/2023 INSC 0083/
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.  619 OF 2023
(@ SLP(C) NO. 15635 OF 2016)
Gas Point Petroleum India Limited                ...Appellant(S)
Versus
Rajendra Marothi & Ors.                    ...Respondent(S)
J U D G M E N T
M. R. Shah, J.
1. Feeling   aggrieved   and   dissatisfied   with   the   impugned
judgment and order dated 29.04.2016 passed by the High
Court   of   Madhya   Pradesh   Principal   Seat   at   Jabalpur   in
W.P.   No.   3342/2015,   by   which,   the   High   Court   has
allowed  the  said writ  petition  preferred by   respondent   No.
1   herein   and   has   set   aside   the   order   passed   by   the   lower
Appellate Court  and has restored  the order  passed  by  the
Executing   Court   with   respect   to   the   property   in   question,
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the   original   respondent   No.   1   –   objector   before   the
Executing Court has preferred the present appeal. 
2. The facts leading to the present appeal in a nutshell are as
under: ­ 
2.1 There   was   a   dispute   between   National   Ginni   Enterprises
and   Smt.   Gayatri   Agrawal   with   respect   to   the   L.P.G.   gas
agreement.   A   civil   suit   No.   07­A/98   was   filed   by   the   said
Smt.   Gayatri   Agrawal   against   the   National   Ginni
Enterprises.   The   learned   Trial   Court   passed   a   decree   by
directing the judgment debtor (National Ginni Enterprises)
to   provide   L.P.G.   gas   as   per   the   conditions   of   the
agreement. The decree provided that if the defendants are
unable to implement the said order, in alternatively it was
directed that the plaintiff was entitled to get the amount of
Rs.   2,38,450/­   +   Rs.   23,500/­   (sic)   relating   to   cost   of   the
gas   cylinders   and   regulators   respectively.   The   judgment
debtor   did  not   fulfill   the   first  portion  of   the   order  and   did
not supply the gas cylinders and regulators. Therefore, the
decree   holder   filed   the   execution   petition   before   the
Executing Court. It was decided to sell the property of the
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judgment   debtor.     Accordingly,   a   declaration   was   made
and   property   was   auctioned   and   sold   on   03.11.2011   in
favour   of   respondent   No.   1   herein.   The   appellant  herein  –
original   respondent   No.   1   filed   objection   before   the
Executing   Court,   contending,   inter­alia ,   that   the   property
was   purchased   by   him   from   judgment   debtor   on
31.08.1999   and   that   they   are   in   possession   of   the   said
land.   An   application   under   Order   21   Rule   90   r/w   151   of
the  CPC  was  filed. The learned Executing  Court overruled
the objections and rejected the application under Order 21
Rule   90   by   order   dated   23.01.2013.   The   appellant   flied
miscellaneous   civil   appeal   before   the   Court   of   Additional
District   Judge,   Damoh   being   Misc.   Civil   Appeal   No.
12/2013.   The   lower   Appellate   Court   allowed   the   said
appeal   and   set   aside   the   order   of   Executing   Court   dated
23.01.2013 and remitted the matter back to the Executing
Court   to   rehear   the   parties   and   after   taking   into   account
all   the   facts   and   circumstances,   pass   a   fresh   order   in
accordance   with   law.   The   order   passed   by   the   lower
Appellate   Court   was   the   subject   matter   before   the   High
Court   by   way   of   present   writ   petition.   By   the   impugned
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judgment   and   order   the   High   Court   has   allowed   the   said
writ   petition   and   has   set   aside   the   order   passed   by   the
lower   Appellate   Court   by   observing   that   the   appellant
herein – original respondent No. 1 has failed to plead and
establish   the   nature   of   irregularity   or   fraud   committed   in
sale   and   therefore,   no   fault   can   be   found   in   the   order   of
the Executing Court. 
2.2 Feeling   aggrieved   and   dissatisfied   with   the   judgment   and
order   passed   by   the   High   Court,   the   original   respondent
No. 1 has preferred the present appeal.  
3. Shri   Ravindra   Shrivastava,   learned   Senior   Advocate   has
appeared   on   behalf   of   the   appellant   and   Shri   Sanjay   K.
Agrawal,   learned   counsel   has   appeared   on   behalf   of
respondent No. 1.
