/2023 INSC 0154/
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.                        /2023
(@ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) NO. 530 / 2022)
Union of India               ...Appellant(s)
Versus
Sanjiv Chaturvedi & Ors.       …Respondent(s)
J U D G M E N T
M.R. SHAH, J.
1. Leave granted
2. Feeling   aggrieved   and   dissatisfied   with   the   impugned
judgment and order dated 23.10.2021 passed by the High
Court  of  Uttarakhand  at  Nainital   in  WPSB  No.  407/2020,
by which, the High Court has allowed the said writ petition
and   has   set   aside   order   dated   04.12.2020   passed   by   the
Chairman,   Central   Administrative   Tribunal   (CAT),
Principal Bench, New Delhi by which the learned Principal
Bench of the Tribunal transferred Original Application (OA)
No.   331/109/2020   filed   by   the   original   writ   petitioner,
from   the   Allahabad   Bench   (Nainital   Circuit   Bench)   to   the
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Principal   Bench,   New   Delhi,   the   Union   of   India   has
preferred the present appeal.  
3. The   facts   leading   to   the   present   appeal   in   a   nutshell   are
under: ­ 
3.1 That the contesting respondent No. 1 herein – original writ
petitioner filed original application (OA) before the Nainital
Circuit Bench, CAT with the following prayers: ­ 
"a.   To   call   for   records   and   issue   appropriate
direction/order   for   quashing   present   system   of   360
degree appraisal being used in empanelment of officers at
the   level   of   Joint   Secretary   and   above   in   Central
Government, being arbitrary, unreasonable, in violation of
principles   of   natural   justice,   being   in   supersession   of
statutory   rules   and   finding   of   Parliamentary   Committee
Report. 
b.   To   restrain   the   respondents   from   filling   up   the
posts   of   Joint   Secretary/equivalent   to   Joint   Secretary
rank   and   also   posts   above   in   rank   of   Joint   Secretary   in
Central Government, through contract system, in future. 
c.   To   set   aside   all   those   provisions   of   present
Central   Staffing   Scheme,   governing   constitution   of   and
evaluation   by   Expert   Panel   for   the   purpose   of
empanelment   at   Joint   Secretary   level   in   Government,
issued   vide   O.M.   36/77/94­EO   Central   (SM­1)"   date
05.01.1996   and   modified   subsequently,   being   arbitrary,
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unreasonable, violative of principles of natural justice and
in   violation   of   basic   federal   structure   enshrined   into   the
Constitution. 
d.   To   direct   the   respondents   to   remove   huge
artificial time lag created between empanelment of officers
of   different   services   and   between   same   levels   in   Central
Government   and   State   Government,   in   case   of   All   India
Service Officers. 
e. To direct the respondents to consider the case of
Applicant for empanelment  to the level of Joint Secretary
in view of fulfillment of all the eligibility criteria regarding
completion   of   requisite   number   of   years   of   service   and
elevation   into   Level­14   of   Pay   Matrix;   or   alternatively,
issue   directions   to   respondents   not   to   reject
abovementioned   case   of   Applicant,   on   any
ulterior/subjective/oblique   consideration,   and   decide   the
same   objectively,   on   merit,   facts   and   in   accordance   with
law only. 
f. To order and appropriate investigation so as to fix
responsibility   into   various   irregularities   into   recruitment
process   of   Joint   Secretary   rank   officers   through   contract
system,   taken   place   in   the   year   2019,   in   view   of
irregularities brought out in para 3.5 of factual matrix."
3.2 That   thereafter,   the   Union   of   India   filed   transfer
application   under   Section   25   of   the   Administrative
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Tribunals Act, 1985 (Act, 1985) seeking transfer of OA filed
by   the   writ   petitioner   from   Nainital   Circuit   Bench   to   the
Principal   Bench,   New   Delhi.   That   by   order   dated
04.12.2020,   the   Chairman   of   the   Tribunal,   Principal
Bench,   New   Delhi,   ordered   transfer   of   the   said   OA   to   the
Principal Bench, New Delhi by observing that: ­
"A perusal of the prayer in the O.A. discloses that the very
procedure   for   empanelment   for   the   post   of   Joint   Secretary
is   sought   to   be   assailed.   The   matters   of   this   nature   have
their   own   impact   on   the   very   functioning   of   the   Central
Government. It is felt that the O.A. deserves to be heard by
Principal   Bench.   Since   the   hearings   are   taking   place
through   video   conferencing,   no   prejudice   are   taking   place
through   video   conferencing,   no   prejudice   would   be   caused
to   the   respondent   in   the   P.T.,   i.e.   applicant   in   the   O.A.
