REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.740 OF 1986
Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community
& Anr.                         … Petitioners
v.
The State of Maharashtra & Anr.                         ... Respondents
with
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 39 OF 1991
J  U  D  G  M  E  N  T
ABHAY S. OKA, J.
FACTUAL ASPECTS
1. In Writ Petition (C) No.740 of 1986, the preliminary issue is
whether the view taken by a Constitution Bench of this Court in
the case of  Sardar Syedna Taher Saifuddin Saheb v. State of
Bombay 1
,   requires reconsideration.
1  (1962) Suppl. (2) SCR 496 : AIR 1962 SC 853
1

2. In   the   case   of   Sardar   Syedna 1
,   the   jurisdiction   of   this
Court   under   Article   32   of   the   Constitution   of   India   was   invoked
for   challenging   the   constitutional   validity   of   the   Bombay
Protection   of   Ex­communication   Act,   1949   (for   short,   ‘the   Ex­
communication   Act’).   Section   3   of   the   Ex­communication   Act
provided   that   notwithstanding   anything   contained   in   any   law,
custom or usage for the time being in force to the contrary, no ex­
communication of a member of any community shall be valid and
shall be of any effect. Under the Ex­communication Act, the term
‘community’ was defined to mean a group, the members of which
are   connected   together   by   reason   of   the   fact   that   by   birth,
conversion or the performance of any religious rite, they belong to
the   same   religion   or   religious   creed   and   includes   caste   or   sub­
caste. Under clause (b) of Section 2 of the Ex­communication Act,
‘ex­communication’   was   defined   as   the   expulsion   of   a   person
from   any   community   of   which   he   is   a   member   depriving   him   of
rights   and   privileges   which   are   legally   enforceable   by   a   suit   of
civil nature by him or on his behalf as such member.
3. Sardar   Syedna   Taher   Saifuddin   Saheb,   who   was   the   51 st
Dai­al­Mutlaq   and   the   head   of   the   Dawoodi   Bohra   community,
challenged   the   Ex­communication   Act   on   the   ground   that   the
2

same infringes the fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles
25   and   26   of   the   Constitution   of   India.   The   said   petition   was
placed before a Constitution Bench. The Constitution Bench, by a
majority,   held   that   ex­communication   amongst   the   Dawoodi
Bohras   forms   an   integral   part   of   the   management   of   the
community.   Therefore,   interference   with   the   right   to   ex­
communicate   amounts   to   interference   with   the   right   of   the
community to manage its own affairs in matters of religion. This
Court   held   that   as   the   Ex­communication   Act   invalidates   ex­
communication   on   any   ground   whatsoever   including   religious
grounds, it must be held to be in clear violation of the right of the
Dawoodi Bohra community guaranteed under Article 26 (b) of the
Constitution   of   India.   Therefore,   this   Court   proceeded   to   hold
that   the   Ex­communication   Act   is   void,   being   in   violation   of
Article 26 of the Constitution of India. 
4. The   prayer   in   the   present   writ   petition   filed   by   the   Central
Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community represented by its Secretary
is for issuing a writ of  mandamus  directing the State Government
to give effect to the provisions of the Ex­communication Act after
reconsidering   the   decision   of   this   Court   in   the   case   of   Sardar
Syedna 1
.   “Rule   nisi”   was   issued   in   the   petition   on   25 th  
August
3

1986.   On   18 th
  March   1994,   a   Division   Bench   directed   that   the
petition   be   listed   before   a   Bench   of   seven   Judges.   The   2 nd
Respondent   –   Syedna   Mufaddal   (53 rd
  Dai­al­Mutlaq)   made   an
application  seeking  a  direction  that   the  petition   should  be  listed
before   a   Division   Bench.   The   writ   petition   was   listed   before   a
Constitution   Bench.   By   the   judgment   and   order   dated   17 th
December   2004 2
,   the   Constitution   Bench   partly   allowed   the
application filed by the 2 nd
  Respondent. Paragraph 14 of the said
order read thus:  
“14.   In   the   facts   and   circumstances   of   this   case,
we   are   satisfied   that   the   matter   should   be   placed
for   hearing   before   a   Constitution   Bench   (of   five
Judges)   and   not   before   a   larger   Bench   of   seven
Judges. It is only if the Constitution Bench doubts
the   correctness   of   the   law   laid   down   in   Sardar
Syedna Taher Saifuddin Saheb case   [1962 Supp (2)
SCR   496   :   AIR   1962   SC   853]   that   it   may   opine   in
favour   of   hearing   by   a   larger   Bench   consisting   of
seven   Judges   or   such   other   strength   as   the   Chief
Justice   of   India   may   in   exercise   of   his   power   to
frame a roster may deem fit to constitute. ”
5. In   terms   of   the   aforesaid   order,   Writ   Petition   with   the
connected Criminal Appeal has been placed before this Bench. In
the meanwhile, there was a subsequent event in the form of the
enactment   of   the   Maharashtra   Protection   of   People   from   Social
Boycott   (Prevention,   Prohibition   and   Redressal)   Act,   2016   (for
2   2005 (2) SCC 673
4

