/2023 INSC 0113/
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
   CIVIL APPEAL NO(S).                   OF 2023
(Arising out of SLP(Civil) No(s). 6261­6262 of 2021)
OFFICE OF THE ODISHA
LOKAYUKTA ….APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
DR. PRADEEP KUMAR PANIGRAHI
AND OTHERS ….RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
Rastogi, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. The   instant   appeals   are   directed   against   the   judgment   dated
3 rd
  February, 2021 passed by the Division Bench of the High Court
of Orissa at Cuttack setting aside Order dated 11 th
 December, 2020
passed by the Odisha Lokayukta initiating to conduct a preliminary
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inquiry   in   exercise   of   power   conferred   under   Section   20(1)   of   the
Odisha   Lokayukta   Act,   2014(hereinafter   being   referred   to   as   the
“Act 2014”) on a complaint dated 9 th
  December, 2020 received from
Mr.Ranjan   Kumar   Das,   Deputy   Superintendent   of   Police,   Vigilance
Cell   Unit,   Bhubaneswar   indicating   the   alleged   corruption   against
respondent   no.   1   who   is   the   elected   Member   of   the   Legislative
Assembly   of   Gopalpur   Constituency   directing   the   Directorate   of
Vigilance,   Cuttack   to   conduct   a   preliminary   inquiry   and   submit   a
report to the Lokayukta.
3. The review petition filed at the instance of the appellant on the
premise   that   Odisha   Lokayukta   was   never   heard   and   no
opportunity   of   hearing   has   been   afforded   before   passing   of   the
impugned Order dated 3 rd
 February, 2021 and it was in violation of
the principles of natural justice, came to be dismissed by passing a
non­speaking Order dated 5 th
 April, 2021.
4. Respondent   no.   1   is   an   elected   Member   of   the   Legislative
Assembly.     Mr.   Ranjan   Kumar   Das,   the   then   Deputy
Superintendent of Police, Vigilance Cell Unit, Bhubaneswar, made a
complaint   dated   9 th
  December,   2020   indicating   serious   allegations
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of   alleged   corruption   against   Member   of   the   Odisha   Legislative
Assembly   of   Gopalpur   Constituency.     Along   with   the   complaint,
supporting documents were also annexed.   The Odisha Lokayukta,
after   taking   into   consideration   the   contents   of   the   complaint   and
the   supporting   documents   annexed   thereto,   in   exercise   of   power
conferred   under   Section   20(1)   of   the   Act,   2014   directed   the
Directorate   of   Vigilance,   Odisha,   Cuttack   to   conduct   a   preliminary
inquiry   against   respondent   no.   1   and   submit   a   report   within   two
months   with   a   further   direction   that   the   Directorate   of   Vigilance
must   ensure   that   during   preliminary   inquiry,   the   mandate   of
Section   20(2)   has   to   be   complied   with   and   further   directed   the
Office of Lokayukta to make available all the relevant record to the
Directorate of Vigilance for compliance.
5. Immediately on a reference made by the Odisha Lokayukta by
its   Order   dated   11 th
  December,   2020   directing   the   Directorate   of
Vigilance to conduct a preliminary inquiry against respondent no. 1
and   calling   upon   the   report,   came   to   be   challenged   by   respondent
no. 1 by filing writ petition before the High Court under Article 226
of   the   Constitution.     Although   the   Office   of   Lokayukta   was
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impleaded   as   one   of   respondent   before   the   High   Court   but   as
informed   to   this   Court,   no   notice   was   issued   to   them   and   on   the
first  date of  hearing,  without  even  affording   opportunity  of  hearing
to   the   appellant   to   submit   their   written   response,   the   Division
Bench   of   the   High   Court   under   Order   dated   3 rd
  February,   2021
proceeded on the premise that entrusting Directorate of Vigilance to
conduct   preliminary   inquiry   is   not   in   terms   of   the   mandate   of
Section   20(1)   and   set   aside   the   Order   dated   11 th
  December,   2020
with a liberty to the Lokayukta to conduct preliminary inquiry, if so
advised,   against   respondent   no.   1   by   the   inquiry   wing   of   the
Lokayukta   with   a   further   liberty   to   proceed   in   conformity   with   the
requirements   of   Sections   20(2)   and   20(3)   after   the   preliminary
report being furnished by the inquiry wing of the Lokayukta.
6. A   review   filed   by   the   Lokayukta   against   the   Order   impugned
dated  3 rd
  February,  2021   came   to  be  dismissed  by   a   non­speaking
order dated 5 th
 April, 2021 which is a subject matter of challenge in
the appeals before us.
7. Learned   counsel   for   the   appellant   submits   that   the   order
impugned dated 3 rd
  February, 2021 is in violation of the principles
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of   nature   justice   and   the   finding   has   been   recorded   without
affording an opportunity of hearing to the appellant and that apart,
it is not in conformity with the mandate of Section 20(1) of the Act
2014.