4. Shri   Ravindra   Shrivastava,   learned   Senior   Advocate
appearing   on   behalf   of   the   appellant   has   vehemently
submitted that in the facts and circumstances of the case
the   High   Court   has   committed   a   serious   error   in   allowing
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the   writ  petition  and  quashing   and   setting  aside  the   well­
reasoned order passed by the lower Appellate Court.   
4.1 It is submitted that in the present case there was breach of
Order   21   Rule   64   and   Order   21   Rule   84/85   of   CPC   and
therefore,   due   to   non­compliance   of   the   aforesaid
provisions the sale has been vitiated.
4.2 It   is   submitted   that   in   the   present   case   the   property   in
question was put to auction on 18.10.2011 and therefore,
the auction purchaser was required to deposit 25% of sale
amount   immediately.   It   is   submitted   that   in   the   present
case   the   auction   purchaser   deposited   25%   of   the   amount
on   03.11.2011.   It   is   submitted   that   therefore   there   is   a
non­compliance   of   Order   21   Rule   84   of   CPC.   It   is   further
submitted   that   the   balance   sale   consideration   (75%)   was
required to be deposited by the auction purchaser within a
period   of   fifteen   (15)   days   from   the   date   of   auction.   It   is
submitted that in the present case balance 75% of the sale
consideration   was   deposited   by   the   auction   purchaser   on
04.11.2011.   It   is   submitted   that   therefore   there   is   also   a
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violation  of  Order   21  Rule 85 of  CPC.  Relying  upon Order
21 Rules 64, 84, 85 and 86 and relying upon the decisions
of  this   Court  in   the  cases  of   Manilal   Mohanlal   Shah   and
Ors. Vs. Sardar Sayed Ahmed Sayed Mahmad and Anr.;
(1955)   1   SCR   108   and   Rosali   V.   Vs.   Taico   Bank   and
Ors.; (2009) 17 SCC 690,  it is prayed to allow the present
appeal. 
4.3 It   is   further   submitted   by   learned   Senior   Advocate
appearing   on   behalf   of   the   appellant   that   even   otherwise
the   High  Court   has  not   properly   appreciated  the   fact  that
the   property   in   question   was   purchased   by   the   appellant
on 31.08.1999 from the judgment debtor and at that time
the property in question was not the subject matter of civil
suit.   It   is   submitted   that   civil   suit   was   filed   for   specific
performance   of   the   L.P.G.   gas   agreement.   It   is   submitted
that even injunction dated 18.05.1999 was not the subject
matter   of   property   in   question.   It   is   submitted   that   when
the   property   in   question   was   put   to   auction   by   the
Executing   Court   on   18.10.2011/03.11.2011   much   prior
thereto   the   appellant   purchased   the   property   on
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31.08.1999. It is submitted that therefore at the time when
the   property   was   auctioned   the   judgment   debtor   was   not
the owner  of the property in question, which as such was
purchased by the appellant by the registered sale deed on
31.08.1999.   It   is   submitted   that   therefore   the   High   Court
has   committed   a   very   serious   error   in   observing   that   the
appellant   purchased   the   property   despite   the   injunction
granted   by   the   Trial   Court   on   18.05.1999   and   that   the
appellant cannot be permitted to raise the objection as the
appellant   has   purchased   the   property   despite   the
injunction.   
4.4 Making the above submissions and relying upon the above
decisions, it is prayed to allow the present appeal. 
5. Present   appeal   is   vehemently   opposed   by   Shri   Sanjay
Agrawal,   learned   counsel   appearing   on   behalf   of
respondent No. 1 herein – auction purchaser. 
5.1 It   is   submitted   by   learned   counsel   appearing   on   behalf   of
respondent   No.   1   that   in   the   facts   and   circumstances   of
the case no error has been committed by the High Court in
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restoring the order passed by the learned Executing Court
and   overruling   the   objections   raised   by   the   appellant
herein – objector. 
5.2 It is submitted that on true interpretation of Order 21 Rule
90 the High Court has rightly refused to set aside the sale
on the alleged violation of Order 21 Rule 64 and Order 21
Rule   84/85.   It   is   submitted   that   the   appellant   purchased
the   property   in   question   during   the   pendency   of   the   suit
and the injunction dated 18.05.1999 was in operation. It is
submitted that therefore the appellant shall not be entitled
to  raise any  objection  thereafter  and pray   to  set  aside  the
sale   on   the   ground   that   the   property   in   question   was
purchased   by   it.   It   is   submitted   that   therefore,   the   High
Court   has   rightly   observed   that   since,   in   the   civil   suit   a
temporary   injunction   was   granted   by   the   Trial   Court   on
18.05.1999   and   by   that   time   the   property   was   not
purchased   by   the   appellant   herein   there   was   no   question
of putting the appellant to notice. 