also'”       
  
3.3 The   order   dated   04.12.2020   transferring   OA   No.
331/109/2020   from   Nainital   Circuit   Bench   to   the
Principal   Bench,   New   Delhi   came   to   be   challenged   by   the
original writ petitioner – original applicant before the High
Court   of   Uttarakhand.   It   was   submitted   on   behalf   of   the
original   writ   petitioner   before   the   High   Court   that   what
was   challenged   in   the   OA   was   the   recruitment   selection
process   for   the   post   of   Joint   Secretary.   He   was   also
aggrieved of the fact that although eligible candidates were
available   for   the   post   of   Joint   Secretary,   within   the   All­
India   Services,   a   policy   decision   has   been   taken   by   the
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Central Government that the post of Joint Secretary would
be filled by hiring persons on contractual basis for a period
of   three   to   five   years   and   the   said   policy   decision   would
adversely   affect   the   rights   of   the   persons   who   are   in   the
All­India   Services.   It   was   also   submitted   on   behalf   of   the
original writ petitioner – original applicant that the ground
on   which   the   Union   of   India   sought   transfer   of   OA   that,
since   the   original   writ   petitioner   has   challenged   a   policy
decision   and   since   the   policy   decision   has   “nationwide
repercussion”, therefore, the OA deserves to be transferred
to   the   Principal   Bench,   New   Delhi,   is   untenable.   It   was
submitted   that   if   the   Parliament   were   of   the   opinion   that
issues of “national importance” need to be decided only by
the Principal Bench, a provision would have existed in the
Administrative   Tribunals   Act,   debarring   other   Benches   of
CAT   from   hearing   issues   of   “national   importance”   or
having   “nationwide   repercussion.”   However,   there   is   no
such   bar   contained   in   the   Administrative   Tribunals   Act,
preventing other Benches of CAT, which are considered to
be equivalent to the Principal Bench, from hearing or from
examining   a  policy  decision  of  the  Central  Government.  It
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was   submitted   that   all   the   Benches   constituted   under
Section 5 of the Act, 1985 would have equal jurisdiction.
3.4 The  petition  was  opposed  on  behalf  of  the   Union  of  India.
The Union of India challenged the territorial jurisdiction of
the   High   Court   of   Uttarakhand   to   entertain   the   writ
petition.   It   was   submitted   on   behalf   of   the   Union   of   India
that since all the relevant files and papers are at New Delhi
the   case   should   be   transferred   to   New   Delhi.   It   was   also
the   case   on   behalf   of   the   Union   of   India   that   since   no
cause   of   action   had   arisen   in   Uttarakhand,   the   Nainital
Circuit   Bench   does   not   have   the   territorial   jurisdiction   to
hear  the  petition.  It was  submitted  that  as  the   policy  was
framed in New Delhi, the names were invited for  selection
in New Delhi, the selection process begins and ends in New
Delhi, therefore, only the Principal Bench at New Delhi has
territorial   jurisdiction   to   hear   the   OA.   It   was   also
submitted   that   since   the   relevant   files   are   lying   in   New
Delhi  and   since  the   relevant   witnesses   would  be   available
in   New   Delhi,   it   would   be   in   the   interest   of   justice   to
transfer   the   case   to   the   Principal   Bench,   rather   than
keeping   the   case   pending   before   the   Nainital   Circuit
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Bench. It was lastly submitted that since the decision with
regard   to   a   policy   decision   of   the   Central   Government
would   have   nationwide   repercussions,   therefore,   only   the
Principal   Bench   would   be   the   suitable   bench   for   deciding
the   validity   of   the   policy   decision.   Therefore,   it   was
submitted   that   the   Chairman   has   rightly   transferred   the
OA from the Nainital Circuit Bench to the Principal Bench
in exercise of powers under Section 25 of the Act, 1985. In
the rejoinder, it was the case on behalf of the original writ
petitioner as regards the cause of action, that part cause of
action   has   arisen   in   Uttarakhand   as   the   names   of   the
eligible candidates for the post of Joint Secretary are called
from the States; thus, the names are recommended by the
States;   the   service   records   of   the   eligible   candidates   are
with the State and the service records are forwarded by the
State.   Moreover,   as   the   decision   to   appoint   the   Joint
Secretaries on contractual basis adversely affects his right
of consideration for the post of Joint Secretary, hence, the
impact of the policy decision deprives his right in the State
of Uttarakhand and therefore, a part of cause of action has
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arisen   in   the   State   of   Uttarakhand   and   therefore,   the
Nainital Circuit Bench has jurisdiction to hear the OA. 
