/2023 INSC 0031/
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL/CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION 
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1978 OF 2013
RAJARAM S/O SRIRAMULU NAIDU
(SINCE DECEASED) THROUGH L.RS.     ...APPELLANT (S)
 
VERSUS
MARUTHACHALAM (SINCE DECEASED)
THROUGH L.RS.  ...RESPONDENT (S)
WITH 
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1990 OF 2013
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 10500 OF 2013
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 10501 OF 2013
J U D G M E N T
B.R. GAVAI, J.
1. The   Criminal   Appeals   challenge   the   common   judgment
and   order   of   conviction   and   sentence   dated   28 th
  October   2008
and   30 th
  October   2008   passed   by   the   Madras   High   Court
whereby the Appellant has been convicted under Section 138 of
the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (hereinafter referred to as
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“the N.I. Act”) and has been sentenced to a fine of Rs. 7 Lakhs
in each case in respect of two cheques for an amount of Rs. 3.5
Lakhs. 
2. The   Civil   Appeals   challenge   the   judgments   dated   08 th
August   2011   and   03 rd
  February   2012   passed   by   the   Madras
High   Court   whereby   the   Original   Suits   filed   by   the   plaintiff­
respondents   for   recovery   of   money   on   the   basis   of   promissory
notes were decreed.
3. For the sake of convenience, the parties will be referred to
as their status before this Court.
4. Since   both   the   Criminal   Appeals   arise   out   of   a   common
judgment,   we   consider   it   apposite   to   refer   to   the   facts   in
Criminal Appeal No.1978 of 2013.   Insofar as the Civil Appeals
are   concerned,   while   they   arise   out   of   different   judgments,   for
the sake of convenience, we shall refer to the facts arising from
Civil Appeal No.10501 of 2013. 
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5. The   present   appeals   arise   from   the   following   factual
matrix:
5.1 In   1992,   the   Appellant­Rajaram’s   wife   subscribed   to   a   5­
year   chit­fund   with   one   Maruthachalam,   the   Respondent
in   Criminal   Appeal   No.   1978/2013   and   Civil   Appeal
No.10500/2013.   Upon   the   Respondent­Maruthachalam’s
persuasion   that,   in   order   to   be   a   successful   bidder,   a
security by way of a blank cheque must be submitted, the
Appellant   submitted   two   signed   blank   cheques   bearing
nos.   237954   and   237956   on   behalf   of   his   wife,   since   she
did   not   have   a   bank   account.   It   is   to   be   noted   that   the
cheques   were   drawn   on   the   account   of   M/s   Brinda
Engineering,   the   sole   proprietorship   concern   of   the
Appellant, maintained with the Laxmi Vilas Bank Ltd.
5.2 It is further the case of the Appellant that in 1995, his wife
subscribed   to   yet   another   5­year   chit­fund   with   the
Respondent­Maruthachalam.
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5.3 In 1997, the bank account on which the said cheques were
drawn was closed due to non­operation.
5.4 The   first   chit   matured   in   1997   and,   since   the   wife   of   the
Appellant   was   never   a   successful   bidder,   thus,   the
Appellant   and   his   wife   repeatedly   requested   the
Respondent   to   release   the   amount   of   the   chits,   but   the
Respondent never did so. On the contrary, the Respondent
promised   to   keep   the   amount   as   a   deposit   and   pay
interest.     Similarly,   the   second   chit   matured   in   1999,
whereafter   also   the   wife   of   the   Appellant   was   never   a
successful   bidder.   Thereafter,   repeated   requests   for
releasing   the   subscription   amount   to   the   tune   of   Rs.   6
lakhs for both the chits were made on their behalf, but to
no avail. Finally, the Appellant and his wife threatened the
Respondent   with   legal   action,   whereupon   the   Respondent
immediately   presented   the   cheques   for   encashment
without any information or intimation to the Appellant.
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5.5 The   Cheque   No.   237954   was   dated   20 th
  October   1999   in
favour of Respondent­Nachimuthu (who happens to be the
brother­in­law   of   Maruthachalam)   for   an   amount   of   Rs.
3,50,000/,   and   was   presented   for   encashment   on   04 th
November   1999   by   the   Respondent   through   his   banker
Indian   Overseas   Bank.   The   said   cheque   returned   unpaid
on   14 th
  November   1999   with   an   endorsement   stating
“account closed”. 
