/2023 INSC 0226/
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REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL MISCELLANEOUS PETITION NO. 157334 OF 2018 
IN
REVIEW PETITION (CRIMINAL) NOS. 1139­1140 OF 2000
IN
CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS. 25­26 OF 2000
NARAYAN CHETANRAM CHAUDHARY           …APPLICANT(S)
VERSUS
THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA                 …RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
ANIRUDDHA BOSE, J.
This   is   an   application   under   Section   9(2)   of   the   Juvenile   Justice
(Care   and   Protection   of   Children)   Act,   2015   (“2015   Act”)   requesting
this Court to hold that the applicant, who is a convict for committing
offences under Sections 302, 342, 397, 449 read with 120B and 34 of
the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (“1860 Code”) was a juvenile on the date

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of commission of the offence. Simultaneous prayer of the applicant is
for his release from custody on the ground of having served more than
the   maximum   punishment   permissible   under   the   Act.   The   applicant
has  been  sentenced  to  death  by   the  Additional   Sessions  Judge,  Pune
by a judgment and order dated 19 th
  February 1998 and 23 rd
  February
1998   respectively.   This   application   has   been   taken   out   in   connection
with   a   petition   for   review   of   the   order   by   which   his   conviction   and
sentence   was   sustained   by   this   Court   after   confirmation   by   the   High
Court. The review petition of the applicant was also dismissed on 24 th
November   2000.   The   applicant,   along   with   two   other   offenders   (Jitu
and   Raju)   were   tried   for   commission   of   offences   under   the   aforesaid
provisions of the 1860 Code. The applicant had not raised the plea of
juvenility   at   the   trial   or   the   appellate   stage.   In   the   Trial   Court,   said
Raju   had   turned   approver   and   was   tendered   pardon.   Both   the
judgment   of   conviction   and   order   of   sentence   were   confirmed   by   the
High Court on 22 nd
 July 1999 in the appeal of the applicant as also in
the   confirmation   proceeding.   The   appeal   against   the   judgment   of
conviction   and   order   of   death   sentence   made   by   the   applicant   was
dismissed   by   this   Court   on   5 th
  September   2000.   The   offence   of   the
applicant   is   no   doubt,   gruesome   in   nature.   On   26 th
  August   1994,   as
per   the   prosecution   case   sustained   by   all   the   judicial   fora   including

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this   Court,   the   applicant   alongwith   the   two   other   accomplices   had
committed murder of five women, (one of whom was pregnant) and two
children. The offence took place at Pune in the State of Maharashtra.
The   applicant   was   arrested   on   5 th
  September   1994   from   his   home
village and is in detention for more than 28 years. 
2. Though the offence was committed at Pune, the applicant claims
to hail from Jalabsar, in Shri Dungargarh tehsil, at present in Bikaner
district,   Rajasthan.   It   is   from   there   he   was   arrested.   He   was   tried   as
Narayan Chetanram Chaudhary.   His plea before us is that his actual
name   is   Niranaram.     In   the   Inquiry  Report,   which  we   shall   deal   with
later in this judgment, there is observation to the effect that people in
Pune, Maharashtra might find it difficult to pronounce Niranaram and
there   is   possibility   of   pronunciation   mistake   to   call   “Niranaram”   as
“Narayan” in Pune. The said tehsil was earlier in the district of Churu
but   in   the   year   2001,   it   came   within   the   Bikaner   district.   Date   of
occurrence   of   the   offence   is   26 th
  August   1994   and   the   chargesheet
submitted against the applicant showed his age to be about 20 years
at   the   time   of   commission   of   the   offence.   The   applicant’s   claim   of
juvenility is primarily based on a “certificate” of date of birth issued on
30 th
 January 2019, in the name of Niranaram, son of Chetanram. The
said certificate has been issued by the Pradhanacharya (Headmaster),

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Rajakiya   Adarsh   Uccha   Madhyamik   Vidyalaya,   Jalabsar,   Shri
Dungargarh. In the said document, it is recorded that Niranaram was
born   on   1 st
  February   1982.   In   a   “transfer   certificate”   by   the   same
authority issued on 15 th
 August 2001, it is reflected that he had joined
the school in Class First on 1 st
 April 1986 vide admission number 568
and left from Class Third (Passed) on 15 th
 May 1989.
By the date of birth reflected in these certificates, the age of the
applicant   on   the   date   of   commission   of   offence   would   have   been   12
years and 6 months. The applicant, as we have already indicated, was
tried   as   Narayan,   not   Niranaram.   Moreover,   in   certain   other
documents   Niranaram’s   age   is   shown   to   be   different   from   that
reflected   in   the   said   certificates.   The   variations   or   discrepancies   as
regards the name of applicant and his age are the factors we shall be
dealing with in this judgment and we shall dwell into these aspects in
subsequent paragraphs of this judgment. 
3. In  the  chargesheet,  the  accused  Narayan’s  age  was  shown   to  be
20   years.  We   find   from   the  judgment  of   the   High   Court  that   the  said
age (20­22 years) was given on behalf of the applicant only at the time
of hearing. The High Court had tangentially referred to the question of
age of the applicant in its judgment in the appeal and death reference.
At   that   time,   however,   the   plea   of   juvenility   was   not   there.   It   was

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observed in the High Court’s judgment that the age of the accused at
the   time   of   occurrence   ought   to   be   borne   in   mind   while   considering
the question of awarding the sentence. 
4. The applicant for the first time wanted a medical examination for
determination   of   his   age   on   14 th
  August   2005,   when   the   Prison
Inspector General, Western Division, Pune went to meet the applicant
at   Yerawada   Central   Prison.   A   request   was   made   thereafter   by   the
prison   authorities   to   the   Chief   Medical   Officer   and   the   applicant   was
taken   to   Department   of   Forensic   Science,   BJ   Medical   College   and
Sassoon General Hospital, Pune. The age determination report by the
Department of Forensic Medicine, of the said institution states that on
24 th
  August 2005, age of the patient was more than 22 years but less
than 40 years including margin of error. The said report reads: ­
“ MD/ AGE/ 198/ 2005
Department of Forensic Science
B J Medical College and Sassoon
General Hospital, Pune
Proforma for age examination
24/8/2005
Mr. Narayan Chetram Chaudhary
Brought by Yerawada Central Prison, Pune
Date: 24/8/2005, time: 3:45 pm, MLC No 25802, date:23/8/2005
Consent: The doctors have given me an idea of the tests involved in
determination   of   age.   I   am   ready   for   the   examination   of   my   own
free will.
(unclear 3 line)
Physical Development: Medium  Teeth: Upper 15 

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Lower 15        Ht 5’9”     Wt 68 kg
Secondary Sex Characters
Male:
Moustache: Present
Beard: Shaved
Pubic Hair: Present 
Voice: normal
Genitals: normal
Medicolegal exam: X Ray plate no R180( 4)  date: 23/8/05
(unclear medical description)
Conclusion: From clinical & radiological examination the age of the
patient on date 24/8/05 'more than twenty two years but less than
forty years (40 years)' including margin of error.
Signed in the presence of:
Sd/­
B G More
Sd/­
Dr. M.S. Vable
Prof. & Head / Assec. Prof. / Asstt. Lect.
Department of Forensic Medicine,
B. J. Medical College, Pune – 411001”
(quoted verbatim from the paperbook) 
5. It was in the  early  part of 2006, we are apprised by Mr. Basant,
learned senior counsel representing the applicant, that his cause was
taken   up   by   certain   human   rights   groups.   Some   public   spirited
individuals   espousing   the   applicant’s   cause   on   the   point   of   juvenility
had written to the President of India on 24 th
  January 2006 requesting
cancellation   of   award   of   death   penalty   on   the   ground   that   he   was   a
juvenile   at   the   time   of   commission   of   the   offence.   A   copy   of   the   said
communication,  captioned  “Mercy  Petition”,  has  been  annexed  as A­7
to the application. The text of this petition is reproduced below: ­ 
“President's Secretariat
CA II Section

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Date­ 24/1/2006
Dy. No. 03­/06 M.P.
Mercy Petition on behalf of a juvenile to the President
Hon. Excellency
The Hon. President of India,
Rashtrapati Bhavan, New Delhi
To his Excellency, the President of the Republic of India 
We   are   an   organization   Human   Rights   and   Law   Defenders
(HRLD) working on different issues on Human Rights violations.
We also work in the Yerawada Central Prison, Pune and provide
free legal aid to the prisoners in peril. 
It is due to the extremity of the matter before us that we∙take the
liberty of corresponding with your Hon. Self to make you aware
that one person names Niranaram Chetanram Chaudhary, born
on   1/2/1982,   who   has   been   awarded   the   death   penalty   in   a
murder   case   in   languishing   in   the   Yerawada   Central   Prison,
Pune.   Therefore,   this   applicant   was   around   13   years   of   age   at
the   time   of   committing   this   offence.   Your   Excellency,   your   office
has   received   a   mercy   petition   from   his   co­accused   Jitendra
Nainsingh   Gehlot   DY   no   7/27   on   8/11/2004.   You   are   indeed
suitably   in   receipt   of   all   the   relevant   case   material   which   has
been earlier sent to you office. 
The   prison   authorities   have   also   requested   us   that   we   should
attract   your   attention   to   the   fact   that   Niranaram   Chetanram
Chaudhary   was   a   juvenile   at   the   time   of   offence   so   that   death
penalty awarded is a mistake of the law. It should also be well
noted that there are various judgement  given by the  High Court
and   the   Apex   Court   and   numerous   and   substantive   laws   to
confirm   that   if   any   person   had   been   a   juvenile   at   the   time   of
committing   the   offence,   it   can   be   a   strong   ground   for
consideration   at   any   stage   of   the   case.   He   has   already   spent
more   than   11   years   languishing   inside   the   four   walls   of   the
prison. We  would like to  bring to  light the miscarriage of justice
in   this   case   where   in   a   13   year   old   juvenile   who   committed   an
offence has become a grown up man inside the prison meant for
major   and   hardened   criminals.   So   we   want   to   request   you   to
consider   this   sensitive   matter   of   a   juvenile   in   conflict   with   law
and   ask   your   august   office   and   Honourable   self   to   cancel   the
punishment   of   death   penalty   awarded   to   the   juvenile   in   this
case. 
Yours truly
Adv. Asim Sarode   Adv. Smita Lokhande     Jagriti           Sanjay
   Jadhav                   Mohat
  Human Rights Activist    Legal Aid Lawyer Student Intern Social Worker
Enclosures: Transfer certificate of Niranaram Chetanram 
Chaudhari and other papers with respect to his proof of age. (All 
attested copies)”
(quoted verbatim from the paperbook)

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6. That   letter,   as   pleaded   in   this   application,   was   forwarded   to   the
Government   of   Maharashtra   eliciting   the   State   Government’s
comments   on   such   claim   of   juvenility.   There   were   subsequent
exchange of communications among the officials on the question of his
age   determination.   In   a   letter   originating   from   the   Superintendent,
Yerawada Central Jail, Pune addressed to Additional Secretary, Home
Department,   Maharashtra   (which   is   Annexure   A­13   to   the   present
application),   the   Jail   authorities   recorded   that   the   Medical
Superintendent,   Sassoon   hospital,   Pune   was   intimated   by   the
applicant that he had studied in a Government School at Jalabsar and
his name in the school was Niranaram. It was in this communication
dated   19 th
  January   2007   a   reference   was   made   to   his   name   being
Niranaram.   It   does   not   appear,   however,   that   any   further   age
determination test was carried out. The said communication reads:­  
“With   reference   to   the   above   subject,   orders   were   given   to
present   a   medical   report   regarding   the   current   age   of   the
condemned   prisoner   C1871   Narayan   Chetanram   Chaudhari.
Accordingly,   the   said   prisoner   was   sent   to   the   Hon   Medical
Superintendent,   Sassoon   Hospital,   Pune   and   the   he   was
requested through letter NV1/ AVT/ 64/ 2007 date 8/1/2000 to
give a medical report about the age of the prisoner.
In his letter no SSR/ Prisoner/ 26/ 06 date 8/1/2007 about the
age of the prisoner, the Hon. Medical Superintendent noted that,
"after   speaking   to   the   prisoner,   it   appears   that   his   actual   age
can be found out through his school records. His name in school
was   Niranaram   Chetanram   Chaudhari   and   he   has   studied   in
the   Government   School   in   Julabsar   until   grade   3.   The   village   is
in   Dungargadh   Taluka,   earlier   Churu   District,   now   Bikaner

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District.   If   you   obtain   a   certificate   from   that   school   it   could   be
useful."   We   have   attached   a   photocopy   of   the   said   letter.
Similarly,   photocopies   of   the   prisoner's   earlier   mercy   petition
submitted by his lawyer Mr. Aseem Sarode along with his school
certificate   are   also   attached.   Photocopy   of   the   school   certificate
submitted by the prisoner is being attached.
Presented for information and further action.”
(quoted verbatim from paperbook)
7. Thereafter, a writ petition was filed in this Court under Article 32
of   the   Constitution   of   India   by   the   applicant   representing   himself   as
‘Narayan   @   Niranaram’   seeking   quashing   of   the   order   of   punishment
imposed upon him on the ground of him being a juvenile on the date of
commission   of   offence.   In   this   petition,   apart   from   the   aforesaid
certificates,   the   applicant   had   relied   on   a   “Family   Card”   of   the
Rajasthan Government issued in 1989, recording the age of Nirana to
be of 12 years as also the aforesaid Transfer Certificate issued on 15 th
August 2001 recording Niranaram’s date of birth as 1 st
 February 1982.
In   both   these   documents,   Chetanram’s   name   appears   as   father   of
Niranaram. This writ petition, registered as W.P. (Criminal) No. 126 of
2013,   was   dismissed   by   a   two­Judge   Bench   of   this   Court   on   12 th
August 2013 with the following order:­
“UPON hearing counsel the Court made the following
O R D E R
“We   are   not   inclined   to  entertain   this  Writ   Petition   under  Article
32 of the Constitution of India and the same is dismissed.”
 