3.5 That thereafter, after considering the relevant provisions of
the   Act,   1985   and   following   the   decision   of   this   Court   in
the case of   L. Chandra Kumar Vs. Union of India (1997)
3   SCC   261 ,   the   High   Court   has   allowed   the   writ   petition
and   has   set   aside   the   order   dated   04.12.2020   passed   by
the Chairman, Central Administrative Tribunal, New Delhi
by   observing   that   there   is   no   requirement   of   law   that   a
policy decision must, necessarily, be challenged before the
Principal   Bench   and   that   there   is   no   provision   under   the
Act,   1985   that   a   challenge   to   a   policy   decision   can   be
heard only by the Principal Bench. 
3.6 Feeling   aggrieved   with   the   impugned   judgment   and   order
passed by the High Court, Union of India has preferred the
present appeal.
     
4. Shri Tushar Mehta, learned Solicitor General appearing on
behalf of the Union of India has vehemently submitted that
as   such   the   High   Court   of   Uttarakhand   has   erred   in
entertaining the writ petition. It is submitted that as such
no   cause   of   action   has   arisen   within   the   territory   of
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Uttarakhand   High   Court,   the   Uttarakhand   High   Court
lacked   the   territorial   jurisdiction   to   entertain   the   writ
petition against the order passed by the Chairman, Central
Administrative   Tribunal,   Principal   Bench,   New   Delhi.
Heavy   reliance   is   placed   on   the   decision   of   this   Court   in
the   case   of   L.   Chandra   Kumar   (supra)   as   well   as   on   the
decision   of   this   Court   in   the   case   of   Union   of   India   Vs.
Alapan Bandyopadhyay (2022) 3 SCC 133. 
4.1 In   the   case   of   Alapan   Bandyopadhyay   (supra)   after
considering and following the decision of this Court in the
case   of   L.   Chandra   Kumar   (supra),   it   is   specifically
observed   and  held   that   “all   decisions   of  Tribunals   created
under   Article   323A   and   Article   323B   of   the   Constitution
will   be   subject   to   the   scrutiny   before   a   Division   Bench   of
the   High   Court   within   whose   jurisdiction   the   concerned
Tribunal   falls.”   It   is   submitted   that   before   this   Court   an
identification question arises. That before this Court in the
case of   Alapan Bandyopadhyay (supra)   the High Court at
Calcutta set aside the order passed by the Principal Bench,
New   Delhi   transferring   the   OA   and   its   files   from   the
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Calcutta Bench to the Principal Bench (New Delhi). That it
is observed and held by this Court that the Calcutta High
Court   lacked   territorial   jurisdiction.   Shri   Tushar   Mehta,
learned   Solicitor   General   heavily   relied   upon   paragraphs
15 to 17.  
4.2 Making the above submissions and relying upon the above
decisions   it   is   vehemently   submitted   by   Shri   Tushar
Mehta,   learned   Solicitor   General   that   the   impugned
judgment   and   order   passed   by   the   High   Court   of
Uttarakhand is wholly without jurisdiction.  
4.3 Shri   Tushar   Mehta,   learned   Solicitor   General   has   made
elaborate   submissions   on   merits   also,   namely,   on   the
powers of the Chairman conferred under Section 25 of the
Act, 1985. 
