the recovery of spade   which   was   used   to   dig   the   burial   site   where   the   dead body   was   concealed,   was   an   additional   circumstance   which proved the guilt of Shibu @ Shibu Singh (accused No. 1). 16. Insofar as last seen theory is concerned, it will be relevant to refer to the following observations of this Court in the case of State of U.P. v. Satish 3 : “ 22.   The last­seen theory comes into play where the time­gap   between   the   point   of   time   when   the accused   and   the   deceased   were   last   seen   alive   and when   the   deceased   is   found   dead   is   so   small   that possibility   of   any   person   other   than   the   accused being the author of the crime becomes impossible. It would   be   difficult   in   some   cases   to   positively establish   that   the   deceased   was   last   seen   with   the accused when there is a long  gap and possibility of other   persons   coming   in   between   exists.   In   the absence   of   any   other   positive   evidence   to   conclude that   the   accused   and   the   deceased   were   last   seen together,   it   would   be   hazardous   to   come   to   a conclusion of guilt in those cases. In this case there is   positive   evidence   that   the   deceased   and   the accused were seen together by witnesses PWs 3 and 5, in addition to the evidence of PW 2.” 17. It   could   thus   clearly   be   seen   that   the   last­seen   theory comes   into   play   where   the   time­gap   between   the   point   of   time 3 (2005) 3 SCC 114 14 when   the   accused   and   the   deceased   were   last   seen   alive   and when the deceased is found dead is so small that possibility of any   person   other   than   the   accused   being   the   author   of   the crime   becomes   impossible.   If   the   gap   between   the   time   of   last seen   and  the   deceased  found  dead  is   long,  then   the   possibility of other person coming in between cannot be ruled out. 18. In   the   present   case,   according   to   the   complainant/PW­1, the   deceased   was   taken   away   by   the   accused   persons   on   the night   of   20 th   November   2000   at   08.00   p.m.     Though,   it   is   the contention   of   the   appellant   that   he   was   taken   into   illegal custody   on   21 st   November,   2000   and   his   arrest   was   shown   on 25 th  November, 2000, we do not find it necessary to go into that aspect of the matter.   A perusal of the evidence of the IO would reveal   that,   on   25 th   November,   2000,   on   the   basis   of   secret information   that   Boby   (accused   No.3/appellant   herein)   was standing   at   Manaloor   Kadavu,   he   proceeded   to   that   place   and arrested him at 02.00 p.m.   He stated that, on the basis of his confession,   various   articles   were   seized   from   his   house.     He further stated that thereafter on the same day, the accused led 15 them   towards   the   place   in   Bharathapuzha   where   the   deceased was buried.  He stated that, after seeing the loose soil, the scene was guarded as it was an odd time.   He further stated that, on 26 th   November 2000, as led by accused No. 3, they reached the place   and   the   Tahasildar,   Ottapalam   prepared   the   inquest report. 19. It can thus clearly be seen that firstly, there is a gap of at least   five  days  from   the   date  on   which,  according   to   PW­1,  the deceased was taken away by the accused persons and the dead body was recovered.  However, the crucial question would be as to  whether  it can be held that  the  prosecution had established beyond reasonable doubt that the recovery of dead body was at the  instance of  Boby  (accused No. 3/appellant  herein). Only   in the   event   the   prosecution   establishes   that   the   recovery   of   the body   was   at   the   instance   of   Boby   (accused   No.   3/appellant herein), the relevancy of the gap of five days would come.  20. As   early   as   1946,   the   Privy   Council   had   considered   the provisions   of   Section   27   of   the   Evidence   Act   in   the   case   of 16 Pulukuri   Kotayya   and   Others   v.   King­Emperor 4 .     It   will   be relevant   to   refer   to   the   following   observations   of   the   Privy Council in the said case: “The   second   question,   which   involves   the construction of s. 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, will now   be   considered.   