8. This   application   was   instituted   on   30 th
  October   2018.   When   it

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was taken up for hearing, a Coordinate Bench by an order  passed on
29 th
 January 2019 had referred the matter to the Principal District and
Sessions Judge, Pune to decide the juvenility of the applicant keeping
in   view   the   provisions   of   Section   9(2)   of   the   2015   Act.   This   order
reads:­
“UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following
O R D E R
Heard learned counsel for the parties. 
The   applicant   ­   Narayan   Chetanram   Chaudhary   has   filed   an
application   (Crl.M.P.No.5242   of   2016   in   R.P.(Crl.)Nos.1139­
1140/2000 in Crl.A.Nos.25­26/2000) seeking review of the final
judgment   of   this   Court   dated   05.09.2000   in   Criminal   Appeal
Nos.25­26 of 2000, upholding his conviction under Sections 342,
397, 449 and 302 of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter referred
to as the `IPC’) and the sentence of death awarded to him under
Section 302 IPC by reopening the Review Petition(Crl.)Nos.1139­
1140   of   2000,   which   were   dismissed   by   this   Court   on
24.11.2000.   The   applicant   has   also   filed   an   application
(Crl.M.P.No.157334 of 2018 in R.P. (Crl.)Nos.1139­1140/2000 in
Crl.A.Nos.25­26/2000) under Section 9(2) of the Juvenile Justice
(Care  and  Protection of  Children) Act, 2015 (hereinafter referred
to   as   ‘the   Act’)   seeking   a   declaration   that   he   was   a   juvenile   at
the   time   of   commission   of   offence.   The   applicant   has   placed
certain additional documents to prove his juvenility at the time of
commission of offence. 
On   31.10.2018,   when   the   matter   came   up   before   this   Court
for   hearing,   the   counsel   for   the   State   was   directed   to   take
instructions   on   the   additional   documents   on   the   question   of
juvenility   of   the   applicant.   However   today,   the   learned   counsel
for   the   respondent­State   submits   that   he   has   not   got   any
instructions in that regard so far. The instant case reflects gross
lethargic   and   negligent   attitude   of   the   State.   In   view   of   the
pendency   of   the   matter,   we   are   restrained   from   observing
anything further.
Keeping   in   view   Section   9(2)   of   the   Act,   we   have   no   other
option   but   to   refer   the   matter   to   the   Principal   District   and
Sessions   Judge,   Pune,   to   decide   the   juvenility   of   the   applicant.
Accordingly,   we   direct   the   Registry   of   this   Court   to   send   the
application   (Crl.M.P.No.157334/2018   in   R.P.(Crl.)   Nos.1139­

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1140/2000   in   Crl.A.Nos.25­26/2000)   along   with   xerox   copy   of
the   documents,   relied   upon   by   the   applicant,   to   the   Principal
District and Sessions Judge, Pune to decide the juvenility of the
applicant.   If   notice   is   given   to   the   applicant,   he   is   directed   to
produce all the original documents before the concerned Court in
support   of   his   claim   of   juvenility   at   the   time   of   commission   of
offence.   The   Principal   District   and   Sessions   Judge,   Pune   is
directed to send a report to this Court, preferably within a period
of   six   weeks.   We   hope   and   trust   that   the   Principal   District   and
Sessions Judge, Pune shall decide the juvenility of the applicant
within the time stipulated hereinabove. 
List   the   matter   immediately   after   receipt   of   report   from   the
Principal District and Sessions Judge, Pune.”
9. In pursuance of direction of this Court, the Principal District and
Sessions   Judge   (we   shall   henceforth   refer   to   him   as   the   “Inquiring
Judge”)  gave  his  report  sustaining  the  applicant’s  claim   for  juvenility.
The de­facto complainant, a family member of the victims has filed an
application  for  intervention.    That  application  is registered as  I.A. No.
58515   of   2019.   We   allow   this   application.   Mr.   Basant,   has   argued   in
support   of   this   finding,   whereas   Mr.   Patil   and   Mr.   Chitaley,   learned
counsel   for   the   State   and   the   intervenor   (de­facto   complainant)
respectively have asked for rejection of the report and dismissal of the
application.   In   his   report,   the   Inquiring   Judge   had   examined   the
following documents:­ 
“1. A Transfer Certificate dated 15/08/2001, issued by Rajkiya
Adarsh   Uccha   Madhyamik   Vidylaya,   Jalabsar   Shiksha   Vibhag,
Rajasthan in the name of Niranaram s/o Chetanram, resident of
Jalabsar,   District   Churu,   showing   the   date   of   birth   to   be
01/02/1982. ( Annexure­ 'I­1'  in his report).
2. The Certificate of Date of Birth of Niranaram s/o Chetanram,
dated 30/01/2019, issued by the Headmaster, Rajkiya Adarsh

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Uccha   Madhyamik   Vidyalaya,   Jalabsar,   Shridungargarh
(Bikaner). ( Annexure' I­2'  in his report).
3.   A   copy   of   School   Register   issued   by   Headmaster,   Rajkiya
Adarsh   Uccha   Madhaymik   Vidyalaya,   Jalabsar,
Shridungargarh,   (Bikaner),   dated   07/02/2019.   ( Annexure­   'I­3'
in his report ) .
4. A Certificate of  Bonafide resident  dated 10/08/2009, issued
by   the   Tahasildar,   Shridungargarh,   Bikaner   in   the   name   of
Niranaram   s/o   Chetanram,   resident   of   Jalabsar,   Tahasil­
Shridungargarh, District­Bikaner.  (Annexure­ 'I­4'  in his report).
5.   A   Certificate   of   Other   Backward   Class,   issued   by   the
Tahasildar Shri dungargarh, Bikaner, dated 10/08/2009, in the
name   of   Niranaram   s/o   Chetanram,   resident   of   Jalabsar,
District­Bikaner. ( Annexure­ 'I­5'  in his report).
6. A copy of Notification dated 23/03/2001 issued by the State
of   Rajasthan,  regarding  inclusion of   Tahasil  has   Dungargarh  in
District   Bikaner   with   effect   from   01/04/2001,   by   removing   the
same from District Churu. ( Annexure­ 'I­6'  in his report).
7.   A   certificate   issued   by   the   Sarpanch,   Grampanchayat
Udrasar, Shridungargarh, certifying that, Narayan Chaudhary is
the   same   person   whose   another   name   is   Niranaram   s/o
Chetanram Chaudhary. ( Annexure­ 'I­7'  in his report).
8. The Rajasthan Government Pariwar Card No.21711 issued in
the name of Chetanram s/o Ratnaram in the year 1989 showing
age  of  'Nirana' as  son of  Chetanram  to  be  of  12 years.  Further,
showing Anada, Mukhram, Birbal to be the brothers of 'Nirana'.
( Annexure­ 'L­1'  in his report).
9.   A   T.C.   Form   issued   by   Rajkiya   Madhyamik   Vidyalaya
Udrasar,   Tahasil­Shridungargarh,   District­Bikaner,   dated
19/09/2003,   in   the   name   of   Anadaram   s/o   Chetanram
Sanatan. ( Annexure­ 'L­2'  in his report ) .
10.   A   Transfer   Certificate,   dated   15/07   /1994   in   the   name   of
Mukhram s/o Chetanram issued by Rajkiya G. R. Mohata Uccha
Madhyamik Vidyalaya, Shridungargarh, Bikaner. ( Annexure­ 'L­
3'  in his report).
11. A photocopy of Proforma for verification of age  examination,
dated   24/08/2005   regarding   Narayan   Chetaram   Chaudhary.
( Annexure­'J­1'  in his report)”
(quoted verbatim from the paperbook)
10. The reasoning and the finding of the Inquiring Judge in his report

13
of 12 th
 March 2019 were in the following terms:­
“38) So far as the inquiry directed to be conducted by this Court
is   concerned,   at   the   outset,   the   relevant   provisions   of   law   with
regard   to   the   inquiry   as   to   juvenility   has   to   be   mentioned   for
reference.   The   provisions   under   the   Act   have   been   mentioned
above.
39) As per section 2(35) of the Act, Juvenile means a child below
the  age  of  18  years. The  authorities  referred   above, specifically
referring   to   retrospectivity  as   to   consideration  of   the   application
of present law to the fact of juvenility is concerned, there cannot
be   any   dispute   about   it.   Hence,   Section   9(2)   of   the   Act   is   a
relevant provision on the basis of which the petitioner has filed a
petition before the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India for declaration
that   he   was   a   child   under   the   Act.   The   said   provision   is
reproduced  above.  In  the   case   of  " Raju   ­vs­   State   of  Haryana
[(2019)   14   SCC   401]   "   there   is   a   reference   to   Rule   7   A   of   the
Juvenile   Justice   (Care   and   Protection   of   Children)   Rules   2007.
The   said   rule   deals   with   making   of   inquiry   by   the   Court   in   the
claim   of  juvenility.  Sub­Rule  3   of  Rule  12  of   the   said   Rules  has
stated about the procedure to be followed for age determination.
After   the   Juvenile   Justice   (Care   and   Protection   of   Children)   Act,
2015   came   into   force,   the   relevant   provision   relating   to   the
procedure to be followed is U/sec.9 of the Act. Similarly, section
94 of the Act deals with presumption and determination of age.
For   ready   reference,   all   these   provisions   have   been   reproduced
above.
40)   The   authorities   of   "Surendra   Kumar   ­vs­   State   of
Rajasthan  [(2008)  SCC  OnLine  Raj  138]"   and   "Shah  Nawaz
­vs­   State   of   Uttar   Pradesh   and   Another   [(2011)   13   SCC
751]"   are relevant with reference to the school record. Similarly,
the authority of " Surendra Kumar (supra) " is useful regarding
entry   in   electoral   roll.   The   authority   of   " Darga   Ram   alias
Gunga   ­vs­   State   of   Rajsthan   [(2015)   2   SCC   775] "   is   useful
regarding ossification test. All these cases have to be considered
with   reference   to   the   case   of   " Raju   (supra) "   and   the   provisions
of law noted above.
41)   As   per   the   provision   in   section   94   above,   in   case   of   doubt
regarding   whether   a   person   is   child   or   not   the   process   of   age
determination shall be undertaken and evidence shall be sought
to   obtain   the   date   of   birth   certificate   from   the   school   or
matriculation   or   equivalent   certificate   from   concerned
examination   board,   if   available.   The   certificate   given   by
Corporation,   Municipal   Authority   or   Panchayat   can   also   be
obtained  and  in the  absence  thereof, age  can be  determined  by

14
ossification test.
42)   Therefore,   if   Rule   7   A   of   the   Juvenile   Justice   (Care   and
Protection of Children) Rules, 2007 is read with it's Rule 12 and
the  present   Section  9  and  Section  94  of  the   Act,  it  is  clear  that,
the   date   of   birth   from   the   school   certificate   or   matriculation
certificate   or   a   certificate   of   Corporation   etc.   is   relevant
consideration.   Thus,   preference   has   to   be   given   to   the   School
Certificates.   Even   in   the   case   of   " Raju   (supra)"   the   Hon'ble
Supreme Court of India made it abundantly clear that the school
certificate   would   be   relevant   for   the   name   as   well   as   date   of
birth.
43)   In   view   of   the   above   provisions   of   law,   and   the   authorities
placed   on   record,   I   proceed   to   examine   the   documents   to   see
whether   the   documents   relied   on   by   the   petitioner   are   genuine
and   authentic   and   whether   those   can   be   relied   on   to   decide
juvenility.   The   submissions   made   by   learned   DGP   and   learned
advocate for the petitioner will be looked into simultaneously.
44)   The   Police   Officer   had   visited   the   Rajkiya   Adarsh   Uccha
Madhyamik Vidyalaya, Jalabsar. He has recorded statement  of
the Incharge Head Master Namrata Prabhusing with reference to
the document at serial no.1  (Annexure­ 'I­1') . The said document
admittedly,   is   in   the   name   of   "Niranaram   s/o   Chetanram".   She
has stated that, the said document was issued by her school on
the   basis   of   the   register   kept   in   the   school.   She   also   certified
that,   the   admission   no.   568   is   correct   as   per   the   register
maintained. The copy of register, which is the document at serial
no. 3  (Annexure­ 'I­3')  was also found by the Police Officer to be
the  correct   copy of   the  register  kept   by the  school.  The  name  of
"Niranaram s/o Chetanram" can be seen in such register. As per
such   register,   the   date   of   birth   of   "Niranaram"   is   01/02/1982.
Even   as   per   document   no.1,   the   date   of   birth   of   "Niranaram"   is
01/02/1982. With regard to document at serial no.2 ( Annexure­
'I­2' ),   the   Police   Officer   found   that   the   same   was   issued   by   the
school   whose   stamp   it   bears.   Merely   because   it's   second   copy
was   not   found   in   the   school   or   that   the   relevant   register   had
some   overwriting   of   names,   though   not   of   the   name   of
"Niranaram",   these   documents   cannot   be   discarded.   The
documents   at  serial  Nos.   1  to   3  appear   to  have   been  issued  on
the basis of the school record. "Niranaram" was admitted in the
school   on   01/04/1986.   Thus,   the   transfer   certificate   dated
15/08/2001   i.e.   the   document   at   serial   no.1   is   the   first
Certificate.
45)   The   Police   Officer   collected   the   copies   of   letter   given   by
"Mukhram" to the Rajkiya Adarsh Uccha Madhyamik Vidyalaya,
Jalabsar for obtaining birth certificate of his brother. Such copies
are   produced   with   report   Exh.16.   Similarly,   a   fresh   certificate,

15
addressed   to   the   Police   Officer   was   also   given   by   the   Head
Mistress dated 23/02/2019 and it is collected and filed with his
report by the Police Officer with Exh.16. Hence, the documents at
serial nos.1 to 3, has a genuine source and  those are  authentic
documents. It is a fact that, these documents have not disclosed
the name "Narayan" thereon. This aspect will be considered later
on, since the purpose of sending the Police Officer was to verify
the   authenticity   of   documents   only.   He   was   not   expected   to
express   his   own   opinion.   It   is   sufficient   that,   the   documents   at
serial nos.1 to 3 were issued by the school, the stamp of which
is   appearing   thereon.   Therefore,   the   documents   at   serial   nos.   1
to 3 are found to be trustworthy and authentic documents.
46) The documents at serial nos. 4 and 5 ( Annexure­ 'I­4 & 'I­5' )
are   the   documents   of   Bona   fide   Residence   and   OBC   Caste
Certificate   issued   by   the   Tahasildar,   Shridungargarh.   The
document at serial no.6 ( Annexure­ 'I­6' ) has not been disputed
and   it   shows   that,   with   effect   from   01/04/2001   Tahasil­
Shridungargarh,   which   was   earlier   in   District   Churu   was
removed   therefrom   and   included   in   the   District   Bikaner.   Hence,
though   the   certificate   dated   15/08/2001   (document   no.1)
mentions   the   District   Churu,   by   virtue   of   the   notification   dated
23/03/2001,   village   Jalabsar   from   Shridungargarh   has   been
included into Bikaner District. The certificates at document serial
nos.   4   and   5   has   a   mention   of   District   Bikaner   for   village
Jalabsar   and   Tahasil   Shridungargarh.   These   certificates   are
dated   10/08/2009.   Therefore,   it   is   obvious   that,   the   name   of
District Bikaner has been mentioned thereon.
47)   The   documents   at   serial   nos.4   and   5   i.e.   the   certificates
issued   by   Tahasildar   can   be   said   to   be   authentic   and   genuine.
The   Police   Officer   had   visited   the   office   of   Tahasildar   and
verified   the   entries   made   of   both   the   certificates   in   the   register
maintained by the Tahasildar. A statement of Tahasildar named
Bhawanisingh   s/o   Prabhudan   was   also   recorded   by   the   Police
Officer.   His   statement   is   sufficient   to   show   that,   both   the
certificates   at   serial   nos.4   and   5   were   issued   by   the   office   of
Tahasildar,   Shridungargarh,   District   Bikaner.   Copies   of
concerned registers have been collected by the Police Officer and
submitted with his report. The serial  numbers of the entry made
in   the   registers   are   matching   to   the   serial   numbers   on   the
certificates   in   the   documents   at   serial   nos.4   and   5.   Therefore,
there is no reason to consider that, the register was not properly
kept.   The   copies   of   register   produced   by   the   Police   Officer   have
been   certified   by   the   Tahasildar   Shridungargarh,   District
Bikaner.   As   such,   the   certificates   of   documents   at   serial   nos.4
and   5   can   be   said   to   have   been   issued   by   the   Tahasildar
Shridungargarh, District Bikaner. As such, the source is genuine
making those documents genuine and authentic. Admittedly, the

