Criminal Appeal No.1669 of 2009
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1669 OF 2009
 Neeraj Dutta             …Appellant
versus
State (Govt. of N.C.T. of Delhi)       ...Respondent
J  U  D  G  M  E  N  T
ABHAY S. OKA, J .
FACTUAL ASPECTS
1. The   appellant   was   convicted   by   the   Special   Judge,   Delhi
for the offences punishable under Section 7 and clauses (i) and
(ii)  of  Section13(1)(d) read  with  Section  13(2)  of  the  Prevention
of   Corruption   Act,   1988   (for   short,   ‘the   PC   Act’).     The   co­
accused,   Mr.   Yogesh   Kumar,   was   convicted   by   the   Special
Judge   for   the   offence   punishable   under   Section   12   of   the   PC
Act.   The   co­accused   was   acquitted   by   the   High   Court.   The
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Criminal Appeal No.1669 of 2009
appellant   was   sentenced   to   undergo   a   rigorous   imprisonment
for a period of three years and to pay a fine of Rs.15,000/­ for
the   offence   punishable   under   sub­section   (2)   of   Section   13   of
the   PC   Act.     For   the   offence   punishable   under   Section   7,   she
was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two years
and   to   pay   a   fine   of   Rs.5,000/­.     Sentences   in   default   of
payment   of   fine   were   also   imposed.     The   conviction   of   the
appellant has been upheld by the High Court by the impugned
judgment.
2. The   complainant   –   Mr.   Ravijit   Singh   died   before   the   trial
commenced.   In   fact,   PW­7,   the   Investigation   Officer,   deposed
that   the   complainant   was   murdered.   In   his   complaint,   the
complainant   stated   that   he   was   doing   business   of   sale   and
purchase   of   cars   in   a   shop   situated   at   Vikas   Puri,   New   Delhi.
His   case   is   that   there   was   no   electricity   meter   installed   in   his
shop   and   therefore,   on   6 th
  May   1996   he   applied   for   an
electricity  meter.       In the complaint filed by  him  on 17 th
  April
2000,   in   the   form   of   his   statement   recorded   by   the   Anti­
Corruption Bureau, he stated that pursuant to the application
dated 6 th
 May 199 6 , a meter was installed in his shop and after
a   few   months,   he   found   that   the   meter   was   removed.     As   the
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Criminal Appeal No.1669 of 2009
shopkeepers in the area had got the electricity meters installed
through   the   appellant,   he   met   her.     On   17 th
  April   2000,   he
received   a   telephone   call   at   7:30   a.m.   from   the   appellant   who
was   working   as   an   Inspector   in   the   D.V.B./electricity
department in the local area.   She called him at her residence
to   discuss   the   issue   of   the   electricity   meter.     At   8:00   a.m.,
when   the   complainant   met   her,   she   demanded   a   sum   of
Rs.15,000/­ for getting the meter installed and ultimately after
negotiations,   she   settled   the   demand   at   Rs.10,000/­.
According   to   the   complainant,   the   appellant   stated   that   she
would come to his shop between 3:00 and 4:00 p.m. when the
complainant   should   hand   over   the   papers   for   the   electricity
meter   and   Rs.10,000/­   as   a   bribe.     The   complainant   stated
that he had no option but to accept her demand for a bribe.
3. The   prosecution’s   case   is   that   on   the   basis   of   the
aforesaid complaint, a trap was laid.   PW­5, Mr. S. K. Awasthi,
was the shadow witness.  When he along with the complainant
as   well   as   members   of   the   raiding   party   visited   the
complainant’s shop at 3:50 p.m., the appellant was not present
there.  At about 4:40 p.m., a telephone call was received by the
complainant   that   the   appellant   would   come   at   around
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Criminal Appeal No.1669 of 2009
5:30/6:00 p.m.   At 5:20 p.m., the appellant came with the co­
accused   and   demanded   the   documents   and   bribe   of
Rs.10,000/­, which was paid by the complainant.   The Special
Court held that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence on
record to prove the guilt of the appellant.  In fact, a finding was
recorded   on   the   basis   of   circumstantial   evidence   that   the
demand  and  acceptance  were  proved.    The  order  of  conviction
of the learned Special Court as regards the appellant has been
confirmed by the High Court in the impugned judgment.