short, ‘the Social Boycott Act’). By clause (c) of Section 20 of the
Social Boycott Act, the Ex­communication Act was repealed. 
THE   BROAD   QUESTIONS
FOR CONSIDERATION
6. As   the   Ex­communication   Act   has   been   repealed,   the
question   which   arises   for   consideration   is   whether   anything
survives in the writ petition for  a decision on merits. If we come
to   the   conclusion   that   the   writ   petition   still   survives   for
consideration,   the   question   which   will   arise   is   whether   the   view
taken in the case of  Sardar Syedna 1 
needs reconsideration.
SUBMISSIONS
7. We  have  heard  the  parties  on  the   aforesaid  questions.  Shri
Siddharth   Bhatnagar,   the   learned   senior   counsel   representing
the petitioners pointed out that the Constitution Bench has held
that   the   practice   of   Baraat/ex­communication   in   the   Dawoodi
Bohra   community   falls   within   the   ambit   of   “matters   of   religion”
under   clause   (b)   of   Article   26   of   the   Constitution   of   India.   He
urged   that   even   if   the   Ex­communication   Act   is   repealed,   the
question   whether   the   practice   of   ex­communication   falls   within
the   ambit   of   “matters   of   religion”,   needs   to   be   decided.   His
5

submission   is   that   the   2 nd
  Respondent   –   Syedna   Mufaddal   (53 rd
Dai­al­Mutlaq) is not only the religious Head but also the Trustee
of   the   community   property.   Therefore,   he   has   to   perform   acts
that   are   not   wholly   religious.   His   submission   is   that   even
assuming  that the practice  of ex­communication  is considered a
matter   of   religion,   it   must   yield   to   the   legislations   on   social
reforms which are protected by Article 25(2) of the Constitution of
India.   He   urged   that   the   rights   guaranteed   under   Article   26   are
subject   to   morality.   He   submitted   that   the   concept   of   morality
under   Articles   25   and   26   would   subsume   within   itself   the
concept   of   Constitutional   morality.   He   relied   upon   the   decisions
of  this  Court  in  the cases of   Manoj  Narula   v.   Union  of  India 3
,
State   (NCT   of   Delhi)   v.   Union   of   India   &   Anr. 4
  and   Navtej
Singh Johar & Ors. v. Union of India 5
  and submitted that the
concept   of   Constitutional   morality   has   been   elaborated   under
these   decisions.   He   also   pressed   into   service   a   decision   of   this
Court in the case of  Indian Young Lawyers Association & Ors.
v.   State   of   Kerala   &   Ors. 6
  (Sabrimala   Temple   5JJ),   which
according   to   him,   holds   that   practices   destructive   of   liberty   and
3   2014 (9) SCC 1
4   2018 (8) SCC 501
5   2018 (10) SCC 1
6   2019 (11) SCC 1
6

those which make some citizens less equal than others cannot be
countenanced.   He   would   also   submit   that   Article   26   cannot
override the protections afforded under other provisions of Part III
of the Constitution of India. His submission is that the practice of
ex­communication   in   the   Dawoodi   Bohra   community   is   violative
of   Articles   17,   19(1)(a),   19(1)(c)   and   19(1)(g),   21   and   25   and
therefore,   it   cannot   enjoy   the   protection   of   Article   26   of   the
Constitution of India.
8. The   learned   senior   counsel   also   urged   that   the   Social
Boycott   Act   does   not   afford   any   protection   against   ex­
communication   as   it   seeks   to   prohibit   the   social   boycott   of   a
member   of   the   community   by   the   Khap   Panchayat   of   the
community.   He  submitted   that  a  member  of   the   Dawoodi   Bohra
community   who   is   already   ex­communicated,   will   not   be   a
member   of   the   community   within   the   meaning   of   the   Social
Boycott Act. Therefore, the Social Boycott Act gives no protection
to   the   members   of   the   Dawoodi   Bohra   community   from   the
unjust and illegal practice of ex­communication.
9. He   urged   that   as   held   in   the   case   of   Sabrimala   Temple
5JJ 6
,   the   word   ‘morality’   found   in   Article   26   would   subsume
within   itself   the   concept   of   Constitutional   morality   and   takes
7

colour   from   the   ideals   of   justice,   liberty,   equality   and   fraternity
on which  our  Constitution  has  been  founded.  He urged that the
practice of Baraat is regressive, which resulted in practically civil
death   of   the   person   excommunicated.   Therefore,   the   practice   of
Baraat will have to be held as contrary to Constitutional morality.
10. He   urged   that   even   the   issue   whether   any   protection   is
afforded   by   Article   17   to   an   ex­communicated   person   belonging
to   the   Dawoodi   Bohra   community   needs   examination.   He
submitted   that   though   Article   26   has   not   been   expressly   made
subject  to   other   provisions  of   Part  III,  in   the   event   of   its  conflict
with   Articles   14,   19   and   21,   it   must   give   way   to   these   three
Articles unless the conflict can be reconciled. In other words, he
submitted   that   the   rights   of   a   religious   denomination   under
Article 26 cannot be determined in isolation and interpreted in a
manner that renders the rights guaranteed to its members under
other   provisions   of   Part   III   nugatory.   He   urged   that   much   water
has   flown   after   Sardar   Syedna 1  
and   therefore,   it   requires
reconsideration.
11. Shri   Tushar   Mehta,   the   learned   Solicitor   General   of   India,
appearing   for   the   State   Government   submitted   that   even   if   the
Ex­communication   Act   has   been   repealed,   the   question   whether
8