16
name thereon is "Niranaram s/o Chetanram" and not "Narayan".
48) With regard to document at serial no.9 ( Annexure­ 'L­2' ), it is
a   certificate   in   the   name   of   "Andaram   s/o   Chetanram".   The
Police   Officer   had   visited   the   Rajkiya   Madhyamik   Vidyalaya
Udrasar   to   examine   the   T.C.   Form   of   "Andaram".   He   also
recorded   statement   of   a   Lecturer   named   Poonam   Jairam   Singh
from   the   said   school.   She   was   Incharge   Head   Mistress   of   the
school.   According   to   her,   the   certificate   of   T.C.   Form   i.e.
document   at   serial   no.9   was   issued   by   her   school.   As   such,
merely for the reason that it's copy was not there, the said T.C.
Form cannot be discarded. The T.C. Form was given on the basis
of school register. Copy of such school register was collected and
the   same   has   been   produced   by   the   Police   Officer   with   his
report. At Serial No.1269 thereon, there is the entry of the name
of   "Andaram   s/o   Chetanram".   Thus,   the   certificate   of   document
at serial no. 9 is also genuine and authentic.
49) With regard to document at serial no.10 ( Annexure­ 'L­3' ), no
claim   is   made   by   the   advocate   for   petitioner   and   he   expressed
that   he   would   not   be   in   a   position   to   comment   as   to   how   the
original   record   corresponding   thereto   was   found   to   be   of   some
other   student.   As   such,   the   document   at   serial   no.10   cannot   be
relied   on.   The   document   at   serial   no.8   ( Annexure­   'L­1' )   is   the
Pariwar   Card.   With   regard   to   such   document,   the   Police   Officer
recorded   statement   of   Gramsevak,   who   has   stated   that,   the
record of the year 1989 was not available in the Grampanchayat
Office.   The   inquiry   made   by   the   Police   Officer   was   misdirected
since   he   was   required   to   make   inquiry   with   the   Development
Officer,   Panchayat   Samiti   Shridungargarh   regarding   Pariwar
Card i.e. the document at serial no.8. Since, no such inquiry was
made, it can be said that, the State did not seriously search for
the   authenticity   of   the   Pariwar   Card.   As   discussed   earlier,   the
document   at   serial   no.9   is   genuine   and   it   is   in   the   name   of
"Andaram".   The   name   of   his   father   is   "Chetanram".   The
documents   at   serial   nos.1   to   5   show   the   name   of   father   to   be
"Chetanram".   The   school   records   similarly   indicate.   Moreover,
the name of the village and District besides the name of father of
"Niranaram"   and   "Andaram"   is   the   same.   As   such,   there   is
ground  to  believe  that  "Chetanram" is  the  father  of  "Niranaram"
and   "Andaram".   The   Pariwar   Card   i.e.   document   at   serial   no.8,
is  in the  name  of  "Chetanram". The  name  of  Village  is  Jalabsar
and  the  names "Anada" and  "Nirana" can be seen therein to  be
the   sons   of   "Chetanram".   As   such,   the   Pariwar   Card   i.e.   the
document at serial no.8 can very well be relied on.
50)   The   document   at   serial   no.7   ( Annexure­   'I­7' )   has   been
reported by the Police Officer to be forged document. It has been
issued   by   Gauradevi   as   a   Surpanch   of   village   Udarasar.   She

17
had   certified   in   the   document   at   serial   no.   7   that,   "Narayan
Chaudhary"   and   "Niranaram"   is   the   name   of   same   person.   Her
statement, statement of her son Jetharam s/o Todaram and one
villager named Udaram was recorded by the Police Officer. All of
them   disowned   the   document   at   serial   no.7.   The   Police   Officer
however, has collected one more document having the signature
of Surpanch Gauradevi and recorded statement of one Kesraram
who was Gramsevak, in support thereof. However, the signature
of   Sarpanch   on   the   document   collected   by   the   Police   Officer
having reference to the statement of Kesraram and her signature
on   document   at   serial   no.   7   appear   to   be   identically   same.   As
such,   in   the   circumstances   when   Gauridevi   admitted   that,   she
was a Sarpanch, the document at serial no. 7 cannot be doubted
as  to the signature  of the  Sarpanch. Gauradevi was  not  able  to
see   and   not   able   to   read.   As   such,   the   statements   of   Jetharam
and  Udaram  would  be  not  be  much relevant, when a document
for   comparison   of   signature   has   been   collected   by   the   Police
Officer.   The   signature   of   Sarpanch   thereon   and   document   at'
serial no. 7 appear to be identical. Hence, even the document at
serial no. 7 can be considered.
51) As per Section 94 of the Act, only when the school certificate
or the certificate of Panchayat and Corporation etc. is not found,
the   ossification   test   can   be   resorted   to.   Since,   in   this   case
authentic school certificates are on record, at this moment, there
is no need to consider the document at  serial no.11 ( Annexure­
'J­1' ).
52)  In view of  the documents  mentioned above, it  appears  that,
"Niranram"   and   "Anadaram"   are   brothers.   It   also   appears   that,
"Chetanram"   is   their   father.   They   are   resident   of   Jalabsar.   The
school   record,   which   is   discussed   in   foregoing   paragraphs,
indicate   the   date   of   birth   of   "Anadram   s/o   Chetanram"   to   be
04/04/1980,   while   the   date   of   birth   of   "Niranaram"   appears   to
be   01/02/1982.   Thus,   from   these   school   documents   it   can   be
said   that,   "Anadaram"   is   elder   to   "Niranaram".   In   the   Pariwar
Card   i.e.   document   at   serial   no.8,   same   is   the   position   since
"Anadaram" is appearing to be elder to "Niranaram". Here, since
the name of father of both these persons is the same, and their
village is also the same, help can be taken from the observations
made   in   the   case   of   " Raju   (supra)"   by   the   Hon'ble   Supreme
Court   of   India.   If   the   certificates   are   read   with   reference   to   the
document   at   serial   no.   7,   it   can   be   said   that   "Niranaram"   and
"Narayan"   is   one   and   the   same   person.   There   is   nothing   on
record   to   show   that,   "Chetanram"   had   another   son   by   name
"Narayan". Even the certificate (document at serial no. 7), is not
considered, there is sufficient material on record to indicate that,
the   school   documents   and   the   documents   issued   by   the
Tahasildar  and   the   Pariwar  Card  are   genuine  and  valid. These

18
documents   make   it   clear   that,   "Niranaram"   is   brother   of
"Anadaram". Hence, both are  siblings. There  is nothing to  show
that,   any   other   person   by   name   "Niranaram   Chetanram"   was
found   at   village   Jalabsar.   Therefore,   from   the   documents   on
record,   the   document   at   serial   no.   7   can   also   be   believed.
Though,   none   of   the   documents   mention   the   name   "Narayan'',
the   name   "Niranaram"   has   to   be   said   to   be   another   name   of
"Narayan".
53)   Though,   not   for   exclusively   basing   the   decision,   but   for   the
general observation in ordinary sense, it can be said that, people
in   Rajasthan   may   be   accustomed   to   pronounce   "Niranaram"
easily, but  the  people  in the  state  of Maharashtra, especially in
Pune,   may   find   it   difficult   to   pronounce   "Niranaram".   For   such
reason,   there   is   possibility   of   the   pronunciation   mistake   to   call
"Niranaram" as "Narayan" in Pune.
54) If "Niranaram" is not "Narayan" and "Narayan" is some other
person,   then   the   State   should   have   brought   clear   documentary
evidence   of   school   record   of   "Narayan"   showing   him   to   be
different   person.   There   is   no   such   record.   As   such,   the   police
record   of   the   Sessions   Case   may   have   shown   the   name
"Narayan" without asking for any identification documents as to
his   name,   in   the   school   record.   There   is   not   a   single   document
filed by state to show that the name of "Narayan's" father is not
"Chetanram" but its different.
55)   In   view   of   the   documents   of   school   and   the   documents
issued   by   the   Tahasildar,   the   date   of   birth   of   the   petitioner
appear   to   be   01/02/1982.   As   such,   on   24/08/1994   his   age
would   be   around   12   years   and   6   months.   If   the   Pariwar   Card,
which  was  issued  in  the  year  1989  is  seen,  the   age   mentioned
therein is 12 years. If it is the age mentioned for the year 1989,
then   in   the   year   1994,   more   particularly   on   24/08/1994,   the
age of the petitioner would be 16 years and 8 months. Thus, it is
still below 18 years.
56) When the school record is available, ossification test cannot
be considered. However, even if the document at serial no.11 is
taken into account, the range mentioned is 22 years to 40 years
in the year 2005. Thus, for the year 1994 the range would come
to 11 years to 29 years. This also supports the certificates, more
particularly the documents at serial nos.1 to 5, 8 and 9. In view
of   the   above   observations,   it   is   abundantly   clear   that,   on   the
date of incident i.e. on 24/08/1994 the age of the petitioner was
around   12   years   and   6   months.   Thus,   he   was   a   child   or   a
juvenile within the meaning of Section 2(35) of the Act.
CONCLUSION:
57)   On   24/08/1994,   the   age   of   Niranaram   Chetanram   was   12

19
years   and   6   months   or   around   the   same.   Narayan   Chetanram
Chaudhary   is   the   same   person,   whose   another   name   is
Niranram   Chetanram   Chaudhary.   Hence,   I   hold   that   the
petitioner was a juvenile on the date of commission of offence.
Hence, the report.”
(quoted verbatim from the paperbook)
11. First   submission   of   Mr.   Patil   is   that   the   question   of   juvenility
cannot be reopened by this application as the applicant had filed writ
petition before this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution of India
(Writ   Petition   (Criminal)   No.126   of   2013)   and   this   writ   petition   was
dismissed by this Court. He has also submitted that the applicant is
relying   on   records   pertaining   to   another   individual   as   at   no   point   of
time earlier he had disclosed that his real name was Niranaram. Even
proceeding   on   the   basis   that   the   applicant’s   actual   name   is
Niranaram,   Mr.   Patil   wants   us   to   discard   the   entire   set   of
documentary   evidences   alleging   that   these   documents,   particularly
the   school   records,   are   fabricated.   He   has   highlighted   certain
discrepancies   in   the   documents   themselves   as   regards   the   family
members   of   the   applicant   and   their   age.   In   particular,   he   has
submitted that family members of the applicant had created a forged
certificate of the Sarpanch, which was marked as annexure I­7 in the
report. He has drawn our attention to the statement of the Sarpanch,
Gauradevi,   as   recorded   in   the   Inquiry   Report.   She   had   stated,   as
disclosed in the report, that she had never issued that certificate.  He

20
has   also   taken   us   through   the   transfer   certificate   of   Andaram   (in
some   documents   referred   to   as   Anadaram   and   Anandaram),   which
was marked as L­2 in the report and that of Mukhram, marked as L­3
therein. As it appears from the Inquiry Report, these two persons are
brothers of the applicant. He has referred to that part of the report, in
which   the   Inquiring   Judge   records   that   the   principal   of   the   school,
Smt.   Namrata   had   stated   that   admission   number   1317   (which   was
recorded   in   the   transfer   certificate   of   Mukhram)   did   not   bear   the
name of Mukhram in school records but the admission number 1317
was   in   the   name   of   one   Babulal   Shreechandanmal   Bhadani,   whose
date   of   birth   was   6 th
  June   1966.   The   principal   of   the   school   further
stated   that   said   transfer   certificate   was   not   signed   by   the   then
principal   of  the   school  and   it   was  never   issued   by   the  school.  It  has
also been stated by Mr. Patil that the family members of the applicant
had   obtained   the   residence   certificate   of   Niranaram   by   affixing   the
photo as also the caste certificate on 10 th
  August 2009 issued by the
Tehsildar   officer   Shri   Dungargarh   when   the   applicant   remained
imprisoned. 
12. Mr.   Patil   has   also   questioned   the   manner   in   which   the   inquiry
was   made.   His   main   submission   is   that   the   expression   of   inquiry   as
employed   in   Section   9(2)   of   the   2015   Act   ought   to   import   the   same

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meaning   given   to   it   under   the   Section   2   (g)   of   the   Code   of   Criminal
Procedure,   1973   (“1973   Code”).   In   this   regard   he   has   referred   to   the
cases   of   Ram   Vijay   Singh   ­vs­   State   of   Uttar   Pradesh   [2021   SCC
OnLine   SC   142]   and   Ashwani   Kumar   Saxena   ­vs­   State   of   Madhya
Pradesh   [(2012) 9 SCC 750]. In the case of   Ram Vijay Singh   (supra),
a Coordinate Bench of this Court found that the procedure prescribed
in   Rule   12   of   the   Rules   made   under   the   Juvenile   Justice   (Care   and
Protection   of   Children)   Act,   2000   (“2000   Act”)   is   not   materially
different from provisions of Section 94 of the 2015 Act. He wants us to
distinguish the finding made by a Bench of two Judges of this Court in
the case of  Ashwani Kumar Saxena  (supra), referring to the judgment
in   the   case   of   Abuzar   Hossain   alias   Golam   Hossain   ­vs­   State   of
West   Bengal   [(2012)   10   SCC   489].   He   has   submitted   that   the
Inquiring   Judge,   to   comply   with   the   mandate   of   Section   9(2)   of   the
2015   Act,   ought   to   have   recorded   evidence   of   the   material   witnesses
on oath for determination of age but he hastily completed the inquiry. 
13. Mr.   Chitaley’s   submissions   are   in   the   same   line.   Relying   on
decision of this Court in this case of   Pawan Kumar Gupta ­vs­ State
(NCT   of   Delhi)   [(2020)   2   SCC   803],   he   has   argued   that   once   the
applicant’s   plea  for   juvenility   was   dismissed,   it   was   not   open   for   him
to resurrect the same claim. As regards the name of the applicant, he

22
has   emphasised   the   fact   that   the   certificate   of   Sarpanch   was   forged
and   there   was   no   documentary   evidence   to   substantiate   the   claim.
With   regard   to   the   entry   in   the   voters’   list   where   Niranaram
Chetanram   Chaudhary’s   name   appears,   he   has   pointed   out   that   the
said   list   of   1993   showed   the   applicant   to   be   of   18   years.   His   other
submission   is   that   the   plea   of   juvenility   ought   to   be   raised   in   close
proximity to institution of the proceedings. On this point the decisions
relied   upon   by   him   are   the   cases   of   Murari   Thakur   &   Another   ­vs­
State of Bihar  [(2009) 16 SCC 256],  Pawan ­vs­ State of Uttaranchal
[(2009) 15 SCC 259],   Mohd. Anwar ­vs­ State (NCT of Delhi)   [(2020)
7   SCC   391]   and   Surajdeo   Mahto   &   Another   ­vs­   State   of   Bihar
[(2022)   11   SCC   800].   Having   regard   to   the   gruesomeness   of   the
offence,   and   involvement   of   the   applicant   having   been   proved   at   all
levels of judicial hierarchy, he has drawn our attention to the following
passage from the case of  Abuzar Hossain  (supra):­
“39.6 Claim of juvenility lacking in credibility or frivolous claim of
juvenility   or   patently   absurd   or   inherently   improbable   claim   of
juvenility   must   be   rejected   by   the   court   at   the   threshold
whenever raised.” 
14. As   would   be   evident   from   the   reasoning   contained   in   the   said
report,   substantial   stress   was   laid   by   the   Inquiring   Judge   on   the
school   admission   register,   on   the   basis   of   which   the   “certificate”   of