5.6 The   other   Cheque   No.   237956   was   dated   25 th
  October
1999   in   favour   of   the   Respondent­Maruthachalam   for   an
amount   of   Rs.   3,50,000/­,   and   was   presented   for
encashment   on   04 th
  November   1999   by   the   Respondent
through   his   banker   Indian   Overseas   Bank.   The   said
cheque   too   returned   unpaid   on   14 th
  November   1999   with
an endorsement stating “account closed”.
5.7 Statutory   Notices   dated   15 th
  November   1999   were   sent   in
respect of the aforesaid dishonoured cheques, which were
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duly   replied   by   the   accused/Appellant   denying   the
existence   of   any   legally   enforceable   debt   and   stating
therein   that   the   Respondent   is   liable   to   pay   the   chit
amount along with subsequent interest. Since the amount
was not paid, the Respondents instituted Complaint Cases
under Section 138 of the N.I. Act, being CC No. 26 of 2000
in respect of Cheque No. 237954 and CC No. 32 of 2000 in
respect   of   Cheque   No.   237956.   Both   the   cases   were
dismissed   by   the   learned   Trial   Court   on   10 th
  July   2001
vide separate judgments. 
5.8 Pursuant to the dismissal of the aforesaid cases, both the
Respondents   instituted   civil/original   suits   for   recovery   of
money on the basis of Promissory Notes. 
5.9 Original Suit No. 112/2003 (earlier OS No. 602/2002) was
instituted   by   the   Respondent­Nachimuthu,   alleging   that
the Appellant had borrowed a sum of Rs. 3 Lakhs on 20 th
October   1998   from   him   and   had   executed   a   promissory
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note on the same day thereby promising to repay the same
with   interest   at   24%   per   annum.   It   was   further   alleged
that   the   Appellant   had   issued   a   cheque   on   20 th
  October
1999   for   Rs.   3,50,000/­   towards   the   discharge   of   his
liability   and   when   the   same   was   presented   for
encashment,   it   was   dishonoured   as   the   Appellant   had
closed   the   account.   Criminal   Case   No.   32/2000   was
pursued   under   Section   138   of   the   N.I.   Act   which   was
dismissed against which an appeal was pending before the
High Court. 
5.10 Another   Original   Suit   No.   266   of   2004   (earlier   OS   746   of
2002)   was   instituted   by   the   Respondent­Maruthachalam,
alleging   that   the   Appellant   had   borrowed   a   sum   of   Rs.   3
Lakhs on 25 th
  October 1998 from him and had executed a
promissory   note   on   25 th
  October   1998,   thereby   promising
to repay the same with interest at 24% per annum. It was
further alleged that the Appellant issued a cheque on 20 th
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October 1999 for Rs. 3,50,000/­ towards the discharge of
his   liability   and   when   the   same   was   presented   for
encashment,   it   was   dishonoured   as   the   Appellant   had
closed   the   account.   Criminal   Case   No.   26/2000   was
pursued   under   Section   138   of   the   N.I.   Act   which   was
dismissed against which an appeal was pending before the
High Court.
5.11 Original Suit No. 112 of 2003 and Original Suit No. 266 of
2004   came   to   be   dismissed   vide   judgment   dated   06 th
January 2004 and 29 th
  July 2005 respectively. As against
both   the   judgments,   appeals   were   preferred   before   the
High Court. 
5.12 The   Appeals   against   the   judgments   in   criminal   matters
were   allowed   by   the   High   Court   vide   common   judgment
and   order   of   conviction   and   sentence   dated   28.10.2008
and 30 th
 October 2008. 
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5.13 In Appeal, Original Suit No. 266 of 2004 and Original Suit
No.   112   of   2003   were   decreed   by   the   High   Court   vide
judgments dated 08 th
 August 2011 and 03 rd
 February 2012
respectively.
5.14 The Appeals against all the 3 judgments of the High Court
are before us and are being disposed of vide this common
judgment.
6. We   have   heard   Ms.   Neha   Sharma,   learned   counsel
appearing   for   the   Appellants   in   all   the   appeals,   and   Mr.   V.
Prabhakar, learned counsel appearing for both the Respondents
in all the appeals. 