8. Learned   counsel   further   submits   that   Section   20(1)   provides
an option to the Lokayukta, who, on receipt of a complaint, if order
to   hold   a   preliminary   inquiry   against   any   public   servant,   may
conduct either by its enquiry wing or by any agency to ascertain as
to   whether   there   exists   any   prima   facie   case   for   proceeding   in   the
matter   any   further.     If   the   relevant   provisions   of   the   Act   are   being
looked into, particularly Chapter VIII of the Act 2014, any agency as
referred to under Section 25 includes the State Vigilance and Crime
Branch   for   the   purpose   of   conducting   preliminary   inquiry   or
investigation, as the case may be, and that is further strengthened
by   the   procedure   for   conducting   a   preliminary   inquiry   or
investigation envisaged under Section 28 wherein it is open for the
Lokayukta   to   conduct   preliminary   inquiry   or   investigation   through
the   agency   of   the   Government.     In   the   given   facts   and
circumstances, the finding which has been recorded by the Division
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Bench   of   the   High   Court   that   entrusting   to   conduct   preliminary
inquiry   by   the   Directorate   of   Vigilance   under   Order   dated   11 th
December, 2020 is not in conformity with the Act 2014, needs to be
interfered with by this Court.
9. Learned counsel further submits that calling upon the inquiry
wing   or   any   agency   to   conduct   a   preliminary   inquiry   is   only   for   a
limited   purpose   to   ascertain   whether   there   exists   prima   facie   case
to proceed in the matter.  The Legislature was conscious of the fact
that  if  it may  cause any   prejudice  to  the incumbent  against  whom
the   prima   facie   case   has   been   registered   and   before   any   further
action   is   being   taken   or   to   make   any   recommendation   to   proceed
either to conduct investigation or initiate a departmental inquiry, it
is   incumbent   upon   the   Lokayukta   to   afford   an   opportunity   of
hearing   to   the   public   servant   as   referred   to   under   Sections   20(2)
and 20(3) of the Act, 2014.   A complete inbuilt procedure has been
prescribed   under   Chapter   VII   for   conducting   preliminary   inquiry
and investigation within the powers of the Lokayukta. Chapter VIII
prescribes   not   only   the   purpose   of   conducting   preliminary   inquiry
and investigation but also in reaching to a final conclusion even at
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the   stage   of   registering   of   the   charge­sheet   as   referred   to   under
Section 20(8) of the Act, 2014.
10. Learned counsel further submits that no adverse or prejudicial
action   was   taken   by   the   appellant   in   initiating   to   conduct   a
preliminary   inquiry   under   its   Order   dated   11 th
  December   2020,
thus   the   interference   made   by   the   High   Court,   at   this   stage,   in
exercise   of   its   jurisdiction   under   Article   226   of   the   Constitution   of
India was neither valid nor justified.
11. Per  contra,  learned  counsel  for  the  respondents,  on   the  other
hand,   submits   that   a   complaint   was   made   by   the   Deputy
Superintendent   of   Police,   Vigilance   Cell,   Bhubaneshwar   dated   9 th
December,   2020,   who   was   the   Officer   of   Directorate   of   Vigilance,
Cuttack, Odisha, Cuttack and direction was given to the Directorate
of   Vigilance,   Odisha   to   conduct   a   preliminary   inquiry   by   Order
dated   11 th
  December,   2020,   the   decision   itself   was   in   violation   of
the principles of natural justice.   Once the complaint was made by
the   officer   of   the   Directorate   of   Vigilance,   at   least   entrusting   the
preliminary   inquiry   to   be   conducted   by   another   Officer   of   the
Directorate of Vigilance, may be senior in the ladder, was not legally
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justified.    The  Officer   of   the  Department   has   made  a  complaint   on
9 th
  December,   2020   and   other   officer   is   called   upon   to   conduct   a
preliminary inquiry as stated that one cannot be a judge in its own
cause   and   that   being   the   reason,   the   Division   Bench   of   the   High
Court   has   permitted   the   Lokayukta   to   conduct   an   inquiry   by   the
inquiry   wing   of   the   Lokayukta   and   administrative   bias   can’t   be
ruled   out   of   the   Directorate   of   Vigilance   who   is   to   conduct   a
preliminary inquiry.  
12. Learned   counsel   further   submits   that   since   the   respondents
were   duly   represented   and   the   Advocate   General   of   the   State
appeared along  with the  State counsel, opportunity  of hearing  was
afforded to the appellant and plea of the principles of natural justice
as   prayed   for   by   the   appellant   being   violated,   in   the   facts   and
circumstances,   does   not   hold   good.     That   apart,   review   petition
came   to   be   rightly   dismissed   as   the   appellant   failed   to   justify   any
manifest   error   being   committed   by   the   Division   Bench   of   the   High
Court under its Order dated 3 rd
  February, 2021 which may call for
our interference.
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13. It   may   be   noticed   that   while   issuing   notice   by   this   Court   on
23 rd
  April,   2021,   operation   of   the   impugned   order   was   stayed.     In
furtherance of the stay granted by this Court, it is informed that the
appellant   has   proceeded   further   and   after   the   preliminary   inquiry
report   being   submitted   to   the   Lokayukta   by   the   Officer   Shri   P.K.
Naik on 28 th
 May, 2021 and after affording opportunity of hearing to
the appellant, a detailed Order was passed by the Lokayukta under
Section   20(3)(a)   dated   27 th
  September,   2021   directing   the
Directorate   of   Vigilance   to   carry   out   investigation.     In   furtherance
thereof,   Directorate   of   Vigilance   submitted   a   detailed   report   of
investigation   to   the   Lokayukta   on   7 th
  June,   2022,   however,   no
further  action  has been  initiated and awaiting  orders  of this  Court
which   is   indicated   in   the   order   dated   24 th
  June,   2022   placed   on
record along with IA No. 89629 of 2022.
14. We  have  heard   learned   counsel   for   the   parties   and  with   their
assistance perused the material available on record.