23
date   of   birth   was   issued.   Referring   to   this   document,   the   original   of
which   we   have   seen,   it   has   been   submitted   that   the   entries   therein
were   not   in   right   sequence.   To   give   illustration,   Mr.   Patil   has
submitted   that   the   entry   number   550   relates   to   the   incumbent
entering   class   4   on   16 th
  August   1984   whereas   entry   number   551
shows   the   incumbent’s   entry   into   class   1   on   4 th
  September   1985.
Four other entries, 552, 553, 554 and 565 showed sequence of dates
of   entry   of   the   incumbents   thereof   in   asymmetric   order.   In   fact,   his
submission   has   been   that   this   entry   register   was   manufactured   and
the pages were manipulated. His further submission on this count is
that   the   date   of   birth   of   Niranaram   recorded   as   1 st
  February   1982
ought   not   to   be   accepted,   having   regard   to   the   provisions   of   Section
35   of   the   Indian   Evidence   Act,   1872   (“1872   Act”).   On   this   count,   he
has relied on decisions of this Court in the cases of   Ravinder Singh
Gorkhi ­vs­ State of U.P.  [(2006) 5 SCC 584] and   Ramdeo Chauhan
alias Raj Nath ­vs­ State of Assam  [(2001) 5 SCC 714]. On probative
value   of   the   entry   in   the   admission   register,   he   has   relied   on   the
judgment of this Court in the case of   Birad Mal Singhvi ­vs­ Anand
Purohit  [(1988) Supp SCC 604]. On this point, his submission is that
the  entry  regarding  age  of  a  person  does  not   carry  much  evidentiary
value to prove the  age in absence of materials on  which  his  age was

24
recorded   in   the   school   register.   He   has   also   taken   us   through   the
“pariwar card” dated 1 st
  January 1989, in which the years of birth of
Andaram,   Niranaram,   and   Mukhram   ought   to   be   1976,   1977   and
1979, on the basis of age of the said individuals reflected therein. As
per   the   school   records,   these   years   ought   to   have   been   1980,   1982
and   1983.   Voter’s   list   dated   1 st
  January   1993   carried   the   age   of
Niranaram as 18 years. The cases in which the plea of juvenility was
accepted by this Court, Mr. Patil’s argument is that age determination
was made in borderline cases, between 16 and 18 years. He has also
highlighted   the   fact   that   the   time   at   which   the   petitioner   was
produced before the Magistrate after arrest, the Juvenile Justice Act,
1986 (“1986 Act”) was operational.  
15. We   shall   first   examine   the   issue   of   the   actual   identity   of
Niranaram.   Is   he   the   same   person   who   has   been   convicted   and
subsequently   sentenced   to   death   as   Narayan?   Even   in   the   review
petition,   the   applicant   described   himself   as   Narayan   Chetanram
Chaudhary. The filing date of the review petition is 31 st
 October 2000.
From the materials before us, we find that his identity as Niranaram
Chetanram   Chaudhary  surfaced  in  early  part  of  January  2006,  as  it
would   appear   from   Annexure   A­7   to   the   application.   This
communication   has   been   captioned   as   “Mercy   Petition   on   behalf   a

25
juvenile   to   the   President.”   In   this   Mercy   Petition,   the   applicant   has
been   referred   to   as   Niranaram.   Certain   public   spirited   individuals
including a lawyer is a signatory to this “Mercy Petition”. Next comes
a   letter   addressed   to   the   Home   Department   of   the   Maharashtra
Government by the Superintendent, Yerawada, Central Jail dated 19 th
January   2007.   We   have   reproduced   the   text   of   this   letter   in   earlier
part   of   this   judgment.   The   said   communication   to   which   we   have
referred   earlier   also   describes   the   applicant   as   Narayan   Chetanram
Chaudhary   and   his   date   of   birth   in   this   communication   is   shown   to
be   1 st
  February   1982.   This   communication   was   dated   24 th
  January
2006.
16. In   the   writ   petition   filed   before   this   Court,   a   copy   of   which   has
been   annexed   at   page   40   of   the   application,   it   has   been   stated   in
grounds C, D and E: ­ 
“C. For that the present Petitioner was ostracized and disowned
by him family immediately after his arrest in connection with the
said   incident.   Hence   the   present   Petitioner   had   no   support   or
effective means of defending his case. Also the present Petitioner
did not possess any material indicating his true age.
D.   For   that   recently   the   father   of   the   present   Petitioner   after   a
gap   of   around   18­19   years   re­established   contact   with   the
present   Petitioner.  Form  his   father  the  present  Petitioner  for  the
first time received documents to indicate his real age at the time
of   the   incident.   The   present   Petitioner   seeks   to   rely   on   the
following documents in order to substantiate his case­
i.  ‘Family Card’  – issued by the State of Rajasthan to
the   father   of   the   present   Petitioner,   dated   17.2.1992
which   records   the   name   of   the   present   Petitioner   as

26
‘Nirana’ and his age as 12 years.
ii.   Transfer   Certificate   –   issued   by   the   Education
Department, Rajasthan which records the name of the
present Petitioner as ‘Niranaram’ and his date of birth
is recorded as 1.2.1982.
iii.   ‘Ration   Card’   –   issued   by   the   State   of   Rajasthan
to the father of the present Petitioner which records the
name of the present Petitioner as ‘Niranaram’.
E. For that  from the abovementioned  documents it becomes clear
that  the present  petitioner’s name is ‘Niranaram’ and his date of
birth   is   1.2.1982.   Thus,   on   the   date   of   the   incident   the   present
Petitioner was 12 years old. Hence the present Petitioner ought to
be   treated   as   a   juvenile   delinquent   and   hence   could   not   have
been tried in a regular trial.”
( quoted verbatim from paperbook)
17. This   writ   petition   was   filed   on   2 nd
  July   2013,   supported   by   an
affidavit   of   one   Mukhram,   on   8 th
  April   2013.   In   that   affidavit,   the
deponent   Mukhram   described   himself   to   be   the   younger   brother   of
the   petitioner.   Though   this   writ   petition   was   not   entertained   by   this
Court, we are referring to this part of the writ petition to demonstrate
how   the   applicant   started   representing   or   re­representing   himself   as
Niranaram.  The   present  applicant   in   this   writ   petition   has   described
himself as Narayan @ Niranaram, son of Chetanram Chaudhary  and
the   same   name   has   been   used   to   describe   the   applicant   in   the
present application.  In the judgment of the Sessions Court (Sessions
Case   No.462   of   1994),   the   accused   no.1   has   been   described   as
Narayan Chetanram Chaudhary.  Thus, we find that he had used the
name of Chetanram as his middlename at the time of his trial, which

27
obviously   refers   to   his   father’s   name.   He   has   been   consistent   in
describing   his   father’s   name.   Now,   the   question   we   will   have   to
address is as to whether the very act of posing himself as Niranaram
at   such   a   belated   stage   is   to   be   accepted   or   not.     In   paragraphs   53
and   54   of   the   Inquiry   Report   we   find   that   the   Inquiring   Judge   had
accepted   the   stand   of   the   applicant   that   Narayan   and   Niranaram   is
the same person.
18. The applicant has sought to establish his identity as Niranaram
relying   on   a   series   of   documents   where   his   father’s   name   has   been
shown   as   Chetanram.     These   include   three   documents   originating
from the school, Rajkiya Adarsh Uccha Madhyamik Vidyala, Jalabsar.
The said institution is a government school. It uses the letterhead of
the   State   Government   with   the   national   emblem.     Copies   of   these
documents   have   been   marked   “I­1”,   “I­2”   and   “I­3”   in   the   Inquiry
Report. The Tehsildar of   Shri Dungargarh,   Bikaner has also issued a
certificate   dated   10 th
  August   2009   to   the   effect   that   Niranaram   is
bonafide resident of the Jalabsar and he has been referred to therein
as son of Chetanram.  The father’s name of the applicant also appears
in the OBC Certificate, which is marked “I­5” to the application. This
certificate   is   also   dated   10 th
  August   2009.   A   certificate   by   one
Gauradevi,   the   Sarpanch   of   Udrasar   gram   panchayat,   Shri

28
Dungargarh  records  that   Narayan  Chaudhary  is  the  same  person  as
Niranaram.     Subsequently,   we   find   from   the   report   of   the   Inquiring
Judge   that   both   Gauradevi   and   her   son   had   disowned   issuing   any
such certificate.   But in the same report, it has been recorded by the
Inquiring   Judge   that   he   had   matched   the   signature   of   Gauradevi
appearing   in   the   said   certificate   with   her   signature   in   another
document   and   found   them   to   be   identical.   This   appears   from
paragraph   50   of   the   report   which   we   have   quoted   above.   In   the
Pariwar   Card   of   Chetanram,   which   is   annexure   “L­I”   to   the   report,
‘ Anada’ ,   ‘Mukhram’   and   ‘Nirana’   have   been   referred   to   as   his   sons.
This also has different dates. The year 1989 appears to be the date of
issue   whereas   the   inspection   dates   show   22 nd
  September   1991   and
17 th
  February 1992. In the said card, the applicant’s age is shown to
be   12   years.     Thus,   there   are   age   variations   of   the   applicant   as
appearing   in   the   family   card   with   that   of   the   school   records   and   we
shall deal with that aspect later in this judgment.  We are referring to
these documents here mainly to examine the applicant’s claim that he
is   the   son   of   Chetanram.     In   the   case   of   Raju   (supra),   it   has   been
observed that the name of the father on certificate can be a factor for
identifying   a   person   with   two   names   floating.     The   two   transfer
certificates   (Annexures   L­2   and   L­3   of   the   report)   of   Anada   and

29
Mukhram  also  carry  the  name  of  Chetanram  as  their   father.    Again,
so   far   as   the   transfer   certificate   of   Mukhram   is   concerned,   there   is
doubt   about   its   originality.     But   we   find   that   there   is   constant   and
consistent   reference   to   Chetanram   as   father   of   Andaram,   Mukhram
and Niranaram appearing in all these documents.
19. The State has taken a plea that at the time of inquiry, sufficient
time   was   not   available   to   them   to   verify   this   fact.   There   are   several
documents   where   Niranaram   has   been   shown   to   be   the   son   of
Chetanram.   After   the   Inquiry   Report   was   made   in   2019,   substantial
time has lapsed since we heard the matter. No material was produced
by   the   State   to   demonstrate   that   there   was   any   other   Niranaram   in
Jalabsar   or   another   Chetanram.   It   is   a   fact   that   the   claimant   for
juvenility has to establish his case. But it has also to be appreciated
that  a  death  row  convict  in prison  for  over  28 years would be under
severe   limitations   in   retracing   his   school   records   and   other   forms   of
age­proof.   In   such   circumstances,   in   absence   of   any   contrary
evidence   we   accept   the   finding   in   the   Inquiry   Report   given   by   the
Principal District and Sessions Judge, Pune that Niranaram has to be
said   to   be   another   name   of   “Narayan”.   Our   opinion   on   this   point
would not vary even if we reject the certificate of the Sarpanch. That
certificate plays a supportive role in determination of the name of the

30
applicant.   Moreover,   in   all   these   documents,   Jalabsar   has   been
shown   as   the   village   of   which   Chetanram   and   his   family   were
residents, and this was the place from where he was arrested. In our
opinion,   the   applicant’s   original   name   was   Niranaram   and   the
applicant   has   discharged   his   part   of   onus   to   establish   that   it   is   he
who has been tried and convicted as Narayan. We accept the finding
of the Inquiring Judge on this point.
20. As   regards   maintainability   of   the   present   application   under
Section   9(2)   of   the   2015   Act,   in   the   case   of   Hari   Ram   ­vs­   State   of
Rajasthan   and   Another   [(2009)   13   SCC   211],   which   authority   was
quoted   with   approval   in   Abdul   Razzaq   ­vs­   State   of   Uttar   Pradesh
[(2015) 15 SCC 637], it has been held that claim of juvenility may be
raised  before  any  Court  which  shall   be  recognised  at  any  stage  even
after   final  disposal   of  the   case.  In   Vinod   Katara   ­vs­   State   of  Uttar
Pradesh  [2022 SCC OnLine SC 1204] the rationale for raising belated
claim   of   juvenility   has   been   explained   by   a   two­Judge   Bench   of   this
Court.   Hari   Ram   (supra)   and   Abdul   Razzaq   (supra)   were   decisions
rendered under the 2000 Act, but so far as 2015 Act is concerned, the
same principle ought to apply. Moreover, in proviso to sub­section (2)
of   Section   9   of   the   2015   Act,   it   has   been   specifically   stipulated   that
the   juvenility   claim   may   be   raised   before   any   Court   and   shall   be

31
recognised at any stage even after final disposal of the case. Same line
of reasoning has been followed in the cases of  Ram Narain ­vs­ State
of   Uttar   Pradesh   [(2015)   17   SCC   699]   and   Upendra   Pradhan   ­vs­
Stae of Orissa   [(2015) 11 SCC 124]. The State has relied on the case
of   Pawan   Kumar   Gupta   (supra)   on   this   point,   resisting   the   Court’s
intervention at this stage. The accused in that case had accepted the
age   determination   report   made   by   the   Investigating   Officer   and   this
was recorded in the order of the concerned Magistrate. As per the said
report   the   accused   was   not   a   juvenile.   The   same   plea   was   raised
again at the appellate stage before the High Court which was rejected,
referring   to   the   order   passed   by   the   Magistrate.   In   connection   with
review   petition   before   this   Court,   the   plea   of   juvenility   was   raised
again,   and   this   was   not   entertained   by   this   Court.   In   the   said
judgment it has been held that once the plea of juvenility  is rejected
from   the   stage   of   Magistrate,   the   High   Court   and   subsequently   the
Supreme   Court,   the   convict   cannot   be   permitted   to   reagitate   that
plea.   In   the   applicant’s   case,   juvenility   plea   has   been   raised   for   the
first time before this Court, albeit after dismissal of his review petition
against   his   conviction   and   sentence   having   been   upheld   by   this
Court.  
21. It   is   a   fact   that   the   juvenility   plea   was   raised   in   Writ   Petition

32
(Criminal)   No.   126   of   2013   and   this   writ   petition   was   dismissed   in
limine. But this dismissal would not operate as res judicata so far as
the   present   application   is   concerned.   Relief   under   Article   32   of   the
Constitution   is   discretionary   in   nature   and   the   order   of   this   Court
dismissing that petition is not supported by reason. A petition under
Section 9 (2) of the 2015 Act contemplates statutory remedy, plea for
which can be raised at any stage. In our opinion, on juvenility plea, if
a writ petition is dismissed in limine, such order would not foreclose
the   option   of   an   accused   (or   a   convict)   to   make   plea   for   juvenility
under sub­section (2) of Section 9 of the 2015 Act. 
22.   We shall, accordingly, proceed to examine his claim of juvenility,
which   has   been   sustained   by   the   Inquiring   Judge   in   the   aforesaid
report.   In   the   case   of   Murari   Thakur   (supra)   a   two­Judge   Bench   of
this Court declined to entertain juvenility plea in an appeal in which
the appellants had been convicted under Sections 302/34 of the 1860
Code. Such a plea was raised before this Court at the appellate stage.
A two­Judge Bench of this Court opined that this point could not be
raised   at   that   stage   because   it   was   neither   taken   before   the   Trial
Court   nor   before   the   High   Court.   It   was   further   observed   in   this
judgment   that   the   question   of   age   of   the   appellant   accused   was   a
question   of   fact   on   which   evidence,   cross­examination   etc.   was