4. While hearing this appeal, a bench of two Hon’ble Judges
of   this   Court   came   to   a   conclusion   that   the   decisions   of   this
Court of the benches of three Hon’ble Judges in the cases of  B.
Jayaraj   v.   State   of   Andhra   Pradesh 1
  and   P.
Satyanarayana   Murthy   v.   District   Inspector   of   Police,
State   of   Andhra   Pradesh   &   Anr. 2
  were   in   conflict   with   an
earlier   three­Judge   bench’s   decision   in   the   case   of   M.
Narsinga   Rao   v.   State   of   A.P. 3
    Accordingly,   the   following
question was referred to the larger bench:
“The   question   whether   in   the   absence   of
evidence   of   complainant/direct   or   primary
1    2014 (13) SCC 55
2    2015 (10) SCC 152
3    2001 (1) SCC 691
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Criminal Appeal No.1669 of 2009
evidence   of   demand   of   illegal   gratification,   is   it
not permissible to draw inferential deduction of
culpability/guilt   of   a   public   servant   under
Section 7 and Section 13(1)(d) read with Section
13(2)   of   Prevention   of   Corruption   Act,   1988
based   on   other   evidence   adduced   by   the
prosecution.”
5. The above­mentioned question was referred for decision to
a   Constitution   Bench,   which   disposed   of   the   reference   by   the
judgment   dated   15 th
  December   2022 4
.     Broadly,   the
Constitution   Bench   held   that   in   absence   of   the   complaint’s
testimony   in   a   prosecution   for   offences   punishable   under
Sections   7   and   13(2)   of   the   PC   Act,   the   prosecution   can   rely
upon   even   circumstantial   evidence   to   prove   the   demand   of
gratification.     In   paragraph   74   of   the   said   decision,   the
Constitution Bench has summarized its conclusions.
RIVAL SUBMISSIONS
6. Shri S. Nagamuthu, the learned senior counsel appearing
for the appellant submitted that this is a case where there is no
evidence   of   demand   of   illegal   gratification   by   the   appellant.
The  learned  senior  counsel  submitted  that  proof of  demand  of
gratification   by   a   public   servant   is   a   sine   qua   non   for   the
offences   punishable   under   Sections   7   and   13(1)(d)   of   the   PC
4    2022 SCCOnline SC 1724
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Criminal Appeal No.1669 of 2009
Act. He submitted that the findings of the Courts are based on
surmises and conjectures. 
7. Ms.   Aishwarya   Bhati,   the   learned   Additional   Solicitor
General appearing for the prosecution supported the impugned
judgments.   She submitted that PW­5 has proved the demand.
Moreover,   on   the   basis   of   the   circumstantial   evidence,   the
demand and acceptance were proved. She also submitted that
once   the   demand   and   acceptance   are   established,   there   is   a
presumption   that   the   acceptance   of   gratification   proves   the
existence of motive or reward.  The learned ASG submitted that
no interference is called for with the impugned judgments.
LEGAL POSITION
8. Before we analyze the evidence, we must note that we are
dealing   with   Sections   7   and   13   of   the   PC   Act   as   they   stood
prior to the amendment made by the Act 16 of 2018 with effect
from 26 th
  July 2018.   We are referring to Sections 7 and 13 as
they stood on the date of commission of the offence.  Section 7,
as existed at the relevant time, reads thus:
“ 7.   Public  servant   taking  gratification   other
than   legal   remuneration   in   respect   of   an
official act.—
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Criminal Appeal No.1669 of 2009
Whoever,   being,   or   expecting   to   be   a   public
servant, accepts or obtains or agrees to accept
or   attempts   to   obtain   from   any   person,   for
himself   or   for   any   other   person,   any
gratification   whatever,   other   than   legal
remuneration,  as  a  motive  or  reward for  doing
or   forbearing   to   do   any   official   act   or   for
showing   or   forbearing   to   show,   in   the   exercise
of   his   official   functions,   favour   or   disfavour   to
any   person   or   for   rendering   or   attempting   to
render any service or disservice to any person,
with   the   Central   Government   or   any   State
Government or Parliament or the Legislature of
any   State   or   with   any   local   authority,
corporation   or   Government   company   referred
to in clause (c) of section 2, or with any public
servant,  whether  named  or   otherwise, shall   be
punishable   with   imprisonment   which   shall   be
not   less   than   three   years   but   which   may
extend   to   seven   years   and   shall   also   be   liable
to fine.