15. Before   we   proceed   to   examine   the   question   raised   in   the
instant appeals, it may be apposite to first take a bird’s eye view of
the Scheme of the Act, 2014.   
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16. The Act, 2014 has been enacted by the legislature of the State
of   Odisha   having   been   assented   to   by   the   President   on   the   16 th
January, 2015 with an object to provide for the establishment of the
body of Lokayukta for the State of Odisha to inquire into allegations
of   corruption   against   public   functionaries   and   for   matters
connected therewith or incidental thereto.   The Act is applicable to
the public servants of the State of Odisha serving in and outside the
State   and   the   public   servants   under   the   control   of   Government   of
Odisha.
17. A   ‘complaint’   has   been   defined   under   Section   2(d),   and   the
term   ‘preliminary   inquiry’   and   ‘public   servant’   under   Sections   2(l)
and 2(n) of the Act 2014 which are stated as follows:­
“2. (1) In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,—
……
(d)   “complaint”   means   a   complaint,   made   in   such   form   as   may   be   prescribed,
alleging   that   a   public   servant   has   committed   an   offence   punishable   under   the
Prevention of Corruption Act,1988;
……
(l) “preliminary inquiry” means an inquiry conducted under this Act;
……
(n)   “public   servant”   means   a   person   referred   to   in   clauses   (a)   to   (h)   of   sub­
section   (1)   of   section   14   but   does   not   include   a   public   servant   in   respect   of
whom   the  jurisdiction   is  exercisable   by  any   court  or   other  authority   under  the
Army   Act,   1950,   the   Air   Force   Act,   1950,   the   Navy   Act,   1957   and   the   Coast
Guard   Act,   1978   or   the   procedure   is   applicable   to   such   public   servant   under
those Acts;
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…….”.
18. Chapter VII prescribes the procedure in respect of preliminary
inquiry  and  investigation,  the  relevant   part  of  which  is  reproduced
as under:­
“20. (1) The Lokayukta, on receipt of a complaint, if it decides to proceed further,
may order— 
(a) preliminary inquiry against any public servant by its Inquiry 
Wing or any agency to ascertain whether there exists a prima 
facie case for proceeding in the matter; or 
(b) investigation by any agency or authority empowered under any
law to investigate, where there exists a prima facie case: 
Provided that any investigation under this clause shall be ordered only if in
the   opinion   of   the   Lokayukta   there   is   substantial   material   relating   to   the
existence  of a  prima facie  case or  any earlier  statutory investigation  or enquiry
regarding the same complaint reveals that a prima facie case exists: 
Provided further that before ordering an investigation under this clause, the
Lokayukta   shall   call   for   the   explanation   of   the   public   servant   and   views   of   the
competent authority, so as to determine whether there exists a prima facie case
for investigation: 
Provided also that a decision to order investigation under this clause shall
be taken by a bench constituted by the Chairperson under section 16.
  (2)   During   the   preliminary   inquiry   referred   to   in   sub­section   (1),   the   Inquiry
Wing   or   any   agency   shall   conduct   a   preliminary   inquiry   and   on   the   basis   of
material,   information   and   documents   collected,   seek   the   comments   on   the
allegations   made   in   the   complaint   from   the   public   servant   and   competent
authority and after obtaining the comments of the concerned public servant and
competent   authority,   submit,   within   sixty   days   from   the   date   of   receipt   of   the
reference, a report to the Lokayukta. 
(3)   A   bench   consisting   of   not   less   than   three   Members   of   the   Lokayukta   shall
consider   every   report   received   under   sub­section   (2)   from   the   Inquiry   Wing   or
any agency and after giving an opportunity of being heard to the public servant,
decide   as   to   whether   there   exists   a   prima   facie   case,   and   make
recommendations to proceed with one or more of the following actions, namely:
— 
(a)   investigation   by   any   agency   (including   any   special
investigation agency); 
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(b)   initiation   of   the   departmental   proceedings   or   any   other
appropriate   action   against   the   concerned   public   servant   by   the
competent authority; 
(c) closure of the proceedings against the public servant and take
action to proceed against the complainant under section 46. 
(4)   The   promotion   and   other   service   benefits   of   a   public   servant   mentioned   in
clauses   (e)  to   (h)  of   sub­section  (1)   of  section   14  shall   not  be   affected  until   the
public   servant   is   put   under   suspension   on   recommendation   of   the   Lokayukta
under section 32 or charge sheet is filed after completion of investigation under
clause (a) of sub­section (3) or a charge memo is issued against the said public
servant   in   a   disciplinary   proceeding   initiated   on   the   recommendation   of   the
Lokayukta under clause (b) of sub­section (3).
  (5)   Every   preliminary   inquiry   referred   to   in   sub­section   (1)   shall   ordinarily   be
completed   within   a   period   of   ninety   days   and   for   reasons   to   be   recorded   in
writing,   within   a   further   period   of   ninety   days   from   the   date   of   receipt   of   the
complaint. 
(6) In case the Lokayukta decides to proceed to investigate into the complaint, it
shall, by order in writing, direct any investigating agency (including any special
agency) to carry out the investigation as expeditiously as possible and complete
the investigation within a period of six months from the date of its order: 
Provided   that   the   Lokayukta,   for   the   reasons   to   be   recorded   in   writing,   may
extend   the   said   period   by   a   further   period   not   exceeding   six   months   at   a   time
and for the maximum period of two years. 