33
required and therefore it could not be allowed to be taken up at a late
stage.   This   was   a   case   under   the   2000   Act,   but   under   the   said   Act
also, provisions of Section 7A thereof is similar to Section 9(2) of the
2015   Act.   In   our   opinion,   this   view   cannot   be   held   to   be   good   law
having   regard   to   the   specific   provisions   contained   in   the   proviso   to
Section 9(2) of the 2015 Act. Moreover, there is a subsequent decision
from   a   Bench   of   same   strength   in   the   case   of   Ashwani   Kumar
Saxena   (supra)   in   which   this   Court   has   examined   the   manner   in
which   the   documents   pertaining  to  establishment   of  juvenility   ought
to   be   examined   and   we   shall   deal   with   this   authority   later   in   this
judgment. Another two­Judge Bench of this Court, in the case of  Ajay
Kumar   ­vs­   State  of  Madhya  Pradesh   [(2010) 15 SCC  83], referring
to   Section   7A   of   the   2000   Act   has   held   that   an   inquiry   is   to   be
conducted   by   the   Court   before   whom   such   a   plea   is   raised   and   the
Court has to render a finding as to whether or not the claimant was a
juvenile.   As   per   this   judgment,   in   case   the   claimant   is   found   to   be
juvenile,   Court   has   to   refer   the   matter   to   the   Board   for   passing
appropriate   order   and   in   such   a   situation,   sentence   passed   by   the
Court shall have no effect.
23. In   Pawan   (supra) a Bench of Coordinate strength opined that in
a case where plea of juvenility is found unscrupulous or the materials

34
in support of such plea lack credibility and do not inspire confidence
and   even   prima   facie   satisfaction   of   the   Court   is   not   made   out,   a
further   exercise   to   examine   such   a   claim   would   be   unnecessary.   In
that   judgment,   this   Court   reflected   upon   the   documents   based   on
which   the   juvenility   claim   was   being   raised   and   came   to   such   a
finding. So far as this case is concerned, in the order passed on 29 th
January   2019,   the   context   in   which   inquiry   was   directed   has   been
expressed.  The relevant part of  this  order  has  been quoted earlier   in
this   judgment.   Thus,   the   observations   made   in   the   case   of   Pawan
(supra)   do   not   apply   in   the   facts   of   this   case,   where   inquiry   has
already been directed. 
24. In   Mohd.   Anwar   (supra)   and   Surajdeo   (supra),   (in   the   latter
case,   author   of   this   judgment   was   a   party),   two   Coordinate   Benches
of   this   Court   opined   that   mitigating   circumstances   like   juvenility   of
age   ordinarily   ought   to   be   raised  in   trial  itself  and   belated  raising   of
such   plea   may   also   underline   the   lack   of   genuinity   of   the   defence
case. In the case of  Surajdeo  (supra), plea of juvenility was raised for
the   first   time   before   this   Court   on   the   basis   of   school   leaving
certificate   alongwith   admit   card   issued   by   the   Bihar   School
Examination   Board.   The   Court   found   that   the   name   of   the   juvenile
claimant did not appear on the documents. But these were decisions

35
rendered in the facts of the respective cases and neither of these two
cases   lay   down   absolute   proposition   of   law   that   the   juvenility   plea
cannot   be   raised   at   the   stage   the   applicant   has   filed   his   petition
under Section 9(2) of the 2015 Act. Moreover, this Court has already
directed   inquiry   and   we   do   not   think   the   applicant’s   plea   can   be
rejected on the ground of being belated claim in the present case.  
25. Next   comes   the   question   as   to   whether   the   course   adopted   by
the Inquiring Judge was in terms of the provisions of the 2015 Act or
not. Mr. Patil, relying on Section 103 of the 2015 Act submitted that
the   inquiry   had   to   be   in   terms   of   the   Code   of   Criminal   Procedure,
1973. Section 103 of the 2015 Act reads:­
“103.   Procedure   in   inquiries,   appeals   and   revision
proceedings .—(1) Save as otherwise expressly provided by this
Act,   a   Committee   or   a   Board   while   holding   any   inquiry   under
any of the provisions of this Act, shall follow such procedure as
may   be   prescribed   and   subject   thereto,   shall   follow,   as   far   as
may   be,   the   procedure   laid   down   in   the   Code   of   Criminal
Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) for trial of summons cases. 
(2)   Save   as   otherwise   expressly   provided   by   or   under   this   Act,
the   procedure   to   be   followed   in   hearing   appeals   or   revision
proceedings   under   this   Act   shall   be,   as   far   as   practicable,   in
accordance   with   the   provisions   of   the   Code   of   Criminal
Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974)”.
So far as the question of determination of age through inquiry by
the   Court,   no   specific   statutory   procedure   has   been   brought   to   our
notice.   The   statutory   provision   contained   in   Section   94   of   the   Act   is
relevant in this regard and the said Section stipulates:­

36
“94.   Presumption   and   determination   of   age .—(1)   Where,   it
is   obvious   to   the   Committee   or   the   Board,   based   on   the
appearance   of   the   person   brought   before   it   under   any   of   the
provisions   of   this   Act   (other   than   for   the   purpose   of   giving
evidence)   that   the   said   person   is   a   child,   the   Committee   or   the
Board shall record such observation stating the age of the child
as nearly as may be and proceed with the inquiry under section
14 or section 36, as the case may be, without waiting for further
confirmation of the age. 
(2) In case, the Committee or the Board has reasonable grounds
for   doubt   regarding   whether   the   person   brought   before   it   is   a
child   or   not,   the   Committee   or   the   Board,   as   the   case   may   be,
shall   undertake   the   process   of   age   determination,   by   seeking
evidence by obtaining— 
(i)   the   date   of   birth   certificate   from   the   school,   or   the
matriculation   or   equivalent   certificate   from   the
concerned   examination   Board,  if   available;  and   in  the
absence thereof; 
(ii)   the   birth   certificate   given   by   a   corporation   or   a
municipal authority or a panchayat; 
(iii)   and   only   in   the   absence   of   (i)   and   (ii)   above,   age
shall be determined by an ossification test or any other
latest medical age determination test conducted on the
orders of the Committee or the Board: 
Provided such age determination test conducted on the
order of the Committee or the Board shall be completed
within fifteen days from the date of such order. 
(3) The age recorded by the Committee or the Board to be the age
of   person   so   brought   before   it   shall,   for   the   purpose   of   this   Act,
be deemed to be the true age of that person.”
26. One   of   the   arguments   on   behalf   of   the   State   has   been   that   the
Inquiry   Report   was   prepared   in   a   flawed   manner,   not   conforming   to
the   provisions   of   the   1973   Code.   In   this   regard,   Mr.   Patil   drew   our
attention   to   Section   2(61)   of   the   2015   Act,   which   stipulates   that   “all
words and expressions used but not defined in this Act and defined in
other acts shall have the same meaning respectively assigned to them

37
in   those   Acts”.   On  this  count,  his   main  argument   has   been  that   the
Inquiring Judge ought to have taken evidence in the manner provided
in   1973   Code   while   returning   his   finding   on   juvenility   of   the
applicant.       
27. It is apparent that the Inquiring Judge has conducted the inquiry
typically   as   a   fact­finding   inquiry   is   conducted   and   has   not   followed
the   procedure   of   summons   trial.     The   documents   on   which   he   relied
on were not formally proved as is the normal procedure in a trial and
there   was   no   examination   or   cross­examination   on   oath.   But   as   it
would be evident from sub­section (1) of Section 103 of the 2015 Act,
the   prescription   for   following   the   procedure   in   summons   cases   is   for
the   Juvenile   Justice   Board   (“Board”)   or   the   Child   Welfare   Committee
(“Committee”)   while   holding   any   inquiry   under   the   2015   Act.     Under
Section   9(2)   of   the   2015   Act   the   Court   also   has   been   empowered   to
make   an   inquiry   if   the   Court   itself   is   of   opinion   that   the   person   was
the   child   on   the   date   of   the   commission   of   offence.     The   mandate   of
following   summons   procedure   has   not   been   prescribed   so   far   as
inquiry   which   ought   to   be   conducted   by   the   Court.     The   manner   in
which evidence could be taken has not been mandated.   The manner
in   which   the   Court   shall   conduct   such   inquiry   has   also   not   been
specifically prescribed.  The procedure which has been followed by this

38
Court   in   the   present   case   has   been   to   direct   a   Principal   District   and
Sessions Judge, a Senior Judicial Officer at the State Level, to conduct
inquiry within a given timeframe.  As we find from the Inquiry Report,
the   Inquiring   Judge   had   directed   a   police   officer   to   make
authentication   of   the   documents   relied   upon   by   the   applicant   and
after   the   police   officer   gave   his   views   on   the   authenticity   of   the
documents,   finding   discrepancy   in   some   of   them.   Thereafter,   hearing
was   conducted   before   the  Inquiring   Judge,   in  which   prosecution  was
represented by an officer holding the rank of Director General of Police
(“DGP”).   Both   the   prosecution   and   police   had   filed   report   and
statement   before   the   Inquiring   Judge.     The   Inquiring   Judge   himself
applied   his   mind   considering   the   submissions   of   the   prosecution   as
also   the   learned   advocate   of   the   applicant   and   the   applicant   himself
was   produced   before   the   Inquiring   Judge.   The   Inquiring   Judge   had
marked   the   documents   filed   before   him   as   exhibits.   The   Inquiring
Judge examined each of the documents upon ascertaining the stand of
the   DGP   and   also   the   advocate   representing   the   applicant.     In
application   filed   before   us,   extract   from   the   school   register   was
annexed which showed applicant’s date of birth as 1 st
  February 1982.
Before the Inquiring Judge, we find that in addition to the documents
annexed to the application, a certificate of date of birth issued by the

39
school   authority   was   also   furnished   by   the   applicant.   The   latter   was
issued   on   the   basis   of   school   register   but   this   certificate   was   dated
30 th
 January 2019.
28.   We find no flaw in the procedure which has been adopted by  the
Inquiring Judge. So far as the procedure for making an inquiry by the
Court, in  our  opinion Section 9(2) of  the 2015 Act does not  prescribe
scrupulously following trial procedure, as stipulated in the 1973 Code
and the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. Section 9 of the 2015 Act reads:­
“9. Procedure to be followed by a Magistrate who has not
been empowered under this Act.— (1) When a Magistrate, not
empowered to exercise the powers of the Board under this Act is
of   the   opinion   that   the   person   alleged   to   have   committed   the
offence and brought before him is a child, he shall, without any
delay,   record   such   opinion   and   forward   the   child   immediately
along   with   the   record   of   such   proceedings   to   the   Board   having
jurisdiction. 
(2) In case a person alleged to have committed an offence claims
before   a   court   other   than   a   Board,   that   the   person   is   a  child   or
was   a   child   on   the   date   of   commission   of   the   offence,   or   if   the
court   itself   is   of   the   opinion   that   the   person   was   a   child   on   the
date of commission of the offence, the said court shall make an
inquiry,   take   such   evidence   as   may   be   necessary   (but   not   an
affidavit) to determine the age of such person, and shall record a
finding on the matter, stating the age of the person as nearly as
may be: 
Provided   that   such   a   claim   may   be   raised   before   any   court
and it shall be recognised at any stage, even after final disposal
of the case, and such a claim shall be determined in accordance
with   the   provisions   contained   in   this   Act   and   the   rules   made
thereunder   even   if   the   person   has   ceased   to   be   a   child   on   or
before the date of commencement of this Act. 
(3) If the court finds that a person has committed an offence and
was   a   child   on   the   date   of   commission   of   such   offence,   it   shall
forward   the   child   to   the   Board   for   passing   appropriate   orders
and the sentence, if any, passed by the court shall be deemed to
have no effect. 

40
(4)  In case  a person under this  section is  required  to  be  kept  in
protective   custody,   while   the   person’s   claim   of   being   a   child   is
being   inquired   into,   such   person   may   be   placed,   in   the
intervening period in a place of safety.” 
The requirement  to follow  the Code is “as far  as practicable,” as
per   Section   103   (2)   of   the   2015   Act.   The   legislature,   thus,   while
prescribing   the   summons   trial   procedure   for   inquiry   by   Board   or
Committee   on   age   determination   of   a   juvenile   claimant   has   not
mandated   any   specific   procedure   for   inquiry   by   the   Court.   It   follows,
by   implication,   that   the   Court   can   formulate   its   own   procedure   for
conducting   inquiry   on   this   count.   So   far   as   the   present   case   is
concerned,   this   Court   had   directed   inquiry   to   be   conducted   by   the
Inquiring   Judge   at   the   first   level,   before   whom   the   applicant   and   the
prosecution   had   sufficient   opportunity   to   present   their   version.   The
report of the Inquiring Judge was subsequently examined by us, again
giving   adequate   opportunity   to   both   sides.   We   have   ourselves   called
for   the   original   admission   register   from   the   school.   The   principal­in­
charge  of the  school,  Namrata  Prabhusingh  had  given  a  statement  in
writing   at   the   inquiry   stage,   and   the   translated   version   of   which
appears at page 311 of the Inquiry Report. She has stated:­
“With   reference   to   aforesaid,   the   name   of   Niranaram   s/o
Chetanram,   Jalabsar   has   been   recorded   in   the   Student
Admission   Register   of   our   Rajkiya   Adarsh   Higher   Secondary
School,   Jalabsar,   Shreedungargad   at   Student   Admission   No.
568.   In   accordance   with   the   said   record,   his   date   of   birth   is

41
written as 01.02.1982. No student by name Narayan was in our
school.”
(quoted verbatim from paperbook)
29. In   Ashwani   Kumar   Saxena   (supra)   two­Judge   Bench   of   this
Court, dealing with the provisions of the 2000 Act observed and held:­
“25.   Section   7­A,   obliges   the   court   only   to   make   an   inquiry,   not
an   investigation   or   a   trial,   an   inquiry   not   under   the   Code   of
Criminal   Procedure,   but   under   the   JJ   Act.   The   criminal   courts,
Juvenile   Justice   Board,   committees,   etc.   we   have   noticed,
proceed   as   if   they   are   conducting   a   trial,   inquiry,   enquiry   or
investigation   as   per   the   Code.   The   statute   requires   the   court   or
the   Board   only   to   make   an   “inquiry”   and   in   what   manner   that
inquiry has to be conducted is provided in the  JJ Rules. Few of
the   expressions   used   in   Section   7­A   and   Rule   12   are   of
considerable importance and a reference to them is necessary to
understand   the   true   scope   and   content   of   those   provisions.
Section   7­A   has   used   the   expressions   “court   shall   make   an
inquiry”,   “take   such   evidence   as   may   be   necessary”   and   “but
not an affidavit”. The Court or the Board can accept as evidence
something more than an affidavit i.e. the Court or the Board can
accept documents, certificates, etc. as evidence, need not be oral
evidence. 
26.   Rule   12   which   has   to   be   read   along   with   Section   7­A   has
also   used   certain   expressions   which   are   also   to   be   borne   in
mind.  Rule  12(2)  uses  the  expression  “prima   facie”   and   “on   the
basis of physical appearance” or “documents, if available”. Rule
12(3)   uses   the   expression   “by   seeking   evidence   by   obtaining”.
These expressions in our view re­emphasise the fact that what is
contemplated   in   Section   7­A   and   Rule   12   is   only   an   inquiry.
Further,   the   age   determination   inquiry   has   to   be   completed   and
age   be   determined   within   thirty   days   from   the   date   of   making
the   application;   which   is   also   an   indication   of   the   manner   in
which the inquiry has to be conducted and completed. The word
“inquiry” has not been defined under the JJ Act, but Section 2(y)
of the JJ Act says that all words and expressions used and not
defined   in   the   JJ   Act   but   defined   in   the   Code   of   Criminal
Procedure,   1973   (2   of   1974),   shall   have   the   meanings
respectively assigned to them in that Code. 
27 .   Let   us   now   examine   the   meaning   of   the   words   “inquiry”,
“enquiry”,   “investigation”   and   “trial”   as   we   see   in   the   Code   of
Criminal   Procedure   and   their   several   meanings   attributed   to