7. Ms.   Neha   Sharma   submits   that   the   High   Court   has
erroneously   reversed   the   well­reasoned   judgements   of   the
learned   Trial   Court.   She   submitted   that   blank   cheques   issued
in the year 1992 by way of security for chit­funds were misused
by   the   Respondents   in   the   year   1999.   She   further   submitted
that   in   the   year   1999,   when   the   cheques   were   sent   for
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encashment, the Appellant was no longer the proprietor of M/s
Brinda   Engineering   and   the   bank   account   on   which   the   said
cheques   were   drawn   was   not   operated   after   1992,   and   had
already   closed   in   1997   due   to   non­operation.   She   further
submitted   that   even   before   the   account   was   closed   down,   the
wife   of   the   Appellant   became   the   sole   proprietor   of   the
enterprise,   and   thus,   the   appellant   could   not   have   signed   the
said   cheques   in   the   capacity   of   the   proprietor   of   M/s   Brinda
Engineering.
8. The   learned   counsel   submitted   that   the   Respondents
herein did not have the financial capacity to lend an amount of
Rs.3,00,000/­   each   as   on   20 th
  October   1998   and   25 th
  October
1998,   when   the   promissory   notes   were   said   to   have   been
executed.   It   is   further   submitted   that   although   it   was   the
Respondents’ case that they had given the amounts out of their
agricultural   income,   since   they   had   not   declared   the   same   in
their  Income  Tax  Returns   from   1992­1999,  thus,  there  was  no
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material  to  show   that  they  could  have  lent   money.  To  buttress
her submissions, the learned counsel relies on the judgment of
this Court in the case of,  Basalingappa v. Mudibasappa 1
, 
9. Per   contra,   Mr.   V.   Prabhakar,   learned   counsel   for   the
Respondents,   submits   that   the   Appellant­Raja   Ram   had   failed
to produce any material evidence to substantiate the claim that
his   wife   subscribed   to   the   chit­funds   run   by   Respondent,
Maruthachalam.   He   submitted   that   the   High   Court   rightly
observed   that   no   material   was   produced   by   the   Appellant­Raja
Ram   to   prove   that   the   cheques   and   promissory   notes   were
issued only  as a security for such a chit. He further submitted
that   no   legal   proceedings   were   initiated   for   the   recovery   of   the
alleged amount due by the Appellant either.
10. The   learned   counsel   submitted   that   there   arose   no
occasion for the Appellant­Raja Ram to issue a blank cheque in
the year 1992 for a chit to be subscribed much later in the year
1995.   It   is   further   submitted   that   even   if   certain   amounts   are
1   (2019) 5 SCC 418
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not   accounted   for   in   the   Income   Tax   Returns,   this   is   a   matter
concerning   only   the   defaulter   and   Revenue   Authority.   Thus,   a
borrower cannot be allowed to take advantage of the same solely
on   the   ground   that   such   an   amount   does   not   reflect   in   the
Income   Tax   Returns.   The   learned   counsel   relied   on   the
judgments   of   this   Court   in   the   cases   of   Bir   Singh   v.   Mukesh
Kumar 2
,   Rohitbhai   Jivanlal   Patel   v.   State   of   Gujarat   and
Anr 3
,   Kalamani   Tex   and   Anr   v.   P.   Balasubramanian 4
  to
buttress his submissions. 
11. We shall first consider the Criminal Appeals.  
12. This   Court   in   the   case   of   Baslingappa   v.   Mudibasappa
(supra)   has   summarized   the   principles   on   Sections   118(a)   and
139 of the N.I. Act.  It will be relevant to reproduce the same.
“ 25.   We   having   noticed   the   ratio   laid
down   by   this   Court   in   the   above   cases   on
Sections   118( a )   and   139,   we   now
2   (2019) 4 SCC 197
3   (2019) 18 SCC 106
4  (2021) 5 SCC 283
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summarise   the   principles   enumerated   by
this Court in following manner:
25.1.   Once   the   execution   of   cheque   is
admitted   Section   139   of   the   Act   mandates
a presumption that the cheque was for the
discharge of any debt or other liability.
25.2.   The   presumption   under   Section
139   is   a   rebuttable   presumption   and   the
onus   is   on   the   accused   to   raise   the
probable defence. The standard of proof for
rebutting   the   presumption   is   that   of
preponderance of probabilities.
25.3.   To   rebut   the   presumption,   it   is
open   for   the   accused   to   rely   on   evidence
led by him or the accused can also rely on
the   materials   submitted   by   the
complainant   in   order   to   raise   a   probable
defence.   Inference   of   preponderance   of
probabilities   can   be   drawn   not   only   from
the   materials   brought   on   record   by   the
parties   but   also   by   reference   to   the
circumstances upon which they rely.