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5.3 It   is   further   submitted   that   even   the   alleged   non­
compliance of Order 21 Rule 64, Order 21 Rule 84 and 85
were  not  raised before  the  Executing  Court  and  therefore,
the High Court has rightly observed that the same cannot
be permitted to be raised subsequently. 
5.4 Making  the  above  submissions  it  is prayed  to  dismiss  the
present appeal. 
6. We have heard learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
respective parties at length. 
7. While   appreciating   the   submissions   on   behalf   of   the
respective   parties   the   chronological   dates   and   events   are
required to be considered which are as under: ­ 
7.1 In the year 1998, the decree holder filed a suit for specific
performance of the L.P.G. gas agreement; 
7.2 The   civil   suit   was   not   with   respect   to   the   property   in
question.   An   interim   injunction   application   was   filed   by
the   original   plaintiff.   It   was   apprehended   that   the
defendants   were   trying   to   leave   Damoh   after   selling   and
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transferring   their   firm,   namely,   National   Gini   Enterprises,
to any other person. The application was filed under Order
38   CPC   as   well   as   for   permanent   injunction.   By   order
dated   18.05.1999   the   learned   Trial   Court   directed   to
maintain status quo.  The learned Trial Court also directed
that if the defendants transfer their firm Ginni Enterprises
to any other person then they would not transfer the same
against   the   interest   of   the   plaintiff.   That   thereafter   the
decree   came   to   be   passed   on   30.09.1999   directing   the
defendants   –   judgment   debtor   –   Ginni   Enterprises   to
supply LPG gas and in the alternative to pay 2,38,450/­ +
Rs.   23,500/­   (sic).   As   the   decree   was   not   executed   the
decree   holder   filed   the   execution   proceeding.   In   the
execution   proceeding   the   property   in   question   was   put   to
auction for recovery of Rs. 2,38,450/­ + Rs. 23,500/­ (sic).
The   property   was   put   to   auction   on   18.10.2011.   The
auction   purchaser   –   respondent   No.   1   herein   deposited
25%   of   the   amount   on   03.11.2011   and   deposited   balance
75% of the amount on 04.11.2011. In light of above factual
scenario,   submissions   on   behalf   of   the   respective   parties,
more   particularly,   submission   on   behalf   of   the   appellant
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on   non­compliance   of   Order   21   Rules   64,   84   and   85   are
required to be considered. 
7.3 While considering the issue involved in the present appeal
with   respect   to   non­compliance   of   the   relevant   provisions
of CPC, the relevant provisions of the CPC are required to
be referred to, namely, Order 21 Rules 64, 84, 85 and 86,
which read as under: ­ 
“Order 21 – Execution of Decrees and Orders 
Rule   64.   Power   to   order   property   attached   to   be   sold
and proceeds to be paid to person entitled .— Any Court
executing a decree may order that  any  property  attached
by   it   and   liable   to   sale,   or   such   portion   thereof   as   may
seem   necessary   to   satisfy   the   decree,   shall   be   sold,   and
that   the   proceeds   of   such   sale,   or   a   sufficient   portion
thereof,   shall   be   paid   to   the   party   entitled   under   the
decree to receive the same.
Rule   84.   Deposit  by   purchaser  and   re­sale  on   default .
— (1)   On   every   sale   of   immovable   property   the   person
declared   to   be   the   purchaser   shall  pay   immediately   after
such   declaration  a   deposit   of   twenty­five   per   cent   on  the
amount   of   his   purchase­money   to   the   officer   or   other
person   conducting   the   sale,   and   in   default   of   such
deposit, the property shall forthwith be re­sold.
(2)   Where   the   decree­holder   is   the   purchaser   and   is
entitled to set­off the purchase­money under Rule 72, the
Court may dispense with the requirements of this rule.
Rule   85. Time for payment in full of purchase­money .
— The   full   amount   of   purchase­money   payable   shall   be
paid by the purchaser  into Court before the Court closes
on the fifteenth day from the sale of the property:
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Provided,   that,   in   calculating   the   amount   to   be   so   paid
into Court, the purchaser shall have the advantage of any
set­off to which he may be entitled under Rule 72.