42
those   expressions.   “Inquiry”   as   defined   in   Section   2(g)   CrPC
reads as follows:
“2. (g)   ‘inquiry’ means every inquiry, other than a trial,
conducted under this Code by a Magistrate or court;”
The   word   “enquiry”   is   not   defined   under   the   Code   of
Criminal   Procedure   which   is   an   act   of   asking   for
information   and   also   consideration   of   some   evidence,
may be documentary.
“Investigation”   as   defined   in   Section   2(h)   CrPC   reads
as follows:
“2.   (h)   ‘investigation’   includes   all   the   proceedings
under   this   Code   for   the   collection   of   evidence
conducted   by   a   police   officer   or   by   any   person   (other
than   a   Magistrate)   who   is   authorised   by  a   Magistrate
in this behalf;”
The expression “trial” has not been defined in the Code
of   Criminal   Procedure   but   must   be   understood   in   the
light   of   the   expressions   “inquiry”   or   “investigation”   as
contained   in   Sections   2(g)   and   2(h)   of   the   Code   of
Criminal Procedure.
28.   The expression “trial” has been generally understood as the
examination by court of issues of fact and law in a case for the
purpose   of   rendering   the   judgment   relating   to   some   offences
committed.   We   find   in   very   many   cases   that   the   court/the
Juvenile  Justice   Board  while  determining  the  claim  of   juvenility
forget   that   what   they   are   expected   to   do   is   not   to   conduct   an
inquiry under Section 2(g) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, but
an   inquiry   under   the   JJ   Act,   following   the   procedure   laid   down
under Rule 12 and not following the procedure laid down under
the Code.
29.   The   Code   lays   down   the   procedure   to   be   followed   in   every
investigation,   inquiry   or   trial   for   every   offence,   whether   under
the   Penal   Code   or   under   other   penal   laws.   The   Code   makes
provisions   for   not   only   investigation,   inquiry   into   or   trial   for
offences   but   also   inquiries   into   certain   specific   matters.   The
procedure laid down for inquiring into the specific matters under
the   Code   naturally   cannot   be   applied   in   inquiring   into   other
matters   like   the   claim   of   juvenility   under   Section   7­A   read   with
Rule 12 of the 2007 Rules. In other words, the law regarding the
procedure   to   be   followed   in   such   inquiry   must   be   found   in   the
enactment conferring jurisdiction to hold the inquiry.
30.   Consequently, the procedure to be followed under the JJ Act
in   conducting   an   inquiry   is   the   procedure   laid   down   in   that
statute   itself   i.e.   Rule   12   of   the   2007   Rules.   We   cannot   import

43
other procedures laid down in the Code of Criminal Procedure or
any other enactment while making an inquiry with regard to the
juvenility   of   a   person,   when   the   claim   of   juvenility   is   raised
before  the  court exercising powers under Section 7­A of the Act.
In   many   of   the   cases,   we   have   come   across,  it   is   seen   that   the
criminal  courts are still having the hangover of the procedure of
trial   or   inquiry   under   the   Code   as   if   they   are   trying   an   offence
under   the   penal   laws   forgetting   the   fact   that   the   specific
procedure has been laid down in Section 7­A read with Rule 12.
31.   We   also   remind   all   courts/Juvenile   Justice   Boards   and   the
Committees functioning under the Act that a duty is cast on them
to   seek   evidence   by   obtaining   the   certificate,   etc.   mentioned   in
Rules   12(3)(a)(i)   to   (iii).   The   courts   in   such   situations   act   as   a
parens   patriae   because   they   have   a   kind   of   guardianship   over
minors   who   from   their   legal   disability   stand   in   need   of
protection.
32.   “Age determination inquiry” contemplated under Section 7­A
of the Act read with Rule 12 of the 2007 Rules enables the court
to   seek   evidence   and   in   that   process,   the   court   can   obtain   the
matriculation   or   equivalent   certificates,   if   available.   Only   in   the
absence of any matriculation or equivalent certificates, the court
needs  to  obtain the  date  of  birth  certificate  from  the  school  first
attended   other   than   a   play   school.   Only   in   the   absence   of
matriculation   or   equivalent   certificate   or   the   date   of   birth
certificate   from   the   school   first   attended,   the   court   needs   to
obtain the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal
authority   or   a   panchayat   (not   an   affidavit   but   certificates   or
documents).   The   question   of   obtaining   medical   opinion   from   a
duly   constituted   Medical   Board   arises   only   if   the
abovementioned   documents   are   unavailable.   In   case   exact
assessment   of   the   age   cannot   be   done,   then   the   court,   for
reasons   to   be   recorded,   may,   if   considered   necessary,   give   the
benefit   to   the   child   or   juvenile   by   considering   his   or   her   age   on
lower side within the margin of one year.
33.   Once   the   court,   following   the   abovementioned   procedures,
passes   an   order,  that   order  shall   be   the   conclusive   proof   of   the
age as regards such child or juvenile in conflict with law. It has
been made clear in sub­rule (5) of Rule 12 that no further inquiry
shall   be   conducted   by   the   court   or   the   Board   after   examining
and   obtaining   the   certificate   or   any   other   documentary   proof
after   referring   to   sub­rule   (3)   of   Rule   12.   Further,   Section   49   of
the JJ Act also draws a presumption of the age of the juvenility
on its determination.
34.   Age   determination   inquiry   contemplated   under   the   JJ   Act
and   the   2007   Rules   has   nothing   to   do   with   an   enquiry   under
other   legislations,   like   entry   in   service,   retirement,   promotion,

44
etc.   There   may   be   situations   where   the   entry   made   in   the
matriculation   or   equivalent   certificates,   date   of   birth   certificate
from the school first attended and even the birth certificate given
by   a   corporation   or   a   municipal   authority   or   a   panchayat   may
not  be  correct. But  court, Juvenile  Justice  Board  or a committee
functioning   under   the   JJ   Act   is   not   expected   to   conduct   such   a
roving enquiry and to go behind those certificates to examine the
correctness of those documents, kept during the normal course of
business.   Only   in   cases   where   those   documents   or   certificates
are found to be fabricated or manipulated, the court, the Juvenile
Justice Board or the committee need to go for medical report for
age determination.”
30.   The case of   Ashwani Kumar Saxena   (supra)   has been   referred to
in   several   judgments   of   this   Court   and   the   ratio   thereof   still   holds
good. Though that was a judgment delivered under the 2000 Act, the
procedure for determining juvenility in the 2015 Act remains broadly
the   same   and   hence   this   authority   shall   remain   valid   for   an   inquiry
under   the   2015   Act.   There   is   a   decision   of   a   Single   Judge   of   the
Allahabad   High   Court   (Lucknow   Bench)   in   the   case   of   Sheo   Mangal
Singh and Others ­vs­ State of U.P.   [(1989) SCC OnLine All 605] in
which, dealing with the 1986 Act, view has been taken that the word
“inquiry”   in   Section   3   therein   means   an   inquiry   under   the   said   Act
and not an inquiry under the 1973 Code. In Section 2(t) of the 1986
Act,   provisions   similar   to   Section   103   of   the   2015   Act   had   been
engrafted.   The   expression   “inquiry”,   in   the   manner   in   which   it   has
been used in the 1973 Code cannot be transplanted in toto so far as
the 2015 Act is concerned, to fit the meaning of inquiry therein. It has

45
an element of search or  investigation under the 2015 Act, not in the
sense these words are used, inter­alia, in Chapters XXIII and XXIV of
the   1973   Code,   which   the   Court   may   require   to   undertake   while
determining   a   juvenility   claim.   The   1973   Code   also   contemplates
preliminary inquiry under Sections 148 and 174 of the Code and the
said expression has not been employed in the 1973 Code to convey a
uniform   meaning  or  procedure.  We  are of  the  view  that  the  meaning
and   scope   attributed   to   the   expression   “inquiry”   in   the   case   of
Ashwani Kumar Saxena  (supra) to be the proper construction of this
word   and   may   be   followed   in   dealing   with   the   question   of
determination   of   juvenility   claim   under   the   2015   Act.   Mr.   Patil   has
argued that  the ratio in the  case of   Ashwani  Kumar   Saxena   (supra)
may have gotten diluted in view of the judgment of this Court in the
case   of   Abuzar   Hossain   (supra),   delivered   by   a   three­Judge   Bench.
But   Abuzar   Hossain   (supra) deals with  the  context in  which inquiry
shall   be   directed   under   the   2000   Act   and   Rules   made   thereunder.
This authority does not come into conflict with ratio of the decision in
the   case   of   Ashwani   Kumar   Saxena   (supra),  to   the   extent   the   latter
judgment   explains   the   meaning   and   implication   of   the   expression
“inquiry” under the 2000 Act and Rules made thereunder.  The aim of
such inquiry  obviously is to determine the juvenility  of the claimant.

46
So   far   as   Section   94   of   the   2015   Act   is   concerned,   though   the   said
provision deals with determination of age of a juvenile­claimant by the
Committee   or   the   Board,   in   our   opinion   the   documents   or   tests
referred to therein would guide the Court as well in making inquiry of
such   nature.     In   absence   of   any   specific   legislative   mandate   as
regards   the   course   a   Court   ought   to   undertake   in   an   inquiry   under
Section   9(2)   of   the   said   Act,   the   prescription   of   the   provisions   of
Section   94(2)   provides   a   safe   guidance   which   the   Court   ought   to
follow.  The result of such inquiry pronounced by the Court would be
in the nature of a declaration on juvenility of a claimant­accused. 
31. In   the   case   of   Rishipal   Singh   Solanki   ­vs­   State   of   Uttar
Pradesh   and   Others   [(2022)  8 SCC  602],  a  two­Judge  Bench  of  this
Court took this view, considering a large body of cases on this subject
and observed: ­
“33.   What   emerges   on   a   cumulative   consideration   of   the
aforesaid catena of judgments is as follows:
33.1.   A claim of juvenility may be raised at any stage
of a criminal proceeding, even after a final disposal of
the   case.   A   delay   in   raising   the   claim   of   juvenility
cannot   be   a   ground   for   rejection   of   such   claim.   It   can
also be raised for the first time before this Court.
33.2.   An application claiming juvenility could be made
either before the court or the JJ Board.
33.2.1.   When   the   issue   of   juvenility   arises
before   a   court,   it   would   be   under   sub­
sections (2) and (3) of Section 9 of the JJ Act,
2015 but when a person is brought before a
committee   or   JJ   Board,   Section   94   of   the   JJ

47
Act, 2015 applies.
33.2.2.   If   an   application   is   filed   before   the
court claiming juvenility, the provision of sub­
section   (2)   of   Section   94   of   the   JJ   Act,   2015
would have to be applied or read along with
sub­section   (2)   of   Section   9   so   as   to   seek
evidence   for   the   purpose   of   recording   a
finding   stating   the   age   of   the   person   as
nearly as may be.
33.2.3.   When   an   application   claiming
juvenility is made under Section 94 of the JJ
Act,   2015   before   the   JJ   Board   when   the
matter   regarding   the   alleged   commission   of
offence   is   pending   before   a   court,   then   the
procedure   contemplated   under   Section   94   of
the   JJ   Act,   2015   would   apply.   Under   the
said   provision   if   the   JJ   Board   has
reasonable   grounds   for   doubt   regarding
whether   the   person   brought   before   it   is   a
child   or   not,   the   Board   shall   undertake   the
process   of   age   determination   by   seeking
evidence   and   the   age   recorded   by   the   JJ
Board to be the age of the person so brought
before  it shall, for the  purpose  of the JJ Act,
2015,   be   deemed   to   be   true   age   of   that
person. Hence the degree of proof required in
such a proceeding before the JJ Board, when
an   application   is   filed   seeking   a   claim   of
juvenility when the trial is before the criminal
court   concerned,   is   higher   than   when   an
inquiry  is   made   by  a   court   before   which   the
case regarding the commission of the offence
is   pending   (vide   Section   9   of   the   JJ   Act,
2015).
33.3.   That   when   a   claim   for   juvenility   is   raised,   the
burden is on the person raising the claim to satisfy the
court   to   discharge   the   initial   burden.   However,   the
documents mentioned in Rules 12(3)(a)(i), (ii) and (iii) of
the   JJ   Rules,   2007   made   under   the   JJ   Act,   2000   or
sub­section (2) of Section 94 of the JJ Act, 2015, shall
be   sufficient   for   prima   facie   satisfaction   of   the   court.
On   the   basis   of   the   aforesaid   documents   a
presumption of juvenility may be raised.
33.4.   The said presumption is however not conclusive
proof   of   the   age   of   juvenility   and   the   same   may   be
rebutted by contra evidence let in by the opposite side.

48
33.5.   That   the   procedure   of   an   inquiry   by   a   court   is
not  the  same  thing  as  declaring the  age  of  the  person
as   a   juvenile   sought   before   the   JJ   Board   when   the
case   is   pending   for   trial   before   the   criminal   court
concerned.   In   case   of   an   inquiry,   the   court   records   a
prima   facie   conclusion   but   when   there   is   a
determination   of   age   as   per   sub­section   (2)   of   Section
94 of the 2015 Act, a declaration is made on the basis
of   evidence.   Also   the   age   recorded   by   the   JJ   Board
shall   be   deemed   to   be   the   true   age   of   the   person
brought   before   it.   Thus,   the   standard   of   proof   in   an
inquiry   is   different   from   that   required   in   a   proceeding
where the determination and  declaration of the age of
a   person   has   to   be   made   on   the   basis   of   evidence
scrutinised   and   accepted   only   if   worthy   of   such
acceptance.
33.6.   That   it   is   neither   feasible   nor   desirable   to   lay
down   an   abstract   formula   to   determine   the   age   of   a
person.   It   has   to   be   on   the   basis   of   the   material   on
record and on appreciation of evidence adduced by the
parties in each case.
33.7.   This   Court   has   observed   that   a   hypertechnical
approach   should   not   be   adopted   when   evidence   is
adduced   on   behalf   of   the   accused   in   support   of   the
plea that he was a juvenile.
33.8.   If two views are possible on the same evidence,
the court should lean in favour of holding the accused
to be a juvenile in borderline cases. This is in order to
ensure   that   the   benefit   of   the   JJ   Act,   2015   is   made
applicable   to   the   juvenile   in   conflict   with   law.   At   the
same   time,   the   court   should   ensure   that   the   JJ   Act,
2015 is not misused by persons to escape punishment
after having committed serious offences.
33.9.   That   when   the   determination   of   age   is   on   the
basis   of   evidence   such   as   school   records,   it   is
necessary that the same would have to be considered
as   per   Section   35   of   the   Evidence   Act,   inasmuch   as
any   public   or   official   document   maintained   in   the
discharge of official duty would have greater credibility
than private documents.
33.10.   Any   document   which   is   in   consonance   with
public   documents,   such   as   matriculation   certificate,
could   be   accepted   by   the   court   or   the   JJ   Board
provided   such   public   document   is   credible   and
authentic as per the provisions of the Evidence Act viz.