Explanations. ­
(a)   "Expecting   to   be   a   public   servant"­   If   a
person   not   expecting   to   be   in   office   obtains   a
gratification   by   deceiving   others   into   a   belief
that he is about to be in office, and that he will
then serve them, he may be guilty of cheating,
but   he   is   not   guilty   of   the   offence   defined   in
this section.
(b)"Gratification".   The   word   “gratification”   is
not   restricted   to   pecuniary   gratifications   or   to
gratifications estimable in money.
(c)   "Legal   remuneration"­   The   words   "legal
remuneration”   are   not   restricted   to
remuneration   which   a   public   servant   can
lawfully  demand, but include all remuneration
which   he   is   permitted   by   the   Government   or
the organisation, which he serves, to accept.
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Criminal Appeal No.1669 of 2009
(d)   "A   motive   or   reward   for   doing”.   A   person
who   receives   a   gratification   as   a   motive   or
reward for doing what he does not intend or is
not in a position to do, or has not done, comes
within this expression.
(e)   Where   a   public   servant   induces   a   person
erroneously   to   believe   that   his   influence   with
the   Government   has   obtained   a   title   for   that
person   and   thus   induces   that   person   to   give
the   public   servant,   money   or   any   other
gratification   as   a   reward   for   this   service,   the
public servant has committed an offence under
this section.”
9. Section   13(1)(d),   as   existed   at   the   relevant   time,   reads
thus:
“ 13.Criminal   misconduct   by   a   public
servant.—
(1)   A   public   servant   is   said   to   commit   the
offence of criminal misconduct,­
(a) ………………………………
(b) ……………………………...
(c) ………………………………
(d) if he,­
(i) by corrupt or illegal means, obtains for
himself   or   for   any   other   person   any
valuable thing or pecuniary advantage; or
(ii)   by   abusing   his   position   as   a   public
servant,   obtains   for   himself   or   for   any
other   person   any   valuable   thing   or
pecuniary advantage; or 
(iii)   while   holding   office   as   a   public
servant,   obtains   for   any   person   any
valuable   thing   or   pecuniary   advantage
without any public interest; or
(e)  ………………………………….”  
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Criminal Appeal No.1669 of 2009
The   demand   for   gratification   and   the   acceptance   thereof   are
sine qua non  for the offence punishable under Section 7 of the
PC Act.
10. The   Constitution   Bench 4
  was   called   upon   to   decide   the
question   which   we   have   quoted   earlier.   In   paragraph   74,   the
conclusions of the Constitution have been summarised, which
read thus: 
“ 74.   What   emerges   from   the   aforesaid
discussion is summarised as under:
(a)   Proof   of   demand   and   acceptance   of
illegal   gratification   by   a   public   servant   as
a fact in issue by the prosecution is a   sine
qua   non   in   order   to   establish   the   guilt   of
the accused public servant under Sections
7 and 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act.
(b)   In order to bring home the guilt of the
accused,   the   prosecution   has   to   first
prove   the   demand   of   illegal   gratification
and   the   subsequent   acceptance   as   a
matter   of   fact.   This   fact   in   issue   can   be
proved   either   by   direct   evidence   which
can   be   in   the   nature   of   oral   evidence   or
documentary evidence.
(c)   Further,   the   fact   in   issue,   namely,   the
proof of demand and acceptance of  illegal
gratification   can   also   be   proved   by
circumstantial  evidence in the  absence of
direct oral and documentary evidence.
(d)   In   order   to   prove   the   fact   in   issue,
namely,   the   demand   and   acceptance   of
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Criminal Appeal No.1669 of 2009
illegal gratification by the public servant, the
following aspects have to be borne in mind:
(i)   if   there   is   an   offer   to   pay   by   the
bribe   giver   without   there   being   any
demand from the public servant and the
latter   simply   accepts   the   offer   and
receives   the   illegal   gratification,   it   is
a   case of acceptance   as per Section 7 of
the   Act.   In   such   a   case,   there   need   not
be a prior demand by the public servant.