That   section   and   the   two preceding sections, with which it must be read, are in these terms. [His Lordship read ss. 25, 26 and 27 of   the   Evidence   Act   and   continued   :   ]   Section   27, which   is   not   artistically   worded,   provides   an exception   to   the   prohibition   imposed   by   the preceding   section,   and   enables   certain   statements made   by   a   person   in   police   custody   to   be   proved. The   condition   necessary   to   bring   the   section   into operation   is   that   the   discovery   of   a   fact   in consequence   of   information   received   from   a   person accused   of   any   offence   in   the   custody   of   a   police officer must be deposed to, and there upon so much of   the   information   as   relates   distinctly   to   the   fact thereby   discovered   may   be   proved.   The   section seems   to   be   based   on   the   view   that   if   a   fact   is actually   discovered   in   consequence   of   information given,   some   guarantee   is   afforded   thereby   that   the information was true, and accordingly can be safely allowed   to   be   given   in   evidence;   but   clearly   the extent   of   the   information   admissible   must   depend on  the  exact  nature  of  the  fact  discovered to  which such information is required to relate. Normally the section   is   brought   into   operation   when   a   person   in police   custody   produces   from   some   place   of concealment   some   object,   such   as   a   dead   body,   a weapon or ornaments, said to be connected with the crime of which the informant is accused. Mr. Megaw for   the   Crown,   has   argued   that   in   such   a   case   the 4 1946 SCC OnLine PC 47 17 “fact   discovered”   is   the   physical   object   produced, and that any information which relates distinctly to that object can be proved. On this view information given by a person that the body produced is that of a   person   murdered   by   him,   that   the   weapon produced is the one used by him in the commission of   a   murder,   or   that   the   ornaments   produced   were stolen   in   a   dacoity,   would   all   be   admissible.   If   this be the effect of s. 27, little substance would remain in   the   ban   imposed   by   the   two   preceding   sections on confessions made to the police, or by persons in police   custody.   That   ban   was   presumably   inspired by   the   fear   of   the   legislature   that   a   person   under police influence might be induced to confess by the exercise   of   undue   pressure.   But   if   all   that   is required   to   lift   the   ban   be   the   inclusion   in   the confession   of   information   relating   to   an   object subsequently   produced,   it   seems   reasonable   to suppose   that   the   persuasive   powers   of   the   police will prove equal to the occasion, and that in practice the ban will lose its effect.  On normal principles of construction   their   Lordships   think   that   the proviso   to   s.   26,   added   by   s.   27,   should   not   be held   to   nullify   the   substance   of   the   section.   In their Lordships' view it is fallacious to treat the “fact   discovered”   within   the   section   as equivalent   to   the   object   produced;   the   fact discovered   embraces   the   place   from   which   the object   is   produced   and   the   knowledge   of   the accused   as   to   this,   and   the   information   given must   relate   distinctly   to   this   fact.   Information as   to   past   user,   or   the   past   history,   of   the object produced is not related to its discovery in the setting in which it is discovered.  Information supplied by a person in custody that “I will produce a knife concealed in the roof of my house” does not lead   to   the   discovery   of   a   knife;   knives   were 18 discovered many years ago. It leads to the discovery of the fact that a knife is concealed in the house of the   informant   to   his   knowledge,   and   if   the   knife   is proved to have been used in the commission of the offence, the fact discovered is very relevant. But if to the   statement   the   words   be   added   “with   which   I stabbed A.”, these words are inadmissible since they do   not   relate   to   the   discovery   of   the   knife   in   the house of the informant.” [ Emphasis supplied ] 21. It could  thus  be seen  that Section  27  of the  Evidence  Act requires that the fact discovered embraces the place from which the  object  is produced and  the knowledge of the accused as to this, and the information given must relate distinctly to the said fact. The information as to past user, or the past history, of the object   produced   is   not   related   to   its   discovery.     The   said   view has   been   consistently   followed   by   this   Court   in   a   catena   of cases. 22. This   Court,   in   the   case   of   Chandran   v.   