(7)   Notwithstanding   anything   contained   in   section   173   of   the   Code   of   Criminal
Procedure,  1973, any  investigating agency  (including any  special agency)  shall,
in   respect   of   cases   referred   to   it   by   the   Lokayukta,   submit   the   investigation
report to the Lokayukta. 
(8)   A   bench   consisting   of   not   less   than   three   Members   of   the   Lokayukta   shall
consider every report received by it under sub­section (7) from any investigating
agency (including any special agency) and may, decide as to— 
(a) filing of charge­sheet or closure report before the Special Court
against the public servant; 
(b)   initiating   the   departmental   proceedings   or   any   other
appropriate   action   against   the   concerned   public   servant   by   the
competent authority. 
(9)   The   Lokayukta   may,   after   taking   a   decision   under   sub­section   (8)   on   the
filing of the charge sheet, direct its Prosecution Wing to initiate prosecution in a
Special   Court   in   respect   of   cases   investigated   by   any   investigating   agency
(including any special agency).
…..”
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19. Section   20   provides   an   inbuilt   mechanism   laying   down   the
procedure   to   be   followed   in   holding   preliminary   inquiry   and
investigation which the Lokayukta, in the facts and circumstances,
on   receipt   of   a   complaint   may   decide   ­   either   order   for   conducting
preliminary inquiry against the public servant by its inquiry wing or
any agency to ascertain whether there exists a prima facie case for
proceeding   in   the   matter;   or   direct   to   hold   an   investigation   by   any
agency   or   authority   empowered   under   any   law   to   investigate,   to
record its satisfaction whether there exists a prima facie case.
20. Sub­sections   (2),  (3)   and   (4)   provide   the  procedure   which   has
to   be   followed   by   the   inquiry   wing   or   any   agency   which   has   been
asked   to   ascertain   the   fact   as   to   whether   there   exists   prima   facie
case   for   proceeding   in   the   matter.     Such   report   is   placed   before   a
Bench consisting of not less than three members of the Lokayukta
to consider the same under sub­section (2) from the inquiry wing or
any agency and after affording an opportunity of being heard to the
public servant, may recommend to proceed with one or more of the
actions as provided under Clauses (a), (b) or (c) of sub­section (3) to
hold   departmental   action   against   the   public   servant.     Sub­section
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(5) prescribes the time schedule of 90 days under which preliminary
inquiry has to be concluded.  Sub­section (6) provides the action to
be taken to carry out the investigation as expeditiously as possible
and   complete   the   investigation   within   a   period   of   six   months.
Under   sub­section(7),   notwithstanding   anything   contained   in
Section   173   of   the   Code   of   Criminal   Procedure,   1973,   the
investigating   agency   may   submit   the   investigation   report   to   the
Lokayukta.     Sub­sections   (8)   and   (9)   provide   the   procedure   to   be
followed   after   investigating   agency   has   submitted   its   report   for
taking further action.
21. Chapter   VIII   provides   the   power   of   the   Lokayukta.     Under
Section   25,   the   power   of   superintendence   and   direction   over   the
investigating   agency   including   the   State   Vigilance   and   Crime
Branch   in   respect   of   the   matters   in   so   far   as   they   relate   to   the
investigation   made   by   such   agency   has   been   entrusted   to
Lokayukta.
22. Section   27   clarifies   that   for   the   purpose   of   any   preliminary
inquiry,   the   inquiry   wing   of   the   Lokayukta   holds   powers   of   a   civil
Court,   under   the   Code   of   Civil   Procedure,   1908   and   any
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proceedings   before   the   Lokayukta   shall   be   deemed   to   be   a   judicial
proceeding   within   the   meaning   of   Section   193   of   the   Indian   Penal
Code, 1860.
23. Section   28   authorise   the   Lokayukta   to   conduct   any
preliminary   inquiry   or   investigation   and   utilize   the   services   of   any
officer or organization or investigation agency of the Government.
24. The   Act,   in   fact,   is   a   complete   code   putting   in   place   the
procedure   under   which   the   Lokayukta   under   the   Act,   2014   within
its territorial jurisdiction holds the authority to adopt a mechanism
in reference to public servants of the State of Odisha serving in and
outside   the   State   and   the   public   servants   under   the   control   of
Government   of   Odisha   to   inquire   into   allegations   of   corruption
against   the   public   functionaries   and   for   matters   connected
therewith or incidental thereto.
25. Mr.   Ranjan   Kumar   Das,   Deputy   Superintendent   of   Police,
Vigilance   Cell   Unit,   Bhubaneswar   was   not   a   person   interested   but
as   an   informant   submitted   a   complaint   against   respondent   no.   1
(MLA   Gopalpur   Constituency)   to   Odisha   Lokayukta   regarding
possession   of   disproportionate   assets   and   intentionally   enriching
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himself   illicitly   adopting   mal­practices.       On   the   said   complaint
being   received,   the   appellant   directed   the   Directorate   of   Vigilance,
Cuttack   to   conduct   a   preliminary   inquiry   against   respondent   no.1
in exercise of his power under Section 20(1) of the Act, 2014 by an
order   dated   11 th
  December,   2020.       Before   any   action   could   have
been   taken   by   the   Directorate   of   Vigilance   in   conducting   a
preliminary   inquiry,   a   writ   petition   was   filed   by   respondent   no.1
before the High Court and on the first motion stage, the High Court,
without   affording   an   opportunity   of   hearing   to   the   appellant,   set
aside the order dated 11 th
  December, 2020 passed by the appellant
for   conducting   a   preliminary   inquiry.     The   action   of   the   Division
Bench of the High Court indeed was in violation of the principles of
natural justice.  