(ii)   On   the   other   hand,   if   the   public
servant makes a demand   and the bribe
giver   accepts   the   demand   and   tenders
the demanded gratification which in turn
is   received   by   the   public   servant,   it   is   a
case   of   obtainment .   In   the   case   of
obtainment,   the   prior   demand   for   illegal
gratification   emanates   from   the   public
servant. This is an offence under Section
13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act.
(iii)   In   both   cases   of   (i)   and   (ii)   above,
the   offer   by   the   bribe   giver   and   the
demand   by   the   public   servant
respectively   have   to   be   proved   by   the
prosecution as a fact in issue. In other
words,   mere   acceptance   or   receipt   of
an   illegal   gratification   without
anything   more   would   not   make   it   an
offence   under   Section   7   or   Section
13(1)(d),   (i)  and   (ii)   respectively   of   the
Act.   Therefore,   under   Section   7   of   the
Act,   in   order   to   bring   home   the   offence,
there   must   be   an   offer   which   emanates
from the bribe giver which is accepted by
the   public   servant   which   would   make   it
an   offence.   Similarly,   a   prior   demand
by   the   public   servant   when   accepted
by the bribe giver and in turn there is
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Criminal Appeal No.1669 of 2009
a   payment   made   which   is   received   by
the   public   servant,   would   be   an
offence   of   obtainment   under   Section
13(1)(d) and (i) and (ii) of the Act.
(e)   The presumption of fact with regard to
the   demand   and   acceptance   or
obtainment  of an  illegal  gratification  may
be   made   by   a   court   of   law   by   way   of   an
inference   only   when   the   foundational
facts   have   been   proved   by   relevant   oral
and documentary evidence and not in the
absence   thereof.   On   the   basis   of   the
material   on   record,   the   Court   has   the
discretion   to   raise   a   presumption   of   fact
while considering whether the fact of demand
has   been   proved   by   the   prosecution   or   not.
Of course, a presumption of fact is subject to
rebuttal   by   the   accused   and   in   the   absence
of rebuttal presumption stands.
(f)   In   the   event   the   complainant   turns
‘hostile’, or has died or is unavailable to let in
his   evidence   during   trial,   demand   of   illegal
gratification   can   be   proved   by   letting   in   the
evidence of any other witness who can again
let   in   evidence,   either   orally   or   by
documentary   evidence   or   the   prosecution
can   prove   the   case   by   circumstantial
evidence. The trial does not abate nor does it
result in an order of acquittal of the accused
public servant.
(g)   In   so   far   as   Section   7   of   the   Act   is
concerned,   on   the   proof   of   the   facts   in
issue,   Section   20   mandates   the   court   to
raise   a   presumption   that   the   illegal
gratification   was   for   the   purpose   of   a
motive or reward as mentioned in the said
Section.   The   said   presumption   has   to   be
raised by the court as a legal presumption or
a   presumption   in   law.   Of   course,   the   said
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Criminal Appeal No.1669 of 2009
presumption   is   also   subject   to   rebuttal.
Section 20 does not apply to Section 13(1)(d)
(i) and (ii) of the Act.
(h)   We   clarify   that   the   presumption   in   law
under   Section   20   of   the   Act   is   distinct   from
presumption of fact referred to above in point
(e) as the former is a mandatory presumption
while the latter is discretionary in nature.”
                   (emphasis added)
The   referred   question   was   answered   in   paragraph   76   of   the
aforesaid judgment, which reads thus: 
“76.   Accordingly,   the   question   referred   for
consideration   of   this   Constitution   Bench   is
answered as under:
In   the   absence   of   evidence   of
the   complainant   (direct/primary,   oral/
documentary   evidence),   it   is
permissible   to   draw   an   inferential
deduction   of   culpability/guilt   of   a
public   servant   under   Section   7   and
Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2)
of   the   Act   based   on   other
evidence   adduced by the prosecution . ”
                 (emphasis added)
11. Even   the   issue   of   presumption   under   Section   20   of   the
PC   Act   has   been   answered   by   the   Constitution   Bench   by
holding   that   only   on   proof   of   the   facts   in   issue,   Section   20
mandates   the   Court   to   raise   a   presumption   that   illegal
gratification   was   for   the   purpose   of   motive   or   reward   as
mentioned   in   Section   7  (as   it   existed   prior   to   the   amendment
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Criminal Appeal No.1669 of 2009
of   2018).     In   fact,   the   Constitution   Bench   has   approved   two
decisions by the benches of three Hon’ble Judges in the cases
of   B.   Jayaraj 1
  and   P.   Satyanarayana   Murthy 2
.   There   is
another   decision   of   a   three   Judges’   bench   in   the   case   of   N.
