WP(C) 302/2023 1 Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION Writ Petition (Civil) No 302 of 2023 State of Punjab Petitioner Versus Principal Secretary to the Governor Respondents of Punjab and Another J U D G M E N T Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI 1 On 22 February 2023, the Council of Ministers of the Government of Punjab recommended the summoning of the Budget Session of the Sixteenth Punjab Vidhan Sabha on 3 March 2023 under Article 174(1) of the Constitution. 2 On 23 February 2023, the Governor o f Punjab addressed a communication to the Chief Minister of the State. The subject of the letter was: WP(C) 302/2023 10 of Ministers. The relevant extracts from the decision make the position of law clear: “28. Under the C abinet system of Government as embodied in our Constitution the Governor is the constitutional or formal head of the State and he exercises all his powers and functions conferred on him by or under the Constitution on the aid and advice of his Council of M inisters save in spheres where the Governor is required by or under the Constitution to exercise his functions in his discretion. 32. It is a fundamental principle of English Constitutional law that Ministers must accept responsibility for every executive act. In England the Sovereign never acts on his own responsibility. The power of the Sovereign is conditioned by the practical rul e that the Crown must find advisers to bear responsibility for his action. Those advisers must have the confidence of the House of Commons. This rule of English Constitutional law is incorporated in our Constitution. The Indian Constitution envisages a Par liamentary and responsible form of Government at the Centre and in the States and not a Presidential form of Government. The powers of the Governor as the constitutional head are not different. 142. T he extraordinary powers of legislation by ordinances, dispensing with enquiries against public servants before dismissal, declaration of emergency and imposition of President's rule by proclamation upon States, are vast powers of profound significance. Indeed, even the power of summoning and proroguing and dis solving the House of the People and returning Bills passed by the Parliament belongs to him. If only we expand the ratio of Sardari Lal and Jayantilal to every function which the various articles of the Constitution confer on the President or the Governor, Parliamentary democracy will become a dope and national elections a numerical exercise in expensive futility. We will be compelled to hold that there are two parallel authorities exercising powers of governance of the country, as in the dyarchy days, exce pt that Whitehall is substituted by Rashtrapati Bhavan and Raj Bhavan. The Cabinet will shrink at Union and State levels in political and administrative authority and, having solemn regard to the gamut of his powers and responsibilities, the Head of State will be reincarnation of Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, untroubled by even the British Parliament — a little taller in power than the American President. Such a distortion, by interpretation, it WP(C) 302/2023 11 appears to us, would virtually amount to a subve rsion of the structure, substance and vitality of our Republic, particularly when we remember that Governors are but appointed functionaries and the President himself is elected on a limited indirect basis. As we have already indicated, the overwhelming catena of authorities of this Court have established over the decades that the cabinet form of Government and the Parliamentary system have been adopted in India and the contrary concept must be rejected as incredibly allergic to our political genius, constitutional creed and culture.” (emphasis supplied) 22 This position was reiterated by a Constitution Bench in Nabam Rebia v. Dy. Speaker, Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly 3. In view of the constitutional provision and the judgments of this Court, there can be no manner of doubt that the authority which is entrusted to the Governor to summon the House or each House of the Legislature of the State is to be exercised on the aid and advice of the Council of Minsters. This is not a constitutional arena in which the Governor is entitled to exercise his own discretion. In the present case, the Governor was not summoning the House for the first time following a general election, but was advised by the Council of Ministers to convene the Budget Session, at the behest of a government which has been duly elected in the general election. Plainly, the Governor was duty bound to do so. 23 While responding to the request by the Council of Mini sters for summoning the House, the communication of the Governor dated 23 February 2023 referred to the Cabinet decision. However, the Governor also referred to the tweet of the 3 (2016) 8 SCC 1 WP(C) 302/2023 12 Chief Minister and to his letter dated 14 February 2023 and then proceeded to state that since both the tweet and the letter were “patently unconstitutional” and “extremely derogatory”, he was compelled to take legal advice “on this issue” and that he would decide on the request thereafter. There was no occasion to seek legal advice on whether or not the Budget Session of the Legislative Assembly should be convened. The Governor was plainly bound by the advice tendered to him by the Council of Ministers. 24 Having said this, it would also be necessary to underscore that both the Chief Minister and the Governor are constitutional functionaries who have specified roles and obligations earmarked by the Constitution. The Governor has a right to seek information f rom the Chief Minister in terms of Article 167(b) on matters relating to the administration of the affairs of the State and proposals for legislation. Once such information is sought, the Chief Minister is duty bound to furnish it. The tone and tenor of th e tweet and the letter by the Chief Minister leave much to be desired. Not furnishing the information which was sought by the Governor would be plainly in dereliction of the constitutional duty which is imposed on the Chief Minister in terms of Article 167 (b). Yet on the other hand, WP(C) 302/2023 13 the dereliction of the Chief Minister to do so would not furnish a justification for the Governor not to comply with the constitutional obligation to summon the House for its Budget Session in terms of the advice which was tendered by the Council of Minist ers. It was after the institution of the petition under Article 32 that the Assembly was summoned. 25 The genesis of the controversy has required the intervention of this Court at two distinct levels: first, to ensure that the constitutional duty of the Governor to act on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers to summon the Legislative Assembly is fulfilled without delay or demur; and second, to ensure that the obligation of the Chief Minister to furnish information to the Governor in terms of Arti cle 167(b) of the Constitution is fulfilled. There are two equally important aspects for the functioning of a parliamentary democracy. First, the failure of a constitutional authority to fulfill its obligation under a distinct provision of the Constitution does not furnish a justification to another to decline to fulfill its own constitutional obligation. Second, while this Court is cognizant of the importance of free speech and expression and the fundamental value embodied in Article 19(1)(a), it becomes n ecessary to emphasize that constitutional discourse has to be conducted with a sense of decorum and mature statesmanship. 26 Political differences in a democratic polity have to be worked upon and sorted out with a sense of sobriety and maturity. The dial ogue between constitutional functionaries cannot degenerate into a race to the bottom. Unless these principles were to be borne in mind, the realization of constitutional values may WP(C) 302/2023 14 be placed in jeopardy. Such a situation emerged before this Court, leading to the institution of a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution for a direction to the Governor to summon the Legislative Assembly. It is inconceivable that the Budget Session of the Legislative Assembly would not be convened. We can only hope that mature constitutional statesmanship will ensure that such instances do not occur in the future as much as we reiterate our expectation that constitutional functionaries must be cognizant of the public trust in the offices which they occupy. The public trust which is entrusted to them is intended to sub -serve the cause of our citizens and to ensure that the affairs of the nation are conducted with a sense of equanimity so as to accomplish the objects of the Preamble to the Constitution. 27 With these observ ations, the Petition shall stand disposed of. 28 Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of. ……….. ............…...….......………………… ..CJI. [Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud] …………. .…....…........……………….…........J. [Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha] New Delhi; February 28, 2023 CKB