26. The aim to the rule of natural justice is to secure justice or to
put it negatively, t hese rules can operate only in areas not covered
by   any   law   validly   made.     The   concept   of   natural   justice,   indeed,
has undergone a change with the passage of time, but still the time­
tested rules, namely, are (i) no one shall be a judge in his own case
( Nemo debet essse judex propria causa ) and (ii) no decision shall be
16

given   against   a   party   without   affording   him   a   reasonable
opportunity   of   hearing   ( audi   alteram   partem ).       At   the   same   time,
action of the authority must be held in good faith without bias and
not arbitrary or unreasonable.  
27. In the first instance, the Division Bench of the High Court has
committed a manifest error in passing of the order impugned dated
3 rd
  February,   2021   while   setting   aside   the   order   of   the   appellant
dated 11 th
 December, 2020 to conduct a preliminary inquiry against
respondent   no.1   in   exercise   of   powers   under   Section   20(1)   of   the
Act, 2014 which is in violation of the principles of natural justice.  
28. Even on merits, the Division Bench has completely overlooked
Section   20(1)   of   the   Act,   2014   that   empowers   the   Lokayukta,   on
receipt   of   a   complaint,   obviously   after   recording   satisfaction,   in   its
discretion   if   intended   to   proceed   and   to   hold   any   inquiry,   can
conduct either a preliminary inquiry against a public servant by its
inquiry wing or any other agency to ascertain whether there exists a
prima   facie   case   for   proceeding   in   the   matter   or   hold   investigation
17

by any agency or authority empowered under any law to investigate
whether there exists a prima facie case.  
29. So   far   as   the   term   ‘any   agency’   is   concerned,   it   clearly
manifests from Section 25 of Chapter VIII which entrusts the power
of superintendence to the Lokayukta to exercise in such a manner
so   as   to   require   any   agency,   including   the   State   Vigilance   and
Crime Branch.   
30. At   the   same   time,   under   Section   28,   for   the   purpose   of
conducting   any   preliminary   inquiry   or   investigation,   it   is   open   for
the Lokayukta to utilize the services of any officer or organization or
investigation agency of the Government and, in the circumstances,
if   the   appellant   in   its   judicious   discretion   and   on   the   facts   and
circumstances   of   the   case,   conduct   a   preliminary   inquiry   through
an   agency   of   the   Government   of   which   reference   has   been   made
under   Section   28   through   the   Directorate   of   Vigilance,   Cuttack,
there appears no legal infirmity being committed by the appellant in
the   decision­making   process   in   conducting   a   preliminary   inquiry
which, in our view, was within the scope and ambit of Section 20(1)
of   the   Act,   2014   and   a   manifest   error   was   committed   by   the
18

Division Bench of the High Court while setting aside the order of the
appellant dated 11 th
  December, 2020 to conduct an inquiry against
respondent no.1.   
31. It is not a case of the respondents that respondent no.1 is not
a   public   servant   or   the   Act,   2014   is   not   applicable   to   him   or   the
Lokayukta   in   its   jurisdiction   was   not   competent   to   conduct   a
preliminary   inquiry   under   Section   20(1)   of   the   Act,   2014.       In   the
given facts and circumstances, the finding returned by the Division
Bench   of   the   High   Court   under   the   judgment   impugned,   in   our
view, is not legally sustainable.   
32. During the course of submissions made by the parties, it was
informed   that   after   the   stay   was   granted   by   this   Court   of   the
judgment   impugned   dated   3 rd
  February,   2021,   the   appellant   has
proceeded   in   conducting   further   inquiry   and   actions   are   being
taken after the Directorate of Vigilance has submitted a preliminary
inquiry report to the Lokayukta under Section 20(3)(a) to carry out
investigation and steps are taken by the Directorate of Vigilance in
summitting   a   report   of   investigation   before   the   appellant   on   7 th
June, 2022.  
19

33. Although we may not appreciate the action of the appellant in
taking   further   steps   when   there   was   stay   of   the   order   impugned
passed   by   this   Court,   but   at   the   same   time,   we   granted   an
opportunity to the respondents as well to justify if the action taken
by   the   appellant   is   not   in   conformity  with   the   mandate   of  the   Act,
2014,     but   from   the   written   submissions   placed   before   us,   we   do
not find any valid objection being raised by the respondents which
may   call   upon   this   Court   to   interfere   in   furtherance   of   the   action
being   taken   by   the   appellant   after   the   preliminary   inquiry   report
was submitted pursuant to order dated 11 th
  December, 2020.   Still
we   leave   it  open   to   respondent  no.1,  if  further   action  taken   by   the
appellant   is   not   in   conformity   with   law,   he   is   at   liberty   to   initiate
proceedings as admissible to him under the law.   