Vijayakumar   v.   State   of   Tamil   Nadu 5
,   which   follows   the
view taken in the cases of  B. Jayaraj 1 
and  P. Satyanarayana
Murthy 2
.     In   paragraph   9   of   the   decision   in   the   case   of   B.
Jayaraj 1
,   this   Court   has   dealt   with   the   presumption   under
Section   20   of   the   PC   Act.     In   paragraph   9,   this   Court   held
thus: 
“9.   Insofar   as   the   presumption
permissible   to   be   drawn   under   Section
20   of   the   Act   is   concerned,   such
presumption   can   only   be   in   respect   of
the   offence   under   Section   7   and   not
the   offences   under   Sections   13(1)( d )( i )
and   ( ii )   of   the   Act.   In   any   event,   it   is
only   on   proof   of   acceptance   of   illegal
gratification   that   presumption   can   be
drawn under Section 20 of the Act that
such   gratification   was   received   for
doing   or   forbearing   to   do   any   official
act.   Proof   of   acceptance   of   illegal
gratification   can   follow   only   if   there   is
proof   of   demand.   As   the   same   is   lacking
in   the   present   case   the   primary   facts   on
the   basis   of   which   the   legal   presumption
under Section 20 can be drawn are wholly
absent.”
5    2021 (3) SCC 687
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               (emphasis added)
The presumption under Section 20 can be invoked only when
the two basic facts required to be proved under Section 7, are
proved.  The said two basic facts are ‘demand’ and ‘acceptance’
of   gratification.   The   presumption   under   Section   20   is   that
unless   the   contrary   is   proved,   the   acceptance   of   gratification
shall   be   presumed   to   be   for   a   motive   or   reward,   as
contemplated by Section 7. It means that once the basic facts
of   the   demand   of   illegal   gratification   and   acceptance   thereof
are proved, unless the contrary are proved, the Court will have
to presume that the gratification was demanded and accepted
as a motive or reward as contemplated by Section 7. However,
this   presumption   is   rebuttable.     Even   on   the   basis   of   the
preponderance   of   probability,   the   accused   can   rebut   the
presumption.
12. In   the  case  of   N.   Vijayakumar 5
,  another   bench   of   three
Hon’ble   Judges   dealt   with   the   issue   of   presumption   under
Section   20   and   the   degree   of   proof   required   to   establish   the
offences   punishable   under   Section   7   and   clauses   (i)   and   (ii)
Section   13(1)(d)   read   with   Section   13(2)   of   PC   Act.     In
paragraph 26, the bench held thus: 
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Criminal Appeal No.1669 of 2009
“ 26.   It   is   equally   well   settled   that   mere
recovery by itself cannot prove the charge
of   the   prosecution   against   the   accused.
Reference   can   be   made   to   the   judgments
of   this   Court   in   C.M.   Girish
Babu   v.   CBI   [ C.M.   Girish   Babu   v.   CBI ,
(2009)  3   SCC   779  :   (2009)  2  SCC   (Cri)   1]
and   in   B.   Jayaraj   v.   State   of   A.P.   [ B.
Jayaraj   v.   State   of   A.P. ,   (2014)   13   SCC
55   :   (2014)   5   SCC   (Cri)   543]   In   the
aforesaid judgments of this Court while
considering   the   case   under   Sections   7,
13(1)( d )( i )   and   ( ii )   of   the   Prevention   of
Corruption   Act,   1988   it   is   reiterated
that   to   prove   the   charge,   it   has   to   be
proved   beyond   reasonable   doubt   that
the   accused   voluntarily   accepted
money   knowing   it   to   be   bribe.   Absence
of proof of demand  for  illegal  gratification
and   mere   possession   or   recovery   of
currency   notes   is   not   sufficient   to
constitute   such   offence.   In   the   said
judgments   it   is   also   held   that   even   the
presumption   under   Section   20   of   the   Act
can   be   drawn   only   after   demand   for   and
acceptance   of   illegal   gratification   is
proved.   It   is   also   fairly   well   settled   that
initial   presumption   of   innocence   in   the
criminal   jurisprudence   gets   doubled   by
acquittal recorded by the trial court.” 