49
Section 35 and other provisions.
33.11.   Ossification test cannot be the sole criterion for
age   determination   and   a   mechanical   view   regarding
the   age   of   a   person   cannot   be   adopted   solely   on   the
basis   of   medical   opinion   by   radiological   examination.
Such   evidence   is   not   conclusive   evidence   but   only   a
very   useful   guiding   factor   to   be   considered   in   the
absence   of   documents   mentioned   in   Section   94(2)   of
the JJ Act, 2015.”
32. Was   the   Inquiring   Judge   wrong   in   giving   his   findings?     The
documents   on   which   he   has   primarily   relied   upon   are   the   school
register, certificate of date of birth of Niranaram issued by the school
authorities   on   30 th
  January   2019   and   transfer   certificate   dated   15 th
August   2001.     The   latter,   however,   is   not   a   certificate   of   transfer
showing   Niranaram’s   shifting   to   another   school   but   this   certificate
records that he had left from Class III on 15 th
  May 1989.   Then there
is   transfer   certificate   of   Andaram   dated   19 th
  September   2003   which
shows   the   date   of   birth   of   Andaram   as   4 th
  April   1980.   There   was
another   transfer   certificate   before   the   Inquiring   Judge   of   Mukhram,
but   this   was   discarded   by   the   Inquiring   Judge   as   the   same   did   not
correspond   with   the   school   records.     All   the   aforesaid   documents
appear to have their origin in the admission register of the school, the
original   of   which   we   have   secured   and   seen.     Apart   from   the
documents   of   the   school,   there   is   a   family   card,   to   which   we   have
referred to earlier.   The  date of issue of Family  Card is 1989 and, in

50
this  card,  issued by   the  State   Government,  Nirana’s  age  is  shown  to
be 12 years. But there are two other signatures of authorities on this
card,   of   1991   and   1992.     For   this   reason,   we   choose   to   ignore   this
document for our inquiry. Apart from these materials, there is extract
from   the  electoral  roll   which   shows   age  of  Niranaram   to   be  18  years
on 1 st
  January 1993.   So far as per this recordal, his age at the time
of   commission   of   offence   would   be   19   years.     The   school   documents
point   to   Niranaram’s   age   to   be   below   16   years   in   the   year   of
commission   of   offence.     The   case   of   Abuzar   Hossain   (supra)   was
relied   upon   by   the   learned   counsel   for   the   State   to   contend   that
production   of  documents   of  the   threshold   stage  of  juvenility­claim  is
sufficient   to   call   for   an   inquiry   but   further   inquiry   is   necessary   to
examine   the   authenticity   or   the   genuineness   of   documents   involved.
In   Parag   Bhati   (Juvenile)   through   Legal   Guardian­Mother­Rajni
Bhati ­vs­ State of Uttar Pradesh and Another  [(2016) 12 SCC 744],
in   relation   to   the   similar   provision   under   the   2000   Act   it   has   been
highlighted that the credibility of documents should be prima facie to
direct   inquiry.   In   the   cases   of   Manoj   alias   Monu   alias   Vishal
Chaudhary ­vs­ State of Haryana and Another   [(2022) 6 SCC 187],
Ravinder   Singh   Gorkhi   (supra)   and   Birad   Mal   Singhvi   (supra)   the
necessity   of   the   documents   being   reliable   has   been   stressed   for

51
determining the juvenility claim.  
33.  As we have already stated, the school in question is a government
school. The “date of birth certificate” of Niranaram has been issued by
the   office   of   the   headmaster   of   the   said   school.   This   certificate   has
been   issued   on   the   letterhead   of   the   State   Government   carrying   the
national emblem. The principal of the school has in writing disclosed
that   the   content   of   the   admission   register   is   maintained   in   ordinary
course   of   business.   Hence,   in   normal   course   the   said   register   would
satisfy   the   test   specified   in   Section   35   of   the   1872   Act,   of   being   a
relevant   fact.   The   case   of   Birad   Mal   Singhvi   (supra)   dealt   with   age
disclosure   in   relation   to   election   and   not   under   2015   Act.   The   latter
gives   a   guideline   under   Section   94   thereof   about   the   documents
which   shall   be   accepted   as   evidence.   The   certificate   of   date   of   birth
has not been accepted by us straightway. In the present application,
extract  from   the   admission   register   has   been   annexed,  supported  by
an   affidavit   of   the   applicant   himself.   Moreover,   we   had   ourselves
called for the original school admission record by our order passed on
8 th
  September   2022,   requesting   Dr.   Manish   Singhvi   learned
Additional Advocate General, State of Rajasthan to ensure production
of the same and the said register was produced before us.
34. As regards authenticity or genuineness of the admission register,

52
which   forms   the   basis   of   certificate   of   the   applicant’s   date   of   birth,
argument   of   Mr.   Patil   is   that   the   whole   register   was   fabricated.   His
submission   is   that   at   the   time   the   extract   therefrom   was   produced
before   the   Inquiring   Judge,   the   same   was   not   paginated.   He   also
argues that  the register  was not stitched. Further, he has submitted
that serial entry no. 566 of the register shows the date of entry of the
student to be 2 nd
  February 1980, which is not in order  in relation to
the   other   entries.   He   has   also   referred   certain   other   entries   in   the
register prior in order to serial no. 568, in which dates of admission of
the   respective   students   are   earlier   than   that   of   the   applicant.   But
these   entries,   at   best,   would   show   some   defect   in   maintaining   the
records   and   cannot   lead   to   the  conclusion   that   the   entire   admission
register is fabricated. Reference has also been made to an entry of one
Lekhram, that stood against serial no. 423, which reappeared in entry
562.   The   endorsement   of   the   school   in   serial   no.   423   is   that   “his
name was deleted” whereas against entry no. 562, recordal is “as per
previous records”. This clearly appears to be the case of re­admission
or   re­entry   in   the   school.   His   further   stand   is   that   there   was
interpolation of pages. He has again pointed out that one of the pages
(page   no.   33)   of   the   register   has   been   stitched   in   reverse.   But   these
are   nitpicking   submissions   and   cannot   lead   to   the   conclusion   that

53
admission   register   itself   is   fake.   So   far   as   Niranaram’s   name   is
concerned,   in   the   admission   register   there   is   no   discrepancy.   His
serial   number   is   568   which   falls   in   order   in   which   the   register   is
maintained   and   is   in   sequence   with   the   admission   entries   of   other
students  barring  few  minor  discrepancies  as  regards  names  in  other
entries. Even if the register has been freshly stitched and paginated to
be   sent   to   this   Court,   that   would   not   lead   to   a   conclusion   that   the
whole thing has been fabricated. Moreover, there is no clear evidence
to   demonstrate   that   at   the   time   of   initial   inquiry,   the   register   was
unstitched or without pagination. We have ourselves seen the register
and it is of sufficient vintage. Thus, we agree with the Inquiring Judge
that the date of birth recorded therein was not a fabricated entry.
35. Now   there   are   four   other   dates   reflecting   different   ages   of   the
applicant.   The   first   is   the   age   in   the   chargesheet   on   the   strength   of
which he has been tried, convicted and sentenced, that is 20 years in
the year 1994.   But the source of disclosure of this age has not been
brought   to  our  notice  by  learned counsel  for  the  parties,  except  that
the applicant’s age was given by his counsel before the High Court at
the  stage of   appeal  hearing.  Next   is the   age  reflected  in  the  electoral
roll and if one goes by that, then his age at the time of commission of
offence   would   be   19   years.   The   electoral   roll   was   referred   to   in   the

54
police report dated 2 nd
 March 2019 but does not appear to have been
considered by the Inquiring Judge. The third source of his age is the
family card, in which it is mentioned that he was 12 years in 1989 or
1991/1992.  That would have taken his year of birth to 1977­79, and
that would make him 15 to 17 years of age at the time of commission
of   offence.   For   the   reasons   we   have   already   explained,   we   have
discarded   the   latter   document.   Now   which   document   or   source   is   to
be accepted by us? In the case of  Pawan  (supra), a Coordinate Bench
of this Court has rejected the juvenility plea when documents to raise
the plea of juvenility were collected after conviction. In that judgment,
this   Court   cited   the   case   of   Murari   Thakur   (supra)   and   the
Coordinate Bench observed:­ 
“41.   The   question   is:   should   an   enquiry   be   made   or   report   be
called   for   from   the   trial   court   invariably   where   juvenility   is
claimed  for the first time before this Court. Where  the  materials
placed   before   this   Court   by   the   accused,   prima   facie,   suggest
that   the   accused   was   “juvenile”   as   defined   in   the   2000   Act   on
the date of incident, it may be necessary to call for the report or
an   enquiry   be   ordered   to   be   made.   However,   in   a   case   where
plea   of   juvenility   is   found   unscrupulous   or   the   materials   lack
credibility   or   do   not   inspire   confidence   and   even,   prima   facie,
satisfaction   of   the   court   is   not   made   out,   we   do   not   think   any
further   exercise   in   this   regard   is   necessary.   If   the   plea   of
juvenility was not raised before the trial court or the High Court
and   is   raised   for   the   first   time   before   this   Court,   the   judicial
conscience   of   the   Court   must   be   satisfied   by   placing   adequate
and satisfactory material that the accused had not attained the
age of eighteen years on the date of commission of offence; sans
such   material   any   further   enquiry   into   juvenility   would   be
unnecessary.
42.   As regards A­2, two documents are relied upon to show that
he had not attained the age of eighteen years on 25­9­2003/26­

55
9­2003.   His   age   (17   years)   mentioned   by   the   trial   court   at   the
time   of   recording   his   statement   under   Section   313   CrPC   is   a
tentative   observation   based   on   physical   appearance   which   is
hardly   determinative   of   age.   The   other   document   is   the   school
leaving   certificate   issued   by   the   Headmaster,   Prem   Shiksha
Niketan,   Bilaspur,   Rampur   which   does   not   inspire   any
confidence as it seems to have been issued on 16­10­2006 after
A­2   had   already   been   convicted.   Primary   evidence   like   entry
from the birth register has not been produced. We find it difficult
to accept Annexure P­3 (school leaving certificate) relied upon by
the   counsel.   For   A­1,   the   only   document   placed   on   record   is   a
school   leaving   certificate   which   has   been   procured   after   his
conviction. In his case also, entry from the birth register has not
been   produced.   We   are   not   impressed   or   satisfied   with   such
material.   There   being   no   satisfactory   and   adequate   material,
prima facie, we are not persuaded to call for report about the age
of A­1 and A­2 on the date of commission of offence.”
36. So far as the case of the applicant is concerned, on the basis of
materials disclosed in the present application, an inquiry was directed
in   the   order   passed   on   29 th
  January   2019.     In   the   case   of   Pawan
(supra) school leaving certificate issued by the headmaster of a school
did   not   inspire   the   confidence   of   the   Court.   Here   however,   we   have
called for  the original admission register itself, on the basis of which
certificate   of   birth   was   issued.   The   latter   is   a   document   specified
under Section 94 (2)(a)(i) of the 2015 Act. In the order of sequence the
age proof is required to be proved as per the aforesaid provision, the
date   of   birth   certificate   is   the   first   document   to   be   examined   for
determination   of   age.   Thus,   factually   the   ratio   of   the   said   judgment
can be distinguished. In the case of  Pawan Kumar Gupta  (supra), the
juvenility claim  was raised for the second time and for this reason it

56
was   held   that   the   same   plea   was   not   maintainable.   A   Coordinate
Bench in the case of   Mohd. Anwar   (supra) has observed that belated
claims   not   only   prevent   proper   production   and   application   of   the
evidence but also undermine the genuineness of the defence. But this
authority   does   not   lay  down,   as   an   absolute  proposition   of   law,   that
belated   production   of   age   proof   cannot   be   examined   to   determine
juvenility   of   an   accused.   Furthermore,   Section   9   (2)   of   the   2015   Act
specifically stipulates that such plea can be raised “at any stage”. The
ratio   of   the   case   of   Surajdeo   Mahto   (supra)   would   also  not   apply  in
the   facts   of   this   case   as   in   this   proceeding   the   Inquiring   Judge   has
gone   into   the   question   as   to   whether   the   certificates   relied   upon   by
the applicant belonged to him or not and has returned a finding that
Niranaram was indeed Narayan. We have also tested this finding and
sustain the view of the Inquiring Judge. 
37.  In the cases of  Ramdeo Chauhan  (supra),  Sanjeev Kumar Gupta
­vs­ State of Uttar Pradesh and Another  [(2019) 12 SCC 370],  Parag
Bhati   (supra),   Manoj   (supra),   Babloo   Pasi   ­vs­   State   of   Jharkhand
and   Another   [(2008)   13   SCC   133]   and   Birad   Mal   Singhvi   (supra),
different Benches of this Court came to findings as regards reliability
of  the  documents  upon   applying  mind  and  none  of  these  authorities
lay down that the certificate of date of birth by the school authorities

57
based on admission register of the school will not be acceptable for an
inquiry under Section 9(2) of the 2015 Act. On the other hand, in the
order of priority in the aforesaid provision, the date of birth certificate
by the school authority has been given the pre­eminence. Though the
heading of the said section reads “presumption and determination of
age”,   the   section   itself   does   not   specify   that   the   date   of   birth
certificate by the school would only lead to presumption. The way the
provision   thereof   has   been   framed,   the   documents   referred   to   in   the
first two sub­clauses of sub­section (2) of Section 94 of the 2015 Act,
if established in the order of priority, then the dates reflected therein
has   to   be   accepted   to   determine   the   age   of   the   accused   or   convict
claiming to be a juvenile on the date of commission of the offence. In
the   event   the   document   referred   to   in   Section   94   (2)(i)   is   there,   the
inquiring body need not go to the documents referred to in sub­clause
(ii) thereof. The only caveat, implicit thereto, which has been sounded
by several decisions of this Court, is that the document must inspire
confidence.   But   lack   of   inspiration   of   the   age­determining   authority
must come for some cogent reason and ought not to be sourced from
such body’s own perception of age of the juvenile­claimant. 
38. A Constitution Bench in the case of   Pratap Singh ­vs­ State of
Jharkhand   and   Another   [(2005)   3   SCC   551]   dealing   with   the