Rule   86.   Procedure   in   default   of   payment .— In   default
of   payment   within   the   period   mentioned   in   the   last
preceding   rule,   the   deposit   may,   if   the   Court   thinks   fit,
after defraying the expenses of the sale, be forfeited to the
Government,   and   the   property   shall   be   re­sold,   and   the
defaulting purchaser shall forfeit all claim to the property
or   to  any   part   of  the  sum   for   which   it   may   subsequently
be sold.”
   
7.4 As   per   Order   21   Rule   84,   on   every   sale   of   immovable
property the person declared to be the purchaser shall pay
immediately   after   such   declaration   deposit   of   twenty­five
per   cent   on   the   amount   of   his   purchase­money   and   in
default of such deposit, the property shall forthwith be re­
sold. 
7.5 As   per   Order   21   Rule   85,   the   full   amount   of   purchase­
money   payable   shall   be   paid   by   the   purchaser   into   Court
before the Court closes on the fifteenth day from the sale of
the   property.   Thus,   as   per   the   aforesaid   provisions,   the
purchaser   has   to   deposit   25%   of   the   sale   amount
immediately on declaring to be the purchaser and the full
amount   of   the   purchase­money   shall   have   to   be   paid   by
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the   purchaser   into   the   Court   before   the   Court   closes   on
fifteenth day from the sale of the property. 
7.6 In the present case admittedly the purchaser – respondent
No. 1 deposited 25% of the amount on 03.11.2011 and did
not deposit 25% of the amount as required under Order 21
Rule 84 immediately. The auction purchaser was required
to   deposit   25%   of   the   amount   the   day   on   which   he   was
declared purchaser i.e., 18.10.2011. Even the balance 75%
of   the   amount   has   not   been   deposited   as   required   under
Order 21 Rule 85. The full amount of the purchase­money
in the present case has been deposited on 04.11.2011 i.e.,
after   the   period   prescribed/provided   under   Order   21   Rule
85. Therefore, there is non­compliance of Order 21 Rule 84
and Rule 85 of CPC.    
8. In   light   of   the   aforesaid   facts,   few   decisions   of   this   Court
on Order 21 Rules 84 and 85 are required to be referred to
and considered.    
8.1 In   the   case   of   Manilal   Mohanlal   Shah   (supra),   it   is
observed and held that the provision regarding the deposit
of   25%   of   the   amount   by   the   purchaser   other   than   the
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decree­holder   is   mandatory   and   the   full   amount   of   the
purchase money must be paid within fifteen days from the
date of the sale. It is further observed and held that if the
payment is not made within the period of fifteen days, the
Court   has   the   discretion   to   forfeit   the   deposit,   and   there
the discretion ends but the obligation of the Court to resell
the property is imperative. In paragraph 8 of the decision,
it is observed and held as under: ­ 
“8.   The   provision   regarding   the   deposit   of   25   per   cent   by
the purchaser other than the decree­holder is mandatory
as the language of  the  Rule suggests. The  full  amount  of
the   purchase   money   must   be   paid   within   fifteen   days
from the date of the sale but the decree­holder is entitled
to the advantage of a set­off. The provision for payment is,
however,   mandatory….   (Rule   85).   If   the   payment   is   not
made  within  the period  of  fifteen  days,  the  court   has  the
discretion   to   forfeit   the   deposit,   and   there   the   discretion
ends but the obligation of the court to resell the property
is   imperative.   A   further   consequence   of   non­payment   is
that   the   defaulting   purchaser   forfeits   all   claim   to   the
property.… (Rule 86).”
8.2 The decision of this Court in the case of  Manilal Mohanlal
Shah (supra)   fell for consideration before this Court in the
subsequent   decision   in   the   case   of   Rosali   V.   (supra).   In
the   said   decision   this   Court   interpreted   the   word
“immediately”   in   Order   21   Rule   84.   In   the   said   decision,
this  Court considered paragraph  11  of the  decision  in the
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case of  Manilal Mohanlal Shah (supra)  in paragraph 20 as
under: ­ 
“20.   What   would   be   the   meaning   of   the   term
“immediately”   came   up   for   consideration   before   this
Court,   as   noticed   hereinbefore,   in   Manilal   Mohanlal
Shah   [AIR   1954   SC   349]   wherein   it   was   held   :   (AIR   pp.