25.4.   That   it   is   not   necessary   for   the
accused   to   come   in   the   witness   box   in
support   of   his   defence,   Section   139
imposed   an   evidentiary   burden   and   not   a
persuasive burden.
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25.5.  It is not necessary for the accused
to   come   in   the   witness   box   to   support   his
defence.”
 
13. It can thus be seen that this Court has held that o nce the
execution   of   cheque   is   admitted,   Section   139   of   the   N.I.   Act
mandates a presumption that the cheque was for the discharge
of any debt or other liability.  It has however been held that the
presumption   under   Section   139   is   a   rebuttable   presumption
and   the   onus   is   on   the   accused   to   raise   the   probable   defence.
The   standard   of   proof   for   rebutting   the   presumption   is   that   of
preponderance of probabilities.  It has further been held that to
rebut   the   presumption,   it   is   open   for   the   accused   to   rely   on
evidence   led   by   him   or   the   accused   can   also   rely   on   the
materials   submitted   by   the   complainant   in   order   to   raise   a
probable   defence.   It   has   been   held   that   inference   of
preponderance of  probabilities can  be drawn  not  only   from   the
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materials brought on record by the parties but also by reference
to the circumstances upon which they rely.
14. In   the   said   case,   i.e.   Baslingappa   v.   Mudibasappa
(supra) ,   the   learned   Trial   Court,   after   considering   the   evidence
and   material   on   record,   held   that   the   accused   had   raised   a
probable   defence   regarding   the   financial   capacity   of   the
complainant.       The   accused   was,   therefore,   acquitted.
Aggrieved   thereby,   the   complainant   preferred   an   appeal   before
the   High   Court.     The   High   Court   reversed   the   same   and
convicted  the  accused.    This Court found that unless the  High
Court   came   to   a   finding   that   the   finding   of   the   learned   Trial
Court   regarding   financial   capacity   of   the   complainant   was
perverse,  it  was  not  permissible  for   the  High   Court  to  interfere
with the same. 
15. In   the   present   case,   the   accused   appellant   had   examined
Mr.   Sarsaiyyn,   Income   Tax   Officer,   Ward   No.18,   Circle   (II)   (5),
who produced certified copies of the Income Tax Returns of the
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complainant   for   the   financial   year   1995­96,   1996­97,   1997­98
and   1998­99.     The   certified   copies   of   the   Income   Tax   Returns
established that the complainant had not declared that he had
lent   Rs.3   lakh   to   the   accused.     It   further   established   that   the
agricultural   income   also   was   not   declared   in   the   Income   Tax
Returns.  
16. The   learned   Trial   Court   further   found   that   from   the
income which was shown in the Income Tax Return, which was
duly exhibited, it was clear that the complainant(s) did not have
financial capacity to lend money as alleged.  
17. The   appellant   had   also   examined   D.W.2­Thiru   Iyyappan,
Assistant   Manager,   City   Union   Bank,   Ramnagar   Branch   with
regard   to   bank   transactions   made   by   the   sole   proprietorship
firm, M/s Brinda Engineering.  
18. D.W.3­Mr.   Subramaniam,   Manager,   Lakshmi   Vilas   Bank,
Ganapathy Branch was also examined on behalf of the defence.
The said witness also deposed that the complainant had signed
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the   application   form   to   introduce   the   accused   to   open   the
account in the bank.  
19. D.W.4­Mr.   Ganesan,   Village   Administrative   Officer,
Ganapathy  Village was also examined and he deposed that the
land in S.F. No. 591/3 and 592/3 was in joint ownership, and,
in the aforesaid survey numbers, the names of 27 persons were
found.  
20. After   analyzing   all   these   pieces   of   evidence,   the   learned
Trial   Court   found   that   the   Income   Tax   Returns   of   the
complainant   did   not   disclose   that   he   lent   amount   to   the
accused, and that the declared income was not sufficient to give
loan  of  Rs.3 lakh.    Therefore,  the  case  of  the  complainant  that
he had given a loan to the accused from his agricultural income
was   found   to   be   unbelievable   by   the   learned   Trial   Court.     The
learned   Trial   Court   found   that   it   was   highly   doubtful   as   to
whether   the   complainant   had   lent   an   amount   of   Rs.3   lakh   to
the   accused.   The   learned   Trial   Court   also   found   that   the
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complaint  had failed to  produce the promissory  note  alleged to
have been executed by the accused on 25 th
 October 1998.   After
taking   into   consideration   the   defence   witnesses   and   the
attending circumstances, the learned Trial Court found that the
defence   was   a   possible   defence   and   as   such,   the   accused   was
entitled to benefit of doubt.  The standard of proof for rebutting
the   presumption   is   that   of   preponderance   of   probabilities.