58
meaning of juvenile under the 1986 Act and the 2000 Act, held:­
“12.   Clause   (l)   of   Section   2   of   the   2000   Act   defines   “juvenile   in
conflict  with law” as  meaning a juvenile  who is  alleged to  have
committed   an   offence.   The   notable   distinction   between   the
definitions of the 1986 Act and the 2000 Act is that in the 1986
Act   “juvenile   in   conflict   with   law”   is   absent.   The   definition   of
delinquent juvenile in the 1986 Act as noticed above is referable
to an offence said to have been committed by him. It is the date
of   offence   that   he   was   in   conflict   with   law.   When   a   juvenile   is
produced before the competent authority and/or court he has not
committed   an   offence   on   that   date,   but   he   was   brought   before
the authority for the alleged offence which he has been found to
have committed. In our view, therefore, what was implicit in the
1986 Act has been made explicit in the 2000 Act.”
39.   In   a   later   decision,   in   the   case   of   Jitendra   Singh   alias   Babboo
Singh and Another ­vs­ State of Uttar Pradesh  [(2013) 11 SCC 193],
this Court’s view was reflected in the following passage:­
“ 72 .   The   upshot   of   the   above   discussion   is   that   while   the
appellant   was   above   16   years   of   age   on   the   date   of   the
commission of the offence, he was certainly below 18 years and
hence entitled to the benefit of the 2000 Act, no matter the later
enactment   was   not   on   the   statute   book   on   the   date   of   the
occurrence.   The   difficulty   arises   when   we   examine   whether   the
trial and the resultant order of conviction of the appellant would
also   deserve   to   be   set   aside   as   illegal   and   without   jurisdiction.
The   conviction   cannot   however   be   set   aside   for   more   than   one
reason:
72.1.   Firstly,   because   there   was   and   is   no   challenge
to the order of conviction recorded by the courts below
in   this   case   either   before   the   High   Court   or   before   us.
As   a   matter   of   fact   the   plea   of   juvenility   before   this
Court by way of an additional ground stopped short of
challenging   the   conviction   of   the   appellant   on   the
ground that the  court concerned  had  no  jurisdiction to
try the appellant.
72.2.   Secondly, because  the fact situation in the  case
at hand is that on the date of the occurrence i.e. on 24­
5­1988   the   appellant   was   above   16   years   of   age.   He
was, therefore, not a juvenile under the 1986 Act that

59
covered the field at that point of time, nor did the 1986
Act   deprive   the   trial   court   of   its   jurisdiction   to   try   the
appellant   for   the   offence   he   was   charged   with.   The
repeal of the 1986 Act by the 2000 Act raised the age
of juvenility to 18 years. Parliament provided for cases
which   were   either   pending   trial   or   were,   after
conclusion of the trial, pending before an appellate or a
revisional court by enacting Section 20 of the Juvenile
Justice   (Care   and   Protection   of   Children)   Act,   2000
which is to the following effect:
“ 20.Special   provision   in   respect   of   pending
cases .—Notwithstanding   anything   contained   in
this   Act,   all   proceedings   in   respect   of   a   juvenile
pending   in   any   court   in   any   area   on   the   date   on
which this Act comes into force in that area, shall
be   continued   in   that   court   as   if   this   Act   had   not
been   passed   and   if   the   court   finds   that   the
juvenile  has  committed an offence, it shall record
such finding and instead of passing any sentence
in   respect   of   the   juvenile,   forward   the   juvenile   to
the   Board   which   shall   pass   orders   in   respect   of
that  juvenile in accordance  with the provisions  of
this   Act   as   if   it   had   been   satisfied   on   inquiry
under   this   Act   that   a   juvenile   has   committed   the
offence:
Provided   that   the   Board   may,   for   any   adequate
and   special   reason   to   be   mentioned   in   the   order,
review the case and pass appropriate order in the
interest of such juvenile.
Explanation.—In all pending cases including trial,
revision, appeal or any other criminal proceedings
in respect of a juvenile in conflict with law, in any
court,   the   determination   of   juvenility   of   such   a
juvenile shall be in terms of clause (l) of Section 2,
even   if   the   juvenile   ceases   to   be   so   on   or   before
the   date   of   commencement   of   this   Act   and   the
provisions   of   this   Act   shall   apply   as   if   the   said
provisions had been in force, for all purposes and
at   all   material   times   when   the   alleged   offence
was committed.”
In   Dharambir ­vs­ State (NCT of Delhi) and Another   [(2010) 5
SCC 344] and  Mahesh Jogi ­vs­ State of Rajashthan  [(2014) 15 SCC

60
184],  similar  view  has  been   taken  by  this  Court.  In   Satya   Deo   alias
Bhoorey   ­vs­   State   of   Uttar   Pradesh   [(2020)   10   SCC   555],   it   was
observed by a two­Judge Bench of this Court that in light of Section 6
of   the   General   Clauses   Act,   1897   read   with   Section   25   of   the   2015
Act, an accused cannot be denied his right to be treated as a juvenile
when  he  was less than 18 years  of age at  the  time  of commission of
offence.   The   reasoning   of   the   Court   was   that   such   right   stood
acquired   and   fructified   under   the   2000   Act,   even   if   the   offence   was
committed prior to enforcement of the 2000 Act on 1 st
 April 2001. 
40.  So far as the applicant is concerned, his claim of juvenility based
on his date of birth in the school certificate would not vary based on
definitions   of   juvenile,   “juvenile   in   conflict   with   law”   or   “child   in
conflict with law” under the 1986 Act, 2000 Act or the 2015 Act. For
applying   the   procedure   for   determining   his   claim,   of   juvenility   or   of
being   a   child,   in   our   opinion,   the   law   applicable   at   the   time   of
undertaking   that   exercise   by   the   concerned   statutory   body   would
prevail.   Hence,   in   his   case,   we   have   tested   his   claim   on   the   basis   of
the provisions of Section 9 read with Section 94 of the 2015 Act.
41.   Under   the   2015   Act   the   date   of   birth   certificate   ought   to   be   the
main   factor   for   determination   of   juvenility.   In   the   case   of   Rishipal
Singh   Solanki   (supra),   the   two­Judge   Bench   of   this   Court   has   laid

61
down   the   principle   that   an   inquiry   initiated   under   Section   9   (2)   of
2015 Act would be similar to that contained in Section 94 of thereof.
We accept this view. We have called for the source of the date of birth
certificate, which recorded the applicant’s birth date at the time of his
entry   into   the   school   which   was   in   the   year   1986.   So   far   as   the
inconsistent dates of birth mentioned in the other documents, none of
them   is   specified   to   be   taken   into   consideration   for   undertaking   the
process of age determination as laid down in Section 94 (2) of the said
statute.  Once the applicant has discharged his onus, in support of his
claim  of  juvenility  by  producing  the  date  of  birth  certificate  from  the
school,   the   State   had   to   come   up   with   any   compelling   contradictory
evidence   to   show   that   the   recordal   of   his   date   of   birth   in   the
admission register was false. The State, in this case, has not come up
with   any   such   compelling   evidence   which   would   render   such
certificate   to   be   unreliable   or   false.     The   State   and   the   complainant
have sought to disprove the applicant’s case on the basis of materials
disclosed by him only, apart from the electoral roll.   Here, we cannot
indulge in any guesswork to doubt the entry in the school register. No
evidence   has   been   led   to   contradict   the   basis   of   the   age   of   the
applicant   reflected   in   the   aforesaid   document.   The   certificate   of   date
of birth as evidence of age having been provided in the statute itself,

62
we shall go by that.   The other factor which has crossed our mind is
as to whether a boy of 12 years could commit such a gruesome crime.
But though this factor shocks us, we cannot apply speculation of this
nature to cloud our adjudication process. We possess no knowledge of
child psychology or criminology to take into account this factor while
examining the report of the Inquiring Judge.  Moreover, the age of the
applicant   revealed   in   the   ossification   test   keeps   the   age   of   the
applicant as claimed by him, within the range specified in the report.
The   said   test   was   conducted   in   the   year   2005,   and   his   age   was
determined in the range of 22 to 40 years.  If we take 22 years as his
age   in   2005,   then   his   year   of   birth   would   haven   been   1983.   That
would   broadly   correspond   to   the   date   of   birth   contained   in   the
admission register. 
42. In   the  case  of   Rishipal   Singh   Solanki   (supra),  it   has  been   laid
down   that   if   two   views   are   possible   on   the   same   evidence   the   Court
should   lean   in   favour   of   holding   the   accused   to   be   a   juvenile   in
borderline   cases.     In   the   case   of   State   of   Jammu   &   Kashmir   (Now
U.T.   of   Jammu   and   Kashmir)   and   Others   ­vs­   Shubham   Sangra
[2022 SCC OnLine SC 1592], the decision of  Parag Bhati  (supra) was
followed,   which   laid   down   that   benefits   of   the   2000   Act   ought   to   be
extended   to   only   such   cases   wherein   the   accused   is   held   to   be   a

63
juvenile on the basis of clear and unambiguous case that the accused
was minor on the date of the incident and the documentary evidence
at least prima facie inspires confidence regarding his minority. It was
opined in this  judgment that  when an  accused commits a grave and
heinous   offence,   his   plea   of   juvenility   cannot   be   allowed   to   come   to
his   rescue   and   Court   cannot   take   a   casual   or   cavalier   approach   in
determining   his   minority.     A   somewhat   different   view   has   been
expressed   in   the   case   of   Rishipal   Singh   Solanki   (supra),   which   we
have referred to above. A view similar to that taken in  Rishipal Singh
Solanki  (supra) was reflected in the decision of a two­Judge Bench of
this   Court   in   the   case   of   Rajinder   Chandra   ­vs­   State   of
Chhattisgarh   and   Another   [(2002)   2   SCC   287].     In   our   opinion
however, in the event the Court, Board or the Committee is satisfied
that the claimant on the date of offence was a juvenile, the dimension
of   gravity   of   the   offence   cannot   be   considered   by   the   Court   to   reject
the benefit granted to an accused or convict under the 2015 Act.  We
agree   with   the   observations   made   in   the   cases   of   Shubham   Sangra
(supra)   and   Parag   Bhati   (supra)   that   a   casual   or   cavalier   approach
should not be taken in determining the age of the accused or convict
on   his   plea   of   juvenility,   but   a   decision   against   determination   of
juvenility   ought   not   to   be   taken   solely   for   the   reason   that   offence

64
involved   is   heinous   or   grave.   The   degree   or   dimension   of   the   offence
ought not to direct approach of the Court in its inquiry into juvenility
of an accused (in this case a convict). The exception where a different
view   can   be   taken   has   been   provided   by   the   legislature   itself   in
Section   15   of   the   2015   Act   and   if   on   the   basis   of   commission   of
heinous   crime,   a   juvenile   is   required   to   be   denied   the   benefit   of   the
2015 Act, the course specified therein would be required to followed.
43. In   the   light   of   our   findings   and   the   reasons   we   have   disclosed
above   for   arriving   at   such   finding,   we   accept   the   report   of   the
Inquiring Judge. We declare that the date of birth of the applicant as
reflected   in   the   certificate   issued   by   the   Rajkiya   Adarsh   Uccha
Madhaymik   Vidyalaya,   Jalabsar,   tehsil   ­   Shri   Dungargarh,   district   –
Bikaner, dated 30 th
 January 2019, a copy of which has been annexed
in   the   Inquiry   Report   as   “I­2”,   is   to   be   accepted   for   determining   his
age   at   the   time   of   commission   of   the   offence   of   which   he   has   been
convicted. Going by that certificate, his age at the time of commission
of offence was 12 years and 6 months. Thus, he was a child/juvenile
on the date of commission of offence for which he has been convicted,
in terms of the provisions of the 2015 Act. This shall be deemed to be
the true age of Niranaram, who was tried and convicted as Narayan.
He has already served more than 3 years of incarceration and under

65
the   law   as   it   prevailed   at   the   time   of   commission   of   offence   as   also
under the 2015 Act, he cannot be subjected to capital punishment. In
view of this finding, the order sentencing him to death passed by the
Additional   Sessions   Judge,   Pune   in   Sessions   Case   No.   462   of   1994
and   subsequently   confirmed   by   the   High   Court   and   by   this   Court
would   stand   invalidated   by   operation   of   law.   He   shall   be   set   free
forthwith   from   the   correctional   home   in   which   he   remains
imprisoned, as he has suffered imprisonment for more than 28 years,
having regard to the provisions of Section 18 of the 2015 Act. Section
21   of   the   1986   Act   also   carried   substantially   the   same   provision   on
the   question   of   maximum   punishment   that   can   be   awarded   to   a
delinquent  juvenile  by  the Juvenile Court. The restriction on  term  of
detention that can be awarded by the Board under the 2015 Act to a
child below  16 years would  also apply  to  the Court  before which the
juvenility question is being determined. 
44. I.A.   No.   5242   of   2016   as   also   I.A.   No.   5245   of   2016   are
applications   taken   out   by   the   applicant   for   reopening   the   review
petition.   We   are   of   the   view,   however,   that   an   application   under
Section   9(2)   of   the   2015   Act   is   an   independent   proceeding   and   we
have   decided   the   same   without   revisiting   the   review   order.   Crl.   M.P.
No. 155609 of 2019 has been filed by the intervenor raising objection

66
to the inquiry report.   We dispose of the same as we have considered
the   content   of   this   petition.   All   other   applications   shall   stand
disposed of. 
45. The present application stands allowed in the above terms.
…..........................J.
      (K. M. JOSEPH)
…...........................J.
(ANIRUDDHA   BOSE) 
…..........................J.
      (HRISHIKESH ROY)
NEW DELHI;
27 th
 March, 2023.

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ITEM NO.1501               COURT NO.11               SECTION II-A
               S U P R E M E  C O U R T  O F  I N D I A
                       RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
CRLMP.NO.157334/2018 in R.P.(Crl.) No. 1139-1140/2000 In 
Crl.A. No. 25-26/2000
NARAYAN CHETANRAM CHAUDHARY                   Applicant(s)
                                VERSUS
THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA                           Respondent(s) 
(with IA Nos.5242 & 5245 OF 2016)
 
Date : 27-03-2023 These matters were called on for pronouncement 
   of judgment today. 
For Petitioner(s)   Mr. R.Basant, Sr.Adv.
Mr. Vishnu P., Adv.
Ms. Trisha Chandran, Adv.
Ms. Shreya Rastogi, Adv.
Mr. Shadan Farasat, AOR
                   
For Respondent(s)  Mr. Sachin Patil, Adv.
                   Mr. Siddharth Dharmadhikari, Adv.
                   Mr. Aaditya Aniruddha Pande, AOR
                   Mr. Bharat Bagla, Adv.
                   Mr. Sourav Singh, Adv.
                   Mr. Geo Joseph, Adv.
                   Mr. Risvi Muhammed, Adv.
                   Mr. Durgesh Gupta, Adv.                   
                   
                   Mr. Hrishikesh Chitaley, Adv.
                   Mr. Vijay Kari Singh, Adv.
                   Mr. Rajat Joseph, AOR
     Hon’ble   Mr.   Justice   Aniruddha   Bose   pronounced   the   judgment   of
the   Bench   comprising   Hon’ble   Mr.Justice   K.M.Joseph,   His   Lordship
and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Hrishikesh Roy.
CRLMP.NO.157334/2018   is   allowed   and   the   applicant   is   directed
to   be   released   forthwith   in   terms   of   the   signed   reportable
judgment, which is placed on the file.
Original   admission   register   and   the   documents   to   be   returned

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to the learned advocate for the State of Rajasthan.
Pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of.
(NIRMALA NEGI)                                  (VIDYA NEGI)
COURT MASTER (SH)                            ASSISTANT  REGISTRAR