351­52, para 11)
“11.   Having   examined   the   language   of   the
relevant   rules   and   the   judicial   decisions
bearing upon the subject we are of opinion that
the provisions of the rules requiring the deposit
of   25   per   cent   of   the   purchase   money
immediately, on the person being declared as a
purchaser   and   the   payment   of   the   balance
within   15   days   of   the   sale   are   mandatory   and
upon   non­compliance   with   these   provisions
there   is   no   sale   at   all.   The   rules   do   not
contemplate   that   there   can   be   any   sale   in
favour   of   a   purchaser   without   depositing   25
per   cent   of   the   purchase   money   in   the   first
instance   and   the   balance   within   15   days.
When there is no sale within the contemplation
of   these   rules,   there   can   be   no   question   of
material irregularity in the conduct of the sale.
Non­payment   of   the   price   on   the   part   of   the
defaulting   purchaser   renders   the   sale
proceedings as a complete nullity. The very fact
that   the   Court   is   bound   to   resell   the   property
in   the   event   of   a   default   shows   that   the
previous   proceedings   for   sale   are   completely
wiped   out   as   if   they   do   not   exist   in   the   eye   of
the   law.   We   hold,   therefore,   that   in   the
circumstances of the present case there was no
sale   and   the   purchasers   acquired   no   rights   at
all.”
8.3 Applying   the   law   laid   down  by   this   Court   in   the   aforesaid
decisions to the facts of the case on hand, it is evident that
there  is  non­compliance  of  mandatory  provisions  of   Order
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21   Rule   84   and   Order   21   Rule   85   and   therefore,   the   sale
was vitiated. 
9. Even   otherwise,   it   is   required   to   be   noted   that   the
appellant herein purchased the property in question much
before  the   auction   of   the   property   i.e.,   31.08.1999.   At   the
relevant time the property in question was not the subject
matter of suit. As observed hereinabove, the subject matter
of   suit   was   specific   performance   of   the   L.P.G.   gas
agreement   and   even   the   ad­interim   injunction   dated
18.05.1999   was   also   against   the   transfer   of   firm   Ginni
Enterprises   to   any   other   person   and   the   defendants   were
directed   to   maintain   status   quo   with   respect   to   their   firm
Ginni   Enterprises.   Therefore,   at   the   time   when   the
property in question was put to auction on 18.10.2011 the
appellant   had   already   purchased   the   said   property   as   far
as   back   on   31.08.1999   as   there   was   no   injunction   with
respect   to   the   said   property   while   ad­interim   injunction
dated   18.05.1999   and   as   observed   hereinabove,   the
property in question was not the subject matter of suit and
the   decree   came   to   be   passed   on   30.09.1999   and   the
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property  was  put to auction  in  the year  2011  for   recovery
of   sum   of   Rs.   2,38,450/­   +   Rs.   23,500/­   (sic) .   The   ad­
interim   injunction   dated   18.05.1999   cannot   be   pressed
into   service   against   the   appellant.   Therefore,   the   High
Court   has   committed   an   error   in   considering   injunction
dated   18.05.1999   against   the   appellant.   Therefore,   at   the
time when the property was put to auction on 18.10.2011,
the judgment debtor was not the owner and therefore, the
same   could   not   have   been   put   to   auction.   Under   the
circumstances,   learned   Executing   Court   erred   in
overruling   the   objections   raised   by   the   appellant   against
the   auction/sale   of   the   property   which   the   appellant
purchased   much   prior   to   the   date   of   the   auction   i.e.,   on
31.08.1999. 
10. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, the
impugned   judgment   and   order   passed   by   the   High   Court
deserves   to   be   quashed   and   set   aside   and   is   accordingly
quashed and set aside and consequently the order passed
by the Executing Court overruling the objections raised by
the   appellant   also   deserves   to   be   quashed   and   set   aside
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and   is   quashed   and   set   aside.   The   order   passed   by   the
lower Appellate Court is hereby restored. It will be open for
respondent   No.   1   to   get   back   the   amount   deposited   by
him,   lying   with   the   Executing   Court.   Present   appeal   is
accordingly   allowed.   In   the   facts   and   circumstance   of   the
case there shall be no order as to costs. 
…………………………………J.
                  (M. R. SHAH)
…………………………………J.
 (C.T. RAVIKUMAR)
NEW DELHI, 
FEBRUARY 10, 2023.
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