5. Shri Shyam   Divan,  learned Senior  Advocate  has appeared
on   behalf   of   the   original   writ   petitioner.   On   the
submissions made on behalf of the Union of India that the
High   Court   of   Uttarakhand   would   have   no   jurisdiction   to
entertain   the   writ   petition   challenging   the   decision   of   the
Chairman,   CAT,   to   transfer   the   OA   from   Nainital   Circuit
Bench   to   Principal   Bench,   New   Delhi,   it   is   vehemently
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submitted   by   Shri   Shyam   Divan,   learned   Senior   Advocate
that under Article 226 (2) of the Constitution of India any
High   Court   can   exercise   jurisdiction   under   Article   226
provided   a   part   cause   of   action   has   arisen   in   its
jurisdiction   irrespective   of   whether   the   authority   or
government   which   passed   the   order   is   not   located   within
the jurisdiction of the said High Court. Thus, there can be
no   doubt   that   the   High   Court   can   exercise   the   powers
under Article 226, if the cause of action, wholly or in part,
arises in the territorial jurisdiction of that High Court. 
5.1 It is submitted that the decision of this Court in the case of
L.   Chandra   Kumar   (supra)   while   recognising   the
jurisdiction   of   a   High   Court   under   whose   jurisdiction   the
Tribunal   falls,   may   not   be   read   to   be   limiting   the
jurisdiction   of   other   High   Court   under   Article   226(2),   if
otherwise available. It is submitted that the decision of this
Court   does   not   confer   exclusive   jurisdiction   on   the   High
Court   under   whose   jurisdiction   the   Tribunal   falls.   It   is
submitted   that   the   judgment   ought   not   to   be   read   as
constricting   the   scope   of   Article   226(2).   Therefore,   to   this
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extent   the   decision   of   this   Court   in   the   case   of   Alapan
Bandyopadhyay (supra)  may require reconsideration.  
5.2 It   is   further   submitted   by   Shri   Shyam   Divan,   learned
Senior Advocate that under the Constitutional scheme, the
remedies   under   Article   226   and   Article   227   are   extremely
valuable remedies available to citizens where they reside or
carry   on   business   or   are   posted.   The   scheme   does   not
require citizens to come exclusively all the way to Delhi to
seek   redressal.   Thus,   limiting   the   remedy   under   Article
226 is contrary to the spirit of the Constitution, contrary to
the spirit and principle of access to justice and contrary to
the   basic   structure   of   the   Constitution   which   enables
judicial   review   across   the   country   and   not   at   one
concentrated location. 
5.3 It   submitted   that   this   Court,   by   way   of   a   judicial   order,
ought not to take away jurisdiction from other high courts
which   are   otherwise   empowered   under   Article   226(2)   to
entertain   a   Writ   Petition   against   the   order   of   a   Tribunal
located in the territory beyond the territorial jurisdiction of
the said high courts. It is further submitted that if such an
interpretation   is   taken   to   its   logical   conclusion,   then   it
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would  result  in  undue   hardship   and  inconvenience  to  the
employees of the central government itself who are posted
across the country.
5.4 Shri   Shyam   Divan,   learned   Senior   Advocate   has   taken   us
to   the   historical   background   of   Article   226   of   the
Constitution   of   India   and   the   development   of   the   law   on
the jurisdiction of the High Courts including the statement
of   objects   and   reasons   to   the   Constitution   (Fifteenth
Amendment)   Act,   1963   and   the   remarks   of   the   then   Law
Minister at the time of introducing the amendment. 
5.5 It   is   submitted   that   in   the   subsequent   decision   of   this
Court   in   the   case   of   Kusum   Ingots   and   Alloys   Ltd.   Vs.
Union   of   India   and   Anr.,   (2004)   6   SCC   254,   which   was
after   the   introduction   of   Article   226(2),   has   observed   and
held  that  the  High  Court would have  jurisdiction if  a part
of the cause of action arises in its jurisdiction irrespective
of location/residence of the authority. 
5.6 It   is   submitted   that   this   Court   in   the   case   of   Alchemist
Ltd. and Anr. Vs. State Bank of Sikkim and Ors., (2007)
11  SCC   335 , noting  the  development of law in  relation to
the territorial jurisdiction of the High Courts under Article
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226   has   held   that   “the   legislative   history   of   the
constitutional   provisions,   therefore,   makes   it   clear   that
after 1963, cause of action is relevant and germane and a
writ   petition   can   be   instituted   in   a   High   Court   within   the
territorial jurisdiction of which cause of action in whole or
in part arises.”