the   practice   of   Baraat/ex­communication   is   protected   by   Article
26(b)   of   the   Constitution   of   India,   survives   for   consideration.   He
invited   our   attention   to   the   order   of   this   Court   in   the   case   of
Kantaru   Rajeevaru   v.   Indian   Young   Lawyers   Association   &
Ors. 7
  (Sabarimala   Temple   Review   –   5   JJ.).   He   submitted   that
the   Constitution   Bench   has   held   that   freedom   of   religion
guaranteed   under   Articles   25   and   26   of   the   Constitution   needs
authoritative   pronouncement   by   a   larger   Bench   of   not   less   than
seven   Hon’ble   Judges.   He   invited   our   attention   to   the   questions
formulated under the said order. He pointed out that on the basis
of the said order, a Bench of nine Judges in  Kantaru Rajeevaru
(Right   to   Religion;   in   Re   –   9   JJ.)   v.   Indian   Young   Lawyers
Association   &   Ors. 8
  (Sabrimala   Temple   Review   –   9   JJ) ,   has
framed   seven issues and at least, the first three issues framed by
the said Bench will arise even in the present case. Therefore, he
urged that this petition be tagged along with the case before the
Bench of Hon’ble nine Judges. 
12. Shri  Fali  S.  Nariman,  the   learned  senior  counsel  appearing
for the 2 nd
 Respondent urged that in view of the repeal of the Ex­
communication   Act,   nothing   survives   in   the   petition   considering
7   2020 (2) SCC 1
8   2020 (3) SCC 52
9

the prayers made in the petition. He also invited our attention to
the fact that the second petitioner has died and there is no one to
represent   the   first   petitioner   which   is   an   unregistered
organization. 
13. He   submitted   that   the   decision   in   the   case   of   Sardar
Syedna 1  
was   noted   by   the   Constitution   Bench   in   the   case   of
(Sabarimala   Temple   5JJ)   6
.   He   relied   upon   the   decision   of   the
Bench   of   seven   Judges   of   this   Court   in   the   case   of
Commissioner,   Hindu   Religious   Endowments,   Madras   v.   Sri
Lakshmindra   Thirtha   Swamiar   of   Sri   Shirur   Mutt 9
.   He
submitted   that   the   issue   of   the   interpretation   of   Article   26   has
been concluded. He lastly submitted that this case should not be
tagged with the review pending  before the bench of Hon’ble nine
Judges   and   at   the   highest,   it   may   be   kept   pending   till   the
disposal of the said case.
14. Shri Dariaus J. Khambata, the learned senior counsel while
supplementing   the   submissions   made   by   Shri   Fali   S.   Nariman
stated   that   the   judgment   in   the   case   of   Sardar   Syedna 1  
has
stood the test of time and there has been no contrary view taken
9   1954 SCR 1005
10

by any Bench. Therefore, no further orders are warranted in this
petition. 
RELEVANT PROVISIONS
15. Before we deal with the submissions, a brief reference to the
Ex­communication Act is necessary. Sections 2 and 3 thereof, are
material, which read thus:  
“2.   In   this   Act,   unless   there   is   anything
repugnant in the subject or context, – 
(a) "community" means a group the members of
which are connected together   by  reason  of  the
fact   that   by   birth,   conversion   or   the
performance of any religious rite they belong to
the   same   religion   or   religious   creed   and
includes a caste or sub­caste;
(b) "ex­communication" means the expulsion of
a person from any community of which he is a
member   depriving   him   of   rights   and   privileges
which   are   legally   enforceable   by   a   suit   of   civil
nature   by   him   or   on   his   behalf   as   such
member.  
Explanation.­ For the purposes of this clause a
right legally enforceable by a suit of civil nature
shall include the right to office or property or to
worship   in   any   religious   place   or   a   right   of
burial   or   cremation,   notwithstanding   the   fact
that   the   determination   of   such   rights   depends
entirely   on   the   decision   of   the   question   as   to
any   religious   rites   or   ceremonies   or   rule   or
usage of a community.  
3.   Notwithstanding   anything   contained   in   any
law,   custom   or   usage   for   the   time   being   in
force, to the contrary, no ex­communication of
11