                (emphasis added)
Thus, the demand for gratification and its acceptance must be
proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 
13. Section 7, as existed prior to 26 th
 July 2018, was different
from the present Section 7.   The unamended Section 7 which
is   applicable   in   the   present   case,   specifically   refers   to   “any
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Criminal Appeal No.1669 of 2009
gratification”.     The   substituted   Section   7   does   not   use   the
word   “gratification”,   but   it   uses   a   wider   term   “undue
advantage”.   When the allegation is of demand of gratification
and acceptance thereof by the accused, it must be as a motive
or reward for doing or forbearing to do any official act. The fact
that   the   demand   and   acceptance   of   gratification   were   for
motive   or   reward   as   provided   in   Section   7   can   be   proved   by
invoking the presumption under Section 20 provided the basic
allegations   of   the   demand   and   acceptance   are   proved.   In   this
case, we are also concerned with the offence punishable under
clauses  (i)   and  (ii)   Section   13(1)(d)   which   is  punishable   under
Section   13(2)   of   the   PC   Act.     Clause   (d)   of   sub­section   (1)   of
Section   13,   which   existed   on   the   statute   book   prior   to   the
amendment   of   26 th
  July   2018,   has   been   quoted   earlier.   On   a
plain   reading   of   clauses   (i)   and   (ii)   of   Section   13(1)(d),   it   is
apparent that proof of acceptance of illegal gratification will be
necessary   to   prove   the   offences   under   clauses   (i)   and   (ii)   of
Section   13(1)(d).   In   view   of   what   is   laid   down   by   the
Constitution   Bench,   in   a   given   case,   the   demand   and
acceptance   of   illegal   gratification   by   a   public   servant   can   be
proved by circumstantial evidence in the absence of direct oral
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Criminal Appeal No.1669 of 2009
or   documentary   evidence.     While   answering   the   referred
question,   the   Constitution   Bench   has   observed   that   it   is
permissible   to   draw   an   inferential   deduction   of   culpability
and/or  guilt of  the  public  servant  for  the  offences punishable
under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the PC
Act.   The conclusion is that in absence of direct evidence, the
demand   and/or   acceptance   can   always   be   proved   by   other
evidence such as circumstantial evidence.
14. The allegation  of demand  of  gratification  and acceptance
made   by   a   public   servant   has   to   be   established   beyond   a
reasonable   doubt.     The   decision   of   the   Constitution   Bench
does not dilute this elementary requirement of proof beyond a
reasonable   doubt.   The   Constitution   Bench   was   dealing   with
the   issue   of   the   modes   by   which   the   demand   can   be   proved.
The Constitution Bench has laid down that the proof need not
be only  by  direct oral  or  documentary  evidence,  but it  can be
by   way   of   other   evidence   including   circumstantial   evidence.
When   reliance   is   placed   on   circumstantial   evidence   to   prove
the   demand   for   gratification,   the   prosecution   must   establish
each   and   every   circumstance   from   which   the   prosecution
wants   the   Court   to   draw   a   conclusion   of   guilt.   The   facts   so
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Criminal Appeal No.1669 of 2009
established  must  be  consistent   with   only   one   hypothesis  that
there   was   a   demand   made   for   gratification   by   the   accused.
Therefore, in this case, we will have to examine whether there
is any direct evidence of demand.   If we come to a conclusion
that there is no direct evidence of demand, this Court will have
to   consider   whether   there   is   any   circumstantial   evidence   to
prove the demand.  