Applying  this  principle, the  learned Trial  Court had  found  that
the   accused   had   rebutted   the   presumption   on   the   basis   of   the
evidence of the defence witnesses and attending circumstances.
21. The scope of interference in an appeal against acquittal is
limited.     Unless   the   High   Court   found   that   the   appreciation   of
the   evidence   is   perverse,   it   could   not   have   interfered   with   the
finding of acquittal recorded by the learned Trial Court.   
22. Insofar   as   the   reliance   placed   by   Mr.   Prabhakar   on   the
judgment   of   this   Court   in   the   case   of   Bir   Singh   v.   Mukesh
Kumar   (supra)   is   concerned,   in   the   said   case,   though   the
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accused   was   convicted   by   the   learned   Trial   Court,   which
conviction   was   maintained   by   the   Appellate   Court,   the   High
Court in its revisional jurisdiction interfered with the same and
acquitted   the   accused.   This   Court   found   that   in   exercise   of
revisional   jurisdiction   under   Section   482   of   the   Code   of
Criminal   Procedure,   1973,   the   High   Court   could   not,   in   the
absence of perversity, upset concurrent findings of fact.  In any
case,   in   the   said   case,   the   accused   had   not   led   evidence   with
regard to the financial capacity of the complainant.   This Court
held   that   once   a   cheque   was   signed   and   handed   over   by   the
accused, it would attract presumption under Section 139 of the
N.I. Act in the absence of any cogent evidence to show that the
cheque was not issued in the discharge of a debt. 
23. In   the   case   of   Kalamani   Tex   and   another   v.   P.
Balasubramanian   (supra),   the   learned   Trial   Court   had
dismissed   the   complaint.     In   appeal,   at   the   behest   of   the
complainant,   the   same   was   allowed   and   the   accused   were
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convicted   for   the   offence   punishable   under   Section   138   of   the
N.I. Act.  In an appeal at the behest of the original accused, this
Court   while   affirming   the   order   of   the   High   Court   observed
thus:
“ 18.   Considering   the  fact   that   there  has
been   an   admitted   business   relationship
between   the   parties,   we   are   of   the
opinion   that   the   defence   raised   by   the
appellants does not inspire confidence or
meet   the   standard   of   “preponderance   of
probability”. In the absence of any other
relevant   material,   it   appears   to   us   that
the High Court did not err  in discarding
the   appellants'   defence   and   upholding
the onus imposed upon them in terms of
Section 118 and Section 139 of NIA.”
24. It can thus be seen that in the facts of the said case, this
Court found that the defence raised by the appellants/accused
did   not   inspire   confidence   or   meet   the   standard   of
“preponderance of probability”.  
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25. In the present case, we are of the considered opinion that
the   defence   raised   by   the   appellant   satisfies   the   standard   of
“preponderance of probability”.
26. Insofar as the reliance on the judgment of this Court in the
case   of   Rohitbhai   Jivanlal   Patel   v.   State   of   Gujarat   and
Anr.   (supra)   is   concerned,   in   the   said   case,   the   learned   Trial
Court   had   acquitted   the   accused,   the   High   Court,   in   appeal,
reversed the acquittal and convicted the accused for the offence
punishable   under   Section   138   of   the   N.I.   Act.     Affirming   the
order of the High Court, this Court held that merely by denial or
merely by creation of doubt, the accused cannot be said to have
rebutted   the   presumption   as   envisaged   under   Section   139   of
the N.I. Act.     This Court held that unless cogent evidence was
led   on   behalf   of   the   accused   in   defence   of   his   case,   the
presumption   under   Section   139   of   the   N.I.   Act   could   not   be
rebutted.     As   such,   the   said   judgment   also   would   not   be
applicable to the facts of the present case. 
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27. In that view of the matter, we are further of the considered
view that the High Court was not justified in reversing the order
of acquittal of the appellant.  