a member of any community shall be valid and
shall be of any effect. ”
The   Ex­communication   Act   has   been   repealed   by   the   Social
Boycott Act. At this stage, it is not necessary for us to go into the
question of the effect of the Social Boycott Act on the practice of
ex­communication   or   “Baraat”   prevailing   in   the   Dawoodi   Bohra
community.
THE FINDINGS RECORDED IN SARDAR SYEDNA
16. Now, we advert to the findings recorded by the Constitution
Bench in the case of  Sardar Syedna 1. 
The said decision contains
separate   opinions   of   K.C.   Das   Gupta,   J.   for   himself   and   J.R.
Mudholkar, J.; N. Rajagopala Ayyangar, J. and B. P. Sinha, C.J.
We may note here that B.P. Sinha, C.J. has written a dissenting
opinion.   The   other   Hon’ble   Judges   took   the   view   that   the   Ex­
communication Act was void as it infringes the rights guaranteed
under Article 26(b) of the Constitution. 
Das Gupta, J. concluded that: 
(a) The   exercise   of   the   power   of   ex­communication   on
religious grounds forms a part of the management of the
community through its religious head;
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(b) The   Ex­communication   Act   takes   away   the   freedom
conferred   by   clause   (b)   of   Article   26   on   the   head   of   the
Dawoodi   Bohra   community   to   ex­communicate   its
members on religious grounds;
(c) Though,   it   is   true   that   the   ex­communication   of   a
member   of   the   community   will   affect   many   of   his   civil
rights,   the   rights   conferred   by   clause   (b)   of   Article   26
have   not   been   made   subject   to   the   other   fundamental
rights. Therefore, the fact that the civil rights of a person
are affected by the exercise of the rights under clause (b)
of Article 26, is of no consequence; 
(d) Prohibiting ex­communication on religious grounds, pure
and   simple,   cannot   be   considered   to   promote   social
welfare and  reform.  Therefore, the  law  which  invalidates
ex­communication   on   religious   grounds,   cannot   be
considered  to  be a  measure  of  social  welfare  and  reform
as contemplated by clause (2)(b) of Article 25; and
(e) Though,   in   the   counter   affidavit   filed   by   the   State
Government, reliance was placed on the fact that Article
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26(b)   is   subject   to   morality,   the   said   argument   was   not
pressed into service.
17. Ayyangar, J. in his elaborate opinion concluded that:
(a) Though,   it   was   argued   that   a   law   preventing   ex­
communication  is a  measure of  social reform, it  was not
suggested that the practice of ex­communication offended
public   order,   morality,   health   or   any   other   part   of   the
Constitution;
(b) Though, the right under Article 26(b) is subject to public
order,   morality   or   health,   it   was   not   suggested   that   the
practice   of   ex­communication   offended   public   order,
morality or health;
(c) The   denomination   within   the   meaning   of   Article   26   and
the   members   of   the   denomination   are   entitled   to   ensure
the continuity of the denomination and such continuity is
possible   only   by   maintaining   the   bond   of   religious
discipline which would secure the continued adherence of
its   members   to   certain   essentials   like   faith,   tenets   and
practices;
14

(d) The right guaranteed under clause (1) of Article 25 is not
confined to freedom of conscience as it also includes the
right to practice religion; 
(e) By   the   phrase   “law   providing   for   social   welfare   and
reforms”, it was not intended to enable the legislature to
reform a religion out of existence or identity. Clause (2)(b)
of   Article   25   does   not   cover   the   basic   essentials   of   the
creed   of   a   religion   which   are   protected   by   clause   (1)   of
Article 25;
(f) The   power   of   ex­communication   for   the   purpose   of
ensuring the preservation of the community  has a prime
significance   in   the   religious   life   of   every   member   of   the
group; and 
(g) The   legislation   which   penalizes   the   power   to   ex­
communicate   even   when   exercised   for   the   purposes   of
preservation  of the  community  cannot  be  sustained as  a
measure   of   social   welfare   or   reform   without   eviscerating
the   right   guaranteed   under   clause   (1)   of   Article   25,
thereby rendering the protection illusory.
15

18. In   his   dissenting   opinion,   B.P.   Sinha,   C.J.,   came   to   the
following conclusions:
(a) The   expressions   ‘matters   of   religion’   and   ‘activities
associated with  religious practice’ in clause (b) of Article
26   do   not   cover   exactly   the   same   ground.   The   activities
associated   with   the   religious   practice   may   have   serious
ramifications, such as economic and financial;
(b) The   autonomy   that   a   religious   denomination   enjoys
under   clause   (b)   of   Article   26   is   in   matters   of   religion.
Article   26   itself   indicates   that   a   religious   denomination
has to deal not only with matters of religion but also with
other   matters   such   as   managing   property   owned   and
possessed by the religious community; 
(c) The matters of religion under clause (b) of Article 26 are
subject not only to public order, morality and health but
also to legislation contemplated by clause (2)(b) of Article
25.   In   the   case   of   Sri   Shirur   Mutt 9
,   it   is   distinctly   laid
down that clause (b) of Article 26 must be read subject to
clause (2)(b) of Article 25; and 
16

(d) The right of ex­communication vested in the head of the
community   is   not   purely   a   religious   matter.   Therefore,
the Ex­communication Act is valid as it does not infringe
the right conferred by clause (b) of Article 26.
WHETHER   THE   WRIT   PETITION
SURVIVES   FOR
CONSIDERATION
19. By   a   majority,   the   Constitution   Bench   held   that   the   Ex­
communication Act was void being in violation of Article 26(b) of
the   Constitution.   We   must   note   here   that   considering   the
definition   of   ‘community’   under   Section   2(a)   of   the   Ex­
communication   Act,   the   applicability   thereof   was   not   confined
only to the Dawoodi Bohra community. The provisions of the Ex­
communication   Act   were   applicable   to   the   practice   of   ex­
communication   prevailing   in   different   religions,   castes   or   sub­
castes.   The   findings   rendered   by   the   majority   view   are   only   in
respect of the right of the head of the Dawoodi Bohra community
to   ex­communicate   a   member   of   the   community.   With   the
greatest   respect   to   the   Constitution   Bench,   while   recording   a
finding   regarding   violation   of   Article   26(b)   only   in   relation   to
Dawoodi   Bohra   community,   the   Ex­communication   Act   in   its
entirety   could   not   have   been   declared   void.   Therefore,   even
17