5.7 It is further submitted that the observations made by this
Court   in   the   case   of   L.   Chandra   Kumar   (supra)   that   all
decisions of tribunals would be subject to scrutiny before a
Division Bench of the High Court within whose jurisdiction
the   tribunal   concerned   falls,   is   not   an   exclusion   of   the
jurisdiction   of   the   other   high   courts   which   may   have
jurisdiction,   particularly,   under   Article   226(2)   of   the
Constitution   of   India.   It   is   submitted   that   therefore,   the
judgment   of   this   Court   in   the   case   of   Alapan
Bandyopadhyay (supra)  may require reconsideration.  
5.8 In   support   of   his   above   request,   he   has   made   following
submissions: ­     
(i)  The   Judgement   of   this   Court   in   the   case   of   Alapan
Bandyopadhyay   (supra)   arose   out   of  an  order   passed
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by   the   Chairman,   Central   Administrative   Tribunal
exercising   powers   under   Section   25   of   the
Administrative   Tribunals   Act,   1985   transferring   the
O.A. filed by the Respondent therein from the Calcutta
Bench   of   the   Central   Administrative   Tribunal   to   the
Principal Bench at New Delhi. The said Transfer Order
was   quashed   by   the   Calcutta   High   Court   by   allowing
the Writ Petition filed by the Respondent therein.
(ii)  The   Order   of   the   Calcutta   High   Court   was   challenged
by   the   Union   of   India   on   the   ground   that   a   challenge
against the order passed in the Transfer Application by
the   Central   Administrative   Tribunal,   Principal   Bench
at   New   Delhi,   was   maintainable   only   before   the   High
Court   of   Delhi   as   the   Principal   Bench   of   the   Tribunal
lies within its territorial jurisdiction. 
(iii)   This   Hon'ble   Court,   referring   to   paragraph   99   of   the
Judgment in  L. Chandra Kumar (supra) , held that any
decision   of   the   Tribunal   can   only   be   subjected   to
scrutiny   before   a   Division   Bench   of   a   High   Court
within whose jurisdiction the Tribunal concerned falls.
Consequently,   it   was   held   that   the   jurisdiction   lies
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with the High Court of Delhi since the Principal Bench
of   the   Central   Administrative   Tribunal   is   located   at
New Delhi.
5.9 It   is   submitted   that   the   relevant   paragraphs   from   the
judgment of this Hon'ble Court in  Alapan Bandyopadhyay
(supra)  are reproduced herein below:
“36.   In view of the reasoning adopted the Constitution
Bench   in   L.   Chandra   Kumar   case   [ L.   Chandra
Kumar   v.   Union of India , (1997) 3 SCC 261 : 1997 SCC
(L&S)   577]   held   Section   28   of   the   Act   and   the
“exclusion jurisdiction” clauses in all other legislations
enacted   under   the   aegis   of   Articles   323­A   and   323­B,
to the  extent   they  exclude  the  jurisdiction  of  the  High
Courts   under   Articles   226/227   and   the   Supreme
Court   under   Article   32,   of   the   Constitution,   was   held
unconstitutional   besides   holding   clause   2( d )   of   Article
323­A   and   clause   3( d )   of   Article   323­B,   to   the   same
extent, as unconstitutional.
37.   Further,   it   was   held   thus   :   ( L.   Chandra   Kumar
case   [ L.   Chandra   Kumar   v.   Union   of   India ,   (1997)   3
SCC 261 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 577] , SCC p. 311, para 99)
“ 99 .   …   The   jurisdiction   conferred   upon   the   High
Courts under Articles 226/227 and upon the Supreme
Court under Article 32 of the Constitution is a part of
the   inviolable   basic   structure   of   our   Constitution.