28. That   leaves   us   to   consider   the   Civil   Appeals.     Insofar   as
the   Civil   Appeals   are   concerned,   the   High   Court,   by   two
different   judgments   and   orders,   has   reversed   the   judgments
and   orders   of   the   learned   Trial   Court   dismissing   the   suits,
thereby   decreeing   them.     It   is   a   settled   proposition   of   law   that
the standard of proof in criminal proceedings differs with that in
civil proceedings. 
29. A   distinguishing   fact   between   the   criminal   proceedings
and   the   civil   proceedings   in   the   present   case   is   that,   while   in
the criminal proceedings the complainant had failed to produce
the promissory notes, in the civil proceedings, the complainant
had   proved   the   promissory   notes.     The   High   Court   found   that
the Civil Appeals were required to be decided on the basis of the
preponderance of probabilities.   The High Court found that the
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complainant   had   established   that   he   was   working   as   a   LIC
Agent,   that   his   father   was   owning   extensive   agricultural
properties   and   that   he   was   deriving   agricultural   income.     The
High   Court,   on   the   basis   of   the   evidence   placed   on   record,
relying   on   the   preponderance   of   probability,   came   to   a
conclusion that the plaintiff had the financial ability to lend the
sum of Rs.3 lakh as on 20 th
 October 1998.  The High Court also
found  that   the  appellant’s   wife  was  not   examined  as  a   witness
in the said case so as to probabilize the defence plea.   The High
Court   found   that   the   best   available   evidence   was   withheld   by
the  defendants/appellants herein  and as such, the principle of
adverse inference was also applicable.   
30. Though it was sought  to  be argued before the High  Court
that   in   view   of   the   judgment   in   the   criminal   proceedings,   the
suit(s)   was   also   liable   to   be   dismissed,   the   High   Court   rightly
observed   that   the   adjudication   in   civil   matters   is   based   on
preponderance of probabilities whereas adjudication in criminal
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cases is based on the principle that the accused is presumed to
be   innocent   and   the   guilt   of   the   accused   should   be   proved   to
the hilt and the proof should be beyond all reasonable doubt.  
31. We,   therefore,   find   no   reason   to   interfere   with   the
judgments   and   orders   passed   by   the   High   Court   in   the   Civil
Appeals.   However, in the facts and circumstances of the case,
we   are   inclined   to   modify   the   decree.     During   the   pendency   of
the proceedings before this Court, the appellants have deposited
an amount of Rs.7 lakh and Rs. 2 lakh pursuant to the orders
of   this   Court   dated   20 th
  February,   2009   passed   in   Criminal
Appeal   No.   1978   of   2013   (arising   out   of   Special   Leave   Petition
(Criminal)   No.1456   of   2009   and   connected   matter   and   dated
13 th
  August,   2012   passed   in   Civil   Appeal   No.10501   of   2013
(arising   out   of  Special   Leave   Petition  (Civil)   No.23036   of   2012).
The   said   amount   has   been   directed   to   be   invested   in   a   Fixed
Deposit   Receipts   from   time   to   time.     We   are,   therefore,   of   the
view   that,   in   the   facts   and   circumstances   of   the   present   case,
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the   decree   needs   to   be   modified   restricting   it   to   the   amount
already   deposited   by   the   appellants   in   both   the   proceedings
with interest accrued thereon.  
32. In the result, we pass the following order:
(i) Criminal   Appeal   Nos.   1978   of   2013   and   1990   of   2013
are   allowed   and   the   common   judgment   of   conviction
dated   28 th
  October   2008   and   order   of   sentence   dated
30 th
  October   2008   respectively   are   quashed   and   set
aside.   The judgments and orders dated 10 th
  July 2011
passed by the learned Trial Court is confirmed. 
(ii) Civil Appeal Nos. 10500 of 2013 and 10501 of 2013 are
dismissed.   However,   the   decrees   of   the   High   Court   are
modified,   thereby   restricting   them   to   the   amount
already deposited by the appellants in this Court in the
civil   and   criminal   proceedings,   along   with   interest
accrued thereon.  
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(iii) The   respondents   in   both   the   Civil   Appeals   would   be
entitled   to   withdraw   50%   of   the   amount   each   from   the
amount   deposited   in   this   Court   with   interest   accrued
upto date. 
33. There shall be no order as to costs.  Pending application(s),
if any, shall stand disposed of.
     …….........................J.       
     [B.R. GAVAI]
…….........................J.       
     [M.M. 
SUNDRESH]
NEW DELHI;
JANUARY 18, 2023 
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