assuming   that   the   view   taken   by   the   Constitution   Bench   is
correct, the question which certainly survives for consideration is
whether   the   practice   of   ex­communication   prevailing   in   other
religions, castes or sub­castes is constitutionally valid.
20. Even   if   the   Ex­communication   Act   has   been   repealed,   the
issue   remains   whether   the   power   of   the   head   of   Dawoodi   Bohra
Community   to   ex­communicate   its   members   is   non­justiciable
being   protected   under   the   umbrella   of   clause   (b)   of   Article   26.
This   issue   requires   examination   in   the   present   day   context.
Therefore,   the   argument   that   nothing   survives   on   merits   in   the
petition, cannot be accepted. 
APPROACH TO BE ADOPTED
21. While   interpreting   the   Constitutional   provisions,   we   must
remember   that   the   Constitution   is   a   living   instrument.   In
paragraph  262  of the  decision  of this  Court in  the  case  of   K.   S.
Puttaswamy   &   Anr.   v.   Union   of   India   &   Ors. 10
,     this   Court
observed thus: 
“262.   ………………………………………………….
Hence,   it   would   be   an   injustice   both   to   the
draftsmen   of   the   Constitution   as   well   as   to
the   document   which   they   sanctified   to
constrict   its   interpretation   to   an   originalist
10   2017 (10) SCC 1
18

interpretation.   Today's   problems   have   to   be
adjudged   by   a   vibrant   application   of
constitutional   doctrine   and   cannot   be   frozen
by   a   vision   suited   to   a   radically   different
society.   We describe the Constitution as a living
instrument simply  for  the reason that  while it is
a   document   which   enunciates   eternal   values   for
Indian   society,   it   possesses   the   resilience
necessary   to   ensure   its   continued   relevance.   Its
continued relevance lies precisely in its ability to
allow   succeeding   generations   to   apply   the
principles   on   which   it   has   been   founded   to   find
innovative   solutions   to   intractable   problems   of
their   times.   In   doing   so,   we   must   equally
understand   that   our   solutions   must
continuously   undergo   a   process   of   re­
engineering. ”
                       (emphasis added)
The   originalist   interpretation   rendered   to   the   provisions   of   the
Constitution   decades   back,   cannot   continue   to   be   valid   for   all
times   to   come   if   the   Constitution   is   to   continue   as   a   living
instrument with continued relevance. 
22. In paragraph 26 of the decision of this Court in the case of
Central   Inland   Water   Transport   Corporation   Ltd.   &   Anr.   v.
Brojo Nath Ganguly & Anr. 11
,  this Court held thus.:
“ 26.   The   law   exists   to   serve   the   needs   of   the
society   which   is   governed   by   it.   If   the   law   is   to
play   its   allotted   role   of   serving   the   needs   of   the
society, it must reflect the ideas and ideologies of
that   society.   It   must   keep   time   with   the
11   1986 (3) SCC 156
19

heartbeats   of   the   society   and   with   the   needs
and   aspirations   of   the   people.   As   the   society
changes,   the   law   cannot   remain   immutable.
The   early   nineteenth   century   essayist   and
wit,   Sydney   Smith,   said:   “When   I   hear   any
man   talk   of   an   unalterable   law,   I   am
convinced that he is an unalterable fool.” The
law   must,   therefore,   in   a   changing   society
march   in   tune   with   the   changed   ideas   and
ideologies. Legislatures are, however, not best
fitted   for   the   role   of   adapting   the   law   to   the
necessities   of   the   time,   for   the   legislative
process   is   too   slow   and   the   legislatures   often
divided   by   politics,   slowed   down   by   periodic
elections and overburdened with myriad other
legislative   activities.   A   constitutional
document is even  less  suited  to this task, for
the   philosophy   and   the   ideologies   underlying
it must of necessity be expressed in broad and
general   terms   and   the   process   of   amending   a
Constitution   is   too   cumbersome   and   time­
consuming to meet the immediate needs. This
task   must,   therefore,   of   necessity   fall   upon
the   courts   because   the   courts   can   by   the
process   of   judicial   interpretation   adapt   the
law to suit the needs of the society.”
                          (emphasis added)
In view of what is held above, the role of the Constitutional
Courts   to   interpret   the   Constitution   considering   the   changing
needs of the society assumes importance.
23. The Constitution Bench in the case of  Navtej Singh Johar 5
emphasized   that   the   principle   of   transforming   Constitutionalism
20