While this jurisdiction cannot be ousted, other Courts
and   Tribunals   may   perform   a   supplemental   role   in
discharging   the   powers   conferred   by   Articles   226/227
and   32   of   the   Constitution.   The   Tribunals   created
under   Article   323­A   and   Article   323­B   of   the
Constitution   are   possessed   of   the   competence   to   test
the   constitutional   validity   of   statutory   provisions   and
rules.   All decisions of these Tribunals will, however, be
subject   to   scrutiny   before   a   Division   Bench   of   the   High
Court   within  whose   jurisdiction   the   Tribunal  concerned
falls .”
(emphasis supplied)
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38.   When   once   a   Constitution   Bench   of   this   Court
declared   the   law   that   “all   decisions   of   Tribunals
created   under   Article   323­A   and   Article   323­B   of   the
Constitution   will   be   subject   to   the   scrutiny   before   a
Division   Bench   of   the   High   Court   within   whose
jurisdiction   the   Tribunal   concerned   falls”,   it   is
impermissible to make any further construction on the
said   issue.   The   expression   “all   decisions   of   these
Tribunals”   used   by   the   Constitution   Bench   will   cover
and   take   within   its   sweep   orders   passed   on
applications   or   otherwise   in   the   matter   of   transfer   of
original applications from one Bench of the Tribunal to
another Bench of the Tribunal in exercise of the power
under Section 25 of the Act.
39.   In   other   words,   any   decision   of   such   a   Tribunal,
including   the   one   passed   under   Section   25   of   the   Act
could   be   subjected   to   scrutiny   only   before   a   Division
Bench   of   a   High   Court   within   whose   jurisdiction   the
Tribunal concerned falls. This unambiguous exposition
of   law   has   to   be   followed   scrupulously   while   deciding
the   jurisdictional   High   Court   for   the   purpose   of
bringing in challenge against an order of transfer of an
original   application   from   one   Bench   of   Tribunal   to
another   Bench   in   the   invocation   of   Section   25   of   the
Act.
40.   The   law   thus   declared   by   the   Constitution   Bench
cannot be revisited by a Bench of lesser quorum or for
that   matter   by   the   High   Courts   by   looking   into   the
bundle of facts to ascertain whether they would confer
territorial   jurisdiction   to   the   High   Court   within   the
ambit   of   Article   226(2)   of   the   Constitution.   We   are   of
the   considered   view   that   taking   another   view   would
undoubtedly   result   in   indefiniteness   and   multiplicity
in   the   matter   of   jurisdiction   in   situations   when   a
decision   passed   under   Section   25   of   the   Act   is   to   be
called in question especially in cases involving multiple
parties residing within the jurisdiction of different High
Courts   albeit   aggrieved   by   one   common   order   passed
by the Chairman at the Principal Bench at New Delhi.”
5.10 It is submitted that the Constitution Bench in   L. Chandra
Kumar   (supra)   was   dealing   with   a   challenge   to   the
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constitutional   validity   of   Article   323­A(2d),   Article   323­
B(3d)   of   the   Constitution   of   India   and   Section   28   of   the
Administrative   Tribunals   Act,   1985   which   excluded
jurisdiction of the Hon'ble Supreme Court under Article 32
and   of   the   High   Courts   under   Article   226.   The   final
conclusion   reached   by   the   Constitution   Bench   in   L.
Chandra Kumar   (supra)  at paragraph 99, was that:
(a)  the power  of Judicial Review guaranteed under Article
32   and   Article   226/227   is   part   of   the   inviolable   basic
structure of our constitution. 
(b) the   provisions   under   challenge   were   declared
unconstitutional   to   the   extent   that   they   exclude   the
jurisdiction of the High Courts and the Supreme Court
under   Article   226/227   and   32   of   the   Constitution   of
India respectively.
(c)  However,   it   was   held   that   all   service   matters   must   at
the first instance go to the Administrative Tribunal and
upon   the   tribunal   delivering   the   judgment   the   same
could   be   subjected   to   a   challenge   under   the   writ
jurisdiction of the High Court within whose jurisdiction
the tribunal falls.
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5.11 It   is   submitted   that   judgment   in   the   case   of   L.   Chandra
Kumar   (supra)  ought not to be read to have held that only
the   High   Court   under   whose   territorial   jurisdiction   the
tribunal   falls   will   have   jurisdiction   to   entertain   a   Writ
Petition against the order of the said tribunal.