The   State   of Tamil   Nadu 5 ,   had   an   occasion   to   consider   the   evidence   of recovery of incriminating articles in the absence of record of the statement of accused No. 1. In the said case also, no statement of accused No. 1 was recorded under Section 27 of the Evidence 5 (1978) 4 SCC 90 19 Act leading to the recovery of jewels.   The Court found that the Sessions Judge as well as the High Court had erred in holding that the jewels were recovered at the instance of accused No. 1 therein   in   pursuance   to   the   confessional   statement   (Ex.   P­27) recorded before PW­34 therein.  It will be relevant to refer to the following observations of this Court in the said case: “ 36.   ……Thus the fact remains that no confessional statement   of   A­1   causing   the   recovery   of   these jewels   was   proved   under   Section   27,   Evidence Act…..” 23. It   is   thus   clear   that   this   Court   refused   to   rely   on   the recovery   of   jewels   since   no   confessional   statement   of   the accused was proved under Section 27 of the Evidence Act. 24. It will also be relevant to refer to the following observations of   this   Court   in   the   case   of   State   of   Karnataka   v.   David Rozario and Another 6 : “ 5.   ……This   information   which   is   otherwise admissible   becomes   inadmissible   under   Section   27 if the information did not come from a person in the custody of a police officer or did come from a person not in the custody of a police officer. The statement which   is   admissible   under   Section   27   is   the   one which is the information leading to discovery. Thus, 6 (2002) 7 SCC 728 20 what is admissible being the information, the same has   to   be   proved   and   not   the   opinion   formed   on   it by   the   police   officer.   In   other   words,   the   exact information   given   by   the   accused   while   in   custody which   led   to   recovery   of   the   articles   has   to   be proved.  It is, therefore, necessary for the benefit of   both   the   accused   and   the   prosecution   that information   given   should   be   recorded   and proved   and   if   not   so   recorded,   the   exact information must be adduced through evidence. The   basic   idea   embedded   in   Section   27   of   the Evidence   Act   is   the   doctrine   of   confirmation   by subsequent   events.   The   doctrine   is   founded   on the principle that if any fact is discovered as a search made on the strength of any information obtained from a prisoner, such a discovery is a guarantee that the information supplied by the prisoner   is   true.   The   information   might   be confessional or non­inculpatory in nature but if it   results   in   discovery   of   a   fact,   it   becomes   a reliable   information.   It   is   now   well   settled   that recovery   of   an   object   is   not   discovery   of   a   fact envisaged   in   the   section.   Decision   of   the   Privy Council   in   Pulukuri   Kottaya   v.   Emperor   [AIR   1947 PC 67 : 48 Cri LJ 533 : 74 IA 65] is the most­quoted authority   for   supporting   the   interpretation   that   the “fact  discovered”  envisaged in  the  section  embraces the   place   from   which   the   object   was   produced,   the knowledge   of   the   accused   as   to   it,   but   the information   given   must   relate   distinctly   to   that effect.   (See   State   of   Maharashtra   v.   Damu   [(2000)   6 SCC   269   :   2000   SCC   (Cri)   1088   :   2000   Cri   LJ 2301] .…..” [ Emphasis supplied ] 21 25. A three­Judges Bench of this Court recently in the case of Subramanya v. State of Karnataka 7 , has observed thus: “ 82.   Keeping   in   mind   the   aforesaid   evidence,   we proceed   to   consider   whether   the   prosecution   has been   able   to   prove   and   establish   the   discoveries   in accordance with law. Section 27 of the Evidence Act reads thus: “ 27.   How   much   of   information   received   from accused may be proved.— Provided   that,   when   any   fact   is   deposed to   as   discovered   in   consequence   of information   received   from   a   person accused of any offence, in the custody of a police officer, so much of such information, whether it amounts to a confession or not, as   relates   distinctly   to   the   fact   thereby discovered, may be proved.” 83.   The first and the basic infirmity in the evidence of   all   the   aforesaid   prosecution   witnesses   is   that none of them have deposed the exact statement said to   have   been   made   by   the   appellant   herein   which ultimately   led   to   the   discovery   of   a   fact   relevant under Section 27 of the Evidence Act. 84.   