also places upon the judicial arm a duty to ensure that a sense of
transformation   is   ushered   consistently   in   the   society   by
interpreting   and   enforcing   the   Constitutional   as   well   as   other
provisions   of   law.   Constitutional   law   has   developed   a   great   deal
during   the   last   few   decades.   The   interpretation   of   various
provisions   of   the   Constitution   made   by   this   Court   decades   back
has   undergone   a   drastic   change.   For   example,   the   narrow
interpretation   given   to   Article   21   in   the   ‘A.K.   Gopalan’   era   is   no
longer   valid.  The  concept   of   freedom  has   undergone   changes.   In
the   21 st
  Century,   society   looks   completely   different   from   what   it
looked in the last century. We see a change in the socio­cultural
ethos   of   society.   Thus,   the  interpretation   of   law   must   keep   pace
with changing needs of society. 
MORALITY   IN   THE
CONTEXT   OF   ARTICLES   25
AND 26
24. The   freedom   of   conscience   guaranteed   under   clause   (1)   of
Article 25 is subject to public order, morality and health. All four
clauses (a), (b,), (c) and (d) of Article 26 are also made specifically
subject   to   public   order,   morality   and   health.   Thus,   the   right   of
the   religious   denomination   to   manage   its   own   affairs   in   matters
of religion is always subject to morality. As far as the concept of
21

morality contemplated by Articles 25 and 26 is concerned, much
water   has   flown   after   the   decision   in   the   case   of   Sardar
Syedna 1
.   Moreover,   in   the   case   of   Sardar   Syedna 1
,   the
argument that Article 26(b) is subject to morality, was not at all
considered   as   it   was   not   canvassed   and   pressed   at   the   time   of
hearing.   In   the   case   of   Navtej   Singh   Johar   5
,   this   Court   held
that when this Court deals with the issue of morality, it must be
guided   by   the   concept   of   Constitutional   morality   and   not   by
societal   morality.   Moreover,   notion   of   morality   evolves   with   time
and   is   not   static.   The   question   whether   Constitutional   morality
can   be   equated   with   equality,   fraternity   and   non­discrimination
needs consideration.
25. The concept of morality as contemplated by Articles 25 and
26   was   considered   in   greater   detail   by   another   Constitution
Bench in the case of   Sabrimala Temple  5JJ   6
. There were four
separate   opinions   rendered   by   the   Constitution   Bench.   Dipak
Misra,   C.J.,   who   wrote   the   opinion   for   himself   and   A.   M.
Khanwilkar, J. and Dr. D. Y. Chandrachud, J. (as then he was),
in their separate opinions concurred on the interpretation of the
concept of morality under Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution.
They also dealt with the issue of the interplay between the rights
22

under   Article   26   and   the   other   rights   under   part   III   of   the
Constitution.   The conclusions in the separate opinions of Dipak
Misra, C.J. and Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, J. can be summarized as
under: 
(a) The expression ‘morality’ used in Articles 25 and 26 has an
overarching position similar to public order and health;
(b) The term ‘morality’ cannot be viewed with a narrow lens so
as to confine the definition of morality to what an individual
or a religious sect may perceive to mean. Morality naturally
implies   Constitutional   morality   and   any   view   that   is
ultimately   taken   by   the   Constitutional   Courts   must   be   in
conformity  with   the  basic  tenets   of  Constitutional   morality.
‘Morality’ for the purposes of Articles 25 and 26 must mean
that   which   is   governed   by   fundamental   Constitutional
principles;
(c) The   expression   ‘subject   to’   is   in   nature   a   condition   and
therefore,   public   order,   morality   and   health   control   Article
26;
(d) There  is  no  convincing   reason   to   allow   provisions   of  Article
26 to tread in isolation. Even if Article 26 is not specifically
23

made subject to other fundamental rights, there would still
be a ground to read both together so that they can exist in
harmony.  Absence  of  specific  words  in   Article  26 making  it
subject to other fundamental rights cannot allow freedom of
religious denomination to exist in an isolated silo; and 
(e) The   freedom   of   religious   denominations   under   Article   26
must be read in a manner that requires the preservation of
equality,   and   other   individual   freedoms   which   may   be
impacted by unrestricted exercise; 
26. Nariman,   J   in   paragraph   176.7,   stressed   that   the   term
‘morality’ refers to that which is considered abhorrent to civilized
society, given the mores of the time, by reason of harm caused by
way, inter alia, of exploitation and degradation. 
27. In   his   opinion   rendered   in   Sabrimala   Temple–5JJ   6
,   Dr.
D.Y.   Chandrachud,   J.(as   he   then   was)   has   dealt   with   the
engagement   of   essential   religious   practices   with   Constitutional
values.   While   dealing   with   the   said   issue,   in   paragraph   289,   he
has observed thus:
“ 289.   For   decades,   this   Court   has   witnessed
claims   resting   on   the   essentiality   of   a   practice
that militate against the constitutional protection
of   dignity   and   individual   freedom   under   the
24