34. So far as the objection raised by the respondents regarding the
action   of   conducting   preliminary   inquiry   being   bias   for   the   reason
that   the   Deputy   Superintendent   of   Police   of   the   Directorate   of
Vigilance has submitted a complaint and the appellant directed the
Directorate   of   Vigilance   to   conduct   a   preliminary   inquiry   by   an
order dated 11 th
  December, 2020, which, in fact, was conducted by
20

a   senior   officer   of   the   Directorate   of   Vigliance   i.e.   Additional
Superintendent of Police Vigilance, Mr. P.K. Naik, who submitted a
report to the appellant on 28 th
  May, 2021 is concerned, we are not
persuaded with the submission of there being any bias on the part
of the Directorate of Vigilance cell in conducting preliminary inquiry
for   the   reason   that   the   Officer   who   submitted   a   complaint   was
simply   an   informant   and   not   the   person   interested,   at   the   same
time,   preliminary   inquiry   was   conducted   by   a   different   Officer   not
connected   with   author   of   the   complaint,   thus   the   plea   of   bias   was
ill­founded.      In  our   view,  the   principles  of  bias,  even  remotely   are
not attracted in the facts and circumstances of the present case.  
35. The   rule   against   bias   is   an   essential   component   of   modern
administrative law.   The rule against bias ensures a fair procedure
by   excluding   decision­makers   who   are   tainted   by   bias.     Under   the
rule,   actual   bias   is   disqualifying   even   though   it   is   prohibitively
difficult to establish.  The basic principle underlying the time­tested
rule is that justice must not only be done but must also appears to
be   done   and   this   rule   has   received   wide   recognition   in   several
decisions of this Court and for our consideration we take note of the
21

judgment of this Court in   A.K.   Kraipak  and others  vs.  Union  of
India and others 1
,  wherein in para 15 this Court held as under:
“ 15.   It   is   unfortunate   that   Naqishbund   was   appointed   as   one   of
the   members   of   the   selection   board.   It   is   true   that   ordinarily   the
Chief Conservator of Forests in a State should be considered as the
most   appropriate person  to be   in the  selection   board.  He  must   be
expected to know his officers thoroughly, their weaknesses as well
as   their   strength.   His   opinion   as   regards   their   suitability   for
selection   to   the   All­India   Service   is   entitled   to   great   weight.   But
then   under   the   circumstances   it   was   improper   to   have   included
Naqishbund as a member of the selection board. He was one of the
persons   to   be   considered   for   selection.   It   is   against   all   canons   of
justice to make a man judge in his own cause. It is true that he did
not   participate   in   the   deliberations   of   the   committee   when   his
name   was   considered.   But   then   the   very   fact   that   he   was   a
member   of   the   selection   board   must   have   had   its   own   impact   on
the   decision   of   the   selection   board.   Further   admittedly   he
participated   in   the   deliberations   of   the   selection   board   when   the
claims   of   his   rivals   particularly   that   of   Basu   was   considered.   He
was also party to the preparation of the list of selected candidates
in   order   of   preference.   At   every   stage   of   his   participation   in   the
deliberations   of   the   selection   board   there   was   a   conflict   between
his   interest   and   duty.   Under   those   circumstances   it   is   difficult   to
believe that he could have been impartial.   The real question is not
whether he was biased. It is difficult to prove the state of mind of a
person.   Therefore   what   we   have   to   see   is   whether   there   is
reasonable   ground   for   believing   that   he   was   likely   to   have   been
biased .   We   agree   with   the   learned   Attorney   General   that   a   mere
suspicion   of   bias   is   not   sufficient.   There   must   be   a   reasonable
likelihood of bias.   In deciding the question of bias we have to take
into   consideration   human   probabilities   and   ordinary   course   of
human   conduct .   It   was  in   the   interest   of  Naqishbund   to  keep   out
his   rivals   in   order   to   secure   his   position   from   further   challenge.
Naturally he was also interested in safeguarding his position while
preparing the list of selected candidates.
(emphasis added)
1  1969 (2) SCC 262
22

36. The   aforesaid   view   was   further   considered   by   a   Constitution
Bench of this Court in  Ashok Kumar Yadav and others vs. State
of Haryana and others 2
 as under:
“16.   We agree with the petitioners that it is one of the fundamental
principles of our jurisprudence that no man can be a judge in his
own cause and that if there is a reasonable likelihood  of bias it is
“in   accordance   with   natural   justice   and   common   sense   that   the
justice likely to be so biased should be incapacitated from sitting ”.
The question is not whether the judge is actually biased or in fact
decides   partially,   but   whether   there   is   a   real   livelihood   of   bias.
What   is   objectionable   in   such   a   case   is   not   that   the   decision   is
actually  tainted with  bias but  that  the circumstances  are such  as
to   create   a   reasonable   apprehension   in   the   mind   of   others   that
there   is   a   likelihood   of   bias   affecting   the   decision.   The   basic
principle underlying this rule is that justice must not only be done
but   must   also   appear   to   be   done   and   this   rule   has   received   wide
recognition in several decisions of this Court . It is also important to
note   that   this   rule   is   not   confined   to   cases   where   judicial   power
stricto sensu  is exercised.  It is appropriately  extended  to all cases
where   an   independent   mind   has   to   be   applied   to   arrive   at   a   fair
and just decision between the rival claims of parties. Justice is not
the function of the courts alone; it is also the duty of all those who
are expected to decide fairly between contending parties. The strict
standards applied to authorities exercising judicial power are being
increasingly   applied   to   administrative   bodies,   for   it   is   vital   to   the
maintenance   of   the   rule   of   law   in   a   Welfare   State   where   the
jurisdiction   of   administrative   bodies   is   increasing   at   a   rapid   pace
that   the   instrumentalities   of   the   State   should   discharge   their
functions   in  a   fair  and   just   manner.   This   was  the   basis   on   which
the   applicability   of   this   rule   was   extended   to   the   decision­making
process of a selection committee constituted for selecting officers to
the Indian Forest Service in   A.K. Kraipak   v.   Union of India   [(1969) 2
SCC  262].  What  happened  in this case was that  one Naqishbund,
the acting Chief Conservator of Forests, Jammu and Kashmir was
a   member  of   the  Selection   Board  which  had  been   set   up  to  select
officers   to   the   Indian   Forest   Service   from   those   serving   in   the
Forest  Department of Jammu  and Kashmir. Naqishbund  who was
a member of the Selection Board was also one of the candidates for
2  1985 (4) SCC 417
23

selection   to   the   Indian   Forest   Service.   He   did   not   sit   on   the
Selection   Board   at   the   time   when   his   name   was   considered   for
selection but he did sit on the Selection Board and participated in
the   deliberations   when   the   names   of   his   rival   officers   were
considered   for   selection   and   took   part   in   the   deliberations   of   the
Selection  Board while preparing the list of the selected candidates
in   order   of   preference.   This   Court   held   that   the   presence   of
Naqishbund   vitiated   the   selection   on   the   ground   that   there   was
reasonable   likelihood   of   bias   affecting   the   process   of   selection.