If,   it   is   say   of   the   investigating   officer   that   the accused appellant while in custody  on his own free will   and   volition   made   a   statement   that   he   would lead   to   the   place   where   he   had   hidden   the   weapon of   offence,   the   site   of   burial   of   the   dead   body, clothes   etc.,   then   the   first   thing   that   the investigating officer should have done was to call for two   independent   witnesses   at   the   police   station itself.   Once   the   two   independent   witnesses   would 7 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1400 22 arrive   at   the   police   station   thereafter   in   their presence   the   accused   should   be   asked   to   make   an appropriate statement as he may desire in regard to pointing   out   the   place   where   he   is   said   to   have hidden the weapon of offence etc. When the accused while   in   custody   makes   such   statement   before   the two   independent   witnesses   (panch­witnesses)   the exact   statement   or   rather   the   exact   words   uttered by   the   accused   should   be   incorporated   in   the   first part of the panchnama that the investigating officer may draw in accordance with law. This first part of the panchnama for the purpose of Section 27 of the Evidence   Act   is   always   drawn   at   the   police   station in   the   presence  of   the  independent   witnesses  so   as to   lend   credence   that   a   particular   statement   was made   by   the   accused   expressing   his   willingness   on his own free will and volition to point out the place where   the   weapon   of   offence   or   any   other   article used   in   the   commission   of   the   offence   had   been hidden.   Once   the   first   part   of   the   panchnama   is completed thereafter the police party along with the accused and the two independent witnesses (panch­ witnesses)  would proceed to  the  particular  place as may   be   led   by   the   accused.   If   from   that   particular place   anything   like   the   weapon   of   offence   or   blood stained   clothes   or   any   other   article   is   discovered then that part of the entire process would form  the second part of the panchnama. This is how the law expects   the   investigating   officer   to   draw   the discovery   panchnama   as   contemplated   under Section 27 of the Evidence Act. If we read the entire oral   evidence   of   the   investigating   officer   then   it   is clear   that   the   same   is   deficient   in   all   the   aforesaid relevant aspects of the matter.” 23 26. This   Court   has   elaborately   considered   as   to   how   the   law expects   the   IO   to   draw   the   discovery   panchnama   as contemplated   under   Section   27   of   the   Evidence   Act.     In   the present   case,   leave   aside   the   recovery   panchnama   being   in accordance   with   the   aforesaid   requirement,   there   is   no statement   of   Boby   (accused   No.   3/appellant   herein)   recorded under Section 27 of the Evidence Act.   We are, therefore, of the considered   view   that   the   prosecution   has   failed   to   prove   the circumstance that the dead body of the deceased was recovered at the instance of  Boby (accused No. 3/appellant herein) .   27. Another circumstance on which the High Court relied was that   the   recovery   of   ornaments   was   at   the   instance   of   Boby (accused   No.   3/appellant   herein) .     We   find   that   both   the   trial court and the High Court have patently erred in relying on such recovery.   The trial court found that there was enough material to   show   that   the   alleged   recovery   memo   was   a   fabricated document   and   the   alleged   recovery   as   per   Ext.   P­14   is   farce. However,   the   trial   court   still   relied   on   the   said   recovery   to convict  the  accused.   In our   view,  the finding  of the trial court 24 in   this   regard   is   totally   perverse   which   has   been   confirmed   by the High Court. 28. Insofar   as   Shibu   @   Shibu   Singh   (accused   No.   1)   is concerned,   the   additional   circumstance   sought   to   be   relied   on by the trial court and the High Court is the alleged recovery  of the  spade.   It is to be noted that the spade was also recovered from the same place from where the dead body of the deceased was   alleged   to   have   been   recovered   at   the   instance   of   Boby (accused   No.   3/appellant   herein) .     The   trial   court   again   held that the place from where the spade was recovered was already known   from   the   disclosure   statement   of   Boby   (accused   No. 3/appellant   herein);   however,   it   still   held   the   recovery   of   the said   spade   to   be   admissible   in   evidence.     