Constitution.   It   is   the   duty   of   the   courts   to
ensure that what is protected is in conformity
with   fundamental   constitutional   values   and
guarantees   and   accords   with   constitutional
morality.   While   the   Constitution   is   solicitous
in   its   protection   of   religious   freedom   as   well
as   denominational   rights,   it   must   be
understood   that   dignity,   liberty   and   equality
constitute   the   trinity   which   defines   the   faith
of   the   Constitution.   Together,   these   three
values combine to define a constitutional order of
priorities. Practices or  beliefs which detract from
these   foundational   values   cannot   claim
legitimacy.”  
                     (emphasis added)
28. The   question   is   whether   the   exclusionary   practice   which
prevails   in   the   Dawoodi   Bohra   community   of   ex­communicating
its   members   will   stand   the   test   of   Constitutional   morality?   As
observed   by   Das   Gupta,   J.   in   the   case   of   Sardar   Syedna 1
,   the
ex­communication of a member of the community affects many of
his   civil   rights.   The   Privy   Council,   in   the   case   of   Hasanali   &
Ors. v. Mansoorali   & Ors. 12
, in paragraph 4, has dealt with the
effect   of   ex­communication   in   Dawoodi   Bohra   community.
Paragraph 4 reads thus:
“ 4.   The   appellants   would   limit   the   effect   of
excommunication, whatever steps might have
been taken to bring it into being, to complete
12   1947 SCC OnLine PC 63
25

social   ostracism.   There   is   nothing,   they   say,
to   show   that   it   excluded   from   rights   of
property   or   worship.   Their   Lordships   do   not
find themselves able to accept this limitation.
The   Dai   is   a   religious   leader   as   well   as   being
trustee of the property of the community, and
in   India   exclusion   from   caste   is   well   known.
There is at least one case in which it is recorded
that   certain   persons   applied   to   the   King   to
intercede   with   the   thirty­third   Dai,   complaining
that   in   consequence   of   excommunication   they
were   kept   from   the   mosques   and   places   where
true   believers   met;   and   no   instance   has   been
cited   where   excommunicated   persons   freely
exercised   their   religious   rights.   Indeed,   the
complaint   in   the   cases   brought   to   their
Lordships'   attention   as   regards   which   relief   is
claimed   for   the   appellants   or   those   whom   they
are   said   to   represent   is   that   they   were   wrongly
excommunicated,   not   that   if   rightly
excommunicated   they   were   wrongly   deprived   of
their   religious   rights.   Excommunication,   in
their   Lordships'   view,   if   justified,   necessarily
involves   exclusion   from   the   exercise   of
religious   rights   in   places   under   the
trusteeship   of   the   head   of   the   community   in
which religious exercises are performed .”
                                             (emphasis added)
A   person   who   is   ex­communicated   by   the   community,   will
not   be   entitled   to   use   the   common   property   of   the   community
and the burial/cremation grounds of the community. In a sense,
such a person will virtually become untouchable (being banished
or ostracized) within the community. In a given case, it will result
in   his   civil   death.   It   can   be   argued   that   the   concept   of
26

Constitutional morality which overrides the freedom conferred by
clause   (b)   of   Article   26,   will   not   permit   the   civil   rights   of   ex­
communicated   persons   which   originate   from   the   dignity   and
liberty   of   human   beings   to   be   taken   away.   The   concepts   of
equality,   liberty   and   fraternity   are   certainly   part   of   our
Constitutional   morality.   Basic   ideas   enshrined   in   our
Constitution   are   part   of   Constitutional   morality.   The   conscience
of   our   Constitution   is   Constitutional   morality.   Hence,   it   is
contended   that   ex­communication   or   ostracisation   is   anathema
to   the   concepts   of   liberty   and   equality.   It   is   against   the   anti­
discriminatory   ethos   which   forms   a   part   of   Constitutional
morality.   Therefore,   the   Constitutional   Court   ought   not   to
tolerate anything which takes away the right and privilege of any
person   to   live   with   dignity   as   the   concept   of   Constitutional
morality   does   not   permit   the   Court   to   do   so.     Therefore,   in   our
view, the protection under Article 26(b) granted by the decision in
the   case   of   Sardar   Syedna 1
  to   the   power   to   ex­communicate   a
member of the Dawoodi Bohra community, needs reconsideration
as   the   said   right   is   subject   to   morality   which   is   understood   as
Constitutional morality. This issue will require examination by a
larger Bench.
27

29. The   concurring   opinions   rendered   by   Dr.   D.Y.
Chandrachud,   J.   and   Mr.   R.F.   Nariman,   J.   extensively   refer   to
the   case   of   Sardar   Syedna 1
.   In   paragraph   164,   Nariman,   J.
records  that   there is  a  need  to  look  into   the  finding   recorded by
the   majority   view   in   the   case   of   Sardar   Syedna 1
  on   the
applicability of clause (2)(b) of Article 25 in some future cases.
INTERPLAY   BETWEEN   THE
OTHER   FUNDAMENTAL   RIGHTS
UNDER   PART   III   AND   ARTICLE
26 
30. We   have   already   referred   to   the   opinion   of   D.Y.
Chandrachud, J. (as then he was) in  Sabrimala Temple– 5 JJ  6
.
It was held that though Article 26 is not specifically made subject
to other fundamental rights, there would still be a ground to read
both together so that they can exist in harmony. The freedom of
religious denominations cannot exist in isolation. Nariman, J. in
his opinion has also dealt with this issue. In note 59 appended to
paragraph 176.7, he observed that:
“ (59).   We   were   invited   by   the   learned   Amicus
Curiae,   Shri   Raju   Ramachandran,   to   read   the
word “morality” as being “constitutional morality”
as   has   been   explained   in   some   of   our   recent
judgments. If so read, it cannot be forgotten that
this   would   bring   in,   through   the   back   door,   the
other   provisions   of   Part   III   of   the   Constitution,
28