CONSIDERATION OF THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD
15. Now,  coming   to  the evidence on record,  according   to  the
prosecution,   the   direct   evidence   is   in   the   form   of   evidence   of
PW­5   –   Mr.   S.K.   Awasthi.   In   this   case,   the   complainant   had
died   and   therefore,   he   could   not   be   examined.     The   raiding
party   consisted   of   PW­5,   Mr.   S.K.   Awasthi,   an   Officer   in
Irrigation Department; PW­6, Mr. O.D. Yadav, Traffic Inspector
and  PW­7, Mr. Niranjan  Singh, ACP.   Going  by  the complaint
which  could  not  be proved  through  the  complainant,  it  is  the
case of the prosecution that the first demand was made by the
appellant   to   the   complainant   in   the   morning   of   17th   April
2000 when he met her at her residence. There was no charge
framed   on   the   basis   of   this   demand.   According   to   the
prosecution’s   case,   the   second   demand   was   made   during   the
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Criminal Appeal No.1669 of 2009
trap.    There  is  absolutely  no  evidence  about  the  first  demand
made   in   the   house   of   the   appellant   as   no   one   except   the
complainant   was   present   there.     According   to   the
prosecution’s   case,   PW­5   was   the   witness   to   the   second
demand   made   by   the   appellant   on   17 th
  April   2000   at   around
5:20   p.m.     PW­5   stated   in   his   evidence   that   though   the
complainant   had   informed   the   trap   party   that   the   appellant
will be visiting his shop at about 3:50 p.m., the appellant did
not   turn   up.     Subsequently,   a   telephone   call   was   received   by
the complainant informing that she would come by 5:30/6:00
p.m.   Ultimately, according to the case of PW­5, at about 5:20
p.m.,   the   appellant   along   with   the   co­accused   came   to   the
Complainant’s shop.   The version of PW­5, which according to
the prosecution constitutes demand, reads thus:
“ Mrs. Neeraj  Dutta asked  the complainant
to   give   papers   regarding   his   electricity
meter   and   Rs.10,000/­   to   her   as   she   was
in   a   hurry.     Complainant   handed   over   the
documents   of   his   electricity   meter   and
treated   GC   Notes   of   Rs.10,000/­   to   Mrs.
Neeraj   Dutta   in   her   right   hand   after   taking
the same out of left pocket of his shirt.  Mrs.
Neeraj   Dutta   handed   over   said   GC   Notes   to
his   associate   Yogesh   Kumar   to   count   and
she   told   the   complainant   that   his   work
would be done.”
                     (emphasis added)
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Criminal Appeal No.1669 of 2009
16. Rest   of   the   examination­in­chief   deals   with   the
acceptance by the appellant and recovery.  Now the question is
whether,   on   the   basis   of   the   evidence   on   record,   the
prosecution   has   proved   the   demand   of   gratification   by   the
accused.   When   we   consider   the   issue   of   proof   of   demand
within   the   meaning   of   Section   7,   it   cannot   be   a   simpliciter
demand   for   money   but   it   has   to   be   a   demand   of   gratification
other than legal remuneration.  All that PW­5 says is when the
appellant   visited   the   shop   of   the   complainant,   she   asked   the
complainant to give papers regarding the electricity meter and
Rs.10,000/­   to   her   by   telling   him   that   she   was   in   a   hurry.
This is not a case where a specific demand of gratification for
providing   electricity   meter   was   made   by   the   appellant   to   the
complainant in the presence of the shadow witness. PW­5 has
not   stated   that   there   was   any   discussion   in   his   presence
between   the   appellant   and   the   complainant   on   the   basis   of
which   an   inference   could   have   been   drawn   that   there   was   a
demand   made   for   gratification   by   the   appellant.   The   witness
had   no   knowledge   about   what   transpired   between   the
complainant   and   the   appellant   earlier.   PW­5   had   admittedly
no   personal   knowledge   about   the  purpose   for  which   the  cash
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Criminal Appeal No.1669 of 2009
was   allegedly   handed   over   by   the   complainant   to   the
appellant. 