It   is   thus   clear   that the   said   recovery   was   from   a   place   which   was   already   known and   not   exclusively   within   the   knowledge   of   Shibu   @   Shibu Singh   (accused   No.   1) .   We   find   that   the   trial   court   has   again committed perversity in arriving at such a finding. 29. It   is   thus   clear   that   the   only   circumstance   that   now remains   is   the   circumstance   of   the   accused   last   seen   in   the 25 company of the deceased on the basis of the evidence of PW­1. In   that   view   of   the   matter,   we   find   that,   solely   on   the   basis   of last   seen   theory,   the   conviction   could   not   have   been   recorded. The prosecution  has utterly  failed to prove that the  recovery  of the   dead   body   of   the   deceased   was   at   the   instance   of   Boby (accused   No.   3/appellant   herein) .     The   recovery   of   the   articles from  the house of   Boby  (accused No. 3/appellant  herein) , even according   to   the   trial   court,   is   farce   and   fabricated.     The recovery   of   the   spade   at   the   instance   of   Shibu   @   Shibu   Singh (accused   No.   1)   is   from   a   place   which,   even   according   to   the trial   court,   was   also   known   on   account   of   the   disclosure statement made by  Boby (accused No. 3/appellant herein) . 30. In that view of the matter, we find that the prosecution has utterly failed to prove the chain of incriminating circumstances which   leads   to   no   other   conclusion   than   the   guilt   of   the accused. 31. Insofar   as   the   reliance   placed   by   Shri   Balgopal,   learned Senior  Counsel on  the case of   Suresh  Chandra  Bahri   (supra) 26 is  concerned,   it  is  totally   misplaced  inasmuch   as  in   paragraph 40, this Court has observed thus: “ 40.   …….Before   we   discuss   the   merits   or   demerits of  the  aforesaid  submissions  we would  like to  state that   the   law   relating   to   conviction   based   on circumstantial evidence is well settled and it hardly requires   a   detailed   discussion   on   this   aspect. Suffice to say that in a case of murder in which the evidence   that   is   available   is   only   circumstantial   in nature   then   in   that   event   the   facts   and circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is required   to   be   drawn   by   the   prosecution   must   be fully   established   beyond   all   reasonable   doubt   and the   facts   and   circumstances   so   established   should not only be consistent with the guilt of the accused but they also must entirely be incompatible with the innocence   of   the   accused   and   must   exclude   every reasonable   hypothesis   consistent   with   his innocence.” 32. It   will   further   be   relevant   to   refer   to   the   following observations of this Court in the said case: “ 71.   ……The   provisions   of   Section   27   of   the Evidence Act are based on the view that  if a fact is actually   discovered   in   consequence   of   information given,   some   guarantee   is   afforded   thereby   that   the information   was   true   and   consequently   the   said information   can   safely   be   allowed   to   be   given   in evidence   because   if   such   an   information   is   further fortified   and   confirmed   by   the   discovery   of   articles or   the   instrument   of   crime   and   which   leads   to   the 27 belief   that   the   information   about   the   confession made as to the articles of crime cannot be false…..” 33. A   perusal   of   paragraph   71   of   the   said   judgment   would reveal   that   the   Court   has   reiterated   that   the   two   essential requirements   for   the   application   of   Section   27   of   the   Evidence Act   are   that   (1)   the   person   giving   information   must   be   an accused   of   any   offence   and   (2)   he   must   also   be   in   police custody.  The Court held that the provisions of Section 27 of the Evidence   Act   are   based   on   the   view   that   if   a   fact   is   actually discovered in consequence of information given, some guarantee is   afforded   thereby   that   the   information   was   true   and consequently   the   said   information   can   safely   be   allowed   to   be given in evidence. 34. In   the   facts   of   the   said   case,   the   Court   found   that   there was, in fact, a confessional statement of the disclosure made by the   appellant   Gurbachan   Singh   which   was   confirmed   by   the recovery   of   the   incriminating   articles.     As   such,   the   Court believed   the   disclosure   statement   and   the   evidence   led   in   that 28 behalf.     