which   Article   26   is   not   subject   to,   in   contrast
with Article 25(1).  In any case, the fundamental
right under Article 26 will have to be balanced
with the rights of others contained in Part III
as   a   matter   of   harmonious   construction   of
these   rights   as   was   held   in   Shri
Venkataramana   Devaru ,   AIR   1958   SC   255   :
1958   SCR   895.   But   this   would   only   be   on   a
case­to­case   basis,   without   necessarily
subjecting   the   fundamental   right   under
Article   26   to   other   fundamental   rights
contained in Part III.”
(emphasis added)
Thus, Nariman, J. was of the view that there may be a need
to balance rights under Article 26(b) with the other fundamental
rights   under   Part   III   of   the   Constitution   without   necessarily
subjecting   the   fundamental   rights   under   Article   26   to   other
fundamental rights contained in Part III.
31. Even   assuming   that   the   ex­communication   of   members   of
the   Dawoodi   Bohra   community   is   always   made   on   religious
grounds, the  effect  and consequences thereof, on  the person  ex­
communicated   needs   to   be   considered   in   the   context   of
justiciable Constitutional rights. The  ex­communication will have
many   civic   consequences   which   will,   prima   facie,   affect   his
fundamental   right   to   live   with   dignity   and   the   right   to   lead   a
meaningful life guaranteed by Article 21. Therefore, the question
29

is whether the said right of the community to ex­communicate its
members   can   be   balanced   with   the   other   fundamental   rights
under Part III of the Constitution and in particular, Article 21. 
CONCLUSIONS   
32. To   conclude,   prima   facie,   we   find   that   the   exercise   of
balancing   the   rights   under   Article   26(b)   with   other   rights   under
Part   III   and   in   particular   Article   21   was   not   undertaken   by   the
Constitution   Bench   in   the   case   of   Sardar   Syedna 1
.   This
question is substantially in issue before the Bench of nine Judges
in   Sabrimala   Temple   Review   ­9JJ .   Moreover,   the   question
whether   the   protection   can   be   given   by   Article   26(b)   to   the
practice of ex­communication is to be tested on the touchstone of
the concept of Constitutional morality as the said right is subject
to   morality.  This  is an  important  and  emergent  issue.  These  are
the   two   main   grounds   on   which   the   said   decision   may   need
reconsideration by a larger Bench. 
33. Sabrimala   Temple–5JJ   6  
decision   was   subjected   to   a
review.   This   Court   dealt   with   the   review   (Sabrimala   Temple
Review   –   5JJ. 7
).     The   majority   opinion   contains   questions
30

formulated for referring it to a larger Bench.  Question Nos. 5.1 to
5.3 are relevant which reads thus:
“5.1.(i)   Regarding   the   interplay   between   the
freedom of religion under Articles 25 and 26 of
the   Constitution   and   other   provisions   in   Part
III, particularly Article 14.
5.2.(ii) What is the sweep of expression “public
order,   morality   and   health”   occurring   in
Article 25(1) of the Constitution.
5.3.(iii)   The   expression   “morality”   or
“constitutional morality” has not been defined
in   the   Constitution.   Is   it   overarching   morality
in reference to Preamble or limited to religious
beliefs   or   faith.  There   is  need   to   delineate  the
contours   of   that   expression,   lest   it   becomes
subjective.”
Accordingly,   the   review   petition   was   listed   before   a   nine­Judge
Bench.     By   the   order   dated   10 th
  February   2020,   the   Bench   of
nine­Judges   ( Sabrimala   Temple   Review   –9   JJ. 8
)   framed   seven
questions of law, out of which questions 3 and 4 are relevant for
our purposes read thus: 
“3.   Whether   the   rights   of   a   religious
denomination   under   Article   26   of   the
Constitution   of   India   are   subject   to   other
provisions   of   Part   III   of   the   Constitution   of
India   apart   from   public   order,   morality   and
health?
 
31

4.What   is   the   scope   and   extent   of   the   word
‘morality’   under   Articles   25   and   26   of   the
Constitution of India and whether it is meant
to include Constitutional morality?”
34. In   view   of   the   discussion   made   above,   questions   3   and   4
formulated by the nine­Judge Bench also   arise for consideration
in the present writ petition.   The decision which will be rendered
by   the   nine­Judge   Bench   will   have   a   direct   impact   on   the
questions which arise for determination in this writ petition.
35. In   the   circumstances,   we   are   of   the   view   that   the   present
writ   petition   deserves   to   be   tagged   with   Review   Petition   (Civil)
No.3358   of   2018   pending   before   the   Bench   of   nine   Hon’ble
Judges.   We,   accordingly   direct   the   Registry   to   seek   appropriate
directions in this behalf from the Hon’ble Chief Justice.
…....…………………J.
    (Sanjay Kishan Kaul)
…....…………………J.
    (Sanjiv Khanna)
…….…………………J.
    (Abhay S. Oka)
…....…………………J.
    (Vikram Nath)
…….…………………J.
     (J. K. Maheshwari)
New Delhi;
February 10, 2023. 
32