17. We may note here that as per the version of the appellant
in   her   statement   under   Section   313   of   the   Code   of   Criminal
Procedure, 1973 (Cr.P.C.), on 17 th
 April 2000, she was working
as an LDC in DVB office.  On that day, she was busy with her
official  duty   in  a collection  drive  organized by  the  department
to   collect   dues   from   the   consumers.     Her   explanation   is   that
the   complainant   was   her   neighbour   and   he   wanted   her
assistance   to   deposit   electricity   charges.     She   stated   that
earlier,   she   had   a   transaction   of   sale   and   purchase   of   a   car
through   the   complainant.     She   has   also   stated   that   the
complainant   was   a   history­sheeter   and   there   were   three   First
Information   Reports   (FIRs)   registered   against   him.   In   this
context,   PW­5   was   questioned   in   the   cross­examination.     The
relevant answer given by PW­5 reads thus:
“I   cannot   confirm   or   deny   that   accused
Neeraj   Dutta   along   with   her   cashier   and
other   staff   consisting   of  four  five  member
had   collected   Rs.71,000/­   in   the   single
delivery point camp held at Jai Vihar and
she   along   with   her   staff   members   were
coming   in   her   car   and   on   the   way   she
stopped   at   the   shop   of   the   complainant
who   was   her   neighbour   to   collect   the
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Criminal Appeal No.1669 of 2009
balance   sale   proceeds   of   Rs.1   lac   of   her
previous car from the complainant as she
had   sold   the   said   car   through   the
complainant   to   M/s.   Sagar   Motors   and
this   payment   was   to   be   received   by   her
through   complainant   from   M/s.   Sagar
Motors.”
It   is   pertinent   to   note   here   that   PW­5   did   not   confirm   the
correctness   of  the   suggestion   but   stated  that  he   was  not   in   a
position   to   deny   the   same.     In   fact,   PW­7,   the   investigation
officer,   deposed   that   cash   of   Rs.71,900/­   was   found   in   the
appellant’s   car.     This   lends   support   to   the   defence   that   there
was   a  recovery   drive   conducted  by   the   appellant.    Apart   from
the   evidence   of   PW­5,   there   is   no   other   evidence   that   is
pressed into service by the prosecution for proving the demand
by   the   appellant.     Even   taking   the   statements   of   PW­5   in   the
examination­in­chief   as   correct,   it   is   impossible   to   even   infer
that the demand of Rs.10,000/­ was made by the appellant by
way   of   gratification.     Every   demand   made   for   payment   of
money   is   not   a   demand   for   gratification.     It   has   to   be
something more than mere demand for money.
18. There   is   one   more   important   factual   aspect   to   be   noted
which   creates   serious   doubt   about   the   prosecution’s   case.   In
the complaint filed by  the deceased complainant on 17 th
  April
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Criminal Appeal No.1669 of 2009
2000,   in   the   form   of   his   statement   recorded   by   the   Anti­
Corruption   Bureau,   he   has   stated   that   pursuant   to   the
application   dated   6 th
  May   199 6 ,   a   meter   was   installed   in   his
shop   and   after   a   few   months,   he   found   that   the   meter   was
removed.   However,   the   Special   Court   has   observed   in
paragraph   19   of   the   impugned   judgment   that   a   complaint
regarding   a   stolen   electricity   meter   was   registered   at   the
instance   of   the   complainant   on   25 th
  April   2000.   Thus,   the
grievance   regarding   stolen   meter   was   made   by   the
complainant 8 days after the alleged demand for bribe. In fact,
PW­7 admitted that the complainant did not produce a copy of
the   application   made   by   him   for   providing   electricity   meter.
PW­7   further   stated   that   the   complainant   did   not   clearly   tell
him that he had given such application. In absence of proof of
making   such   application,   the   prosecution’s   case   regarding
demand   of   bribe   for   installing   new   electricity   meter   becomes
doubtful.     Moreover,   till   24 th
  April   2000,   the   complainant   did
not register a complaint regarding commission of offence.  This
makes   the   prosecution’s   case   regarding   the   demand   of
gratification   on   17 th
  April   2000   for   installing   a   new   electricity
meter extremely doubtful. 
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19. In the  present  case, there are no  circumstances brought
on   record   which   will   prove   the   demand   for   gratification.
Therefore, the ingredients of the offence under Section 7 of the
PC   Act   were   not   established   and   consequently,   the   offence
under Section 13(1)(d) will not be attracted.
20. Hence,   the   appeal   must   succeed.   We   set   aside   the
impugned   judgment   and   the   judgment   of   the   Special   Court
and set aside the conviction and sentence of the appellant. The
bail bonds of the appellant stand cancelled. Appeal is allowed.
……..…………………J.
(Abhay S. Oka)
……..…………………J.
 (Rajesh Bindal)
New Delhi;
March 17, 2023.   
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