Hegde, J. speaking on behalf of the Court countered the argument
that   Naqishbund   did   not   take   part   in   the   deliberations   of   the
Selection Board when his name was considered, by saying :
“But   then   the   very   fact   that   he   was   a   member   of   the
Selection  Board must have had its own impact on the
decision of the Selection Board. Further admittedly he
participated in the deliberations of the Selection Board
when   the   claims   of   his   rivals   ...   was   considered.   He
was also party to the preparation of the list of selected
candidates in order of preference. At every stage of his
participation   in   the   deliberations   of   the   Selection
Board   there   was   a   conflict   between   his   interest   and
duty....   The   real   question   is   not   whether   he   was
biased.   It   is   difficult   to   prove   the   state   of   mind   of   a
person. Therefore what we have to see is whether there
is reasonable ground for believing that he was likely to
have   been   biased....   There   must   be   a   reasonable
likelihood   of   bias.   In   deciding   the   question   of   bias   we
have   to   take   into   consideration   human   probabilities
and ordinary course of human conduct.”
This Court   emphasised that it was not necessary to establish bias
but it was sufficient to invalidate the selection process if it could be
shown that there was reasonable likelihood of bias. The likelihood
of bias may arise on account of proprietary interest or on account
of   personal   reasons,   such   as,   hostility   to   one   party   or   personal
friendship  or family relationship  with the other . Where reasonable
likelihood   of   bias   is   alleged   on   the   ground   of   relationship,   the
question   would   always   be   as   to   how   close   is   the   degree   of
relationship   or   in   other   words,   is   the   nearness   of   relationship   so
great as to give rise to reasonable apprehension of bias on the part
of the authority making the selection.”
                                                           (emphasis added)
24

37. In   the   instant   case,   the   complaint   was   made   by   the   Deputy
Superintendent of Police (Mr. Ranjan Kumar Das) of the Directorate
of   Vigilance,   who   is,   directly   or   indirectly,   not   concerned   with   the
complaint,   he   can   be   said   to   be   an   informant   to   the   office   of   the
appellant   and   that   apart,   a   preliminary   inquiry   was   conducted
independently   by   a   senior   officer   of   the   Directorate   of   Vigilance,
Additional   Superintendent   of   Police,   Mr.   P.K.   Naik,   who   submitted
his   report   of   the   preliminary   inquiry   on   28 th
  May,   2021,   the
question   of   bias   in   the   instant   facts   and   circumstances   does   not
arise   at   all   and   that   apart,   the   Constitution   Bench   of   this   Court
recently  in   Mukesh Singh  vs.  State (Narcotic Branch  of  Delhi) 3
,
while examining the question as to whether in case investigation is
conducted by the police officer who himself is a complainant is the
trial   stands   vitiated   and   the   accused   is   entitled   to   acquittal   and
after   examining   the   scheme   of   the   Code,   finally   answered   the
reference as under:
“13.   From   the   above   discussion   and  for   the   reasons   stated   above,
we conclude and answer the reference as under:
13.1.   (I)   That   the   observations   of   this   Court   in   Bhagwan
Singh   v.   State   of   Rajasthan   [(1976)   1   SCC   15]   ,   Megha
3   2020 (10) SCC 120
25

Singh   v.   State   of   Haryana   [(1996)   11   SCC   709]
and   State   v.   Rajangam   [(2010)   15   SCC   369]   and   the   acquittal   of
the accused by this Court on the ground that as the informant and
the   investigator   was   the   same,   it   has   vitiated   the   trial   and   the
accused  is  entitled  to acquittal are  to  be  treated  to be   confined  to
their   own   facts.   It   cannot   be   said   that   in   the   aforesaid   decisions,
this   Court   laid   down   any   general   proposition   of   law   that   in   each
and   every   case   where   the   informant   is   the   investigator   there   is   a
bias caused to the accused and the entire prosecution case is to be
disbelieved and the accused is entitled to acquittal.
13.2.   (II) In a case where the informant himself is the investigator,
by that itself cannot be said that the investigation is vitiated on the
ground of bias or the like factor. The question of bias or prejudice
would   depend   upon   the   facts   and   circumstances   of   each   case.