5.12 The   effect   of   the   Judgment   in   Alapan   Bandyopadhyay
(supra)   is that only the High Court under whose territorial
jurisdiction   the   tribunal   falls   would   have   jurisdiction   to
entertain   a   Writ   Petition   against   the   order   of   the   said
Tribunal.
5.13 It   is   submitted   that   as   is   clear   from   the   section   dealing
with   the   development   of   law   relating   to   the   territorial
jurisdiction   of   the   High   Courts,   the   intent   and   purpose
behind   adding   clause   (2)   under   Article   226   would   be
defeated  if   paragraph   99   of   L.   Chandra   Kumar   (supra)   is
interpreted in such a manner.
5.14 It is further  submitted that the power  of judicial review is
an   integral   and   essential   feature   of   the   Constitution   and
even   a   constitutional   amendment   cannot   exclude   the
power   of   the   high   courts   and   the   Supreme   Court   to
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exercise   their   power   of   judicial   review   and   this   power   can
never be ousted. 
5.15 It   is   respectfully   submitted   that   this   Court,   by   way   of   a
judicial   order,   ought   not   to   take   away   jurisdiction   from
other   high   courts   which   are   otherwise   empowered   under
Article 226(2) to entertain a Writ Petition against the order
of a Tribunal located in the territory beyond the territorial
jurisdiction of the said high courts.
5.16 It   is   submitted   that   under   the   Constitutional   scheme,   all
twenty­five   High   Courts   have   equivalent   jurisdiction,   and
no discrimination or special treatment is envisaged to any
particular   High   Court.   This   is   one   of   the   facets   of
independence of judiciary.
5.17 It   is   further   submitted   that   if   such   an   interpretation   is
taken   to   its   logical   conclusion,   then   it   would   result   in
undue hardship and inconvenience to the employees of the
central   government   itself   who   are   posted   across   the
country. For example, if an application were to be filed by
an aggrieved employee before the Ernakulam Bench of the
Central   Administrative   Tribunal,   and   an   Order   for   its
Transfer   to   another   Bench   were   to   be   passed   by   the
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Principal Bench at Delhi, the aggrieved would be forced to
travel all the way from Ernakulam to Delhi to challenge the
Transfer Order and contest the case. As already submitted
above,   this   would   defeat   the   very   purpose   of   inserting
Article 226(2) into the Constitution with the specific intent
of   providing   a   cheap,   effective   and   efficacious   remedy   in
law at the doorstep of the aggrieved person.
5.18 It   is   therefore   prayed   that   the   decision   of   this   Hon'ble
Court   rendered   in   Alapan   Bandyopadhyay   (supra)   case
ought to be reconsidered in light of the submissions made
above. 
6. Regard   being   had   to   the   important   issue   raised   by   Shri
Shyam   Divan,   learned   Senior   Advocate   appearing   on
behalf   of   respondent   No.   1   and   the   submissions   made   by
Shri   Tushar   Mehta,   learned   Solicitor   General   and   having
gone   through   the   judgment(s)   and   order(s)   passed   by   this
Court   in   L.   Chandra   Kumar   (supra)   and   Alapan
Bandyopadhyay   (supra)   and   that   the   issue   involved   is
with   respect   to   the   territorial   jurisdiction   of   the   High
Courts and the effect of introduction of Article 226(2) of the
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Constitution   of   India   and   the   statement   of   the   Law
Minister   while   introducing   Article   226(2)   of   the
Constitution   referred   to   hereinabove   and   that   the   issue
involved   affects   a   large   number   of   employees   and   is   of
public importance, we think it appropriate that the matter
involving   the   issue   of   territorial   jurisdiction   of   the
concerned   High   Court   to   decide   a   challenge   to   an   order
passed by the Chairman, CAT, Principal Bench, New Delhi
should   be   considered   by   a   Larger   Bench.   Let   the   registry
place   the   matter   before   the   Chief   Justice   of   India   for
appropriate   orders   at   the   earliest   so   that   the   aforesaid
issue is resolved at the earliest.   
………………………………….J.
[M.R. SHAH]
NEW DELHI; ………………………………….J.
MARCH 03, 2023 [B.V. NAGARATHNA]
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