As   already   stated   hereinabove,   in   the   present   case, there   is   no   confessional   statement   of   Boby   (accused No.3/appellant   herein)   recorded   with   regard   to   recovery   of   the dead body of the deceased.  35. In the result, the appeal is allowed. 36. The   judgment   dated   18 th   December   2004   passed   by   the trial   Court,   thereby   convicting   the   appellant   under   Sections 395,   365,   364,   201,   380,   302   read   with   Section   34   of   the   IPC and the impugned judgment dated 25 th  August 2008, passed by the High Court affirming  the same are set aside. The appellant is   acquitted   of   all   the   charges   charged   with.   The   bail   bonds   of the accused shall stand discharged.  37. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of. …..….......................J. [B.R. GAVAI]        ……....................…..J.        [M.M. SUNDRESH] NEW DELHI; JANUARY 12, 2023. 29 1 ITEM NO.102/1 COURT NO.8 SECTION II-B S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS Criminal Appeal No(s). 1439/2009 BOBY Appellant(s) VERSUS STATE OF KERALA Respondent(s) Date : 12-01-2023 This appeal was called on for hearing today. CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE B.R. GAVAI HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.M. SUNDRESH For Appellant(s) Mr. R. Basant, Sr. Adv. Mr. Abdulla Naseeh V.T., Adv. Meena K. Poulose, Adv. Mr. Akshay, Adv. Mr. Ashok Basoya, Adv. Ms. Shruti Jose, Adv. Mr. P. S. Sudheer, AOR For Respondent(s) Mr. K.N. Balgopal, Sr. Adv. Mr. Harshad V. Hameed, AOR Mr. Dileep Poolakkot, Adv. Ms. Ashly Harshad, Adv. UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following O R D E R The appeal is allowed in terms of the signed reportable judgment. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of. The concluding paragraph of the judgment reads as under : “The judgment dated 18 th December 2004 passed by the trial Court, thereby convicting the appellant under Sections 395, 365, 364, 201, 2 380, 302 read with Section 34 of the IPC and the impugned judgment dated 25 th August 2008, passed by the High Court affirming the same are set aside. The appellant is acquitted of all the charges charged with. The bail bonds of the accused shall stand discharged.” (Geeta Ahuja) (Anju Kapoor) Assistant Registrar-cum-PS Court Master (signed reportable judgment containing the reasons is placed on the file) # signed order dated 12.1.2023 along with ROP has already been uploaded and sent to the concerned Branch. 3 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1439 OF 2009 BOBY APPELLANT(S) VERSUS STATE OF KERALA RESPONDENT(S) O R D E R For the reasons to be recorded separately, t he appeal is allowed. The judgment and order dated 18.12.2004 of the trial Court of conviction and sentence of the appellant punishable under Sections 395, 365, 364, 201, 380, 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code and the judgment and order dated 25.08.2008 of the High Court affirming the same are set aside. The appellant is acquitted of all the charges charged with. The bail bonds of the accused shall stand discharged. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of. ............... J. ( B.R. GAVAI ) ............... J. ( M.M. SUNDRESH ) NEW DELHI 12 th JANUARY, 2023 4 ITEM NO.102 COURT NO.8 SECTION II-B S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS Criminal Appeal No(s). 1439/2009 BOBY Appellant(s) VERSUS STATE OF KERALA Respondent(s) Date : 12-01-2023 This appeal was called on for hearing today. CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE B.R. GAVAI HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.M. SUNDRESH For Appellant(s) Mr. R. Basant, Sr. Adv. Mr. Abdulla Naseeh V.T., Adv. Meena K. Poulose, Adv. Mr. Akshay, Adv. Mr. Ashok Basoya, Adv. Ms. Shruti Jose, Adv. Mr. P. S. Sudheer, AOR For Respondent(s) Mr. K.N. Balgopal, Sr. Adv. Mr. Harshad V. Hameed, AOR Mr. Dileep Poolakkot, Adv. Ms. Ashly Harshad, Adv. UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following O R D E R For the reasons to be recorded separately, t he appeal is allowed. The judgment and order dated 18.12.2004 of the trial Court of conviction and sentence of the appellant punishable under Sections 395, 365, 364, 201, 380, 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code and the judgment and order dated 25.08.2008 of the High Court affirming the same are set aside. The appellant is acquitted of all the charges 5 charged with. The bail bonds of the accused shall stand discharged. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of. (Geeta Ahuja) (Anju Kapoor) Assistant Registrar-cum-PS Court Master (Signed Order is placed on the file)