Therefore, merely because the informant is the investigator, by that
itself   the   investigation   would   not   suffer   the   vice   of   unfairness   or
bias   and   therefore   on   the   sole   ground   that   informant   is   the
investigator,   the   accused   is   not   entitled   to   acquittal .   The   matter
has   to   be   decided   on   a   case­to­case   basis.   A   contrary   decision   of
this Court in   Mohan Lal   v.   State of Punjab   [(2018) 17 SCC 627] and
any   other   decision   taking   a   contrary   view   that   the   informant
cannot   be   the   investigator   and   in   such   a   case   the   accused   is
entitled   to   acquittal   are   not   good   law   and   they   are   specifically
overruled.”
                                                                    (emphasis added)
38. We   are   of   the   considered   view   that   there   was   no   element   of
bias in conducting a preliminary inquiry in the instant case and the
objection raised by the respondents stands overruled.   
39. The further objection raised by the respondents is in reference
to the locus standi of the appellant in filing appeal in this Court and
in   support   of   his   submission,   counsel   placed   reliance   on   the
judgments   of   this   Court   in   National   Commission   for   Women   vs.
26

State   of   Delhi   and   another 4
  and   M.S.   Kazi   vs.   Muslim
Education   Society   and   others 5
.     In   our   considered   view,   the
submission is wholly bereft of merit for the reason that the action of
the appellant initiated pursuant to order dated 11 th
 December, 2020
for conducting a preliminary inquiry in exercise of powers conferred
under   Section   20(1)   of   the   Act,   2014   was   a   subject   matter   of
challenge before the High Court at the instance of respondent no.1
and if that is being interfered with and the action of the appellant is
being   set   aside   under   the   impugned   judgment   dated   3 rd
  February,
2021,   the   appellant,   indeed,   was   a   person   aggrieved   and   has   a
locus   standi   to   question   the   action   interfered   with   by   the   Division
Bench   of   the   High   Court   and   the   only   remedy   available   with   the
appellant is to question the order of the Division Bench of the High
Court by filing  an special leave petition in this Court under Article
136 of the Constitution.
40. The   judgment   in     National   Commission   for   Women   ( supra)
on which the respondents have placed reliance was a case where in
criminal   trial,   in   the   first   instance   held   by   the   trial   Court,   the
4  2010 (12) SCC 599
5  2016 (9) SCC 263
27

accused   was   convicted   and   on   appeal   being   preferred   by   him,   was
later acquitted by the competent Court of jurisdiction and obviously
appeal could be preferred against the order of acquittal either by the
prosecution i.e. the State Government or  the victim, under Section
378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, but either of the party
has   not   preferred   any   appeal   and   it   was   the   National   Commission
for   Women   who   approached   this   Court   by   filing   a   special   leave
petition   under   Article   136   of   the   Constitution   and   this   Court   still
has   ventured   to   examine   the   appeal   preferred   by   the   Commission
on   merits,   but   observed   that   the   special   leave   to   appeal   at   the
instance of the appellant – National Commission for Women, is not
maintainable   and   obviously   at   least   the   National   Commission   for
Women was not a person aggrieved and it has no locus to object the
order passed by the competent court of jurisdiction.  
41. At   the   same   time,   the   judgment   of   this   Court   in   M.S.   Kazi
(supra) was a case where the teacher was terminated by a minority
institution   after   conducting   a   disciplinary   inquiry.     As   the   matter
travelled   to   the   High   Court   under   Article   226/227   of   the
Constitution and at this stage the Division Bench of the High Court
28

observed that since the Tribunal is not a party respondent who was
the   Administrator   before   whom   the   dispute   inter   se   between   the
parties  i.e.  the  teacher   and  the  minority  institution  was  examined,
the objection was sustainable, still that objection was turned down
by   this   Court   as   referred   in   para   9   and   held   that   it   is   the   person
aggrieved who has to pursue his or her remedy available under the
law   and   in   the   case   on   hand   the   person   aggrieved   invoked   the
jurisdiction   of   the   Tribunal,   but   the   Tribunal   was   not   a   necessary
party   to   the   proceedings   for   the   reason   that   the   lis   was   between
teacher   and   the   minority   institution   and   accordingly,   this   Court
held that the High Court has committed an error in dismissing the
letters patent appeal on the ground that it was not maintainable in
the absence of Tribunal being a party respondent.   
42. Both   the   judgments   relied   upon   are   not   even   remotely
concerned   with   the   facts   and   circumstances   of   the   present   case.
To   say   in   other   words,   if   the   order   of   the   appellant   directing   the
Directorate   of   Vigilance   to   conduct   the   preliminary   inquiry   in
exercise   of   power   under   Section   20(1)   of   the   Act,   2014   dated   11 th
December,   2020   has   been   set   aside   by   the   High   Court,   obviously,
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the   appellant   is   a   person   aggrieved   and   can   certainly   question   the
legality/validity   of   the   judgment   of   the   High   Court   impugned   by
invoking   jurisdiction   of   this   Court   under   Article   136   of   the
Constitution.
43. Consequently,   the   appeals   succeed   and   are   accordingly
allowed.   The judgment of the High Court dated 3 rd
 February, 2021
and the review order dated 5 th
  April, 2021 are hereby set aside. No
costs.  
44. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.
……………………………J.
                                                     (AJAY RASTOGI)
……………………………J.
                                                         (BELA M. TRIVEDI)
NEW DELHI
FEBRUARY 23, 2023.
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